

HEARINGS ON COLD WAR, KOREA, WWII POWS

HEARINGS BEFORE THE SELECT COMMITTEE ON POW/MIA AFFAIRS

**UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED SECOND CONGRESS**

SECOND SESSION

ON

COLD WAR, KOREA, WWII POWS

NOVEMBER 10 and 11, 1992



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HEARING ON COLD WAR, KOREA, WWII POWS

TUESDAY, NOVEMBER 10, 1992

U.S. SENATE,
SELECT COMMITTEE ON POW/MIA AFFAIRS,
Washington, DC.

The committee convened, pursuant to notice, at 2:15 p.m., in room SH-216, Hart Senate Office Building, Hon. John F. Kerry (chairman of the committee) presiding.

Present: Senators Kerry, Smith, Reid, McCain, Daschle, Grassley, Kohl, and Robb.

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN F. KERRY, U.S. SENATOR FROM MASSACHUSETTS

Chairman KERRY. The hearing of the Senate Select Committee on POW/MIA Affairs will come to order.

We are meeting this afternoon for the first of 2 days of hearings concerning efforts to account for Americans lost during World War II, the Korean Conflict, and the cold war. Some who have been following these hearings, which have been primarily focused on Indochina, may question why the sudden shift.

It is not a shift. The original mandate of this committee in the Senate resolution that created the committee encompassed trying to explore what we could within the timeframe of World War II, Korea, and cold war incidents.

We have been obviously able to do that to a much greater degree than we originally anticipated because of the changes in the former Soviet Union, though as we will hear from our own people and others, there is still considerable distance to travel, and much that could be improved in the production of information and documents, but we certainly have had access that we never dreamt of previously. Senator Smith and I on a trip to Moscow were actually escorted through the bowels of the KGB right up to archives that clearly had never been viewed previously by American eyes, let alone U.S. Senators.

We will return to the question of Indochina after a number of members of the committee make a trip to Southeast Asia to follow up on information that has been developed by the committee. We are leaving Thursday and will return before Thanksgiving and then have a final week of hearings on the accountability question with DIA, DOD, and also with families, and also questions about some of the private efforts over the years which we will review quickly.

We recognize today as we come together for this hearing that the principle of accounting for lost American servicemen no matter

when the war or what the conflict is the same, whether it occurred 20 years ago or 50 years ago. If there's knowledge about their fates, whether in our own Government or governments overseas, we want to share that knowledge and we want the public to share it.

Now that the Iron Curtain has lifted, we have reason to hope that what has long been suspected or rumored may now be conclusively established or denied, and we have reason to demand that matters long classified by our own Government on security grounds may now be made fully available.

Over the past several months, there have been a number of rumors, allegations, and some fact about what may have happened to American prisoners. President Yeltsin has admitted that some Americans were imprisoned in the former Soviet Union after World War II. He has said that some U.S. prisoners were interrogated by the Soviets during the Korean war, and he has acknowledged the capture and imprisonment of perhaps a dozen airmen during the cold war period.

Other individuals have come forward with allegations about the transfer of American prisoners to China and about the possibility that our Government may have concealed information about prisoners left behind in Korea.

I might add that when Senator Smith and I were in Russia, we were given a list of names of people and we were told specifically by high-ranking officials that a number of these individuals had in fact been transferred from Korea to China, and that they could speak to that fact with complete assurance.

In looking into these and other issues, it is our hope that we are all going to remember to keep our focus on the facts as best as we can determine them. Neither allegation nor denial can be taken at face value, and we have to accept that although we can obviously certainly hope to learn more about these events and we do hope to, the passage of time and the uncertainties of war make it highly unlikely that we will learn everything.

With respect to these earlier conflicts, as with Indochina our focus has to be firmly set on the truth. We have to try to maximize the opportunities that have been created by the end of the cold war to follow up with the Russians and with Eastern Europeans, and we must make it clear to China and North Korea today that we attach a high priority to cooperation on this issue.

We must also review our own intelligence and other files so that we know the right questions to ask and the right places to look and the right people to talk to. If—miraculous as it might seem to some people, if there are Americans still alive in Russia or elsewhere who wish to return, then, as President Yeltsin said, they ought to be returned forthwith. They should be brought home.

If there are remains of our dead, then those must be identified, and clearly if the families so desire, returned and laid to rest on American soil.

So that is our task. I would say, and I think Senator Smith joins me in saying that the committee is handicapped by the fact that we live under a 1-year existence. We do not clearly have the power to exhaust all of the possibilities here on any war, and what the committee can hope to do at best is sufficiently open a window or door so that we can continue this process, and in fact have put into

place a process that will guarantee the full accounting that the American people have a right to expect.
Senator Smith.

STATEMENT OF HON. ROBERT C. SMITH, U.S. SENATOR FROM NEW HAMPSHIRE

Vice Chairman SMITH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and it is frustrating to be under the gun with a deadline, with the committee sunsetted at the end of the year, and it is 50 years late, but finally we are getting at a hearing to get at some of the information that should have been out a long time ago on what happened to many of our men after the Korean war.

The purpose of the select committee today is to consider—or meeting today is to consider the fate of several hundred unaccounted for American POWs and MIAs from not only the Korean war but also the cold war, and as the legislative history of this committee will make clear from day one, I have consistently said it was my intention to ensure that an investigation by the Senate take place on the Korean war and the cold war POWs and MIAs, even though because of the recent aspect of the Vietnam war the Vietnam war has taken up most of our time.

This committee was really not established to look into the fate of only the American servicemen from Vietnam, but as Senator Kerry said also obliged to examine the so-called forgotten war, and that is the process which we are beginning for the first time today in the context of a public hearing, and I am pleased that we finally arrived at this point.

I might add, as some of you know, I had gone to Korea a couple of times, and on my last trip was able to secure a few remains back from the North Koreans, but more importantly was able to set up a dialog with the North Koreans that I think may help us to get a lot more answers than we have been able to get thus far. So we have been working behind the scenes on this, even though this is the first public hearing on the matter.

I recently received a copy of a letter from the Commissioner of Veterans Services in the State of Massachusetts, ironically, which sums up best, I think, our obligation today, and he wrote: "In spite of the recent publicity of the Korean war due to the efforts to build a Korean war Memorial, most of our citizens still overlook it, although those who fought in it suffered, for the most part, far more than those who fought in Southeast Asia."

For example, many of our men in Korea fought under almost unbelievable conditions, specifically the 15,000 soldiers and marines at the Chosin Reservoir in late November, early December 1950 who were surrounded by 120,000 to 150,000 Chinese troops.

Few Americans realize that the fatality rate in Korea was three times that in Vietnam. Some 54,000 troops died in Korea over a 3-year period, compared to 57,000 in Vietnam over 10 years, and as the war in Korea dragged on, our troops returning home were often reviled by fellow Americans, as those returning from Vietnam.

Nor did few Americans know that as compared to some 2,000 MIAs from Vietnam, there are more than 8,000 MIAs from Korea.

It is my understanding that it has been said that there is not enough money for your committee to investigate any MIA reports except those pertaining to the Vietnam Conflict. I hope that such is not the case. 8,177 Korean war families are as anxious to learn of the fate of their sons as those of the Vietnam MIAs, and I would appreciate hearing from you about this matter."

Well, it has been a long time coming, I might say to the gentleman, but I am pleased at least that we are getting to his letter, which really hits it right on the head, and in response let me state that this committee is anxious and willing to learn the fate of these men. That is why we are here.

In order to set a proper context for these hearings, I have attached to my statement for the record, and it is available, I believe, at the back of the room, what I believe is the most comprehensive compilation of U.S. Government policy and intelligence information concerning what we have known about the fate of many of our missing men from the Korean Conflict and what we did about it.

It is a document that shows in explicit detail with a lot of research that the government of North Korea did not return a large number of American servicemen at the end of the war, and that some of the men left behind were sent to Communist China and to the Soviet Union.

Internal documents and statements made at the time also show that our Government believed that men were still alive in captivity, and until only a few months ago has kept that reality from the American people. It has covered up what it knew through a pattern of denial, misleading statements, in some cases lies, and by doing so with regard to the Korean Conflict it broke its commitment with the people who put on the uniform to fight for the freedoms and protection that we and our allies enjoy today. It is not a very good chapter in American history.

I would have expected that from the Communist governments of the former Soviet Union, China, North Korea, Laos and Vietnam, but in America we are supposed to level with the people. In the Senate, that is what I believe we are here for. That is what we are elected to do—confront the problem head-on, tell it as it is, do something about it.

In the bureaucracy, for whatever reason—and I am not making any allegations as to the reason—this did not apply. As far as the unaccounted-for POWs from the Korean Conflict, blatant examples of the pattern of denial are cited in the chronological report that I released today.

I am not here to debate that. I believe the record is clear. I am not here to debate the record. People can read the record and they can decide for themselves.

I am pleased to report that, following the formation of this select committee and on a large scale only in the last few months, the pattern of denial is finally beginning to change. Through the work of the new dedicated personnel at Task Force Russia which operates at the Defense Department and in Moscow, we are beginning finally to make progress.

The men and women of Task Force Russia deserve our gratitude for their dedication and persistence. Many of them are sitting here in the front row today, and they have my full support.

But even as progress is being hindered by elements within the Russian Government, according to our committee investigator who has been in Moscow for the last 6 months—and I quote now—it appears clear, based upon the facts available and in the absence of relevant documents pertaining to cold war incidents forthcoming from the Soviet side, that we are intentionally being stonewalled on this subject.

Regarding the Korean war, our investigator states, and I quote, apparently reliable information from several former Soviet colonels now retired indicates that the Soviets did in fact participate in interrogations, and there appears to be a strong possibility that at least a handful of U.S. POWs, possibly more, were transferred to Soviet territory during the Korean war.

Concerning Vietnam, our Moscow investigator has informed us that, quote, there is at least some circumstantial evidence, and I emphasize circumstantial evidence, that interrogations of U.S. POWs took place and that at least a few U.S. POWs may have been transferred from Vietnam to the Soviet Union. If so, there is a good chance that some of them may be alive.

I want to point out that even our own intelligence agencies have information yet to be followed up on which give credence to this possibility. Let me be specific. The CIA has today released information they received in 1982 which referred to POWs from the Vietnam Conflict being moved to a specific location in Russia during the war.

To date, elements within the Russian Government have refused to allow our investigators access to the original KGB source of this information. Tomorrow, we will hear from General Volkogonov, military adviser to President Yeltsin. We will want to know why we have been denied access to certain Russian witnesses who are believed to have information concerning American POWs. We will then hear from the U.S. members of the Joint Commission on POWs set up after the committee's successful trip to Moscow last February.

Today, we will hear from the departments in our own Government that were responsible for handling POW issues from the Korean war and the cold war prior to the formation of this committee and the establishment of the joint commission.

We will also hear today from some members of the Government and the military who were involved with the POW/MIA issue in Korea or were POWs themselves. During the Eisenhower administration, people who received direct information on other American POWs still alive at the time who may have been transferred to camps in Northern China and Siberia, we may hear from them as well.

Later this afternoon, we will also hear from independent researchers who through their dedication and persistence over the last few years have been digging out information from their own archives on POWs.

Finally, I would like to draw everyone's attention today to how real the possibility is that an American MIA from the Korean war could still be alive in some secret labor camp deep inside Russia. You will recall that last June—and this was pretty well covered in the news—our committee investigator in Moscow received informa-

tion that an alleged Air Force pilot from the Korean war named David Marken, M-a-r-k-e-n, had been seen alive in the 1980's in a Russian labor camp at Pechura some 500 miles northwest of Moscow.

At the time, I asked General Volkogonov, who was here in Washington, to allow our team to go to this camp immediately. 5 days later, once President Yeltsin arrived in Washington and made his dramatic statements, they were allowed to go—the investigators were allowed to go.

When our team got to the Pechura labor camp the results were inconclusive, and there was evidence that there had been all sorts of activity at the camp prior to the arrival of our investigators. The results of the visit were inconclusive, and since that time three additional Russian sources have told us about sightings of the alleged David Marken, M-a-r-k-e-n, one as late as January 1991.

Yet as of today the Pentagon states that one of the reasons they have been unable to move on this case is because the name association in their words, quote, simply does not pan out, unquote. But at the same time, we know that the data bases searched by the Pentagon did not include some casualty files of missing servicemen from the Korean war. Those files were destroyed in a fire at the St. Louis Record Center on July 12, 1973.

Last night, somewhat dramatically and ironically, I was able to make contact indirectly through a staff member with the very woman who was engaged to be married to an Air Force pilot named David Markhan, M-a-r-k-h-a-n, in 1952. However, as she has recounted to us, David went to serve in Korea and in 1952 was shot down and reported as missing in action, presumed dead.

She never heard another word. Her description of David Markhan, and she has pictures of him, matches the physical descriptions provided by the Russian sources, yet we have no record of David Markhan.

In view of this information, I want to state very clearly that I hold the Russian Government—the Russian Government and all its factions—responsible for finding David Markhan, dead or alive, and returning him and others like him back to the United States. Four decades is long enough.

Having said that, Mr. Chairman, I am ready to look to the future, and I look forward to hearing from our witnesses today, and again I am not here to debate whether POWs were left behind or kept back after the Korean war. I think the evidence is clear that they were. Whether you use the term left behind—

I am here to say that the Communists and the United States have an obligation, an obligation to aggressively resolve this issue, and it has got to go a lot further than a select committee that is going to be sunsetted on December 31.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

[The prepared statement of Senator Smith follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF SENATOR BOB SMITH

The select committee meets today to consider the fate of several hundred unaccounted for American POWs and MIAs from the Korean conflict and the cold war. As the legislative history of this committee will make clear, from day one, I have

consistently stated that it was my intention to ensure that an investigation by the Senate took place on Korean war/cold war POW/MIAs.

This committee was not established to look into the fate of only the American servicemen who did not return from Vietnam. We are also obligated to examine the so-called "forgotten war." And that is a process which we are beginning for the first time today in the context of a public hearing. I am pleased that we have finally arrived at this point.

I recently received a letter from the Commissioner of Veterans services in the State of Massachusetts which I think sums up best our obligation today. He wrote:

"In spite of the recent publicity of the Korean war due to the efforts to build a Korean war Memorial, most of our citizens still overlook it, although those who fought in it suffered, for the most part, far more than those who fought in Southeast Asia. For example, many of our men in Korea fought under almost unbelievable conditions; specifically, the 15,000 soldiers and marines at the Chosin reservoir in late November/early December of 1950 who were surrounded by 120,000 to 150,000 Chinese troops. . . . few Americans realize that the fatality rate in Korea was three times that in Vietnam. Some 54,000 troops died in Korea over a 8-year period compared to 57,000 in Vietnam over 10 years. And as the war in Korea dragged on, our troops returning home were often reviled by fellow Americans as those returning from Vietnam. Nor do few Americans know that as compared to some 2,000 MIAs Vietnam, there are more than 8,000 MIAs from Korea. It is my understanding that it has been said that there is not enough money for your committee to investigate any MIA reports except those pertaining to the Vietnam conflict. I hope that such is not the case. 8,177 Korean war families are as anxious to learn of the fate of their sons as those of the Vietnam MIAs. I'd appreciate hearing from you about this matter."

In response let me state that this committee is also anxious to learn the fate of these men, and that is why we are here today.

In order to set a proper context for these hearings, I have attached to my statement for the record, what I believe is the most comprehensive compilation of U.S. Government policy and intelligence information concerning what we have known about the fate of many of our missing men from the Korean conflict and what we did about it.

It is a document that shows, in explicit detail, that the government of North Korea did not return a large number of American servicemen at the end of the war, and that some of the men left behind were sent to Communist China and to the Soviet Union.

Internal documents and statements made at the time also show that our Government believed men were still alive in captivity, and until only a few months ago, has kept that reality from the American people. It has covered up what it knew through a pattern of denial, misleading statements, and outright lies. And by doing so, with regard to the Korean conflict, it broke its commitment with the people who put on the uniform to fight for the freedoms and protection we and our allies enjoy today.

I would have expected that from the Communist Governments of the former Soviet Union, China, North Korea, Laos, and Vietnam. But in America, we're supposed to level with the people. In the Senate, that's what I believe we're elected to do. Confront the problem head on, tell as it is, and do something about it. In the bureaucracy, for whatever reason. This did not apply as far as the unaccounted for POWs from the Korean conflict.

Blatant examples of the pattern of denial are cited in the chronological report I have released today. So I am not here to debate this point. I believe the record is clear. People can read, and decide for themselves.

I am pleased to report that following the formation of this select committee, and, on a large scale, only in the last few months, the pattern of denial is finally beginning to change. Through the work of the new dedicated personnel at "Task Force Russia," which operates at the Defense Department and in Moscow, we are beginning to make progress. The men and women at Task Force Russia deserve our gratitude for their dedication and persistence. Many of them I see sitting here today in the front row. They have my full support.

But even this progress is being hindered by elements within the Russian Government. According to our committee investigator, who has been in Moscow for the last 6 months, and I quote, "it appears clear based on the facts available and the absence of relevant documents pertaining to cold war incidents forthcoming from the Soviet side, that we are intentionally being stonewalled on this subject."

Regarding the Korean war, our investigator states, and I quote, "apparently reliable information from several former Soviet colonels now retired indicates that So-

viets did, in fact, participate in interrogations, and there appears to be a strong possibility that at least a handful of us POWs, possibly more, were transferred to Soviet territory during the Korean war."

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Tomorrow, we will hear from General Volkogonov, military adviser to President Yeltsin. We will want to know why we have been denied access to certain Russian witnesses who are believed to have information concerning American POWs. We will then hear from the U.S. members of the Joint Commission on POWs, set up after the committee's successful trip to Moscow last February.

Today, we will hear from the departments in our own Government that were responsible for handling POW issues from the Korean war and the cold war, prior to the formation of this committee and the establishment of the Joint Commission. We will also hear today from some members of the Government and the military who were involved with the POW/MIA, or were POWs themselves, during the Eisenhower administration—people who received direct information on other American POWs still alive at the time who were transferred to camps in Northern China and Siberia.

Later this afternoon, we will also hear from independent researchers, who, through their dedication and persistence over the last few years, have been digging out information from our own archives on POWs.

Finally, I want to draw everyone's attention today to how real the possibility is that an American MIA from the Korean war could still be alive in some secret labor camp deep inside Russia. You will all recall, that last June, our committee investigator in Moscow received information that an alleged Air Force pilot from the Korean war named David "Marken" had been seen alive in the 1980's in a Russian labor camp at Pechora—some 500 miles north west of Moscow. At the time, I asked General Volkogonov, who was here in Washington, to allow our team to go to this camp immediately. 5 days later, once President Yeltsin arrived in Washington and made his dramatic statements, we were allowed to go.

When our team got to the Pechora labor camp, the results were inconclusive, and there was evidence that there had been all sorts of activity at the camp prior to the arrival of our investigators. The results of the visit were inconclusive, and since that time, three additional Russian sources have told us about sightings of the alleged David "Marken," one as late as January 1991.

Yet, to this day, the Pentagon states that one of the reasons they have been unable to move on this case is because the name association, in their words, "simply does not pan out." But at the same time, we know that the databases searched by the Pentagon did not include some casualty files of missing servicemen from the Korean war. Those files were destroyed in a fire at the St. Louis Records Center on July 12, 1973.

Last night, we made contact with the very woman who was engaged to be married to an Air Force pilot named David Markham in 1952. However, as she has recounted to us, David Markham went to serve in Korea, and in 1952, was shot down and reported as missing in action, presumed dead. She never heard another word. Her description of David Markham, and she has pictures of him, matches the physical descriptions provided by the Russian sources.

In view of this information, I want to state very clearly, that I hold the Russian Government, and all its factions, responsible for finding David Markham and returning him and others like him, safely to the United States. Four decades is long enough.

Having said all that, Mr. Chairman, I am now ready to look to the future, and I look forward to hearing from our witnesses on how we should go about resolving the fate of our POWs from the Korean conflict and the cold war.

Thank you.



SENATOR BOB SMITH New Hampshire

November 10, 1992

"We do have certain evidence that indicates there are additional prisoners alive who should be returned."

-- August 6, 1953 - Statement of U.S. General Mark Clark, Commander of the United Nations Command in Korea, Pentagon News Conference, (one week after the signing of the Korean Armistice Agreement and the exchange of lists of POWs to be repatriated.)

"A compilation of reports indicate that during the past two years, several POWs have been transferred from POW camps in North Korea to points in Manchuria, China, and Siberia."

-- August 19, 1953 - Memorandum by the U.S. Army Combined Command for Reconnaissance Activity, Korea.

"There were 1,012 persons (U.S. personnel unaccounted for from the Korean Conflict) where there was evidence that they were alive in Communist hands."


-- March 9, 1954 - Closed-door testimony of Army G-2 Intelligence Officer, Colonel Trammel, before Senate subcommittee.

"There is no evidence to suggest that any U.S. personnel were not released from captivity in Korea."

-- November 9, 1989 - Defense Intelligence Agency Chief of the POW/MIA Office, Colonel Joseph Schlatter.

"There are no intelligence indicators that U.S. personnel from the Korean Conflict were not returned to U.S. control at the end of the war."

-- June 28, 1990 - Testimony before Congressional hearing on the POW/MIA issue by the Deputy Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency, Rear Admiral Donald Marryott.



The New York Times

CHRONOLOGY OF POLICY AND INTELLIGENCE MATTERS CONCERNING
UNACCOUNTED FOR U.S. MILITARY PERSONNEL AT THE END
OF THE KOREAN CONFLICT AND DURING THE COLD WAR

Prepared by the Office of Senator Bob Smith
Vice-Chairman, Select Committee on POW/MIA Affairs

November 10, 1992

- June 25, 1950 -- North Korea, at the direction of President Kim Il Sung crosses the 38th parallel invading South Korea, beginning the Korean Conflict.
- June 27, 1950 -- The United Nations Security Council passes Resolution 83 recommending that Member States furnish assistance to the Republic of Korea (South Korea). U.S. Air Forces are immediately committed.
- July 7, 1950 -- The United Nations Security Council passes Resolution 84 recommending that the military forces provided by Member States be made available to a Unified Command under the United States, and authorizing that Command to use the United Nations flag at its discretion in the course of its operation. U.S. and member nation ground forces are immediately committed under the command of U.S. General Douglas MacArthur.
- October 2, 1950 -- In a telegram to Stalin in the Soviet Union, China's Communist Party Chairman Mao Zedong states "We have decided to send part of the armed forces into Korea, under the title of Volunteer Army, to do combat with the forces of America and to assist our Korean comrades. We recognize this course of action as necessary."
- October 13, 1950 -- In a telegram to China's Prime Minister Zhou Enlai, then in Moscow seeking Stalin's support, Mao states, "...we unanimously believe that having our troops enter Korea is more advantageous...If we do not send troops, allowing the enemy to press to the Yalu border and the arrogance of reactionaries at home to grow, this will be disadvantageous to all sides. Above all, it will be most disadvantageous to Manchuria; all of the South Manchurian electricity will be threatened."
- November 24, 1950 -- By this date, the North Koreans are driven northward by the UN Member State forces under General MacArthur and eventually back to the Yalu River (the boundary between China and North Korea).

November 26, 1950 -- A large Communist Chinese army, under Mao's directive, invades the north in support of the North Koreans and help them drive the UN forces south after much bitter fighting. Thousands of Americans are killed, wounded, and captured during this Communist offensive.

January 1, 1951 -- By this date, the North Korean-Chinese army has forced the UN forces back to the 38th parallel, and the South Korean capital of Seoul had fallen into enemy hands.

March 12, 1951 -- French intelligence sources inform the U.S. Far East Command that "according to report valued C-3 and dated December 9 1950, 3,000 American POWs have been moved to the Korean border with China by December, 1950. The report adds that another 1,200 "lightly wounded" American POWs had been placed at an Air Defense hospital in An Tung, Manchuria. (now known as the Three Eastern Provinces of China.) (Source: 12 March 1951 declassified State Department Cable)

March 14, 1951 -- A counteroffensive by the UN retakes Seoul.

April 9, 1951 -- The Central Intelligence Agency reports that source (still classified 11/10/92) has reported that "Officers captured in North Korea by the Chinese Communists are now interned in a former army prison in Mukden, Manchuria. Enlisted men are confined in concentration camps in T'unghua. The daily routine includes physical exercise, political training in Marxism and Leninism, and analysis of the Korean War by Communist political directors." The date of information is early April, 1951, according to CIA. CIA notes that another report, SO-54598, had also referred to U.S. POW camps in Mukden. (Source: SO617354, Central Intelligence Agency, partially declassified.)

May 8, 1951 -- The Central Intelligence Agency reports that, according to a source, 25 American prisoners of war from Korea arrived in Canton by rail from Hankow at 6:00 p.m. on April 11, 1951 and were being held by 50 armed police and some plain-clothes men at facilities at Tung Hua Road. (Source: Declassified Report No. SO63715, CIA)

On May 8, 1951, according to a 6 September 1951 CIA report, 30 American prisoners of war depart Mukden, Manchuria for Hankow by rail. The prisoners are reported in good spirits and tidily dressed. (Source: CIA declassified report dated 6 September 1951)

May 29, 1951 -- The Central Intelligence Agency reports that, according to a source, 45 American prisoners of war arrived in Canton at 6:00 p.m. on April 23, 1951 on two special cars of the Canton-Hankow Railroad, and were being held at

facilities on Tung Hua Road. It is reported that on April 30, 1951, Chinese Communist authorities in Peiping ordered that American POWs held at Tung Hua be taken to Kwailan. It is further reported that at 3:00 a.m. on May 2, the POWs were moved in two trucks, accompanied by four armored cars, to the Tashat'on Rail Station. (Source: Declassified CIA Report No. SO 65066. 29 May 1951)

June 27, 1951 -- The Central Intelligence Agency reports that, according to a source, "By April 15, 1951, approximately 500 American prisoner of war from Korea had arrived in Hankow, and on April 18th, some of them were paraded through the streets of Hankow under heavy guard...In mid-April, 60 prisoners of war, most of whom were American, arrived in Canton via the Canton-Hankow railroad, and were being detained at facilities at Tung Hua road in Canton...In mid-June 1952, 52 American POWs from Korea were still incarcerated in the baptist church on Tung Hua Road, Canton." (Source: Declassified CIA Report No. SO66740 dated June 27, 1951.)

July, 1951 -- Peace negotiations commence at Kaesong.

August 11, 1951 -- The Central Intelligence Agency reports information from a subsource that, according to a North Korean staff member of the State Security Bureau in Seoul on 12 February 1951, "all American prisoners of war were sent to camps in Mukden, Tunghua, and Antung Provinces of Manchuria, where they were put to hard labor in mines and factories." (Note: February 12 is before the U.N. forces retook Seoul on March 14, 1951) (Source: CIA Report No. SO65823, declassified)

In another Central Intelligence Agency report, a source states that "On August 2, 52 American POWs from Korea, who had been held in the Baptist church on Tung Hua Road, Canton, left Canton by train for Peiping via Hankow under guard of a platoon of Chinese Communist soldiers." (Source: CIA Declassified Report No. SO69870)

August 22, 1951 -- The Central Intelligence Agency reports that, according to a source, some 40 U.N. POWs in Canton, including British and American officers and enlisted men, have participated in "propaganda tours and street demonstrations" in Canton in early May, 1951. (Source: CIA declassified report No. SO70338)

August 24, 1951 -- The Central Intelligence Agency reports that, according to a source, "78 American prisoners of war are in a camp at No. 35, Lane 1136 Yuyen Road, Shanghai. They have no freedom of movement and are not free to talk. They must

attend meetings daily to study Communist doctrine. Camp officers are appointees of the East China Bureau and the East China Military Area, and four English speaking Soviets." Ten names of alleged U.S. servicemen, written in Chinese, are provided "from a scrap of paper picked up in the POW camp." The identities are not evaluated by CIA. (Source: 24 August 1951 declassified CIA report no. S070512.)

September 6, 1951 -- 60 American prisoners of war are reported being held in Canton as of mid-July, according to a CIA source. (Note: According to another source (11 August 1951), 52 American POWs were moved from Canton on August 2, 1951 by rail to Peiping.) (Source: declassified CIA report dated 6 September 1951)

September 27, 1951 -- According to a CIA source, as of late August, 1951, "Many American prisoners of war are being used in Peiping for propaganda purposes."

September 28, 1951 -- The Central Intelligence Agency reports information from a source that as of mid-September 21 American prisoners of war are confined at Lo Chia Shan in Wuch'ang, Communist China, and that their political instruction is being carried out by a former Chinese student in America and a Soviet major. (Source: Declassified CIA report No. S072900, dated 28 September 1951)

October 4, 1951 -- The Central Intelligence Agency reports, that according to a source, the Chinese Communists held a meeting on August 1, 1951 to celebrate Army Day. "During the meeting, 5 American prisoners of war, captured in Korea, were escorted by Communists soldiers to the rostrum. Two of them addressed the gathering." (Source: Declassified CIA Report No. S073337, dated 4 October 1951.)

October 23, 1951 -- 170 U.N. prisoners of war are reported by a CIA source to have arrived in Canton by train from Hankow on October 3, 1951. (Source: CIA declassified report no. S074469)

October 25, 1951 -- A CIA source reports the existence of an American and British POW camp at Shamsen, Canton, and lists some of the names, in Chinese, of U.S. 8th Army personnel. The names are not further evaluated by CIA. (Source: Declassified CIA report no. S074807 dated 25 October 1951)

October 27, 1951 -- A CIA source reports that 125 American prisoners of war were observed walking to Antung, China on the night of March 25, 1951. (declassified CIA report)

October, 1951 -- Peace negotiations between the Communists and

the United Nations Command continue at Panmunjom, Korea.

December, 1951 -- The Psychological Strategy Board under President Truman, in a Top Secret memorandum, makes the following observations concerning the question of forced repatriation of North Korean and Chinese prisoners-of-war, in the context of an exchange of POWs following the Korean Conflict:

"Our treatment of Soviet and satellite expatriates has an unfortunate history, as you will recall. As a result of an agreement at Yalta, the United States in the years immediately after World War II assisted the Soviet Union in the repatriation of various categories of Soviet bloc persons -- chiefly prisoners of war, escapees, and displaced persons. The result of our cooperation was that more than four million Soviet citizens were returned to the Soviet Union and that thousands were executed or punished in other ways without regard to the conditions which caused their displacement from Soviet-controlled territory."

"In addition, persons escaping from the Soviet area after World War II were forcibly returned to Soviet control as a matter of U.S. policy up until well into 1948. This treatment of Soviet expatriates became well known to the populations within the Soviet area, and, as has been well documented, became the cause of widespread despair. It practically stopped the flow of defectors, and it would make it very difficult to wage effective psychological warfare against the Red Army in event of war."

"Our policy was subsequently changed so that persons entering the Allied areas of Germany and Austria are no longer forcibly returned. The treatment we have given defectors has, however, not been sufficiently good or well publicized to erase the former picture."

"This is the background within which the question of forcible repatriation of Chinese and North Korean prisoners of war must be examined. Repetition of our previous mistake would discourage defection by Chinese communist forces in any future conflict."

"It would therefore in the long run cost us more American lives than are involved in the exchange of prisoners problem."

The writer of the memorandum concludes stating:

"I have learned by way of hearsay that the President is informed on this question and is inclined to oppose forcible repatriation."

(Source: declassified memorandum December, 1951, Truman Presidential Library)

January, 1952 -- Army Captain Mel Gile of the Far East Command Liaison Group reports that one of his agents had found that 63 U.S. POWs were being shipped by truck and rail from Pyongyang, North Korea to Chita, in the Soviet Union. Gile states the U.S. command cancelled air strikes on the railway he reported would be carrying the POWs. (Source: 1990 Wash. Times and USA Today interviews with Gile)

January 2, 1952 -- U.S. Army Intelligence receives information that more than 500 U.N. prisoners were in a camp in Tung Kuan Ying, 10 miles east of Mukden, Manchuria "to be given short-term training pending transfer to the Soviet Union on order of central authorities." The same reports states that 494 U.N. POWs had been observed inside China since December, 1951.

January 4, 1952 -- A CIA source reports that in mid-November, 1951, "the U.N. prisoners of war who had arrived in Canton on October 3 were removed and sent elsewhere. Complete secrecy was maintained during the move from Shamsen, Canton to a destination unknown." (Source: declassified CIA report No. 79124)

January 5, 1952 -- A CIA source reports that 13 American and 8 British prisoners of war were transferred by rail from Canton to Hankow. CIA also reports they have another report of U.S. POWs in the Canton area "performing hard labor on airfields." (Source: 5 January 1952 CIA declassified report.)

February 6, 1952 -- A CIA source reports that around December 27, 1951, "the Chinese Communists moved 300 U.S. POWs...into a concentration camp near Tat'ung. The prisoners are under the instruction of Europeans" CIA reports that the report is possibly a fabrication as the information appears doubtful. (Source: CIA declassified report dated 6 February 1952)

February 14, 1952 -- A CIA source reports that about the first week of January, the Chinese Communists were parading U.S. captives (prisoners of war) in Paoshan, Yunnan Province, for propaganda purposes. The source reports the Communists pointed the U.S. soldiers to the spectators, saying "these are the people we've been fighting -- and have conquered." (Source: CIA declassified report dated 14 February 1951)

February 19, 1952 -- The declassified "post-agenda discussion" suggested notes for a meeting of the Psychological Strategy Board under President Truman state:

*Subject: The Strategic Significance of Involuntary POW Repatriation in Korea.

"At the present time, there is no widespread active concern in the U.S. on the question of possible failure on the part of the Chinese to return all American prisoners. But articles now beginning to appear in the press raise the specter that the issue might be presented to the American public as an "exchange of Chinese lives for American lives." Should this develop, it is likely that the public outcry would obscure the basic moral issue and jeopardize the effectiveness of the U.S. policy decision."

"At the present time, it appears that the Department of State and the Department of Defense are engaged in the collection and careful analysis of the facts pertaining to this problem. Preliminary indications are that perhaps 3,000 Chinese and up to 10 percent of the North Korean POWs will fall within the category of those whose return to their homelands would result in their death, or who for other reasons do not wish to be repatriated."

(Source: Declassified notes from Truman Library 19 February 1954 -- U.S. Psychological Strategy Board)

March, 1952 -- Admiral R.E. Libby, U.S. negotiator in Korea, advises his communist counterparts, "You denied that you hold in Korea more than 11,500 prisoners whose names you gave us...You denied that you ever held any of our captured personnel outside Korea...we have evidence which clearly convicts on both counts. Earlier, he states "We have convincing evidence you are holding prisoners in retention camps outside Korea without reporting them to our side."

Libby had further stated "a number of captured communist soldiers have told of escorting UN prisoners to camps in China." Libby states one of the captured Communist Chinese soldiers "described in detail a prisoner of war processing center in Harbin (deep in Central Manchuria) to which he had helped escort captured United Nations personnel. The soldier stated he had seen "more than 1,000 UN prisoners - Americans, South Koreans and others -- at the Harbin processing camp." (Source: South China Morning Post March 9, 1952)

April 15, 1952 -- The Central Intelligence Agency reports, that according to a source, "In November, 1951 about 50 American prisoner of war were brought under guard from Shanghai to Hangchow, and were taken to Maochiafou and placed in the detention center there." The report further states that as of February 10, 1952, 15 of them were taken elsewhere, leaving only 35. Maochiafou is reported as "probably near Hangchow."

(Source: CIA report dated 15 April 1952, declassified)

May 2, 1952 -- The Central Intelligence Agency reports, that according to a source, "In April 1952, there were 35 American prisoner of war at the Maochiafou Camp. The following is a partial list of the Americans." No evaluation of the names is done by CIA. (Source: CIA declassified report dated 2 May 1952)

June 13, 1952 -- B-29 is downed by a Soviet MIG over the Sea of Japan. (Source: DoD, Russian Archives.)

July 17, 1952 -- The Central Intelligence Agency, in a report from a still classified source, states:

"In May, 1952, the War Prisoner Administrative Office in P'yongyang...under the control of an intelligence officer attached to the general headquarters of the Soviet Far Eastern Military District, controlled prisoner of war camps in Manchuria and North Korea. The office, formerly in Mukden (Manchuria), employed 30 persons, several of whom were English-speaking Soviets."

"The office had developed three types of prisoner of war camps. Camps termed 'peace camps' detained persons who exhibited pro-Communist leanings, and were characterized by considerate treatment of the prisoners and the staging within the camps of Communist rallies and meetings."

"Reform camps, all of which are in Manchuria, detained anti-Communist prisoners possessing certain technical skills. Emphasis at these camps was on reeducation of the prisoners."

"Normal prisoner of war camps, all of which were in North Korea, detained prisoners whom the Communists will exchange. Prisoners in the peace and reform camps will not be exchanged. Officials of North Korean prisoner of war camps sent reports on individual prisoners to the War Prisoner Administrative Office. Cooperative prisoners were being transferred to peace camps."

"On 6 January 1952, four hundred United States prisoners, including three hundred Negroes, were being detained...in Mukden, Manchuria...All prisoners held there, with the exception of three second lieutenants, were enlisted personnel...The prisoners, dressed in Communist Chinese Army uniforms were not required to work...two hours of indoctrination were conducted daily by staff members of the Northeast Army Command. Prisoners were permitted to play basketball in the courtyard"

(Source: CIA Report No. SO 91634, dated July 17, 1952)

October, 1952 -- Truce negotiations between the Communists and the U.N. forces break down.

January 2, 1951 -- Despite the December, 1951 report by President Truman's Psychological Strategy Board, U.S. Senator Wiley is told by the Department of Defense that "no information is available which would enable the Department of Defense to prepare a statistical and descriptive account of the ultimate fate of these individuals after their repatriation to Soviet authorities pursuant to the terms of the Yalta Agreement." The December, 1951, in discussing the question of forced repatriation for Korean War POWs, states that four million Russians at the end of World War II were forcibly sent back, and that thousands of them were subsequently executed and punished by the Russians. (Source: Defense Department letter dated January 2, 1953)

January 18, 1953 -- A U.S. Navy patrol aircraft is shot down in the South China Sea. A U.S. Coast Guard Seaplane crashes during rescue operations in the vicinity. According to the United States, the planes are not engaged in operations for the United Nations Command. The U.S. later expresses the belief that personnel from these incidents fall into Communist custody (Source: 5 May 1954 Defense Department summary)

February 24, 1953 -- An Army Combined Command for Reconnaissance Activities Korea memorandum states:

"The following information was received from Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Republic of Korea Government. Report originally came from Nationalist Chinese Embassy --"

"According to reliable information, the Communist Chinese Forces have transferred UN POWs to Russia in violation of the Geneva Conference. These POWs will be specially trained at Moscow for espionage work. POWs transferred to Moscow are grouped as follows: British 5, Americans 10, Canadians 3, and 50 more from various countries."

"Russia has established a Higher Informant Training Team at Uran, Hodasong (phonetic) in Siberia in October, 1952. 500 persons are receiving training, one third of them women. Japanese constitute the largest group and the others are Korean, Filipinos, Burmese, and American."

The date of information is given as "October - 22 December 1952."

Comments in this report by the U.S. Army Combined Command for Reconnaissance Activities, Korea state:

"This office has received sporadic reports of POWs being moved to the USSR since the very inception of the hostilities in Korea. These reports came in great volume through the earlier months of the war, and then tapered off to a standstill in early 1951, being revived by a report from January of this year (1953). It is definitely possible that such action is being taken as evidenced by past experience with Soviet authorities. All previous reports state POWs who are moved to the USSR are technical specialists who are employed in mines, factories, etc. This is the first report that they are being used as espionage agents that is carried by this office."
(Source: U.S. Army Combined Command report dated 24 Feb. 53)

April 20-26, 1953 -- Peace talks are resumed and Operation Little Switch, the first prisoner exchange, takes place. The Communists release 600 United Nations "sick and wounded" prisoners. The United Nations releases 6,000 "sick and wounded" Communist prisoners.

May, 1953 -- Esquire Magazine reports that the Foreign News Service had obtained information from a "reliable" source they encountered in 1952 that American POWs were being screened by Chinese and Soviet personnel who spoke fluent English. The source reports that an initial decision to keep these POWs back or place them in POW camps on the North Korean side of the Yalu River was made during this initial screening. The source reports that very important personnel were flown to the USSR, while others were shipped by rail to the Soviet Union for further processing. The Foreign News Service reports that they have no way of confirming the story, but that the extensive detail provided brought them to the conclusion that the information was accurate.

July 15, 1953 -- The Central Intelligence Agency reports information from a source that "In late May, 1953, approximately 1,500 United Nations prisoners of war were confined in a camp at Tungchutin, Tientain, in Communist China. The majority of these prisoners of war were American Marine officers and men who were sent to this camp after recovery from wounds." CIA comments that "a POW camp once tentatively accepted in Tientain, was dropped from available listings in January, 1953 because of a lack of recent reports concerning it."
(Source: CIA declassified report dated 15 July 1953)

July 22, 1953 -- During the peace negotiations, the Communists report they are holding 12,763 prisoners to be repatriated.

July 27, 1953 -- The Armistice Agreement is signed between the Communists and the U.N. Forces at Panmunjom, Korea. A Military Armistice Commission, a temporary Neutral Nations

Repatriation Commission, and a Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission are established to enforce the terms of the armistice. No formal peace treaty is ever concluded.

Paragraph 13f of the Armistice Agreement provides for the voluntary repatriation of POWs and for the repatriation of remains.

July 29, 1953 -- An RB-50, with a crew of 17 members, is shot down by Russian MIG-15 jets over the Sea of Japan. An American vessel rescues the co-pilot who had parachuted. The U.S. Government informs the Soviets that "it appears highly likely that the other crewmembers survived and that they were possibly rescued by the Soviet vessels."

August 5, 1953 -- Operation Big Switch commences with the exchange of POWs "desiring repatriation" by both sides. The United Nations Command begins the transfer of 75,823 POWs directly to the Communists in the demilitarized zone (DMZ). The Communists begin the transfer of 12,773 Allied POWs (3,597 U.S. POWs) in return.

August 6, 1953 -- The Commander in Chief of the United Nations Command General Mark Clark returns to Washington from Korea, after signing the Armistice on July 27th. He holds a news conference at the Pentagon, which is covered by the New York Times as follows:

"General Clark pledged to press the Communists for further information on the additional troops he believed they held and for a possible exchange. He said that he pointed out the wide discrepancy between his information and that supplied by the Communist on prisoners during the truce negotiations. He had been advised by his superiors in the Pentagon, he said, not to delay the armistice negotiations over the discrepancy but to reserve the privilege of later protest. This will be done, the general said, first at the Military Armistice Commission, and, if there is no satisfaction there, later at the political conference that will follow. General Clark, stating that the only thing that the Communists respected was force, declared in a detailed discussion of the prisoner question:"

"They respect force and I know of no way except through political and diplomatic means of getting any reaction from them on this prisoner of war question other than the application of force, which is not in the cards, in my opinion," said Clark.

"Conceding that Army authorities in the Far East could not prove that additional US soldiers and airmen are being held captive..., General Clark said there nevertheless remained

"other information that leads us to believe that they have more."

"We do have certain evidence that indicates that there are additional prisoners alive who should be returned, and I assure you, as Commander-in-Chief, while I am there, I will press that in the military and political conferences," Clark declared.

At the same press conference, General Clark announces his retirement effective October 31, 1953.

(Source: New York Times article dated August 7, 1953)

August 7, 1953 -- General James A. Van Fleet, Commander of the U.S. 8th Army in Korea, states:

"A large percentage of the 8,000 American soldiers listed as missing in action in Korea are still alive."

August 7, 1953 -- Communist controlled radio in Peiping, China reports that United Nations POWs had now been informed that they had a right to refuse to return and that "if any prisoners of war do not wish to be repatriated directly, the United Nations would be informed of the number 'as soon as possible.'" (Source: New York Times, 7 August 1953, Tokyo byline, same day)

August 10, 1953 -- A Combined Command for Reconnaissance Activity Korea Army Memorandum states:

"A. A compilation of reports indicate that during the past two years, several POWs have been transferred from POW camps in North Korea to points in Manchuria, China, and Siberia. These points include Mukden, Harbin, Antung, Yench'eng, Chiamusso, Miensien, Peiping, Shanghai, Chungking, Timesin, Canton..."

"B. Figures show that the total number of MIAs plus known captured less those to be US repatriated leaves a balance of over 8,000 unaccounted for."
(Source: declassified 10 August 1953 Army Memorandum)

August 31, 1953 -- The Assistant Chief of Staff, G2 received a memorandum from the Army General Staff listing 23 U.S. personnel "believed not desiring repatriation." The information is submitted "from interrogation Big Switch repatriates inclusive to 23 August 1953."
(Source: 31 August 1953 Army memorandum)

September 1, 1953 -- The Joint Intelligence Processing Board, Headquarters, U.S. Army Forces, Far East (ADV) prepares a

memorandum listing 32 United States Prisoners of War who have "elected to refuse repatriation." The information is based on information provided by released American POWs. The report further states that "much of the information is based on rumor and hearsay and consequently quite difficult to evaluate."

(Source: 1 September 1953 Army Memorandum)

September 6, 1953 -- The United Nations Command and the Communists announce that repatriation (Operation Big Switch) has been completed for all individuals who had elected to be returned. (Source: 12/22/53 Memo to SecArmy from Ass. Sec. Army)

September 9, 1953 -- The United Nations Command presents a list to the Communists of 3,404 U.N. and South Korean personnel still unaccounted for. The list includes the names of 944 U.S. personnel, of which 610 were Army. It is later reported that General Mark W. Clark handed over the list to the Communists demanding that they be returned "or else." General Clark is reported to say that the list was compiled from statements of the communists themselves, radio broadcasts originating in Peiping, letters written from prisoners' camps, or from the observations of former U.N. prisoners of war in Red prisons. (Source: 31 December 1953 CINCUNC message, News Article by Joseph F. McLaughlin, Boston)

September 12, 1953 -- Communist correspondent Burchett indicates that the Chinese Communists continue to retain in a non-prisoner of war status certain United States Air Force personnel, alleged to have overflowed Chinese territory. Burchett indicates that their return must be sought through diplomatic negotiations. (Source: March 5, 1954 State Department memorandum)

September 16, 1953 -- Communist broadcasts over the Government-controlled Peiping radio state that the 3,400 roster from the United Nations Command is "fake" and is designed by the United Nations Command "to obscure the fact that the Allies are forcibly detaining prisoners on our side."
(Source: New York Times, Tokyo byline, Sept. 16, 1953)

September 21, 1953 -- The Communists, in response to the September 9th UN message, state that 518 of the 3,404 had already been repatriated, and another 380 had previously been reported to the UN as dead, escaped, or already returned. No identification of these individuals is made by name or nationality, though the U.S. subsequently learns on October 3rd that 112 of the total figure were Americans.
(Source: 12/22/53 Memo to SecArmy from Ass. SecArmy, 4/29/53 Army Assistant Chief of Staff memorandum)

On the same day, the Communists submit a roster of 98,742 POWs for whom they demand an accounting (15,584 Chinese and 83,158 Koreans)

September 23, 1953 -- The United Nations Command turns over 22,604 "non-repatriates" (ie: POWs who had refused repatriation) to the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission.

September 24, 1953 -- The Communists deliver 359 United Nations Command "non-repatriates" (23 U.S.).

September 25, 1953 -- The U.N. Command makes a second demand for the accounting of the 3,404 UN/South Korean unaccounted for personnel stating that the first reply was completely unsatisfactory.

October 3, 1953 -- The Communists again counter the September 25, 1953 demand by referring to a list of 98,783 names of Communists who they claim are being held in United Nations custody.

They also provide a further breakdown of 899 United Nations Command personnel of the 3,404 UNC total referred to on September 21, 1952. The Communists state 112 of the total were U.S. personnel who had either died, escaped, or were released at the front. (The U.S. privately notes that 70 of the 112 names had been reported as dead by U.S. returnees at Operation Big Switch.)
(Source: 31 December 1953 message from CINCUNC)

October 20, 1953 -- The Communists by letter to the Commander in Chief of the United Nations Command claim that they have accounted for the 899 UNC personnel (on October 3rd), and demand that the UN Command account for their September 21st list of 98,000 POWs. (Source: 31 December 1953 CINCUNC Memo)

November 21-23, 1953 -- Three former members of the Republic of Korea Army, escaped through the demilitarized zone "and reported to the United Nations Command that Communists still held large numbers of prisoners of war."

The United Nations Command protests in the Military Armistice Commission and demands that the Communists "hand over to the custody of the Custodian Forces of India all those prisoners that your side still retains."

December 1, 1953 -- The Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission declines to conduct an investigation into the allegations of the three Koreans who escaped on November 23, 1953 concerning large numbers of POWs still being held.

December 7, 1953 -- The U.N. Representative to the Military Armistice Commission requests the Communist side to agree to an impartial investigation of the evidence given by the three defectors. The Communist side rejects the proposal.

The Communists again reiterate their demand that the United Nations Command account for the persons on the list of 98,000 Communist POW personnel provided on September 21, 1953.

December 10, 1953 -- The senior United States member of the Military Armistice Commission charges the Communists with violation of the Armistice by retaining custody of prisoners of war who desired repatriation. The Communists counter with a demand for the accounting of 27,000 prisoners of war "illegally released by President Rhee with assent of the United Nations Forces."

December 14, 1953 -- Two additional Koreans escape to South Korea and confirm the statements made by the three escapees in November that prisoners were still being held by the Communists.

December 16, 1953 -- Verification of the 2 Koreans who escaped on December 14th as bona-fide members of the Republic of Korea Army is made.

December 18, 1953 -- The British Government offers to make on behalf of the Unified Command an approach to the Chinese Communists at Peiping to seek the return of United Nations Command personnel who may still be in Communist custody.
(Source: 5 March 1954 State Department memorandum)

U.S. News and World Report writes that 944 Missing GI's have become slave laborers in Communist hands. The report states that "there is substantial evidence now, for example, that a number of American prisoners were marched through the streets of Mukden, deep inside Manchuria, in a victory parade. As far as is known here, none of those men has returned. No repatriated prisoner has said he participated in that parade... There are (also) reports from returning Japanese prisoners, repatriated this month from Russia, that some Americans have been seen in a prison not far from Moscow."

December 22, 1953 -- Secretary of State John Foster Dulles instructs the U.S. Commander in Chief of the United Nations Command to "continuously press Communist members of the Military Armistice Commission to account for missing personnel." (Source: Letter to Secretary of the Army from Assistant Secretary of the Army.)

The State Department also informs the Commander in Chief of the United Nations Command that the British through their Foreign Office in Peiping will seek to confirm unofficial reports that Communist China is holding in custody United Nations personnel in China. (Source: Ibid.)

December 23, 1953 -- Assistant Secretary of the Army, Hugh Milton, asks the Army Chief of Staff to provide information "concerning 610 Army personnel listed as prisoners of war and still unaccounted for by Communist Forces." Milton asks for information on educational background, technical specialties, and if they have a background which would make them susceptible to Communist indoctrination. (Source: 12/22/53 letter to Chief of Staff from Army Ass. Secretary)

December 31, 1953 -- In a memorandum to the Department of the Army, the Command in Chief of the United Nations Command makes the following points:

"Question of tactics to be employed in pressuring Communists for accounting of about 3,400 UNC POWs has been under continuous study here since the conclusion of Operation Big Switch."

"During the period September 9, 1953 to date, the United Nations Command has presented the Communists with lists of United Nations Command personnel who are believed to be, or may have been, in their custody. (Note: includes 965 U.S. personnel)"

"On September 21, 1953, the Communists submitted a roster of 98,742 POWs for whom they demand an accounting. After exhaustive research by AFPE PWIB, we have as of December 26, 1953 been able to establish reasonably accurate identification as follows, none of which has yet been given to the Communists:

- (1) Duplications, 668
- (2) Escaped: Chinese, 50 Korean, 26,803
- (3) Repatriated during Little Switch:
Chinese, 15 Korean, 332
- (4) Repatriated during Big Switch: Chinese 4, Korean 2,219
- (5) Delivered to NMRC: Chinese, 14,495. Korean, 7,479
- (6) Korean CI, 37,527
- (7) Koreans not qualifying as POWs and later released, 142
- (8) Deceased: Chinese 4. Korean 250
- (9) Never in UNC custody: Chinese, 91. Korean, 2,008
- (10) Status not yet determined, 6,655. (Total, 98,742)

"Whether we shall be able to complete identification of the 6,655 persons (10) is highly problematical. Difficulties inherent in present records stem from early days of Korean

conflict when POW registration was not fully established..."

"We can expect nothing from the Communists on accounting for the 3400 UNC personnel unless we are willing to provide them with the information they have demanded; while we may realize some public benefit by a reiteration of our demands, they can produce a logical argument that we must do likewise... If we account for the 98,000, they may submit additional lists with just enough accuracy to keep us on the defensive interminably. If we continue to demand accounting of UNC personnel, they can move further to demand return of additional alleged POWs, and from there to civilians (of whom there are hundreds of thousands in South Korea.)"

"At the conclusion of Operation Big Switch, the Communists reported they had returned all UNC POWs desiring repatriation. It is highly unlikely they would now return any additional persons whom they might be holding, since they would be hard put to develop a logical reason for their retention. We, on the other hand, have no way to force them to do so. Our only bargaining weapon - a weak one at that - is answering this demand for the 98,000."

"Regardless of our efforts, the Communists will, in the end, give us only that information which they wish to supply, when they want to."

"In view of the above, it is extremely doubtful that either an accounting or recovery of UNC personnel will result from further demands on the Communists or by the exchange of lists. However, we are prepared to adopt the following course of action: ...we shall inform the Communists in the Military Armistice Commission that we are prepared to submit an accounting (as soon as the list can be properly prepared). Before handing it over, we will demand that a satisfactory accounting be first supplied for the 3,427 UNC names. If the Communists are interested, they will undoubtedly refuse to produce the UNC list without a simultaneous receipt of their rosters. We will have to agree, realizing that we shall probably find their accounting wholly unsatisfactory. From this point, we feel sure we shall move into the usual phase of charges and counter charges without any real results obtainable. We request your comments and/or concurrence on course of action proposed..."

January 12, 1954 -- The Department of the Army conveys the views of the State and Defense Departments to the Commander in Chief of the United Nations Command concerning his December 31, 1953 message. The message states:

- "1. State and Defense agencies report continuing interest

- being expressed by congressional and private sources.
2. Nevertheless, both departments agree with your analysis and your viewpoints and in probable undesirable developments.
 3. Therefore, suggest that the course of action you outlined be held in abeyance pending further study in Washington."

(Source: 12 January 1954 Army message to CINUNC)

January 16, 1954 -- In a memorandum to the Secretary of the Army the Assistant Secretary of the Army writes under the heading: "The Unaccounted for Americans Believed To Be Still Held Illegally By The Communists:

1. There are approximately 954 United States personnel falling into this group. What the Department of the Army and other interested agencies is doing about their recovery falls into two parts. First, the direct efforts of the UNC Military Armistice Commission to obtain an accurate accounting, and second, efforts by the G2 of the Army, both overt and covert, to locate, identify, and recover these individuals. G2 is making an intensive effort through its information collection system world-wide, to obtain information on these people and has a plan for clandestine action to obtain the recovery of one or more to establish the case positively that prisoners are still being held by the Communists... The direct efforts of the UNC are being held in abeyance pending further study of the problem by the State Department."

2. A further complicating factor in the situation is that to continue to carry these personnel in a "missing" status is costing over one million dollars annually. It may become necessary at some future date to drop them from our records as "missing and presumed dead."

(Source: 16 January 1954 memorandum to Secretary of the Army)

January 18, 1954 -- The U.N. Representative to the Military Armistice Commission again requests the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission to investigate charges that the Communists were withholding prisoners of war. (Source: 29 January 1954 Army memorandum)

January 22, 1954 -- The Army responds to the December 23rd request from the Assistant Secretary of the Army on the breakdown by certain categories of 610 Army personnel listed as prisoners of war still unaccounted for by Communist Forces."

January 26, 1954 -- Again, the UNCMAC requests the NNSC to investigate charges that prisoners of war were being withheld by the Communists.

January 27, 1954 -- A Japanese repatriate from POW Camp #21 at Khabarovsk from 1950 - 1953 reports the following to the U.S. representatives in Tokyo. He states that during the period April - May, 1953, he "heard from Soviet guards, prisoners and laborers that the crew of a military plane shot down by Soviets was in Khabarovsk prison." (Source: Declassified Report No. 1835 from Air Force filed -- portions still redacted)

January 28, 1954 - The Chief of Staff of the Army instructs that a memo be prepared by the Secretary of the Army recommending that the Secretary of Defense forthwith propose that the United States Government officially and publicly press for a Communist accounting of missing American military personnel." (Source: 28 Jan. '54 memorandum)

January 29, 1954 -- After coordinating with Army, Navy, Air Force, the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3 proposes three courses of action to be undertaken, other than those already undertaken by the Military Armistice Commission, to gain a "Communist Accounting of Missing UNC Personnel.":

1. Seek the release of personnel through the diplomatic efforts of the United Kingdom.
2. In the United Nations General Assembly, charge the Governments of Communist China and North Korea with a violation of the Armistice Agreement.
3. Release to the press a joint State-Defense public announcement."

Under item #1, it is noted that a disadvantage is that "to obtain the release of US personnel, the United States would almost certainly have to pay a "price". Such "price" could be acknowledgment of violations of the Manchurian borders, admission of "germ warfare", withdrawal of support for the Nationalists Government Republic of China on Formosa, admission of Red China and North Korea to the United Nations."

Under item #2, it is noted that a disadvantage is that it "would almost certainly assure that any individuals still alive would never live to return to the United States and that it would offer an opportunity to the Communists to demand in turn an accounting for 98,742 personnel on their side. Efforts to answer this demand would evoke violent protests from the ROK and the Nationalist China Governments."

Under item #3, it is noted that UNC evidence concerning the survival of 944 Americans "is based on letters written home by prisoners, prisoner of war interrogations, questioning of returnees, communist radio broadcasts, and the actual circumstances of their disappearance from UN Command control."

February 5, 1954 -- A reliable friendly foreign intelligence service reports to the U.S. information they had received from a Turkish source traveling in Central Asia. The source, who had been interrogated in Turkey, states that while at Mukden, Manchuria, he "saw several coaches full of Europeans who were also taken to the USSR. They were not Russians. Source passed the coaches several times and heard them talk in a language unknown to him." Source states that one of the coaches was full of wounded caucasians who were not speaking at all. (Source: Charity Interrogation Report No. 619 referenced in declassified cables dated 23 March 1954)

February 8, 1954 -- Secretary of the Army Robert T. Stevens sends a memorandum to the Secretary of Defense. Stevens recommends that meetings occur with the State Department to formulate plans "for the initiation of diplomatic negotiations through the offered assistance of the United Kingdom." Stevens also recommends releasing a joint State-Defense public announcement, "now held in abeyance by the Operations Coordinating Board, to reassure the families concerned and the American people that our Government is taking all feasible action in seeking an accounting for the missing servicemen listed as prisoners of war in the Korean conflict."

Following the sending of this memorandum, an informal conference is held with representatives of the three Services, Defense, and State. "It was agreed that by memorandum the State Department would describe in some detail what diplomatic actions would be initiated by the United Kingdom, and would seek Defense concurrence in such an approach."

February 23, 1954 -- Seventy wives and mothers of U.S. POW/MIAs from the Korean Conflict travel to the United Nations in New York. They are not received by either the UN General Secretary or the U.S. Ambassador to the U.N. They are told by the General Secretary's assistant, "The UN has no authority over the foreign affairs of member states."

March 5, 1954 -- In a letter to the Assistant Secretary of Defense, Frank Nash, the Assistant Secretary of State Walter Robertson states that they have no objection to the December 18, 1953 British offer to make an approach to the Chinese

Communists at Peiping to seek the return of UNC personnel who may still be in Communist custody. It is noted that there are 18 USAF personnel who have been retained whose return should be sought through diplomatic negotiations. Department of Defense concurrence in this proposal is requested. The letter further notes that the Defense Department had already signed off on an approach being undertaken by the British on behalf of 11 non-UNC Navy and Coast Guard personnel missing on January 18, 1953.

March 9, 1954 -- During a classified session of a Senate Subcommittee on Investigations of the Committee on Government Operations, the Senators are told the following by the Department of Defense concerning numbers of POWs and MIAs from the Korean War (transcript now declassified):

Colonel Trammell: (G-2 Department of Defense): "...on the 18th of January, 1954...G-2 (Army Intelligence) considered, for all services, that there were 1,012 persons where there was evidence that they were alive, that they had been alive at one time in Communist hands. Also, on that same day of those whom the Adjutant General had listed as known captured, 120 of those were not accounted for."

Senator Potter: "120 that the Adjutant General had classified --"

Colonel Trammell: "Classified as known captured were not accounted for. In other words, both the Adjutant General and G-2 agreed that this certain number were known captured and yet in (Operation) Big Switch (August/Sept. 1953), 120 of the known captured were not accounted for..."

...of those that G-2 has listed in Section 3 as having been in Communist hands alive at one time, as of the 18th of January, 892 were not accounted for. Among those we had some evidence as late as April 1953 which we consider a positive indication that the man was alive as late as that time."

Senator Potter: "As late as April 1953?"

Colonel Trammell: "As late as April 1953 we had convincing evidence that the man was alive and in Communist hands. But 892, as indicated, were not accounted for in that group. The two figures I have just given you, that is, the 120 and the 892 total the 1,012 which is the figure I started with as of January 18."

March 10, 1954 -- The Department of the Army, G-2, requests the Army CIC center at Ft. Holabird, Md. to detail six CIC type investigators for a period of two weeks to comply with a

Senate request "for the most recent information on Americans captured in Korea, and on whom the Communist forces in Korea have failed to render sufficient accounting... Senator Potter, as a subcommittee consisting of one member, is examining the basis on which the United States is demanding the return of, or accounting for, from the Communist Forces, Americans taken as prisoners of war and on whom sufficient accounting has not been rendered." (Source: 10 March 1954 G2 Army Memorandum)

March 11, 1954 -- The G2, Department of the Army informs the Air Force that Senator Potter, Acting Chairman for a Special Study being conducted by the Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, has requested that he be furnished with "the number, by Services, of personnel still carried in a missing in action or captured status." The G-2 requests the Air Force to furnish them "with a copy of any findings and determinations of death made by your office subsequent to Operation Big Switch. These findings and determinations of death will be used to adjust the rosters prepared as a result of information previously furnished pursuant to Reference Disposition Form, file G2-CDOR dated 25 August 1953."

On the same day, the Assistant Chief of Staff, G2, is informed that "the Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations is attempting to formulate a course of action to follow to effect the recovery of American personnel believed to be alive and still in Communist custody... I have requested the U.S. Air Force to furnish a roster of all persons carried as MIA or captured at the termination of 'Operation Big Switch' for incorporation in a final consolidated roster from all sources of personnel who might possibly remain in Communist custody."

March 15, 1954 -- The Army CIC center complies with the March 10, 1954 request from the Army G-2 for six additional personnel to help respond to Senator Potter's request. (Source: 15 March 1954 Army CIC memorandum)

In a separate memorandum, the Acting Chief of the Returnee Section, G2, Department of the Army, mentions that "Senator Potter has requested that the figures (presented to his committee on March 9, 1954), both for officially listed as captured and personnel considered by G2 to have been under Communist control, be broken down as of 18 January 1954, by military services. Returnee section possess certain rosters enumerating American personnel in the category mentioned above. All personnel named in the 'G2 Believed Captured Roster' are known to have been alive in Communist custody at some time after their having been reported missing in action. Copies of these rosters were furnished CGAFFE

immediately subsequent to the completion of Operation Big Switch. Currently, these rosters are in the process of being brought up to date, at which time, a final accounting will be made available to Senator Potter."

March 16, 1954 -- The Air Force Liaison Office in Hong Kong sends a report to the G2, USAF, in Washington. The report is filed by Colonel Delk Simpson, the Assistant Air Liaison officer who had arrived in Hong Kong for duty on November 3, 1953. The report reads, in pertinent part:

"This office has interviewed refugee source who states that he observed hundreds of prisoners of war in American uniforms being sent into Siberia in late 1951 and 1952. Observations were made at Manchouli on USSR-Manchurian border. Source observed POWs on railway station platform loading into trains for movement into Siberia. In railway restaurant source closely observed three POWs who were under guard and were conversing in English. POWs wore sleeve insignia which indicated POWs were Air Force noncommissioned officers. Source states that there were a great number of Negroes among POW shipments and also states that at no time later were any POWs observed returning from Siberia. Source does not wish to be identified for fear of reprisals against friends in Manchuria, however is willing to cooperate in answering further questions and will be available in Hong Kong for questions for the next few days."

March 17, 1954 -- The Department of the Air Force forwards to the Department of the Army a list of 18 USAF personnel "alleged to have been captured in Manchuria, and who are being retained as political prisoners. Three of these persons, identity unknown, were reported to have died." (Source: 17 March 1954 Memorandum)

The Department of the Army, G2, forwards to the Senate Permanent Sub-Committee on Investigations (Att: Senator Potter) a "breakdown by service of American Personnel Unaccounted for in Korea as of January 18, 1954:

- A. Officially captured - 120 (98 Army, 18 Marines, 4 USAF)
- B. Personnel Considered by G-2 to have been in Communist custody - 892 (827 Army, 1 Navy, 6 Marines, 58 USAF)

Recap for all services, Officers 85, Warrant Officers 2, Enlisted Men, 805." (Source: 17 March 1954 Army G2 Memorandum to Senate)

March 19, 1954 -- The Deputy Secretary of Defense responds to the Secretary of the Army's February 8th memorandum on formulating plans for United Kingdom participation on securing an accounting of missing UNC personnel. In regards

to releasing a public statement on U.S. efforts to gain an accounting, "the Department of Defense and the Department of State have jointly agreed, however, that no formal press release on the subject is desirable at the present time...If the subject remains relatively quiescent in the public mind, it is not felt that a formal release will be necessary."

March 23, 1954 -- The American Consul General in Hong Kong, Julian F. Harrington, sends an updated cable to the Secretary of State, entitled, "American POWs reported en route to Siberia." The cable refers to the March 16, 1954 interview with the refugee and states, in pertinent part:

"A recently arrived Greek refugee from Manchuria has reported seeing several hundred American prisoners of war being transferred from Chinese trains to Russian trains at Manchouli near the border of Manchuria and Siberia. The POWs were seen late in 1951 and in the spring of 1952 by the informant and a Russian friend of his. The informant was interrogated on two occasions by the Assistant Air Liaison Officer and the Consulate General agrees with his evaluation of the information as probably true and the source as of unknown reliability."

Harrington concludes stating that the refugee was leaving by ship today. The reporting officer at the Embassy further states, "Source is very careful not to exaggerate information and is positive of identification of American POWs." The cables contain amplifying information on the substance of the report in great detail. (Source: 23 March 1954 cable.)

April 12, 1954 -- The Department of Defense by letter concurs in the British proposal outlined in the State Department's March 5, 1954. They also forward to the Department of State a list of 18 USAF personnel retained by the Communists in a non-prisoner of war status. (Source: 12 April 1954 DoD letter to State with attached list.)

April 19, 1954 -- Secretary of State John Foster Dulles sends a cable to the American Embassy in Moscow instructing that the Soviets be given an Aide-Memoire from the United States on U.S. POWs having been transported into the Soviet Union. Dulles tells the U.S. Embassy that the Soviets should be told "we have reliable accounts of transfers of POWs at Manchouli." Dulles also refers to a recent report from Hong Kong on POW transfers which "corroborates previous indications that UNC POWs might have been shipped to Siberia during Korean hostilities." Finally, Dulles notes that the Department of State had just accepted a British offer to make representations in Red China to gain the release of POWs. (Source: declassified cable dated April 19, 1954)

April 22, 1954 -- In a memorandum, the Commander in Chief of the United Nations Command states, "Senior Member UNCMAC is of opinion Communist Contingent Geneva will demand an account for 98,742 alleged Communist POWs. Recommend immediate account by category and number if questions raised, with reasons for objecting to account by name; that is, fear of reprisals against families, pressures against subject individual, and so forth. Believe such an accounting will have maximum propaganda and psychological value for UNC, will be disconcerting to Communists and might jeopardize additional Communist preparing statements for Geneva use. Also recommend U.S. follow up by demanding accounting for or release of 3,405 UNC POWs...This office concurs in the UNCMAC recommendation."

April 29, 1954 -- In a memorandum to the Assistant Secretary of the Army from the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-1, Major General Robert Young states, "unconfirmed reports received by G-2 indicate the possibility that some American personnel may still be in the hands of the Communist Forces. However, no positive individual identification has been established and the reports are lacking confirmation."

The memorandum further states that the Department of the Army, under the provisions of Public Law 490, "has placed 618 soldiers, known to have been in enemy hands and unaccounted for by the Communist Forces in the following categories -- 313 - Finding of Death (Administratively determined), 275 - report of death, 21 - dishonorable discharge, 4 - under investigation (missing in action for less than one year), 3 - under investigation, prognosis undecided, missing in action for over one year."

General Young states, "Efforts by the U.S. to negotiate for the return or information relative to these personnel have been hampered by Communist forces' claims that we have not properly accounted for 98,742 POWs allegedly held by the United Nations Command."

General Young concludes his memorandum stating:

"The intelligence agencies are making an intensive effort through world-wide information systems to obtain reports on missing personnel that may still be in Communist hands. A plan has been formed by use of clandestine systems to obtain recovery of one or more such persons to establish the case beyond doubt before the world that such persons are being held."

"It is the established position of the Army to obtain the return of any UNC personnel which may remain in Communist control and all feasible efforts will be taken to accomplish

this result."

May 5, 1954 -- A diplomatic message is delivered to the USSR by the U.S. Embassy in Moscow per instructions by the Secretary of State. The message reads, in pertinent part,

"The United States Government has recently received reports which support earlier indications that American prisoners of war who had seen action in Korea have been transported to the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and that they are now in Soviet custody. The United States desires to receive urgently all information available to the Soviet Government concerning these American personnel and to arrange for their repatriation at the earliest possible time." (Source: declassified cable.)

The Defense Department participates in preparing a summary showing 944 U.S. military personnel "presumed to be in Communist custody" and for whom "the United Nations Command has not received a satisfactory accounting." The summary also lists the names of 18 USAF personnel for whom "the United States has reason to believe are being held by Communist China." Finally, the memorandum lists 11 U.S. military personnel downed on January 18, 1953 in the South China Sea, and for whom "the United States has reason to believe that they may be in Communist custody." (Source: 5 May 1954 Summary prepared in Geneva with Defense Department participation.)

May 11, 1954 -- At the UN Geneva Conference, the U.S. delegation to the conference, headed by Ambassador Johnson, holds a meeting with representatives of the International Committee of the Red Cross. Ambassador Johnson explains to the Red Cross the Korean War casualties on the U.S. side -- 23,196 killed in action, 105,871 wounded in action (of this figure, 2,495 subsequently died of wounds), 13,108 missing in action. Of the 13,108 U.S. military personnel listed as missing in action, 5,131 had returned to military control, 7,956 were missing, and 21 "refused repatriation." The May 5, 1954 is attached to the memorandum of conversation of this meeting showing 944 United States "Prisoners of War."

During the meeting, the Red Cross officials ask "whether we knew why these 944 were being retained, although so many others had been repatriated through the Military Armistice Commission. We replied that this might be the result of slipshod personnel reports to the Communist Command (who perhaps were unaware of all those under their control) or a desire to retain those individuals whose technical knowledge might be valuable to the Communist war potential, or who might continue to have some propaganda value to the Communist cause."

(Source: Department of Defense Memorandum of Conversation dated May 11, 1954)

May 13, 1954 -- The Soviet Union responds to the May 5, 1954 US diplomatic message on POWs stating:

"The assertions in the note of the United States Government that American war prisoners, participants in military action in Korea, have been transferred to the Soviet Union and are at the present time maintained under Soviet guard are without any kind of basis and are clearly invented, as there are not and have not been any such persons in the Soviet Union."

(Source: New York Times article, May 13, 1954)

May 17, 1954 -- The Department of the Army, G-2, in a memorandum for the record, states:

"This letter complies with the request by Senator Potter that he be provided with new statistics approximately six weeks subsequent to the hearing. The listing in paragraph 2.b., is composed of those US personnel, identified through the use of their names in broadcasts and propaganda or whose names appeared on the return address of POW mail, who are considered to have been admittedly held by the Communists. In addition the Communists have not declared these individuals as dead and no witnesses to their deaths have been uncovered. These revised statistics, when compared with the official casualty figures based on the original UNC request for accounting of 944 (618 Army) reveal only minor difference in total numbers."

"General Powell of G-1 has discussed the subject of the two lists, the Adjutant General Casualty Roster and the G-2 intelligence roster, with General Wieble and (Assistant Secretary of the Army Hugh Milton) Mr. Milton. In the event the G-2 statistics are publicized in an attempt to show that G-2 and the Adjutant General are not in agreement, it may place the Army in an unfavorable position temporarily from a public relations standpoint. G-2, G-1, and the Adjutant General have been working together on this matter, and it is believed that any misrepresentation of the G-2 statistics can be quickly refuted. It must be pointed out that the Returnee Section does not possess any information which indicates any Army individual believed to have been in Communist custody, is alive today."

"It should be noted, however, that this office has on file seven reports which indicate that there still may be Americans in Communist custody." (Source: 17 May 1954 Army Memorandum)

May 25, 1954 -- In a memorandum to Senator Potter from the Department of the Army, "currently adjusted statistics of American personnel which G2 believes to have been in Communist custody at one time" are forwarded to the Senate subcommittee. The memorandum provides the following new breakdown of the 1,012 personnel provided to the Committee on March 17, 1954 --

"Personnel accounted for by US reports of known deaths, return to military control, and dishonorable discharge (21): -- 601.

Personnel accounted for by US administrative presumptive findings of death: -- 393
Alleged diplomatic prisoners: 18 (furnished by Air Force_)
Total: 1,012"

The memo further states, "Even though a presumptive finding of death, an administrative determination, was made under the authority of the Missing Persons Act, a basis exists for believing that 393 US personnel were at one time in the hands of the opposing forces and are, therefore, maintained by this office as active cases until a more conclusive accounting can be obtained."

July, 1954 -- The U.S. Air Force initiates "Project American", a secret project of the 6004 Air Intelligence Service Squadron and the 6002 Air Intelligence Service Group at Shirol Air Base, Japan. The purpose of the project is "carrying out extensive research with regard to USAF personnel unaccounted for after the Korean conflict." The 1957 Historical Report of the Squadron (then classified) states:

"Through information collected from repatriated U.S. and U.N. prisoners of war, Japanese repatriates, foreign refugees, and numerous intelligence reports, a strong possibility emerged that a large number of the personnel listed as missing in action may still be alive and interned in Communist prison camps. The objective of this project is to investigate the identification of as many of these men as possible. This objective is to be accomplished by the exploitation of all possible documentary and human sources." (Source: declassified Semi-Annual Historical Report, 6004 Air Intelligence Service Squadron. #1)

July 29, 1954 -- The Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations sends a letter to Department of Defense asking for a breakdown of U.S. personnel held in Iron-Curtain countries.

August 17, 1954 -- The United Nations Command and the Communists agree at Panmunjom to an "Understanding" on the delivery and return of remains.

(Source: UNCMAC Point Paper dated 4 January 1988)

August 18, 1954 -- An Army memorandum, in anticipated response to the Senate subcommittee's July 29, 1954 request, states that the Adjutant General of the Army has submitted a list of 526 names. The memo also lists 18 Army personnel who were held in Manchuria as prisoners of the Chinese and North Korean Communists, and later repatriated.

The memo states:

"While there is reason to believe that these persons were, at one time, alive and in the hands of the Communist Forces in Korea, there is no positive evidence that any of them are alive as of this date..."

"Of the reports received to date on material provided by repatriated Japanese prisoners of war, there have been nine (9) nebulous, inconclusive references to United States personnel; however, in no case was a name remembered nor any other information furnished which could be considered positive for identification purposes..."

"Some information concerning American servicemen who were taken into China after having been captured in the Korean conflict has been received from intelligence sources other than the military."

September, 1954 -- The United Nations Military Armistice Commission and the Communists conclude negotiations regarding the recovery of deceased servicemen who were interred in territory under the control of the opposing forces. The Communists turn over approximately 4,023 United Nations deceased personnel, including 1,869 alleged remains of U.S. servicemen. The exchange takes place at the Demilitarized Zone. The U.S. later states that not all of the remains of U.S. servicemen actually interred in the North were turned over.

(Source: 16 January 1956 Army Memorandum, 16 November 1954 Army letter, October 1987 Defense Department Memorandum)

October 30, 1954 -- The United Nations Command and the Communists agree to terminate the August 17, 1954 "Understanding" on the return of remains, but to keep in effect Paragraph 20 of the Understanding, which provides that any remains discovered subsequent to the termination of the agreement would be returned through the Military Armistice Commission (MAC) Secretaries. North Korea interprets this to mean that "the MAC is not competent or obligated to deal with searching for remains, but that any remains discovered by chance will be returned through the MAC secretaries in accordance with Paragraph 20 of the Understanding."

(Source: 4 January 1988 UNCMAC Point Paper)

November 16, 1954 -- The next of kin of a missing servicemen is informed by the Department of the Army that the remains turned over by the Communists in September "have been evacuated to our scientifically equipped laboratories at Camp Kokura, Kyushu, Japan, for examinations by professional anthropologists and identification specialists...this task may be quite time-consuming."

January 12, 1955 -- John Noble, an American, is released from a Soviet prison camp after getting word to the United States of his existence, via a postcard to Switzerland sent by an inmate. He reports that while he was in prison at Putna, Irkatak, and Taichet, he is told by various German prisoners about American officers and enlisted men, who were captured in Korea, who were then in the Soviet prison system. (Source: declassified State Dept. January 1955 cable)

Noble also reports being told by a German Yugoslav living in the Soviet Union that he had seen 8 American fliers who had been shot down over the Baltic Sea and "picked up by a Soviet Coast Guard vessel." Noble states he is told by the German Yugoslav that the plane was shot down in 1950, which correlates the information to the April 8, 1950 shootdown. (13 January 1955 declassified Berlin communication 421)

The State Department reports that, according to the source, "the fliers stated that they feared being lost or hidden in USSR because the Soviet authorities had reported that they had been killed by being shot down, by the crash...they were on their way to the north or had just arrived in Vorkuta as of June 30, 1954." (Source: State Department Berlin Communication 12 January 1955 declassified.)

The State Department reports information from a German POW who had been imprisoned in the Soviet Union that 9 American fliers from Korea were at Kirov, in the Soviet Union. (Source: declassified State Dept. Berlin communication 420 12 January 1955, No.4-32)

May 31, 1955 -- Fifteen mothers of U.S. POW/MIAs return their son's medals to President Eisenhower, stating, "Our sons want your loyalty, not your medals."

June 8, 1955 -- The Chief of Special Operations, Office of the Secretary of Defense, prepared a memorandum concerning the "recovery of unrepatriated prisoners of war."

The memorandum concludes:

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"We have been unable under existing national policy considerations, to bring about an accounting by the Communies on the original 944 list. With regard to the "political prisoners" (15 USAF personnel held in Manchuria), diplomatic and political pressure must be credited with effecting partial release, but only in the context of an emerging Chinese Communist strategy of making a play for world public opinion to gain political objectives vis-a-vis the U.S."

"Various alternate courses of action have been developed by the military. They have never been implemented because of a Presidential decision, publicly announced, that "all peaceful means" must be exhausted before any other course would be considered. Most often mentioned alternate courses have been in the general field of sea and air blockade of the China Coast or U.S. supported retaliatory measures by the Chinese nationalists against the mainland. Current Joint Chiefs of Staff recommendations (which could be characterized as "stand-by" alternatives) are on file in JCS and SecDef offices." (Source: 17 June 1955 declassified Defense Dept. memorandum)

June 17, 1955 -- The Defense Advisory Committee on Prisoners of War meets to discuss the June 8, 1955 memorandum from the Office of Special Operations. (The results of this meeting are not known.) (Source: 17 June 1955 declassified Defense Dept. memorandum)

June 28, 1955 -- A U.S. Special Agent for Army Intelligence 441st Counter Intelligence Corps files a report entitled "United States Nationals Held As Prisoners of War in China." The report lists six (6) accounts of observations of POWs in various locations in China, to include An Tung, Shen Yang, a Peiping penitentiary, Hsi Hua Farm, Ts'ao T'an Farm, and a Tai Yuan Machine Factory in Shanhsi Province. (Source: declassified Army Special Agent report.)

June, 1955 -- The list of 526 unaccounted for POWs from the Korean Conflict is reduced by this date to 450. (Source: 1960 JCS Cable)

July 25, 1955 -- An 82 page report on POWs is issued by a ten-member committee of the Secretary of Defense. The panel consists of four generals and one admiral. The report is entitled, "The Fight Continues After the Battle." The report applies a survival ratio of 62 percent to 4,735 American servicemen who have been declared "missing and presumed dead." The report concludes that the Communists should be held "strictly accountable" for (then) 470 Americans still missing.

July, 1955 -- Three of the 21 "voluntary non-repatriates" are

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returned to U.S. control. (Coward, Griggs, and Bell)

August 1, 1955 -- The Department of the Air Force 6004 Air Intelligence Service Squadron, responsible for Project American begun in July, 1954, prepares a report entitled "USAF Personnel Possibly Alive in Communist Hands." The report begins, "This report, prepared by the Escape and Evasion Section 6004th is a summary of information collected on USAF personnel 'missing in action' during the Korean hostilities." The report "lists 137 personnel who may be alive in communist prison camps." The report states that "it does not include 'possibly missing' personnel." (Source: Declassified August 1, 1955 report, including list of names and intelligence information.)

August 1-4, 1955 -- The remainder of the 15 USAF "political prisoners" are released. This includes, USAF serviceman Steve Kiba who reports to Air Force Intelligence, CIA, and the State Department, that he had seen other U.S. servicemen alive in captivity who had not been returned. (Kiba later reports that he "was ordered to forget what I had seen...and to never discuss this matter with anyone." (Source: Statement by Steve Kiba, November 4, 1978)

August 17, 1955 -- President Dwight Eisenhower signs an Executive Order committing all facilities of our Government to "establish contact with, support and obtain the release of all of our prisoners of war." (Source: 27 October 1956 declassified memorandum signed by Deputy Secretary of Defense.)

November 26, 1955 -- The United Nations Command representative to the Military Armistice Commission passes a list to the Communists of unaccounted for UNC POWs.

January 16, 1956 -- The Department of the Army in a notice to the next of kin of a U.S. POW states, "Available evidence indicates that many of the casualties which are carried on the records of the Department of Defense as missing in action in South Korea were actually captured and transported to North Korea where they subsequently died; however, specific information is lacking as to the number, identity or circumstances surrounding their disappearance." (Source: 16 January 1956 Army Board of Officers Memorandum on Sfc Lewis W. Sowles.)

February 25, 1956 -- The Communists, during a Military Armistice Commission meeting at Panmunjom, Korea, gives an accounting of some of the individuals on the UNC lists which had been passed on November 26, 1955. According to the United Nations Command, "final revisions result in a United Nations Command list of 2,233 unaccounted for POWs."

April 28, 1956 -- General Mark Clark, former Commander in Chief of the United Nations Command in Korea, states to the New York Times that three thousand United Nations soldiers captured in Korea, including 1,000 Americans, are being held as hostages by the Communists. These prisoners will be used to bargain with us at some future time -- perhaps to get a seat for Red China in the United Nations. (Source: New York Times, April 28, 1956)

May 29, 1956 -- The Assistant to the Secretary of Defense (Special Operations) sends a memorandum to the Service Secretaries stating, "...it has become apparent that only in those instances where solid evidence of the identity and location of U.S. personnel is displayed, can the Communists be made to negotiate on a practical basis...In order to strengthen the hand of the State Department representatives at Geneva as well as our military representatives at Panmunjom, it is requested that an attempt be made by your Department to consolidate any and all information now on hand and to prepare an intelligence estimate in each of the cases representing missing personnel from your services." The consolidated estimates are requested by July 1, 1956. (Source: 29 May 1956 Defense Department memorandum)

June 20, 1956 -- State Department reports that a crew member of the B-29 downed over the Sea of Japan on June 13, 1952 had been observed in October, 1953 in a Soviet hospital north of Magadan near the crossing of the Kolya River between Elgen and Debin at a place called Narionburg. The crew member reportedly had stated that he had been convicted wrongfully under Item 6 of Article 58 of the Soviet Penal Code.

Secretary of State Dulles sends a cable to U.S. Embassies in Moscow and Tokyo concerning whether it was "desirable at this time to question the Soviet Government specifically with reference to the detention of American fliers whose presence has been reported by repatriates from Soviet prison camps."

Dulles further states, "There have been reports mentioned in the communications under reference, from American, Japanese, and other sources indicating specifically the detention of American aviation personnel since 1949 and the possibility that among them are included air crew members of such lost or destroyed aircraft."

Dulles recommends an Aide-Memoire be presented to the Soviets stating:

"The United States Government has for some time received, from persons of various nationalities freed from Soviet Government imprisonment during the last several years,

reports that they have conversed with, seen or heard reports concerning United States military aviation personnel, belonging either to the United States Air Force or to the United States Navy Air arm, in actual detention in the Soviet Union...the reports concerning such personnel have now become so persistent and detailed, and so credible, that...it requests the Soviet Government to inform the United States Government in detail concerning each American military person who has been detained."

July 2, 1956 -- The Department of the Army responds to the May 29, 1956 memorandum and encloses "Data Sheets" on 188 U.S. Army personnel listed as "missing." It is stated that the data sheets are maintained by the Adjutant General and that "the information reflected therein is based on interviews of various personnel returned to military control, enemy and domestic news publications, enemy radio broadcasts, command reports, photographs, etc." (The names of 188 personnel are attached to the memorandum) (Source: 2 July 1956 Memorandum containing listing of 188 Army names.)

July 16, 1956 -- The U.S. formally presents to the Soviets the Aide-Memoire proposed by Secretary of State Dulles on June 20th concerning the presence of American POWs in the Soviet Union. The diplomatic note goes on to cite specific examples, stating "the United States Government is informed and is compelled to believe that the Soviet Government has had and continue to have under detention the following:

1. One or more members of the crew of a United States Navy Privateer-type aircraft which came down in the Baltic Sea area on April 8, 1950. The United States Government has since that time received reports that various members of the crew of this U.S. aircraft were, and are, detained in Soviet detention places in the Far Eastern area of the Soviet Union.

2. One of more members of the crew of a United States Air Force B-29 which came down on June 13, 1952. An officer, believed by the United States Government to have been a member of this crew was observed in October, 1953, in a Soviet hospital north of Magadan near the crossing of the Kolyma river between Elgan and Debin at a place called Marionburg. This officer stated that he had been wrongfully convicted under Item 6 of Article 58 of the Soviet Penal Code."

August 13, 1956 -- The Soviet Government, in response to the July 16th U.S. message, categorically denies holding any United States military personnel.

August 21, 1956 -- State Department dispatch from Vienna,

Austria, details information from a returned Austrian prisoner of war concerning an American POW named Lt. Racek, who "had been a lieutenant of armored troops in Korea, where he was captured." The Austrian source reports that Lt. Racek was held with him in Prison #2, Irkutsk, and subsequently in Lubyanka Prison in Moscow. The U.S. Embassy in Vienna reports, "Source did appear sincere in his desire to help Racek and he was altogether positive in his information."

(Source: State Department declassified cable 21 Aug. 56)

October 13, 1956 -- W.C. Daniel, National Commander of The American Legion, sends a telegram to President Dwight Eisenhower, expressing concern about U.S. POWs.

October 19, 1956 -- President Eisenhower responds to The American Legion stating that "all American servicemen known to be held prisoner by the Communists in Korea were released by September 6, 1953 (the last day of Operation Big Switch.)"

"There remained 15 USAF personnel who had been illegally retained in Communist China, in violation of the Korean armistice agreement. Through invoking the good offices of the United Nations and the assistance of friendly countries, we secured the return of these men to their homes in 1955."

"Still of concern to the United States government is a group of several hundred missing military personnel feared dead of whose exact fate we have reason to believe the Communists should have knowledge. We have never ceased to press the Communists, through both military and diplomatic channels, for an accounting of these men."

(Source: 19 October 1956 White House Communications Center copy of message from Eisenhower to Daniel)

October 27, 1956 -- Deputy Secretary of Defense Reuben Robertson sends a memorandum to the Service Secretaries requesting "that you initiate a program to screen exhaustively all files and records on each case in order to provide as completely as possible the identifying data about each person, a complete account of the circumstances surrounding his capture or disappearance, and any evidence which will demonstrate when and where the individual was in the hands of the Communists." Robertson requests that an initial report be prepared no later than 1 December 1956 and quarterly thereafter until further notice.

(Source: 27 October 1956 declassified memorandum.)

November 27, 1956 -- On behalf of the Department of the Army, Assistant Secretary of the Army Hugh Milton responds to the October 27, 1956 memorandum from the Deputy Secretary of

Defense. Milton writes, "a program has been initiated to screen all files and records and to document all information available concerning each of the men believed to have been captured in Korea and for whom no satisfactory accounting has currently been obtained." Milton encloses three summaries concerning Corporal Richard G. Desautels, Private First Class Archie Walker, and Private Frank Worley, and states "further reports will be forwarded quarterly hereafter."

(Source: 27 November 1956 Army memorandum)

January 22, 1957 -- Rear Admiral Ira Nunn at Panmunjom states to wire services, "I am sure some of these prisoners are still alive. Today's meeting (with the Communists) was called in the hope we will obtain further information on these unaccounted for prisoners we believe are alive. Also, the meeting would give some comfort to the families."

May 27, 1957 -- The Far East and Pacific Subcommittee of the House Foreign Affairs Committee holds a hearing on American prisoners of war.

The Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (Manpower, Personnel, and Reserve), Stephen S. Jackson, states:

"Shortly after the official exchange of POWs had been completed in September of 1953 officials of the U.N. Command handed the Communist side a list of 3,404 names of missing U.N. Command personnel, including the names of 944 United States servicemen of whom we had reason to believe the Communists should have some knowledge. Our belief that the Communists should have knowledge of the individuals was based upon several sources of information:

"First, interviews with repatriated personnel who stated that had seen certain named individuals who had not been repatriated, who had not otherwise been accounted for, and who had been alive and in Communist hands; secondly, Communist radio broadcasts giving the names of certain U.N. Command personnel and admitting that they were under Communist control; thirdly, propaganda pictures in our possession which had been taken by the Communists and circulated for propaganda purposes showing American military personnel on forced marches taking part in parades in Communist-held cities, undoubtedly against their will; fourthly, mail which had been written by POWs to their friends and relatives in the United States attesting to the fact that they were in a POW status; fifthly, air crews who had seen our airmen parachute from disabled aircraft and, after safe landings, surrounded enemy forces or civilians. In addition, other intelligence reporting supported our contentions."

"The point I am trying to make here is that there is considerable circumstantial evidence from which to draw the conclusion that these individuals were alive and under Communist control in relatively stable situations, removed from battle, and at periods ranging from several days to many months after they had become missing in action from their own U.N. Command units."

"The efforts of the United States Government to get the Communists to fulfill their commitments (under the Korean Armistice Agreement) have been continuous, persistent, frustrating, and largely unrewarding. In addition to efforts to secure an accounting (by the Communists) through the Military Armistice Commission, the graves registration units of the U.N. Command continued their investigations, the Military Services continued the sifting of thousands of reports, interviews with returned POWs, and the interrogation of friendly sources of Korean and other nationalities, attempting to piece together all available information which would throw light on the fate of the missing."

"Through the unilateral efforts of the United States Government, which I have just mentioned, the list of 944 had been reduced to 526 by August, 1954. This reduction came about because the efforts we had made produced conclusive evidence of death for 418 of the original list."

(Note: The Committee subsequently releases the names of 450 unaccounted for American prisoners of war, and by resolution of the House and Senate, calls on the Executive Branch to "make the return of the four hundred and fifty American prisoners of war still imprisoned by Communist forces the foremost objective of the foreign policy of the United States." H.Con.Res.140 introduced in March, 1957)

October 15, 1957 -- The American Consulate in Strasbourg, France receives information from a Polish National who had been held as a prisoner in the Russian concentration camp of Bulun, in the province of Yakutsk. The source reports having been held with three American soldiers who had been captured during the Korean War. (Source: State Department declassified cable dated 21 October 1957)

February 28, 1958 -- The Director of Collection and Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force, Colonel Harry J. Kieling, sends a memorandum to the Commander in Chief of Pacific Air Forces, Att: Director of Intelligence, entitled "Collection Requirements Pertaining to American Prisoners Held in Communist Countries."

Kieling forwards "dossiers of 187 missing USAF personnel for

your retention."

Kielling requests CINCPAC to prepare, on a one-time basis, a status report on Project American and to continue to maintain and update this program consistent with USAF objectives in recovering personnel.

July 1 - December 31, 1958 -- The U.S. Air Force, 6004 Air Intelligence Service Squadron in Japan formulates plan to "expand theatre collection efforts" on Project American. Discussions are held with Lt. Colonel Showalter, J-2, USFJ. The Squadron reports, "it is hoped that these plans may be implemented in the near future."

July 7, 1958 -- The United Nations Command passes the list of unaccounted for POWs to the Communist side at Panmunjom, asking for an accounting.

July 9, 1958 -- In a letter to Senator Knowland from the Office of the Secretary of Defense, it is stated:

"At the present time, there are approximately 450 American military personnel on whom the Department of Defense has information which indicates that they were at one time in the hands of the Communists and for whom we have not received a satisfactory accounting."

January 29, 1959 -- The United Nations Command to the Military Armistice Commission at Panmunjom inquires to the Communist side on the list of unaccounted for UNC POWs.

April 28, 1959 -- North Korean Major General Chu Chang Joon states, "We did our duty of counting your prisoners satisfactorily. The issue is all settled as far as our part is concerned."

April 29, 1959 -- President Dwight Eisenhower, at a press conference, states in response to a question on the number of POWs unaccounted for and efforts to recover them, "Now, I recall from memory that there were a great number of people that we couldn't account for, and we have had long, serious and even continuing discussions with the Chinese Communists, trying to make them disclose where our prisoners were held... We have gotten back a few and there are still some left there... but the details we would have to look up for you, and you could get them from Mr. Hagerty (White House Press Secretary James C. Hagerty.)"

Hagerty later states, "I think I can add... the chances are they are not alive, but there may be some. We just don't

know. It is because of those who may survive that we cannot give up any hope."

(Source: Public Papers of the President, No. 89 p. 88)

October, 1959 -- In an interview with Pulitzer Prize Newhouse Newspaper reporter Ed Mowery, the former chief of intelligence (G-2) of the Far East Command under General Douglas MacArthur, states, "I suggest that the assumption of presumption of death (on unaccounted for POW/MIAs) in this instance is a unilateral act by our own (Pentagon) statisticians. The Defense Department, administratively, has eliminated them from an accounting. Why not presume them alive?"

June 24, 1960 -- The United Nations Command representative to the Military Armistice Commission passes the list of unaccounted for POWs to the Communist side.

July 28, 1960 -- The Joint Chiefs of Staff reduces the list of 450 unaccounted for POWs from the Korean War (earlier reduced from 944) to 391 "largely through the efforts of U.S. Graves Registration Units and the US intelligence agencies, working with little or no cooperation or assistance from the North Koreans or Chinese Communists." The JCS states that "definite evidence of death has been established (in reducing the number) through the continuing efforts of the military services to establish the facts in each individual case."

In a public release by the Department of the Defense, it is stated:

"Although the possibility cannot be completely foreclosed that some few of them (the 391) might still be alive, there are no reliable facts to support such a conclusion."

(Source: Joint Chiefs of Staff cable dated 28 July 1960)

1961 -- A Chinese defector, Wu Shu-jen claims to have seen 70-80 Americans at a machine tools factory in Tsingtao, China (Shantung province). He claims that a factory official told him they were American POWs. (Source: testimony before the House Committee on Internal Security.)

January 16, 1961 -- The Department of the Air Force Manual No. 200-25, in an Official Use Only document, provides data information "on each of the 187 Air Force officers and airmen still missing in action as a result of the Korean conflict. It is provided for use by intelligence personnel of the United States and its allies in acquiring additional information regarding their fate."

October 11, 1961 -- President John F. Kennedy, in response to a question about the prospect of talks with the Chinese Communists, states, "We have been meeting periodically for the past three or four years, for a period at Geneva and most recently at Warsaw, in which we talked about the exchange of prisoners, or rather the release of prisoners..."

December 2, 1961 -- The Saturday Evening Post Magazine reports that the prisoners referred to by President Kennedy on October 11th are "presumably the American servicemen who were captured by the Chinese Communists during the Korean War and for whom the Communists have never made any adequate accounting. Although the State Department takes the attitude that the majority of these men are presumed dead, while "some few of them might still be alive", it is apparent that some of them at least are still considered a matter for negotiation, and that the Chinese Communists regard them as pawns in the game of power politics. If we surrender on (the question of recognizing) Formosa, it is implied, the Communists might talk about prisoners. Of course, these men may be dead but, unless many have been shot, it is hard to believe that all of them -- young men in the prime of life -- have succumbed."

January 16, 1962 -- The United Nations Command representative to the Military Armistice Commission passes the list of unaccounted for UNC POWs to the Communist side at Panmunjom, Korea.

February 5, 1962 -- A Miami News article refers to POW information from a Russian MVD intelligence officer who defected to the West in Tokyo in 1954. The agent is reported to have stated the officials in the Soviet Embassy in Tokyo had reported to him that U.S. POWs from Korea had been taken to Russia. (Note: The defector, Uri Rastvorov, was interviewed by Colonel Philip Corso in the mid-1950s)

June 4, 1962 -- U.S. Senator Thomas J. Dodd is informed by letter from the Department of State that they have a "classified list of United States citizens imprisoned in Communist countries." The State Department writes that "this is a matter of considerable sensitivity."

February 23, 1963 -- The United Nations Command representative to the Military Armistice Commission passes the list of unaccounted for UNC POWs to the Communist side at Panmunjom, Korea.

August 11, 1964 -- The list of unaccounted for UNC POWs is again passed to the Communist side at Panmunjom.

June 4, 1965 -- The list is again referred to during a MAC meeting with the Communist side.

October 11, 1966 -- The list is again referred to during a MAC meeting with the Communist side.

1967 -- Chinese defector, Wu Shu-jen, claims to have seen Americans again at a factory in Qingdao, China.

November 7, 1967 -- The list of unaccounted for UNC POWs is again referred to during a MAC meeting with the Communist side at Panmunjom, Korea.

January 23, 1968 -- The U.S. Navy reconnaissance ship Pueblo is captured by the North Koreans off the North Korean East Coast with a crew of 73 persons on board. Negotiations lead to the subsequent release of the crew.

August, 1968 -- A North Korean defector claims to have seen two American POWs on the outskirts of P'yongyang, and is reportedly told that there were 10 American pilots at this location that had been sent to North Korea during the Vietnam Conflict.

The defector is debriefed by U.S. and South Korean sources in 1980 in Seoul.

(In March, 1992, the Department of Defense refuses to honor a Select Committee request for access to the source, without compromising his identity. - Source: 9 March 1992 meeting between Chuck Wells of Defense, Staff Director Frances Zwenig, and Deputy Staff Director Dino Carluccio, subsequent March 1992 Defense Department letter to Senator Kerry/Smith)

May 26, 1969 -- The United Nations Command Senior Member sends a letter to his Communist counterpart requesting information on unaccounted for UNC POWs.

April 10, 1970 -- The United Nations Command Senior Member sends a letter to his Communist counterpart requesting information on unaccounted for UNC POWs.

April 16, 1971 -- Another letter is sent to the Communist side by the UNC requesting an accounting.

May 5, 1971 -- The Communist side at Panmunjom responds to the 16 April UNC request stating that they had "repatriated all prisoners to the UNC side" and that the United Nations Command "must return" North Korean POWs.

April 25, 1972 -- The United Nations Command sends a letter to the Communist side requesting information concerning

unaccounted for UNC POWs.

May 26, 1972 -- The Communist side responds stating that the UNC must return all North Korean POWs and that all UNC prisoners had been repatriated.

February 1, 1973 -- At a Senate hearing by the Judiciary Committee, investigating internal security laws, a former Soviet prisoner, Avraham Shifrin, testifies that he was in a concentration slave-labor camp near Kazakhstan from 1953 to 1963. He states, "First, I must ask you to excuse my English, because I cannot speak like you. I learned my English in concentration camps and my first teachers were kidnapped American officers."

May 31, 1973 -- The United Nations Command requests an accounting of POWs from the Communists at Panmunjom.

June 18, 1973 -- The Communist side at Panmunjom provides reply similar to previous years.

May 17, 1974 -- Accounting requested by UNC side.

May 28, 1974 -- The Communists provides reply similar to previous years.

1975 -- A Romanian POW since 1945, George Risou, escapes from the Soviet Union with five others. He reports 900 American POWs still held in a secret KGB prison camp. He states that Soviet authorities had assigned Russian names to American, English, French, and other POWs there, for deniability. (Source: John Brown, 2 December 1990 Sunday Oregonian.)

While speaking with a staff member of a communist embassy based in Algiers, Reverend Paul Lindstrom of Illinois reports being told that nine U.S. crewmen from a plane shot down in the Sea of Japan in 1953 were seen in August, 1973 in a Soviet slave-labor camp at Gandala. (Source: Los Angeles Times, July 8, 1990)

According to a 3/8/92 Associated Press account filed in Seoul, U.S. officials from Seoul and Washington meet in 1975 in Hawaii to plan a possible prisoner release through North Korea of Vietnam Conflict U.S. POWs. The Associated Press cites "a reliable source who attended the talks."

June 19, 1975 -- The UNC requests an accounting at Panmunjom.

June 28, 1975 -- The Communists reply similar to that of previous years.

November 2, 1975 -- In reference to the Baltic sea shootdown of a U.S. aircraft and subsequent reports that some of the crew were captured and held in Soviet prisons, the U.S. Government states they "have no reason to believe reports that 8 of the 10 crewmen were prisoners in Soviet camps." (Source: International Herald Tribune article.)

July 2, 1976 -- The UNC requests an accounting at Panmunjom.

July 12, 1976 -- The Communists reply similar to that of previous years.

August 17, 1977 -- The UNC requests an accounting at Panmunjom.

August 22, 1977 -- The Communists reply similar to that of previous years.

August 17, 1978 -- The UNC requests an accounting at Panmunjom.

August 24, 1978 -- The Communists reply similar to that of previous years.

June 20, 1979 -- A cable to the Secretary of State from the U.S. Embassy in Seoul discusses the annual submission to the Communists by the United Nations Command Military Armistice Commission of the list of unaccounted for American POWs. The cable states:

"We are aware that UNC attempted in 1971 to terminate annual submission of letters but was instructed by Defense to continue with the ritual. Although there may be lingering bureaucratic reasons for perpetuating the submission of these letters, we think it is time to stop."

August 20, 1979 -- The United Nations Command sends a letter to the Communist side at Panmunjom requesting information on unaccounted for UNC POWs.

August 29, 1979 -- The Communist side refer to their previous letters.

October, 1979 -- Romanian design engineer Serban Oprica claims to have seen in 1979 11 caucasians working on a collective farm north of Pyongyang while in North Korea on a bus tour. He is told that they were "American prisoners, prisoners of war in North Korea."

Rev. Paul Lindstrom meets with a Soviet dissident who served time in Gandala prison. Lindstrom states, "He told me that at Gandala he had spoken to two American men from the downed flight (over the Sea of Japan in 1953) as recently as 1975." (Source: Los Angeles Times, July 8, 1990)

August 8, 1980 -- The UNC sends letter to Communist side requesting information concerning unaccounted for UNC POWs.

August 13, 1980 -- Communist side refers to their previous letters.

September 3, 1981 -- The UNC sends letter to Communist side requesting information concerning unaccounted for UNC POWs.

September 17, 1981 -- The Communist side refer to their previous letters.

August 11, 1982 -- The UNC sends letter to Communist side requesting information concerning unaccounted for UNC POWs.

August 17, 1982 -- The Communist side refer to their previous letters.

November, 1982 -- In reference to the court case of Private Roger Dumas, captured during the Korean Conflict, a USG memorandum to the Office of the Secretary of the Army states, "We are in agreement that every effort to keep this matter out of the public eye should be made. It is clear from your memo that you wish no additional information be provided to the Justice Department. Your course of action seems appropriate."

December 21, 1982 -- The United Nations Command Senior Member requests the Communist side to conduct a search of the burial sites of UNC POWs at UNC POW Camp No. 5 for possible UNC remains and passes a map depicting the burial site. The Communist side ignores the request.

July 23-26, 1983 -- The status of Army private Roger Dumas, captured during the Korean Conflict, is the subject of a trial at the Federal District Court in Connecticut. After three days of hearings, the judge orders the Army to grant Dumas' brother a full hearing on the matter. As a result, in 1984, the status of Roger Dumas is changed from MIA to POW for the period 4 November 1950 until 26 February 1954. The presumptive finding of death dated 26 February 1954 is affirmed by the Adjutant General of the Department of the Army.

August 17, 1983 -- The UNC Senior Member requests the Communist side for information on unaccounted for UNC POWs. The UNC also asks the Communist side for the return of UNC remains.

August 22, 1983 -- The Communist side simply refer to their previous letters.

August 17, 1984 -- The UNC Senior Member requests the Communist side for information on unaccounted for UNC POWs. The UNC also asks the Communist side for the return of UNC remains.

August 24, 1984 -- The Communist side simply refer to their previous letters.

August 28, 1985 -- The UNC Senior Member requests the Communist side for information on unaccounted for UNC POWs. The UNC also asks the Communist side for the return of UNC remains.

August 31, 1985 -- The Washington Post does a report on the March, 1954 Hong Kong report filed by Colonel Simpson on the refugee who claimed to have seen several hundred US POWs being transferred to Russian trains in late 1951 and 1952. The Pentagon informs the Post that "they suspect, but are not certain, that they were French troops being repatriated after the French negotiated an end to the Indochina war in May, 1954."

The Pentagon fails to mention that the sightings actually took place in late 1951 before the end of the French Indochina war and the return of French POWs.

October 20, 1985 -- The North Korean Foreign Minister tells Mr. Frank Kerr of the U.S. Chosin Few veterans organization in New York that North Korea will cooperate in returning military remains if the United States formally requests a search for and recovery of U.S. war dead. (Source 4 January 1988 UNC Point Paper)

October, 1985 -- A North Korean staff officer comments informally at Panmunjom to the UNC side that North Korea "might start looking for remains if asked to do so."

November 23, 1985 -- The United Nations Command follows up asking the North Koreans to search for and repatriate UNC remains.

January/February, 1986 -- The following positions are outlined by the UNC and Communist side during discussions at Panmunjom on searching for and repatriating remains.

"UNC position: The subject of military remains is a humanitarian issue. Remains should be returned through the Military Armistice Commission

"North Korea position: The Armistice does not cover search and exhumation. It is recommended that the U.S. and North Korea have bilateral negotiations on this issue.

(Source: 4 January, 1988 UNC Point Paper.)

February 11, 1986 -- The United Nations Command sends letters to the 16 United Nations Command Member Nations requesting all available information on the status of MIA's.

February 14, 1986 -- The UNC sends letter to Communist side stating that the Military Armistice Commission should handle the remains issue, and that the remains issue involves all UN/ROK forces, not just the U.S.

March 4, 1986 -- North Korea responds at Panmunjom stating that military remains will be returned when recovered, but the Armistice Agreement does not require search and exhumation of remains.

June, 1986 -- The Pentagon states in writing that "there is a possibility that the soldiers (referred to in Colonel Simpson's 1954 report) were captured French troops being repatriated after the Indochina War." Again, the Pentagon fails to mention that the sightings took place before the repatriation of French prisoners.

June, 1986 -- Colonel Henry Land of the Office of the Secretary of Defense is quoted as saying, in reference to Korean Conflict POW/MIAs, "the bottom line is that until the North Koreans get to a position and they want to release prisoners and the remains that are up there. They will do it when they feel it is to their advantage."

The Department of Defense in its POW/MIA FactBook states, "At every opportunity, the U.S. Government continues to press for the fullest possible accounting of Americans still unaccounted for as a result of the Korean War."

August, 1986 -- The United Nations Command representative to the Military Armistice Commission passes to the North Koreans information pertaining to the location of UNC remains. The materials pinpoint burial sites associated with 13 former POW camps and a POW hospital, seven former UNC cemeteries in the North, and listed 291 crash sites from which UNC airmen had not been recovered.

September 11, 1986 -- North Korea responds stating the information had been passed to the "appropriate agencies."

December 11, 1986 -- The United Nations Command meets with representative of the Chosin Few veterans organization and briefs them on the United Nations Command position on remains negotiations.

December 18, 1986 -- The UNC sends following up letter to North Korean side asking if they have had any success in discovering remains.

December 29, 1986 -- North Korean side responds stating the information had been passed to "relevant organs."

1987 -- The U.S. Government receives information that a high ranking North-Korean diplomat is reported to have told a visiting Westerner in North Korea that his country was holding up to 2,500 sets of remains of U.S. servicemen.

July 30, 1987 -- The United Nations Command representative to the Military Armistice Commission makes the following points to the North Korean side:

1. North Korea has an obligation to return UNC remains which North Korean officials have told US veterans that they have discovered.

2. The remarks made by North Korean staff officer (October, 1985) led the United Nations Command to believe North Korea may have already discovered UNC remains.

3. The question of remains is not only an Armistice issue but also a humanitarian issue. The MAC is the appropriate agency to deal with the remains issue.

4. The UNC is prepared to negotiate a subsequent agreement similar to the one of 1954 (17 August) to eliminate any technical problem involving the question of searching for and discovery of remains.

5. The UNC is prepared to dispatch a multinational team, accompanied by the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission representative, to assist North Korea in locating UNC remains.

6. North Korea must return the UNC remains through the MAC.

North Korea states in response that the search for and recovery of remains is not an Armistice issue.

Following the MAC meeting, the UNC Senior Member holds a press conference and states that North Korea is using the remains issue in an attempt to force bilateral negotiations with nations that currently do not recognize North Korea.

October, 1987 -- A factsheet on "Americans Unaccounted for in the Korean War" is released by the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense, International Security Affairs. The factsheet begins, "The U.S. Government has ongoing efforts to achieve the fullest possible accounting of Americans missing and unaccounted for while serving their country." The factsheet concludes, "...the lack of responsiveness thus

far by the KPA (North Korea) on this issue will not blunt the determination of the U.S. Government to achieve the fullest possible accounting of Americans missing and unaccounted for as a result of the Korean War."

November 14, 1987 -- The United Nations Command in a letter to the North Korean side, requests that they return UNC remains which North Korea already has in its possession, and that the MAC will be the appropriate agency to handle the issue.

November 21, 1987 -- The North Korean side responds again stating that the issue of Korean War remains is "outside the purview of the Military Armistice Commission."

January, 1988 -- North Korea advises the United Nations Command that they would be interested in meeting to discuss the return of UNC remains. Just before the meeting to discuss returning remains, South Korea accuses the North of complicity in the KAL November, 1987 bombing. Outraged by the adverse publicity generated by South Korea, North Korea withdraws from its proposed arrangements for the return of two sets of remains which they identify by name and serial number. (Source: March, 1989 letter to Senate from Assistant Secretary of Defense.)

August 7, 1989 -- The Defense Intelligence Agency states, in response to a Freedom of Information request, that it "holds no records on those missing or captured during the Korean Conflict."

October 23, 1989 -- The Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs informs a U.S. Senator that an 18 month inquiry and review of documents, employing researchers from the National Archives, the U.S. Army Center for Military History..., had concluded that allegations that the U.S. Government abandoned POWs in World War II and Korea were "unfounded." The letter further states, "This detailed investigation failed to discover any evidence that American military personnel are being detained in the Soviet Union, China, North Korea, or any third country. This was not a preconceived conclusion, but we are not surprised. The United States has always placed a high priority on accounting for all its military personnel, living and dead."

November 9, 1989 -- The Chief of the POW/MIA Office at the Defense Intelligence Agency, Colonel Joseph A. Schlatter, responds to a letter from a next of kin of a missing serviceman from the Korean Conflict. He states:

"There is no evidence to suggest that any U.S. personnel were not released from captivity in Korea. The 389 'known to be held in North Korea' is a misleading statement that

unfortunately has gained public acceptance...There is no evidence that 389 (or any other number) Americans were held in captivity and not released at the end of hostilities." (Source: 9 November 1989 letter signed by Col. Schlatter)

December, 1989 -- The Department of Defense, in a written statement, says, "As far as we can tell, no American POWs from the Korean Conflict were taken out of North Korea and into the USSR or China, and not ever accounted for. We don't know if the Communists continued to hold any Americans after the armistice was signed, because we have never been fully satisfied with their accounting for our missing men...At present, we have no evidence that there are American POWs from that conflict being held against their will...The United States Government has never 'written off' any American service members in Korea, or anywhere else."

May 28, 1990 -- North Korea returns five sets of U.S. servicemen remains to a Congressional delegation led by Congressman Sonny Montgomery.

June 28, 1990 -- In testimony before the House Foreign Affairs Committee, Subcommittee on Asian and Pacific Affairs, Defense Intelligence Agency Deputy Director Rear Admiral Ronald Harryott states:

"Although stories have surfaced from time to time alleging that Americans are still being held by the North Koreans, Chinese, or the Soviets, there are no intelligence indicators that U.S. personnel from the Korean conflict were not returned to U.S. control at the end of the war."

"Likewise, the Soviet Union has been the central focus of U.S. and Allied intelligence activities for most of this century, and China has been watched for almost 50 years. I believe this scrutiny would have likewise revealed at least a hint of American prisoners held in either country had they been taken there. Again, no such evidence has ever surfaced."

July, 1990 -- In an interview with Major Garrett of the Washington Times, Retired General Eugene Tighe, a former Air Force intelligence agent during the Korean Conflict, states, "Let me say that intelligence reports I received left no doubt at all to me that American POWs left North Korea to go to the Soviet Union and China."

July 8, 1990 -- American Red Cross spokeswoman Donna Schneider in Seattle, Washington, states that her agency knows of 12 reported sightings of American POWs in Siberia, some as recently as the 1970's. (Source: Los Angeles Times)

In response, the Defense Department states, "...the reports may at one time have been believed... (but) there is no reason to think any Americans are currently being held as a result of the Korean War anywhere in the world."

In the same article, former director of the Foreign News Service, Zygmunt Nagorski, Jr. states that during the 1950's his foreign reporters had an extensive "source network" of truck drivers and other working-class Soviets employed at or near prisons in Molotov, Khabarovsk, Chita, Omsk, Chermoz, and elsewhere. Nagorski claims his sources informed him that there were still up to 1,000 American POWs in Siberia from the Korean War when he last had contact with them in the late 1950's. (Source: Los Angeles Times, July 8, 1990)

September 14, 1990 -- former DIA Director Lt. General Daniel Graham, states on CBN, "They (the Soviets) would come with a list of specialties and find out whether such specialties existed among the U.N. prisoners in the camps in North Korea and China...and then they would ship them off."

January 2, 1991 -- A report by the Congressional Research Service of the Library of Congress states:

"The end of the Korean War in 1953 was followed by a period of intensely bitter political relations between the US on the one hand, and the North Koreans and the Chinese on the other. The temper of the times thus could suggest that the two Communist enemies of the United States during the Korean War, as well as a Stalinist Soviet Union, might be inclined to hold live Americans -- perhaps even more so than Vietnam in the 1970's."

February, 1991 -- At the request of the Korean War Veterans Association, Senator Bob Smith begins a series of discussions with a North Korean diplomat in New York on the subject of unaccounted for POWs and MIAs from the Korean Conflict.

June, 1991 -- Senator Smith travels to Panmunjom, Korea where he meets with Vice Foreign Minister Kang Sok-Chu at Tong il Gak in North Korea. North Korea returns the remains of 11 U.S. servicemen following the meeting.

September, 1991 -- Senator Smith holds a follow-up meeting in New York with North Korean Vice Foreign Minister Kang Sok Chu, with the concurrence and participation of the State Department in an effort to establish a process to gain information on unaccounted for POWs and MIAs.

In preparation for the meeting, and in conjunction with urging from Senator Smith, the State Department proposes

in writing that "a Committee be established as a humanitarian organization separate from the Military Armistice Commission and separate from the auspices of the United Nations Command to regularize the return of MIA remains and the exchange of information about Korean War POWs and MIAs."

(Source: State Department talking point paper Sept. 1991)

The proposal is presented to the Vice-Foreign Minister, and he is informed that the U.S. would soon be presenting it formally through its Beijing channel with North Korea.

The Vice-Foreign Minister accepts the proposal "in principle."

(Source: Meeting notes Sept. 91, U.N. visit)

December 5, 1991 -- 96 U.S. Senators send a letter to Russian President Boris Yeltsin urging him "to facilitate the release of GRU and MSB intelligence reports, files or information that may ease the pain for thousands of American families who have never learned the fate of their loved ones."

January 6, 1992 -- The Chairman and Vice-Chairman of the Select Committee on POW/MIA Affairs both receive correspondence from retired Colonel Philip Corso, former National Security Staff Assistant to President Dwight Eisenhower.

Corso states: "When I was a member of the National Security Council on the White House staff under President Eisenhower (1953-1957), I interrogated Yuri Alexandrovitch Rastvorov, a Russian KGB officer who defected to the U.S. from the USSR embassy in Japan in January, 1954...Rastvorov revealed that Russian diplomats coming to Japan had seen U.S. POWs in the USSR. Rastvorov personally had seen a trainload of U.S. POWs heading into Siberia after changing trains at the Manchurian-Russian border...I submitted my report...In a few days, President Eisenhower decided not to make this information public because he was concerned about adverse effects on the families of missing POWs."

After a check with still classified documents on file with the Eisenhower Presidential Library, it is confirmed that Corso did interrogate Rastvorov after the Korean Conflict in January/February 1955. Rastvorov remains under Central Intelligence Agency protection in the United States. He is interviewed by Select Committee staff in February, 1992.

February, 1992 -- During the trip by the Select Committee on POW/MIA Affairs to Moscow, Chairman John Kerry and Vice-Chairman Bob Smith are provided with a list of 536 names

which is described by a high-ranking Russian intelligence official as U.S. POWs from the Korean Conflict who were interrogated by the Soviets, some of whom had then been sent to Communist China.

A subsequent check of the names with the National Records Center in St. Louis reveals that up to 125 of the 536 names are unaccounted for U.S. servicemen from the Korean Conflict.

Also, during the Select Committee's trip, General Dmitri Volkogonov informs the Chairman and Vice Chairman of a specific incident "after the Korean War when an American helicopter landed in North Korea." Volkogonov states that records showed the Communists denied any knowledge of the incident, but internally, North Korea had informed the USSR that "two of the fliers were captured alive."

Finally, during the trip, the Senators push for the formation of a Joint Commission on POWs.

May 13, 1992 -- North Korea releases 15 sets of U.S. servicemen remains at Panmunjom, Korea.

May 28, 1992 -- North Korea releases 15 more sets of U.S. servicemen remains at Panmunjom, Korea.

June, 1992 -- In response to a press question, Pentagon POW/MIA spokeswoman Captain Susan Stradnansky states:

"We don't have any evidence that anyone was transported from Korea to the Soviet Union."

June 9, 1992 -- The Select Committee investigator in Moscow interviews a Russian ex-prisoner who claims he was imprisoned with a Korean War American POW in the 1980's at a prison camp in the Ural Mountains. The name of the POW is reported as David Marken. Marken, according to the ex-prisoner, had told him he left for Korea in 1952, was shot down in 1953, was wounded and captured, and spent six months in a North Korean hospital. Marken told the ex-prisoner, during the time they spent together in prison, that there were approximately 50 Americans in a group in North Korea awaiting transfer to the Soviet Union, but he was transferred by military aircraft as part of a group of 5 to 10 Americans. Marken reportedly told the source he did not know where the others were. The source arrived at the Pechora camp, 500 miles north of Moscow, in September, 1982 where he met Marken and knew him until he was released in 1986. Marken was reported to be about 62 years old in 1982. The source went back to bring Marken a package of cigarettes, tea, onions, and sausage in 1989, and was told

by one of the inmates that Marken was still alive.

June 18, 1992 -- Following a request by Senator Smith to the Russian Chairman of the Joint Commission on POWs, General Volkogonov, arrangements are made five days following the request for U.S. investigators to travel to the Pechora prison camp to search for Marken. The investigation is inconclusive at best. Following the trip, another former inmate of the prison confirms that Markin had been a prisoner assigned to his work detail. Finally, another source has since surfaced from the Ukraine who reports that Markin was last seen at Knyazhpogost, Russia in January, 1991. The investigation continues.

June 19, 1992 -- In response to a request from the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Staff prepares a summary of 39 Cold War personnel involving a total of 132 U.S. personnel who are still unaccounted for. The request follows statements by Russian President Yeltsin about the existence of U.S. servicemen on the soil of the former Soviet Union following World War II, the Korean Conflict, Vietnam, and during the Cold War, and his letter to the Select Committee of POW/MIA Affairs.

June 23, 1992 -- Senator Smith releases the list of up to 125 names (from February, 1991 Moscow trip and subsequent research) of U.S. servicemen who were reportedly interrogated by Soviets during the Korean Conflict and sent to China. Senator Smith requests the Secretary of State to pursue the matter with the People's Republic of China.

June 25, 1992 -- Malcolm Toon, head of the U.S. side of the U.S. Russia Joint Commission, states, "I think we're going to end up with absolutely zero...my gut feeling is that there's nobody alive under Russian control."

July, 1992 -- The People's Republic of China Embassy in Washington releases a statement saying, "The Chinese side settled the issue of American prisoners of the Korean War long ago...all the POWs were treated in a humanitarian manner. None of the POWs under Chinese control was transferred to a third country or to Chinese territory."

August 4, 1992 -- A U.S. representative to the Joint Commission on POW/MIAs interviews a former Russian prisoner at Khabarovsk, Siberia who reports having observed three Americans who arrived at his camp in October 1952, and left three months later. Joint Commission investigators are following up on leads provided during this interview.

August 12, 1992 -- The Department of Defense releases a POW/MIA Fact Sheet in which it is stated, in reference to Korean War

era POW/MIAs, and what is being done to search of them:

"Unfortunately, there are no detailed records available from the Korean War, making today's searches difficult. The U.S. Government is prepared to accept any remains that the North Koreans may have on a purely humanitarian basis and not tied to any political or diplomatic agenda."

"Records for the Korean War era are not nearly as extensive as those for the Vietnam War, making the search for those POW/MIAs much more difficult."

In regards to Cold War incidents, it is stated:

"There are 135 individuals still unaccounted for as a result of 14 air losses during the Cold War: 10 related to the former Soviet Union, three China-related, and one Korea-related incident. The Defense Department has done a thorough review of these incidents and each will be discussed with the appropriate governments. All information held by the Department of Defense has been shared with the affected families and with the Congress."

August 19, 1992 -- Select Committee investigator in Moscow interviews Russian Colonel (retired) Gavril Ivanovich Korotkov, a Far East expert with the Scientific Research Institute, formerly part of the Soviet Ministry of Defense. Colonel Korotkov reports he served from July 1950 to mid-1954 as part of a General Staff analytical group reporting to the Commander in Chief of the Soviet Far East Military District on developments from the ongoing war in Korea. Korotkov outlines in great detail the fact the Soviets interrogated American POWs in Korea. Korotkov states that on several occasions he had visited the Soviet Naval Base at Pos'Yet, located in the USSR/China/North Korea Tri-Border Region, which served as a transit point for the movement of American servicemen north to Khabarovsk, Siberia. Although there was an airfield nearby, he believes that the bulk of the Americans transported from Pos'Yet to Khabarovsk were transported by rail, but most likely at least some of the American POWs were moved from North Korea or China by air.

Although Korotkov did not know the exact number, he states that the number of American Korean War POWs processed through Khabarovsk was in the hundreds. Korotkov states that operational directives during the Korean Conflict said that Americans should be captured alive, not killed. Korotkov further states that the North Koreans were quite willing to allow the Russians direct access and eventual control over American POWs. Finally, Korotkov states that he had personally interrogated two American POWs. He could not remember the names of any of the American POWs who were

processed through Khabarovsk, except for a Lieutenant Colonel Black. (Note: Possibly Lieutenant Colonel Vance Eugene Black, recorded as captured on November 1, 1951.)

Korotkov is reported by Select Committee investigator to be "highly credible and forthcoming."

October 27, 1992 -- U.S. investigators on the U.S./Russia Joint Commission interview a Russian citizen who served four and a half years in prison in Zimka Camp near Knyazhpogost, Russia. He reports that in the fall of 1952 or the spring of 1953, he had an encounter with an American pilot who had been shot down in North Korea and forced to land in Soviet territory near Vladivostok. The pilot said he had a plane of three, and that his radioman had been in Zimka as well. The pilot did not know what happened to the third member. The pilot remained at Zimka for three to six months, and was then transferred to an unknown location.

November 9, 1992 -- Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs Ken Quinn is scheduled to raise the POW/MIA issue during an on-going visit to the People's Republic of China.

November 10, 1992 -- Kim Il Sung continues his 44 year reign as the leader of North Korea. He undoubtedly knows the fate of several thousand unaccounted for American MIAs from the Korean Conflict.

Chairman KERRY. Folks, I know there are a lot of strong feelings on this issue. If I could just ask you to bear with us because of the Senate procedures, it would be very helpful.

Senator Kohl.

STATEMENT OF HON. HERBERT KOHL, U.S. SENATOR FROM WISCONSIN

Senator KOHL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Chairman, this is an important hearing for at least two reasons. First, there is the human pain and anguish with which we are dealing, families living for years with the nagging uncertainty and the gnawing doubts about the ultimate fate of people they love, not just soldiers or symbols or warriors, but much more importantly, fathers and brothers, husbands, uncles, and sons, human beings who had lives and hopes and dreams. On the most basic of ethical levels, we owe the families of these men a full accounting.

Tomorrow, the committee will hear from some of those families. One of my own constituents, Jane Reynolds Howard, will describe what she has done on her own to find out what happened to her husband. She is a brave and a dedicated woman. No American citizen should have to do what she has done to get the help and the information to which she is legitimately entitled.

But second, there is a question of national policy and national honor. For years, the general public thought that the POW/MIA issue was a unique consequence of the horror of Vietnam. It was in some ways symbolically appropriate that the most divisive war in our history would leave in the minds of many a legacy of abandonment, anguish, and betrayal.

But now we are beginning to sense that a crucial legacy of Vietnam may have been a continuing voice of protest, protest not against the war but rather against our failure to account for everyone we sent, protest against our failure to tell the truth, and the legacy of our so-called better wars of Korea, and World War II, and even the cold war, may have been an awful silence, an acceptance on faith of the Government's word, and the Government's gift of a tomb to honor an unknown soldier whose body metaphorically represented the remains of everyone who did not come home.

Those so-called good wars took place in a simpler time, before the credibility gap, before cynicism and doubt became a part of the fabric of American life. Some might say we would be better served if we left it at that way, if we kept our doubts and our fears quiet, if we just let it be, but there are people who deserve an answer, and there is a Nation that needs to know what war is all about, not only the horror of the battlefield but the terror of the camps and the prisons and the gulags.

We do not yet know what the consequences of this investigation will be, but we hope and believe that ultimately, no matter what the pain, the truth will set us free.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

[The prepared statement of Senator Kohl follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF SENATOR HERBERT KOHL

This is an important hearing for at least two reasons.

First, there is the human pain and anguish we are dealing with. Families living for years with the nagging uncertainty and the gnawing doubts about the ultimate fate of people they love. Fathers and brothers and husbands and uncles and sons. Not just soldiers. Not just symbols. Not just warriors. But people. Human beings who had lives and hopes and dreams. On the most basic of ethical levels, we owe the families of these men an accounting.

Tomorrow, the committee will hear from some of those families. One of my own constituents, Jane Reynolds Howard, will describe what she has done—on her own—to find out what happened to her husband. She is a brave and dedicated woman. But no American citizen should have to do what she has done to get the help and information she is legitimately entitled to.

But second, there is a question of national policy. And national honor. For years the general public thought that the POW/MIA issue was a unique consequence of the horror of Vietnam. It was, in some way, symbolically appropriate that the most divisive war in our history would leave, in the minds of many, a legacy of abandonment, anguish, and betrayal.

But now we are beginning to sense that Vietnam's real legacy may have been a continuing voice of protest. Protest not against the war but rather against our failure to account for everyone we sent. Protest against a failure to tell the truth.

And the legacy of our "better" wars—of Korea and World War II and even the cold war—may have been an awful silence. An acceptance, on faith, of the Government's word and the Government's gift of a Tomb to honor an Unknown Soldier whose body metaphorically represented the remains of everyone who did not come home.

Those "good wars" took place in a simpler time. Before the credibility gap. Before cynicism and doubt became a part of the fabric of American life. Some might say we would be better served if we left it that way. If we kept our doubts and fear quiet. If we just let it be.

But there are people who deserve an answer. And there is a Nation which needs to know what war is all about: not just the horror of the battle field, but the terror of the camps and the prisons and the Gulags as well.

We do not know what the consequences of this investigation will be. But we do believe that, ultimately, no matter what the pain, the truth will set us free.

Chairman KERRY. Thank you, Senator Kohl. Senator McCain.

Senator MCCAIN. I have no opening statement.

Chairman KERRY. Senator Grassley.

STATEMENT OF HON. CHARLES E. GRASSLEY, U.S. SENATOR FROM IOWA

Senator GRASSLEY. Mr. Chairman, the research and documented discoveries of prisoners of war left behind from wars before Vietnam are both startling and troubling. The emergence of this information from dormant and dusty archives is a result of cooperation between American citizenry and their Government.

Students and researchers of the POW/MIA issue from the Korean war, World War II, World War I and the cold war, have been way ahead of the Government in terms of uncovering answers. In a way, because the American public has played such an active role in the research, we are likely to discover more answers.

The competitive spirit of independent researchers, unobstructed by Government bureaucracy and by classification restrictions, will uncover in a very short number of years whatever the Government can cover up for decades. There are additional such hurdles to overcome, but there are fewer than those impeding research of the Vietnam war.

Those who have led the way in researching these earlier wars are to be commended for their dedication and perseverance. The importance of examining the POW/MIA issue of wars preceding Vietnam is to gain an awareness of the precedent for the Communist policy of retaining prisoners of war at the conclusion of hostilities.

ities. If Communist regimes held back prisoners after World War II and Korea, why are we so naive to think that the Vietnamese would not do likewise?

Similarly, we discover in reviewing archived documents that the mind set to debunk did not originate with DIA from 1973 forward. Debunking may have been the oldest established practice of a bureaucracy. We will see examples that today, as it occurred following earlier wars, the practice has merely been refined over time.

I regret that this committee was not able to spend more time and effort in researching the POW/MIA issue from these earlier conflicts, because the truth does deserve to be known.

At a minimum, this committee should ensure that the declassification process extends to all information from these wars as well, and that unfettered access to archive materials is given to private researchers who will, over time, unveil the truth.

So Mr. Chairman, I commend you for conducting these hearings, and especially the vice chairman, who has made this area a major focus of attention. I congratulate you not for the good that is going to come just from families knowing the fate of loved ones, but we have to reestablish for people who serve now and who will defend freedom in future wars, that when we tell people who are in the military that if they are taken prisoner they will not be forgotten, that in fact we do mean it.

Chairman KERRY. Thank you very much, Senator Grassley.

Before I turn to Senator Reid, let me just say on behalf of the committee, so that folks know who are following this particular issue particularly closely and are involved in seeking the truth on it, I am confident that in our final report—and we will begin some discussions, as you know, very shortly regarding our findings—that one of the things we will do is recommend a very specific process and structure (and I know the vice chairman and I are in agreement on this) as to how this will be specifically followed up on.

So while this committee's existence may in fact terminate as of December, the legacy of this committee we hope will be a several-part process whereby the Soviet/Chinese piece and also the Indo-Chinese, the Vietnam piece, et cetera, will both be proceeding down different tracks with mechanisms in place that ensure the process of continued accounting, and I know that this committee is going to be determined to see that happen.

So I do not want people saying well, God, we just scratched the surface today. We know we are only opening doors today, but we will not forget this, as the Senator from New Hampshire has said, and we will guarantee there is some mechanism recommended to President Clinton.

Senator Reid.

STATEMENT OF HON. HARRY REID, U.S. SENATOR FROM NEVADA

Senator REID. Mr. Chairman, last Friday I spent the evening with a Korea combat veteran. He was very badly wounded on a cold, dark winter night on a mountaintop in faraway Korea. He still carries the scars of that war and thinks of it every day as he straps on his artificial limb—his leg.

As my friend went with me through a new book he had received just a few days before on the history of the Indianhead Division in Korea, he spoke of the war in very specific terms, which included those that did not come home either through death, capture, or simply being unaccounted for.

Many years have passed since the war years in Korea. For those who, like my friend, have memories there and loved ones there, the pain is still with them, and it is too bad that we will not have the time or means to adequately address those left behind in Korea.

Mr. Chairman, I very much appreciate your statement just made that even though this committee will not be involved in the specificity that it would take to look into the problems of that war in the early fifties, I think it is important that we do outline a program, as you said we will do, that those in the private sector and those in Government who have responsibilities to do so will do a better job than has been done in years past.

Chairman KERRY. Thank you very much, Senator Reid. Senator Daschle.

Senator DASCHLE. Mr. Chairman, I have no opening statement.

Chairman KERRY. Senator Robb.

Senator Robb. Mr. Chairman, I have no opening statement.

Chairman KERRY. Thank you very much.

If I could now ask each of the members of the first panel if they would rise so we can swear you in.

[Witnesses sworn.]

Chairman KERRY. If you would—I think, Mr. Secretary, are you going to lead off?

Mr. PTAK. Yes, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman KERRY. If you would just identify yourself.

TESTIMONY OF ALAN C. PTAK, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR POW/MIA AFFAIRS

Mr. PTAK. My name is Alan Ptak. I am Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for POW/MIA Affairs. On my left is Captain Phil Gay, who is from the joint staff. On my right is Dr. Paul M. Cole, who is with the RAND Corporation and is under contract to my office to do work on Korea and basically finding answers in Russia. On his right is Charlie Kartman from the Department of State.

First of all, what I would like to do is say thank you very much for the opportunity to be here. I have submitted a lengthy statement that I would like to have entered into the record, if I may. I have drawn upon the joint commission's interim report for much of what is in my lengthy prepared statement, and again I would like to say thank you very much for the opportunity to be here.

This hearing provides me an opportunity to tell you and the American people about the many efforts now underway to address the POW/MIA issue as it pertains to the Korean war and the cold war, and what I would like to do now is make a brief statement just to kind of summarize my remarks, if that is OK, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman KERRY. It is all right, and let me just say that in each case the full testimony will be placed in the record as if read in full.

Mr. PTAK. Because of our current efforts are primarily a result of the work of the U.S.-Russian Joint Commission on POW/MIAs, I believe that it is important to provide the committee with some background and recent accomplishments of the commission and put those accomplishments in perspective with past U.S. Government efforts to account for our missing servicemen.

Although I believe we still have far to go before we can claim total success, it is important to understand that the movement we are seeing today in light of decades of Communist denial and stonewalling is truly amazing, and I would like to preface my remarks by saying that many of the comments that were made earlier by the members of the committee concerning knowledge, focus on facts, getting the truth, and so forth, I think is what we are trying to do in the Department of Defense and the Government in general, and particularly on the commission.

First, a brief history. The need to account for our missing service personnel and the unprecedented opportunities for cooperation arising from the demise of the Soviet Union motivated the United States and Russia to establish a joint commission on POW/MIAs. From its inception last March, the joint commission has given priority to determining whether unaccounted-for Americans are being held against their will in the former Soviet Union, and if so, insisting upon their immediate return.

Mr. Rich Kauzlarich, the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Canadian and European Affairs, will appear tomorrow to discuss in greater detail the genesis of the joint commission, its structure, and the progress we have made with our Russian counterparts.

However, just briefly, Ambassador Toon, as you know, is the chairman of the U.S. delegation. He has designated my office as the executive secretariat. In fact, I brought with me members of my office, and in particular Mr. Ed Ross who is the executive secretary, and our job is to coordinate joint commission efforts and to implement policy decisions formulated by all the commissioners on the joint commission.

We provide policy guidance and operational direction to Task Force Russia, the organization created by the Department of the Army to acquire and analyze data provided by the Russian side.

Secretary Cheney designated the Army to provide operational support to the joint commission, and Senator Smith, I agree with you, I think the Joint Task Force Russia has done an outstanding job in just a very short time, and I would be remiss if I didn't also give credit to the Task Force Russia's counterpart, Joint Task Force Full Accounting, their counterpart in Southeast Asia under General Needham. I think they, too, have made a great deal of progress.

Task Force Russia pursues leads concerning U.S. POWs through interviews and access to archival records. This information is checked to determine its value and reliability. Once the validity is confirmed, the information is released to the next of kin through the appropriate casualty affairs office, and I think this is an important point.

From both Task Force Russia and Joint Task Force Full Accounting, as we get information we check for its validity and its veracity, we make sure that that information is passed to the casual-

ty offices of each service—Army, Navy, Air Force and Marines—so that they can get that information to the families. The families are our number one concern.

This, of course, is our most important objective—getting the answers to the loved ones of our missing servicemen. Task Force Russia is directed by Major General Bernard Loeffke, and he will be here tomorrow to discuss his organization at greater length.

Well, what are our accomplishments to date? The joint commission organized its efforts into four areas: Vietnam, Korea, the cold war, and World War II, so I would like to briefly discuss the commission's accomplishments as they apply to Korea and the cold war.

The joint commission plays a crucial role in the U.S. Government's efforts to account for missing servicemen from the Korean war. The commission's work focuses on information obtained by the Soviets through combat and intelligence operations in North Korea.

We are aggressively pursuing leads on missing servicemen developed both through human and documentary sources, and I guess it is important to say here that this is kind of a two-pronged approach. You have the archival research, you try to get into documents, you try to get information that way, but then you also conduct interviews with people.

In the case of World War II, some of the individuals that we would try to interview, as you would expect, are getting up in years. In some of the other conflicts, we have a greater opportunity to get to those individuals.

The Russians have already provided over 700 pages of documents that have allowed us to identify 10 unaccounted-for servicemen from Korea as having been captured and interrogated by the North Koreans, and it was not previously known that these individuals were captured.

This is significant information and, although it does not constitute an accounting by any means, it does tell us that these individuals were at one time alive and in enemy control. As yet, we have seen no documentation indicating that the Soviets interrogated American POWs or that POWs were transferred to the Soviet Union from Korea.

We believe that interviews with former Soviet officials will be the most promising source of information for Korean war losses. We have interviewed ex-Soviet military officers who claim to have participated in interrogation of U.S. POWs.

This past September, the U.S. delegation traveled to Khabarovsk in Eastern Siberia to investigate these reports. Although we discovered no information on American POWs, local Russian officials pledged to cooperate fully with the commission. Another point I'd like to emphasize is, if we have a bit of information and we try to track it down, and maybe we don't get any positive results, it doesn't mean that we close that particular case. We keep looking for more information.

We suspect that information on Soviet involvement with American POWs from the Korean war would have been very highly classified and accessible only to high-level Soviet officials and to those directly involved in the project. We will therefore continue to

pursue this matter vigorously through interviews and public appeals for information. I am hopeful that with an aggressive investigative strategy, we can make some real progress.

The one area in which I believe we can make the most progress is the cold war. For the most part, the cold war incidents are well-known, well-documented, and involve a small number of unaccounted-for servicemen. The joint commission has focused its efforts on 10 incidents which occurred between 1950 and 1965. In these 10 incidents 90 U.S. crewmembers are unaccounted for.

Despite the lack of conclusive evidence, we do not rule out the possibility that crewmen from these aircraft may have survived their loss incident long enough to have been rescued by the Soviets. Information on the possible survival of any of these men has been limited to U.S. debriefs of repatriots from the 1950's, which provide second-hand reports that some of the missing American crewmen were sighted in Soviet prisons.

Although we lack conclusive evidence to support these claims, we are pursuing these efforts with vigor, and the joint commission will continue to demand a full accounting of each case, whether or not we have information indicating that the individual survived.

We have provided the Russians very specific data on these 10 incidents, including names, dates, aircraft types, and last-known locations. Even with this information, the Russians have supplied only limited documentation, and basically we've done this twice, where I actually participated, where we gave for each loss incident the date, the type of aircraft, the listing of all the crewmen, and so on but, as I mentioned, we still have only limited information from the Russians.

Clearly, these cases lend themselves to resolution. We believe the Russian Government should be able to provide information on each case regardless of whether or not any of the crew survived. I am hopeful that we can move quickly toward full disclosure about these tragic casualties of the cold war.

This concludes my remarks concerning the joint commission, but I have a few comments on the department's efforts outside of the joint commission to account for missing servicemen from Korea. Outside the joint commission, we are currently engaged on two fronts to account for missing servicemen from Korea—the United Nations Command Military Armistice Commission, UNCMAC, and a study contracted to the RAND Corporation.

UNCMAC represents 16 nations who joined the South Koreans against North Korean aggression, and they have continued to press the North Koreans for the repatriation of remains of United Nations servicemen since the termination of hostilities in 1953.

In 1953, a total of 3,748 U.S. POWs were released, and in 1954 the remains of 1,868 U.S. servicemen were repatriated. Of these remains, the identities of 866 were unknown. There are still over 8,100 U.S. servicemen who have never been accounted for. These include servicemen buried in temporary cemeteries, those lost at sea, and those reported as missing.

Other than the repatriations in 1953 and 1954, there has been little progress, despite the continued efforts of the United States and UNCMAC, to account for these missing servicemen. UNCMAC

has on numerous occasions to urged the North Koreans to cooperate.

In 1986, UNCMAC presented the North Koreans with a complete listing of known cemetery and POW camp sites in the North along with a list of U.N. servicemen. In response, the North Koreans steadfastly deny that they are holding any Americans as POWs or warehousing remains.

As you are aware, Mr. Vice Chairman, in 1990 and 1991 the North Koreans repatriated the remains of 5 and 11 servicemen respectively with the support of Congressman Montgomery and yourself. In May of this year, the North Koreans repatriated 30 sets of remains to the United Nations Command.

Although none of the remains returned since 1990 have been identified, this cooperation is promising. Only time will tell if this is a portent of increased cooperation or just another in a series of frustrations in dealing with the North Korean Government on this issue.

The task of accounting for missing Americans from the Korean war is complicated by the fact that the historical record of that conflict is incomplete. To address this problem, my office has contracted with the RAND Corporation to examine the POW/MIA issue and U.S.-North Korean relations. Dr. Cole will provide the committee with more details later in his statement.

In addition, the U.S. Army Central Identification Lab in Hawaii—CIL-HI—has undertaken the massive task of creating a comprehensive Korean war casualty base. This will contribute significantly in accounting for those who are missing and identifying repatriated remains.

In closing, I want to reassure this committee that the Defense Department has not forgotten those unaccounted-for servicemen from World War II, the Korean war, the cold war, as well as Vietnam. Time and the intransigence of Communist regimes are formidable obstacles, but despite these obstacles the U.S. Government has and continues to endeavor to account for our fellow countrymen. We are determined to do everything possible to obtain a full accounting. Our fellow countrymen and their families deserve no less.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Ptak follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF ALAN C. PTAK

Good afternoon, Mr. Chairman. I want to thank the committee for inviting me here today. This hearing provides me an opportunity to tell you and the American people about the many efforts underway to address the POW/MIA issue as it pertains to World War II, the Korean war and the cold war. Since the U.S.-Russia joint Commission plays a significant role in this issue, I believe that it is important to provide an overview of the structure, accomplishments and expectations of the Commission which was established in March 1992. Final judgments about the Commission's success are premature. We still have much work to complete. Nonetheless, it is important to understand how the Commission works and where it is going. I would like to preface my remarks by stating that it is not within my competence or area of responsibility to dwell upon actions or decisions made by previous administrations almost 40 years ago, when an adversarial tone marked relations between the United States and the Russians. Also, the level of cooperation we now enjoy would have been simply unthinkable in the past.

STRUCTURE

The compelling need to account for our missing service personnel and the unprecedented opportunities for cooperation arising from the demise of the Soviet Union motivated the United States and Russia to establish a Joint Commission on POW/MIAs. The Commission began its work in Moscow on March 26, 1992. From its inception, the Joint Commission has given priority to determining whether any American POW/MIAs are being held against their will in the former Soviet Union and, if so, insisting upon their immediate return. The Joint Commission's other priorities are locating and identifying remains of U.S. Soldiers, and obtaining information which will account for missing service personnel.

Ambassador Malcolm Toon chairs the U.S. Delegation to the Commission. U.S. Commissioners include Senators John Kerry and Bob Smith; Congressmen John Miller and Pete Peterson; Defense Intelligence Chief of Staff A. Denis Cliff; Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European and Canadian Affairs Richard Kauzlarich; Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs Kenneth Quinn; the Assistant Archivist of the United States, Dr. Trudy Peterson and myself. The Russian delegation is headed by Col.-Gen. Dmitriy Volkogonov, one of President Yeltsin's top advisers, with representation from the Russian Ministries of Defense, Foreign Affairs, Security, Internal Affairs, the Foreign Intelligence Service, and the Russian Parliament.

We have had three meetings of the Commission Inaugural session in March 1992, a special meeting held in June following President Yeltsin's comments on POWs at the June Summit with President Bush, and one held in September. Another session is scheduled for mid-December 1992. In addition, a working level meeting was held in May.

Ambassador Toon has designated my office as the Executive Secretariat to coordinate this effort and to implement policy decisions formulated by Commissioners.

The Executive Secretariat provides Commission policy guidance and assigns operational taskings to Task Force Russia, the Department of the Army Office created to acquire and analyze data provided by the Russian side of the Commission.

Task Force Russia was established by the Secretary of the Army in his role as the Commission's Executive Agent. The Task Force is directed by Maj. Gen. Bernard Loeffke. Archivists, historians and an interpreter in Task Force Russia's Moscow office pursue all leads concerning U.S. POWs through interviews and access to archival records. The Task Force's Headquarters in Washington translates, analyzes, and compares this information to existing U.S. Databases to determine its value and reliability. Once the data's validity is confirmed, it is released to the next of kin through the appropriate Casualty Affairs Office.

Task Force Russia has a combined staff of 35, including 7 persons on the ground in Moscow. It has already analyzed approximately 1,600 pages of documentation and conducted 92 interviews. With the addition of this Task Force, there are now 550 Department of Defense personnel working the POW/MIA issue.

ACCOMPLISHMENTS TO DATE

In order to better focus the Commission's work, we organized the Commission's efforts into four parts: the Vietnam war, Korean war, cold war and World War II. I will discuss the Commission's accomplishments as they apply to each of these four conflicts.

A. Vietnam war: determining whether any U.S. Service personnel are still being held in the former Soviet Union against their will is our top priority. We have therefore emphasized the importance of interviews with former Soviet officials who might have served in a civilian or military capacity in Vietnam or neighboring countries. We have interviewed ex-Soviet military officers and diplomats who served in Indochina. Despite having vigorously examined every lead, to date we have no conclusive evidence supporting claims that U.S. POWs were transferred to the Soviet Union. It is also important to note that some of these key individuals, including the former Soviet Ambassador to Laos, have refused to be interviewed by the Commission.

We are also examining data from Russian archives. We have received several documents from the Russian side of the Commission concerning the Vietnam war. None of those documents, however, indicates that any U.S. POWs were transferred from Indochina to the U.S.S.R. Furthermore, our Russian counterparts on the Commission maintain that no archival information has yet been discovered indicating that any U.S. POWs from the Vietnam war were interned in the U.S.S.R., or that Soviet personnel ever participated in interrogations of U.S. POWs during the Vietnam war.

Given the sensitivity of information concerning Soviet involvement with U.S. POWs from Vietnam, and Russia's restriction on the release of such material (most of which remains classified by the Russians) we expect further progress from Russian archival material to be slow. We therefore feel that personal interviews will prove to be a much more lucrative source of immediate information.

B. Korean war: the U.S.-Russia Joint Commission is working hard to account for missing Americans from the Korean war about whom the Russians may have knowledge resulting from Soviet involvement in that conflict. Task Force elements in Russia and here in Washington are aggressively developing and pursuing leads through documentary and individual sources on the fates of missing Americans from the Korean war.

For example, the Russians have already provided over 700 pages of documents that have allowed us to identify 10 American servicemen, previously listed as simply unaccounted for, as having been captured and interrogated. But we have seen no archival documentation indicating that the Soviets interrogated American POWs or transferred them to the Soviet Union. On this basis, the Russians continue to maintain their denial of any major involvement with American POWs.

As I have already stated, we believe that interviews with former Soviet officials will be the most fruitful sources of information about Korean war POWs. We have interviewed 3 ex-Soviet military officers who claim to have participated in interrogations of U.S. POWs. The U.S. Delegation to the joint Commission traveled to Khabarovsk this past September to investigate these reports. Although we discovered no new information, local Russian prison officials and archivists pledged to cooperate with the Commission. Ambassador Toon broadcast an appeal on regional radio calling on citizens with information on American POWs to come forward with their stories.

In view of what we have learned so far, we suspect that information on Soviet treatment of American POWs from the Korean war would have been highly classified by the Soviets and accessible only to those directly involved and to key decision makers. We will therefore continue to pursue this matter vigorously through interviews, public appeals and cooperative arrangements with Russian archives.

C. cold war aircraft losses: we have focused our efforts on 10 shootdown incidents which occurred between 1950 and 1965 involving 90 crewmembers unaccounted for. Despite the lack of conclusive evidence, we do not rule out the possibility that members of these crews may have survived the loss incident long enough to be rescued by Soviet units. U.S. debriefs from the 1950's provide second-hand evidence that individuals matching the descriptions of members of a few of these crews were sighted in Soviet prisons; however, we lack conclusive evidence of such prisoners.

In order to expedite archival searches, we have provided the Russians highly specific data—including names of service members involved, dates, last known locations, and aircraft types—on these 10 incidents. Despite this assistance, the Russians have only supplied limited documentation to date on these cases. However, the Russian side of the Commission has promised to provide us pertinent information, and now appears more willing to pass data on crewmembers who did not survive these incidents. Furthermore, we are encouraged that in September, the Russian side, for the first time, included representatives of the border guards in the Commission's work. We hope the border guards' archives will provide further insight on these shootdowns.

D. World War II: most of the information provided by the Russians to date pertains to World War II. General Volkogonov has said that Soviet authorities may have not repatriated all American servicemen who found themselves on Soviet-controlled territory at the end of World War II. Nonetheless, most of the material we have received from the Russians concerns individuals who were returned to American military control rather than those who were not repatriated. During the Commission's September meetings in Moscow, the Russians gave us access to the archives of the Soviet Army and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. We believe that this should shed further light on the fate of U.S. POWs who found themselves on Soviet territory at the end of World War II and were not repatriated. Dr. Cole from Rand will provide more specifics in his testimony.

E. Information given to the Russians: both as a humanitarian gesture and as a sign of our desire to be responsive to Russian POW concerns, we have provided the Russians specific information on several Soviet POWs and MIAs. During the September 1992 meetings in Moscow, Ambassador Toon passed General Volkogonov the names of 17 former Soviet soldiers from the Afghan war who the U.S. Government believes are currently living in the West. Ambassador Toon also provided Volkogonov with the names of three Soviet sailors whose bodies were recovered by the United States. In 1974, after their submarine sank in the Pacific in 1968; Ambassa-

dor Toon further noted the United States recovered three additional bodies which it could not identify. This information was passed in the hope that this sign of reciprocity would encourage further cooperation from Russian officials.

F. Joint efforts: in addition to interviews and archival searches, we are encouraged by a range of additional joint efforts we have undertaken with the Russians. Ambassador Toon and General Volkogonov appeared together on Russian national television in March and September 1992, appealing to Russian citizens to provide the Joint Commission any information they might have on U.S. POWs. Similar appeals have also been made in Russian newspapers. These appeals resulted in contact from Russian citizens offering information which may relate to U.S. POWs.

With our Russian counterparts, we have also jointly investigated possible leads on U.S. POWs in St. Petersburg as well as in remote Russian sites such as Khabarovsk, Vorkuta, Totma and Pechora. The Russians worked with us to execute these trips quickly and professionally. During our visit to Khabarovsk, we were accompanied by top officials of Russian security ministries, including a general from the Ministry of Internal Affairs who is the director of the Russian prison system. These officials were professional and helpful.

Top-level Russian support for our efforts is unprecedented. During Ambassador Toon's meeting with President Yeltsin in September, Yeltsin pledged his full commitment to uncovering the truth about U.S. POWs in the former U.S.S.R. Shortly after that meeting, Yeltsin directed by Presidential decree all relevant Russian ministries by to cooperate fully with the Commission. General Volkogonov is clearly dedicated to working with us on this issue. Ambassador Toon has also discussed this effort during his meetings with other top Russian officials, including Vice President Rutskoi, Director of the Foreign Intelligence Service Primakov, Minister of Security Barannikov, and former GRU head of Military Intelligence Timokhin.

With this high-level support, we believe we have seen some movement on the part of the Russian security services toward a more cooperative relationship with the Commission. For the first time, during our September meetings in Moscow, representatives of the Russian security services participated in Commission discussions. This is not to say that the security services have transformed themselves into partners; on the contrary, we believe bureaucrats within these services, who have been trained to distrust the United States, continue to impede the Commission's progress. Eliminating this bureaucratic inertia and anti-U.S. bias will take time and continued resolve on our part.

EXPECTATIONS

Having gone through the structure and accomplishments of the Commission, I would now like to discuss future expectations for the Commission.

The Commission is planning its next plenary session in Moscow during the week of December 14. This session will afford us another opportunity to measure our progress. During these meetings, we will examine whether President Yeltsin has fulfilled his pledge to Ambassador Toon to overcome Russian bureaucratic resistance to the Commission. We will also wish to see whether General Volkogonov achieves his goal of determining by year's end which archives contain material relevant to our program. We hope to stimulate progress in archival research by expanding our pilot programs with individual Russian archives to include at least some of those which, until recently have been off limits. We have already established cooperative programs with the central Soviet Army archives and the archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, in which Russian archivists have been tasked to search for data on U.S. POWs for a 3-month trial period. If the programs prove successful, we will extend them. We hope the evidence arising from these projects will reverse Russian bureaucratic inertia by building enthusiasm among Russian archivists to cooperate with the Commission.

We will follow up on a wide range of individual topics that have surfaced from the documents provided to us at our meeting in September. We will conduct further interviews with former Soviet diplomats, representatives from the intelligence community, and military activists whom we met at our last meeting. This will require us to consolidate data we are receiving from knowledgeable individuals throughout the former U.S.S.R. And in the Soviet emigre community. We will also attempt to attract interviewees by continuing our public appeals in the Russian media, and through voice of America broadcasts.

In addition, we will continue joint visits with the Russians to locations outside of Moscow which we believe may be linked to U.S. POWs. Combined with media efforts to publicize the Commission's work, we expect site visits to keep the public spotlight on our efforts and encourage those with information to step forward as a civic duty.

Finally, Task Force Russia will acquire its full complement of 40 full-time personnel, including 30 persons in Washington and 10 in Moscow.

CONCLUSIONS

This report provides a snapshot of a dynamic process unfolding during a period of unprecedented opportunity. It is our hope that the support for the Commission demonstrated by President Yeltsin and General Volkogonov will convince those that may be reluctant that it will be in everyone's best interest, including their own, if they cooperate. This will require patience and perseverance. Nevertheless, the humanitarian nature of the Commission's work has struck a sympathetic note with many Russians, whose own losses and suffering in past wars serve as a strong ally in our efforts to account for our missing servicemen.

Now that I have provided you an overview of the Joint Commission, I would like to discuss the other approaches we are taking to account for missing American servicemen from the Korean war.

In addition to the work of the Joint Commission on the Korean war, we are currently engaged on 2 fronts, the United Nations Command Military Armistice Commission (UNCMAC), and a Rand Corporation study, in our efforts to account for missing American servicemen from that conflict. UNCMAC, which represents the 16 nations who joined the South Koreans in the conflict, has continued to press the North Koreans for the repatriation of the remains of unaccounted for U.N. servicemen since the termination of hostilities in 1953. During operations little switch and big switch in 1953, a total of 3,748 U.S. POWs (out of a U.N. Total of 13,457) were repatriated. In 1954, the remains of 1,868 U.S. servicemen (out of a U.N. Total of 4,023) were repatriated in operation glory. Of these remains, 866 were declared unknown.

However, there are still over 8,100 U.S. servicemen (out of a U.N. Total of over 10,200) whose remains have never been accounted for. These include servicemen buried in U.N. temporary cemeteries in territory overrun by the enemy, those lost at sea, and others simply reported as missing. This number also includes 389 Americans about whom the North Koreans should have knowledge. Information gathered from intelligence sources and POW debriefings suggested that these were individuals who were possibly captured or lost in North Korean territory, and if deceased, their remains were under enemy control.

Other than the repatriations in 1953 and 1954, there has been little progress, despite the continuing efforts of the United States and UNCMAC, to account for these missing servicemen. The UNCMAC has attempted to influence the other side by returning the remains of 4 Chinese soldiers discovered in the Republic of Korea and by returning the bodies of North Korean civilians who had drowned in a post-war accident and washed ashore in the south. In 1986, UNCMAC passed a complete listing of known cemetery and POW camp sites in the north along with the list of U.N. servicemen, including the 389 Americans, about whom we believe the North Koreans should know something. In response to reports of alleged sightings of American POWs still held in their country, the North Koreans have steadfastly denied that they are holding any Americans as POWs from the war.

Not all of the missing Americans are presumed to be in the north. You must remember that in the early stages of the war, the enemy overran most of the Korean peninsula. They had immediate control of the battlefields and any POWs were subjected to tortuous marches back north, many dying along the way. In 1984, in South Korea, the U.S. Army excavated a battle site based on information received from representatives of project freedom, an organization which was seeking the recovery of remains in the south. However, none of the exhumed remains were determined to be American. In mid-1985, after extensive research into archive material, army personnel determined that excavation of a different battle site would not be warranted because of previous, well documented searches by graves registration personnel.

In 1990 and 1991, the North Koreans turned over the remains of 5 and 11 servicemen, respectively, through the auspices of Congressman Montgomery and Senator Smith. In May of this year, the North Koreans turned over 30 sets of remains to the United Nations Command. Despite the fact that none of the 46 remains returned since 1990 have been identified, the new-found willingness of the North Koreans to deal with the United Nations Command without a defined U.S. Government presence, and to negotiate on a more regular basis for the repatriation of remains is promising. Only time will tell if this a portent of increased cooperation, or just another in a long series of frustrations in dealing with the North Koreans on this issue.

Part of the problem in accounting for missing Americans from the Korean war is that the historical record of that conflict is incomplete. In order to correct that prob-

lem and provide better policy support, we have initiated two projects. My office has contracted with the Rand Corporation to develop an historical perspective on the issue. The study reviews and analyzes our efforts over the last 40 years to account for the missing in order to identify and resolve inconsistencies and inaccuracies in past positions. Dr. Cole will be providing you with more complete details on his study in his statement. The U.S. Army Central Identification Laboratory in Hawaii (CIL-HI) has undertaken the massive task of creating a comprehensive Korean war casualty data base. This will significantly aid us in our accounting of who is missing and identifying repatriated remains.

In closing, I want to reassure this committee and the American people that the Department of Defense has not forgotten those servicemen who remain unaccounted for from the Korean war. The lack of historical continuity and the conditioned restraint, and even intransigence, of our former Korean and cold war enemies are imposing obstacles. We are determined, however, to do everything possible to continue our efforts to account for these Americans. They and their families deserve no less.

Thank you.

Chairman KERRY. Dr. Cole?

TESTIMONY OF DR. PAUL COLE, ANALYST, RAND CORPORATION

Dr. COLE. Mr. Chairman, Senator Smith, members of the committee, I would like to thank you for the opportunity to appear today. Before I proceed, however, I would like to note that the views and conclusions expressed in these remarks are my own, and should not be interpreted as representing those of the RAND Corporation or any of the agencies sponsoring its research.

I am here to discuss World War II, Korean war, and cold war MIA/POW issues as they are illuminated by archive research. This statement derives from my ongoing research that is sponsored by the Department of Defense through RAND.

Since October 1991, the Department of Defense has sponsored two related projects at RAND. The first project provided funding for a 6-month study, focusing on the fate of American MIA/POWs from the Korean war. A second project expanded the scope and provided additional resources for research into whether American servicemen and civilians were transported to the territory of the Soviet Union or its allies during World War II, the early cold war, as well as the original subject, the Korean war.

I have been the leader and principal investigator of both projects. This work is in the interim report phase. The sponsor of my work is aware of the content of my statement and encouraged me to appear today.

In my prepared statement, the long one which I have submitted for the record, I discuss World War II, the Korean war and early cold war incidents at length. I have been working in the U.S. Archives for over 1 year on these issues. I have worked with archivists in the former Soviet Union and researchers in a number of foreign countries. The following conclusions and observations derive from these sources.

First, World War II. One, the number of American POWs who were not repatriated from German POW camps appears to be less than 200. Assertions that tens of thousands of American POWs were somehow abandoned are not consistent with the historical record.

Two, United States and Soviet Archives suggest that fewer than 100 American POWs, perhaps 50 or fewer, were held on the territory of the U.S.S.R. after World War II.

Three, an undetermined number of American air crews—these were not POWs—were detained on the territory controlled by the U.S.S.R., after making forced landings. This happened both in the Asian and European theaters. Records show that many, if not all, of these crews were repatriated from the U.S.S.R. Some others may not have been repatriated from Soviet-occupied territory. But I must emphasize, this is a question for further research.

Four, the U.S. Government located the graves of hundreds of American servicemen on Soviet-controlled territory. Once again, these were not POWs. The vast majority were on the territory of Soviet-occupied Germany. Records show that a few of these remains were recovered from the territory of the U.S.S.R.

Early cold war incidents. One, in the 1950's, the U.S. Government systematically collected live sighting reports of American citizens, military and civilian, in Soviet Bloc control. This information provided the basis for dozens of U.S. requests for information and protests to the Soviet Government.

Two, between 1945 and 1959, U.S. Government protests resulted in the repatriation of at least nine American citizens held in the Soviet Union.

Three, between 1945 and 1969 at least 23 U.S. military aircraft were shot down by Soviet Bloc forces. On at least three occasions, live crewmembers were repatriated.

Four, the U.S. Government believed that some crewmembers were imprisoned by the Soviet Union. Many protests were made by the U.S. Government on their behalf.

Five, throughout the 1950's, the U.S. Government was very well-informed about the number of American civilians who were not permitted to leave the Soviet Bloc. Many protests were made on their behalf.

Six, in 1950's, the U.S. Government kept detailed records on the whereabouts of American defectors in the Soviet Bloc. The majority of these defectors lived in East Germany or Czechoslovakia. Few lived in the Soviet Union. Some American defectors were imprisoned by the Soviets as suspected spies.

The Korean war. One, the record on individual MIA/POW cases is extremely detailed. Individual cases were originally organized chronologically and geographically. Eventually the cases were reorganized alphabetically. We are now rebuilding the geographic and chronological database. Few questions about Korean war MIA/POW cases will remain unanswered, once this effort is completed.

Two, there are two groups of Korean war prisoners who have not been accounted for: prisoners who made it alive to a POW camp, and those who did not. Those who made it alive to a camp, but were not repatriated, are known as POW, body not recovered, POW/BNR. The location and number of more than 2,000 POW/BNR remains can be estimated with great certainty. Whether any of these remains still exist after 40 years, is another matter entirely.

Three, prisoners who did not survive the time between capture and arrival at a camp should not be lumped together with POW/BNR statistics. I have introduced a new category called post-capture killed, body not recovered, PCK/BNR, that distinguishes this group from POW/BNR. Approximately 900 or more PCK/BNR's oc-

curred during the Korean war, and these remains are scattered geographically throughout North Korea.

Chairman KERRY. Could you just take a minute to explain what that is again?

Dr. COLE. Once someone is captured, just because they are captured, doesn't make them a POW.

Chairman KERRY. Correct.

Dr. COLE. They have to make it to a camp. In between the point of capture and getting to a camp, many died.

Chairman KERRY. Why is that? Why is the camp the distinguishing factor? Why aren't they a prisoner the minute they are captured?

Dr. COLE. Well, just for statistical purposes. Remember, the point of my research is to try to figure out a recovery strategy. If the last point that they are seen alive is after capture, somewhere between point A and point B, then you have to search the entire area.

Chairman KERRY. Well, it makes statistics easier, but it certainly does not resolve the issue from a human point of view for a family. I mean if somebody is, in terms of trying to get to the question of resolving what happened to the person, they were still captured.

Dr. COLE. Yes, Senator, but my point is that it actually assists in the recovery process. If you want a strategy to find these remains, you have to distinguish between those who were last known alive in a POW camp and those who died elsewhere. Those camps haven't moved. But the people who died on marches, and were transported on trucks and so forth, these remains are spread out across an entire geographic area that covers thousands of square miles.

But the point is we know about how many suffered this fate. That's the important thing.

Chairman KERRY. And what do you categorize them as?

Dr. COLE. Post-capture kills. They never made it to a POW camp alive.

Chairman KERRY. Why do you put them as a kill? What if they were transferred to another country?

Dr. COLE. The Judge Advocate War Crimes Section, in 1953 and 1954, made estimates of how many people were murdered after they were captured. I'm basing this number on this estimate. Also, they made an estimate of where these murders occurred.

Chairman KERRY. Did this apply to Korea?

Dr. COLE. Yes, sir.

Chairman KERRY. How then, do you have an accounting, a statistic for those who went to either China or the Soviet Union?

Dr. COLE. I'll get to that at the end.

Chairman KERRY. All right, then do not let me interrupt you.

Dr. COLE. What I'm trying to do is show that if we just look at 8,177 it's rather daunting. But we know something about specific groups of these unaccounted for people, these MIAs, and it will give us a sense of what sort of remainder that we're looking for. Those of whom we just don't know anything.

I'm trying to associate it geographically and chronologically.

Senator DASCHLE. Mr. Chairman, can I ask just one question along those lines?

You base your post-capture kill on documentation that—

Dr. COLE. Yes, Senator.

Senator DASCHLE. Without any doubt?

Dr. COLE. No, there is nothing in the archive business that is beyond doubt. I wouldn't sit here and tell you that. I cross-check as much material as I can.

Senator DASCHLE. Isn't that, then, a pretty precarious distinction to say post-capture killed and POW—

Dr. COLE. No, sir.

Senator DASCHLE [continuing]. Because if you do not have documentation—

Dr. COLE. I do have documentation. The point is, we have eyewitness reports from POW debriefs, of people who were captured—say a platoon or whatever. As they were put on a forced march—there was a famous one, from Seoul to Pyongyang—they can say Mr. X was taken off to the side of the road, shot and pushed in a ditch. You often have five or six eyewitnesses of where that occurred, what time it occurred, and who the victim was.

Then they move another three kilometers. Someone sits down in the road. They have frost-bitten feet. They can't move anymore. The guard comes up and shoots them. And they move on. We have all these reports. But they only came out through POW debriefs.

Now my point is, and I shouldn't undervalue this, we have documentation. But you're looking at the world's biggest skeptic. That's the reason why I have this job. I don't believe anything until I'm able to lay my hands on the documents, go see the people, and visit the sites if I can. So what I'm giving you are my conclusions. I can support each one very meticulously.

Senator DASCHLE. Thank you.

Dr. COLE. Four, the location of approximately 3,500 MIAs, in my view, will never be determined—that's the location—because it is impossible to know where they perished. An estimate of how many MIAs perished can be made. But the location cannot be established for a variety of reasons.

Five, the location of remains left in isolated burial sites, U.N. cemeteries, and aircraft crashes on North Korean territory can be stated with great precision.

Six, since 1953, the United States has received from North Korea nearly 900 sets of unidentified remains. These remains were collected by the North Koreans in a way that almost ensures that association with an individual MIA will never be made. And remember, all of these names are still on the 8,177 list. They are buried in Hawaii. Forensic methods cannot compensate for the absence of identification media.

Seven, there is no doubt that the North Koreans have curated remains returned in the 1990's. This storage may have started years ago.

Eight, American POWs were transferred to the territory of the People's Republic of China during the Korean war, in order to be interrogated by Russians and Chinese. The majority of these POWs were returned to camps in North Korea. Those known to be held as political prisoners were repatriated in the mid-1950's. Thus far, there is no documentary evidence, no archival evidence, that suggests Americans were left behind in the People's Republic of China. Most of this evidence comes from interrogations and interviews.

There are suggestions that some American POWs were withheld by North Koreans, but no evidence confirms these assertions in the archives. I haven't found it.

Nine, American POWs were interrogated by people the POWs identified as Russians. Only a small percentage of the total repatriated American POW population reported this type of contact.

Ten, evidence shows that perhaps two dozen repatriated American POWs were successfully recruited by foreign intelligence services. U.S. authorities were aware of this soon after the Korean war.

Eleven, as a part of a coordinated Communist peace offensive, seven American missionaries who spent nearly 3 years in a North Korean camp were repatriated in May 1953, via China, Moscow and Berlin. The Americans had been held as internees, rather than as POWs.

Twelve, circumstantial evidence suggests that Americans were transferred from Korea or China to the territory of the U.S.S.R. This evidence is overwhelmingly hearsay, or the result of interviews conducted by other investigators. From the basis of my research, I can tell you there is no documentary evidence thus far in the U.S. record that confirms this. There are only suggestions.

I elaborate on each of these points in my prepared statement. Thank you.

[The prepared statement of Dr. Cole follows and his full Congressional testimony is printed in the Appendix of November 10, 1992.]

STATEMENT ON
POW/MIA ISSUES
BEFORE THE SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
ON POW/MIA AFFAIRS

Dr. Paul M. Cole

Analyst
International Policy Department
RAND

November 10, 1992

The views and conclusions are those of the author and should not be interpreted as representing those of RAND or any sponsors of the research.

TESTIMONY
AS PREPARED FOR DELIVERY
BEFORE THE SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
ON POW/MIA AFFAIRS

Dr. Paul M. Cole

Analyst
International Policy Department
RAND

November 10, 1992

INTRODUCTION

Mr. Chairman, Senator Smith, members of the Committee, I would like to thank you for the opportunity to appear today. Before I proceed, I would like to note that the views and conclusions expressed in these remarks are my own and should not be interpreted as representing those of The RAND Corporation or any of the agencies sponsoring its research.

I am here to discuss World War II, Korean War and Cold War MIA-POW issues as they are illuminated by archive research. This statement derives from my on-going research that is sponsored by the Department of Defense through RAND.

Since October 1991, the Department of Defense has sponsored two related projects at RAND. The first project provided funding

for a six-month study focusing on the fate of American MIA-POWs from the Korean War. A second project expanded the scope and provided additional resources for research into whether American servicemen and civilians were transported to the territory of the Soviet Union or its allies during World War II, the early Cold War, as well as the original subject, the Korean War.¹

I have been the leader and principal investigator of both projects. This work is in the interim report phase. The sponsor of my work is aware of the content of my statement and encouraged me to appear today.

In my prepared statement, I discuss World War II, the Korean War and early Cold War incidents at length. I have been working in the U.S. archives for over one year on these issues. I have worked with archivists in the former Soviet Union and researchers in a number of foreign countries. The following conclusions and observations derive from these sources.

• World War II

- 1) The number of American POWs who were not repatriated from German POW camps appears to be less than 200. Assertions that tens of thousands of American POWs were somehow abandoned are not consistent with the historical record.

¹RAND's Phase II research team included the author of this study Dr. Paul M. Cole, Mr. Sergei Zamascikov and Mr. Theodore Karasik.

2) U.S. and Soviet archives suggest that fewer than one hundred American POWs--perhaps 50 or fewer--were held on the territory of the USSR after World War II.

3) An undetermined number of American air crews (not POWs) were detained on the territory controlled by the USSR after making forced landings. Records show that many, if not all of these crews were repatriated from the USSR. Some others may not have been repatriated from Soviet-occupied territory. This is a question for further research.

4) The U.S. government located the graves of hundreds of American servicemen on Soviet-controlled territory. These were not POWs. The vast majority were on the territory of Soviet occupied Germany. Records show that a few of these remains were recovered from the territory of the USSR.

Early Cold War Incidents

1) In the 1950s, the U.S. government systematically collected live sighting reports of American citizens--

military and civilian--in Soviet bloc control. This information provided the basis for dozens of U.S. requests for information and protests to the Soviet government.

2) Between 1945-1959, U.S. governmental protests resulted in the repatriation of at least nine American citizens held in the Soviet Union.

3) Between 1945-1969, at least twenty-three U.S. military aircraft were shot down by Soviet bloc forces. On at least three occasions live crew members were repatriated.

4) The U.S. government believed that some crew members were imprisoned by the Soviet Union. Many protests were made by the U.S. government on their behalf.

5) Throughout the 1950s, the U.S. government was very well informed about the number of American civilians who were not permitted to leave the Soviet bloc. Many protests were made on their behalf.

6) In the 1950s, the U.S. government kept detailed records on the whereabouts of American defectors in the Soviet bloc. The majority of these defectors lived in East Germany or Czechoslovakia. Few lived in

the Soviet Union. Some American defectors were imprisoned by the Soviets as suspected spies.

• The Korean War

- 1) The record on individual MIA-POW cases is extremely detailed. Individual cases were originally organized chronologically and geographically. Eventually the cases were reorganized alphabetically. We are now rebuilding the geographic and chronological data base. Few questions about Korean War MIA-POW cases will remain unanswered once this effort is completed.
- 2) There are two groups of Korean War prisoners who have not been accounted for: Prisoners who made it alive to a POW camp and those who did not. Those who made it alive to a camp but were not repatriated are known as POW, body not recovered (POW(BNR)). The location and number of more than 2,000 POW(BNR) remains can be estimated with great certainty. Whether any of these remains still exist after 40 years is another matter.
- 3) Prisoners who did not survive the time between capture and arrival at a camp should not be lumped together with POW statistics. I have introduced a new casualty category, post-capture killed, body not

recovered (PCK(BNR)). Approximately 900 PCK(BNR) occurred during the Korean War.

- 4) The location of approximately 3,500 MIAs, in my view, will never be determined because it is impossible to know where they perished. An estimate of how many MIAs perished can be made, but the location cannot be established in these cases.
- 5) The location of remains left in isolated burial sites, UN cemeteries and aircraft crashes on North Korean territory can be stated with precision.
- 6) Since 1953, the United States has received from North Korea nearly 900 unidentified remains. These remains were collected by the North Koreans in a way that almost ensures that association with an individual MIA will never be made. Forensic methods cannot compensate for the absence of identification media.
- 7) There is no doubt that the North Koreans have curated remains returned in the 1990s. This storage may have started years ago.
- 8) American POWs were transferred to the territory of the People's Republic of China during the Korean War in order to be interrogated by Russians and Chinese.

The majority of these POWs were returned to camps in North Korea. Those known to be held as political prisoners were repatriated in the mid-1950s. Thus far there is no documentary evidence in the archives that suggests Americans were left behind in the People's Republic of China. There are suggestions that some American POWs were withheld by North Koreans, but no evidence confirms these assertions.

9) American POWs were interrogated by people the POWs identified as Russians. Only a small percentage of the total repatriated American POW population reported this type of contact.

10) Evidence shows that perhaps two dozen repatriated American POWs were successfully recruited by foreign intelligence services. U.S. authorities were aware of this soon after the end of the Korean war.

11) As a part of a coordinated Communist peace offensive, seven American missionaries who spent nearly three years in a North Korean camp were repatriated in May 1953 via China, Moscow and Berlin. The Americans had been held as internees rather than POWs.

12) Circumstantial evidence suggests that Americans were transferred from Korea or China to the territory of the USSR. This evidence is hearsay or result of interviews conducted by other investigators. No documentary evidence thus far located supports this conclusion.

I elaborate on each of these points in my prepared statement which I would like to submit for the record.

Chairman KERRY. Thank you very much. Are either Captain Gay or Mr. Kartman going to have statements?

Mr. PTAK. Yes, just a brief statement. I will turn to Captain Phil Gay.

Chairman KERRY. Captain?

**TESTIMONY OF CAPTAIN JOHN P. GAY, USN, DIRECTOR, ASIA/
PACIFIC DIVISION, J-5, THE JOINT STAFF**

Captain GAY. Mr. Chairman, Senator Smith, members of the committee, as Mr. Ptak stated, I'm Captain Phil Gay. I work on the Joint Staff. We have a very small interface on the Joint Staff for POW/MIA matters. Primarily we interface with the Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet, between the Washington agencies.

We do have another hat, where we respond to tasking from the Office of the Secretary of Defense, Mr. Ptak's office. And in this particular case, the cold war report, that's exactly how we got tasked. As you all know, back in June when President Yeltsin said that he felt like some POWs had been taken during the cold war, kept in the Soviet Union and perhaps were still alive—within hours of that comment, we got tasked to collect all the available information on cold war losses. And we went off and did exactly that.

We started this project by brainstorming a little bit, and making a determination on what agencies would have that type of information. And we worked with the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the CIA, DIA, NSA, State Department—in particular, at State for demarches, communications that went back and forth between the United States and the Soviet Union, China and Korea. And we worked with all the services, especially the service casualty officers, so we could make determinations about what families were told and what information they knew.

We defined the parameters of what we wanted to look at, and we opted for 1946 all the way through 1991 as our timeframe—we're going to have a little bit different numbers than perhaps other people have had. This report is already in the committee record. There has been one minor update to that report since that time, and the number of missing was revised down from 135 total, to 133. We took two names off relating to incident that took place during the Korean war. They were already in the Korean database information at that point, the hot war database, so we took them out of the cold war database.

We collected all the data. We got total cooperation, we felt, from all the agencies involved. We collected all the data, generated a computer-based data report. We submitted it to the Secretary of Defense on the 25 June. We made one minor update to that report since that time.

To the best of my knowledge, prior to us collating all this data, there was no governmentwide effort to include all the cold war data into a single report, from 1946 through 1991. I'm convinced that we made as comprehensive and as complete a look as we possibly could have. We were asked to turn this around in a relatively short time, which we did.

In my examination of all the material associated with cold war losses, I saw nothing that would support that any of the 133 missing were captured or held in the Soviet Union, China, or Korea. However, as many of you know, because of the circumstances surrounding some of these incidents, this possibility—and I stress that, possibility—can certainly not be ruled out, because of the circumstances surrounding some of the crashes.

And that's all I have for an opening statement. Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Captain Gay follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF CAPTAIN PHIL GAY

1. PERSONAL BACKGROUND

- Born 4 Dec. 41 in Johnsonburg Pennsylvania.
- Commissioned and finished flight school in Feb 1965.
- Completed four combat deployments to Southeast Asia from 1965 to 1973, flying 480 combat missions.
- Commanded U.S.S. *Niagara Falls*, and just prior to assignment to the Joint Staff, commanded the aircraft carrier, U.S.S. *John F. Kennedy*, during Desert Shield and Desert Storm.

2. POW/MIA ISSUE INVOLVEMENT

- Currently Chief, Asia-Pacific Division, J-5, Directorate of Strategic Plans and Policy, the Joint Staff.
- POW/MIA affairs for the Joint Staff is handled in a branch subordinate to the Asia-Pacific division.
- LTC Jim Cashwell heads this branch.
- The division function is to support the chairman and the director, Joint Staff, on politico-military issues affecting U.S. interests in Asia, the Pacific, and POW/MIA affairs.
- Main focus of Joint Staff involvement in regional affairs is two-fold:
 - To provide the Joint Staff and the Theater Commander's interface with the Washington Interagency Community; to represent the Theater Commander and the service interests at the national level.
 - To transmit strategic policy guidance and provide timely support to the Theater Commander, assisting him to accomplish his operational mission.
- For POW/MIA issues, the Joint Staff sits on various boards and panels in the Washington Community and provides support to USCINCPAC and his subordinate Joint Task Force Full Accounting.
- Joint Staff responds to requirements of the National Command authority as required.

3. SECDEF TASKING

- In that regard, OSD requested the Interagency Community look at cold war records on losses, following Russian President Yeltsin's claims of Soviet cold war capture/imprisonment of Americans, and the possibility of their presence, still, on Russian soil.
- Mid-June Request—rapid turn around desired.
- Joint Staff tasked to coordinate and compile effort.
- J-5 accepted tasking, and energized community

4. THE COLD WAR PROJECT

- Project initiated by contacting Government agencies assessed to have records or knowledge of cold war incidents and losses.
- Interface was comprehensive—cooperation was unqualified.
- In addition to Joint Staff, agencies involved included: OSD, CIA, DIA, NSA, State and the services.
- Parameters of the problem were defined—all were tasked to provide pertinent current or historical information.
- Agencies involved worked from common ground-rules, toward a common objective.
- Documentation from 1946-1991 was sent to Joint Staff for review—thorough review was personally conducted by LTC Caswell and myself.
- Joint Staff collated all data received.
- Final collated data was formatted into a report.

—Draft and final report was further coordinated with all agencies involved in the effort.

—Final report was sent to SECDEF on 25 Jun. 92.

—Concurrently, collated data base and all records were transferred to OSD (PW/MIA) for their maintenance.

—Additional relook, based on specific questions, was requested by ASD (ISA) in Oct. 92.

—Relook was completed on 3 Nov. 92.

—No additional substantive information was developed—minor data base adjustment accomplished.

—Joint Staff concurred with OSD in data base adjustment of one incident—RB-57 shoot down in 1953, an event more appropriately associated with Korean war.

—Based on revised data base, Joint Staff created update information paper on 5 Nov. 92.

5. CONCLUSIONS

- To the best of my knowledge, no governmentwide all inclusive compilation of cold war shoot down/losses existed prior to SECDEF Directive and Joint Staff Execution.
- 25 Jun. 92 report, with 3 and 4/5 Nov. 92 updates stand as the definitive compilation on cold war losses contiguous to Communist territories.
- The look, and relook was comprehensive and complete.
- In my examination of the material used in compiling this report I saw nothing that would support that any of the 133 missing were captured and held in the former Soviet Union, China, or Korea. However, because of the circumstances surrounding some of the incidents this possibility, and I stress possibility, can not be ruled out.

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
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CAPTAIN JOHN P. GAY COMMANDING OFFICER, USS JOHN F. KENNEDY (CV 67)



Captain John P. Gay was born 4 December 1941 in Johnsonburg, Pennsylvania. He graduated from Johnsonburg Area Joint High School and then attended Penn State University. In August 1963, he entered the Naval Aviation Cadet (NAVCAD) program at NAS Pensacola, Florida, and received his commission and wings in Beaville, Texas, in February 1965.

Upon completion of A-4 Skyhawk fleet readiness squadron training in October 1965, Captain Gay reported to VA-216, based at Naval Air Station Lemoore, California. With the "Black Diamonds" he completed two Southeast Asia combat deployments on board USS Hancock (CVA 19) and USS Coral Sea (CV 43) and a Mediterranean cruise on board USS Saratoga (CV 60).

In May 1969, following his last cruise with the "Black Diamonds," Captain Gay reported to the "Dam Busters" of VA-125 as an instructor pilot and landing signals officer (LSO). During this tour, he also served one year additional duty to the Commander, Light Attack Wing Pacific as the wing LSO.

Captain Gay then transitioned to the A-7B Corsair II aircraft and reported to the "Ravens" of VA-93. He completed two combat deployments on board USS Midway (CV 41) with the "Ravens."

Captain Gay reported to the Naval Postgraduate School at Monterey, California, and completed his undergraduate work in Government and International Relations. After graduating in June 1975, he reported to Commander, Carrier Group FOUR in Norfolk, Virginia, where he served as flag secretary and aide. Upon completion of this tour in April 1977, he reported to the Staff of the Chief of Naval Operations (OP-06) as a systems analyst.

Following A-7E refresher training, Captain Gay served as executive officer then commanding officer of the VA-86 "Sidewinders," assigned to USS Nimitz (CVN 68), from November 1979 through June 1982. Following a brief tour on the staff of the Chief of Naval Operations (OP-90), Captain Gay re-established Carrier Air Wing Thirteen and served as its commander from March 1984 to November 1985. During this tour, he introduced the F/A-18 to the East Coast and established five new squadrons.

Another tour on the Staff of the Chief of Naval Operations followed his tour as CAG-13. Captain Gay served as a Navy planner in OP-06.

Captain Gay then took command of the Guam-based USS Niagara Falls (AFS-3) in January 1988. He served as commanding officer of the combat stores ship until August 1989, when he once again returned to Washington, D.C. On his fourth Washington tour he served as executive assistant to the Commander, Military Sealift Command.

Captain Gay assumed command of USS John F. Kennedy in the Red Sea during Operation Desert Shield on December 7, 1990, and led Kennedy throughout Operation Desert Storm.

Captain Gay has accumulated over 4,500 flight hours in 18 aircraft models and has 1,257 traps on 13 aircraft carriers. He is a veteran of 480 combat missions and 28 combat support missions in Southeast Asia. His awards include the Silver Star, three Legions of Merit, the Distinguished Flying Cross, Bronze Star, two Meritorious Service Medals, 47 Air Medals and various commendations, service, and campaign medals and ribbons.

Captain Gay is married to Carol Stevenson, formerly of Arlington, Virginia, and has two sons, John Jr., and Justin.

Mr. PTAK. Now we'll have Charles Kartman from State.
Chairman KERRY. Mr. Kartman?

**TESTIMONY OF CHARLES KARTMAN, DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF
KOREAN AFFAIRS, STATE DEPARTMENT**

Mr. KARTMAN. Mr. Chairman, Mr. Vice Chairman, members of the committee, I too am honored to have been invited to join you today to assist the Select Committee in its efforts to clarify the record of the United States' diplomatic efforts on behalf of Korean war POW/MIAs.

Our recent diplomatic activities have, for the first time since the end of the Korean war, opened the possibility of a more regular and satisfactory process of returning remains and resolving questions about those who are unaccounted for in the conflict. As you know, we do not have official relations with North Korea. And thus, all our communications on the POW/MIA issue, until 1988, were at Panmunjom, through the Military Armistice Commission, under the United Nations command.

Unfortunately, we received no cooperation in this area from the North Koreans, despite their armistice obligations. And from the time of the last return of remains in late 1954, already referred to by Mr. Ptak, for over three decades no remains were returned at Panmunjom. In 1988, however, in support of President Roh Tae Woo's diplomatic efforts, we announced a modest policy initiative aimed at enhancing the prospects for resolving the problems of the Korean war, by drawing North Korea out of its isolation.

As part of that process, we opened a diplomatic channel with the North Koreans through our respective embassy political counselors in Beijing. At our first meeting in 1988, and subsequently on many occasions in that channel, we told the North Koreans that in order to improve relations with us they should take steps in several areas, including Korean war POW/MIAs.

In 1990, on Memorial Day, the DPRK, North Korea, returned five sets of remains to a congressional delegation headed by Representative Sonny Montgomery. In June 1991, they handed over 11 more sets to Senator Smith, who had participated in arrangements for this action. Senator Smith used this occasion to reinforce our position on the importance of regularizing the process.

On both occasions, the North Koreans made it plain that they hoped to derive some political benefit from their actions. Further, we believe by insisting on American congressional participation in the process, they hoped to deflect some blame for their inaction until that point onto the executive branch. What they discovered, however, was that there was no difference of views between the legislative and executive branches in Washington. I believe it was that discovery that was essential for the next set of events.

In January of this year, Undersecretary of State Kantor discussed with a high-level North Korean delegation in New York the full range of issues, focused of course on our concerns regarding the North Korean nuclear program, but including the MIA issue. Then in April, North Korean President Kim Il Sung, in an interview with the Washington Times, said that North Korea was prepared to resolve the MIA issue in a humanitarian manner.

In May, the North Koreans returned 30 sets of remains in Panmunjom directly to the United Nations command. The North Koreans said explicitly at the time that they were willing to discuss formal arrangements to return further remains to the United Nations command.

While the North Koreans appear to seek to use the POW/MIA issue to achieve narrow political objectives in terms of bilateral U.S.-North Korean relations, we have a continuing responsibility to act in this matter on behalf of all the U.N. command nations with Korean war MIAs, including South Korea. Nonetheless, we have approached the issue with some flexibility, indicating that we are willing to discuss practical arrangements to move this process ahead toward regularization.

The North Koreans have shown some interest. And we have held a number of discussions in Beijing and Panmunjom on this subject. And I might add here, that throughout this process we have had excellent cooperation and support from the South Korean Government, and our other allies in the U.N. command. Questions have been raised about the possible shipment of Vietnam-era POWs to or through North Korea, as well as about Korean war POWs being sent to China or the U.S.S.R.

We have asked the DPRK to give us any available information on POWs and MIAs. In reply, we have only been told that there is not a single POW in the DPRK. We have raised this issue with both Russia and China repeatedly this year, and will continue to do so with them and with North Korea.

As we develop a more productive dialog with North Korea about MIA issues, we will press for answers on all relevant questions, including identification of remains, since none of those returned to date have been identifiable. The best answers will come from a longer-term process, which will bring about not only the return of remains, but also the resolution by other means—archival research for example—of questions surrounding the fate of Korean war MIAs.

Thank you.

[The prepared statement of Charles Kartman follows.]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF CHARLES KARTMAN

Mr. Chairman, Mr. Vice Chairman: I am honored to have been invited to join you today to assist the Select Committee in its efforts to clarify the record of the United States' diplomatic efforts on behalf of Korean war POW/MIAs.

Our recent diplomatic activities have, for the first time since the end of the Korean war, opened the possibility of a more regular and satisfactory process of returning remains and resolving questions about those who were unaccounted for in the conflict.

As you know, we do not have official relations with North Korea, and thus all our communications on the POW/MIA issue until 1988 were at Panmunjom, through the Military Armistice Commission under the United Nations Command. Unfortunately, we received no cooperation in this area from the North Koreans, despite their Armistice obligations, and from 1954 to 1988 no remains were returned at Panmunjom.

In 1988, however, in support of President Roh Tae Woo's diplomatic efforts, we announced a modest policy initiative aimed at enhancing the prospects for resolving the problems of the Korean peninsula by drawing North Korea out of its isolation. As part of that process, we opened a diplomatic channel with the North Koreans through our respective embassy political counselors in Beijing. At our first meeting in 1988, and subsequently on many occasions in that channel, we told the North

Koreans that in order to improve relations with us they should take steps in several areas, including Korean war MIAs.

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On both occasions the North Koreans made it plain that they hoped to derive some political benefit from their actions. Further, we believe, by insisting on American congressional participation in the process, they hoped to deflect some blame for inaction until that point onto the executive branch. What they discovered, however, that there was no difference of views between the legislative and executive branches in Washington. I believe it was that discovery that was essential for the next set of events.

In January, Under Secretary of State Kanter discussed with a high-level North Korean delegation the full range of issues, focused on our concerns regarding the North Korean nuclear program, but including the MIA issue. Then, in April, DPRK President Kim Il-Sung, in an interview with the Washington Times said that North Korea was prepared to resolve the MIA issue in a humanitarian manner.

In May, the North Koreans returned 30 remains in Panmunjom directly to the United Nations Command. The North Koreans said explicitly at the time that they were willing to discuss formal arrangements to return further remains to the UNC.

While the North Koreans appear to seek to use the POW/MIA issue to achieve narrow political objectives, in terms of bilateral U.S.-DPRK relations, we have a continuing responsibility to act in this matter on behalf of all the UN Command nations with Korean war MIAs, including South Korea. Nonetheless, we have approached the issue with some flexibility, indicating that we are willing to discuss practical arrangements to move this process ahead toward regularization. The North Koreans have shown some interest, and we have held a number of discussions in Beijing and Panmunjom on this subject. And I might add here that throughout this process, we have had excellent cooperation and support from the South Korean Government and our other allies in the UN Command.

Questions have been raised about the possible shipment of Vietnam-era POWs to or through North Korea, as well as about Korean war POWs being sent to China or the USSR. We have asked the DPRK to give us any available information on POWs and MIAs; in reply, we have only been told that "there is not a single POW in the DPRK." We have raised this issue with both Russia and China repeatedly this year, and will continue to do so with them and North Korea.

As we develop a more productive dialog with North Korea about MIA issues, we will press for answers on all relevant questions, including identification of remains since none of those returned to date have been identifiable. The best answers will come from a longer term process which will bring about not only the return of remains but also the resolution by other means—archival research, for example—of questions surrounding the fate of Korean war MIAs.

Chairman KERRY. Thank you, very much. Let me try to ask a few bottom-line questions, fairly quickly if I can, before turning to other colleagues, so that we get through the kind of gobbledygook of formal statements, and kind of get at it.

What is the bottom line here? Is it our Government's policy that we hold that Korean-American prisoners of war were transferred to either China or the Soviet Union?

Mr. PTAK. It is our policy that we are still doing the analysis of the information that we have received to this point, and we don't rule out that possibility.

Chairman KERRY. We don't rule it out, but we don't accept it, is that what you are saying?

Mr. PTAK. Yes, sir. Right now we don't rule it out, but we are still looking at the available information.

Chairman KERRY. Dr. Cole, do you believe there is sufficient evidence to make a finding that Americans were transferred from Korea to either China or the Soviet Union?

Dr. COLE. The circumstantial evidence leads to the conclusion that this happened.

Chairman KERRY. And what is the circumstantial evidence?

Dr. COLE. Interviews with individuals, the kind of reporting that we've gotten from Task Force Russia in the past couple of months, from prison guards and that sort of thing.

Chairman KERRY. Well, let me ask you something. Are any of those interviews with people who were there, who say they saw it happen?

Dr. COLE. Apparently, yes.

Chairman KERRY. Well, why is that circumstantial? It's direct evidence.

Dr. COLE. Well, I'm not a lawyer, sir. And what I'm trying to distinguish—

Chairman KERRY. But I am asking you why you qualify that as circumstantial? That is not circumstantial.

Dr. COLE. Because the second part is what I call archival or documentary, you see.

Chairman KERRY. And does the archive document that this happened?

Dr. COLE. No. Neither what I've seen from the Soviet archives, or the U.S. archives.

Chairman KERRY. Have you seen all the Soviet archives?

Dr. COLE. Of course not, no.

Chairman KERRY. Do you believe the Soviets will readily, the former Soviets would readily own up on documentary form that they did this, when they said for years they didn't?

Dr. COLE. Certain people will.

Chairman KERRY. And are we now succeeding in getting those certain people to do this?

Dr. COLE. Well, it remains to be seen. Access to archives in any country is a political act. There are certain people who have a political interest in seeing this information come out in the former Soviet Union. And it's not isolated. Remember, it's not isolated to Russia. We haven't even begun to scratch the surface in the other republics, say the Ukraine or the Baltics.

Chairman KERRY. Well, if a high Soviet official delivers a list of people to two U.S. Senators, and says this is a list of people who were in Korea, and some of them were transferred to China. And we bring the list back, and we give the list to our Defense Department. And indeed, there are on that list names of people who remain unaccounted for as prisoners from Korea, is that direct, do you think we should take that as direct evidence from a high official?

Dr. COLE. No, sir. No, sir.

Chairman KERRY. That's not substantive?

Dr. COLE. It is substantive. Are you referring to the list that you obtained in February of this year?

Chairman KERRY. Correct.

Dr. COLE. I've gone through that list carefully. For example, there are seven missionaries on that list.

Chairman KERRY. I understand that. But are there people—

Dr. COLE. My point is—

Chairman KERRY. But are there people on the list—well, there are also people on the list who were returned to the United States, correct?

Dr. COLE. Yes, sir.

Chairman KERRY. There are people on that list who were captured, who in fact came back to America. So it is, indeed, a list of people who were also servicemen, correct?

Dr. COLE. Yes, they are on there as well.

Chairman KERRY. And there are names on that list, are there not, of people who we know to have been captured, who did not come back and remain unaccounted for, correct?

Dr. COLE. I believe there is a small number of those, yes.

Chairman KERRY. But my question to you is why, cumulatively, if you take these sort of circumstantial bits of evidence, as you call them—

Dr. COLE. Yes.

Chairman KERRY. But they are cumulative. You have a guard who said, I did this. You have a soldier who said, yes we transferred people. You have a KGB operative who says, indeed we interrogated them and they were transferred to China. After you have five or six—or whatever number, I'm not saying it is five or six—do you not have the capacity to draw a conclusion?

Dr. COLE. Oh, yes, sir. I said, the circumstantial—

Chairman KERRY. Well, what is your personal conclusion?

Dr. COLE. Yes, it occurred.

Chairman KERRY. It occurred?

Dr. COLE. Yes.

Chairman KERRY. People were transferred from Korea to China?

Dr. COLE. Yes, and to the Soviet Union.

Chairman KERRY. And to the Soviet Union?

Dr. COLE. Yes, sir.

Chairman KERRY. OK. Now we are getting somewhere. That's helpful. Is there a reason that our Government does not accept that? Is there a reason that our Government is doubtful?

Mr. PTAK. I think as I said earlier, Mr. Chairman, I wouldn't even characterize it as doubtful. As was said earlier, we have sources who have reported things. We have third-party hearsay and that sort of thing. And because of that type of information that comes in, in conjunction with the archival research that we were undertaking, and are continuing to do right now, we're trying to do analysis on bringing the human-type reporting and the archival reporting together, and make some sense of it.

I think it would be premature to make a definitive statement, until we can do the analysis that brings the human source reporting and the archival reporting together. To give you an example, on this last Joint Commission trip, there were a lot of reports about people being transferred to Khabarovsk. And so we went to Khabarovsk. We tried to interview as many individuals as we could who had been around during World War II and Korea. In fact, we were there for a short time, and after we left, I left General Loeffke on the ground to continue the interviewing process.

Chairman KERRY. Well, let's say that we—let's say we accept this happened. In fact, Boris Yeltsin said there were some people transferred, didn't he? Didn't President Yeltsin say that?

Mr. PTAK. I don't recall exactly what he said, although—

Chairman KERRY. He didn't say they were transferred? I'm seeing some shaking heads.

Mr. PTAK. I don't recall him saying transferred. But again, I think one of the things that I've learned in my first 11 months in this position is, the thing that we don't want to do is to make a premature judgment, and maybe even go to the point of notifying a family and then find out that a source changes his story.

Another, maybe perhaps it sounds anecdotal-type information, but in this last trip to Moscow the Commission was presented various documents, some of which didn't even relate to POWs. But as a gesture, they were handed over to Ambassador Toon and to the commissioners. Well, right in those documents that were given to us in Russian and translated, it talks about how the information can be either changed, distorted and so forth, in order to keep the truth from anybody who might fall upon the documents.

Now those documents go back to World War II, specifically I believe it was 1949. But nevertheless there is a pattern here of deception on the part of the Russians, with a lot of their documentation. So in my judgment, we have to be very, very careful before we make a judgment about an occurrence, or something like that, until we have documentary evidence, archival evidence, and sources.

Chairman KERRY. But you are talking in the specific. In the generic, we know that there is a story to be told, yet to unfold. Do you accept that? About people who were transferred?

Your own researcher from the RAND Corporation has spent a year looking at this, and he believes, am I correct, you accept that people were transferred?

Dr. COLE. Small numbers, sir.

Chairman KERRY. A small number?

Dr. COLE. Yes.

Chairman KERRY. What are we dealing with, do you think, based on the evidence?

Dr. COLE. I'd hate to put a figure on it, so if you'll accept this generality right now, at least less than 100, and probably half that.

Chairman KERRY. What have the reports on 54 American airmen from the Korean war who were interrogated on Chinese territory by Soviet special services—what have those revealed, those reports?

Dr. COLE. This list came to the United States through two channels. My group in Moscow gave it to me in May. Then it came to the Commission, the list of 59 that was actually 57 because of two duplications. Are we talking about the same thing, not 54 but 57?

Chairman KERRY. Yes, we are. Yes.

Dr. COLE. This is an amplification of what I said earlier. I don't trust any of this documentation. The Soviets gave this to us and said they were all Americans. Well, they weren't. There was one Australian on that list, right? Donald William Pinkstone. So when they give us this information, sometimes they don't even know what they have.

The Russians gave it to us with the idea that they had been transferred to the territory of the U.S.S.R. Then it turns out these were the interrogation transcripts that had been made by the Chi-

nese. That was the way they split up the division of labor. The Chinese did the interrogations, gave the English language notes to Russian translators, who then wrote summaries.

So what they actually gave us was the summaries of these interrogations.

Chairman KERRY. Well, what do they reveal?

Dr. COLE. They reveal that most of these guys came back. But the more interesting thing is—

Chairman KERRY. You say most of these people came back?

Dr. COLE. Yes, about—I can't remember the exact number right now, but the second list that they gave us, of 71 names, there were some names that were left off, between the 59 list and the 71 list. These are the ones who were originally reported in the Soviet records, on this 59 list, of being either MIA, or dead.

I've interviewed people who had live contact, Soviets who had live contact with these people. It tells us a lot about their methodology, for starters, how they managed the interrogations.

Chairman KERRY. When did they come back? They came back—

Dr. COLE. I have the specific dates, if you'd like to see them.

Chairman KERRY. Do you know how they came back?

Dr. COLE. Yes.

Chairman KERRY. Through where?

Dr. COLE. Through Big and Little Switch, the POW releases.

Chairman KERRY. All right, so they did come back. So they were interrogated on Chinese soil?

Dr. COLE. Yes, sir. And there is a certain number in that group—

Chairman KERRY. But then you are saying they were repatriated after that?

Dr. COLE. Yes, and there's about what, 10 or 11 on this list who came back in 1955.

Mr. PTAK. Mr. Chairman, can I just make a real quick follow-up? 54 reports we have, which summarize interrogations; 33 are Americans, only four of them are unaccounted for. There is no indication from those summaries that the Soviets participated in the interrogations. But I want to go one step further.

I think earlier we were kind of in a discussion about the cooperation and so forth. What I've discovered is, there are some individuals in Russia who, I believe, really want to cooperate with us on the Commission. I believe there is probably an equal number that don't want to cooperate with us on the Commission.

So one of the difficulties we have is, we can't just take what we're given at face value.

Chairman KERRY. And follow it up, I understand that. In fact, our own investigator confirms that there are some major difficulties in Russia still in following up on information, and getting access for interviews. In fact, Senator Smith and I found that firsthand in our own visit. And there are clearly entities that do not want to have anything to do with this, or with us. And it is still a struggle. So it is not an open door.

Mr. PTAK. Exactly. And that is the point I want to make: that I think we are making progress, but I'm not giddy about it.

Chairman KERRY. Let me turn to Senator Smith.

Vice Chairman SMITH. Dr. Cole, just to follow up on—have you in your archival research seen any intelligence reports?

Dr. COLE. Yes, sir, quite a few.

Vice Chairman SMITH. And what do they say regarding American POWs from the Korean war, after being held after the war?

Dr. COLE. Quite a bit. It's a very rich archival source. First, let me just say what my hypothesis was. My hypothesis was that you had to figure out who was the consumer of this information. Why would anyone collect it, and who back in Washington would read it, because that would tell you where to look for this stuff.

So I focused in on the 8th Army G-2 records, because what, 90 percent of the POWs in Korea were Army. I also looked into the Air Force a bit, but my primary focus was on Army. During the war there were weekly updates, and also monthly summaries. So I've covered, I think, all of those, all that we found anyway.

After the war, when the switches began to occur—there was Big Switch, Little Switch, and Operation Glory—it became clear, during Big Switch that no officers were coming out. So the 8th Army command sent a message to Washington asking for permission to withhold North Korean and Chinese officers. But the problem was they had already been released.

During the switches, American officials were aware that something was going on. Now the problem that occurs is that the assumption was made—and I can't explain this assumption—the assumption that we live with today, is that everybody who was left behind was alive. But if you go back to the original casualty reports, the casualty jackets, you see that, for example in aircraft incidents, wingmen say, there's no way this guy got out of the plane. You know, we saw it go in. That sort of thing, right?

If you look at the Army data, the MIAs that are on the 389 list, the UNCMAC list, are clustered around 8 months. Almost 85 percent of all the Army MIAs occurred during these months. The survival rates in the POW camps for that period, in some months, was zero.

Then you have also the incidents of these, what I call the post-capture kills, that are happening in the hundreds during these months. G-2 was keeping very careful track of this, and reporting it on a weekly and monthly basis.

Vice Chairman SMITH. Right. But I just want to—you indicated, I think you explained your position on circumstantial evidence. But in addition to these personal interviews from POWs who returned and other guards and others who had seen, you also have intelligence documents which we have seen. So you have a supplementary bit of information to what you said.

Let me just move to you for a moment, Mr. Ptak. I get concerned, we have gone through all of this stuff on Vietnam for so many months now, so many years. But when you say we are not ruling anything out, I look back, and again I don't want to go through all of this because it is all written down and it is all self-explanatory.

But just to highlight a couple of points. General Mark Clark believed that there were American POWs left behind. In fact, he cites a reference to documents that he had at his disposal to say so. He was the main man at the time. On September 9, 1953, the U.N.

command presents a list of the Communists of 3,400-plus U.N. and South Korean personnel. The list includes the names of 944 U.S. personnel, et cetera. Clark handed over the list of the Communists, demanding that they be returned or else. Then on September 16, using Communist broadcasts as their source, the allies again appeal to the North Koreans that, you are forcibly detaining prisoners on your side.

And I think also, you would know this Dr. Cole better than anyone else I am sure, very prevalent throughout all of this period of time is the armistice that began to unfold in the mid-April, June, July 1953, was a great deal of discussion on the part of the North Koreans about the so-called American POWs that we held of theirs, some 98,000 or whatever it was, did not want to return, many of them did not want to return. The North Koreans did not believe us, and made it very clear in many of the statements that I have read, and you have read more than I have.

And I would like you to comment on this. They made it very clear in their statements that they outright believed that we were forcibly detaining their POWs from coming back. They made it very clear that there was a quid pro quo here. That we do not intend to provide you a complete accounting of yours, until you provide us with a complete—and that put us on the spot.

President Truman referred to it in 1951. Just comment on that, and briefly, because I have another couple of questions.

Dr. COLE. Sure.

Mr. PTAK. Mr. Chairman, let me make a brief comment, and then I'll turn to Dr. Cole.

For 10 months, we pressed, and we pressed trying to get information about POWs and MIAs in Vietnam. And over the last couple of weeks now, we think that we have the potential for a breakthrough, because the Vietnamese have said that they have all this information. I believe it was because of the perseverance of the Joint Task Force For Full Accounting, that we were able to get that breakthrough.

We are now doing the same thing in Russia. Pressing, and pressing, and pressing the Russians for the answers. I don't know, I forget who it was who said it here earlier, but the answers are in Russia and the answers are in Vietnam. That's what we are trying to do.

Vice Chairman SMITH. I do not dispute that. But I refer to a statement again that was made by Rear Admiral Donald Marriott, Defense Intelligence Agency, June 28, 1990, in testimony before a congressional hearing. There are no intelligence indicators that U.S. personnel from the Korean conflict were not returned to U.S. control at the end of the war.

That is a pretty definitive statement. Now we have just heard testimony here that that is wrong. So why does somebody from DIA—I realize it was not on your watch—but why does somebody from DIA come up here and say that?

Mr. PTAK. I can't speak for prior, but I will tell you, Senator, that we are pressing and pressing with the archival research, and also the investigators on the ground.

Vice Chairman SMITH. I know that. But we have to have a common base here, and we have to get started. We are 40 years too

late. There is no evidence—again, this is Colonel Joe Schalter, November 9, 1989—there is no evidence to suggest that any U.S. personnel were not released from captivity in Korea.

Now that is just, I just do not understand, people in responsible positions, coming up here to the Hill and saying that kind of thing, when in fact—I mean, I am not going to sit here and dispute every one of these reports, and go back and hem and haw around about whether—you have the people who were there 40 years ago saying it, over, and over, and over again.

John Foster Dulles said it on April 19, 1954. He said, he sent a cable to the American embassy in Moscow, instructing that the Soviets be given a memoir from the United States on U.S. POWs having been transported into the Soviet Union. He tells the U.S. embassy that the Soviets should be told, we have reliable accounts of transfers of POWs at Man-chou-li, and so forth.

And I do want to dispute it, because I have been through that for 8 years with you people. I do not have the desire to dispute it. As I said in my opening statement, the facts speak for themselves. The evidence speaks for itself. And it is time, it is time for you people to come up here and accept that evidence, and begin to move to the next step, which is to find out what happened to these people and where they are.

That is what we have to start doing. So why don't you just admit that you have the evidence? I want to give you a chance to respond, Dr. Cole.

Dr. COLE. Sure. Senator, I'm not a governmental official, so I can give you a blunt answer on this. What you're dealing with is bad research. I'm a university professor, as well. We're dealing with C-minus stuff, in some cases.

But one thing: data should not be confused with Government policy. Just because you have a number, that doesn't mean that represents Government policy. Now this 944 list, I don't know where it came from, and I've been looking for 1 year how they chopped this list of 8,177 MIAs down to 944. Now it's at 389, right? About what, 600 have been resolved.

I can tell you that on this 389 list, I've gone back and looked at the last casualty report, and sometimes the field search cases, and sometimes the after-action reports of the units and so forth. In many cases—and the data I have here breaks out this way. Of the 389, 181 were suspected of perhaps being captured. 207 were suspected of not being captured, lost under circumstances inconsistent with live capture.

But for some reason, and I'm telling you up front, I don't know why these two got lumped together, or why for 40 years we've been referring to these people as unrepatriated POWs. The historical record is very clear on this. We're not dealing with a field of unrepatriated POWs. It's a mix of things that we can identify and separate, one from the other.

The fact remains that at the time, the day that the switch was going on, we suspected that they were holding our people back. There was a feeling of impotence and helplessness. What are we going to do about it? Our first move was we decided to take some hostages of our own. But we were too late. We had already turned them back.

So the very first thing that happened, September 3, 1953, we hit the Communist side with a list, and said, give us information about the following people. We've never gotten beyond that.

Vice Chairman SMITH. Well, I will yield at this time to Senator McCain.

Senator MCCAIN. Dr. Cole, I would appreciate a continuation of blunt answers.

But first, Mr. Ptak, when a person is a casualty in combat, what is the determination—let me say, if they are declared missing in action, the family of that person continues to receive full pay and benefits, is that correct?

Mr. PTAK. Yes, sir.

Senator MCCAIN. And what happens then if the determination is made that that person is killed in action?

Mr. PTAK. I'll have to get the answer for the record exactly, because I want to be very accurate. But there—

Senator MCCAIN. There is a lump-sum payment, termination of further pay?

Mr. PTAK. Right, because there is a legal—

Senator MCCAIN. So therefore, doesn't it seem logical, and Captain Gay can comment on this, that it would be far better to place a person in the category of missing in action than killed in action, for obvious—for that reason among others. Would you agree with that, Captain Gay?

Captain GAY. Sure.

Senator MCCAIN. Would you agree with that?

Mr. PTAK. Yes.

Senator MCCAIN. Dr. Cole, would you repeat again how many Americans you believe from the Korean war, roughly, are unaccounted for?

Dr. COLE. Well the official figure, unaccounted for—well, let's be precise. These are people who went there and didn't come back, and we don't know what happened to them, 8,177.

Senator MCCAIN. Of those 8,177 how many, as a result of your research, do you believe have been, are still unaccounted for, as a result of your research?

Dr. COLE. I have run these numbers. I want to give you an accurate answer here. But while I'm looking for this, I can tell you that the way I did it. I did it geographically, because if we're going to try to recover people, then we have to look for a geographic location. We know the location of approximately 2,177 people who died in POW camps.

The number for those who died after they were captured, on death marches, or atrocities or whatever—I've found it here, the number is approximately, and I have to emphasize, you're dealing with my numbers, to the best of my ability to come up with this. OK?

So this may be different when we spend some more time with it. 2,119 POW/BNR. OK. Then, missing in action at sea, 293. Now in my view, the missing in action at sea are not going to be recovered. Those remains are gone. There may be the odd miracle, but that's why I have this on this list.

Abandoned graves in U.N. cemeteries in North Korea is about 300. Now the reason why it's about 300 is because we didn't learn

anything from World War II. We allowed divisions to have their own cemeteries. As they went up toward the Yalu, they left cemeteries behind. When the Chinese came in, they had to start disinterring these remains, and bringing them down to a location area.

A lot of these remains were recovered in Operation Glory. But we can't verify this unless we have access to the territory of North Korea. Then we have known and unrecovered, isolated burials. For example, if there was a skirmish and you left somebody behind, you would leave a marker, take the grid coordinates and move out. That's about 576.

Then we have a number of air crashes on the territory of North Korea, where we've never had the opportunity to investigate. There's a total, and I took the high end on this one, 412 sets of remains. Then we have unidentified, but repatriated remains, 894. All these names are on the 8,177 list. The total that I come up with, of remains that we have a pretty good idea of where they are, is 4,594. If you associate it chronologically and geographically, you have a pretty good idea of where they are.

Senator MCCAIN. So that leaves you with what?

Dr. COLE. 3,497. What I call, you have a high degree of location uncertainty. They could be anywhere. In some cases, literally anywhere. I have six categories where I've come up with ideas of where they might be distributed.

Senator MCCAIN. How many of those would you, as a result of your research, believe are still alive, or could have been left alive at the time of the end of the war?

Dr. COLE. Only one group. That would be the group that were transported someplace else. They were captured and taken alive someplace else.

Senator MCCAIN. What I am trying to get at here, Dr. Cole, is we have a wide disparity here. That the staff provided us with a memo that thousands were left alive, in Korea, after the war was over.

Dr. COLE. Yes.

Senator MCCAIN. Your research indicates to me that that number is far less than that. I am trying to get some comparison here between what the staff has compiled, and what your research has indicated. I think it is important for us to have some kind of parameter to work with here.

Dr. COLE. Yes, sir. And all I can tell you is, I have a great deal of confidence in my research and the numbers I've done.

Senator MCCAIN. Which leads you to what conclusion?

Dr. COLE. Which leads me to the conclusion that we are dealing with a very small number of people who we can't account for from the Korean war. And that's why I come down to the number of somewhat less than 100.

Chairman KERRY. How do you work that 3,000 down?

Senator MCCAIN. Yes, that is what I was going to say. Would you go through this process that gets you from the 3,497 to a few?

Dr. COLE. Yes, sir. This is in my statement that I submitted, my longer one. First, you have a category that I described earlier, the post-capture kills. These are people who are captured and moved, and they died while they were being moved. We know where the death marches were, for example. You can plot these out and from

eyewitness testimony estimate where the remains were left behind—people shoved off of cliffs and that sort of thing.

Chairman KERRY. And you know they were, in fact, shoved off of cliffs?

Dr. COLE. Yes, sir.

Chairman KERRY. And you know they were shot by virtue of the people who did make it back, correct?

Dr. COLE. Yes, sir, that's the record. And the number that's estimated there—you get some pretty wild estimates on this, too, but at least 900. So I took a low end on that.

Then you have the kind of MIAs that are just—

Chairman KERRY. When you say you took the low end, what is the range?

Dr. COLE. Oh, the range was up in the thousands, up—

Chairman KERRY. So you took the low end, 900.

Dr. COLE. I was trying to be as conservative as possible, because if we take the high end we've accounted for the entire group.

Chairman KERRY. Fair enough. No, we just want to do this—

Dr. COLE. You, know, so take the low end.

Chairman KERRY. We just want to understand your process.

Dr. COLE. OK. Then, for the lack of a better term, I mean we're talking about pretty severe combat here. We're talking about disintegrations. We're talking about people who got hit by howitzer shells or their airplanes blew up in the air. There's a certain number of just people who just disintegrate in war.

There's additional lost at sea. Some people were lost at sea, but it's not attributed to being lost at sea because we didn't know that their airplanes went down over water, or we suspected it and can't prove it. Then you have—

Chairman KERRY. How do you arrive at a number for those?

Dr. COLE. This is the point. I don't think—there's no way to be certain about these things. I'm just saying that of these that we don't know about, there's only a certain number of ways, certain number of things that can happen to them.

Chairman KERRY. But I think what Senator McCain was asking, and I am also trying to understand, is you have built up a structure which leaves you 3,000 and some.

Dr. COLE. Yes, sir.

Chairman KERRY. Now, in answer to Senator McCain's question you said there are only about 100 or less.

Dr. COLE. Yes. My point is you can't put a precise number on it.

Chairman KERRY. But tell us how you dealt with those 3,000. How do you go from 3,000 and some potentially alive down to less a 100?

Dr. COLE. All right. I have an attached—

Senator McCain. Thank you for asking my question.

[Laughter.]

Dr. COLE. I haven't attached precise numbers to this, OK, but this is the framework that I'm working with. The post-capture kills, I took the low end of the estimate, about 900. Then combat losses and additional lost at sea is probably around 1,500 or 2,000. I talked to some people at RAND about combat modelling, you know, how many just flat out disintegrations do you get from that kind of combat, OK?

Then combat kills left in place. These are people who were KIA and the troops withdrew and the body was just left outside. Or, for example, these horrific events like the Chosin Reservoir where the eyewitness accounts of casualties loaded onto jeeps that would fall off and then just be ground to pieces by the trucks that came behind them, you know. They were talking about several hundred.

From this 3,497, my best estimate is slightly over 3,000. That's why I say that we're dealing with a couple of hundred that we really don't know about. My guess is, if you have a couple of hundred that you don't know about, the same thing did not happen to all of them. So I took half. Look, it's my—it's my model. I can't blame anybody else for it but I haven't seen another one to compare it to yet.

Senator McCain. My time is expired, Mr. Chairman, but it is very important that we get—and I guess it is in your prepared statement, but I would appreciate any elaboration on how you went through this process. Because there is a dramatic difference—

Dr. COLE. Yes, sir.

Senator McCain. In your view, and I am not debunking your view or that of the staff. But somehow we need to try and reconcile those differences and so any additional information you can provide us as to how you achieved this.

Dr. COLE. That's my objective. I'd be happy to do that.

[Dr. Cole's revised prepared statement, p. 61-67, respond to this request]

Senator McCain. Thank you very much.

Vice Chairman Smith. Excuse me. John, where do you see thousands from the staff? I do not see that, I cannot find that, where they refer to thousands.

Mr. PTAK. Mr. Chairman, while we're waiting, Task Force Russia's analysts view is that if you include China and Russia, somewhere between 100 and 400, could be as many as 400. It's a soft estimate, but what I'll do is I'll get Task Force Russia to provide that for the record also.

Chairman KERRY. Thank you, that will be very helpful. While Senator McCain looks, let me turn to Senator Grassley.

Senator McCain. It says during the Korean war thousands, estimates of the numbers vary but at least, at least hundreds who had been POWs were not returned after the armistice.

Vice Chairman Smith. So it is hundreds.

Senator McCain. It is at least hundreds. Then later on—and I can find others that are in the thousands as well. General Van Fleet said a large percentage of the 8,000 American soldiers listed as missing in action in Korea are still alive.

Vice Chairman Smith. I think they were extrapolating from the thousands, but the hundreds is the only reference I can find.

Chairman KERRY. But we are all dealing in the same ballpark for once.

Dr. COLE. That's the first I've heard this estimate, by the way, and I would, in general, concur with it.

Chairman KERRY. I think it is a fair question and it is good to understand. Senator Grassley.

Senator Grassley. Could I defer to Senator Reid for a minute?

Chairman KERRY. Absolutely. Senator Reid.

Senator REID. In the briefing material that we have there is a statement, the Truman administration acutely aware of this, meaning the fact that the Soviets held people back in prior wars. In December 1951, the present psychological strategy board concluded that forcible repatriation of Chinese and Korean POWs in exchange for American POWs would, in the long run, cost us more American lives than are involved in the exchange of prisoners problem.

Do you understand what that means?

Dr. COLE. All I know is what is meant by forcible repatriation. What they mean about the tradeoff there is kind of murky. Is it in one of the statements here?

Senator REID. No, I just read this to you. It says: In other words, we must accept the reality that we will not recover all our POWs at the end of the war. This document is quoted at length in the chronology of policy following these introductory paragraphs.

Dr. COLE. What do I make of it?

Senator REID. Yes.

Dr. COLE. Well, sometimes you get a little speculation in these documents, you know. This seems to me to be a contingency plan. That doesn't mean that we should plan on not getting these people back, but what if we don't. You see that all the time. The paradigm for these guys in the Truman administration was World War II where we agreed to forcible repatriation and it led to the horrible things that happened with the Cossacks for example.

Senator REID. Maybe I do not understand the term forcible repatriation, then. Help me with that.

Dr. COLE. After World War II, the agreement that was made with the Soviet Union was that all nationals—all citizens of that particular, you know, of all the Allies, would be returned to their country of origin.

Senator REID. But some of them did not want to go back.

Dr. COLE. Obviously not. There was quite a few people who were fighting with the Germans who weren't thrilled by that.

Senator REID. I understand that. You indicated that you had six categories that made up the subtraction from 3,497. One was post-captured kills, two, disintegrations, three, lost at sea, and what were the other three?

Dr. COLE. The first one—just so you know, it's on page 64 of my statement. Post-captured kills actually break out into four categories. And then two, ground combat disintegrations, three, aerial combat disintegrations, four, additional lost at sea, five, combat kills left in place, and six, post-capture transport to third countries, which is a euphemism for going to China or the Soviet Union or someplace else. We can't exclude that because there was an entire Eastern Bloc. We could find records in East Germany or the Baltics or something like that.

Senator REID. Changing the subject a little bit, one of the things that has always concerned me is when we first started these hearings we learned that there were a number of pilots shot down during the cold war. 26, I think, is the number that I heard somebody talk about earlier. What were the survivors told?

Dr. COLE. Survivors?

Senator REID. The husbands—I mean the wives, the mothers, the fathers of these.

Dr. COLE. I can tell you in a couple of cases from the historical record that in most cases the families knew what was going on. They knew that their family member was involved in a high-risk mission. And in some cases they were told as much as anybody else knew, in some cases people didn't know.

But then over the years, of course, as new information came up, this didn't always get transmitted to family members, you know, 10 or 15 years later. That's what the record shows.

Captain GAY. Yes, sir. In our research we worked with the service casualty officers. That's exactly what we found, that families were, in fact, told that—in most of the cases they were lost at sea and most of the airplanes went down at sea. And in each case we could verify that the families were, in fact, notified that he was lost at sea.

And there was no—it was difficult to tell because of the age of the records, whether they were told exact, you know, locations. Some of the exact locations were not available to us, so we don't know exactly if they said—you know, if you went down and, you know, immediately adjacent to the Soviet coast, whether they were told that or not, I couldn't make that determination.

Senator REID. So what I understand is that most of the time the families knew that these airmen were involved in high-risk operations over the Soviet Union and that they were told shortly after they were knocked down that they had been lost at sea, or something to that effect. Is that a fair statement?

Captain GAY. I don't know whether they were told they were involved in high-risk operations.

Dr. COLE. Sir, not all of these missions were intended to be high-risk missions. A lot of them were intended to be routine operations and the Soviets came out and shot them down without warning. For example, in 1950 the Privateer incident, that kind of mission was occurring, you know, sometimes—

Senator REID. These were just training missions.

Dr. COLE. No, not training. They were electronic intelligence missions that were occurring, you know, on a regular basis.

Vice Chairman SMITH. I am going to have to ask the audience to please refrain from outbursts so that we can continue with the hearing.

Mr. PTAK. If I might say, our main job now is to find answers. And it's to get the information on the fate of the loved one, and when we get that information, get it to the family. I really—it's very difficult, I think, for anybody here at the table to try to talk about something that happened back 40 years ago. Our concern is to get the answers and get the truth and get that information to the families.

Senator REID. My point is, though, with the 26, we can deal with them quite specifically. The 3,497, we cannot do that. But with the 26, I think that we really have an obligation to give their survivors, even though it is much later, an indication of what happened, when it happened, and where it happened.

Mr. PTAK. Senator, I agree with you. And, as a matter of fact, here just recently in our latest information that we have gotten

through the commission, we have been able to notify some families of what happened to their loved one. In fact, just today, as I was leaving to come here, we got another report from Task Force Russia that had to do with another incident. We haven't been able to notify the families yet so I'm not at liberty to give the details, but we are making progress and I agree with you that we need to get that information to the families.

Senator REID. And, Dr. Cole, I also, in closing, appreciate your statement, it is my model, show me something better. And I appreciate that. I am not sure I agree with all your numbers here, but you have spent a significant amount of time coming up with these numbers and until somebody does something better I think we have to be guided by what you have done.

Dr. COLE. Senator, my idea is that if we worked together on this—I know that your staff has put together a lot of material that I haven't seen. This isn't a confrontation. Let's get to the bottom of this in the best way we can.

Mr. PTAK. Senator Reid, if I might just add to—already, I think, you've gotten two instances, both with Captain Gay talking about the fact that never before had a comprehensive list of cold war incidents, you know, been put together on one list, Dr. Cole, with his research. Again, I'm not trying to paint a picture that's too rosy, but I think we've made a lot of progress, particularly in the last 10 months.

Senator REID. Thanks.

Vice Chairman SMITH. Senator Grassley.

Senator GRASSLEY. Mr. Ptak, in reference to your statement about the Joint Task Force Full Accounting being the reason that we were successful in getting the 5,000 photos that we got, this just is not true. And I do not want you to take my word for it, it is just as simple as you reading some of the documentation that this committee has read. And, of course, this documentation is classified so, of course, I cannot go into it here.

But it is not true. In fact, it is my judgment, after studying this, that it happened in spite of the Joint Task Force Full Accounting and in spite of the DIA. And I want to say this because I do not want to let your statement stand. It is my judgment that the credit should go to Carl Ford in the Office of Secretary of Defense, and indirectly the chairman of this committee.

I think you will find that that is what the documents show, and I think you would find that if it was up to DIA and the Joint Task Force Full Accounting, the effort would not have been successful. I just make that as a statement, and if you read the material and you come to a different judgment than I do, you are free to, obviously, disagree. But I think that your analysis of that is just plain wrong.

Additionally, and to my first point that I want to make for a question, you said that in May the North Koreans returned 30 sets of remains. Yet before May they denied that they had these remains. They have also denied holding POWs. Can we really trust these denials in light of their disingenuousness on the remains issue?

Mr. PTAK. Senator, I'd be the first one to say no, but I would also say that I think the fact that we got remains back is promising.

And I hope that in the future it's more than just promising. I hope that we'll get more remains returned.

If I could just say one thing, going back to your earlier comment. I think—I think we now have in place, for, I think, the first time ever, not only all of the elements of the Department of Defense that deal with POW/MIA, but also other parts of the U.S. Government. And I think that—I mentioned the Joint Task Force Full Accounting because I think—I have both General Needham and JTFFA under me and I have General Leoffke and Task Force Russia under me.

The point I'm trying to make is that we now, I think, truly in the Department of Defense are a team. Any successes that we get are a team effort. Any failures that we get, I think we all have to accept the failures. So I would stand by my statement except to say that successes that we have now in the Department of Defense are because we're, I think, finally a team.

Senator GRASSLEY. Well, I would hope so after all these years. But more importantly, I think—go back and read what we have got, and I think you are going to find that the Joint Task Force Full Accounting was a stumbling block and an impediment.

In regard to these remains from North Korea and what they said before May and what they did after May, I just simply remind you that in April we were told by the Vietnamese that, you know, they had been fully cooperating with us for all these years. And then all of a sudden in October we get all of these photos.

How hard are we pressing the issue of live prisoners with the North Vietnamese?—And when you answer that, I would like to have you point to specifics that our Government has done to determine live prisoners, if there are any in North Korea?

Mr. PTAK. Senator, we—since I've been on board we have maintained that the number one priority with regard to the POW/MIA issue is if there are live Americans, discovering where they are and bringing them home.

With regard to Vietnam in particular, both in my first trip with General Vessey in January, my trip with Secretary Solomon in March, my most recent trip with General Vessey here just a number of weeks ago with Senator McCain, the number one priority has always been on maintaining and accelerating a live sighting mechanism. For the very point that you're talking about is to have a mechanism in place to determine whether there are live Americans in Vietnam.

Senator GRASSLEY. Now, I am talking about North Korea.

Mr. PTAK. Well now, with regard to North Korea I'll turn to my colleague at the State Department. We have a little different relationship now with North Korea than we do with Vietnam.

Mr. KARTMAN. Mr. Senator, first, we still do not have official relations with North Korea. The leverage that we have in what may become a relationship is very, very slight. In fact, there is still a technical state of belligerency between the UN Command and North Korea.

So to say at the outset, yes, we have pressed them for any information relating to POW and MIAs and we've excluded nothing from that search. But I would have to be frank in saying that we're just at the beginning of that process, that our hope is that we

would achieve the kind of political breakthrough with them that would get from them the kind of cooperation that will be necessary for fuller accounting.

Dr. COLE. Senator, if I could add one historical note. In 1953, the U.S. Army began a program that was called RECAP-K, which is return of captured—I can't remember the exact title—return of captured American military personnel, something like that, K standing for Korea.

It was a program designed to collect all the information we could about any reported case of someone being left behind in Korea. Extensive interviews were done with all the repatriated POWs, leads were followed up. It was a very comprehensive program and it went on for a number of years.

What happened is that the North Koreans have been so intransigent that it was impossible to get significant new information after a while. As far as I can tell, the program kind of died out in the late fifties, around 1960.

Senator GRASSLEY. Well, Mr. Ptak, the reason I bring it up is in your statement you dwell on documentation and information. It seems to me that the real issue here is looking for live men, if they exist. Has there been anything done about David Markhan, as an example? What has been done, I should ask?

Mr. PTAK. When the information concerning Markin first came up we already had in place in Moscow a small group of investigators from the joint commission, one of which, I believe, was one of the members of the staff. That was given a high priority and, in effect, there was a live sighting-type mechanism carried out in Russia by having investigators go to Pechura on, I think it was a couple of occasions at least. And I believe that at one point General Volkogonov, when he felt that progress wasn't being made, asked for the prison commander to come to Moscow so he could get to the bottom of the information.

As I believe I said earlier, just because we don't necessarily run to ground information on a case it doesn't mean we close it. And so we are continuing to have the Markin case as an open case and I'm hopeful that we'll get more information as we do our archival research.

Senator GRASSLEY. You know, I asked specifically what you have done. What you have just said could be interpreted as meaning that you have not done much expect open up a file and leave it as a pending matter. Has anything more specific than what you have told me been done on the Markin case?

Mr. PTAK. We have physically gone to Pechora, which was a location where Markin was supposedly being held. We did—my understanding is Task Force Russia did interviews with people that hopefully would have information. And as far as I'm concerned, that is still an open case. So it's a live sighting-type mechanism, and then hopefully we'll get more information, perhaps in archival research.

Senator GRASSLEY. Do you want me to yield, Senator Reid?

Senator REID. Yes, please.

Senator GRASSLEY. Yes.

Senator REID. I spoke to one of the officers who was over there working on that case in some length, and they have done—they have interviewed people in the prison, they have talked to the war-

dens, people in the town. And every time they think they have something it falls apart. Now this has been a couple of months ago and he was headed back, but they have done more than open a file. I mean this one man that I spoke to had spent weeks on this one case himself in the former Soviet Union.

Mr. PTAK. That's correct. It's a combination of almost like a live sighting investigation with the investigators going to the location to interview people, but then there's also the archival research.

Chairman KERRY. Let me just say to my colleagues we are getting up against the clock here, because I know there is a dinner with the President tonight and some members have to be at that. So we are going to run into a time problem here a little bit. Are there any additional questions? Senator Smith.

Vice Chairman SMITH. Go ahead, John.

Chairman KERRY. Senator McCain?

Senator MCCAIN. Very briefly, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Ptak, I strongly disagree with any allegation that members of the joint task force have been a stumbling block or impediment. These are officers and men who have, many of them, served in the Vietnam war. Many of them served and sacrificed for a long period of time. In my visit to Hanoi I have seen the conditions under which they have worked. Many of them have become ill because of the malaria and other diseases.

I, frankly, have to say for the record that any allegation that they are a stumbling block or impediment to resolution of this issue simply must be made out of ignorance or worse.

Dr. Cole, very quickly, I want to just address the World War II issue with you a second. Your conclusion is the number of American POWs were not repatriated from German POW camps appears to be less than 200.

Dr. COLE. Yes, sir.

Senator MCCAIN. Again, how do you get from the allegations or folklore or whatever it is that there were tens of thousands, allegations that there were tens of thousands of Americans that were left behind after World War II, down to your point of 200. I think it is very important for the record.

Dr. COLE. Yes. Two ways. The first way is to do research on my own just to see what answer I come up with. Pretend like nobody else has done any work and I just go out and work as hard as I can to come up with an answer. Remember, this is derived from U.S. sources.

U.S. archival sources show that of the rosters in the German POW camps—and, remember, we took over this territory so we were able to physically inspect the territory. We didn't have that luxury in North Korea or Vietnam. We could count the people coming out. There were 191, according to the judge advocate general's strength and accounting branch, who were seen in camps and nobody knew where they went. This was the estimate made by the people who were counting the POWs at the time.

I haven't found any evidence in the records that contradict this. Now, then—

Senator MCCAIN. Where does the tens of thousands come from?

Dr. COLE. Well, this is the thing. That's somebody else's number. So I did the second thing. I tested their hypothesis. So instead of

taking it on and saying I'm going to prove it's false, my technique was to ask, what else has to be true if this is true?

What else has to be true is that all of the records that we've found thus far in Britain, Germany, the Soviet Union, and the United States, have to have the same error of the same magnitude. I find that to be unreasonable. The second thing is these people were doing things, they were eating, they were sending letters, they were receiving packages. Where are the protests from these 23,000 families from World War II?

We do have protests from several dozen families, right, that were coming in saying we had a letter from our son in a camp, what are you going to do about it. We had a facility in Moscow where these cases were taken up with the Soviets.

Senator REID. When, when?

Dr. COLE. Immediately after the war. General Dean was in charge of this in Moscow. This also is covered in my statement. On and on and on, there has to be transport for these people. The POW debriefs of people being released from these camps. I mean this would account for 24 percent, about, of the entire POW population. That's an enormous part to go missing with nobody knowing that they were even gone. Then it's to be discovered 40 years later.

So I go through these assumptions. What else has to be true? In my own view, when you go back to the original documents that produced this number, you have basically two choices. You can accept that the people who wrote these wrote a very ambiguously worded memo to London that then was followed up with one that said, do you really mean what you said? And then the answers come back no, this is what the data actually mean. You can look at it as a typical reporting error that was corrected, or you can look at it as a grand conspiracy where these data were inserted afterwards.

And here's the most damning piece of information, in my view. If you're going to abandon 23,000 people as a matter of Government policy, then the estimates of how many people are in that prison population have to be faked from the first day that the United States enters German territory in 1944.

They made estimates of how many people were being captured. After the war we got back 14,000 more than we expected. This would mean that the estimate was actually off by 37,000, right, if you take the number of 23,000.

The idea that someone in 1944 began to fake the estimates and that nobody said anything about it, to me things just don't happen that way. I choose, based on the evidence, to draw the conclusion that my hypothesis is a bit sounder than the other.

Senator MCCAIN. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator GRASSLEY. Mr. Chairman.

Chairman KERRY. Senator Grassley.

Senator GRASSLEY. I would like to comment on what Senator McCain said only to say that I would hope he would withhold this judgment on this. As I have suggested, my judgment is based upon the documentation, not something I saw myself but what I think will clearly be evidenced in the documents. And those documents are available right now, I believe, for anybody to see. And further, I would simply say that I was not talking about just the Joint Task

Force Full Accounting, but I was also including in that the Defense Intelligence Agency as well.

Senator REID. Mr. Chairman.

Chairman KERRY. Senator Reid.

Senator REID. How many prisoners were returned after the Second World War from European areas and other places, prisoners of war?

Dr. COLE. The estimates vary, but they're in the 90,000's.

Senator REID. And Korea, how many?

Dr. COLE. Oh, you know, I keep track of the ones that didn't come back. This is going to take me a minute to remember. Does anyone remember? Somewhere around 7,000 is the number I can remember. I can look it up for you.

Senator REID. And then Vietnam we had 500 and some.

Dr. COLE. Sir, I haven't done any work on Vietnam.

Senator REID. Is that not right?

Mr. PTAK. We can get that to you precisely for the record.

Senator REID. So that is about right.

Mr. PTAK. Right.

Chairman KERRY. Thank you. Senator Smith.

Vice Chairman SMITH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Kartman, just to—I know we have to wrap the panel up but I am very interested in what is going on out in Beijing with the relationship with the North Koreans. When I was there last year in a private meeting that I had with Kon Sok Chu, I believe, he seemed to be very willing to move on with some effort to resolve this.

And, of course, the MAC and all of that is a big political problem, of course. But subsequent to that meeting they did repatriate several sets of remains. But I got the impression in the discussion that I had with him that he had a lot of information. Not just remains, but a lot of information.

And there was a clear distinction in our discussion—and I do not want to go into everything because it was a private meeting and I do not want to go out public with it at this time. But there was a clear distinction in our conversation between POWs and the term those who wanted repatriation or those VNR's, voluntarily not returning. And I urge you in your discussions with Beijing, and I am sure you have, but to make sure that those distinctions are very clear.

God knows what would draw an individual to the conclusion of voluntarily not returning after so many months of torture or whatever else might have happened to them, and I am not trying to draw conclusions there either, but there are many reasons why somebody may, quote, unquote, voluntarily not return.

Just briefly, how are those meetings going at this time? Is there any hope of—how is the joint commission moving at this time?

Mr. KARTMAN. Mr. Vice Chairman, after you meeting with Kon Sok Chu at Panmunjom we received a number of signals from North Korea that were uniformly encouraging. And on that basis we proceeded attempting to be rather flexible and not being absolutely wedded to one particular outcome in terms of structure.

No one can describe what goes on in the North Korean capital of Pyongyang to make them blow hot and cold on this kind of an issue, but for a time there they blew cold and we stopped making

progress. Things have picked up a little bit rather recently. We are still talking to them about it and, all in all, I am rather cautiously optimistic, as we say in my building, that we are going to do something.

Vice Chairman SMITH. I was—and, again, I am not going to characterize or quote from the conversation really, but let me just say this. After the meeting—there were two staff people with me—the impression was very clear to me, based on the conversation—we were working with their interpreter, I understand that, so there might have been some disadvantage there.

It was very clear to me that not only had some people remained in North Korea after the war but they very well may, in fact, have been transferred to a third party nation, either China or the Soviet Union. And I think that I would encourage you to follow up on that.

It is interesting, I was never much—I say for the record I was really never asked for a debriefing from the State Department when I returned. They did not want me to go. But I did call for one myself and provide some information to the Department.

I just have one final question, because we are moving to the next panel, to Mr. Ptak. You indicated in your statement, I believe, that none of the MIAs returned from North Korea. The remains that we have received since 1990 have been identified. I realize that the identification process is very complex and the fact that a dog tag may be with a body does not necessarily mean that it is that person.

But I am particularly interested in one case in New Hampshire because it was an individual whose dog tag was identified as a soldier from New Hampshire, and there were also some anecdotal pieces of information that were provided with that that gave some indications that that person may have been alive—was definitely alive and was captured and may even have been in a hospital. Now has that family been notified of this information?

Mr. PTAK. Senator, I'm not familiar with that specific case but I'll certainly take it for the record.

[The information requested was provided to the family in August 1992.]

Vice Chairman SMITH. I would like to know. I know the name. I was prepared to say it publicly; I will not at this point until I hear from you. But the reason I would want, would consider making that name public, is because I cannot locate the family. It has been a lot of years and I cannot locate the family, and sometimes by making it public you can locate the family. But I would like to know if you have made any contact with that family or have tried to. If you would let me know that, I would appreciate it.

Mr. PTAK. I will. Yes, Senator.

Vice Chairman SMITH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman KERRY. Thank you very much, Senator Smith. Let me thank all of you at this point. We will leave the record open in the event that any colleagues have additional questions that they wish to submit in writing and I want to thank you very much.

Vice Chairman SMITH. May I make one additional request? I am sorry, I forgot. There was a 1968 sighting that we had asked you folks about. I think the staff director and some others had asked

you in a meeting to provide us the source, the name of the source or at least access to the source without compromising the source, of an alleged sighting of American POWs from Vietnam in North Korea.

And you denied us access to that source, your Department. And I would ask, just for the record, to reconsider that request because it links the two periods and it is the only one that we have and I am very interested in talking to that source, either anonymously, by telephone, or whatever it takes so that you do not have to compromise the source.

Mr. PTAK. This is the document that dates to 1954?

Vice Chairman SMITH. 1968.

Mr. PTAK. 1968.

Vice Chairman SMITH. A North Korean defector—it is on page 41 of my chronology. It is a North Korean defector claims to have seen two American POWs in the outskirts of Pyongyang and has reportedly told there were 10 American pilots at this location that had been sent to North Korea during the Vietnam conflict. The defector was debriefed by United States and South Korean sources in Seoul in 1980.

And then we asked you in March, your Department, for access to the source without compromising his identify and you denied us that, or Margaret Munson denied it in a letter to me—sent, excuse me, to Senator Kerry. So if you could—

Mr. PTAK. I'll check that out for you, Senator.

Vice Chairman SMITH. I would like you to—I would ask you, for the record, to reconsider that request so we could talk to that source.

Mr. PTAK. All right, Senator.

Chairman KERRY. Thank you very much, Senator.

Thank you, gentlemen, very much. If we could ask panel No. 2, please, to try to come up as fast as possible, that would be very helpful. Thank you. Lieutenant Colonel Philip Corso; Surbon Oprica; Colonel Delk Simpson, retired; and Steve Kiba.

And if I could ask each of the new panelists to come forward and stand and be sworn.

[Witnesses sworn.]

Chairman KERRY. Thank you. I would like to ask each of you if you would begin your opening statements but do so with an understanding that we would like to have your summaries. Your full texts will be placed in the record as if read in full, and we will try to proceed on the 5 minute time clock.

Colonel Corso, do you want to lead off?

Colonel CORSO. Yes.

Chairman KERRY. If you would bring the mike down and closer, I think you are going to find it a little more helpful.

TESTIMONY OF LIEUTENANT COLONEL PHILLIP CORSO, USA, RET, NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL STAFF, EISENHOWER ADMINISTRATION

Colonel Corso. Sir, my statement is about nine pages. Do you want me to read it all or just start a summary?

Chairman KERRY. I beg your pardon?

Colonel Corso. Nine pages.

Chairman KERRY. Give a summary, if you can. Just your key points.

Colonel Corso. Senator Kerry and gentlemen, during the Korean war I was head of the special projects division of the Far East Command. That is in the G-2 section of the Far East Command. One of my primary duties was to keep track of the enemy POW camps in North Korea, their locations, the conditions in these camps and estimated number of American and Allied prisoners of war in each camp and the treatment these prisoners received at the hands of the enemy.

I also served as a member of the UN truce delegation at Panmunjom during the closing days of the war, and I assisted and participated in the discussions on Little Switch operation, the exchange of sick and wounded prisoners of war. And I stayed on after that for the Big Switch and I was actually present at the time when the prisoners were brought in.

Chairman KERRY. Colonel, if I could just ask you to speak a little more clearly into the mike so we can understand.

Colonel Corso. How's this, Senator, is this better?

Chairman KERRY. Better.

Colonel Corso. I just said I participated in the operations at Panmunjom, as member of the truce delegation, on Operation Little Switch, the exchange of sick and wounded prisoners of war, and also I stayed on and participated in Big Switch and during that period I came back to Tokyo.

At the end of the Little Switch Operation, that is the exchange of sick and wounded, I prepared a document showing that all our sick and wounded were not returned, that is when the last one came in and I was actually on the ground when they came in. The statement said that 500 of our prisoners, our estimate was, 500 were not returned that we knew were sick and wounded and seriously ill or wounded and would not survive unless they were brought back soon for treatment.

The statement was read at the table by Rear Admiral John C. Daniel, who was deputy chairman of the truce delegation at the time. This was considered the second level because the main delegates had not arrived yet. They came for Big Switch, this was at the end of Little Switch.

When the statement was read, the presiding Chinese general, Bien Zhang-Wu, who was presiding for the Chinese and not the North Koreans because he was on the same level as Admiral Daniel, he had a pencil in his hand and he snapped it in half. Now this was given in the open by the delegation that 500 sick and wounded had not been returned, yet I never saw any reports of it picked up in the news media. Returning sick and wounded confirmed at least 400 were left behind.

Upon the completion of this tour, I had my orders to come back so I came back to the United States. And I was called to President Eisenhower's National Security Council Operations Coordinating board as a member of the staff. My primary duties at the time were prisoners of war matters on the National Security Council level, because I had compiled and worked on this data in the Far East Command and in Korea.

Also, I found out at the time that there were certain policy statements made that hindered our operation and to find out more information, and I'll come back to those later.

At the conclusion of Little Switch and the beginning of Big Switch, and at the end of Big Switch, we concluded at the time there were about 8,000 prisoners in Big Switch who had not been returned. And this particular information was sent back to the United States at the time, and at the United Nations I began to prepare statements that were going to be given to the United Nations by Dr. Charles Mayo and Henry Cabot Lodge.

Dr. Charles Mayo gave the statement on bacteriological warfare, and Ambassador Lodge on the United Nations prisoners of war. And we found out the time the Chinese, under the Russian tutelage, had a detailed, scientific process of Pavlovian type experiments which they were conducting on our prisoners.

We knew about this information, but we were hindered from sending agents to the North to find out more about this because this was handled mostly by OPC, which was a unit of the CIA.

Now, during my tour in Korea, I compiled the evidence, I was receiving this daily, that prisoners had not been returned from North Korea and had been sent, in fact, to the Soviet Union. The war was still going on at the time.

The information that I had was compiled, from many sources and I was amazed to hear that there was no evidence in the archives on this. There are actually hundreds of reports. The reports came from prisoner of war interrogation reports of North Koreans, prisoners of war, Chinese prisoners of war, and defectors, and some photographs that our reconnaissance planes took.

These reports were compiled and kept in files, and I'd say off hand that there must have been 300 or 400 of these reports easily in my file of knowledge of prisoners of war and that our prisoners had been sent up through Manchuria to Man-chou-li. There they were transported north and changed trains. They were changed across a platform because the of the gauge and sent to the Soviet Union. I had very definite information on two trainloads.

Chairman KERRY. Where did the information come from?

Colonel Corso. I stated that, sir. They came from Chinese prisoners of war, North Korean prisoners of war, civilian defectors, and photographs. We had photographs of the camps.

Vice Chairman SMITH. How many in the trainloads?

Colonel Corso. I know of two definite, and we estimated 450—each train held 450 prisoners. I had information on the third trainload, but I never quite secured information definitely to tie it down, the third one, as well as the two. So, the figure that we used mostly was 900, because we had definite information. We had 200 or 300 reports.

Chairman KERRY. And where did you disseminate this to?

Colonel Corso. This was disseminated first—As the information was compiled to my immediate superiors.

And every evening, we had what we called a teleconference. This was a large screen in those days with a tape, and the information was compiled and sent to Washington, to the Pentagon. We used to go down about 1 in the morning because of the difference in time

and send this during the night. I personally sent this information many times.

Chairman KERRY. And did you send specific information to the effect that American prisoners were transferred?

Colonel CORSO. Yes, sir.

Chairman KERRY. You said that specifically?

Colonel CORSO. I said that specifically. I send the information over here. I send it in documents and compilation of intelligence.

Chairman KERRY. And your rank at that time was—

Colonel CORSO. I was lieutenant colonel.

Chairman KERRY. Lieutenant colonel?

Colonel CORSO. Yes.

Chairman KERRY. Let me just come back to one other thing. When you say 500 people were not returned who were sick and wounded?

Colonel CORSO. That was on Little Switch.

Chairman KERRY. Correct.

Colonel CORSO. Yes, sir.

Chairman KERRY. I'm going back to that. Did you know, in fact, that those people were still alive and held prisoner at that time, or had you simply known they were sick or wounded at one time?

Colonel CORSO. No, sir. I was sent to the truce delegation specifically for that purpose. I participated for that purpose. During the process of compiling this information on the prisoners also taken to Russia, my position was to compile information on all our prisoners of war including the location of the camps, who was in the camps, how they were treated, locations, movements, and so forth.

Chairman KERRY. What I'm getting at is, when you say there were 500 people you expected to come back who were sick and wounded—

Colonel CORSO. Yes, sir.

Chairman KERRY. Were you told they were sick and wounded?

Colonel CORSO. The information that we had compiled estimated that our number of sick and wounded originally was 2,000. Graded down this was about 1,700. We had a 1,200 figure, I think, back at Little Switch, we received back about 700.

Chairman KERRY. Where did you get that from? How did you know?

Colonel CORSO. It came from the same sources that I've named before. These were intelligence sources. They were, as I say, Chinese prisoners of war, North Korean prisoners of war, defectors, and a smattering of agent information.

Chairman KERRY. They did not give you names, did they?

Colonel CORSO. In certain cases, there were names. Mostly, my job was to compile the numbers and the figures. The names as I got them were—

Chairman KERRY. What percentage might have been names?

Colonel CORSO. I'd say, sir, that possibly half were names because as I got the names, those were sent to personnel. They weren't kept by the intelligence division.

Chairman KERRY. Is it possible that you received intelligence about somebody being sick or wounded—now, I'm not trying to discount it, I'm just trying to understand it.

Colonel CORSO. Oh, no. Yes, sir, I understand.

Chairman KERRY. I want to understand what the realm of possibilities are here. When you say 500 didn't come back, is it possible that some of those 500, because they were sick and wounded, died between the time that somebody reported they were held and the time of Little Switch?

Colonel CORSO. Yes, sir. These people were very seriously sick, our reports showed. And the report that I wrote that was given at the delegation said that unless they were returned, they would die, but that we expected them to be returned when Little Switch ended. But at the end of Little Switch that number hadn't been returned. And I had information in some of the camps that no one was taken out of to repatriate. This was confirmed by our returning sick and wounded.

Chairman KERRY. And the expectation of 2,000 or so was not a hard list. That was an intelligence based judgment. Is that correct?

Colonel CORSO. It was an intelligence based analysis made on, I would say sir, 100 or 200 reports. The reports also—there were agents reports in there. And some of our agents, some of our guerrillas who were up there mixed up with the prisoners of war.

Chairman KERRY. I just wanted to ask those couple of questions. I have to excuse myself for a little while here for a meeting in back. Senator Smith will continue to chair.

Vice Chairman SMITH [presiding]. Do you have further to go in your statement Colonel?

Colonel CORSO. Well, I skipped through it, sir. I would skip through it because it's long and I know that it is late in the day.

Vice Chairman SMITH. I just wanted to ask you if you were going to get to it. Then you can proceed through it. But I was going to ask you the next question which is, what did your superiors do with the information, not talking about the 500 who were sick and wounded, I'm talking about the trainloads of people that allegedly went to China?

Colonel CORSO. Well, the way the system operated, sir, I would brief—as we had our staff meetings with the Chief of Staff and so forth, I would brief on the subject and at the briefing—that was inform my superiors. In fact, they were a succession of General MacArthur, General Ridgway, and General Clark.

I would brief my superiors on this, and then the position was to compile this information in the form to send to Washington, to the Pentagon, which we did through telecon systems in those days. And it was sent over in almost every case. My superiors were notified of this.

Nothing was done in the Far East with this information. It was sent back to Washington for processing or instructions. But generally, we never got any instructions back to do anything about it.

Later I found out that this was actually policy guidance. We didn't receive any guidance because policy forbade us to do anything about it. I was surprised earlier when I heard that there was no documentation.

The documentation came from the Far East, and it came in hundreds of reports, and it was sent by teleconference every night. Not every night, sir, but as it became available, which was quite often. I was a telecon officer many nights on this subject and would send the information. And nothing was ever done.

Even after Big Switch and then the information was estimated that 8,000 prisoners who were not returned. And we had information too, at the time, which I don't think has been really brought out, that some of these prisoners, the sick and wounded, in Little Switch were actually brought to Kaesong on the outskirts of Panmunjom, but were never handed over to us.

We received information of that type that they had them a few miles away and never turned them over.

Vice Chairman SMITH. Were you at the White House and indicated to President Eisenhower—

Colonel Corso. I'm the one that—

Vice Chairman SMITH. And you told President Eisenhower about the information that you had regarding two, possibly three carloads of POWs.

Colonel Corso. It was coming later in my statement, sir, but I'll cover that right now because I want to—

Vice Chairman SMITH. I just want to ask you what he said.

Colonel Corso. I want to get the record straight on exactly what happened because there's a lot of speculation on what happened that a lot of people are commenting on, but there were only three of us present. Unfortunately, the President died. C.D. Jackson, my superior, passed away. I was the only one left that was actually there. I know what happened and I will tell you what happened, without any speculation.

I was at—my position at the NSC was to prepare, to sit on the policy groups, and keep track of information on prisoners of war and missing prisoners of war. That was one of my main duties. I had other duties too, but that was my primary mission.

I compiled the report. I had quite a file on this. But dealing with President Eisenhower, you didn't bring him a complete file. You generally brought him one paragraph, summed up what it said, all the information there, because the President used to say if you can't say it in one paragraph, don't say it.

So, I had a call from my principal, C.D. Jackson, one day who was special assistant to the President. He said, get over, we have to go see the President. Bring your prisoner of war report.

My prisoner of war report that I handed him was one page. I walked in the office. The President was in the Oval Office, the three of us, and I saw him, and he said, I understand you have a report on prisoners of war going to the Soviet Union? I told him yes, that's what I'm here for.

Now, I compiled this report not only here but information in Korea, which I said before, that close to 1,200 that we suspect, but about 900 certain did go there. Our information is solid, as solid as intelligence information can be, because that's the nature of intelligence.

I handed him the report and he read it. And he had a very serious look on his face. It was—sir, I don't know how I can explain it. You have to live through it. This was not a pleasant meeting. It did not last long. In fact, the times that I went in his office, any of the meetings or when he'd give me an assignment, they very generally didn't last more than about 5 minutes.

So, I handed him the report, and he looked at me. He said, Colonel, he said, do you have any recommendations because in the mili-

tary, generally the writer of the report has to make a recommendation to his superior who then decides on what to do with it.

I said, yes. The nature of this report—these men will never come back alive because they will get in the hands of the KGB who will use them for their purposes. Espionage, play-backs, or whatever. This is not uncommon in the intelligence business. Once they fall in their hands, there's little hope of them coming back.

And I told him, Mr. President, you are aware of the system of the KGB, how they use prisoners of war and defectors? And he said, yes, I am. He said, is your recommendation not to make it public? I said, my recommendation is not to make public the part—the KGB operation. It's difficult to understand at its best. It hasn't been revealed. The part on prisoners, (numbers) that I don't know, but it has been made public.

So, the President said, well, I accept your recommendation. He said, why do you believe we shouldn't make it—and I told him, well, it will have an effect on the families and they're going to know what happened to these boys. And naturally it will come up, the discussion of the KGB. How does this operation operate?

And he said, well, I agree, we cannot give it to the families. Then I said, Mr. President, though, may I send a copy of this report to the Department of Defense? He said, yes.

I asked him also, I am writing a speech for Ambassador Lodge on the atrocities committed against our prisoners. Can I put this in his speech which really declassifies it? He said, yes, you may, and I did, sir.

It was never picked up in the newspaper. It is in the speech I left with Ambassador Lodge that he have on the atrocity presentation. Now, this of course—that ended my meeting with President Eisenhower.

Vice Chairman SMITH. Let me clarify for the record the date of that meeting. What was the date of that meeting?

Colonel Corso. It was in—oh, I would say about the 5th or 6th month of 1954, sir.

Vice Chairman SMITH. After the Armistice?

Colonel Corso. After the Armistice because I had come back to the United States. It was after the Armistice, that I remember. It was in 1954. That period of time.

Senator McCARN. You don't know specifically the date?

Colonel Corso. No, I don't know specifically, sir. It might be—I understand the committee has seen the report. It would be on the report, I am sure. But I don't have a copy of the report. That was classified.

Vice Chairman SMITH. I think it might have been January or February 1954.

Colonel Corso. It might have been 1954, but I could date it by a speech to the United Nations by Ambassador Lodge. It was just before that period, it might have been, because I joined the National Security Council about, oh, I would say right after the 2nd quarter of 1953 when I came back from Korea in May or June. That might have been 1954, because C.D. Jackson left, I supported him at the U.N.

Vice Chairman SMITH. I have just one more question, sir. And we haven't gotten the statements from other witnesses. If others want

to ask a question of this witness and then we can move on, that's fine.

But I just want to ask you opinion on a statement. August 17, 1955, President Eisenhower sign an Executive order committing all facilities of our Government to establish contact with, support, and obtain the release of all of our prisoners of war, referring to the Korean war. How do you react to that statement, based on your conversation with the President?

Colonel CORSO. Well, that statement was followup to the information. And I was in the National Security Council, but I did not participate in writing that statement.

Vice Chairman SMITH. Did we put all of our efforts into trying to locate them?

Colonel CORSO. We put a lot of effort in, sir, but our policy sort of tied our hands on this; U.S. policy tied our hands.

Senator McCAIN. U.S. policy was?

Colonel CORSO. The policy was the Soviet Union, North Koreans, and the Chinese are not coconspirators, and we will not make strident statements to antagonize them. But the big policy was the policy of fear. Fear of general war. That was the policy that was stopping us.

Senator McCAIN. Our policy was fear of general war?

Colonel CORSO. Fear of general war, and I have the policy numbers. They are in my statement. Yes, sir. That type of policy—for example, that policy was thrown at us many times.

Senator McCAIN. And you're saying General MacArthur, when told that there's 1,200 American prisoners alive, said yes, it's best not to tell the families?

Colonel CORSO. Not General MacArthur, sir.

Senator McCAIN. I'm sorry. General Eisenhower, or President Eisenhower.

Colonel CORSO. But it didn't come out definitely on the President. The thing was we should not break to the families that they would—when they're going to the Soviet Union, that they wouldn't be in the hands of the military, they would be in the hands of—it was the NKVD in those days. In the hands of the NKVD (now KGB).

That would take a lot of explanation, and you'd have to tell the families that these boys were going to be tried, used, exploited for NKVD operations which were espionage, sabotage, and take their identities. And that we felt would have been damaging to the families, but it's hard to explain, sir.

Senator McCAIN. How would that have been damaging to the families to tell them that their loved ones are alive?

Colonel CORSO. They were going to be exploited in a very sinister way. As far as telling them they were alive, sir, I put in a speech at the United Nations that 900 prisoners of war had gone to the Soviet Union, had been transferred to the Soviet Union. Now, there was no mention that they were dead or not dead, but that was put in the statement and released, and he gave me permission to put that in.

Senator McCAIN. But not to tell the families?

Colonel CORSO. That was the recommendation that he accepted, and said not to tell the families at the time. Yes, sir, that was it.

And, as I say, I'm one of the people that lived with that for 40 years now. I'm the only one that is left that was present. And the recommendation was based on the intelligence, and what I knew and what I felt at the time. The President agreed.

So, if there's any blame to put anywhere, I'm the only living one who was in that room that day—that night—or that day.

Senator McCAIN. Colonel, I did not know General Eisenhower, President Eisenhower personally. I do know many, many, many, many people who knew him. And for me to assume that he would say to 900 families, I'm sorry, but we're not going to tell you anything about the fact that your loved ones may be alive strains my imagination.

Colonel CORSO. Well, sir, it possibly does. But later on, he did give me permission to put this information out. And later one, like the Executive order, things moved on and were changed. At the time, there was an intelligence factor mixed up in this when they were sent to the Soviet Union.

So, sir, I agree with you that this was—as I say, I was there for 4 years.

Senator McCAIN. Well, Colonel, you say these people contributed greatly, and lost more than 10,000 POWs in Korea and Vietnam. We have yet to see the 10,000 number, but I appreciate your testimony. Thank you.

Colonel CORSO. The 10,000—the policy contributed greatly. As I say, whether it is 10,000; whether it was 8,000 in Korea total. Now, I'm not speaking only of the ones sent only to the Soviet Union here. Remember, we had intelligence reports on many of these people were sent to China, but it was very difficult to get information back. We couldn't send agents that far up during the Korean war.

Vice Chairman SMITH. Senator Grassley, do you have any questions of Colonel Corso? The other three witnesses have not yet given their statements.

Senator GRASSLEY. I want to ask him, I assume that you heard the testimony of the former panel. Do you have any comments on what you heard, especially relating to the numbers left behind and unaccounted for?

Colonel CORSO. Left behind in Korea?

Senator GRASSLEY. Yes.

Colonel CORSO. I have no quarrel with the 8,000 number. That was our estimate that we made over there at the time that they were never returned, and so they were left behind.

Senator GRASSLEY. Well, you also heard the testimony that maybe those numbers weren't very accurate, though, from the standpoint of different ways of accounting. Like, for instance, some of them went down over the ocean, and maybe that wouldn't have been noted, and they could have been included in the list. Do you feel that we had a good accounting?

Colonel CORSO. I felt at that time, our intelligence reports that we were getting in from the sources I named, were the best accounting that we had at the time. And we were compiling it; trying to keep it compiled on a day-to-day basis. And the figure was that 8,000 were not returned.

Senator GRASSLEY. How many amputees came home from Korea?

Colonel CORSO. I really don't know, sir. I've never kept track of anything like that.

Senator GRASSLEY. Could you find this out? Does anyone else know whether or not this information exists? It is important so that we can compare and contrast this data with that of the Vietnam war. As we know, not one amputee returned from Vietnam.

Colonel CORSO. The only thing I can say about that, sir—I was present at Panmunjom the day the Little Switch prisoners came back, because I still remember we built a little area where they were going to bring them in.

And the next morning, we saw about 1,000 workers out there. And the Communists had built up, to counter ours, a big red arch that they were going to bring the prisoners through. So, this was an area almost like a no-man's-land.

The prisoners would come through. The sick and wounded we had would go through in the other direction. There they would be freed, and no guards would go through with them.

And our prisoners came through. I don't remember ever seeing an amputee. Some were carried in on stretchers, but I never remember one walking through, let's say, with a crutch or anything like that. I can't remember anything like it.

And I watched until the whole 700 came through. It took a long time, all day, because they brought them up sort of in dribbles. They didn't bring them up all at once.

[The prepared statement of Colonel Corso follows:]

Corso STATEMENT

Statement of Lt. Col. Philip J. Corso, U.S. Army (Ret.), Hearings of U.S. Senate Select Committee on POW/MIA Affairs, Washington, D.C., November 10, 1992.

Ladies and gentlemen, I am Lieutenant Colonel Philip J. Corso, U.S. Army (Retired), and I am extremely pleased to be able to speak to you this afternoon.

During the Korean War, I held the position of Chief, Special Projects Branch of the Intelligence Division, Far East Command, where I served under the commands of General Douglas MacArthur, General Matthew Ridgway and General Mark Clark.

One of my primary duties was to keep track of enemy POW camps in North Korea, their locations, the conditions at these camps, the estimated number of American and Allied prisoners held at each camp, and the treatment these prisoners received at the hands of the enemy.

I also served as a military intelligence officer with the United Nations Truce Delegation at Panmunjom in the closing days of the war in April 1953. There, I assisted with discussions dealing with the exchange of sick and wounded prisoners, known as "Operation Little Switch." Both sides eventually reached complete agreement on exchanging sick and wounded POWs. Soon after that eventful day, however, I caused an incident that nearly brought "Little Switch" to a halt.

I had prepared a detailed intelligence report showing that the Communists had violated the agreement by not giving up all of the sick and wounded they were holding. We estimated they still held 500 POWs. Furthermore, the condition

of these POWs was such that if they did not receive adequate treatment immediately, they would surely die.

Rear Admiral John C. Daniel, Deputy Chief of the UN Delegation, read my intelligence report at a meeting at which Chinese Communist General Nien Zhang-wu presided. He became so angry at hearing my facts that he snapped in half a pencil he was holding. He got up from the table and turned to leave. Then, he caught himself, came back, sat down and glared at me in anger.

Although Admiral Daniel made this charge in an open session attended by newspaper reporters from many nations, the American news media never reported this damaging information to the American public. The Communists never returned those 500 sick and wounded POWs. And this fact, too, went unreported by the American press. Nor did the policy makers and high government officials in Washington ever make an issue of these charges.

Later, during my tour as a military assignee to President Eisenhower's National Security Council Operations Coordinating Board staff, 1953-1957, I discovered that U.S. policy contributed in no small way to this strange silence.

One policy document, NSC-135/3, contained such statements as these: "Begin talks at Panmunjom in the interests of peace." "The United States should not refer to the USSR as an aggressor in Korea." "Agree to the term that Chinese communists in Korea were volunteers." "Agree to a neutral nations repatriation commission which includes Czechs and Poles."

Upon completion of "Operation Big Switch," the final exchange of POWs in September 1953, we concluded -- based on reliable intelligence -- that more than 8,000 American POW/MIAs were not returned or accounted for by the Communists. Again, I feel strongly that our national policy contributed significantly to the silence on this grave issue. For example, NSC-68/2 said, "The USSR, Chinese

Communists and North Koreans are not co-conspirators." And NSC-135/3 stated, "Korea is an inconclusive operation, and continued maintenance of military operations would create the grave danger of general war."

At this point, I would like to introduce some statements I made to the Senate Armed Services Committee during its "muzzling of the military" hearings in 1962. My full testimony is contained on page 3126 of the Committee's publication, "Report, Military Cold War Education and Speech Review Policies."

"Upon my return to the United States, at the request of Mr. C. D. Jackson, special assistant to the President, I was assigned to the Operations Coordinating Board. My initial duties were to do the basic research and prepare data for Dr. Charles Mayo in Committee I at the UN on the subject of 'Bacteriological Warfare' and 'Question of Atrocities Committed by the North Korean and Chinese Communist Forces Against United Nations Prisoners of War in Korea,' delivered by Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge.

"My findings revealed that the Chinese Communists with their allies, the North Koreans and Soviet Union, carried on a detailed scientific process aimed at molding war prisoners into forms in which they could be exploited. Prisoners who underwent the experiences and later returned to their own countries reported that the experts assigned to wearing down prisoners were highly trained, efficient, and well educated. They were, in short, specialists in applying psychological rather than physical torment.

"These experts were trained in highly specialized schools in the Soviet Union and Communist China. Their methods of eliciting individual compliance are the same in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union as they were in China and Korea.

"During my tour of duty with the Operations Coordinating Board, virtually all projects pertaining to prisoners of war and the Soviet ideological threat were assigned to me. I did not agree with the items in our present code of conduct, especially those portions which instructed a soldier on how to act when he became a prisoner of war, mainly because they were defensive and did not fully consider the nature of the Communist captors and the methods they used to extract confessions or elicit individual compliance.

"Some of the returned U.S. prisoners of war that I interviewed stated 'they had been taken to Mukden, Manchuria.' This was in itself a violation of the so-called neutral status of Communist China. More revealing was the information that the U.S. prisoners of war had been sent to the Soviet Union. None of which ever returned. This information came to me from various sources. It was declassified and placed in one of Ambassador Lodge's speeches. My information was derived from two main sources: Chinese prisoners of war and a high-level Soviet defector. The Chinese prisoners stated that they had seen and talked to U.S. prisoners of war at Man-chou-li, Manchuria. Here the passengers had to be transferred from Chinese to Soviet trains because of the difference in the gage of the tracks. The defector stated to me that Soviet Embassy personnel coming from the Soviet Union had told him there were Korean War U.S. prisoners of war in the Soviet Union."

Now, let me tell you more about the defector who confirmed that American POWs had been taken to the Soviet Union. He was Yuri Alexandrovitch Rastvorov, a Russian KGB officer who defected to the U.S. from the Soviet Embassy in Japan in January 1964.

My superior, C. D. Jackson, prevailed upon CIA Director Allen Dulles to deliver Rastvorov to me. U.S. Air Force Brigadier General Dale O. Smith, on a

one-year assignment to the NSC, also sat in on the interview. Rastvorov revealed he had personally seen U.S. POWs heading into Siberia after changing trains at the Manchuria-Russia border. Rastvorov told me he believed that selected U.S. soldiers -- especially those with no roots nor family ties -- were taken to Russia as part of a joint KGB-CRU operation to be debriefed on details of their backgrounds. Then, Russian nationalists would be able to assume the identities of these POWs and be "played back" at appropriate times to carry out espionage activities in the U.S. and Canada.

I submitted my report on my interrogation of Rastvorov to Jackson and President Eisenhower. I recommended that the report not be made public because the POWs should be given up for being dead since we knew the Soviets would never relinquish them. Out of concern for the POWs' families, the President agreed. He did, however, give me permission to submit a copy of my report to the Department of Defense. And he allowed me to include information about the Communists' mistreatment of American POWs in a UN speech I was preparing for Ambassador Lodge. Unfortunately, the American press responded to Lodge's speech with a strange and eerie silence.

How many American soldiers were taken to the Soviet Union? I knew about 800 or 900 for sure, but the number might have been as many as 1,200. My intelligence reports had referred to three trainloads, and each train could hold up to 450 people.

The chief reason I ultimately was forced to rely on Rastvorov's knowledge to confirm my intelligence reports about American POWs being taken to the USSR is that we were hard-pressed during the Korean War to be able to confirm exactly what was happening inside Manchuria or Communist China. The responsibility and jurisdiction for running agents inside the Communist territories belonged to a

unit called the Office of Policy Coordination (OPC). OPC, a covert-action organization reporting to the U.S. State and Defense Departments but funded and staffed by the CIA, was created in 1948.

Once again, U.S. policy hindered such intelligence-gathering activities. The State Department, for instance, had put pressure on our intelligence sources in Taipei and Hong Kong to refrain from reporting anything that might show Peking's preparedness to enter the Korean War and thus support General MacArthur's position. Policy makers in Washington so strongly pressed the notion of the likelihood of a general war that they inserted in NSC-135/3 the declaration, "Aid to anti-Communist forces in China would increase the danger of general war."

To be productive, American intelligence efforts on the Chinese mainland would have had to elicit the cooperation of the anti-Communists. But policy forbade any such working arrangement with our friends there. Prohibited from contacting Chinese anti-Communists, no American agents were able to operate on the mainland. Policy was deliberately designed to dry up any intelligence and curtail our agents' activities on the Chinese mainland.

This policy also kept Chinese Nationalist commandos and troops from striking at unprotected coastal areas and sabotaging the few railroads that moved the Chinese Communist forces north to Manchuria and from there into North Korea. So complete was the intelligence blackout caused by this specific policy that troops of the United Nations Command did not learn of the presence of the Chinese Communist Army in North Korea until they met them in battle.

Both President Truman and President Eisenhower realized that policy was being subverted in the implementation stages, and took steps to correct the system. I must also give credit to President Eisenhower and the Department of

Defense, both of whom disregarded CIA and Department of State policy guidance incorporated in NSC-68/2: "There is no reliable intelligence concerning the role of the USSR in Korea."

Have you ever heard a more preposterous statement?

When I served on the National Security Council, I kept a daily log of my activities. I'd like to share a few entries with you now.

Sept 28, 1953	Received the final atrocity report from Defense.
Jan 27, 1954	Joint statement on missing 944 U.S. POWs. Defense made a film on atrocities.
Feb 4, 1954	Report on 21 U.S. turncoats.
Feb 11, 1954	Wrote plan to discredit Soviet use of 21 turncoats upon which they used brainwashing techniques.
March 1954	Release on 22,000 Chinese POWs who refused to go back.
May 13, 1954	Study on Soviet advisors in Indo-China. Release had good press coverage.
May 15, 1954	Defense released study, "Truth about Soviet Involvement in Korea." Also released study of Chinese Communist aggression and barbarism in Korea. Good press coverage. Getting many inquiries.
May 24, 1954	U.S. News & World Report published entire report, "Truth about Soviet Involvement in Korea" (in May 28 issue).
Aug 5, 1954	Study released on forcible detention of POWs.
Nov 24, 1954	Chinese Communists condemned 13 U.S. POWs as spies.

In view of the above entries and my report of the Rastvorov interview, it is hard for me to understand that as late as July 1992 -- as reported by Mark Sauter

in a copyrighted article in the Tacoma, Washington, Morning News Tribune -- Pentagon spokesmen, and even national security adviser General Scowcroft, claim they have no information about missing U.S. Korean War POWs being taken to the Soviet Union.

I maintain that much information about Korean War POW/MIAs remains to be found in the files of various government agencies. In 1954, for instance, the Department of Defense made available to me more than 200 reports, and it allowed me to interview 80 former POWs. In addition, while I served in Korea, I had compiled and sent to the Department of Defense many reports about our POWs.

These recent denials are typical of many high-level government officials who, for a long time, either weren't interested in pursuing the truth about what happened to our Korean War POW/MIAs or just didn't want to be bothered with our questions.

As for the role of America's press in this matter over the past forty years, I must say that most reporters often were reliable enough in those infrequent instances when they received factual information. Of course, exceptions stand out in my memory -- especially those journalists who wrapped themselves in the American flag and accepted money from the CIA to report the "party line" to supplement their incomes.

I have lived with the unresolved POW/MIA issue, both in Korea and Vietnam, for more than half my life. This is the third time I have appeared before a congressional committee and told what I know about POW/MIAs.

I can't point my finger at specific presidents or political parties for having covered up the facts. Instead, I must lay the blame for most of the alleged cover-ups on the shoulders of those who formulated our national policy over the years:

ill advised people in our State Department, the CIA and other government agencies who, for reasons known only to themselves, allowed their actions to be influenced by foreign ideology and slanted intelligence.

These people contributed greatly to the loss of more than 10,000 POWs in Korea and Vietnam, for our nation's policy in Vietnam was nearly identical to that in Korea. But, even more tragically, their dedication to a no-win policy of fear and paralysis was responsible for the loss of 112,000 American lives in these two wars.

In closing, let me say that the American people must never allow similar circumstances to prevail ever again in the future. Together, we must insist that the formulation of our nation's policies and their implementation should be held firmly in the hands, hearts and minds of our elected officials, and not be entrusted exclusively to the whims of professional bureaucrats.

I thank you again for granting me this opportunity to speak today. I commend each and every one of you for your personal devotion and dedication to this worthy cause. In attempting to uncover the truth about this important issue, the Senate Select Committee on POW/MIA Affairs is performing a truly great service for thousands of American citizens.

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CORSO STATEMENT

STATEMENT OF LT. COL. PHILIP J. CORSO, DEPUTY CHIEF, FOREIGN TECHNOLOGY DIVISION, OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT, DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY

I am Lt. Col. Philip J. Corso, presently holding the position of Deputy Chief, Foreign Technology Division, Office of the Chief of Research and Development, Department of the Army. My duties, in brief, are keeping abreast of all foreign developments which may be of interest to Army research and development, and act as liaison officer with the Technical Intelligence and Security Divisions of the Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence.

During the Korean war, I was Chief of the Special Projects Branch, Intelligence Division, Far East Command. My duties included the production of intelligence on political and subversive activities in North and South Korea. Within this framework I was responsible for intelligence on Communist activities within our prisoner of war camps in South Korea and the enemy camps in North Korea. Because of the information I had available, early in 1953, I was sent to Korea as a member of the staff of the delegation at Panmunjom. I assisted in the discussions for the exchange of sick and wounded prisoners of war.

Upon my return to the United States, at the request of Mr. C. D. Jackson, special assistant to the President, I was assigned to the Operations Coordinating Board. My initial duties were to do the basic research and prepare data for Dr. Charles Mayo in Committee I at the U.N. on the subject of "Bacteriological Warfare" and "Question of Atrocities Committed by the North Korean and Chinese Communist Forces Against United Nations Prisoners of War in Korea," delivered by Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge.

My findings revealed that the Chinese Communists with their allies, the North Koreans and Soviet Union, carried on a detailed scientific process aimed at molding war prisoners into forms in which they could be exploited. Prisoners who underwent the experiences and later returned to their own countries reported that the experts assigned to wearing down prisoners were highly trained, efficient, and well educated. They were, in short, specialists in applying psychological rather than physical torment.

These experts were trained in highly specialized schools in the Soviet Union and Communist China. Their methods of eliciting individual compliance are the same in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union as they were in China and Korea.

During my tour of duty at the Operations Coordinating Board, virtually all projects pertaining to prisoners of war and the Soviet ideological threat were assigned to me. I did not agree with the items in our present code of conduct, especially those portions which instructed a soldier on how to act when he became a prisoner of war, mainly, because they were defensive and did not fully consider the nature of the Communist captors and the methods they used to extract confessions or elicit individual compliance.

Some of the returned U.S. prisoners of war that I interviewed stated "they had been taken to Mukden, Manchuria." This was in itself a violation of the so called neutral status of Communist China. More revealing was the information that the U.S. prisoners of war had been sent to the Soviet Union. None of which ever returned. This information came to me from various sources. It was declassified and placed in one of Ambassador Lodge's speeches. My information was derived from two main sources: Chinese prisoners of war and a high-level Soviet defector. The Chinese prisoners stated that they had seen and talked to U.S. prisoners of war at Man-chou-li, Manchuria. Here the prisoners had to be transferred from Chinese to Soviet trains because of the difference in gauge of the tracks. The defector stated to me that Soviet Embassy personnel coming from the Soviet Union had told him there were Korean war U.S. prisoners of war in the Soviet Union.

The information upon which I based my studies and conclusions were on intelligence, and research and examination of information over a considerable period of time. I believe that the Communist menace can be exposed and eventually destroyed by revealing the blunt truth of their internal and external manipulations. Treatment of prisoners of war reflected one phase of a conscience system which actively rejects, subverts, and destroys decent standards of conduct and the whole structure of humane values from which they are derived—a system which denies that all men are created equal and are made in the image of God.

NOVEMBER 25, 1991.

KENNETH QUINN

Deputy Assistant Secretary of State, for East Asian and Pacific Affairs,

U.S. Department of State,
2210 C Street N.W.,
Washington, D.C. 20520.

Dear Mr. Quinn: The November 16, 1991 edition of The Palm Beach Post carried an Associated Press story reporting that an American POW from the Vietnam war might be living in the Soviet Union. The article concluded, "President Bush and Secretary of State James Baker have asked the Soviet Union to look into reports that American POWs from World War II, the Korean war and Vietnam were secretly shipped to the Soviet Union. The Soviets have denied knowledge of any living POWs but promised to cooperate in any enquiries."

I feel obliged to share with you and Secretary Baker information I received in the mid-1950s that confirms that many American POWs from the Korean war were, indeed, shipped to Russia.

During the Korean war, from 1950 to 1953, I served as Chief of Special Projects, Intelligence Division, in the Far East Command. I ended my assignment by serving for 5 months as a member of the Panmunjom UN Truce Delegation in 1953, participating in "Operation Little Switch," the exchange of sick and wounded POWs.

While in Korea, I suspected that some American prisoners listed as MIAs had actually been sent to the U.S.S.R. But I had no solid proof to back up my suspicions. When I was a member of the National Security Council on the White House staff under President Eisenhower (1953-1957), however, I interrogated Yuri Alexandrovitch Rastvorov, a Russian KGB officer who defected to the United States from the U.S.S.R. embassy in Japan in January 1954.

My superior, C.D. Jackson, special assistant to President Eisenhower, contacted CIA Director Allen Dulles and arranged to have Rastvorov delivered to me for interrogation. U.S. Air Force Brigadier General Dale O. Smith, on a 1-year assignment to NSC, asked to sit in on the "interview."

Rastvorov revealed that Russian diplomats coming to Japan had seen U.S. POWs in the U.S.S.R. Rastvorov personally had seen a trainload of U.S. POWs heading into Siberia after changing trains at the Manchuria-Russian border. (This change of trains was necessary because the two railroads used a different gauge of track.)

Rastvorov believed that selected U.S. soldiers, those with no roots or family ties, were taken to Russia, then debriefed on details of their backgrounds. Then, Russian nationalists would be able to assume the identities of these POWs and be "played back" to the United States at appropriate times to carry out espionage activities.

I submitted my report on Rastvorov's interrogation to Jackson. In a few days, he told me that President Eisenhower had decided not to make this information public because he was concerned about adverse effects on the families of missing POWs. Later, I received permission to submit my report to the Secretary of Defense.

The Associated Press wire story also reported that you are chairman of the POW-MIA Interagency Group. You have a tough job. You must handle hundreds, if not thousands, of inquiries from families who hope their loved ones are still alive today somewhere. My prayers go with you and the heavy burden of your efforts.

I hope that my report of Rastvorov's information might assist the State Department in finding out if American POWs are still alive in the U.S.S.R. Please call me if you need further information about my interrogation of Rastvorov.

As a courtesy, I am sending a copy of my letter to Major General Smith to his last known address. He's getting up in years, as I am, and I hope he is in the best of health.

Most cordially,

PHILIP J. CORSO,
Lt. Col., U.S. Army (Retired)

LETTER FROM KENNETH M. QUINN, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY, EAST ASIAN & PACIFIC AFFAIRS

DECEMBER 3, 1991.

PHILIP J. CORSO,
Lt. Col. U.S. Army (Retired),
2706 Fairway Drive,
Jupiter, Florida 33477.

Dear Mr. Corso: I am writing to acknowledge receipt of your letter dated November 25 regarding the subject of American POWs from the Korean war who may have been sent to the Soviet Union. I also wish to thank you for your concern with the subject and your willingness to provide information which may be helpful to resolving questions about it.

Apparently, the Associated Press report, from which you obtained my name, did not clearly specify that my responsibilities extend only to POW/MIAs from the Vietnam war. I am therefore taking action to make your letter available to Deputy Assistant Secretary of State L. Desaix Anderson who coordinates U.S. Government relations with Korea, as well as to our Soviet Desk and the Department of Defense. Mr. Anderson's mailing address is the same as the one to which you addressed your letter to me.

Thank you again for your concern with this issue.

Sincerely,

KENNETH M. QUINN,
Deputy Assistant Secretary
East Asian & Pacific Affairs

LETTER FROM JAMES R. CYPHER, WRITING/EDITING/PUBLICITY SERVICES

JANUARY 6, 1992.

THE HONORABLE ROBERT SMITH,
Select Committee on POW/MIA Affairs,
The Capitol,
Washington, DC 20510.

Dear Senator Smith: For the Committee's background in investigating the likelihood that American POWs from World War II, the Korean war and the Vietnam war were taken to the U.S.S.R, I am enclosing a copy of a letter my client, Lt. Col. Philip J. Corso, U.S. Army (Retired), sent to Messrs. Quinn and Baker at the U.S. State Department on November 25, 1991, as well as a copy of Mr. Quinn's December 3, 1991 reply.

Colonel Corso and I hope that information regarding his interrogation of KGB defector Yuri Rastvorov in 1954 might prove useful to the committee in its upcoming meetings with Russian officials.

I am collaborating with Colonel Corso in preparing his memoir for publication, and the results of the Rastvorov "interview" will certainly be included in the book. After Colonel Corso retired from military service in 1963, he served for more than a year as a member of Senator Strom Thurmond's staff. In fact, Senator Thurmond recently approved the text of his Foreword to Colonel Corso's book.

If you or your staff have any questions about details regarding Colonel Corso's chat with Rastvorov, please contact Colonel Corso in Jupiter, Florida, at (407) 743-8941.

I also am sending copies of the enclosed information to your committee colleague, Senator John Kerry.

Most cordially,

JAMES R. CYPHER,

Senator GRASSLEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Vice Chairman SMITH. I would like to move on with the other three witnesses to go ahead and give your brief statements if you can. Is it Mr. Oprica? And do you have a statement, sir? If you do, please summarize it if you can.

TESTIMONY OF SURBAN OPRICA, FORMER RUMANIAN ENGINEER SERVING IN NORTH KOREA

Mr. OPRICA. My name is Surban Oprica. I was born in Romania in 1944, August 1. I finish the college and received a Master Degree Diplomat in construction, and I start to work at the technology institute of designing, which designs factories for electrical items, and electronic devices.

And in 1979, I was sent from Romania to help North Korea to build a TV factory. The first TV factory. I was sent in Pyongyang, and the factory was not far from Pyongyang.

I am the only person here who lived in North Korea, and I know more about North Korea than somebody else who has not lived there. But we worked 6 days, and each Sunday they make for us, like they send us to museums for relaxing one day. We went to other parts of Korea, and on more trips. I remember trips. One was at the museum, when I saw American parts exposed. It was a museum with children, grandchildren was working for North Korea, and was going inside to see somewhere else.

To make sure my story, I was 1979 September in North Korea and October. I don't remember exact. Would be the first 2 weeks of November. And Sunday the bus take us, and was like an honor for me to go to see the international friendship—what now I believe was the international friendship exhibition. The six story temple-like building contained thousands of gifts to Kim Il Sung brought by foreign dignitary.

During that trip we were technical Romanian in the bus was 15, 20. We see a land like a camp where vegetables, and my attention was to—because I saw a person with a European face, with blue eyes, very close to the bus. And I was very shocked. And everybody on the bus was shocked. And I was looking behind him I saw 7 or 10 peoples with Caucasian face. And behind them, I saw more people working in the camp.

Vice Chairman SMITH. How were they dressed, and were they guarded?

Mr. OPRICA. They were dressed with North Korean dress, like Chinese, but they worked in the camp and was dark color.

Vice Chairman SMITH. But you saw them?

Mr. OPRICA. Yes, I saw them.

Vice Chairman SMITH. Did you see them close up?

Mr. OPRICA. Yes, close up and personal.

Vice Chairman SMITH. Did you hear them speak?

Mr. OPRICA. No they didn't make no gestures or something to show us they are—only what they—

Vice Chairman SMITH. Were they guarded? Were they guarded?

Mr. OPRICA. No.

Vice Chairman SMITH. Not guarded?

Mr. OPRICA. No guard.

Vice Chairman SMITH. What were they doing?

Mr. OPRICA. They work in field. I think they work for a field of cabbage or something like that.

Vice Chairman SMITH. Did anybody tell you who they were or who they thought they were?

Mr. OPRICA. The noise in the bus, because its the bus—Sunday, was the person bus was play some games, they make some jokes or something. So they stop and was like a question who they was? But I sort of remember somebody in bus ask the North Korean who supervises us who they were, and they changed the subject. We don't receive any answer.

Vice Chairman SMITH. Your English is much better than my Romanian, but I am still having a little difficulty.

Mr. OPRICA. Yes.

Vice Chairman SMITH. I just want to state for the record that you are an engineer, you are Romanian, you were in Pyongyang in 1979.

Mr. OPRICA. Yes.

Vice Chairman SMITH. And you saw these people.

Mr. OPRICA. Yes.

Vice Chairman SMITH. Now, I want to come back to that, but before that I want to go back to what you said, because I had difficulty understanding you, and I want to see if I can clarify it.

You said you saw a museum. Did I understand you correct?

Mr. OPRICA. It was another trip. This was 19—8.

Vice Chairman SMITH. 1980?

Mr. OPRICA. 80.

Vice Chairman SMITH. 1980?

Mr. OPRICA. Yes, 1980.

Vice Chairman SMITH. And you saw a museum where? In Pyongyang?

Mr. OPRICA. No, it was somewhere, another place. I start to tell you everything that I saw in North Korea—

Vice Chairman SMITH. But a museum in North Korea. Is that what you said? Somewhere in North Korea.

Mr. OPRICA. Yes.

Vice Chairman SMITH. And what did you see in that museum? What did you say you saw in that museum? I did not understand you.

Mr. OPRICA. My wife and me, we saw parts of the American soldiers.

Vice Chairman SMITH. You saw parts of American soldiers?

Mr. OPRICA. They put in alcohol and they keep to scary people, and people all the time were pressure—the Korean people.

Vice Chairman SMITH. I guess I don't understand. You saw parts—were these in—do you understand formaldehyde? Were they in liquid? What did you see?

Mr. OPRICA. Limbs, hands, heads.

Vice Chairman SMITH. Heads? How do you know they were soldiers?

Mr. OPRICA. They have a lot of American armament items. Uniforms, flags, everythings.

Vice Chairman SMITH. How many did you see?

Mr. OPRICA. Five or six, something like that. They have a big museum. It is done like below grade and—but this is part of my statement, because the most important is I saw what I believe they are POW, American POW.

Vice Chairman SMITH. You were told these other folks were American POWs that you saw, right?

Mr. OPRICA. Yes, I find out later when was a fight between Korean and the Romanian. The Romanian told—

Vice Chairman SMITH. Who did you report this to?

Mr. OPRICA. I report this 4 years ago to the authority. Was to John Rowland, U.S.A. representative, and was my—sent the statement to Pentagon. Unfortunately, I don't think—was nothing done from not 4 years. But because I am an American citizen, last year in my vacation I was in Romania. And today I can tell there is a person who will make statements about what I saw. The person who were on the bus during that trip.

Vice Chairman SMITH. One more question, and then we will move to the next witness. Were you told that these pilots were from the Korean war or the Vietnam war?

Mr. OPRICA. The parts?

Vice Chairman SMITH. The pilots?

Mr. OPRICA. No, no pilots, I talk about—

Vice Chairman SMITH. Prisoners. I'm sorry, prisoners. POW.

Mr. OPRICA. We think they was—what I believe they are from POW—was like their age. I don't think they are from Vietnam. I never was discussion between Romanian technical workers and me. They are American but they are from the Korean war.

Vice Chairman SMITH. Korean war?

Mr. OPRICA. Korean war, yes.

Vice Chairman SMITH. Just for the record, Mr. Oprica gave this information to Representative John Rowland in 1988, and also a DOD officer, so we might be able to—we can get the information on what was given there. Thank you.

Colonel Simpson?

TESTIMONY OF COLONEL DELK SIMPSON (USAF, RETIRED), FORMER U.S. MILITARY ATTACHE IN HONG KONG

Colonel SIMPSON. In 1954, while I was U.S. Air Attache stationed in Hong Kong, I reported to Headquarters Air Force Intelligence an eye witness account of approximately 700 American prisoners from the Korean war being transported from Man-chou-li, China into Siberia.

Since my retirement in 1961, I have endeavored to bring to the attention of officials of the Government my intelligence report in an effort to generate some action. I have visited offices of Senators and a Member of the House of Representatives. I have given interviews to the Washington Post and the Wall Street Journal.

I have visited with the officer in charge of MIAs in the White House, and I have been interviewed by the office of Director of Intelligence in the Pentagon, where it was later said, I am told, that I was senile and that the prisoners I reported were French from the French-Indochinese War, being taken to Siberia for return to the French.

It was not until 6 months ago that I came to understand the possibility of why I received such official inaction. At that time, I met Colonel Corso, and Colonel Corso told me that in 1953, he was the author of a policy while on the White House staff to abandoned all prisoners being held by the Russians. He said the policy was approved by President Eisenhower.

Senator, it is incomprehensible to me that anybody would make such a decision to send out our boys to a sure death.

[The prepared statement of Colonel Simpson follows:]

My name is O'Wighton Dalk Simpson. I am a retired Lieu. Colonel of the United States Air Force.

In 1954, while I was the United States Air Attache stationed in Hong Kong, I reported to Headquarters, Air Force Intelligence an eyewitness account of approximately 700 American prisoners from the Korean war, being transported from Manchuli, China, into Siberia.

Since my retirement in 1961, I have endeavored to bring to the attention of officials of the government my intelligence report in an effort to generate some action. I have visited the offices of Senators and a member of the House of Representatives. I have given interview to the Washington Post and the Wall Street Journal. I have visited with the office in charge of MIA's in the White House and I have been interviewed by the office of the Director Of Intelligence in the Pentagon, where it was later said, I am told, that I was senile and that the prisoners I reported were French from the French Indo-Chinese war, being taken to Siberia for exchange to the French.

The only serious recognition of the possible validity of my report has been the support from the Korean Prisoner organization and some individuals throughout the United States, principally in Seattle.

It was not until six months ago that I came to understand the possibility of why I received such official inaction. At that time I met Colonel Philip A. Corso, U.S. Army, Retired. Colonel Corso told me that in 1953 he was the author of a policy, while on The White House Staff, to abandon all prisoners being held by the Russians. He said we were not at war with Russia and the U.S. did not want to cause and friction with Moscow. He said this policy was approved by President Eisenhower.

O'Wighton Dalk Simpson
O'WIGHTON DALK SIMPSON

Biography of O'Wighton Delk Simpson

Lieut. Colonel, United States Air Force, 223-03-6540

Assignments during military career:

Knollwood Air Force Base, Southern Pines, N. C.
Headquarters, First District Air Force Technical Training
Command, Aide de Camp to the Commanding General

Headquarters, Army Air Corps, Washington, D.C. Special Assistant
to The Air Inspector 1943-1947

Commanding Officer, Air Base Group Itazuke Air Force Base, 5th
Air Force in Japan 1947-1948

Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, 5th Air Force, Nagoya
Japan and in Korea 1949-1950

Student and Faculty at Armed Forces Staff College, Norfolk,
Virginia 1950-1952

Director of Intelligence Training, Air Tactical Command
Headquarters, Langley Field, Virginia 1952-1953

Assistant Air Attache to London with duty in Hong Kong, B.C.C.
1953-1955

Special Assistant to the Commander in Chief, North American Air
Defense Command, Colorado Springs, Col. 1955-1957

Air Force Attache, United States Embassy Bucharest, Rumania
1957-1959

Special Assistant to the Commander in Chief, Air Materiel
Command, Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, Dayton, Ohio
1959-1961

Retired April, 1961.

Vice Chairman SMITH. Let me focus back—is that your statement? I do not want to interrupt you.

Let me ask you a question. What year was this?

Colonel SIMPSON. 1954.

Vice Chairman SMITH. And did you say you saw or you received reports?

Colonel SIMPSON. I have an eye witness.

Vice Chairman SMITH. You have an eye witness?

Colonel SIMPSON. I had an eye witness.

Vice Chairman SMITH. Who told you that 700 Americans—

Colonel SIMPSON. Approximately. It was two trainloads. We estimated 350 men on each train.

Vice Chairman SMITH. Going from North Korea?

Colonel SIMPSON. No, going from China, Man-chou-li on the Siberian border.

Vice Chairman SMITH. To where?

Colonel SIMPSON. To Siberia. That's where they have to change the undercarriage.

Vice Chairman SMITH. What was your opinion at the time of the source, as far as credibility?

Colonel SIMPSON. Well, he was Polish.

Vice Chairman SMITH. You do not have to identify him, but as far as—

Colonel SIMPSON. I couldn't identify him if I wanted to. But he was trying to get to Australia, and he was very afraid that they were going to try to stop him. And I had to promise to keep his name and destination secret. So, it was a classified report, and I sent it to the headquarters, Pentagon Building. I never got any response from anybody about anything.

Vice Chairman SMITH. Now, you said that when you reported this to your superiors, they accused you of being senile. Is that what you said?

Colonel SIMPSON. Oh, this was recently, in the last few years.

Vice Chairman SMITH. Oh, yes? Who accused you of being senile?

Colonel SIMPSON. DIA.

Vice Chairman SMITH. Do you have a name?

Colonel SIMPSON. Oh, it was an admiral and a full colonel. I've forgotten their names, but they met me and treated me like I was a VIP.

Vice Chairman SMITH. Like you were what?

Colonel SIMPSON. Like a very important person. They took me down in the bowls of the Pentagon Building. I explained what I had done and about what I had reported years before. And then they came up with the idea that I was senile, and the people I reported were French. Senegalese, actually. My informant had never seen a man with black skin before.

Vice Chairman SMITH. I read the excerpts from the report that you had received, and it was unique in the sense that it specifically identified a large number of black soldiers.

Colonel SIMPSON. Yes, because he had never seen a black man before. He was born in Manchuria.

Vice Chairman SMITH. Did you ever receive any followup information on that report at all?

Colonel SIMPSON. No, not from anybody. I finally got a copy of it somebody dug up from the archives, and I was very frustrated because it came—apparently it was handled through the State Department.

The State Department had put the name of my predecessor or the report. That didn't mean a damn to me. I don't care. But it was inaccurate and they had it signed by Mr. Harrington, the counsel general, which is normal. But they had my informant—they turned him into a Greek instead of a Polish man. I just took that as an example of how the State Department screws things up.

Vice Chairman SMITH. Mr. Kiba, let me move to you. Is that pronounced correctly? Mr. Kiba?

Mr. KIBA. Kiba.

Vice Chairman SMITH. Excuse me. You were a prisoner of war in the Korean war, correct?

Mr. KIBA. During the Korean war, yes.

Vice Chairman SMITH. Proceed with your statement.

Mr. KIBA. I just want to say something before I start. I appreciate you inviting me here. But what I don't understand is, you are supposed to have a committee of 12.

Mr. KIBA. I have waited a long time. I have been trying to inform you for years, and years, and years, and I am not trying to be disrespectful or anything.

Vice Chairman SMITH. You are entitled to make your statement. I hear you.

Mr. KIBA. I will go ahead with this. I would appreciate it—and I have waited a long time. I would appreciate if you would let me read this, and then I want you to question me.

Vice Chairman SMITH. Proceed, sir.

TESTIMONY OF STEVE KIBA, FORMER KOREAN WAR U.S. POW HELD IN CHINA

Mr. KIBA. In appearing before you—before the committee. I say you, now, because almost all the committee—well, except for you, they're gone. Well, it's intimidating to me because I'm an ex-airman. I didn't have much education, and so forth, and I'm a country boy from West Virginia, and I now live in South Carolina.

But it really is not half as intimidating or anywhere near as intimidating as being cut off from your world; being isolated; and being force to stand 18 to 24 hours a day in front of Red Chinese interrogators with a Red Chinese guard holding a machine pistol to your temple, caressing your temple. Now, that was intimidating.

And they were sadistic and barbaric. And because I know you're not going to threaten to shoot me—the committee's not, right? But they did every day, every hour, every few minutes, and then threatened me with all kinds of horrendous tortures, and they even did some of them.

And you're not going to put me on a starvation diet. They did. And you're not going to withhold my water because I don't answer your questions. They did. I would go days, and days, and days without a drink of water. And I would go days and even weeks without a bite of food.

And you are not going to threaten to not send me home, and they did every day. They told me I would never go home unless I cooperated. And they threatened to keep me for life. And they kept some of my friends for life. They're still there.

Now, in my testimony I'm going to tell you about American POWs who were abandoned after the 1953 cease-fire, and I know what I'm talking about, because I was left over there after the 1953 cease-fire.

Now, our essentially unarmed B-29—I say essentially unarmed because we were flying a B-29 with only two tail guns, and we were flying way up high, at 24,000 feet in the jet stream, and they caught us. And we were attacked and shot down. And this happened January 12, 1953, about 10:45 p.m. And we were captured. And we were held over 2 years after the war was over.

Now, if the U.S. Government had accepted and lived up to its responsibilities to the men it sent off to fight, fight our battles during World War II, the Korean war, and the Vietnam war, we wouldn't have to be here, would we. It is a known fact that we abandoned American servicemen after these wars, and let their families down. I know we abandoned some because I saw some of them.

President Harry Truman was the first President to leave Americans behind. Then President Eisenhower abandoned Americans POWs after the Korean war in North Korea, Red China, and the Soviet Union. In a press conference on April 29, 1959, President Eisenhower acknowledged that not all American POWs were repatriated after the Korean war cease-fire. And Richard Nixon was Vice President then.

Then in March 1973, President Nixon went on national TV and proclaimed that all POWs were home. He knew this was not true, and Henry Kissinger knew that this was not true, and North Vietnam knew that this was not true, and even I, an insignificant ex-POW knew that it was not true.

Surely, President Nixon must have known about the Korean war POWs who were left behind. I'm positive that he knew because I wrote him numerous letters reminding him of this fact and pleaded with him not to allow it to happen again if and when we had a peace with North Vietnam.

And during Lyndon Johnson's administration, I wrote to President Johnson and informed him about the American POWs abandoned in North Korea, Red China and Siberia after the Korean war cease-fire. And I pleaded with him not to let it happen again.

And during President Nixon's first administration, I wrote more than one letter—I don't know how many, but I wrote quite a few letters to every single Congressman and every single Senator about the POW/MIA issue. And, well, I don't know whether you were a Senator then or not. I don't remember.

I was going to say maybe some of you got some of my letters. Some of these fellows probably were Senators then, right? And maybe they got some of my letters, but they didn't answer me. In fact, I received very few replies.

I received replies from the Ohio Senators, because at that time, I was living in Ohio. In addition, I wrote to every middle school, junior high school, high school in Ohio. And I say, at that time I was living in Ohio.

I wrote to almost every, if not every, daily paper in the State of Ohio, to many of the larger papers throughout the Nation, like New York Times and all the others.

And I wrote to TV stations, radio stations, talk show hosts, national offices of the VFW, American Legion and every civic and service organization I could think of. And I got very few replies.

I wrote to anyone I thought that might be willing to speak up for the MIAs. Response, or shall I say lack of response, was disheartening. It seemed that no one or very few people really cared about our abandoned POWs, except, of course, for their immediate families and a few friends.

Very few people even believed me that the POWs were left behind in Red China, Red North Korea and the Soviet Union, and no one wanted to believe that it could happen again in Southeast Asia.

I tried to warn them that it was going to happen again. Presidents Ford, Carter, Reagan, Bush, were all informed about our Government's leaving POWs behind in Communist hellholes in North Korea, Red China, the U.S.S.R., and Red Vietnam.

I wrote to every President from Johnson to Bush about our abandoning our fighting men. The response, if they even bothered to respond, was always the standard form letter by some underling telling me that everything humanly possible was being done to resolve the matter.

It seems that we live in a throwaway society. Like everything else we use, we "used" these brave, courageous, loyal men to fight our battles and then when they were captured, we just threw them away, abandoned them and forgot them. What about their families? We take away their husbands or fathers or brothers or sons and then tell them to be patient.

Well, they have been patient for years and years, some even for decades. Like Robert Dumas, for example. He has been trying for 42 years to learn the fate of his brother, who is an MIA in North Korea. And Robert has much pertinent information and pictures and documents proving that his brother was seen as late as 1957 alive. And I think this committee ought to hear what Robert and some of the other family members have to say.

I have a question for you? Why does our Government expect the POW/MIA families to come up with concrete, conclusive evidence to prove that their missing loved ones are alive and not ask the enemy for any proof that they're dead? You always ask the MIA family to prove that they're alive and to give you some concrete evidence. Now, how in the world are they going to go over there and get you concrete evidence?

Why does our Government take as gospel the word of the Communists who are expert, professional liars over the word of its own loyal, patriotic servicemen? And what about the MIA children? If we can't bring the parents home—their fathers home—then we should provide each one of them with a good college education, all the way up to a doctor's degree if they can handle it.

The draft dodgers and war protesters are afforded more consideration than our MIAs and their families. I know because I was an MIA, I was a POW, and my family was an MIA family. And you would be surprised at some of the things they tried to pull on them

just because they were dumb "Hunkies" (refers to someone who hails from Hungary).

Why is the Government afraid that some of our MIA/POWs might still be alive? Why was the Government in such a hurry to decide that all MIAs should be declared KIA? In my testimony, for purpose of brevity, I limit it to specific sightings, statements concerning the capture of Weese and Van Voohris—those were the two men on my crew. They were captured alive as they touched the ground in North Korea.

And I also limit it to specific threats never to release me.

Vice Chairman SMITH. What was the year of that incident?

Mr. KIBA. We were shot down January 12, 1953.

Vice Chairman SMITH. And when were you released?

Mr. KIBA. August 4, 1955. And this was 2 years after the cease-fire.

Vice Chairman SMITH. Did you see your two crew mates in captivity after the armistice?

Mr. KIBA. I saw Van Voohris.

Vice Chairman SMITH. He was alive with you?

Mr. KIBA. He was alive.

Vice Chairman SMITH. Did he come back?

Mr. KIBA. He did not come back. Let me finish this. There are other things you should ask me about that.

I did not include the horrible conditions and treatment at the hands of the sadistic Communist captors, even though it might help you to understand better the type of warped minds with which we're dealing. I hear so many people say, well, why would they keep them? They have no reason to keep them. They do! The reason is, they don't need a reason. They are mean, sadistic. They're different than we are. A Communist is different.

I know. I had to live with them for 32 months. For almost 40 years, I've been trying to inform the American people and the news media of the heinous crime of enslaving the bodies and minds of our courageous fighting men by the godless Communists. And they are. They don't believe in God. They're atheists.

For almost 40 years, our own Government has known of it and for almost 40 years kept it from the POW families and the American people. They've kept this a secret. They have known a lot of things, but they don't tell us.

Isn't it high time to correct this grave injustice perpetrated by the Communist enemy and covered up by the MIAs own Government? What I have said to you and to the American people is important. This is doggone important. The information in the 30-page testimony which I presented to the Select Committee is extremely pertinent. The American people have a right, and especially the POW/MIA families, to know that living, missing American POWs were left behind. They damn well were left behind! This information must not be hidden any longer.

Government officials used to, and perhaps still do, tell the families that to release information on the status and circumstances of a POW might jeopardize his well-being. Keeping the families informed with, the truth couldn't jeopardize the unfortunate POW any more than what leaving him to rot in a far-off hellhole could jeopardize him. Which is worse?

The families can take it. I've waited decades to tell you these incredible facts. I've attempted to tell you many times. So don't treat them lightly. What the Red Chinese did to our crew and what they forced us to endure, I can understand. I understand it completely. But what I don't understand is why our Government—I can't understand and it really hurts—is why our Government, when I came back, when our crew came back, they ordered us to remain silent about the others whom we had seen.

I couldn't understand and I still don't, why they chose to abandon fellow countrymen.

Vice Chairman SMITH. Sir, could I interrupt you just for a second right there? How many others did you see after the armistice, other than your crewmate?

Mr. KIBA. OK, let me see.

Vice Chairman SMITH. Roughly, a number.

Mr. KIBA. Roughly, 10 to 15.

Vice Chairman SMITH. You saw them. You were imprisoned with them or you saw them, you talked with them.

Mr. KIBA. I didn't talk to them, no. You have to realize, as I told you, these Chinese are mean. And they kept us under very close guard. I could see them. It was very difficult to communicate, even with Van Voohris. He was 6 feet from me.

Vice Chairman SMITH. But you knew there were other Americans other than Van Voohris?

Mr. KIBA. Yes.

Vice Chairman SMITH. And you saw them?

Mr. KIBA. We saw them and some of my crew saw them. Now, I have to tell you this, none of the crew saw Van Voohris. I was the only one that saw Van Voohris. And this makes it difficult because when I came back, they tried to discredit me and tried to make me believe that I had imagined it.

Vice Chairman SMITH. Well, now, let me ask you about that. When you came back, you were debriefed—

Mr. KIBA. Debriefed, yes.

Vice Chairman SMITH [continuing]. And you told the debriefers what you just told us.

Mr. KIBA. Yes.

Vice Chairman SMITH. And what was their response to that?

Mr. KIBA. Well, it depends on which debriefer, now. We were debriefed by at least three groups, Air Force, CIA and I think it was either Defense Department or State Department. I'm not sure which it was.

And in some cases they tape recorded most of what we said. In some cases they would shut the tape recorder off and then would talk to us.

I love this country, and I wouldn't hesitate to volunteer again. If my country needed me, I would go tomorrow. And I didn't dodge the draft or protest the war. No Kiba ever dodged the draft or protested his country's policy while it was in conflict with a foreign power.

Our parents instilled in us family values, strong patriotism. They loved this country and sent four sons off to war. I had three brothers who also fought in World War II. They didn't run away.

Are there any MIAs still alive? I believe so. Because deep down a man wants to live and this strong will to live helps him to endure the worst kind of treatment and conditions. And I'll tell you one thing. For the first 3 or 4 months, I wanted them to kill me. I was hoping they would kill me. I was praying that they would kill me to put me out of my misery.

My diet at the Peanut Palace—did you read this? OK, at the Peanut Palace, my diet was 15 half peanuts. You know what a peanut in a shell looks like? OK. There are two in there, right. And so I got 15, but if you put them together back in the shell, they would be 7½, and a small bun, about that size.

And for lunch, I got 15 peanuts and two small buns. For supper, I got 15 peanuts and two small buns. Now there was a catch, though. Oh, they also allowed me a cup of water a day. The only problem was, if you weren't in your room, in the cell, and you were upstairs being interrogated, you didn't eat. If you were out of the cell at the time they delivered the food, you didn't get any.

And that happened many times, because as I told you, the interrogations ran anywhere from 6 hours to 18 hours to 24 hours. And when they were through doing this, they would take you back to the cell. Maybe a half hour later, you'd be taken right back up.

So you were going sometimes days and days and days without getting any sleep. And you were going days and days without food or water. And they would sit in front of you and they would slurp their tea and their brandy and their water, and they'd ask you, would you like a drink? Yes, I'd like a drink. Cooperate and we'll give you a drink.

And I won't tell you what I told them. OK, are my friends Weese and Van Voohris still alive? I don't know. But I do know one thing. That they bailed out of the B-29 because airmen in the back of the B-29 saw them leave. And, as I told you, I saw Van Voohris 6 to 7 months later. In fact, the exact dates were around July 20 or 21 through about the end of July, first of August 1953 was when I saw him.

And if there's even the slightest chance that even only one POW is alive, we—and by we I mean you and me, the Government, the news media, everybody, every single American—owes it to that POW and to that family to get him home.

And I'm telling you, don't let down our missing men from World War II, the Korean war, and the Vietnam war. Also, Senator, don't endanger our future men by cutting the defense budget too much. You cut that defense budget too much and we still have enemies. We have 1 billion Chinese over there and they're not our friends. They told me that they were going to destroy us. And they told me it didn't matter if it takes 1 year, 5 years, 10 years, 100 years; they're going to destroy us. And they mean it.

If you send the boys off to fight again, let them fight to win, not like in Korea and Vietnam. You tied our hands. And we want no more no-win wars like Korea and Vietnam! And if they are so unfortunate as to be captured, don't leave them behind and don't abandon them and don't forget them.

Now that's all the statement that I have here. Now, I'm sure you have some questions here. You're probably wondering why the CIA

interrogated me, I mean, debriefed me. It seemed more like interrogation, but it was really a debriefing.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Kiba follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF STEVE E. KIBA

I was born February 5, 1932, in Lundale, an impoverished mining community on Buffalo Creek in Logan County, W.V.A. My parents were immigrants from Hungary, and both worked hard to raise their eleven children.

My early childhood was spent in various mining camps along the creek. In 1945, our family moved to Akron, Ohio. I graduated from Kenmore High School in 1950.

On July 31, 1950, I enlisted in the Air Force and spent 5½ years serving my country. My primary duty was as a radio operator on a B-29.

On the night of January 12, 1953, while on a routine leaflet drop mission over North Korea, our "unarmed" B-29 was attacked and shot down. Our aircraft was definitely over North Korean territory, approximately 40 miles south of the Yalu River.

The following afternoon, after over 18 hours of exposure to sub-zero temperatures, I was captured. Approximately 72 hours later, the Communists transported our crew by force into Red China.

During the first 18 months, the Red Chinese failed to notify our Government that they were holding us; consequently we were carried as MIA. It was only through a freak accident that our Government and our families learned that we were alive and being held captive by the Communists. During the first 8 months we were subjected to extremely long and harsh interrogations; forced to exist on a starvation diet; deprived of drinking water; not permitted to keep ourselves clean; subjected to sub-human, degrading, and humiliating treatment; isolated in an effort to demoralize, disorient, and dement us; and harassed by being subjected to intensive and extensive "re-education" (indoctrination) lectures and sessions. After the first 8 months, the interrogations terminated, but everything else was the same.

During the interrogation and "re-education" sessions, I was incessantly harangued by accusations of being a spy and of having violated Red Chinese territorial air space. About 2 years after our capture and after being shanghaied, we were tried and sentenced as espionage agents.

Over 2 years after the Korean war Ceasefire, we were released (8/4/55) after almost 32 months of hell.

Upon our release (in Japan) and after our return to the United States, we underwent an intensive and extensive "de-briefing." In these de-briefing sessions we were admonished to remain silent regarding those who never made it out.

I was discharged from the Air Force on December 16, 1955, and in January 1956, I entered college. In December 1958, I got married. In June 1959, I received my BA degree from Akron University. In September 1967, I received my MA degree in Spanish from Kent State University. We have two children.

LETTER FROM STEVE E. KIBA, MIA-POW

Re: American servicemen and civilians left behind in Red China after the Korean Armistice was signed

During the Korean "Police Action," I was a radio operator on a B-29 in the 581st Air Resupply Squadron (581st Air Resupply and Communications Wing). Colonel John K. Arnold was our Wing Commander.

The crewmembers on our stripped-down, virtually unarmed, B-29 were Capt. Eugene Vaadi, aircraft commander; 1st Lt. Wallace Brown, pilot; 1st Lt. John Buck, bombardier; Capt. Elmer Llewellyn, navigator; 2nd Lt. Henry Weese, radarman; T/Sgt. Howard Brown, flight engineer; A/2c Daniel Schmidt, CFC gunner; A/2c Harry Benjamin, left scanner; A/2c John Thompson, right scanner; A/1c Alvin Hart, tail gunner; A/1c Steve Kiba, radio operator.

Our home base was Clark Field (Philippines), but two of our aircraft were TDY to Yakota AFB (Japan) and were attached to the 91st Strategic Reconnaissance Squadron. Our job was to fly leaflet drop missions over North Korea.

Our crew's first mission was on 1/12/53. Because it was our first combat mission, we had three extra men on board: Colonel John Arnold, Major William Baumer (instructor pilot), and 1st Lt. Paul Van Vochris (instructor radarman and Weese's friend).

About 2245 hours, we were attacked simultaneously by MIG-15's and radar-controlled ack-ack. Our B-29 sustained heavy damage—three engines were burning and

the forward bomb-bay was engulfed in flames. Captain Vaadi gave the order to abandon the aircraft. We bailed out and were scattered all over the North Korean hill-side.

By late afternoon of 1/13/53, most of the crew and "extras" had been captured. After we were captured, we were taken to an old stone jailhouse. About 1700 hours, a young Chinese interpreter boasted to me that they had now captured 13 airmen from our B-29—two last night as they touched the ground. I asked him how everyone was because I knew that Llewellyn and Baumer had been injured. He told me that only two men were wounded and all the others were in good shape. I now knew that 13 of the 14 were at least alive. [Of the 11 of us who returned home, none of us were captured the night of the attack. The two captured that night had to be Weese and Van Vochris.]

About 1800 hours, the Chinese put Benjamin and me in an American weapons carrier. T/Sgt. Brown, 1st Lt. Brown, and Captain Vaadi were already in the weapons carrier. There were also twelve heavily armed guards accompanying us.

The weapons carrier drove us to a small town and stopped at a large u-shaped building. We were taken from the weapons carrier one by one and into the building and put into separate rooms. For about 2 hours we were on display for the townspeople.

At 2100 hours, I was blindfolded, handcuffed, and placed in leg irons and put in a truck with other crewmembers. The truck took us to some old wooden barracks somewhere in the North Korean countryside.

The next morning an English speaking Chinese soldier came into my room to ask me a few questions. I inquired about the other crewmembers. He, too, told me that two crewmembers were captured as soon as they hit the ground. He gave me some information about the other crewmembers. For example, T/Sgt. Brown played football. Schmidt was worried about his wife, Baumer and Llewellyn were wounded but not to worry because they would be treated well, and Benjamin was always singing and was in the room below mine. He apologized for the quality of the meager food, the frigid room, and the absence of toilet articles. He said because of the war many things were scarce and difficult to get here in North Korea.

I was also questioned by a mean English speaking Chinese soldier. On 1/16/53, he asked me if I knew where I was. I told him I was in North Korea. He got upset and screamed that I was in the People's Republic of China. I insisted that I was in North Korea. This went on for about 2 hours.

Late that same afternoon the friendly soldier came to my room. We chatted for awhile, and he informed me that shortly I would be taking a long train ride and my living conditions would improve greatly. He said where I was going would be much better than a POW camp. I asked him if I was being taken to China and if he was coming also. He said yes I was going to China but he had to remain here in North Korea.

That evening several Chinese soldiers came to my room. They blindfolded me, handcuffed me, and placed leg irons around my ankles. They carried me downstairs and put me into an American jeep. They took me to another large u-shaped building where we (two guards and I) stayed until almost 2400 hours. Then we walked to the train station, got on a passenger car loaded with Chinese soldiers, and headed north. You see, we were taken into Red China by force on a train.

We arrived in Mukden, Manchuria, about 1200 hours on 1/17/53. While in Mukden (1/17/53 to 2/1/53), I was held in two different prisons: the Hotbox and the Peanut Palace. At the Peanut Palace I underwent horrendous interrogations which lasted anywhere from 6 hours to 24 hours a day. Here, too, the interrogators arrogantly bragged about how the brave, heroic people's volunteers shot our plane out of the sky and how two of our crew were captured as soon as they reached the ground.

At 1100 hours on 2/1/53, I was escorted to the train station by two heavily armed guards. On this trip the two guards and I had the entire passenger car to ourselves.

We arrived in Peking about 0200 hours on 2/2/53. From the train station I was taken to a political prison on the outskirts of town.

About 2100 hours on 2/4/53, I was moved to another prison in the heart of Peking. We called this prison the "hotel."

Here at the "hotel" the interrogations resumed. A session would last anywhere from a few hours to over 24 hours. The interrogators would work in 4 to 6 hour shifts. Even though there was a stool in the room, most of the time the prisoner had to stand. If you were out of your cell and in an interrogation session when meals (or drinking water) were served, you just missed out. This happened often.

I was continually threatened with death—told that no one knew that I was alive and that the U.S. Government had abandoned me. They kept saying that they

would never send me home. They kept pointing out that I was enduring pain and misery 24 hours a day for a pittance—a paltry \$2.50 per day—10½ cents per hour. You know, the Chinese interrogators were right about one thing: being a POW was not a 9 to 5 job. A POW's fears, anxieties, pains, hunger, and thirst knew no time limitations.

In the interrogation sessions on 3/7/53, they accused our crew of spying because of the three extra men. They also accused us of working for the CIA. In almost every session after that, they attempted to force us to confess to it.

About 2100 hours on 4/5/53, I was moved to another prison (the Spider Web) on the outskirts of Peking. It was here where I saw the other Caucasians.

Toward the end of April 1953, I learned that Schmidt was in my cellblock. One of our guards tore holes in the paper screen that covered half of my inside window. The holes were large enough for me to see anyone who was taken down the hall to the toilet. I tried to communicate with Schmidt by tapping code, coughing code, and calling out my name. Schmidt would acknowledge by smiling and coughing. He couldn't do much more because the guard was watching him too closely.

Sometime in the early morning hours of 6/1/53, I heard the Chinese move someone into our cellblock. Later that morning I heard an unfamiliar set of footsteps coming down the hall to go to the toilet. This newcomer was using crutches. I watched him through the holes in the screen as he went to and returned from the toilet from 6/1/53 to 7/1/53.

This new man was Caucasian, 5'9", medium build, with fair complexion and a shaven head. As his hair grew back, it appeared to be dark brown or black. He wore the same type clothes as Schmidt and I.

I tried to communicate with him by tapping code, coughing code, and calling out my name and asking him his name. He was being watched too closely to answer me. I didn't see this man or Schmidt each and every time that they came down the hall because some of the guards would make me sit down on my board and they would stand in front of the holes in the screen.

After 7/1/53, I didn't see the new man again. I did continue to hear and occasionally see Schmidt. About the time the new man moved in, Schmidt was having trouble walking. He moved so slowly that by the time he reached my window, the guards would make me sit down and one guard would stand in front of my window.

In May and June, the political commissar must have really gotten concerned about my "incorrect" attitude and behavior, for the number and length of the political indoctrination or "re-education" sessions were increased. I was subjected to hour after hour of lectures dealing with the birth and history of communism, Communist ideology, Communist goals and aspiration, Communist (guerilla) techniques to world domination. It was apparent that, despite my vehement objections, a fervent endeavor was being made to indoctrinate me. What really impressed and frightened me were the strong convictions and visible dedication of the lecturers to the ultimate party goals. They made no bones about it—their main goal was the eventual destruction of our free democratic society. All lecturers expressed the view that time was of no essence—it really didn't matter whether it took 5, 10, 50, or even 100 years.

About 1000 hours on 7/18/53, I was moved to another cell-block. I was put in the last cell on the left—cell No. 15. I was in cell No. 15 from 7/18/53 to 8/4/53. While in cell No. 15, I saw numerous Caucasians.

My bedboard was sitting directly under the outside window. There was a picket fence type thing that covered the bottom half of the window. The top half of the window, except for two panes was covered with paper. They evidently had been broken and replaced, and the Chinese had forgotten to repaper them. The top half of the window was propped open. Sitting on the board, I would look up and see outside into the courtyard. Three cell-blocks connected to form this courtyard or patio. As I was looking at the patio, I saw two men walking. They appeared to be Caucasians. One was built like our aircraft commander; he was even baldheaded. The other man looked enough like our pilot to be his brother. I was pretty sure that these two men were white, but I wasn't positive because they were on the far side of the patio. They were out for about 15 minutes. After they were taken in, two other men were brought out. They, too, were kept on the other side of the patio. They moved and exercised like Caucasians. I watched them until they were taken back to their cells. Two others were then brought out. One seemed to have a crippled leg. He was using a crutch and a cane. I continued to watch them, and the longer I did the more convinced I became that they were white.

I had to be careful not to let the guards see what I was doing; if they thought I was watching the prisoners in the patio, I would be moved to another cell or cell-block.

That afternoon during the siesta period, I noticed another man walking in the patio. He was walking around the circle. As he approached my side of the patio, I saw that it was John Thompson. I watched him until he was led back through the door at the end of my cellblock and into the small circle and from there into the cellblock to the right or to the left. Three cellblocks merged into the small circle: mine, and one ran off to the left and one to the right where they connected into another small circle.

After the siesta I kept my eye on the patio and saw a group of twelve Chinese prisoners. They pattered around in the flower gardens near the cellblocks and in the center of the circle for a while and then walked for a while. That afternoon I saw several different groups of Chinese prisoners.

One morning, I think it was 7/21/53, I was sitting on the board, and from time to time I would glance up at the window. I saw a man walking around the circle in the patio. He passed within 6 feet of my window. He was definitely white, of medium build, about 5'11", light (blond) hair, light complexion, and was wearing black pants with a white patch and a white shirt with a black patch. Schmidt, Thompson, the other whites, and I also were wearing the same type of clothes as this man. He was quite active and walked at a lively pace. He reminded me a little of Benjamin. I thought I knew who he was, but I wanted to watch him for awhile and get a better look.

About this time my door opened, and the houseboy escorted me out to walk in another patio. When I returned to my cell, the white man was just being taken in. He went through the same door through which Thompson had passed.

After the 2 hour siesta, I saw the baldheaded one and the slim one walking in the patio again. I watched. When my guard went toward the far end of the cellblock, I stood up on the board and tried to get a better look at the two men. I saw that they were definitely white, but they were just a little too far away for me to identify. I had to be careful because the "ammo carrier" guard could enter the cellblock at my end and might surprise me. Later, by climbing up on the window ledge, I was able to get a better look at those who I thought were white. My suspicions were confirmed. I watched these men for about the next 2 or 3 weeks. As he was being returned to his cell, I got several good looks at the man who reminded me of Benjamin. I was pretty sure that he was the extra radarman (Paul Van Voohris) who accompanied us on our ill-fated mission. Every time he was being taken in, I would pound code on the wall with my cloth shoe to let him know who I was. I also called out my name as he neared my window, and I called his name. He would glance up and smile. He had to be careful, too, because his guards watched very closely.

During this time I noticed that Thompson, Van Voohris, and the groups of Chinese prisoners were permitted to walk around the circle, but the other whites were kept on the far side of the patio. This influenced me to believe that they were not members of our crew.

On 8/4/53, I was moved to another cellblock and put into a cell next to the toilet.

On 8/12/53, my 212 day in HELL, I finally got to take a bath. The wooden tub was oval-shaped. It was half full of lukewarm but dirty water. I was not allowed to use soap because others had to use the water after me, and I certainly was not the first to use it. The houseboy allowed me 5 minutes in the tub.

On 8/20/53, I was moved into the 5th cell on the left side of the cellblock. Later I was escorted to the interrogation area and informed that I would be put with a crewmember. I asked to be with Hart, Weese, or VanVoohris. My request was denied. They reread the prison rules to me and informed me that we would be getting more reading material (Communist propaganda) that we must study.

That evening they moved Dan Schmidt into my cell, and other crewmembers were moved into the cellblock. John Buck and Wally Brown were in the first cell on the left side; Eugene Vaadi and Elmer Llewellyn were in the third cell; Howard Brown, Harry Benjamin, and John Thompson were in the sixth cell. They also moved two men into the fourth cell on the right side.

After the bell rang for board time, Schmidt hobbled over to the honey bucket. While he was there, the guard rolled up the flap on our inside window. He also rolled up the flaps on the windows of the other cells. On his way back to his board, Schmidt looked out the flap and said that there were Americans in the cell across the hall.

I jumped up and rushed over to the window and took a look. I saw two white men. One was short, about 5'8"; the other was about 5'10". Both were dressed the same as we were. Their hair was cut short just like that of the other Americans.

Schmidt and I started talking and calling each other by name and raising our voices in hopes of getting their attention. The guard rushed down the hall and told

us to shut up and go to sleep. He rolled down our flaps and stood by our window until we both lay down.

The next morning the houseboy came into the cellblock and let us out to get our own wash water. The water barrel was at the upper end of the cellblock. On the way to the barrel, I strained my ears to pick up the voices from the other cells. While at the barrel, I heard Buck and Wally Brown. On the way back, I heard Vaadi and Llewellyn. I also heard voices in English coming from the cell across the hall, but I couldn't identify them.

On 8/22/53, we were given reading material. Schmidt and I heard the men in the cell across the hall reading in English.

We attempted to contact the mystery cell by calling out our names and asking them who they were. We tried again the next day but with no success.

On the evening of 8/23/53, Schmidt and I began chatting with the men (Howard Brown, Benjamin, and Thompson) in the sixth cell. We would wait until the guard was at the upper end of the cell-block.

About 1100 hours on 8/24/53, the guard told Schmidt and me that our inside window was dirty. He handed me a damp rag and ordered me to clean the window. I climbed up onto the window ledge and started wiping the glass. I looked across the hall and noticed that the mystery cell door was wide open. I looked into the cell and saw that it was empty. The two mystery English speaking Caucasians had been moved out—bedboards, honey bucket, and all.

For the younger airmen the "re-education" sessions continued, and the political indoctrinators unceasingly harassed us with their foul propaganda and threats of violence and horrible consequences should we persist in harboring our reactionary attitudes. Over and over they screamed that we would never leave the People's Republic of China, that no one knew that we were alive, and that if they so desired they could kill us, torture us, or keep us chained and caged forever. Most of them delighted in telling us in detail their torture techniques. They also seemed to take special delight in taunting us with the threat of never going home and telling us that if our Government and people really cared about us they would do something to secure our release.

Back in our cells, we prayed for relief from our miserable existence and illegal, unjust detention. We kept hoping and praying to hear the droning of American bombers overhead and the cheerful shouts of friendly marines rushing down the corridors of our cellblocks to throw back the steel bolts on our cell doors. But, the bombers never came, and the steel bolts were never drawn.

Every night we lay on our hard boards and dreamed of the good life in the States. Our escape from the boring, tedious, and painful reality was short-lived, for our sleep was very frequently shattered by terrible nightmares and morning always found us still caged and chained. The growing hunger pains, the incessant thirst, the various and numerous body aches, the fears, the frustration, the disillusionments were all working on our bodies and minds. The thought that no one knew we were alive and the thought that so few even cared kept invading our minds and slowly shaking our morale. Our morale steadily deteriorated, and we felt that our hopes of ever being released were rapidly diminishing. The vicious interrogators' threats of never allowing us to go home and of letting us rot away in our filthy cells were fast becoming a reality.

On 1/27/54, we (the five airmen) were taken from our respective cells and escorted to the shower building. While we were undressing the attendant had us stop and step into stalls while they brought in another man. Howard Brown and I were in one of the bath stalls. We watched as the stranger undressed. He was about 5' 9" or 10", about 140 pounds, and had brown hair and whiskers. He was white and appeared to be about 50 years old. His sides seemed to be caved in, and he looked as if he really had endured a rough time. He was put into the bath stall next to the one in which Howard Brown and I were. As he entered the stall, we tried to communicate with him, but we failed because the Chinese were watching him too closely. We were called out and allowed to finish undressing. We showered in water that was alternately ice cold and scalding hot. It was not very often that we had the opportunity to shower, so we did our best to take advantage of every drop.

On 3/10/54, we were allowed to take another shower. We saw the old man again. We speculated that he might be one of the captured American fighter pilots mentioned in Hewlett Johnson's book or perhaps one of the newsmen being detained by the Reds.

On 3/27/54, the five enlisted men were taken for another short walk. We were circling the patio when we heard a voice from behind the third window in Skid Row holler, "Damn if it ain't . . ." We stopped in our tracks and stared directly at the window and saw a white face and a hairy arm.

The houseboy in Skid Row rushed into the cell and forced the man from the window and closed it.

We later learned that it was Colonel Arnold.

On 5/18/54, the nine of us were moved to the cellblock we called Skid Row. Before they moved us, they moved Colonel Arnold to another cellblock.

On 5/28/54, we were moved back to Carnegie Hall and into the same cells which we had vacated 10 days earlier. On going to the latrine, we learned that our short sojourn in Skid Row was because the one-holer was being repaired. Also three natives were moved into the cellblock.

On 6/17/54, we were taken by cells to the front office for another bull session. Bluebeard told Schmidt and me that we were brought in so they could ask us if there were anything they could do to make our stay more bearable and comfortable. I told him that they could send us home, especially since the war was over and there had been a prisoner exchange. He denied that the war was over and refused to discuss our being brought by force into Red China. He made it quite clear that we were not prisoners of war but war criminals. He insisted that we had violated Red Chinese air space and suggested that unless we changed our attitudes and allowed ourselves to be reeducated we would be in the People's Republic of China for one helluva long time, regardless of whether or not the war was over.

We again inquired about the other crewmembers, but as usual we were advised to forget them and to worry only about ourselves. We asked to be put with the officers. We were flatly denied this request because the officers were bad and might corrupt our minds even more. I pointed out that many American soldiers and marines were found in North Korea with their hands bound behind their backs and a huge gaping bloody hole in their heads. This accusation really unnerved Bluebeard, and he seemed at a loss as how to answer. After a brief pause he reminded us that the People's Republic of China follows a "lenient" policy toward the "many" American prisoners she was holding.

Schmidt and I elaborated on what was wrong with the way they were treating us and suggested many changes and ways to improve the situation. But, it seemed that any change or improvement hinged on our willingness to recognize and admit that we had committed a grave and serious crime against the People's Republic of China and our willingness to surrender our will and allow our minds to be cleansed of all the filthy, corrupt ideas which now permeated them. In our present state we were vicious enemies of the People's Republic and the Chinese people. According to Bluebeard, our "only" hope of staying alive and of ever getting out of the People's Republic was to cooperate fully and unconditionally.

Schmidt and I concurred that the Chinese could take their improved treatment and ram it. Consequently, we notice absolutely no improvement in our treatment or conditions.

On 7/7/54, we were moved to Skid Row. Benjamin and Thompson were in the first cell on the right nearest the small circle which connected Skid Row and Carnegie Hall. Schmidt and I were in the second cell. Howard Brown was in the third cell. Vaadi and Llewellyn were in the fourth cell. Wally Brown and Buck were in the sixth cell. Crip, a Chinese prisoner, and his partner were in the fourth cell on the opposite (left) side of the hall, and another Chinese prisoner was in the sixth cell across from Wally Brown and Buck.

On Saturday, 10/9/54, each member of our crew was measured for a set of clothes. Late that afternoon we received a new set of blacks: cotton padded pants and jacket. Even though the Chinese denied that the war was over, we knew it was. We believed that we got the new clothes because they were going to release us. Our optimism was overflowing at this point. We expected to be taken to the train station anytime now.

At boardtime we lay down in a very keyed up state. We were thinking of the things we would do when we were home. Every strange footstep in the corridor jarred us, and we waited impatiently for the doors to open. It was a long, restless night for the whole crew. No doors opened. The next morning found us still in our prison cells and not on a train homeward bound.

All through the next day (Sunday, 10/10/54), we anticipated being taken from our cells and to the train station. We waited, waited, and waited—every minute dragging by seeming like hours, but still no train ride.

Late that afternoon we were taken one by one to an interrogation room where we were handed a paper stating that our crew had violated Red Chinese air space and that we were to be tried and punished according to the laws of the People's Republic of China.

Needless to say that we were all devastated. We were expecting to be released, but instead we were to appear in their kangaroo court to face charges of intruding into Red Chinese air space to carry out acts of espionage.

That evening nine members of our crew were transported to downtown Peking to the courthouse. Colonel Arnold and Major Baumer were brought to the courthouse in separate vehicles.

Much false evidence was presented against us, including the false confessions signed under much duress on 7/27/53. We were found guilty.

We were returned to prison to await our sentencing.

On the afternoon of 11/23/54, we were taken back to the Peking courthouse, and the "so-called" judge called the court to order. The head judge read off the sentences ranging from 10 years for Colonel Arnold, the "main culprit," to 4 years for the airmen, the "cannon fodder." Needless to say, we all felt crushed.

On Tuesday morning, 12/7/54, the five airmen and the four officers were moved to another cellblock near the shower building.

The cells in this cellblock were smaller than those in Skid Row; they were about 6 feet by 10 feet. The wall between the last two cells on each side of the hall had been knocked out to form two large cells.

The five airmen were moved into the large cell on the right; the four officers were put in the large cell on the left. About 20 minutes later Major Baumer was moved in with the officers.

About 1700 hours, Richard Fecteau was brought into the cellblock and put with the airmen. John Downey was put with the officers.

The doors to the large cells were left unlocked, and we could go from one cell to the other.

Downey and Fecteau were with us for 3 weeks (12/7/54 to 12/28/54). During this time we learned all about Downey and Fecteau and their deplorable situation. They were CIA agents and were shot down on 11/29/52. They didn't know what happened to their two pilots.

In many of their interrogations the Chinese tried to link them with us. Downey was accused of being the ring leader and in charge of both missions. He must have really been an extraordinary man to direct our mission from a prison cell deep in Red China.

Downey and Fecteau were sentenced the day before we were. Downey got life, and Fecteau got 20 years.

The morning of 1/9/55, we were given a haircut, a shave, and a new pair of dark blue padded pants and jacket.

About 1400 hours, we were escorted to a large open area near the Administration Building. On the way to this area, we were joined by Colonel Arnold, Downey, and Fecteau. Upon arriving at the area, we saw that there were many cameramen already there.

We exercised for awhile and then divided into sides and started a volleyball game. All this time the cameramen were busy taking movies and photos. We were able to exchange a few words with Downey, Fecteau, and Colonel Arnold.

About 1500 hours, we were escorted back to our respective cells. On the way to our cells, Bugs, one of our interpreters, told us that later they would prepare a special supper for us. We attempted to convince them to let us visit with Colonel Arnold, Downey, and Fecteau until supper time. We failed.

About 1900 hours, we were taken to a dining room where Colonel Arnold, Downey, and Fecteau joined us. We were served several Chinese dishes and some canned meat and fruit from our packages from home. Although the Chinese food was good, it was the American food that delighted us. Throughout the entire meal photographs were being taken.

After the meal the houseboys cleaned up the mess and moved the tables back to set up a pingpong table. There were also small tables off to the side where we could write letters or play cards. On each small table there was a pan containing candy, apples, tangerines, and cigarettes. Some of us sat and shot the bull; some played cards; others pretended to write letters. All the while the photographers were snapping pictures.

About 2100 hours, we were taken to another room where we were given a mediocre physical. Photos were taken here too. After the physical we were escorted back to our separate cells.

The next morning, 1/10/55, we discussed the party and the possibility of being freed. We all felt that we had been deceived. Most of us were sorry and disgusted with ourselves for having allowed our pictures to be taken. We figured that they would be used for propaganda. The Chinese would claim that the photographs depict our daily routine. They would claim that the prints prove that they are humane and

lenient and treat their prisoners well. The thing that really upset us was that many people would be naive enough to believe it.

On 1/20/55, Bugs informed us that the Chinese Government had invited our loved ones to visit us in Peking and that the U.S. State Department had refused to let them come. The Chinese wanted us to write to our loved ones and encourage them to come.

As we discussed the matter, everything became clear. What the Chinese were after was a touching reunion at which they could release us into the custody of our loved ones. What ideal propaganda material such a scene would provide! Such a humanitarian move would accomplish three things: soften world opinion, efface any charges of barbaric and inhumane treatment we might register, and make our denials of border violation useless. Most of us agreed that we would rather rot in Red China than to do anything which would devalue our denials and help the enemy. We wanted the whole world to know how rotten the Communists were and they shanghaied us and brought us into Red China by force and were holding us against our will by force.

On 1/22/55, we wrote home and urged our loved ones not to visit us in Red China under any circumstances. I wrote the return address as usual spelling peace with an -ie instead of an -ea.

During the last week of January 1955, we saw a white man in the patio. He was brought out about the same time every day. He appeared to be about fifty or so, wore glasses, had grayish hair and whiskers, and was wearing the same colored blue padded clothing as we.

We also saw another white man in the patio. He was tall, about 6' 2" or better, dark hair, crooked nose, and looked English. He was dressed in the same type of black padded clothing that we were given just before our trial.

We continued to watch these two men. One day we succeeded in attracting the older man's attention; we called him Abuelo. Abuelo looked up at the window and smiled. Then he went through the motions of boxing. He was being guarded too closely to risk communicating with us.

We continued to watch for Abuelo and the English-looking man, and we saw them quite often. Abuelo would look up at the window and smile every opportunity he had. We would stand on a bed board and wave to him and go through all kinds of contortions in sign language trying to tell him who we were. When he walked around the patio in a circle and as he approached the window of our cell, we would talk louder to each other so that he could hear us. He would give us an affirmative nod as he passed by the window. We tried the same on the other man but always with the same results—nothing. He continued to walk with his chin on his chest and paid no attention to us. Occasionally we thought that we saw a slight smile on his lips, but we were never sure that we were getting through to him.

Late Easter Sunday afternoon, we saw Abuelo sitting under the tree directly across from the window of the cell next to our large cell. This small cell was used for storage. Thompson and I went into the small cell to get a better look and to be able to talk to the old man.

Schmidt watched for our guard and houseboy. We hissed to attract Abuelo's attention. He glanced up at the window and smiled. He told us that he had been very sick. He also told us that he was from New Zealand and was arrested in 1950. He was tried, found guilty, and sentenced to 1 year by the People's Tribunal. We told him who we were and asked him if he had heard anything about us. He said that he had read about our trial. He also knew about Downey and Fecteau. On the chance that he would be released before we were, we asked him to inform the United States that we were not guilty of the border violation and that we were brought to Red China by force. He agreed to do it. He told us that his treatment was very poor.

On Saturday morning, 4/23/55, we were moved to another cellblock where two crewmen were assigned to a cell. We were the only prisoners in the cellblock, and we could go from cell to cell and walk in the hall. We were probably moved to keep us from communicating with Abuelo and the other white man.

Early Monday morning of 7/4/55, we were moved to another cellblock. This cellblock had two large cells at the far end. Five of us were put into the last cell on the left and five in the last cell on the right.

At 1900 hours on Sunday 7/31/55, we were escorted across the prison to a building somewhere near the Administration Building. We waited outside, and in about 5 minutes Colonel Arnold joined us. We were taken inside, and we filed into a room in the same order as at the Peking Courthouse. We remained standing in front of a desk behind which two Chinese officials were seated. One of them spoke. He told us that our case had been reviewed and that since the People's Republic of China is

lenient toward those who have confessed their crimes, they have decided to free us because of our good behavior.

After they calmed us down, they took us to the dining hall and served us a good Chinese dinner. From there we returned to the cellblock to pickup our belongings. Then we were taken to the train station. We departed Peking at about 2330 hours. We stepped across the line into the most welcome arms of the British MP's at 1836 hours on 8/4/55.

I arrived home 8/13/55.

After spending about 2 months in Akron, Ohio, I reported to Bolling AFB in Washington, D.C.

Several days after arriving in DC., our debriefing was resumed. (We underwent light debriefing in Japan and on the plane on our way to the States.) We were debriefed by both Air Force Intelligence and Civilian Intelligence. The sessions were conducted almost daily from 0800 to 1700 hours. Sometimes they were held on base and sometimes in town. They asked me hundreds of questions pertaining to our mission, our capture, our interrogations, our treatment at the hands of our captors, our 3 weeks with Downey and Fecteau, and our seeing other Americans or allies—including Van Voohris. I was quizzed at great lengths about our contacts with Downey and Fecteau. Almost everything (but not all) we said was recorded on tape and in writing.

In these debriefing sessions I passed on the message which Fecteau had given me concerning both Jehol and Samurai. I was admonished to keep silent about this and about the other Caucasians whom I had seen. Schmidt and other crewmen received the same warning. I was told that both Downey and Fecteau knew what they were getting into before they signed their contract and that the U.S. Government and the CIA would not recognize or even admit that they were American citizens. As far as the U.S. Government and the CIA were concerned, these two men did not exist. It's ironical—very few Americans knew about these unfortunate men, but the enemy knew every minute detail about them and their mission. And what's the big secret about the other Caucasians being detained?

These warnings greatly upset me. I liked and admired Downey and Fecteau. Weese and Hart were crewmembers and good friends. I didn't know Van Voohris too well because he was an officer and I was an enlisted man, but I still considered him a friend. I was pretty certain that Hart was killed in his tailgun position when the MIG's attacked. I knew that both Weese and Van Voohris bailed out—crewmen in the rear of the aircraft saw them jump. I knew that they were captured alive as soon as they touched ground—numerous Chinese interpreters and interrogators boasted about it. I knew that Van Voohris was alive as of late July, early August 1953—I saw him.

It disturbed me to know that there were still fellow Americans sitting in a Red Chinese political prison, their minds and bodies slowly but surely wasting away. It also disturbed me to find out that our own Government was going to sit idly by and allow this to happen.

Occasionally we had to go to the Pentagon for various reasons. While in the Pentagon, we visited the Casualties Department and looked through old letters and telegrams which dealt with our incident and imprisonment. We saw letters written by our families inquiring about our status, and we saw the Air Force's answers to these letters. I told the personnel in Casualties about the white men, including Van Voohris, whom I had seen at the "Spider Web." They told me and the other crewmen that there were still hundreds of Americans unaccounted for and that these Americans were being carried on a missing list. They also showed me photos of some of the missing to see if I could recognize any of them.

Since my return to the Free World, I often wonder about the other white men whom I saw walking in the patio while I was a prisoner. Who were they? Could they be some of the hundreds of American servicemen who are still being carried on the Missing List and who have not been accounted for but who have been so callously abandoned by their own Government and forgotten by the vast majority of their fellow countrymen? It is hard to believe that such a cruel and heartless act could be perpetrated in modern times, but it did happen. Several hundred of our brave, loyal fighting men were held over by the Communists, and our own U.S. Government allowed it to happen! It is the inhumane, barbaric, sadistic, vicious communist jailer who carries out the sentence, but it is our own Government who pronounces it by dint of its refusal to get tough and demand and obtain a complete and accurate accounting of ALL AMERICANS missing.

Without a doubt, the cruelest and most horrible fate a fellow human being could possibly suffer is to be held against his will without even notifying his Government or loved ones of the fact that he is alive and being held. It is heinous enough to

fetter a man's body and to attempt to control his mind, but to do it over a prolonged period of time and to remove any hope of ever escaping the tedium of solitary confinement is just too terrible for the average Westerner to comprehend. It is most difficult for us to believe that anyone could be so cruel. But, fellow Americans, there are indeed people that cruel: the Communists.

Presently, there are 2,265 American servicemen unaccounted for from the Vietnam war. Very few of these men's names appear on any Communist list of POWs. Yet, since 1975, there have been 751 firsthand live sightings reported to our Government.

Communist Vietnam claims that they have no knowledge of these men, yet evidence exists that some of these men were captured alive. Granted, many of these 2,265 MIAs are likely dead, but not all of them. Too, it is hard for me to believe that 2,265 or even 751 men could disappear off the face of the earth, especially in a tightly controlled totalitarian society such as that of Red North Vietnam. These men have been abandoned! All that remains now is to forget them!

While I was in missing status, my parents were advised to remain silent and bear their grief and burden in silence. To speak out and to attempt to discover my status was not in the best interest of U.S. foreign policy. My father and mother were verbally threatened with dire consequences if they didn't go along with the way the Government was handling the matter. Incredible! Yes, but true! It would be safe to assume that the loved ones of the Southeast Asia MIAs are still meeting the same stubborn resistance as did my parents.

It is a fact that Red China and North Korea did indeed hold over American servicemen after the Korean Conflict, and it is a fact that the U.S. Government knew this and still abandoned these brave, loyal men to a life of never-ending misery and agony in a communist hellhole somewhere in North Korea, Red China, or the Soviet Union.

And what happened to the thousands of allied prisoners-of-war who were liberated by the Russians from POW camps in Germany and Poland?

The Communists are able to subject American captives to years and years of indescribable hell and to inflict untold suffering and anguish on their innocent loved ones because, for some unknown reason, the U.S. Government prefers to abandon its own fighting men to ruffling the communist leaders and perhaps jeopardizing our shaky relationship with these two-faced, Godless disciples of the devil. They are able to get away with it because the majority of the American people either refuse to believe that such a cruel thing can happen or they are just too calloused and insensitive to become involved in a concerted effort to prevent it. Yes, it is the Godless Communists who starve, torture, and ill-treat these captives, but it is the U.S. Government who sanctions it and allows it to happen.

The American public, too, must share in the guilt for failing to voice their ire and disgust over this deplorable policy. During the Vietnam war the "silent majority" sat idly by and allowed the draft-dodgers and the war protesters to dictate our Government's war policies. Most politicians were afraid of them. The war protesters prolonged the war by giving the Communists reason to believe that all Americans were against our stand against communism. Thus, by prolonging the war, they prolonged the suffering of our prisoners-of-war.

Each and every American citizen owes it to our "less fortunate" fighting men—the missing prisoners—and to their families to join in a concerted effort to secure the release of the living and to obtain a full, accurate, and complete accounting of the deceased. The patient, courageous MIA families have a right to know the truth—the fate of their loved ones.

It has been 19 years since the signing of the Paris Peace Treaty which resulted in the release of some of our POWs, and it has been 17 years since American servicemen were withdrawn from South Vietnam. We still do not have a complete and accurate accounting of our missing countrymen.

Many "experts" claim that there exists no definite and conclusive proof that any of these men are still alive and in the hands of their Communist captors. They blindly accept the word of the deceitful enemy. They expect definite and conclusive proof from the MIAs' families that they are alive, but they don't ask for or expect concrete evidence from the Communists that these captives are dead. Even if all MIAs were dead, the families have the right to expect to have the remains returned.

It is true that recently the Communist Vietnamese provided the Select Committee on POW/MIA Affairs 4,000 to 5,000 photographs taken of captured American servicemen during the war. Hopefully these photographs will clear up many MIA cases, but don't expect much help from the communists in clearing up and resolving the discrepancies and live-sightings. It is a disgrace, a blight on American History and a slap in the face of our founding fathers, to send our young men off to war, risking

life and limb, and then turn our backs on them if they are so unfortunate enough to be captured and made prisoners-of-war.

Vice Chairman SMITH. Why don't you answer your own question of why?

Mr. KIBA. See, we were shot down in North Korea. In fact, it was 4 days. On the 16, a mean son of a gun came in and he asked me where I was shot down. I told him North Korea. And he started screaming and he said, no, you're in Red China. Well, he didn't say Red China, he said the People's Republic of China. Now I refuse to say that.

Then a friendly interrogator came in, interpreter, came in, he told me I was going to take a trip. I said, you're sending me to a POW camp. He said, no, you're not going to camp. You're going somewhere better.

I said, where are we going, Red China I told him, you know. He said, you're going to the People's Republic of China. And that night they put us on a train and shipped us off to Mukden up in Manchuria.

And a few months later, in the interrogations—at first they started accusing us of germ warfare, dropping germs on the leaflets that we were dropping. And then they changed and they accused us of espionage. They claimed that we were CIA agents working for the CIA.

And I don't remember whether I put it in the testimony or not, but we were put on trial, and we were tried and convicted of being espionage agents working for the CIA. And a few months later, they moved two CIA agents in with us for a 3-week period. That would be John Downey and Richard Fecteau.

And at the end of the 3 weeks, they moved them out with no explanation. They moved them in with us with no explanation. They moved them out. So that's why the CIA wanted to question us. I saw others, too.

Chairman KERRY. Mr. Kiba, let me, if I can, intercede here for just a moment. First of all, I want to thank you for your testimony and I know you were concerned that not all Senators are here or something, but I want you to know I was watching you on television. This is being televised internally in the circuit in the Senate. And we have this technology today that somehow connects us even when we're not here.

So I did hear your testimony. I listened to you talk about—

Mr. KIBA. It does make it look a little bad though, doesn't it?

Chairman KERRY. No, no, no. I understand. I just wanted you to know that, because I found your testimony riveting obviously and—

Mr. KIBA. I mean to me, personally, to me. I come all the way from South Carolina to testify before a committee and all I have is the co-chairman.

Chairman KERRY. I know, but unfortunately, sir, that—the nature of the lives of most people here is such is that they get pulled back to their office for one thing or another. It doesn't mean that they're not listening to you.

Mr. KIBA. Oh, one or two.

Chairman KERRY. No, no, no. I'm saying, I can't vouch for everybody, but I'm telling you that people really are, you know, listening. I heard you and I've also read your entire testimony.

Mr. KIBA. OK.

Chairman KERRY. And it is not just us you're talking to, it's also the American people.

Mr. KIBA. Right.

Chairman KERRY. And there is a record here and yours is very much a part of that.

But I want to ask you a couple of questions based on what you're saying. First of all, in your testimony, you mentioned a number of names of people who were there with you, different people who were there, Colonel Arnold and different folks that you saw at one time or another.

When you say that there were 15, are you—is that the group you're referring to?

Mr. KIBA. No, no.

Chairman KERRY. It's a separate 15.

Mr. KIBA. This would be in addition to my crew.

Chairman KERRY. OK. So, in addition to your crew, there were maybe 15 people.

Mr. KIBA. Between 10 or 15, I'll say, yes. I'd have to stop and count them up, but between 10 and 15.

Chairman KERRY. Often in your testimony, you referred to somebody who was, you could see, a white man who was walking around the patio or somebody who was enclosed or something.

Mr. KIBA. Yes.

Chairman KERRY. Were you able to tell that they were, in fact, American? Did you know that or did you just—

Mr. KIBA. I could tell they were Caucasians.

Chairman KERRY. OK, but you weren't certain they were Americans?

Mr. KIBA. There would be no way, because, see, during that war, we had UN involvement, so they possibly could have been British or French or—

Chairman KERRY. But at any rate, there were 15 Caucasians?

Mr. KIBA. Caucasians, yes.

Chairman KERRY. And, was that the total number of people in the course of the period beyond the armistice that you were there? You were there until 1955?

Mr. KIBA. 1955, right.

Chairman KERRY. Almost 2 years beyond, is that right? Now, they ultimately did release you?

Mr. KIBA. Yes.

Chairman KERRY. Can you explain or help the committee to understand why they might have released you, but not released the others?

Mr. KIBA. OK. I think the reason they released us and I got this from the Chinese interrogators and interpreters. One thing they kept telling us, that our Government has abandoned us. They don't care about you. If they did, they'd bring you home.

—And they say, we're trying to get you free. We're trying to release you. And what we want from your Government is a seat in

the United Nations and the island of Taiwan. And of course, our Government wasn't dealing.

And if our Government had dealt, I'd been very disappointed, because I would rather have sat there and rotted in hell for the rest of my life than to give them anything.

Chairman KERRY. I understand that. But why did they let you go?

Mr. KIBA. Well, I think this was a ploy. They released us because they could claim that they were humane and they could claim that they were kind and so forth. In fact, on—

Chairman KERRY. Were the others alive when you were released?

Mr. KIBA. Some of them were, but I can't tell you about all, because some of these—the most of them I saw in July 1953, the big part of them, when I was in cell number 15.

Chairman KERRY. In the aftermath of 1953, did you see any people, after 1953?

Mr. KIBA. Oh, yes, yes. We saw some in 1954 and in 1955.

Chairman KERRY. And these are the people that you referred to just as Caucasians? This is where your testimony was referring to people you saw in that prison?

Mr. KIBA. That's right.

Chairman KERRY. Now, what does our Government say was the location of your flight?

Mr. KIBA. We were south of the Yalu River.

Chairman KERRY. Our Government concurs that you were shot down 40 miles—

Mr. KIBA. Our radar tracked us.

Chairman KERRY. So no one from our Government ever tried to assert that you might have strayed over Chinese soil?

Mr. KIBA. Oh, no, no.

Chairman KERRY. That's not even at issue?

Mr. KIBA. No.

Chairman KERRY. OK.

Mr. KIBA. See that black dot there? See the P on Pyongyang? OK. We were coming across this way toward where that little bay goes in there. We were coming right through there, and we were approximately 40 miles south.

Chairman KERRY. OK.

Mr. KIBA. And we were flying high, 24,000 feet. And along there there's a set of railroad tracks with searchlights, radar-controlled searchlights and radar-controlled ack-ack. And so they hit us with the radar-controlled ack-ack, plus a bunch of MIGs.

Chairman KERRY. Now, when you were on your journey north very shortly, it was about 72 hours later, right? You were transported north almost immediately?

Mr. KIBA. Right.

Chairman KERRY. Did you see any other people being transported north at that time?

Mr. KIBA. No.

Chairman KERRY. During the course of your captivity, other than the people you saw, did you learn from others in the prison or from guards or anybody, about other Americans being brought?

Mr. KIBA. See, after we were moved to China, we were in solitary confinement most of the time. And, most of the guards wouldn't

talk to you because if they did, they were punished. And if we talked to the guards, we were punished, too. But a few—

Chairman KERRY. You learned nothing from guards or anything?

Mr. KIBA. Oh, I learned a little bit from guards. I learned enough Chinese to know when the war ended. And I knew when Big Switch took place and Little Switch took place.

Chairman KERRY. The most people that you saw in this prison who were Americans, was it what period, in 1973?

Mr. KIBA. 1953, yes.

Chairman KERRY. In 1953, excuse me.

Mr. KIBA. July 1953.

Chairman KERRY. And that was in China?

Mr. KIBA. In China, in Peking. See, we spent about 3 weeks in Mukden, and they put us on another train, and we took a long train ride and ended up in Peking.

Chairman KERRY. Now, when you were debriefed and told not to tell anybody about this, that was in 1955 after you came back?

Mr. KIBA. 1955, right.

Chairman KERRY. Did you ever go to anybody and begin to kind of say, I am troubled by this?

Mr. KIBA. I was troubled by it a great deal, but I didn't do too much until about 2, 3 years later, then I started trying to contact people and trying to get people to listen.

See, right after I got out—

Chairman KERRY. As you contacted people, did you find other people who confirmed what you were saying from other places or experiences?

Mr. KIBA. No. The people I was trying to contact was Government officials and newspapers, you know, people—

Chairman KERRY. And they just gave you the cold shoulder basically?

Mr. KIBA. Yes.

Chairman KERRY. What do you attribute that to?

Mr. KIBA. I don't know. I think it is hard for the American people to even think that we would do such a thing, would do something. I mean, it's unbelievable, incredible. And it's hard for you to believe.

Chairman KERRY. It is hard for anybody. Sure it is. I wanted—well, I guess it is not hard for us to believe any more after the course of last year's hearings.

Senator Smith has a question. I just want to finish up, but go ahead.

Vice Chairman SMITH. Well, just on your point there. Were you aware, were you made aware by the Chinese of the exchange of prisoners at the armistice? Because you came in just before the armistice, you obviously extended beyond the armistice.

Were you told, did they try to rub your nose in it or—you are not going to go home? What did you know?

Mr. KIBA. The Chinese kept saying—I know the war is over.

Vice Chairman SMITH. You did know that.

Mr. KIBA. I knew exactly when it was over and I knew when they were exchanging POWs and I would tell my interrogators, the interpreters, that the war is over, let me go home. And they would keep telling me, the war is not over.

And then, a little bit later, about a year or so later, they would tell me that my case is different. And they would tell me, you're not a POW. Nobody knows you're alive. If you don't do as we expect of you, we're going to keep you here forever.

Chairman KERRY. Well, I would like to—yes, Colonel Simpson? The only concern I have is Mr. Oprica has a plane to get to and we have one more panel.

Colonel SIMPSON. I just want to say one more thing. When he came home, I met him at the border.

Chairman KERRY. You met him at the border?

Mr. KIBA. Yes, he gave me my first Coca-Cola. I remember it.

Colonel SIMPSON. This may help you to understand. I was ordered to go up to the border to meet him when they were coming in, but I didn't know exactly when they were coming in. And so I went and told the consul general, who had the rank of minister, that I was going up to the border to meet the possible return of the POWs.

And he said, no, you mustn't go. And I said, I'm sorry, I'm going. I said, I've been ordered by Washington to go up there.

He said, well, I don't want you to go and I said, well, I'm going anyhow. He said, I don't give a damn if they never come back. That gives you a clue to the prevailing attitude from the American Ambassador.

Chairman KERRY. Mr. Kiba, let me just say to you that—first of all, I want to ask one last question. Was there any effort made to recruit you? Did they try to—

Mr. KIBA. Yes, they did. I was very young at that time and after the interrogators—another thing. You know, we were interrogated for almost 8 months. And you know that's not necessary. You're going to get all the information you need within a few days. But they interrogated our crew for around 8 months.

And they would work in shifts. I think what they were doing was training interrogators and so forth.

OK, now, starting in the latter part of April, May, they started the political indoctrination. And I think I mentioned that in here—

Chairman KERRY. Yes, you did. Yes, you did.

Mr. KIBA. We called that Communist bull.

Chairman KERRY. Yes, sir.

Mr. KIBA. And they offered me several times to stay and you know, they even told me, you're not an American. You're a Hungarian. Your mother and dad are Hungarian. You're not American. Why don't you stay? We'll train you. We'll send you through the university.

Chairman KERRY. Well, let me just say to you that I dare say there aren't many people much more American than you. And I personally want to extend to you my profound respect and admiration and gratitude for coming forward today, but particularly my respect and I think the respect of Senator Smith and the entire committee.

I must tell you, you know, I spent 24 hours in fake captivity in the SERE training and decided that nothing could be worse in human existence than losing one's liberty and was petrified of the notion of ever being captured. So, I tell you, for anybody who spent

24 hours in real captivity, let alone years as you did, you have my just undying respect and admiration and I thank you for—

Mr. KIBA. Let me say one thing. Young men had it rough, the airmen. But the officers had it 10 times as rough as we did. They really gave the officers the real going over, especially Colonel Arnold.

They made him stand one time 7 days and 7 nights in interrogation. They fed him one time a day and they took him out to the bathroom one time a day. If he started to fall, they'd hit him with the rifle. And they would put clamps on him and dislocate his shoulders.

Then they'd take his fingers—his hands would swell up and they would milk his fingers. See, so they were really nasty with them.

Chairman KERRY. Well, some of the most extraordinary tales of human spirit have come out of our prisoners of war.

Mr. KIBA. Oh, another thing, Colonel Arnold was in solitary the complete time.

Chairman KERRY. I saw in your testimony, you mentioned that there was one point where the door opened and you saw him but they immediately shut it.

Mr. KIBA. Right.

Chairman KERRY. Well, let me thank you. We do have to move on to the next panel.

Vice Chairman SMITH. Let me also, just in closing, just thank you, Mr. Kiba, for what you did for your country and what you endured. You are one hell of a brave man and I am proud that you came up and your country has every reason to be proud of you and thank God there are people like you who are willing to—

Mr. KIBA. I apologize for losing—

Vice Chairman SMITH. No, that is all right. I also thank all the witnesses.

Chairman KERRY. I would like to thank you all. Colonel Corso, thank you. Colonel Simpson, thank you very much.

If we could call the last panel up.

The hearing will be in order. Gentlemen, if you would rise, so I can swear you please.

[Witnesses sworn.]

Chairman KERRY. As you can see from our little discussion up here, we have run up against a real barrier in terms of time. Senator Smith has to be at a dinner with the President of the United States. We have some things backed up here.

I do not want to do any injustice to this panel. And so I am going to try to sort of throw this at you a little bit, and see if we can work it out.

Is it possible that you could each summarize a 5-minute statement, the gist of what you want to say? We can put your full statements in the record and then to whatever degree we do need to ask you a questions. I just do not want anybody to feel short-changed in their capacity to put in front of the committee information obviously. Is that agreeable to everybody?

Mr. Brown: Did you say that we can make a 5-minute—

Chairman KERRY. Two of you are authors with a full book on this subject. And we understand that you are not going to be able

to summarize a book in 5 minutes. The committee has the books. We have obviously—staff is going to go through.

[Pause.]

Chairman KERRY. What we could do—

Vice Chairman SMITH. Would you guys be available in the morning?

Mr. Sanders: I am.

Mr. Boylan: Yes.

Mr. Ashworth: I could make myself available.

Chairman KERRY. You cannot be here in the morning?

Mr. Brown: I can.

Mr. Sanders: We all can. To tell you the truth, we would also like to have Mr. Cole from RAND Corporation here. We would very much like to have him here.

Chairman KERRY. Well, let me figure out. We are going to start. What we will do is, then, is bring you folks in at the unheard of Senate hour of 8 a.m. We will start at 8 a.m. and we will have to suspend at 9:30 sharp for General Volkogonov, so we can move forward, because we have a very full schedule tomorrow also.

So with that understanding, I think it is best that we recess now until tomorrow morning at 8 a.m.

Yes, sir?

Mr. Sanders: One question. Is there any possibility of bring Mr. Cole back? I mean, it's really important. He sat up here and said things that are just nonsense.

Chairman KERRY. Let me just say to you folks, please, let me just say that I am not sure that the purpose will be served. Whatever you want to rebut and whatever you want to say to the contrary, you have the right to say.

Mr. Sanders: I would love for him to try to rebut me while I'm saying it.

Chairman KERRY. Well, I think the committee will unquestionably further that process. I can guarantee you that we will follow up if it is not possible to have him here. But whatever facts are to the contrary, we are clearly going to want to sort out. So I can assure you that we will do that.

Let me—and I knew that you would want to do that. I think it is going to be fairer to you and better to the process to do this at 8 a.m. in the morning.

So we will stand in recess until 8 a.m. tomorrow morning.

[Whereupon, at 6 p.m., the hearing was recessed.]

APPENDIX

OUTLINED STATEMENT OF DR. PAUL M. COLE, ANALYST, INTERNATIONAL POLICY
DEPARTMENT, RAND CORP.

CONGRESSIONAL TESTIMONY



RAND

World War II, Korean
War and Early Cold
War MIA-POW Issues

Dr. Paul M. Cole

CT-101

November 10, 1992

REVISED: December 4, 1992

SI-358 1

TESTIMONY
AS PREPARED FOR DELIVERY
BEFORE THE SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
ON POW/MIA AFFAIRS

This portion submitted for
the record.

Dr. Paul M. Cole

Analyst
International Policy Department
RAND

November 10, 1992

REVISED: DECEMBER 4, 1992

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PROJECT ORIGINS

In 1991, Congressman John Miller (R-WA) and Senator John McCain (R-AZ) introduced bills calling for measures to achieve a full accounting of American MIA-POWs. The intent of this legislation (HR 2038-9) was to compel the Department of Defense to search archive holdings and to locate, declassify and release records concerning World War II, the Korean conflict and the Vietnam War. The question of who in the Department of Defense (DoD) would be responsible for responding to this legislation was resolved in June 1992 when the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) determined that the DIA's

primary contribution to ISA, the IAG process, and ultimately to the POW/MIA families and next of kin will remain limited to support of the U.S. Government's Vietnam War POW/MIA recovery effort. ... The DIA feels that the U.S. Government effort [concerning the Korean War and World War II] is now, and will likely remain, predominantly an archival research effort with very limited requirements for pure intelligence analysis.¹

Following DIA's decision to limit its work to current intelligence gathering tasks and analysis concerning the Vietnam War, RAND was asked to focus on the "archival research" defined by DIA.²

Since October 1991, the Department of Defense has sponsored two related projects at RAND through the National Defense Research Institute, a federally-funded research and development center. The first project (Phase I) provided funding for a six-month (October 1991-April 1992) study focusing on the fate of American MIA-POWs from the Korean War. The purpose of the project was to provide policy support for U.S. negotiations with North Korea over the issue of recovering the remains of U.S. servicemen. A second project (Phase II, April 1992-April 1993) expanded the scope and provided additional resources for research into whether American servicemen and civilians were transported to the territory of the Soviet Union or its allies during World War II, the early Cold War, as well as the original subject, the Korean War.³ I have been

¹From: Dennis M. Nagy, Executive Director, Defense Intelligence Agency To: The Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs, OASD (ISA)) June 26, 1991

²RAND was not asked to address the Vietnam War.

³The Phase II research team included the author of this study Dr. Paul M. Cole, Mr. Sergei Zamascikov and Mr. Theodore Karasik.

the project leader and principal investigator of both projects. This statement is based on the archive work I have completed thus far for ISA.⁴

The Defense Department's office of International Security Affairs (ISA)/East Asia and Pacific Region was the project monitor for Phase I. Phase II, though conceived in ISA/East Asia and Pacific Region, was conducted after February 1992 under the newly-created DoD office of MIA-POW Affairs. As required by Public Law 102-183 (HR 2038-9) Section 406, the Secretary of Defense submitted to Congress in March 1992 a Report to Congress Concerning Certain United States Personnel Classified as Prisoner of War or Missing in Action During World War II or the Korean Conflict. This report summarized ongoing DoD efforts to resolve these MIA-POW issues. The Secretary noted in this report that Phase I of the

RAND study will focus on American servicemen who were reported missing in action, presumed killed (body not recovered), or who were taken prisoner but remain unaccounted for. RAND research will be focused to describe United States and United Nations efforts made to retrieve those missing in action, prisoners of war, and remains of deceased servicemen buried in North Korea. This report suggests options that could lead to a fuller accounting for U.S. personnel.⁵

The Secretary's report, submitted before Phase II of this project was underway, noted that Phase I study results were "expected to be available in June 1992." The Phase I delivery schedule, which was revised by the Phase II project description, set the deadline for delivery of the final report at April 1, 1993. This project is on-time and has met every interim reporting requirement. I have been project leader and principal investigator for both projects.


Since October 1991, I have worked in various U.S. archival holdings. The information presented in this statement, which derives from the interim project report, reflects research in many countries including the United States and the former Soviet Union. The research I commissioned into Soviet archives is described in the following section.

⁴The documents cited in this statement have all been properly declassified, the majority through Executive Order 12356, Section 3.3.

⁵Report to Congress Concerning Certain United States Personnel Classified as Prisoner of War or Missing in Action During World War II or the Korean Conflict. 7

Access to information in the former Soviet Union

In December 1991, following consultations with the Department of Defense, RAND established an archive research team in Moscow. (It is important to note that this team was created during the final days of the Soviet Union.) The purpose of this research was to explore, to the greatest extent possible, the military archives of the USSR to determine whether American MIA-POWs had been transported to the territory of the USSR. The structure of this research group is illustrated in the following diagram.



My objective was to organize an archive research effort that would apply a sound methodology to the prevailing conditions in Moscow. Access to archives is a political act, but ideally research should not be organized to serve political purposes. In order to ensure that our research was authorized, the work of RAND's Moscow-based team was formally approved and supported by various Soviet political authorities, such as the Veteran's Committee of the Supreme Soviet, intelligence organs such as the KGB and military officials from the General Staff, the USSR Ministry of Defense and the Institute for Military History. The support from these institutions ensured unprecedented access to a variety of previously closed holdings as well as a coherent system for proper document handling, authentication and declassification. Following the break-up of the USSR, analogous political bodies that replaced the central state organs of the Soviet Union continued to support RAND's work.

The initial hypothesis for this research, developed by the RAND team in December 1991, was based on the assumption that one could not exclude the possibility that some American servicemen had been transferred to the Soviet Union. The goal was to answer the question, not to assign blame. Since the research team in Moscow was required to support its conclusions with concrete evidence, the task of the Moscow-based team was to assess this hypothesis against primary source evidence obtained from archives of the former USSR. From the very beginning our research was organized to encompass archives in other former Soviet republics. This was not, in other words, an effort focused exclusively on Russia.

Two assumptions guided the organization of our research in Moscow. First, political agreements made over the heads of the hands-on researchers would not be productive because at the end of the day the research product depends completely on the researchers. Researchers must have an incentive to be thorough, thus our effort began by putting together a team of dedicated specialists. We worked together to formulate a coherent research strategy. Second, our work, though linked to governmental interests, had to remain separate from official inquiries. This was based on the desire to eliminate, to the greatest extent possible, the influence of political concerns on the course of research and the document declassification process. Against this background the archive research in the former Soviet Union began in December 1991.

The first methodological issue the group addressed was how to obtain access to archive holdings, the majority of which were still classified. The team solved this by putting together a core research group consisting of active service military officers who were both cleared for access to this material and trained in academic research. At least six members of the Moscow-based group hold the Ph.D. in military history or other history fields. A great deal of time was devoted to creating and shaping a joint research strategy so that the work completed in Moscow would be compatible with the work being done in U.S. sources. The approach was dubbed the "deliberate Swiss cheese" strategy because holes were left in the manuscript being prepared at RAND so that results from Moscow could be inserted and evaluated quickly. The motivations for the Soviet-Russian side to cooperate with this project are being addressed in a separate report by RAND analyst Sergei Zamascikov.

After access was obtained, from January to May 1992 research focused on a search for materials that could link Soviet military personnel to American military personnel in Korea. The archive materials were in such sorry shape, however, that the team split into three groups or search teams that worked simultaneously. The first studied records chronologically, the second searched them according to geographic region and the third studied materials in countries that cooperated with the USSR. This approach produced a more effective research methodology. Lists and records that enabled the team to begin compiling a data bank of information were located.

The team determined that many of the records had been falsified or altered when they were generated. Sorting out fact from fiction became a major methodological issue. After May attention was focused on the most effective way to declassify documents that had been collected. A number of high-ranking officials who understood the project and the importance of it agreed to use their influence to obtain proper declassification. An elaborate system was designed to ensure that authentic copies of all documents would be made.

The freedom of action of the Moscow-based archive research team was diminished following the creation of the U.S.-Russian Commission in March 1992. In March 1992, the Commission chose to exclude the work of independent researchers and to limit archive inquiries in Moscow to official channels. Following this decision, independent researchers in Moscow cooperating with

RAND were systematically discouraged from doing research into the MIA-POW issue. Our research team's access was impeded, but it was not completely eliminated. After March 1992, the exchange of information between RAND and the Joint Commission was curtailed until Army Task Force Russia was "charged by DoD to establish and maintain close contact with you and your team to insure that RAND and Task Force efforts are integrated and complementary."⁶

I am pleased to report that the RAND team in Moscow was able to produce significant results. The Moscow team's report was delivered as scheduled in September 1992. The research team is still intact but it is working at a reduced pace. The results of the archive work in the United States were also productive.

World War II

My research on World War II MIA-POW issues has focused on the European theater of operations. In particular, I have looked into the question of whether Americans liberated from Nazi German POWs camps by Soviet forces were transported to the territory of the USSR. Though this work is on-going, I would like to highlight the following points.

Following the Allied invasion of Normandy in 1944, Allied Headquarters began to make estimates of the number of Allied POWs in German custody. After Allied forces entered German territory in September 1944, the Prisoner-of-War Executive Branch, G-1 Division, Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force issued periodic reports showing the location of German POW camps and estimated number of prisoners. As of March 15, 1945, 76,854 Americans were estimated to be in German POW camps.

In October 1944 the War Department assigned responsibility for POW recovery and repatriation procedures to the commanding generals in the European and North African Theaters of Operation and the chief of the United States Military Mission in Moscow. A policy for the care and evacuation of American POWs, known as "ECLIPSE Memorandum Number 8," was issued in November 1944. The final guidance governing the movement of U.S. POWs, issued on April 4, 1945 (the CATOR program) provided for evacuation from forward areas by air.

The Americans and Soviets agreed to a set of repatriation procedures. A U.S.-Russian conference in Moscow held on May 23, 1945 resulted in a "Plan for

⁶Letter from Major General Bernard Loeffke, Director, Task Force Russia to Dr. Paul M. Cole, RAND August 24, 1992

the Delivery through the Army Lines of Former Prisoners of War and Civilians Liberated by the Red Army and the Allied Forces," which was signed on May 28.

According to the European Command, the total number of American POWs recovered from German POW camps was 91,252, nearly 14,000 more than expected. The correct status of these POWs could not be known and an accurate accounting of these POWs listed as killed or missing could not be made by Allied Headquarters until the POWs were liberated and repatriated. According to U.S. records, slightly less than 30 per cent of all repatriated American POWs were liberated from German camps by Soviet forces. U.S. records show that by May 23, 1945, 28,662 American POWs liberated from German camps by Soviet forces had been recovered from Soviet custody. This included 2,858 who passed through the transit camp at the port city of Odessa, in Ukraine. Soviet records, on the other hand, show that as of December 1, 1946, 22,554 American POWs liberated by Soviet forces had been repatriated. I attribute the difference between the two figures to sloppy Soviet record keeping.

Mechanisms existed through which an accounting for missing military personnel and displaced civilians could be sought. Following World War II, the Executive Committee of the Societies of the Red Cross and Red Crescent of the USSR established a Central Information Bureau in Moscow to locate missing persons, particularly those displaced by the war. The Bureau announced on July 1, 1945 that it would assist American citizens "making welfare and whereabouts inquiries about persons in the Soviet Union." The Bureau offered its services free of charge and welcomed inquiries directly from persons in the United States. Records in the U.S. archives concerning the inquiries U.S. military and diplomatic authorities made on behalf of dozens, perhaps hundreds of unaccounted for people have been located. Most of these inquiries began as a result of information provided by family members.

During and after the time U.S. citizens were being repatriated through Odessa, the Office of the Military Attaché at the American Embassy Moscow maintained a file entitled, "American Missing Persons." The file contains copies of correspondence relating to U.S. government efforts to obtain information from Soviet repatriation authorities concerning reports that American servicemen were being held on the territory of the Soviet Union or detained by Soviet forces elsewhere. It contains copies of perhaps one hundred letters to and from U.S. and Russian authorities concerning individual American servicemen and entire crews of U.S. aircraft presumably lost over

Soviet territory. It is not clear whether this file, which covers the time period of December 1945 to July 1952, is complete in its present form in the National Archives though the sources of information are not in doubt.

In addition to this correspondence, the information in the "American Missing Persons" file derives from Missing Air Crew reports and Enemy Evasion Aid Reports that noted when the crew of a damaged bomber was seen bailing out or crash landing behind Russian lines. There is no question that many bomber crews survived after parachuting or crash landing on territory controlled by Soviet forces. Many of these crewmen were repatriated. U.S. and Soviet records suggest, however, that an undetermined number were not. The U.S. Embassy at Moscow's efforts to obtain information about American citizens held on the territory of the USSR were severely limited by the Soviet position that some American citizens were considered by Soviet authorities to be Rumanians, Hungarians, other eastern Europeans or even citizens of the USSR. In these cases the Soviet government always refused to give the U.S. Embassy even the slightest bit of information in response to inquiries concerning people the Soviet authorities considered to be non-U.S. citizens.

Charges have been made that thousands of American POWs liberated from Nazi German POW camps by Soviet forces were never repatriated. I have found no evidence to support this assertion. To assess the validity of this claim, however, the following test was conceived. In order for it to be true that circa 23,000 American POWs were liberated from Nazi German camps then retained by Soviet forces and "abandoned" by the U.S. government, the following assertions must also be true.

- That Supreme Allied Headquarters deliberately distorted estimates of Americans in Nazi camps following the first day of the Normandy invasion in order to arrive at a final March 1945 estimate that would conceal the existence of 37,000 American POWs. This would mean that the plan to abandon a precise number of POWs was conceived and implemented in early 1944. This would also mean Allied Headquarters deliberately underestimated the total American POW population by more than 30 per cent (estimate of 76,000 did not factor in 14,000 unanticipated recoveries + 23,000 POWs whose existence had to be concealed so they could be left in Soviet custody).

- That the Soviets had at one time in their custody approximately 56,500 American POWs, 23,000 of which were not estimated as POWs by Allied Headquarters, were not carried as POWs in German records, and all of whom were successfully imprisoned in the USSR without a trace. This would mean the Soviets under-reported by 40 per cent their own internal repatriated American POW data.

- That the Soviets had a motive for neglecting to take credit for circa 6,000 Americans who were counted by Allied Headquarters as having been liberated by the Soviets. This would also mean that Allied Headquarters had a motive for giving credit to the Soviets for returning circa 6,000 more men than they claimed while simultaneously concealing the alleged fact that 23,000 had been withheld.

- That identical discrepancies in American POW data were somehow simultaneously "inserted" in Soviet, German and British data. This would mean all of the Allies, the Germans, the Soviets and fellow prisoners concealed the existence of 23,000 POWs (24 per cent of the entire American POW population in Germany) during and after the war.

- That the reporting of the post-war U.S. Army "Psyopool" program, designed to collect information on Americans in Soviet custody in the 1950s, was tampered with. This would mean that over a period of decades the U.S. government screened and suppressed live sightings of 23,000 "abandoned" POWs.

- That the families of the 23,000 "abandoned" POWs either participated in the cover-up or that the inquiries from some or all of the 23,000-plus family members have been suppressed. This would mean that the letters from POWs who wrote home to their families from German camps and the records of those who received Red Cross parcels records have been forged, concealed or destroyed with no trace even from the families involved.

The evidence simply does not support any of these assertions. The assertion that nearly 23,000 American POWs were liberated from Nazi German POW camps by the Soviets then "abandoned" by the U.S. government cannot be verified. In my view, it is false. This does not mean, however, that all American POWs liberated by Soviet forces were repatriated. The number of American POWs who might have been detained by the Soviets is significantly lower.

The Strength and Accounting Branch, Machine Records Unit, Army Adjutant General, compiled a list of "American Prisoners of War Held by German Government Unaccounted For." The 191 names on this list are arranged by name, rank and serial number. Thus far, about a half dozen of these names have been associated with POWs liberated from German camps by Soviet forces. The United States government made inquiries on behalf of these and on behalf of dozens of other POWs not on this list.

Soviet archives show that Rada Camp No. 188 at Tambov was scheduled to receive perhaps four dozen American POWs after World War II. Eyewitness accounts estimate the presence of perhaps 45 American POWs in Camp No. 188 as late as December 1945. There is evidence that some of these men were eventually transferred from Camp No. 188. No archive evidence has thus far

been found that documents the presence of Americans in Camp No. 188 or any other Soviet camp. The circumstantial evidence and eyewitness accounts, however, lead to the conclusion that several dozen American servicemen were once held alive in Camp No. 188.

The Tass news agency reported on June 29, 1992 that "at least one U.S. POW was buried near the city of Tambov." The grave is allegedly located near the village of Kirsanov where a World War II hospital once stood. Thus far it has not been established that the individual in question, Luigi Francesco di Bartholomeo, was either an American citizen or a POW who once served in the American armed forces. General Dimitrii Volkogonov told the press that U.S. servicemen with "suspect" names -- Russian, Jewish and Ukrainian -- were "treated with great suspicion" by the Soviet secret police. Thus far no documentary evidence supports these assertions concerning this alleged Soviet policy. If this were Soviet policy, then it remains to be explained why the only alleged American POW thus far identified by the Russians does not fall into any of these categories.

Some explanations of what happened to unrepatriated American POWs do not hold up well under scrutiny. In December 1991, the Senate Select Committee on MIA-POW Affairs visited Moscow. During this visit, General Dimitrii Volkogonov gave the U.S. delegation a list, containing the names of fourteen Americans who died were alleged to have died in Soviet custody during World War II. There is no information concerning the sources used to compile this list. The list does not correspond to unaccounted-for POW records of the Adjutant General. There is no correlation between this list and the mandate of the Joint U.S.-Russian Commission on MIA-POWs either.

Following World War II, the U.S. government recovered the remains of some of the U.S. servicemen who had been buried on the territory of the USSR during the war. These men were Merchant Marines, air crewmen or liberated POWs who died in Soviet custody en route to repatriation sites. As early as 1945, the United States negotiated with Soviet authorities for the right to search, using American Graves Registration personnel, on the territory of the USSR for the purpose of locating and recovering the remains of American World War II dead. The recovery effort was initially directed by the War Department's Service, Supply, and Procurement Division. Many restrictions were placed by the Soviets on the U.S. search and recovery efforts.

The Search and Recovery Teams were not permitted to move freely in the Soviet Zone, but were compelled to adhere to a Soviet-approved itinerary; a Russian officer and generally one or two Russian enlisted men always accompanied the Team. The personnel of the Search and Recovery Teams were permitted to ask questions only of Germans concerning the bodies. Oftentimes the Germans were told to shut up by the Russian Officer accompanying the Team. During the night a Russian guard was stationed outside the door of the Team's hotel rooms. Members of the Team were not allowed to leave the room alone and all had to eat together under guard. As a consequence of the limited success of the military effort, subsequent negotiations were later undertaken through the Department of State.

The Soviet side demanded exact locations, names and insisted that the costs of recovery efforts be covered by the U.S. government. The U.S. government covered these expenses from a fund established by the Quartermaster General. Soviet records show the remains of at least three American servicemen were exhumed and repatriated from the Far East zone in 1947. Similar statements have been found for a total of three Americans. They are the following:

USAF Corporal Matthew M. Gladek, July 6, 1947
 USAF Sergeant Paul Utchek, July 6, 1947
 USAF Sergeant Thomas E. Ring, July 6, 1947

In addition, a receipt for the transfer of the three to Vladivostok where custody was transferred to representatives of the American Fifth Fleet has been found.

On May 6, 1948 the Department of State submitted to the Soviet Foreign Ministry a list 31 Americans buried on the territory of the USSR. On July 8, 1948, the United States requested the return of 23 remains as shown in the following table:

List of Deceased Personnel Buried in
 Russia as of 8 July 1948

Name	Rank	Service Number	Burial Location
1. Allen, Keith N.	Lt. Col	03 031 21	American-English Cemetery, Murmansk, USSR
2. Betancourt, Juan	Fireman	Bk.No. 10 9177	Archangel, USSR
3. Collins, Edward A.	GM3c	71 114 92	Murmansk, USSR
4. Dailey, Domingo	Messman	2 384 506	American-English Cemetery, Murmansk, USSR
5. Estle, Raymond C.	1st Lt	0 753 279	U.S. Cemetery, Novi Senzhari, USSR. 49° 20' Lat, 34° 20' Long, 25 miles outside of Poltava, USSR
6. Gestido, Jose	Fireman	2 16 402	Archangel, USSR
7. Hall, Edward J.	Oiler	2 11 561	Archangel, USSR
8. Heindel, George J.	Ch. Eng.	2 27 455	American-English Cemetery, Murmansk, USSR
9. Hendrickson, Jacob	Ch. Eng.	2 215 668	Foreign Cemetery, Archangel, USSR
10. Hibbard, Paul R.	1st Lt	0 758 565	U.S. Cemetery, Novi Senzhari, USSR. Plot A, Row 1, Grave 4
11. Johansson, Eric A.	Boat	2 137 504	Small Island, NW of Molotovsk, USSR
12. Kerchner, Richard G.	Pfc	6 947 136	U.S. Cemetery, Novi Senzhari, USSR. Plot A, Row 1, Grave 5
13. Larsen, Richard C.	Ch. Off.	Bk.No. 105 458	Second Christian Cemetery, Odessa, USSR

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14.	Lukacek, Joseph G.	F/O	T - 61 544	U.S. Cemetery, Novi Senzhari, USSR. Plot A, Row 1, Grave 1
15.	Neighbours, Fleet B.	Ch. Stew	2, 112 406	Archangel, USSR
16.	Nies, Walter	S/Sgt	37 307 545	Heydekrug, POW Camp No. 6, Grave 3, East Prussia
17.	Robinson, Roy A.	Sic	611 06 37	City Cemetery, Murmansk, in lost for Foreigners, USSR
18.	Roland, Donald R.	Lt (jg)	175 115	British Plot, Kosnechetskoye Cemetery, Archangel, USSR
19.	Simpson, Donald C.	Sgt	38 412 844	U.S. Cemetery, Novi Senzhari, USSR. Plot A, Row 1, Grave 3
20.	Teaff, William F.	T/Sgt	35 586 750	Heydekrug, POW Camp No. 6, Grave 4
21.	Timmerman, Lyle E.	Cpl	12 138 246	Second Christian Cemetery, Odessa, USSR. Plot 127, Row 7, Grave 2
22.	Walker, George B.	S/Sgt	34 147 240	Heydekrug POW Camp No. 6, Grave 2
23.	Yates, Ted	Sgt	38 148 940	Second Christian Cemetery, Odessa, USSR. Plot 127, Row 7, Grave 1.

On June 21, 1948 the Soviet Foreign Ministry notified the U.S. Embassy that the

responsible Soviet authorities have declared their readiness to carry out themselves exhumation of remains of American citizens buried in the territory of the USSR and to deliver remains to Berlin where they can be transferred to American authorities.⁷

The cost of this process was not indicated at first. In December 1949, however, the Soviet government notified the U.S. government that the cost to "exhume and deliver to Berlin, Germany the remains of 16 World War II dead now

⁷From: Moscow #1164 To: State (Restricted) June 23, 1948

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buried in various Russian cemeteries" would be 204,000 Rubles (\$25,500 at the prevailing exchange rate). There was no indication of how this sum was derived, but since the exchange rate was artificial, any cost accounting would have been irrational anyway. On October 27, 1948, the Soviet authorities were furnished by the Department of State with a list of names and burial locations of all U.S. World War II dead interred on Soviet territory for whom information as to burial location was known.

The Soviet government claimed to be able to locate 16 of the 24. On December 22, 1949 the Soviet Foreign Ministry sought

reimbursement in the amount of 122,977 rubles for sums reported as having been incurred by them in connection with the exhumation, preparation, casketing, and transportation of the bodies of six (6) United States airmen whose remains were interred within Soviet territory.

These six had been shot down near Cape Lopatka on June 10, 1945. The United States asked permission for a U.S. graves registration search and recovery team to enter Cape Lopatka to recover the remains, but this was not permitted by the Soviets. The remains were recovered in September 1948 by the Soviets, transferred to Japan and on to the United States. The six U.S. airmen were the following:

Denton, Leslie C. Jr.
Eiser, J. Nathan
Ernser, Roland R.
Irving, Edward J.
Lang, Frederick A.
Lord, Orvil H.

The Soviet side submitted the bill for the first time on October 5, 1949. The cost of the operation was covered by the United States based on an estimate provided by the Soviet side.

As of January 17, 1950 the Quartermaster General estimated that a general area of the grave could be identified for 646 "remains not yet recovered from Russian occupied and controlled territory." The location of these graves is illustrated in the following table:

Soviet Zone (of Germany)	419
Russia	15
Austria	122
Poland	20
Czechoslovakia	0
Hungary	28
Roumania	42
TOTAL	646

The 646 figure did not include remains to be recovered from the Mediterranean Zone (Bulgaria, Yugoslavia and Albania) or those in the Far East Zone. On November 17, 1950 the Soviet Foreign Ministry notified the U.S. government that "for \$1,000" the Soviet government was "willing to open unidentified graves at Matzicken POW Camp in an effort to locate the missing bodies of Nies, Walker, and Teaff." No records have been located that shed light on the outcome of this offer.

On September 11, 1992, the ABC television program 20/20 broadcast a segment on the subject of American MIA-POWs. The 20/20 segment was the product of a joint investigation with the Tacoma, Washington News Tribune. The purpose of the 20/20 segment, according to the New Tribune, was to "highlight the failure of the joint U.S.-Russian POW/MIA Commission to locate... U.S. POWs taken by the Soviets during World War II, Korea, the Cold War and Vietnam."

The New Tribune article and ABC asserted that the graves of four American POWs had been found in Odessa. ABC producer Chris Harper noted, "I think there was a very specific intent on the part of the Soviets to cover up the bodies of these men." Cemetery records at the port city of Odessa allegedly listed the names of the following four Americans:

1. Corporal Lyle Timmerman
2. Chief Mechanic Alberto Cairo
3. Richard Larson
4. Sergeant Ted Yates

The 20/20 segment concluded that these four had been POWs. The facts are very different.

On May 6, 1948, the U.S. government sent Note 268 to the Soviet government in Moscow. The content of the notes is as follows.

Embassy of the
United States of America

Note No. 268

The Embassy of the United States of America presents its compliments to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and, with reference to its note no. 137 of February 13, 1946, and previous correspondence in regard to operations of United States Army Graves Registration personnel in Soviet controlled areas, has the honor to communicate the following:

According to the available records of the United States Government there are some thirty known cases of American war dead buried on the territory of the Soviet Union. Of this number six are buried on Cape Lopatka, Kamchatka, and the Embassy is informed that arrangements have now been made with Soviet representatives in Tokyo for the delivery of these remains to the United States Army Graves Registration Service in Tokyo during the month of June 1948.

With a view to identifying and removing the remainder of American war dead on Soviet territory, the United States Government would like to send to the Soviet Union an American officer of the Graves Registration Service accompanied by a technician and a small amount of equipment. The proposed plan of operation would be to identify and remove the remains from their present resting places and collect them in Moscow, whence they would be sent in a single rail shipment to Berlin for forwarding to the United States. The officer to be assigned to this duty is Major Charles A. Jobgerson, who has performed work of this nature in Hungary and Rumania and is at present engaged in the removal of American war dead from Poland.

There is attached a list of American war dead on Soviet territory as revealed by available records. It will be noted that the remains are located principally at Murmansk, Archangel, Poltava and Odessa. It is believed that there are additional cases beyond those listed in the attachment and any information which the Soviet Government can provide with regard to other American war dead buried in the Soviet Union will be greatly appreciated.

In bringing the foregoing matter to the attention of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs the Embassy solicits the Ministry's assistance in obtaining the necessary authorization for the accomplishment in the Soviet Union of this project to return American war dead to the United States. The Embassy will be grateful to the Ministry for its sympathetic cooperation to this end.

Moscow, May 6, 1948

List of United States World War II Deceased
Buried in Soviet Union

Name of Deceased Pertinent Data: Rank,
Army Serial No. etc. Location of Grave

ARCHANGEL:

Roland, Donald R.	Lieutenant, U.S.N.R.	Allied Cemetery
Batancourt, Juan	Fireman, BK-109077	Soviet Cemetery
Hendricksen, Jacob	Buried Dec. 25, 1944	Local Cemetery, Foreign Section.
Neighbors, Fleet B.	Near grave of artist Bishtusoff	Buried Aug. 20, 1942, location known to caretaker
Hall, Edward		Buried July 1942 Very large and old cemetery

MOLOTOV:

Johansson, Eric Alvar		Location known to Inflat
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MURMANSK:

Allen, Keith N.	Lieutenant Colonel Air Corps, 0-303121	American-English Cemetery
Daily, Domingo	Z-384506	American-English Cemetery
Heindel, George James	Chief Engineer Z-27455	American-English Cemetery
Walragen, Eugene	Died May 12, 1942	
Robinson, Roy A. Jr.	Buried March 5, 1943	

ODESSA:

Larsen, Richard C.	105458	Buried March 31, 1945 Second Christian Cemetery
Timmerman, Lyle E.	Corporal, 12138246	Second Christian Cemetery Plot 127, Row 7, Grave 2
Yates, Ted	Sergeant, 38138940	Second Christian Cemetery

Plot 127, Row 7,
Grave 1

Cairo, Alberto	Chief Engineer Buried October 23, 1946
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POLTAVA: UNITED STATES CEMETERY NOVISENZHARI:

Estle, Raymond C.	First Lieutenant, 0-753279	Plot A, Row 1, Grave 2
Hibbard, Paul R.	First Lieutenant 0-758565	Plot A, Row 1 Grave 4
Kerchner, Richard O.	Private 1st Class 6947136	Plot A, Row 1 Grave 5
Lukacek, Joseph G.	Flight Officer T-61544	Plot A, Row 1 Grave 1
Simpson, Donald C.	Sergeant, 38412844	Plot A, Row 1, Grave 3

HEVDEKRUG: MATZICKEN PRISONER OF WAR CEMETERY:

Teaffy, William F.	Technical Sergeant, 35586750	Grave 4
Nies, Walter	Staff Sergeant, 37307545	Grave 3
Walker, George B.	Staff Sergeant, 34147240	Grave 2

CAPE LOPATKA, KAMCHATKA:

Eiser, Nathan S.	Captain, 0-724028	Scene of Airplane Crash June 9, 1945
Denton, Leslie C. Jr.	34607983	
Irving, Edward J.	0-396038	
Ford, Orvil H.	0-784739	
Lang, Frederick A.	34275916	
Ernsner, Roland R.	16046137	

My research, information obtained by Army Task Force Russia (TFR) and Soviet archive information complement one another on these issues. Each source contradicts the ABC/News Tribune allegations.

After the ABC broadcast, Army Task Force Russia, acting as Executive Agent for the U.S.-Russian Commission on MIA-POWs, initiated an extensive search of records pertaining to these assertions. The U.S. Army's Center for Memorial Affairs, the National Personnel Records Center and the Coast Guard's Merchant Vessel Personnel Office were able to identify the four servicemen and the disposition of their remains. The Office of the Quartermaster General of the Army noted on July 2, 1948 that Larsen, Timmerman and Yates were included on a list of deceased American citizens whose remains were expected to be delivered by the Soviets through Berlin to U.S. custody.

Corporal Lyle Earl Timmerman's case is found in American and Soviet archives. Timmerman was reported missing in France on September 19, 1944. He was later reported as captured by the Germans. He was liberated from a Nazi German camp by the Red Army and sent to Odessa for repatriation. While in Odessa, on March 19, 1945 Timmerman sat in the courtyard of the transit camp. A stone wall collapsed on him, killing him instantly. His family was notified of his death three days later. Timmerman's body was buried in British battle dress uniform with military honors in the Second Christian Cemetery in Odessa. Photographs were taken and passed through military channels to Mrs. Timmerman. On July 8, 1948 the Department of State requested the return of Timmerman's remains. The remains were returned by the Soviet government on December 29, 1950. The remains were processed by the U.S. Graves Registration Service for identification at the U.S. Military Cemetery in Neuville-en-Condroz, near Liege, Belgium. The remains were transferred to Mrs. Timmerman's custody for burial at Freysbush Cemetery, Fort Plain, New York on May 9, 1951.

Information about Sergeant Ted Yates is also found in American and Soviet archives. This information is consistent with the data obtained by Task Force Russia. Yates was reported missing in France on July 23, 1944. He was later reported captured by the Germans. He was liberated by the Red Army and sent to Odessa for repatriation. On March 19, 1945 he was killed by the same collapsing wall that killed Timmerman. His family was notified of his death three days later. Yates was buried in the Second Christian Cemetery in Odessa with military honors. Photographs of the ceremony were sent to his family. On July 8, 1948, the Department of State requested the return of his remains from the Soviet government. On December 29, 1950 these remains were received by U.S. authorities in Berlin. The remains were processed by the U.S. Military Cemetery in Neuville-en-Condroz, near Liege, Belgium. Yates'

father requested that the remains be sent to Hillcrest Cemetery, La Junta, Colorado for reinterment.

Information concerning Richard C. Larsen, a U.S. Merchant Marine who died in his sleep on March 29, 1945 aboard the SS *George L. Baker* at anchor in the harbor of Odessa is found in U.S. records. On July 8, 1948 the Department of State requested the return of Larsen's remains from the Soviet government. The remains were returned on December 29, 1950. According to the wishes of Larsen's wife, he was permanently interred at Neuville on January 4, 1951.

Chief Engineer Alberto Cairo, U.S. Merchant Marine, served aboard the SS *William Allen White*. While at anchor in the Odessa harbor, Cairo died of sclerosis of the heart on October 29, 1946. Cairo's widow was notified by the Assistant U.S. Naval Attaché of the death and burial on December 7, 1946 and she was sent photographs of the funeral service. He was buried in Odessa in the Second Christian Cemetery, Plot 127, Row 7, Grave 3, apparently next to Timmerman and Yates. Precise information on the location of Cairo's grave does not appear in the American note of May 6, 1948. The return of his remains may not have been requested or perhaps his widow did not request repatriation of the remains. No record has been found in U.S. or Soviet sources indicating a return of Cairo's remains, though there is no doubt the remains of Timmerman and Yates were repatriated and the remains of Larsen were recovered.

Early Cold War Incidents

Information from U.S. archive sources shows that 23 U.S. military aircraft were shot down by Soviet or Soviet block anti-aircraft fire in the early Cold War years. Many crashed into the high seas or in disputed areas of the sea. The U.S. government suspected that crewmembers were captured by Soviet forces after their aircraft were attacked. Records show that on at least three occasions American aviators were returned to U.S. military control after they had been shot down and captured by Soviet forces (C-118, 1958; RB-47, 1950; U-2, 1960). The U.S. government suspected that others had been held alive and never repatriated or otherwise accounted for.

The total number of Cold War aircraft incidents (1945-1969) of all types exceeds 150. Of these, 23 three were shoot downs of American aircraft. Dates for shoot downs in the following table are taken from a variety of service statements, DoD summaries, newspaper accounts and analytical reports.

Early Cold War Aircraft Shootdowns
1945-1969

1. Soviet fighters shot down a U.S. Navy PBY-40 (Privateer) over the Baltic, April 8, 1950
2. U.S. Navy plane shot down by Soviet fighters off Vladivostock (November 6, 1951)
3. Soviets shot down a USAF B-29 over the Sea of Japan (June 13, 1952)
4. Soviet fighters shoot down USAF B-29 in the vicinity of Hokkaido, Japan (October 7, 1952)
5. Soviet fighters shot down a USAF B-29 over North Korea (January 12, 1953)
6. U.S. Navy PV-2 shot down near Formosa (January 1, 1953)
7. U.S. F-84 shot down by Czech MiG (March 10, 1953)
8. U.S. RB-50 shot down by Soviet fighters off Cape Povorotny near Vladivostock (July 29, 1953)
9. B-29 shot down over the Sea of Japan (April 7, 1954)
10. U.S. PV-2 shot down over the Sea of Japan (September 4, 1954)
11. U.S. RB-47 shot down (April 18, 1955)
12. U.S. RB-47 shot down (April 18, 1956)
13. U.S. P4-M shot down near Formosa (September 10, 1956)
14. USAF RB-50 shot down ca. 200 miles west of Niigata, Honshu, Japan (September 10, 1956)
15. U.S. T-33 shot down over Czechoslovakia (December 23, 1956)
16. U.S. C-118 shot down over Armenia (June 27, 1958)
17. Soviets shot down a USAF C-130 over Armenia (September 2, 1958)
18. U.S. U2 shot down over Soviet Union (May 1, 1960)
19. USAF RB-47 shot down by Soviet fighters near Kola Peninsula (July 1, 1960)
20. Unspecified U.S. aircraft shot down over PRC (September 17, 1965)
21. U.S. RB-57 shot down over Black Sea (December 14, 1965)
23. Unspecified U.S. aircraft shot down (August 21, 1967)
23. U.S. C-121 shot down over Sea of Japan (April 14, 1969)

As shown in the following memorandum to the President, in the view of Secretary of State Dulles, in 1955 U.S. citizens and USAF personnel from the 1950 Privateer incident were being held alive in the Soviet Union.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT
(Secret)⁸

Date: July 18, 1955

Subject: Americans Detained in the Soviet Union

The American people share with other peoples of the world a real concern about the imprisonment of some of their countrymen in the Soviet Union. Most of these persons have been held since World War II. It is time to liquidate problems rising out of that War so that we may proceed with greater mutual trust to the solution of major issues facing the world today.

Of greatest concern to American people are reports reaching the United States about Americans still being held in Soviet prison camps. The American Embassy in Moscow has made many representations on this subject. While we appreciate the recent release of several Americans, others still remain in Soviet custody. On July 16 the American Embassy in Moscow gave the Foreign Office a list of eight American citizens about whose detention in the Soviet Union we have information from returning prisoners of war. Any action you would take to bring about the early release of these particular persons would help relations between our countries.

We have also received a number of reports from returning European prisoners of war that members of the crew of the U.S. Navy Privateer, shot down over the Baltic Sea on April 18, 1950, are alive and in Soviet prison camps. We are asking for their repatriation and that of other American citizens being held in the Soviet Union not only because of general humanitarian principles, but also because such action is called for under the Litvinov-Roosevelt Agreement of 1933.

(Signed) John Foster Dulles

⁸Declassified July 30, 1991

The United States government continued to suspect that some U.S. air crewmen were imprisoned in the USSR. On June 20, 1956 the DoS sent the following query to the American Embassies at Moscow and Tokyo:

Reference is made to the Department's Airgram A-785 of April 16, 1954 to the American Embassy, Tokyo on the subject "Aircraft Incidents Survivors" and related telegraphic correspondence, including Section 2 of Moscow's telegram to the Department No. 944 of February 1, 1954, final paragraph.

The Department is considering whether it has become appropriate as well as desirable at this time to question the Soviet Government specifically with reference to the detention of American fliers whose presence has been reported by repatriates from Soviet prison camps and detention places, even though the basic information received in the Department is not as specific as that which has underlain the representations made to the Soviet Government in other cases.

The Soviet Government has already denied knowledge of the whereabouts of any crew members of the B-29 destroyed by Soviet fighters off Hokkaido on October 7, 1952 and the B-50 destroyed by Soviet fighters over the Sea of Japan on July 29, 1953. This Department, however, made no specific inquiry with respect to the detention of survivors of the United States Navy Privateer shot down by Soviet fighters over the Baltic Sea on April 8, 1950, nor with respect to the B-29 missing over the area of the Sea of Japan on June 13, 1952; nor has it made specific representations with respect to the reported detention of United States aviation personnel who may have come into Soviet custody during the Korean hostilities. There have been reports mentioned in the communications under reference, from American, Japanese and other sources indicating specifically the detention of American aviation personnel since 1949 and the possibility that among them are included crew members of such lost or destroyed aircraft. The Embassies are, of course, aware of the widely publicized allegations of the repatriate John Noble, which have been corroborated in part by other repatriates, concerning the Navy Privateer crew. It is believed that the information may be specific enough to justify a departure from the existing practice of identifying by name individual survivors held in detention; and publicity to the request may encourage other repatriates to come forward with information.

Moscow and Tokyo's comments are requested on the general desirability of such action and particularly on the following proposed note.

VERBATIM TEXT

The Embassy of the United States of America presents its compliments to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Union of

Soviet Socialist Republics and has the honor to refer to the question of the detention of United States military personnel in the Soviet Union. The United States Government has for some time received, from persons of various nationalities freed from Soviet Government imprisonment during the last several years, reports that they have conversed with, seen or heard reports concerning United States military aviation personnel, belonging either to the United States Air Force or to the United States Navy Air Arm, in actual detention in the Soviet Union. The United States Government has sought in all such cases to obtain, if possible, precise identification of American nationals detained by the Soviet Government, although it notes that by international law and international practice the Soviet Government is obliged to inform the United States Government first of any American nationals whom the Soviet Government holds in custody or to permit such nationals to communicate with the proper United States authorities. The reports concerning such personnel have now become so persistent and detailed, and so credible, that, although the United States Government is not able to identify by name these American nationals now detained by the Soviet Government, it requests the Soviet Government to inform the United States Government in detail concerning each American military person who has been detained in the Soviet Union at any time since January 1, 1949 of whom the United States Government has not heretofore been informed by the Soviet Government, giving in each case the name of the person and the circumstances underlying his detention.

Specifically, the United States Government is informed and is compelled to believe that the Soviet Government has had and continues to have under detention the following:

1. One or more members of the crew of a United States Navy Privateer-type aircraft which came down in the Baltic Sea area on April 8, 1950. The United States Government has since that time received reports that various members of the crew of this United States aircraft were, and are, detained in Soviet detention places in the Far Eastern area of the Soviet Union. In particular, it is informed, and believes, that in 1950 and in October, 1953 at least one American military aviation person, believed to be a member of the crew of this United States Navy Privateer, was held at Camp No. 20 allegedly near Taishet and Collective Farm No. 25, approximately 54 kilometers from Taishet, under sentence for alleged espionage. This American [illegible] was described as having suffered burns on the face and legs in the crash of his aircraft and using crutches or a cane.

Reports have been received from former prisoners of the Soviet Government at Vorkuta that in September 1950 as many as eight American nationals, believed to be members of the crew of the United States Navy Privateer to which reference is made, had been seen in the area of Vorkuta in September 1950.

stated that he was serving a twenty-five year espionage sentence and had been a member of a downed United States aircraft.

For the information of the Soviet Government, the crew of the United States Navy Privateer when it departed for its flight over the high seas of the Baltic consisted of the following United States Navy personnel, all nationals of the United States:

Name	Rank	Serial Number
Fetts, John H.	Lt.	320676 USNR
Seeschaf, Howard W.	Lt.	264095 USN
Reynolds, Robert D.	Lt. jg	368573 USN
Burgess, Tommy L.	Ens.	506762 USN
Danens Jr., Joe H.	AD1	3685438 USN
Thomas, Jack W.	AD1	2242750 USN
Beckman, Frank L.	AT1	2799076 USN
Purcell, Edward J.	CT3	2540438 USN
Rinnier Jr., Joseph N.	AT3	2542600 USN
Bourassa, Joseph Jay	AL3	9539864 USN

2. One or more members of the crew of a United States Air Force B-29 which came down on June 13, 1952, either over the Sea of Japan or near the Kamchatka area of the Soviet Union. An officer, believed by the United States Government to have been a member of this crew, was observed in October, 1953 in a Soviet hospital north of Magadan near the crossing of the Kolyn River between Elgen and Debin at a place called [illegible]. This officer stated that he had been convicted, wrongfully, under [illegible] of Article 58 of the Soviet Penal Code.

3. While the foregoing specific cases involve the crew members of two aircraft, it may well be that the Soviet Government has in its custody members of the crews of other United States aircraft, particularly crew members of aircraft engaged on behalf of the United Nations Command side of the military action in Korea since 1950.

The United States Government desires that the Soviet Government makes its inquiry on the foregoing subject as thoroughly as possible but that it keep this Embassy informed of progress as soon as possible.

An early response as to the Soviet Government's intentions with respect to the present request will be appreciated.⁹

⁹From: State #CA-10165 To: Moscow and Tokyo (Confidential) June 20, 1956
794.5411/6-2056

On July 16, 1956, the United States government sent a note to the Soviet government "requesting information concerning American airmen who had been lost under circumstances which lead some to believe that the airmen might have been detained by the Soviet Government. The Soviet Government replied on August 13, 1956 that a careful investigation by appropriate Soviet authorities had established that no American citizens from the personnel of the United States Air Force or Navy were on the territory of the Soviet Union."

During the early Cold War years, the U.S. government also kept track of American defectors to the Soviet bloc. From at least 1957 to 1962, the USA Industrial and Personnel Security Group (USAIPSG), located at Fort Holabird, Maryland was responsible for holding and controlling dossiers, collecting and filing information, and making reports concerning the Returned or Exchanged Captured American Personnel -- World Wide (RECAP-WW) program. USAIPSG collected information from newspapers, spot reports, and dossiers. Every six months, in July and January, USAIPSG made a report to CI Branch, ACIS of every case in which the person had not been returned to U.S. military control or civilian custody.

The Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, Counterintelligence Branch, Headquarters, United States Army, Europe, compiled as of August 6, 1959 a "List of Known United States Army Defectors in USAREUR." This list contains 28 names. A later version of the list in 1960 contains 53 names. A RECAP-WW summary from July 1961 lists 42 American servicemen who were "under Sino-Soviet bloc control." The RECAP-WW roster in 1963, the most recent update thus far located in the archives, contains information on the cases of 50 American defectors to the Soviet bloc. Only one defector was identified as living on the territory of the USSR. The others were located primarily in East Germany and a few lived in Czechoslovakia.

The U.S. government did not distinguish among the Americans held illegally in the Soviet Union. The U.S. government investigated and pursued any credible lead that indicated U.S. servicemen or civilians were unlawfully held in the Soviet Union. In the 1950s, consistent efforts were made to obtain the release of every person after it had been determined that the individual was probably an American citizen. The record of U.S. government démarches and requests for information submitted to the Soviet Foreign Ministry is extensive. Some of these efforts proved successful, others were

not. The United States also participated in the United Nations ad hoc Commission on Unrepatriated POWs, the Soviet government did not.

In October 1953 the Soviet Union repatriated a number of Austrian POWs and civilians who had been interned in the USSR since the end of World War II. As part of the Army's "Psypool" project, these returnees were interviewed by U.S. officials in order to obtain information about the possibility that American citizens were being held in the USSR illegally. Information collected from former U.S. prisoners and prisoners from other countries who were released and interviewed by U.S. officials provided a base from which the United States government was able to make official protests and inquiries to the Soviet government on specific cases of U.S. citizens held in the Soviet Union illegally.

The Department of State was aware that Eastern European governments prevented claimants to U.S. citizenship from contacting U.S. missions. They have denied American consular officers access to claimants to U.S. citizenship, they were not cooperative in reporting vital statistics, departures from the country, and in general made it difficult for U.S. officials to put together an accurate picture. The DoS estimated in 1954, for example, that the number of potential claimants to American citizenship in Poland was estimated to be several thousand in addition to those already verified, and in the USSR at approximately 2,000. The DoS created six classifications. One, individuals who established claims to United States citizenship. Two, non-dual national American citizens excluding official personnel. Three, verified American citizens who were permitted to depart. Four, American citizens who informed U.S. missions that they were unable to depart because of the failure of the communist government to grant exit documentation. Five, Americans who when last heard from were in labor camps, prisons, or concentration camps. Six, individuals who disappeared under circumstances that would indicate they were incarcerated. These categories are reflected in the following table:

U.S. Citizens in the USSR or Its
Satellites in Eastern Europe
(1954 Department of State Table)

	USSR	Poland	Czech	Rumania	Hungary
Approximate number of verified American citizens resident in country (including dual nationals)	704	3,000	291	377	394
Approximate number of verified American citizens resident in country excluding dual nationals)	45	10	118	39	11
Approximate number of documented American citizens (including dual nationals) whom we know to have attempted to depart but could not because of denial of exit documentation	113	577	45	116	100
Number of verified American citizens known to be incarcerated at present time	2	-0-	1	-0-	1
Number of verified American citizens who have disappeared under circumstances indicating that they are presently incarcerated.	-0-	1	2	3	-0-

As shown in the following table, by 1956, the U.S. government's efforts resulted in the release from Soviet bloc captivity of over one dozen American citizens.

American Citizens Released
from Soviet Bloc
Countries as a Result of the
Efforts of the United States Government
(1956)¹⁰

Hungary

Robert A. Vogeler
Israel Jacobson of the American Jewish Joint Distribution
Committee

Czechoslovakia

William N. Oatis
George H. Jones) - American soldiers
Clarence R. Hill)
Lieutenant Luther G. Roland - American pilot
Stanley E. Abbot) - Mormon missionaries
C. Aldon Johnson)
Vlasta Vraz - Representative of the American Relief for
Czechoslovakia

The Soviet Union

Homer H. Cox
Leland Towers
John H. Noble
William A. Verdine
William T. Marchuk
Wilfred C. Cumish
Charles Hopkins
Murray Filde (Feinherh)
Sidney Ray Sparks

Poland

¹⁰Department of State data from 1955-1956.

Hermann Field

On December 5, 1991 the U.S. government submitted data to the Russian government "concerning certain individuals who could have been detained in the Soviet Union in the 1950's." The Russian response noted, "As a result of our research, we have uncovered a series of documents which shed light on the fate of those individuals; the documents are being passed over to the U.S. side as a gesture of goodwill." The Russian conclusions are as follow:

-- Mr. Wilfred S. Kumish was handed over by Soviet authorities to the U.S. side in Berlin on September 5, 1955.

-- Mr. Sidney Ray Sparks was handed over to U.S. authorities on 17 February 1956.

-- Research conducted in 1955 established that U.S. citizens Verta Elizabeth Thompson and William Baumeister were not held on the territory of the Soviet Union.

-- A B-29 aircraft was shot down June 13, 1952 to the south of Valentine Bay in the Far East. Members of the crew of that aircraft were not found by patrol ships or on-duty border guards.

-- In relation to the crew of a B-50 aircraft (the incident occurred July 29, 1952 in the Sea of Japan),¹¹ we have established that pick-up operations of the Americans were not carried out by the Soviet side.

-- Besides the remains of six crew members of a U.S. Airforce C-130 which crashed in the area of Yerevan September 2, 1958, and which were handed over to the U.S. side, we did not discover any other U.S. pilots from that airplane.

-- As to the question touched on by the U.S. side about the fate of Col. Serny and 1st Lt. Kushman, we would like to have more detailed data (year and place of birth, first names, etc.) which would allow us to provide a more definitive answer.

Two of the people the U.S. side inquired about, Sparks and Cumish, were returned to U.S. authorities nearly 36 years ago. The inquiry about Baumeister concerns a U.S. serviceman who died in 1944, whose remains were recovered, indentified and buried at his family's request in Fort Snelling National Cemetery in Minneapolis, MN in 1957. The State Department stopped

¹¹This date, provided by the Russians, has not been verified in U.S. sources. The Russians may actually be referring to an RB-50 shot down near the Cape of Povorotny on July 29, 1953.

making representations on behalf of "Col. Serny" by 1954 since it was impossible either to verify Serny's claim to U.S. citizenship and or believe the testimony of numerous witnesses who reported that Serny claimed to be responsible for "rounding up John Dillinger" as well and to know where the kidnapped Lindbergh baby had been hidden. Representations on behalf of "Kushman" were also stopped, apparently because it was impossible to relate the information obtained from repatriates to any U.S. citizen.

On July 30, 1992, General Dimitrii Volkogonov, chairman of the Russian Delegation to the U.S.-Russian Commission on MIA-POWs, published an article in *Izvestia* in which he listed the names of 39 American citizens who had been detained illegally by the Soviet government. None of the 39 was an American MIA-POW. The information Volkogonov revealed in *Izvestia* was consistent with many U.S. démarches that found their way into various Soviet archives.

Volkogonov claimed the information had been found in "Top Secret KGB files" though Volkogonov also told the press on several occasions that he did not have access to KGB archives.

U.S. Embassy Note No. 575, October 4, 1949 to the Soviet government is a protest listing by name 31 American citizens illegally detained or imprisoned by the Soviet government. U.S. Note No. 575 was not treated as a routine matter by the Soviet government when it was received. Soviet archives show the U.S. note was sent to each member of the Politburo as well as to eight recipients in the Foreign Ministry. Five of the people identified in U.S. Note No. 575 were included on the in Volkogonov's article. The U.S. government also protested the arrest of Ida Sophie Muller, who was included in Volkogonov's article, in an aide-memoire to the Soviet government on December 12, 1949.

Korean War MIA-POW Issues

Korean War casualty data have always been dynamic. During the war the data changed as casualties increased, ambiguous losses were resolved as information about the missing was collected and assessed. The casualty resolution effort of the U.S. armed forces began shortly after the Korean People's Army (KPA) invaded the Republic of Korea (ROK) on June 25, 1950. The first U.S. Air Force casualty occurred on July 1 and the first Army casualty on July 2, 1950. Over the next 36 months, U.S. combat casualties occurred at different rates during the Korean War. The first U.S. ground element to

engage the North Koreans, Task Force Smith, lost 145 men who were classified missing-in-action.

The second phase of combat (September 16, 1950 - December 31, 1950) began with the UN offensive that included the Inchon landing. The end of the second phase coincides with the offensive by the Chinese People's Volunteers (CPV). U.S. forces attempted to collect information on MIAs beginning in 1950. Col. Lamont set up a map in his office in the EUSAK compound on which he recorded the locations of the missing-in-action (MIA), killed-in-action (KIA) and the Missing Air Crews Reports (MACR).

The graves registration mission changed almost overnight when the two separate field commands began to fall back after the Chinese Communist Forces intervened in the fighting. Whereas the GRS units, until 25 November, had raced to operate cemeteries near the battle lines, after the Chinese intervention the emphasis was on evacuation to the relative security of rear areas, where the remains were concentrated, later to be further evacuated to Japan. In Japan the remains were to be processed for shipment to their homeland.¹²

All isolated burials which were reported by the divisions in their recurring reports and all those claimed by statements of witnesses also were recorded and filed for later use in recovery and disinterment work. The repatriation of Gen. Walker's body led to a public outcry in the United States to "send my boy home, too." Never before had there been a mass evacuation of KIA remains during hostilities. This became U.S. policy in December 1950 which created an unprecedented demand on the logistic train for dealing with thousands of decomposing cadavers. Many could not be recovered. On November 1, 1950 the CPV cut off the escape route for the U.S. 8th Cavalry Regiment then decimated it. The bodies of hundreds of Cavalrymen, unrecoverable under the terms of the Armistice Agreement, remained buried on the hills of Unsan.

Casualty reporting methods changed over time. Until the Chinese intervention, data were collected and plans made according to the expectation that there would be a quick UN victory. In early November 1950, as Graves Registration Service (GRS) and other casualty resolution policies indicate, victory was thought to be in hand. The Chinese intervention changed all of

¹²Graves Registration Service in the Korean War: An Unofficial History Extracted from *History of the Korean War* Volume III, Part 16 (Secret until declassified by TAG 60674) Prepared by the Military History Section, Headquarters, United States Army Forces Far East and Published by HQ EUSA-J4 (DJ-VE-R), 17

this. Over time, as the scope of the war enlarged, Korean conflict casualty data became more detailed. Compare, for example, Department of Defense (DoD) data of January 7, 1952 with a DoD report released in August 1953 and another from December 1953.

Department of Defense Casualty Listing
as of January 7, 1952

22,627	dead
93,129	wounded
11,381	missing in action
2,091	captured
1,393	returned to service

130,621 total

Preliminary DoD Casualty Figures
August 1953

Dead:	25,604
(KIA	22,731)
(Other causes	2,873)
Wounded	103,492
Missing	8,529
Captured	2,219
Captured and	
Missing returned	
to Duty	2,433

(These data reflect 2,469 who died of wounds and 404 who had been reclassified from missing to dead. The aggregate missing category was reduced by 404 known dead, 2,433 MIA-POWs who returned, and 2,219 known POWs.)

Interim DoD Report of U.S. Battle Casualties
As of December 31, 1953

	Total DoD	Army	Navy	Marines	Air Force
1. Total Casualties (sum of 3, 4, & 5)*	142,118	110,081	2,080	28,110	1,847
2. Total Deaths (sum of 3, 4a, & 5a)	30,606	25,208	395	4,137	866
3. Killed in action - Total	22,986	18,852	297	3,294	543
4. Wounded in action - Total	105,807	79,644	1,597	24,651	378
a. Died of wounds	2,480	1,911	21	537	11
b. Other	103,327	77,733	1,576	23,651	367
5. MIA Total	13,325	11,585	186	628	926
a. Died or presumed dead	5,140	4,445	77	306	312
b. Returned to Military control	5,131	4,638	35	194	264
c. Current captured**	101	93	-0-	7	1
d. Current missing	2,953	2,409	74	121	349

Interim Report of U.S. Battle Casualties, continued

* These figures reflect findings of presumptive death and other determinations, changes in status, and revisions processed through 31 December 1953. The data indicate the cumulative number of permanent and temporary losses from effective military strength as the result of enemy action.

** Status of Item 5c:

	Total	Army	Navy	Marines	Air Force
Gross captures	5,625	5,145	31	225	224
Died	1,106	1,079	-0-	24	3
Returned	4,418	3,973	31	194	220
Current captured	101	93	-0-	7	1

Following the Chinese intervention in the Korean War, evidence began to accumulate concerning the magnitude of post-capture deaths inflicted on U.S. forces. To fully appreciate these data, several distinctions need to be made among types of prisoners. Capture does not mean an individual ever formally became or was counted as a POW. Between the time an individual was captured and the time he arrived at a POW camp his status was MIA. POW refers to those who made it to a POW camp alive. Prisoners who made it to a camp alive but for whom there has been no accounting are referred to as POW(BNR). Those who disappeared after capture but did not reach a POW camp are defined here as post-capture killed, body not recovered (PCK(BNR)). POWs who chose to stay in Communist custody at the end of the Korean War are referred to as voluntary nonrepatriates (VNR).

Definitive conclusions about the number of PCK(BNR) and POW(BNR) suffered by U.S. forces in Korea are difficult to reach because the collection, reporting and analysis of data concerning missing or captured Americans was severely impeded throughout war. The status of captured Americans changed dramatically, often with no indication to the outside world. Many Americans were tortured to death, summarily executed, beaten or marched to death and scattered randomly across vast geographic areas in shallow or unmarked graves--if they were buried at all. The extensive record of cruelty and barbarism has been assembled slowly and painstakingly over a number of years. The atrocities committed by the North Korean People's Army were so

common that they could only have been a matter of official government policy, in the view of analyst Harry Summers.

On November 14, 1951, Col. James M. Hanley, head of the War Crimes Section of the U.S. Eighth Army's Judge Advocate Section, took exception to the Eighth Army's Training Directive No. 6, August 26, 1951, which implied that captured prisoners would receive better treatment in the hands of the Communist Chinese Forces than from the North Korean People's Army.¹³ Hanley released a report designed to knock the wheels off of this belief. According to Hanley's report, between November 1950 and November 1, 1951, the North Koreans had "wantonly killed 147 American prisoners of war." The Chinese, on the other hand, had "killed 2,513 (United States) prisoners of war since November 1, 1950, and in addition, ten British soldiers, forty Turks, five Belgians, and seventy-five soldiers of unknown nationality." (These victims would have been counted as UN Command missing or, if found dead, as KIA. Hanley was not, apparently, referring to prisoners killed in POW camps.) The largest number of Americans reported to have been killed by the Chinese was a group of 200 Marines slaughtered, according to Hanley's report, on December 10, 1950. The Pentagon ordered an investigation of the facts of the report and the motivations behind its release. The author of the report claimed to have evidence that the wholesale massacre of captured Americans was a policy ordered by "higher-ups" within the Communist force structure.

Thousands of family members besieged the Pentagon with requests for information. The publicity following the release of the Hanley report forced the UN truce negotiating team to change the priority of the MIA-POW issue from second to first on the UN agenda. U.S. officials could not say if Hanley's data were wrong but at the same time would not confirm it. On November 20, General Matthew Ridgway, who mildly censured Colonel Hanley for overstepping the limits of his duties, said from his headquarters in Tokyo that it was possible 6,000 American soldiers now listed as missing in action in Korea had been captured and killed by Communist troops. At the same time, however, he said the United States investigation showed positive proof covering 365 Americans. When Ridgway made these comments more than 10,000 U.S. servicemen were listed as missing.

¹³Historical Report, War Crimes Division, Judge Advocate Section, Korean Communications Zone, December 31, 1952 (Restricted Security Information), p. 9. RG153 Records of the Judge Advocate General, War Crimes Division 1952-54.

In April 1953, however, CINCFE received a request from Washington (office unknown) asking for "the best current estimate of the number of American lives lost as a result of illegal action by the enemy following capture." CINCUNC replied on May 13 that as of April 15

the best estimate of the number of such deaths was 1,379. This estimate, however, did not include results of interrogations of sick and injured returnees. Preliminary study of this recently acquired information indicated that the additional evidence might establish "a minimum of about 4,000 previously unconfirmed deaths of Americans in enemy hands." Not all of these deaths, however, were attributable to illegal post-capture action by the enemy.¹⁴

General Mark Clark prepared a speech for delivery at the United Nations following Little Switch in 1953. In this speech, which was not made, Clark noted that of the 28,815 murders committed by the Communist forces in Korea, 11,622 victims were UN soldiers. Clark added, "The United Nations Command has been most meticulous and objective insofar as such is humanly possible, in its investigation of the background upon which I base my report."¹⁵ This appears to be a reference to the work of Colonel Hanley and his colleagues in the War Crimes Division.

MIAs were inflicted on U.S. forces in the following chronological order:

¹⁴"Deaths of Communist-held Prisoners," (Confidential) in HQ FEC/UNC Command Report (Top Secret) May 1953, 45

¹⁵Mark W. Clark, *From the Danube to the Yalu* (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1954), 300-301

Chronological Accumulation of
Korean War MIA, KIA (BNR) and PCK (BNR)
(Does not include POW (BNR))

	1950	1951	1952	1953
January		35	93	39
February		159	53	21
March		43	47	102
April		162	22	35
May		88	38	28
June		66	117	66
July	355	56	85	258
August	136	73	81	
September	188	120	137	
October	99	118	259	
November	1460	90	53	
December	1085	52	61	
	3323	1062	1046	549


Total: 5,980 (MIA, KIA (BNR) and PCK (BNR)
with incident date)¹⁶

¹⁶This table is based on Mapper data. There are some duplications and errors in the Army Central Identification Laboratory, Hawaii (CILHI) Mapper database. The number of anomalies appears to be around 25, or three-tenths of one per cent (.003) of the total number of MIA cases (8,177). These are being searched for, cross-checked, identified and deleted by CILHI.

In 1954, the Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations' Subcommittee on Korean War Atrocities reported that during the three years of the Korean War "the Communist enemy committed a series of war crimes against American and United Nations personnel which constituted one of the most heinous and barbaric epochs of recorded history."¹⁷ Between October and December 1953 the Senate committee, chaired by Senator Charles E. Potter (D-MI), inquired "into the nature and extent of Communist war crimes committed in Korea" against Americans, though it was noted that similar crimes had been committed against personnel from other UN allies. The Senate committee reviewed the process for collecting and reporting war crimes. This operation was the responsibility first of the Army Staff Judge Advocate of the Far East Command. The mission was transferred to the Commanding General, Eighth Army, in October 1950 then to the Commanding General, Korean Communication Zone in September 1952.

Post-war Senate hearings documented about one dozen massacres and well thought out, premeditated torture. Mutilated bodies of American servicemen, many with their hands still tied behind their backs, were often dumped into shallow pits. Some of these were recovered and photographed for use as evidence in war crimes trials. Lt. Colonel Jack R. Todd, Chief of the War Crimes Division in Korea, testified in 1957 that "the most accurate estimate of American troops who died as a result of war crimes was 5,639 as of November 1953." Lt. Colonel Todd added that the figure was conservative and might increase as investigations proceeded.

¹⁷U.S. Congress. Senate. Korean War Atrocities -- Report of the Committee on Government Operations Made Through Its Permanent Subcommittee On Investigations By Its Subcommittee On Korean War Atrocities Pursuant to S. Res. 40 (Washington, DC: January 11, 1954), 1 Hereafter Korean War Atrocities

U.S. Army POWs Surviving Internment¹⁸

Month	Number Captured and Interned	Died During Internment	Percent Repatriated (%)
1950			
July	805	532	34.0
August	21	21	0.0
September	11	11	0.0
October	9	5	44.5
November	1,911	888	53.6
December	1,002	509	49.3
1951			
January	190	65	65.8
February	660	421	36.3
March	17	2	88.3
April	431	66	87.3
May	408	95	77.9
June	11	0	100.0
July	9	2	77.8
August	45	4	91.2
September	53	1	98.2
October	24	6	75.0
November	59	2	96.7
December	7	0	100.00
1952			
January	7	0	100.0
February	5	0	100.0
March	13	0	100.0
April	2	0	100.0
May	6	0	100.0
June	16	1	93.8
July	15	0	100.0
August	3	0	100.0
September	30	1	96.7
October	13	2	84.7
November	8	0	100.0
December	5	0	100.0

¹⁸U.S. Prisoners of War in the Korean Operation - A Study of Their Treatment and Handling by the North Korean Army and Chinese Communist Forces (Ft. Meade: Army Security Center, 1954), Appendix XX, 633

Month	Number Captured and Interned	Died During Internment	Percent Repatriated (%)
1953			
January	2	0	100.0
February	11	0	100.0
March	13	0	100.0
April	6	0	100.0
May	7	0	100.0
June	21	0	100.0
July	105	0	100.0
TOTAL	5,961	2,638	55.7

For Americans who survived the initial phase of capture, the dangers had only begun. The trip from the battlefield to a POW camp was a death sentence, in the estimate of the Judge Advocate Section of the Korean Communications Zone, for more than 1,000 Americans. American prisoners were

forced to participate in what was uniformly described by survivors as death marches. The treatment of prisoners on marches was the same in all instances, clearly establishing that such was a predetermined plan formulated on a high Communist command level.¹⁹

Shortly after capture, many American POWs were stripped of their clothes and boots and forced to march on frozen feet. Those who fell were killed by guards.²⁰ Those who managed to survive routinely lost as much as 45 pounds. A well documented Seoul to Pyongyang march began with 376 Americans on September 26, 1950. When it was over three weeks and 250 miles later, 80 Americans were dead. On a march from Kuna-ri to POW Camp No. 5, 300 died along the way. "Of the 706 prisoners who left Bean Camp and marched to Prisoner-of-War Camp No. 1 at Changsong, approximately 100" were alive in the

¹⁹Korean War Atrocities, 10

²⁰British spy George Blake, who survived a death march, notes, "People who couldn't keep up and fell behind were shot by the Korean guards... This may appear merciless on the part of the Koreans, but, if the stragglers had been left behind, they would have been doomed to a slow but certain death from hunger and cold." No Other Choice (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1990), 133

fall of 1953.²¹ It is not known precisely how many died in this way, where they died, or what if anything was done with the bodies of the American POWs.

In 1953 the War Crimes Division of the Judge Advocate Section, Korean Communications Zone, released an analysis of POW statements obtained following Operation Little Switch. American returnees reported that between 4,514 and 6,577 Americans died after being taken prisoner by the Communist forces. In the lesser of the two estimates, 3,147 Americans were reported to have died in camps while 1,367 perished during marches. In the greater of the two estimates, 5,159 Americans were reported to have died in camps while 1,418 died during marches after capture. All of the deaths inflicted during marches occurred before 1952. The Little Switch analysis concluded:

Although the corpus delicti may never be established to prove conclusively the extent of the crimes committed by the enemy, the fate of thousands of United Nations troops may be accurately concluded by the evidence gathered and compiled by the War Crimes Division.

In February 1954 the War Crimes Division of the Judge Advocate Section, Korean Communications Zone, released an analysis of 1,000 POW statements obtained following Big Switch. This report notes that at the end of the Korean War 12,608 Americans were classed as missing-in-action (7,955 missing and presumed dead; 4,631 captured and returned; 22 voluntary non-repatriates). The Communist side admitted that 1,022 Americans died in POW camps. By adding the Communist figures (4,631 captured and returned; 1,022 died in captivity; 147 escaped from camps; 22 voluntary non-repatriates), the War Crimes Division could estimate that 6,786 Americans were not fully accounted for. Such a high figure for unrecovered battlefield dead was out of the question. The conclusion was that 6,786 Americans had died in enemy hands after capture as a result of crimes and atrocities.

This information has many implications for any current remains recovery strategy. If remains of those who died during death marches are to be recovered, a forensic sweep of the march routes one thousand meters to each side from beginning to end might be required.

The gruesome nature of the POW camps administered by the North Koreans and Chinese resulted in hundreds of unreported or unverified deaths. The Senate committee gathered evidence that showed the treatment given American

²¹Korean War Atrocities, 10

prisoners in Communist prisoner-of-war camps was a sequel to the brutalities and indignities suffered by the prisoners on death marches. The prisoners at these camps were survivors of marches and were necessarily in poor physical condition. Thousands of American prisoners died at a rate of 15 to 20 per day. "One witness testified that during a 7- to 8-month period 1,500 prisoners died of beri-beri, dysentery, pellagra, and other diseases as a result of malnutrition at camp No. 5 at Pyoktong."²²

A Congressional report from 1957 notes that 2,762 U.S. POWs were never repatriated. This is due to the fact that almost 40 per cent of the U.S. servicemen held as POWs died in North Korean and Chinese prison camps. Maj. Clarence L. Anderson, who was a prisoner of war in Korea for 34 months, and four other American physicians who were prisoners, made a comprehensive study of their experiences along medical lines. He testified that from the start of the Korean War until the spring or summer of 1951, 38 percent of all American prisoners of war died. These deaths were to a great extent attributable to the treatment by Chinese Communists. Many prisoners died of starvation.

²²Korean War Atrocities, 11

Status of Korean War POWs as of June 8, 1955

Status	Total	Army	Navy	Marine	USAF
Total known captures	7,190	6,656	40	231	263
Died in captivity	2,730	2,662	9	31	28
Returned prior to truce	650	650	-0-	-0-	-0-
Repatriated	3,778	3,323	31	200	224
Voluntary nonrepatriates	21	21	-0-	-0-	-0-
Still retained	11	-0-	-0-	-0-	11

The post-war official record of Korean conflict POW data is, at best, confusing. Numbers cited in Congressional hearings and data provided by the Department of Defense are often contradictory, ambiguous, inconsistent or a mixture of any of these. Two incompatible figures for the number of Marine Corps POWs, 231 and 227, are cited in the same 1957 Congressional report.²³ Of the 7,190 U.S. servicemen reported to have been POWs by the U.S. Congress, 4,428 were reported to have been repatriated. According to this Congressional report, therefore, 2,762 U.S. POWs were not repatriated. The Congressional report that states 7,190 U.S. servicemen were POWs associates no names with its breakdown of 6,556 Army, 263 Air Force, 231 Marine Corps and 40 Navy POWs. This POW breakdown, however, only adds up to 7,090, a discrepancy of 100. A discrepancy of 100 also appears when the number of post-capture deaths estimated by the War Crimes Division of the Eighth Army Adjutant General (5,639) is added to the Army figure for POW(BNR) (2,638). The result (8,277) is 100 more than the figure provided by the American Battle Monument Commission (8,177).

The discrepancy of 100 is intriguing because an error of the same magnitude occurs in data provided by two separate agencies. One explanation

²³U.S. Congress. House. Committee on Government Operations. *Communist Interrogation, Indoctrination, and Exploitation of American Military and Civilian Prisoners* July 27, 1956 (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1957), 2.

for the 100 MIA cases is as follows. As of September 1992, 80 Korean War MIA cases are not associated with a date of incident. These are often treated statistically as a category different from other MIAs. If one were to generate a list of Korean War MIAs according to date of incident, one would not find these 80 cases. There are also 16 cases listed in the field of 8,177 MIAs in which the date of incident occurred after the end of the Korean War, i.e. after the Armistice. If one generated a list of Korean War MIAs bounded by the day it began (June 25, 1950) and the day the Armistice was signed (July 27, 1953) there would be a discrepancy of 16. Thus if today one were to generate a Korean War MIA list by incident bounded by the beginning and the end of the war, the discrepancy from the American Battle Monuments MIA list would be 96. If this calculation were made in the mid-1950s the number may have been 100. Perhaps four out of the 100 cases were resolved in the interim.

DoD data contain similar anomalies. A 1955 Department of Defense publication states that 7,160 U.S. personnel who served in the Korean War were counted as POW.²⁴ According to this DoD report, 4,428 U.S. POWs were repatriated, 2,730 U.S. POWs were determined to have died in camps and 21 "sincere converts" stayed behind. No explanation has been found for the discrepancy in the Department of Defense POW figures (2,730 dead + 4,428 repatriated + 21 VNR = 7,179 total POWs). From this breakdown, DoD's total number of POWs (7,179) is 19 more than its announced figure of 7,160. DoD's high total POW figure (7,179) is eleven fewer than the Congressional high figure (7,190). The greatest discrepancy (89) is found between DoD's high total POW figure (7,179) and the Congressional low POW figure (7,090). POW(BNR) figures also vary by source and year: Congress: 2,762 (1957); DoD: 2,730 (1955); Army 2,638 (1954). This confusion is perhaps a logical consequence of the alluvium of data created during the three years of the Korean conflict.

The bitter experience of forced repatriation carried out following World War II resulted in the U.S. insistence during the Korean conflict armistice negotiations on a policy of voluntary repatriation. In keeping with the terms of the Armistice, on or about September 24, 1953, 23 American soldiers who chose not to return to U.S. military control were transferred to the custody

²⁴POW...the fight continues after the battle. A Report by the Secretary of Defense's Advisory Committee on Prisoners of War (Washington, DC: August 1955), 79. This data was collected by the Defense Advisory Committee on Prisoners of War.

of the Custodial Forces, India. The 23 had until January 23, 1954 to decide whether or not to return to the United States. Two who chose to return were sentenced to ten years and life terms for collaborating with the enemy, though both were released by 1959. The 21 who chose to remain in Communist custody were the following:

List of 21 American Voluntary Non-Repatriates²⁵

1. Cpl Clarence C. Adams	RA 14 267 602
2. Sgt Howard R. Adams	RA 38 556 261
3. Sgt Albert C. Belhomme	RA 13 296 992
4. Pfc Otho G. Bell	RA 18 276 618
5. Pfc Richard O. Corden	RA 11 150 311
6. Cpl William A. Cowart	RA 14 313 076
7. Sgt Rufus E. Douglas ²⁶	RA 38 713 869
8. Pfc John R. Dunn	US 52 051 841
9. Cpl Andrew Fortuna	RA 36 984 833
10. Pfc Lewis W. Griggs	RA 18 322 825
11. Pvt2 Samuel D. Hawkins	RA 18 273 591
12. Pfc Arlie H. Pate	RA 18 307 990
13. Cpl Scott L. Rush	RA 15 277 362
14. Pfc Lowell D. Skinner	RA 15 291 649
15. Cpl Lorraine V. Sullivan	RA 19 304 844
16. Pvt2 Richard R. Tenneson	RA 17 281 893
17. Pvt2 James G. Veneris	RA 13 009 671
18. Cpl Harold Webb	RA 14 333 636
19. Pfc William C. White	RA 18 330 412
20. Pfc Morris R. Wills	RA 12 356 664
21. Pfc Aaron P. Wilson	RA 18 284 033

On January 23, 1954 the remaining 21 voluntary non-repatriates (VNR) were dishonorably discharged from the Army. The Army had reason to believe that some or all of the 21 VNRs had committed serious offenses against either the Uniform Code of Military Justice or Title 18, United States Code, or both. The Commanding General, Military District of Washington was designated as the

²⁵Eleven of the 21 had left China by the end of 1958. By 1966 only three were left there, two of them World War II veterans. Since then at least one has returned to the United States.

²⁶On June 23, 1954, DoD was notified by the Veterans Administration that they had received word from the Chinese Red Cross that Sergeant Douglas had died of a heart attack. Date of death unofficially reported to be June 8, 1954.

responsible commander for the conduct of investigations and for bringing charges. The Military Justice Division's tentative assessment was that there was sufficient evidence to justify a court-martial 15 of the 21 for violating Article 105 and six of the 21 for treason.

The American Battle Monuments Commission roster of Korean War MIAs, which has been in print for many years, lists 8,182 "killed but no body recovered from the Korean War." In 1991, reflecting five resolved cases, 8,177 U.S. servicemen were listed as missing from the Korean War in a variety of official and unofficial sources. Thus conventional wisdom holds that 8,177 Americans are still missing in action from the Korean War. The aggregate figure in this cumulative list has not disputed by any credible source, but it is misleading to think there is no information concerning the 8,177 or that all of these men were lost during combat operations. One analyst contends that "most are truly 'missing'--that is, they are airmen who went down at sea or in rugged mountainous terrain, soldiers and Marines who disappeared in the confusion of battle and whose bodies were never recovered."²⁷ The story is somewhat more complex than this.

On September 9, 1953, UNC gave the Communist forces the list of all unaccounted for UNC personnel whose fate it was believed the Communist side could help resolve. The total UNC list, 3,404 persons from ten countries in the UN Command combat team, contained the names of 944 of the 8,177 Americans carried as MIA in U.S. records. The criteria on which the 944 were selected from the 8,177 were explained to the Communist side. The 3,404 names on the list, the entire roster of unaccounted for UNC MIAs for whom the Communists were asked to provide information, were presented to the Communist side by the UNC as personnel known to have been "captured by you and to have been in your custody."

This complete tabulation of names of individuals together with their nationalities and service numbers contains the names of men who we know you held. The list contains only the names of people who:

- 1) Spoke or were referred to in broadcasts from your radio stations.
- 2) Were listed by you as being your captives.
- 3) Wrote letters from your camps.
- 4) Were seen in your prisons.

²⁷Harry G. Summers Jr., Korean War Almanac (New York: Facts on File, 1990), 184-5

None of these people have been reported by you as having escaped or died as is required by Paragraph 58a of the Armistice Agreement.²⁸

The distribution of the entire roster of the 3,404 UNC personnel is shown in the following table.

²⁸The Secretariat, Military Armistice Commission, Panmunjon, Korea. Eighteenth Meeting of the Military Armistice Commission, held at Panmunjon, Korea, September 9, 1953. Photocopy.

Unaccounted for UNC personnel for whom the UNC expected the Communist side to provide additional information

	September 1953 ²⁹	May 1954 ³⁰
United States	944	944
Britain	19	20 ³¹
Australia	9	9
Canada	3	4
South Africa	8	8
Greece	1	1
Turkey	5	4
Colombia	2	2
Belgium/Luxemburg	3	3
Republic of Korea	2,410	2,410
Total	3,404	3,405

For reasons that have yet to be determined, as soon as the 944 list was prepared, the UNC and various U.S. officials began to refer to it as if it were a roster of unrepatriated POWs. In early 1954, Secretary of the Army Robert T. Stevens referred to the 944 as a list of "missing American servicemen listed as prisoners of war."³² The 944 list and those that have followed it have been referred to as the list of "unrepatriated POWs" ever since, but this is not entirely correct. The record clearly shows that the list of 944 unaccounted for American personnel includes "those missing and presumed dead"³³ as well as POW(BNR). The 944 names included POW(BNR), PCK(BNR) known to have been alive in Communist control, PCK(BNR) and other

²⁹Eighteenth Meeting of the UNCMAC, September 9, 1953

³⁰Memorandum of Conversation. Participants: Delegation of the International Committee of the Red Cross and Ambassador Johnson and Mr. Barringer. Subject: "United Nations Command and Other US Military Personnel in Communist Custody" May 11, 1954

³¹The British government issued a White Paper on the Treatment of British Prisoners of War in Korea (London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1955). The total number of British POWs was 978. These were the first British troops to be held captive by a Communist country. The UNC list of September 9, 1953 gives a total of 19 British.

³²Memorandum for the Secretary of Defense from Secretary of the Army Robert T. Stevens February 2, 1954

³³Memorandum for the Secretaries of the Army, Navy, and Air Force from General USMC (ret.) G. B. Erskine, Assistant to the Secretary of Defense (Special Operations) April 18, 1958

MIAs for whom there is neither evidence of capture nor evidence the individual was ever alive in Communist custody.

The 944 list was reduced in 1953 to 526 in August 1954 based on the results of U.S. government efforts to resolve MIA cases. In August 1954, Rear Admiral T. B. Brittain, senior member of the UNCMAC, presented a list of 2,840 unaccounted for UNC personnel to Lt. General Lee Sang Cho, his Communist counterpart, at the forty-seventh meeting of the MAC. Brittain said of the 526 Americans on this list, "We are convinced these men were in your hands and we still consider them as not having been accounted for in a satisfactory manner." The Communist side, which left without looking at the list, said "All persons have been repatriated in accordance with the armistice agreement. Your list is a fabricated roster."³⁴ In October 1954 UNC asked the Communists to make additional inquiries and searches for 688 UNC dead -- 288 buried in seven UN cemeteries in North Korea and 400 Allied airmen presumably killed in 318 crashes on North Korean territory.

By December 6, 1954, as a result of other information obtained by the U.S. government, the list was reduced to 470. This number was announced by Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge Jr. at the December 8, 1954 Plenary Session of the General Assembly of the United Nations. The list was further reduced to 450 by 1955 after the Army removed 55 names, "39 of which were based on evidence submitted by repatriates and 16 of which were based on recovered identifiable remains."³⁵ To this point the names on the 944 list had not been released to the general public.

In 1957 the Department of Defense was asked to provide to Congress an estimate of the number of unrepatriated U.S. POWs from the Korean conflict. In response, Deputy Assistant Secretary Stephen S. Jackson testified that this number, originally 944, had been reduced to 450. The misperception of the original 944 list was perpetuated because DAS Jackson responded to a request for unrepatriated POWs by delivering the UNC list of 450. Jackson perpetuated an error that was not of his making.

Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense Stephen Jackson told Congress in 1957 about the evidence and methods on which the DoD's findings were based:

The point I am trying to make here is that there is considerable circumstantial evidence from which to draw the

³⁴"Korea Reds Asked About Lost 2,840," New York Times, August 18, 1954

³⁵Memorandum From: Captain Allen, TAGO (Confidential) To: The Secretary of the Army (and others) May 23, 1958

conclusion that [the 944 missing] were alive and under Communist control in relatively stable situations, removed from battle, and at periods ranging from several days to many months after they had become missing in action from their own UN Command units.

This demand on the Communists for an accounting produced a superficial and totally unacceptable reply. On several subsequent occasions similar demands were placed upon the Communist side through the Military Armistice Commission for an accounting. The results have been essentially negative. In addition to the efforts to secure an accounting through the Military Armistice Commission, the Graves Registration Units of the UN Command continued their investigations, the military services continued the sifting of thousands of reports, interviews with returned POWs, and the interrogation of friendly sources of Korean and other nationalities, attempting to piece together all available information which would throw light on the fate of the missing.³⁶

Jackson noted in his 1957 testimony that the servicemen on the DoD list "had been alive in Communist hands" but not necessarily in POW camps. Jackson was also explicit in pointing out that the list included those whose status was based on information derived from "air crews who had seen our airmen parachute from disabled aircraft and, after safe landings, surrounded by enemy forces or civilians." This information was consistent with the UNC version of the list.

As a result of Jackson's testimony, the list of 450 names was made public for the first time. In December 1957 two missing Army personnel, Pfc Connie M. Conner (RA 19360219) and Pvt Donald Dickinson (RA 19341489) were added to the list, bringing the total to 452. The manner in which the list was cut from 452 to 391 can be documented, though it is not always clear from the records which list is referred to as the one from which resolved cases should be subtracted since records tend to refer to lists by number rather than by the names of the cases. On May 12, 1958 the Acting Adjutant General of the Army recommended, in light of the presumptive findings of death for 39 servicemen and the recovery of identifiable remains of 16 others, that 55 names be removed from the Korean War unaccounted-for personnel list. The evidence for the death findings in the 39 cases was derived from interviews with repatriated POWs. Recommendations for reductions were made after reviewing cases, obtaining eyewitness accounts, recovering bodies and drawing conclusions from a review of case files that missing cases could be

³⁶U.S. Congress. House. Subcommittee on the Far East and the Pacific of the Committee on Foreign Relations. *The Return of American Prisoners of War Who Have Not Been Accounted For By the Communists* (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1957), 3

recategorized as KIA (BNR), remains recovered or otherwise resolved. In 1960 the list was reduced to 391 "through the efforts of U.S. Graves Registration Units and the U.S. Intelligence Agencies, working with little or no assistance from the North Korean or Chinese Communists."³⁷ The reduction from 452 to 391 was the fruition of staff action started in April 1958. Throughout this time the roster continued to be referred to erroneously as a list of unrepatriated POWs.

In 1984 a list of 389 names was presented to the Communist side by the United Nations Command Military Armistice Commission.³⁸ In 1991 the Department of Defense stated in testimony before Congress that 389 U.S. servicemen who had been POWs in North Korea had not been repatriated or otherwise accounted for by the Korean People's Army and the Chinese.³⁹ The *MIA-POW Factbook* produced by the Department of Defense in 1991 should have referred to this group of 389 U.S. servicemen as those whose fate might be resolved with the assistance of the Communist forces.

³⁷Draft DoD Statement on Reduction of List, "attached to Memorandum From: General USMC (Ret) G. B. Kreskin, Assistant to the Secretary of Defense (Special Operations) (Confidential) To: The Secretaries of the Army, Navy, Air Force and the Commandant of the Marine Corps June 10, 1960
³⁸Memorandum From: Rear Admiral Charles F. Horne III, Senior Member, UNCMAC To: Major General Li Tae Ho, Korean People's Army, Senior Member Korean People's Army, Chinese People's Volunteers Component, Military Armistice Commission. August 17, 1984
³⁹POW-MIA Fact Book, 35

The 944 List
Becomes
The 389 List

Month	Year	Total
September	1953	944 (A 610, N 3, M 19, AF 312)
December	1953	965
August	1954	526
December	1954	470
Mid-1955		450 (A 244, N 3, M 13, AF 190)
December	1957	452
June	1960	452 (A 246, N 3, M 13, AF 190)
July	1960	391
	1984	389
	1992	389 (A 188, N 3, M 12, AF 186)

The 944 list from which the 389 list is derived was misrepresented to the Communist side from the very first day. This is not a list of Americans reported by UNCMAC to the Communists as exclusively those

known to have been captured by you and to have been in your custody.⁴²

The MIA or prisoner status of the individuals on the 389 list can be verified or at least crosschecked against three sources: original casualty status cards, POW casualty assessments and personnel files. The cards are either white "GR-36 Cases Status Cards" or blue "Office of the Quartermaster General Form T-320 Title: Casualty Data Cards." An individual's casualty status may also be verified with the information in an Individual Deceased Personnel File (so-called 293 file). The POW casualty assessments, which thus far have been located only for Army personnel, reflect information derived from repatriate interviews, intelligence reports and enemy propaganda broadcasts. The Central Identification Laboratory, Hawaii has begun the tedious process of comparing the information on the status cards against the information in the 293 file to ensure that the MAPPER database which was built on status card information is

⁴²The Secretariat, Military Armistice Commission, Panmunjon, Korea. Eighteenth Meeting of the Military Armistice Commission, held at Panmunjon, Korea, September 9, 1953

accurate. This verification process will also determine whether the information on the status cards was correctly entered four decades ago.⁴¹

UNCMAC's characterization of the status of the servicemen on the 389 list is utterly irreconcilable and in diametric contradiction to casualty status data maintained by the U.S. government. Based on information on the status cards at CILHI, the 389 list contains the names of 197 MIAs, 180 Americans who may or may not have ever been prisoners, and one case with the status R (resolved). Prisoner status means that the individual was lost under circumstances that were consistent with a probability of live capture. There is no evidence in many cases that those listed as POWs were ever seen alive in a POW camp. POWs may in fact have been PCK(BNR), MIA or KIA(BNR).

⁴¹As of September 1992, CILHI had completed 4 per cent of the crosschecking between the status cards and the 293 files.

389 UNCHAC List (1984)

Total:

Army	188
Navy	3
Marines	12
Air Force	186
	38942

POW status in CILMI records

Army	76
Navy	3
Marines	4
Air Force	98

Subtotal 181

MIA status in CILMI records

Army	112
Navy	0
Marines	7
Air Force	88

Subtotal 207

The Army roster on the 389 list contains 188 names. Of these, Casualty Status cards show that 76 were last thought to be POWs and 112 MIAs. The majority (83 per cent) of the 188 Army MIA cases occurred in the first eight months of the Korean War. If the information that is known about survival rates for MIA-POWs in these months is associated with these losses, the following picture emerges. The data show that the likelihood of survival for this group was very low.

⁴²The total of POW plus MIA is 388 because one case is listed as resolved.

Army Personnel From the 389 List

	Number of 188 Army MIA-POWs appearing on the 389 list	Survival rate of all Army POWs captured this month	Estimate of U.S. Deaths due to war crimes this month
1950			
July	41	34%	More than 150
August	17	0%	More than 200
September	3	0%	More than 300
October	1	44.5%	More than 50
November	15	53.6%	More than 75
December	22	49.3%	More than 75
1951			
January	3	65.8%	More than 50
February	54	36.3%	More than 50
Total	156 (83% of 188)	35.4% (Average)	More than 950

These examples for Army MIA-POWs illustrate the fact that casualty data must be associated chronologically and geographically in order to arrive at an estimate of how long an individual might have survived after loss or capture and where remains might have been located at the time of death.

The U.S. negotiating strategy and recovery methods used to resolve these cases should reflect this reality. A Korean War remains recovery strategy must take into account the circumstances of loss. The following tables illustrate how unrecovered remains of the entire field of 8,177 American MIA cases may be classified for this purpose.

Additions to the American Battle Monuments 8,177 MIA list derived from
CILHI Mapper data⁴³

8,980 (MIA with incident date)^a

Added to:

- 80 (MIA, KIA(BNR) and PCK(BNR) cases with no incident date)
- 16 (MIA occurring Armistice thru end of 1953)
- 7 (Anomalous status in the Mapper database)^b

101

6,883 (Total U.S. Korean War MIA cases)^c

2,119 (Total U.S. POW(BNR)) cases)^d

8,202 Total Korean War MIA-POW cases^e

Notes:

- ^a Includes KIA(BNR) and PCK(BNR). Excludes POW(BNR).
- ^b These seven cases are suspected to be input errors. They are being searched and if they are errors will be removed from the CILHI database.
- ^c Includes KIA(BNR) and PCK(BNR). Excludes POW(BNR).
- ^d The figure 2,119, taken from CILHI data, represents the last status of those on the 8,177 list. It includes both POWs who are known to have died in camp and those suspected of having been withheld by the Communists. Army Judge Advocate Section War Crimes Division estimates of fatalities that occurred in POW camps range from 5,178 (made following Operation Little Switch) to 3,147 (made after Operation Big Switch). There are larger official estimates of the number of POW(BNR).
- ^e All U.S. MIA, KIA(BNR), PCK(BNR) and POW(BNR) Korean War cases.

⁴³September 1992 Central Identification Laboratory, Hawaii Mapper data (Korean war casualty database).

Reductions from MIA, KIA(BNR), PCK(BNR) and POW(BNR)

8,202 Total Korean War MIA-POW cases

- (25) (Difference between CILHI data minus Battle Monuments data.)^a
- (40) (Resolved cases not removed from Battle Monuments Commission 8,182 list.)^b
- (65) (Errors and resolved cases)

8,137 Total Korean War MIA-POW Cases^c

Notes:

- ^a The Mapper system shows 8,202 total cases. This calculation is based on the assumption that the accurate figure is 8,177. As noted, the CILHI data is being verified. Apparently the error rate is .003.
- ^b This figure is arrived at by comparing the resolved MIA cases in the 450 list to the Battle Monuments Commission list. These 40 are apparently still on the Mapper database listed as "resolved." Since these cases have been resolved the total should be deducted from the remaining MIA-POW cases. There may be more resolved cases that have not been removed, but this requires a search of the 944 list.
- ^c Includes all U.S. MIA, KIA(BNR), PCK(BNR) and POW(BNR) cases based on CILHI records.

Possible Magnitude and Distribution of Low Degree Of Location
Uncertainty MIA-POW Cases

	Subtotal	Total
1. Missing in action at sea (all services):		293 ^a
2. POW (ENR) Prisoners last known alive in POW camps:		2,119 ^b
3. Americans in UN cemeteries in North Korea: Total known Americans in UN cemeteries Minus Operation Glory returns identified	1,520 (1,200)	320
4. Known and unrecovered isolated burials in North Korea: U.S. Army U.S. Air Force Branch and nationality unknown Data from Memorial Division, OM	217 4 108 247	576
5. UNC air crashes in North Korea: ^c		412
6. Unidentified repatriated remains: ^d Operation Glory Remains repatriations following Armistice	848 ^e 46 ^f	894
7. Total MIA-POW cases with low degree of location uncertainty		4,614

Notes:

^a The location of loss is not in question, but the vast location and the intervening four decades lead to the conclusion that these remains should be declared unrecoverable.

^b There were not 2,119 American POWs left alive in Communist custody. Of the 389 cases presented by UNCMAC as "unrepatriated POWs," the last casualty status for 181 cases was POW. This does not mean, however, that 181 POWs were left alive in Communist custody.

^c The entire roster (322 crash sites, 412 casualties) is counted here.

^d The names of these repatriated but unidentified remains are on the 8,177 MIA list.

^e They have been determined to be unidentifiable. These remains are entombed at the Punchbowl Cemetery, Hawaii.

^f These remains are stored at CILHI. This number will probably be larger after the examination of remains currently stored at CILHI is completed. The North Koreans have not yet returned remains that are not actually co-mingled remains of two or more individuals.

Action Steps that Can be Taken in an Effort to Resolve Low Degree of
Location Uncertainty MIA-POW Cases

1. Missing in action at sea (293)
 - a) Very low probability of resolution
 - b) Declare these remains to be unrecoverable
2. POW(ENR) (2,119)
 - a) Verify location of camp cemeteries
 - b) Compare to Operation Glory manifests
 - c) Compare to overhead imagery
 - d) Withheld POWs
 - i. Last known alive location
 - ii. Distinguish MIAs from POWs on UNCMAC list
3. Graves in UN Cemeteries in North Korea (320)
 - a) Verify number of graves
 - b) Compare to Operation Glory manifests
 - c) Compare to overhead imagery
4. Known and unrecovered isolated burials in North Korea (576)
 - a) Compare to Operation Glory manifests
 - b) Compare to overhead imagery
 - c) Compare to alleged North Korean recovery sites
5. UNC air crash sites (412 personnel)
 - a) Compare to 1954 remains return (66 sets)
 - b) Compare to overhead imagery
 - c) Compare to PEARF records
6. Unidentified repatriated remains (894)
 - a) Punchbowl (848)
 - i. Very low probability of identification
 - b) Repatriated after Armistice (46+)
 - i. Low probability of identification
7. Remains stored in North Korea (Number impossible to estimate)
 - a) Curated remains might resolve high and low uncertainty cases
 - b) Anticipate curated remains will be unidentifiable

- c) Total number of curated remains impossible to estimate
 d) Anticipate curated remains will have little identification media

High Degree Of Location Uncertainty MIA-POW Cases

8,137	(All MIA, KIA(BNR), PCK(BNR) and POW(BNR))
-(4,614)	(Cases with low degree of location uncertainty)
<3,523 ⁴⁴	(Cases with a high degree of location uncertainty)

⁴⁴The number of remains currently curated by the North Koreans must be deducted from this figure.

Possible Magnitude and Distribution of <3,523 High Degree of Location Uncertainty MIA-POW Cases:

1. Post-capture killed, body not recovered PCK(BNR)	
a) Murdered then left near capture site, not reported in "b"	Perhaps dozens
b) Died/murdered during marches	959 - 1,367 ^a
c) Prisoners held in research facilities then killed ^b	-0- - Hundreds
Estimate of 1a, b, c:	1,000 - 1,500
2. Ground and air combat disintegrations and unrecoverable KIAs carried as MIA/POW	1,500 - 2,000 ^c
Estimated Total of 1 & 2:	3,459 - 4,867
3. Additional lost at sea (aircraft incidents and amphibious operations)	Unknown
4. Combat kills left in place that were not recorded as isolated burials	Perhaps dozens
5. Post-capture transport to third countries	Fewer than 50 ^d
Estimated Total 1, 2, 3, 4 & 5:	3,559 - 4,967

Notes:

a Includes prisoners who died of combat wounds inflicted prior to capture. The 959 estimate, made by the Army Judge Advocate Section following Operation Big Switch debriefings of American returnees, is less than the estimate of 1,367 evaluated fatalities arrived at following the analysis of Operation Little Switch debriefings. It is unclear from the data whether the reports are sequential (thus meant to be added to one another) or cumulative (thus the adjusted figure is 959).

b. This estimate is based on press reports.

c "Most American MIAs 'are truly 'missing'--that is, they are airmen who went down at sea or in rugged mountainous terrain, soldiers and Marines who disappeared in the confusion of battle and whose bodies were never recovered." Harry G. Summers, Jr., Korean War Almanac (New York: Facts on File, 1990), 184. If Summers' estimate is correct, "most American MIAs" would be 51 per cent or 3,042 MIA and PCK(BNR) cases. The number of disintegrations that occurred over three years of combat operations in Korea may be higher than the range presented here.

d The total number transported and returned to POW camps in Korea may be much greater. This total concerns individuals who may have been transferred but never surfaced alive again subsequent to this potential event.

**Action Steps that Can be Taken to Resolve High Degree of Location
Uncertainty MIA-POW Cases**

1. Post-capture killed (BNR)
 - a) Search march routes 1,000 meters either side
 - b) Search POW collection points
 - c) Anticipate DPRK will not permit a) or b)
2. Ground combat disintegrations
 - a) Derive more precise estimate of nonrecoverables from combat models
 - b) Recovery or prospects for identification are near zero
3. Aerial combat disintegrations
 - a) Derive more precise estimate of nonrecoverables from combat models
 - b) Recovery or prospects for identification are near zero
4. Combat kills left in place
 - a) Field search case map overlays
 - b) Crash sites
 - c) Compare with overhead imagery
5. Remains stored in North Korea
 - a) Curated remains might resolve high and low uncertainty cases
 - b) Anticipate curated remains will be unidentifiable
 - c) Estimate number stored
 - d) Anticipate curated remains will have little identification media
6. Post-capture transport to third countries
 - a) Assessment of one-way transport to former USSR
 - i. Stop the harassment of independent researchers
 - ii. Resolve issues through research methods
 - iii. Find and examine Sharashka administrative files
 - iv. Coordinate CILHI and UNCMAC efforts
 - b) Assessment of one-way transport to PRC
 - c) Assessment of one-way transport to Nth country

Allegedly Transported to the USSR from Korea

The United Nations Command and the U.S. command structure were both well aware of the Soviet presence during the Korean conflict.⁴⁵ Eyewitness testimony and intelligence service documentation reveals a significant Soviet presence on the ground in North Korea and in the air during the war. There was no question that Russians and East Bloc pilots flew MiGs in combat in Korea. This fact is documented in memoirs such as those of General Clark, in U.S. archive material and in Soviet archives. There is also substantial anecdotal information about Soviet pilots in Korea. There is little physical evidence of the Russian presence in Korean air combat since the Soviet policy was to conceal this activity to the greatest extent possible. Russians were reluctant to engage in combat over water, for example, apparently due to the desire to avoid being captured alive in the event of a water landing. UN forces attempted to capture Soviet pilots to prove that the USSR was actively engaged in the Korean conflict but the Soviets were prepared to take extraordinary measures to prevent their capture:

For months FEAF attempted to capture ejecting MiG pilots, putting a Sabre CAP over them and alerting air-sea rescue. Each time, the MiG pilot so targeted escaped into the countryside. One day, a MiG went down over the coast, its pilot ejecting and then landing safely in the Yellow Sea. Alerted, a rescue helicopter left Ch'o-do island, heading north to pick him up. Meanwhile, a Sabre CAP orbited the downed airman, floating safely in the water, obviously alive and well. Suddenly, four flights of MiGs jumped the Sabres, triggering a fierce dogfight. While the Sabres fought for their lives, four other MiGs suddenly appeared, diving down and strafing their erstwhile comrade in the water, a telling comment on Stalinist Russia's regard for human life.⁴⁶

There were visual sightings of Caucasian pilots flying MiGs or descending in parachutes, but there is no public documentation that a Soviet pilot was ever captured by UN forces in Korea. FEAF intelligence officers always insisted that the Sabre pilots did not need to know the nationality of the men they

⁴⁵"Intelligence Considerations," Annex C (Secret), "Enemy Procedure for Interrogation," RG338 (Secret)

⁴⁶Richard P. Hallion, *The Naval Air War in Korea* (Baltimore, MD: The Nautical & Aviation Publishing Company of America, 1986), 153

fought, but Sabre pilots believed that most of the 'honcho' pilots were Russians and that the 'recruits' were Chinese and North Koreans.⁴⁷

The UN forces had no doubt that the Russians were in the air in large numbers.

Such was reported by covert intelligence sources; from time to time enemy pilots who bailed out were observed to be Caucasian types; and Sabre pilots frequently encountered adversaries of considerable skill who evidently accompanied a MiG formation in the role of instructors. In 1953 a Polish air force defector stated that many Soviet flight instructors in his country previously had fought in Korea against the Sabres.⁴⁸

It is particularly revealing that after the UN forces began Operation Moolah, a reward of \$100,000 to the first pilot to defect with a MiG, "an unlocated radio transmitter began jamming our Russian language broadcasts of the offer, but did not interfere with the Korean or Chinese language versions."⁴⁹ As shown in the following table, a number of Soviet Air Force pilots were decorated for their performance in combat operations in Korea.

⁴⁷Robert Futrell, *The United States Air Force in Korea* (New York: Duell, Sloan and Pearce, 1961), 652.
⁴⁸United States Air Force Operations in the Korean Conflict 1 November 1950 - 30 June 1952, prepared by the USAF Historical Division, Air University, 1953, 107.
⁴⁹General Mark Clark, *From the Danube to the Yalu* (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1954), 208.

**Soviet pilots received the title
of Hero of the Soviet Union
for combat duty in Korea⁵⁰**

1. Major Stepan A. Bakhaev
2. Captain Arkadii S. Boytsov
3. Captain Nikolai G. Dokashenko
4. Captain Grigori I. Ges'
5. Major Anatolii M. Kavelin
6. Captain Sergei M. Kramarenko
7. Major General Georgii A. Lobov, 64th Corps commander
8. Captain Mikhail I. Mikhin
9. Major Stepan I. Naumenko
10. 1st Lieutenant Boris A. Obratsov
11. Major Dmitrii P. Oskin
12. Captain Grigori U. Okhai
13. Colonel Evgenii G. Pepelyaev
14. Mikhail S. Ponomarev
15. Lt. Colonel Grigori I. Pulov
16. 1st Lieutenant Dmitrii A. Samoilov
17. Lt. Colonel Aleksei P. Smorchkov
18. 1st Lieutenant Evgenii M. Stelmakh
19. Captain Trofim P. Subbotin
20. Captain Nikolai V. Sutyagin
21. 1st Lieutenant Pyodor A. Shibanov
22. Captain Lev K. Kirillovich

⁵⁰The source of this data does not wish to be identified.

There is a Soviet Air Force cemetery at Port Arthur, China. Annual memorial services were held there when Sino-Soviet relations permitted such observances.

Direct contacts between people suspected to be Russians and American POWs were reported in the U.S. press as early as 1950. U.S. Army personnel who returned to friendly lines after being captured in 1950 reported they were "questioned at three places by Russian officers in North Korean uniforms."

The Lieutenant said he had been questioned by Russian officers at Andong, and thereafter at corps headquarters near Kongju and at this sector's front headquarters at Chochiwon. He said their questions were wholly political.¹¹

U.S. records show that in the early months of the war American POWs were routinely transferred to Chinese territory at Andong (An'Tung) where they could be questioned by Soviet officers. One returning POW stated that a Chinese guard was overheard to say in An'Tung the Russians had a section in the city to themselves.¹² Routine transfer to China appears to have stopped in the early part of 1951. Soviet contact with American POWs did not stop, however, since it was not limited to Chinese territory.

The presence on Korean territory of Soviet officers is not disputed. Contact between American POWs and those suspected of being Soviet officers is based on evidence in POW debriefings where "in a few scattered instances returnees claimed to have been interrogated by persons whom they thought to be Russians."¹³ Repatriated POWs who recalled contact with Russians were asked to provide a description of their physical appearance. One POW recalled being asked if he could speak Russian or Polish by a Caucasian, 5' 9", 165-170 pounds, erect posture, 35 years old, dirty blond hair, long thin face with prominent nose, pale complexion with blue or green eyes. The POW reported seeing this alleged Russian twice, once at Pyongyang and Chungang and again at Chungang-Jin wearing civilian clothes. A Caucasian suspected of being a Russian struck the POW with this sidearm during the course of one interrogation.¹⁴ A Caucasian identified by Chinese guards as a Russian struck

¹¹Charles Grutzner, "Russian Queried U.S. War Captives," *New York Times*, September 28, 1950

¹²RG319 (Army Staff) AC of S, G1 (Personnel) Decimal File 1954 383.6 February-April Box number 1693, Shelton Foss statement

¹³"Enemy Procedure for Interrogation," C-5

¹⁴RG319 (Army Staff) AC of S, G1 (Personnel) Decimal File 1954 383.6 February-April Box number 1693, Martin Watson statement

an American prisoner with a .45 calibre sidearm during another interrogation that took place on November 5, 1950 approximately one-half mile from the city of Unson.¹⁵ A repatriated POW reported seeing someone claiming to be a Chinese citizen who spoke Russian and Chinese fluently. The POW thought this person was actually a Russian.¹⁶ The task of verifying the presence of Russians who participated in the interrogation of American POWs has proven to be a difficult task.

According to an Air Force assessment of the Korean War POW experience, the Soviet military apparently maintained officers in North Korea whose mission was to participate in the interrogation of USAF POWs.

Interrogators of three nationalities, Chinese, North Korean, and Caucasian (presumably Russian) questioned USAF personnel during the Korean conflict. The preponderance of interrogators were Chinese who, after their entry into the conflict in late October of 1950, took over the responsibility for POW from the Koreans. Evidence indicates that the Koreans reluctantly gave up this responsibility, and that often tense feelings arose concerning who was to have custody of a new POW. Not infrequently, POWs reported that they were captured by North Koreans and turned over to the Chinese only after much heated discussion and sometimes near violence between the two groups. In some cases POW remained in North Korean custody for prolonged periods of time.

The USAF study goes on to note that Caucasian (possibly Soviet) interrogators were very few and there were none at all by the end of 1952. These generally were found at intermediary interrogation sites such as command posts, artillery and anti-aircraft battalions, where the prisoner temporarily was held. Presumably, they were there as military advisors to the North Koreans and performed a few interrogations out of curiosity or perhaps expediency.¹⁷

During the Korean War, Soviet military intelligence was organized under the 64th Air Corps. Any Soviet units operating in Korea apparently would have

¹⁵"The man who hit me was not a Chinese. He was of the white race, wore a different uniform and talked in a language that sounded to me like Russian. His uniform was Russian and the Chinese guards told us he was a Russian." RG153 Entry 183 Army JAG War Crimes Division, Operation Big Switch Interrogations, 1953-1954, A-C Box 1 "B" Folder 1, Lloyd Brandon affidavit

¹⁶RG319 (Army Staff) AC of S, G1 (Personnel) Decimal File 1954 383.6 February-April Box number 1693, John J. Sutherland statement.

¹⁷Analysis of the Korean War Prisoner of War Experience HQ USAF SERA: PW

Analysis Program Report A10-2, March 1974, Appendix One, 25

¹⁸Analysis of the Korean War Prisoner of War Experience, Appendix One, 25

been under the jurisdiction of the 64th Corps. The Deputy Chief of Intelligence of the 64th Soviet Air Corps, Victor Alexandrovich Bushuyev, said that there would have been no other units involved in intelligence operations in Korea that were not subordinated to the 64th Corps. Bushuyev said:

It's true that the presence of the 64th Corps was a secret. It did not appear in the Soviet press. It was a concealed fact. But it was not possible to hide three divisions, a regiment, 500-600 flights per day plus a lots of planes shot down. You couldn't hide this in Korea.

We had contacts with the American POWs, mainly the pilots. We weren't interested in anybody else. I was responsible for organizing the interrogations and for processing all of the information received during the interrogations.

How were the interrogations organized? All arrangements, the structure of the interrogation, its content etc., were completely in the hands of the Chinese. We prepared questions in advance. Then we gave the questions to the Chinese. They asked the questions while interrogating the American POWs. When I was there I believe all American POWs were completely in Chinese hands on the territory of North Korea.

All American pilots, with no exception, would be interrogated in the town of Sinidju. It was the very northern most point in Korea, near the Yalu river across from An' Dung where we were stationed. There was a special building there-- the interrogation point. Americans would be brought there. We could see it from An' Dung. We would go there about twice a week to interrogate the prisoners. Sometimes there were just a few of them so we didn't need to go.

I was responsible for the interrogations of the POWs, but neither I nor the translators ever saw any of the POWs with our own eyes. Contact on our level was completely prohibited. We only had to get questions ready and then receive the answers.

We would enter the building from a different side before the POWs were brought there. We would go to our room and would sit there very quietly. Only then would they bring in the POWs. We had no visual contact. We would sit behind the wall, a thin wooden wall, and the translators would sit with us. We heard everything. The interrogations were in English, of course.

We were prohibited absolutely from seeing the Americans. Then a new translator appeared, his name was Kolya Mankuev. He was a Buryat Mongol. He looked Chinese. This Kolya Monkuev would go to that room and participate in the interrogations directly.

The interrogations were conducted in English. We received handwritten materials in English, written by the Chinese. They were on blank pieces of paper. After capture each POW filled in a form. This form would come to us and we would pick people who were of interest to us. I have never held such a form in my hands. We would just get excerpts from them. Our translators then translated all of the material.

Every week we would write an overview. It would go to Moscow, I knew that. I only wrote the report. I suppose they were sent to the General Staff. But if [the original English transcripts] were enclosed or not I didn't know. Maybe they were. Who would keep them in Korea?

The Main Intelligence Directorate in Moscow would give us questionnaires: ask this, ask that, whatever we thought was interesting. I don't want to offend the American pilots, mainly we would deal with the pilots, but they were of no value. They didn't know anything. They were average pilots and good athletes.

I was there for more than one year, the most tense period. Practically all the POWs went through my hands, not in person but their files and interrogation materials. Several hundred of them. But, again I want to say that none of them was of any serious value to us. We knew twice as much as they could tell us.

The interrogations were easy. The only case was that of Neimann who refused to answer any questions. He was wounded and that was the formal reason why he refused. He was in some hospital. He said it was a violation of some international laws. Of course they wanted to interrogate him, but then I never saw any materials of his interrogations.

Practically all of the American POWs belonged to the Chinese. The war was conducted not by the Koreans but by the Chinese and Soviets. The Koreans were under pressure and had no rights. They would just load and unload stuff, build roads, that sort of thing.

There was no need to bring Americans to Russia. Military personnel, location of bases and all that were already known. We had no questions of this sort. We had the planes as well, all their parts, so it didn't make any sense [to take pilots to Russia]. If someone asked for political asylum we would have, but I haven't heard of any such cases. As far as I know our counterintelligence people didn't express any particular interest in the pilots. We would have known this.

Of course, such an operation could have taken place without the knowledge of the 64th Air Corps. We were the

military structure but I have no doubt that there were other contacts that existed, not just through our General Staff.⁵⁹

Bushuyev recalled that the chief of intelligence, Col. Tashchan, thought it would be a good idea to interrogate Col. Arnold who was shot down on January 12, 1953. Bushuyev said:

Arnold was an interesting figure. We thought it would be nice to get him to Moscow. That's all I know. I just remember those conversations about Arnold being a star. They checked him from here [Moscow] and found out that, yes, Arnold was a world star of the first category. He was known as a writer, journalist.

At first Arnold refused to speak. Then the Chinese conducted this thing with him. I didn't know then that it existed. The Chinese asked us to wait, let us work with him, he'd speak in three days. Three days later Arnold said he wouldn't answer our questions but he asked for a piece of paper. He said he'd write things down. And he wrote 18 pages with his small handwriting in one night. Our guys translated all of that.

Assertions that Americans were transferred to the territory of the Soviet Union from Korea or China can be found in official sources, academic articles and the popular press. These sources tend either to assert or assume that American servicemen were transported to the territory of the Soviet Union. The evidence offered to support these assertions and assumptions, however, is not always compelling.

The well publicized report by a former U.S. military attaché in Hong Kong, who in 1955 obtained hearsay information of 700 soldiers being taken to Siberia, is under investigation. The attaché's source was a Polish citizen who reportedly witnessed about 700 soldiers getting off a train on the Sino-Soviet border while the train's undercarriages were changed from standard-gauge to broad-gauge width.⁶⁰

No documentation or additional firsthand eyewitness testimony has been found to support this claim.

An article in May 1953 asserted, based on alleged Soviet sources, that "our best information is that large numbers of Americans are now living in

⁵⁹Paul M. Cole's interview with Viktor Alexandrovich Bushuyev, Deputy Chief of Intelligence, 64th Air Corps, Moscow September 16, 1992

⁶⁰POW-MIA Fact Book, "Missing and Unaccounted for Americans from World War II and the Korean War," 35-6

camps scattered in the various Republics of Russia."⁶¹ This may have been true, but there is no documentary evidence either that any of these alleged American had been POWs or that they had been transported to the USSR from Korea or China.

The following list contains names, all alleged to be U.S. servicemen, who may have been interrogated by Soviet authorities or whose names appeared in the records of the Soviet 64th Air Corps. The following list is a composite of four separate lists obtained from Russian sources by RAND and the Joint Commission.

The first list was compiled by RAND's Moscow-based research team and delivered to RAND in May 1992. The second list was delivered by the Moscow team to RAND in September 1992. The first Russian list contained 59 names, the second 71. There are two duplications (Parks/Parks and Zwotker/Zweicker). The duplications apparently occurred because the list was prepared on a manual typewriter as names were found. The difference in the name "Parks" when written in Cyrillic is significant enough to conclude that the cases were separate when in fact they were not. The Parks duplication has been deleted as has the name Zwotker. (The correct spelling is probably Zwiacher.) One case has been identified as that of an Australian rather than an American.⁶² A Canadian has been identified on a Joint Commission list discussed below.

The names, service numbers, capture date and other information have been checked against the Mapper database system maintained at the Army Central Identification Laboratory (CILHI). The data in the Russian version was not always complete. The English version contains complete information taken from the CILHI files. A few cases were checked against Veterans Administration files. The order in which the Russian names were listed is the same. An original version of the Russian list is available which shows the quality of the original document.

The first review of the 57 cases in June 1992 at CILHI resulted in 47 matches or identifications that are consistent with the information provided by the Russian team. With one exception, all of the cases identified on the RAND lists are U.S. Air Force personnel. The one exception is a Royal

⁶¹Zygmunt Nagorski, Jr., "Unreported GI's in Siberia," *Esquire*, May 1953

⁶²The Australian, Donald Pinkstone, was located by and has corresponded with Dr. Cole. Pinkstone recalls being interrogated by people who were, in his opinion, Russians. In his view he was not transported to the territory of the USSR or PRC during his captivity.

Australian Air Force pilot who has been in contact with RAND researchers concerning the details of his captivity in North Korea.

The other two lists were obtained by the U.S.-Russian Commission on MIA-POWs. The first list of 71 names (70 after deleting one duplication) was provided by the Russian side in May 1992. The Russian title of this list is "List of U.S. Air Force Crew Members Participating in Combat Operations in North Korea 1950-1953 and about Whom Information Has Been Found in Documents of the 64th Fighter Aviation Corps." On September 24, 1992 the Russians provided a list of 59 names to the Joint Commission. The title of this list is "List of U.S. Air Force Personnel Shot Down in Aerial Combat and by Anti-Aircraft Artillery During Military Operations in Korea and Transited Through an Interrogation Point." The Commission list of 59 names is identical to the RAND list of 59 names.

There is evidence that some of these men were interrogated by people suspected of being Soviet officers. Thus far there is no evidence that any of the men on this list were transferred to the territory of the USSR during the Korean War.

RAND LIST

?Name = Unmatched or unidentified

Italics = Held on territory of PRC (confirmed or USG suspicion)

List = Name appears on the following lists

V = Name appears on Volgovanov/Senate Select Committee list
 UNC = Name appears on UNCHAC 389 list
 TFRM = Name appears on Task Force Russia (TFR) May 1992 list
 TFRS = Name appears on Task Force Russia September 1992 list
 RANDM = Name appears on RAND May 1992 list
 RANDS = Name appears on RAND September 1992 list
 ## = Name on TFRS and RANDM, not included on TFRM or RANDS

FSC = Field Search Case number

Sta = Status as reported in FSC or 293 casualty file or on casualty card

RMC = Returned to military control, presumably repatriated
 MIA = Missing In Action
 KIA = Killed In Action
 BTB = Believed to be POW
 ? = No information or unknown
 D = Reported deceased in Soviet records

Last Name Craft/Duty	First	Rank/Service No. Unit No. and Name	Captured	List	FSC #	Sta
Stahl	Charles Eugene	2Lt/253981	7 Jan 1952	TFRM TFRS RANDM RANDS		RMC
Maultsby F-80/Pilot	Charles Wayne	2Lt/AO-1910993 35 F-B/8 F-B Grp	5 Jan 1952	TFRM TFRS RANDM RANDS		RMC
Green F-84E/Pilot	Joseph F.	2Lt/20803A ?	11 Jan 52	TFRS RANDM RANDS ##		RMC
Eyres B-29/?	Thomas Llewellyn	1St/AO-0695638 93rd Bomb Sq Med	??	TFRM TFRS RANDM RANDS	A426	RMC
Henderson	Jack E.	Captain/?	31 Aug 51	TFRM TFRS RANDM RANDS		RMC

Wilkins	James V.	Captain/?	3 July 51	TFRM TFRS RANDM RANDS	RMC
MacLelland B-26B/Pilot	Donald J.	LtCol/AO-790369 729 Bomb Squad	8 May 51	TFRM A187 TFRS RANDM RANDS	RMC
Smith	J. B.	Captain/?	8 May 51	TFRM TFRS RANDM RANDS	RMC
Wright F-86E/Pilot	Vernon	1Lt/AO-1910299 25 Ftr Intep Sq	16 Jan 52	TFRM TFRS RANDM RANDS	RMC
Peterson F-86E/Pilot	Daniel DeLong	2Lt./2221743 25 F-1 Sq/51 F-1	17 Jan 52	TFRM TFRS RANDM RANDS	RMC
Enoch B-26/?	Kenneth Lloyd	1Lt/AO-2069988 ?	13 Jan 52	TFRM A415 TFRS RANDM RANDS	RMC
Quinn B-26/?	John S.	1Lt/17993A ?	13 Jan 52	TFRM A415 TFRS RANDM RANDS	RMC
Thrash	William Gay	LtCol/?	12 Dec 51	TFRM TFRS RANDM RANDS	RMC
Richardson	Judson C.	7/?	14 Dec 51	TFRM TFRS RANDM RANDS	RMC
Kubicek B-29/Pilot	Harold Bratislav	Cpt/12108A 93rd Bomb Sq Med	4 July 52	TFRM A426 TFRS RANDM RANDS	RMC
Frick F-86A/Pilot	Vance R.	2Lt/? 336 F-1/4 F-1 Grp	21 Apr 52	TFRM TFRS RANDM RANDS	RMC

DeArmond F-86/Pilot	Michael Edward	1Lt/20161A 335 F-1/4 F-1 Grp	21 Apr 52	TFRM TFRS RANDM RANDS	RMC
Parks F-86E/Pilot	Roland William	2Lt/23197A 51st Ftr Intep Wg	4 Sept 52	TFRM A590 TFRS RANDM RANDS	RMC
Ellis F-86A/Pilot	John G.	1Lt/AO-1862790 336 F-1/4 F-1 Grp	20 July 52	TFRM TFRS RANDM RANDS	RMC
Zwiacher F-80/Pilot	John Wesley	1Lt/AO-2222083 36 F-B/8 F-B Grp	30 Apr 52	TFRM TFRS RANDM RANDS	RMC
Tenney F-86E/Pilot	Gilbert	Cpt/803490, 289613 51 F-Int Grp	3 May 52	TFRS RANDM RANDS ##	A784 MIA /D
Reid B-29/Left gnr	Elbert J. Jr.	A1C/AO-14382534 19th Med Bomb Gp	10 June 52	TFRS RANDM RANDS ##	A580 M
Kniss F-51/Pilot	Paul R.	2nd Lt/491936 12 F-B Sq/19 F-B	31 May 52	TFRS RANDM RANDS ##	MIA
?Jilliam ?Gilliam		Major/?	14 Apr 52	TFRS RANDM RANDS ##	D
Arnold B-29/Pilot	John Knox, Jr.	Col/1212A 91st Strat Recon	12 Jan 53	V TFRM TFRS RANDM RANDS	A654 RMC
Thompson B-29/?	John Walker	A2C/AF-13361707 591 Resupply Cmd	13 Jan 53	TFRM TFRS RANDM RANDS	A654 RMC
Buck B-29/AOBomber	John W.	1Lt/AO-787245 91st Strat Recon	13 Jan 53	V TFRM TFRS RANDM RANDS	A654 RMC

Llewellyn B-29/Navigator	Elmer Fred	Cpt/AO-2072360 91st Strat Recon	13 Jan 53	TFRM TFRS RANDM RANDS	A654	RMC
Vaadi B-29/ACCmdr	Eugene J.	Cpt/AO-825008 91st Strat Recon	13 Jan 53	TFRM TFRS RANDM RANDS	A654	RMC
Schmidt B-29/?	Daniel C.	A2C/AF-19391475 91st Strat Recon	13 Jan 53	V TFRM TFRS RANDM RANDS	A654	RMC
Benjamin B-29/Scanner	Harry Martin	A1C/AF-27345828 91st Strat Recon	13 Jan 53	V TFRM TFRS RANDM RANDS	A654	RMC
Kiba B-29/Radio Op	Steve E.	A1C/15426310 91st Strat Recon	13 Jan 53	V TFRM TFRS RANDM RANDS	A654	RMC
Baumer B-29/InstPlt	William H.	Maj/AO-733786 91st Strat Recon	13 Jan 53	TFRM TFRS RANDM RANDS	A654	RMC
Brown B-29/Flt Eng	Howard W.	TSG/AF-36809947 91st Strat Recon	13 Jan 53	TFRM TFRS RANDM RANDS	A654	RMC
Brown B-29/Pilot	Wallace L.	2Lt/AO-2221928 91st Strat Recon	13 Jan 53	TFRM TFRS RANDM RANDS	A654	RMC
Moreland B-29/Navigator	Joseph E.	1Lt/AO-2070097 91st Strat Recon	4 July 52	TFRS RANDM RANDS ##	A611	RMC
Strieby B-29/Co-pilot	Francis Allen	2Lt/AO-1912123 91st Strat Recon	4 July 52	TFRS RANDM RANDS ##	A611	RMC
Brazil B-29/?	Kenneth S.	1Lt/AO-772819 91st Strat Recon	4 July 52	TFRS TFRM RANDM RANDS	A611	RMC

Combs B-29/Radio op	Edwin D.	A1C/AF-18359624 91st Strat Recon	4 July 52	TFRS RANDM RANDS ##	A611	RMC
Koski B-29/?	William Emile	A1C/17299984 91st Strat Recon	4 July 52	TFRS RANDM RANDS ##	A611	RMC
Johansen B-29/Photo op	Charles Vernon	SSgt/AF-19124748 91st Strat Recon	4 July 52	TFRM TFRS RANDM RANDS	A611	RMC
Rivers B-29/Engineer	Bernard Francis	SSgt/AF-11158439 91st Strat Recon	4 July 52	V TFRS RANDM RANDS ##	A611	RMC
Bass B-29/Tail gnr	Kenneth H.	A1C/AF-14357650 91st Strat Recon	4 July 52	V TFRS RANDM RANDS ##	A611	RMC
Hand B-29/R gunner	Donald L.	A2C/19371141 91st Strat Recon	4 July 52	V TFRS RANDM RANDS ##	A611	RMC
Fisher F-86F/Pilot	Harold Edward	Cpt/445018 R# /AO2204126-actual 39th Ftr Intcp Sq	7 Apr 53	TFRM TFRS RANDM RANDS	A672	RMC
Harker F-84G/Pilot	Charles A.	1Lt/640924-R# /AO2224102-actual 311th Ftr Bmr Sq	4 May 53	UNC TFRS RANDM RANDS ##	A692	MIA KIA
Niemann F-86E/Pilot	Robert	1Lt/989294/22287A 334 Ftr-Intcp Sq	12 Apr 53	TFRS RANDM RANDS ##	A678	MIA /D
Osburn F-84D/Pilot	John Arthur	Cap/796188 311 F-B/58 F-B Gp	19 Sept 52	TFRS RANDM RANDS ##		MIA
Heller F-86/Pilot	Edwin Lewis	LtCol/9900A 16th Ftr-Intcp Sq	23 Jan 53	TFRM TFRS RANDM RANDS	A648	RMC

Izbiky F-86E/Pilot	Edward G.	2Lt/AO-2223853	19 Feb 53	TFRM TFRS RANDM RANDS	MIA
Pape ???	Donald L.	1st Lt/?	15 May 53	TFRM TFRS RANDM RANDS	RMC
Giraud F-86/Pilot	John	Col/A-16292	16 June 53	TFRM TFRS RANDM RANDS	RMC
Bettinger ???	Stephen L.	Maj./AO-816087	20 July 53	TFRM TFRS RANDM RANDS	
Coury F-86F/Pilot	Robert A.	Capt./AO-687679 12 F-B Sq 18 F-B	10 June 53	TFRM TFRS RANDM RANDS	MIA BTE
Hodges F-86/Pilot	Albert V.	1Lt/AO-2224077	19 June 53	TFRM TFRS RANDM RANDS	MTA
Dillon F-86F/Pilot	Edward	2nd Lt/AO-2225446 12 F-B Sq 18 F-B	13 June 53	TFRM TFRS RANDM RANDS	MIA BTE
Pinkstone Meteor/Pilot	Donald William	Sgt/A-2925 77 I/F Sqd RAAF	15 June 53	TFRM TFRS RANDM RANDS	A719 RMC
Fornes ??/Pilot	William L.	1Lt/ 69 AS 58 IBG	6 Aug 52	TFRM RANDS	RMC
Schwable ???	Fran H.	Col/ 1st Marine Wing	8 Jul 52	TFRM RANDS	RMC
Johanson B-29/?	Charles Vernon	Sgt/??	4 Jul 52	TFRM RANDS	RMC
Bartholomew ???	Gabriel P.	Maj/334 AS	18 Oct 52	TFRM RANDS	RMC
Johnson ???	Johnny M.	Sgt/ 307 Bomber Wing	18 Oct 52	TFRM RANDS	MIA KIA
Abrahamson ???	Gerald	??/ 28th EAS	29 Jan 53	TFRM RANDS	RMC

Van Slyke ?/Radio Oper.	Leland H.	A-10? 28 AS, 19 BAG	30 Dec 52	TFRM RANDS	RMC
Shaw ?/Pilot	Hamilton	2Lt/ 8 Res 5th AA	1 Dec 50	TFRM RANDS	RMC
McDonough ?/Pilot	Charles	Capt/? 5th AS, 363 Det	4 Dec 50	TFRM RANDS	MIA KIA
?Denstech B-29/?	Frank S.	Capt/?	10 O/N? 52	TFRM RANDS	?
?Hern B-29/?	Joseph S.	?/? 371 AS, 307 AG	12 Apr 51	TFRM RANDS	RMC
Oldewage B-29/?	Daniel Henry	Sgt/?	12 Apr 51	TFRM RANDS	RMC
Metz B-29/?	Henry X.	Sgt/?	12 Apr 51	TFRM RANDS	RMC
Kling B-29/Gunner	Marvin E.	A1C/?	4 Dec 51	TFRM RANDS	RMC
Knege B-29/Nav.	George J.	Lt/?	4 Dec 51	TFRM RANDS	RMC
Mcree	Leonard Lewis	Sgt/? 371 AS, 307 AG	4 Dec 51	TFRM RANDS	RMC
Gant d. May 2, 92 in USA B-29/Gunner	John K.	Sgt./AF14051878 93 AS, 19th AG	4 Dec 51	TFRM RANDS	A180 RMC
Millward d. Oct 16, 91 in USA ?/Gunner	George E.	Sgt/? 93		TFRM RANDS	A180 RMC
Bergmann ?/Radio Op.	Louis H.	Sgt/ 93 AS, 19 AG		TFRM RANDS	A180 RMC
Unruh B-29/Pilot	Halbert C.		4 Apr 51	TFRM RANDS	MIA KIA
Dean ???	Zach Wesley	Capt/ 39 AS, 35 AG	22 Apr 51	TFRM RANDS	RMC
?Obney		Major 40th AS, 35th AG	13/4 Aug 51	TFRM RANDS	
Miller Buried in MT ?/Pilot	Howard P. Jr.	1Lt/A21910262 336th AS, 4th AG	22 Jun 51	TFRM RANDS	A224 RMC RMC KIA

17Harm B-29/Gunner	17H 347th BAC	11 Sept 52	TFRM PANDE	
Wuge B-29/?	Henry D.	11 Jan 53	TFRM A654	MIA D
Van Voorhis B-29/?	Paul E.	11 Jan 53	TFRM A654	MIA D
MacKenzie ?/Pilot	Andrew Robert R. Canadian AF	15 June 52 5 Dec 52	TFRM	MYC

If it is true that the Soviet 64th Air Corps received interrogation transcripts made by the Chinese for every USAF POW, at one time at least 263 interrogation transcripts existed. If transcripts were made of interrogations USAF personnel who were carried as MIA, then there would have been more. General Volkogonov turned over 55 interrogation transcripts to the Joint U.S.-Russian Commission. Questions for further research include: a) Have the other 204 transcripts been located? b) Have the English language notes of the interrogations provided by the Chinese to the Soviets been located? c) Have the Soviet General Staff analyses of these transcripts been located? d) Is it possible to obtain Chinese records of these interrogations?

The Senate Select Committee obtained a list of 510 names during its 1992 visit to Moscow. The Select Committee compared the Russian list to the list of 8,182 Korean War servicemen who have not been accounted for. A total of 68 names matched with no discrepancies. An additional 20 names matched with the exception of minor discrepancies (i.e., missing or different middle initial). Another six matched names were similar to two or more names on the U.S. Battle Monument Commission list. At least 94 unaccounted for Americans are included on the Russian list.

The Select Committee forwarded this list to the National Personnel Records Center, Military Personnel Records Division, to verify the Committee's preliminary findings. This check revealed that 265 names were repatriated U.S. POWs. Of the remaining 271 names, 192 could not be located on any list, registry, or file. Many of these were cases in which the Russians provided nothing but a last name or unusual names. Of the remaining 79 names, 31 were found by the Archives to be unaccounted for U.S. POW-MIAs. An additional 48 names were of servicemen listed as died while captured. This list may be a

roster of names collected from American POWs during interrogations conducted by Russians in Korea.

A group of seven American civilians, most of them Catholic or Methodist missionaries, held in a North Korean prison camp during the Korean War was released in May 1953. The Americans had been held in North Korea as "internees" rather than as POWs. These internees were survived a death march in November 1950 when 17 other internees, including some Americans, and 99 American POWs died. The Americans were released to Soviet custody after the United States asked Moscow to use its good offices for this purpose. The group was transported across China by train, crossed the Sino-Soviet border at Otpor and continued on to Moscow where the group was welcomed by U.S. Ambassador Charles Bohlen.⁶³ From there the group traveled to Berlin then to the United States via Prestwick, Scotland. The members of the group were the following:⁶⁴

Name	Hometown of next of kin
1. William Robert Booth	Jamaica, New York
2. Louis L. Dams	Fresno, California
3. Nellie Dyer	Conway, Arkansas
4. Anders Kristian Jensen	Cumberland, Pennsylvania
5. Mary Ellen Rosser	Knoxville, Tennessee
6. Bertha Adkisson Smith	Holden, Missouri
7. Lawrence A. Zellers	Weatherford, Texas

During the peace offense that led to the release of the Americans, the Soviets contributed to the repatriation from North Korea of civilians from France and Britain. The names of these American missionaries appear on the Volkogonov 510 list.

Thus far the facts concerning deaths of American MIA-POWs in post-capture status have not been established. I have interviewed two Soviet military advisers in Korea who had contact with two American POWs who were not

⁶³"Freed Americans Arrive in Moscow," New York Times, May 12, 1953

⁶⁴"U.S. to fly civilians home," New York Times, May 7, 1953

repatriated. The first, tentatively identified as First Lieutenant Robert Niemann, was definitely seen and perhaps interrogated by Soviet military advisers. Niemann, who is on the RAND and TFR lists, is listed in Soviet records as deceased. Another Soviet military adviser recalled having contact with "Lt. Colonel V. Black" in order to arrange an interview with Pravda. Lt. Colonel Vance E. Black of California, who has not been accounted for since he was shot down in May 1951, was seen alive by an American POW in Pyongyang in March 1952. Lt. Colonel Vance E. Black may be the "V. Black" who was identified in the Pravda article and seen by a Soviet military adviser.

According to a retired KGB Major General, Soviet intelligence wanted to recruit agents. George Blake's decision to work for the KGB, whether it was the result of recruitment or simply a walk-in, gave the KGB additional incentive to find other potential agents among the UN prisoner-of-war population. Army G2 analyses of repatriated American POWs turned up an alarming number of cases that fit this pattern. In June 1954 the U.S. Army advised the Air Force that

evidence had been uncovered which concerned the assignment of Sabotage and Espionage missions to repatriated American prisoners of war during "Big and Little Switch," and that quite recently new cases of this type have been discovered.⁶⁵

No evidence has yet been obtained that points toward a similar North Korean or Chinese interest in recruiting agents. There have been reports over the years that American POWs were used as guinea pigs in Sino-Soviet biological experiments. None of these has been documented thus far.

Intelligence reports located in the U.S. archives are nearly silent on the issue of whether American MIA-POWs were transferred to the territory of the USSR. If this activity took place, it was not discussed in Eighth Army G-2 daily reports or annual summaries. If this activity took place it was not widely known to repatriated POWs. Thus far only one repatriated POW affidavit has been located that mentions this activity:

One particular [Chinese guard told me] while we were gathered around him talking that he had been a Captain in Chang Kai

⁶⁵Memorandum to Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2 Intelligence, Department of the Army (Secret) from Gilbert R. Levy, Chief, Counter Intelligence Division, Directorate of Special Investigations, The Inspector General, Department of the Air Force, June 14, 1954

Che's Army. He was captured and given the choice of fighting with Mac Tré Dung or dying. He liked to live. He gave us what little news he could find. ... He also told us of one (1) helicopter pilot with rank of Second Lieutenant being taken to Russia in March 1952. He did not know the branch of service. This information was gathered by sign language, by broken English and by pictures drawn on the ground then erased.⁶⁶

The position of the U.S. government on the issue of whether Americans were transported from Korea or China to the territory of the USSR has changed over time. According to press reports, in May 1954 the U.S. Department of State delivered a note to the Soviet Foreign Ministry accusing the Soviets of having transferred American prisoners to the territory of the Soviet Union from Korea. The Soviet Government's rejection of the U.S. note was the first public notice that the U.S. had made such a protest. The number of prisoners involved and other details were not made public. The Soviet reply, published in Moscow newspapers, said:

The assertions in the note of the United States Government, that American prisoners of war, participants in military action in Korea, have been transferred to the Soviet Union and are at the present time maintained under Soviet guard are without any kind of basis and are clearly invented, as there are not and have not been any such persons in the Soviet Union.⁶⁷

Reports were apparently collected through U.S. intelligence and diplomatic channels that U.S. servicemen who were POWs during the Korean War were seen in Soviet camps.

The U.S. government's position on this issue in 1955 was unequivocal. In spite of a previous U.S. government protest to the Soviet government that asserted the Soviets held American POWs taken from Korea, in 1955 a coordinated interagency position concluded the opposite.

With regard to the question of United States personnel captured in Korea, the Department of Defense has informed us that all American servicemen, missing or unaccounted for in that conflict have been presumed dead. In close cooperation with the Department of Defense, however, we intend to continue to seek information from the Communists about their fate.

⁶⁶RG153, Army Judge Advocate General, War Crimes Division, Operation Big Switch Interrogations, 1953-1954, A-C, Box Number 1, statement by John T. Cain.
⁶⁷"Soviet Denies Having U.S. Korea Prisoners," New York Times, May 11, 1954

Further, we have no evidence that any United States personnel captured in Korea were ever taken to the Soviet Union.⁶²

There has been no official explanation that squares these two apparently contradictory positions.

The possibility that American POWs were moved from Korea or China to the territory of the USSR cannot be ruled out. Thus far no documentary evidence has been found to support such a position. Circumstantial evidence (viz., missing POWs, Sino-Soviet intelligence cooperation, Russian presence in Korean POW camps) and eyewitness testimony (former prisoners, Soviet military sources) point toward the possibility that some American POWs may have been taken to the USSR. The motives for this activity have not been established.

In my view it is reasonable to conclude that the Soviet 64th Air Corps did not participate in the transport of American MIA-POWs from Korea or China to the territory of the USSR. If this activity occurred, some other organization is responsible for it. The possibility also exists that a trail of paper that can be used to document this activity remains to be located in the Soviet, Chinese and North Korean archives.

Conclusions about remains recovered from North Korea

U.S. Army Graves Registration overseas policy changed during the Korean War. Until 1951, the policy had been to recover remains from the battlefield, bury them in temporary graves until the end of the war, then return the war dead to the United States after the war was over. It was replaced by a "concurrent return" policy which called for bodies to be embalmed overseas for shipment to the United States. Recovering remains of U.S. casualties buried in North Korea was another matter all together.

In previous wars, U.S. graves registration personnel were able to inspect battlefields and crash sites. This resulted in an accounting for the majority of MIAs. After the Korean War the task of accounting for dead POWs was difficult, the identification of MIA deaths next to impossible. The poor or nonexistent marking of POW graves plus the North Korean unwillingness to report the deaths of POWs made an otherwise difficult task much more difficult. During the war it was known that the graves of deceased POWs were

⁶²Letter from Assistant Secretary Thurston B. Morton to Congressman Vorys February 10, 1955 611.61241/1-2156. Emphasis added.

not deep enough to prevent erosion. So-called markings were so poor that most disintegrated after one or two years. One study estimates that the North Koreans reported having the remains of 1,651 dead, all of whom the North Koreans claimed to be able to identify. Approximately 3,970 UNC dead were buried in the vicinity of POW camps.

For example, three areas around Camp 5, Pyoktong were used as cemeteries for POWs who died in captivity. Site One, located on a slope near the Yalu, was at one time estimated to contain 1,500 bodies. This area has been washed away by rains and Yalu River floods over the years. Site Two, northeast of the camp, contained an unknown number of bodies. Site Three, situated on a hill behind the camp, was a small area estimated to contain few bodies. Other burial sites were identified but none were confirmed. Estimating the number of bodies located in any one area was complicated by the fact that the North Koreans and Chinese would often bury two or more corpses in the same grave.

The NKA-CPV have returned remains over the years 1954-1992. North Korea appears to be applying two lessons learned from Cho En Lai on how to use human beings as leverage in relations with the United States: First, use remains to obtain par political status with the United States. Second, use emotion and the politics of remains issue to "go over the heads of U.S. officials" by appealing to the general public.

The North Koreans have not, however, demonstrated the anthropological sophistication of the Chinese or Vietnamese, nor has North Korea demonstrated a coherent strategy. No tangible advantage or benefit has been derived thus far from the use of remains as leverage. In addition, North Korean claims have almost no credibility. Names North Korean officials associate with returned remains have not been confirmed by forensic analysis in a single case. Remains said to be of individuals are comingled. Remains said to be recently exhumed have been curated in a controlled environment for a protracted period of time that exceeds the time elapsed between the alleged exhumation and delivery.

November 9, 1954 the Communist forces delivered what they said were 66 remains, 62 of which were "reported as recovered from air crashes" and the other four recovered from from "other than air crashes." The Communist forces did not associate names with these cases, but they did give longitude and

latitude coordinates for the location of each recovered remains.⁶⁹ It is unclear whether any of these remains were associated with missing Americans, though Headquarters Korean Communications Zone maintained a roster of 322 "Air Crashes In Enemy Held Territory" involving 412 casualties. These crash sites were identified by longitude and latitude, transverse mercator grid system location, aircraft type, and number of remains.

On May 27, 1990, after months of difficult negotiations, North Korea returned the remains of five U.S. Korean War MIAs to Representative Sonny Montgomery at Panmunjon.⁷⁰ Congressman Montgomery's report states the North Koreans "claimed to have unearthed the remains in separate sites in North Hwanghae Province, located north of Panmunjon in southern North Korea."⁷¹ The remains were accompanied by artifacts--buttons, an Air Force jacket, and two dog tags--provided by the North Koreans. The five sets of remains were subsequently examined by U.S. forensic specialists at the Central Identification Laboratory in Hawaii. The remains were actually fragments of seven bodies, none of them Asian. "By comparison of the dental and physical records...none of the remains were of the two servicemen which North Korea, based on finding two dog tags, had associated by name with two sets of remains."⁷²

The United States insisted that the remains be returned through the MAC. The North Koreans claimed that they were not required to use the MAC. The ceremony at which the remains were handed over contained representatives from the Congressional delegation and the MAC, thus a precedent was not established that contradicts the U.S. commitment to the armistice arrangements. In September 1990 the North Koreans offered to return 11 sets of remains. The United States replied that this would be acceptable as long as the remains were delivered to the MAC. The North Koreans refused to do so and criticized the United States for showing no interest in recovering remains. At the same time, the North Korean Deputy Permanent Observer to the United Nations, Ho Jong, continued to pursue the North Korean strategy that seeks to pressure the U.S. government into a bilateral government-to-government dialogue.

⁶⁹RG92. Memorandum from Lt. Colonel P. F. Hazelbaker, Acting Chief, Memorial Division, QMC to The Quartermaster General. November 23, 1954.

⁷⁰U.S. Congress. House. Committee on Veterans' Affairs. Report on Congressional Delegation Trip To Korea (Washington, DC: U.S. Printing Office, 1990).

⁷¹Report on Congressional Delegation Trip To North Korea, 13

⁷²Report on Congressional Delegation Trip To North Korea, 13

On June 24, 1991, Senator Bob Smith (R-NH) received "what North Korea said were remains of 11 U.S. soldiers who fought in the Korean war" at a ceremony at the Panmunjon peace pavilion.⁷³ The North Koreans attempted to link the return of these remains to an agreement in principle to establish a joint U.S.-North Korean commission that would explore the possibility of returning more remains. Senator Smith noted that he was not empowered to "negotiate on behalf of the U.S. government" and that U.S. policy was to obtain remains "through the MAC."⁷⁴

The remains delivered by the North Koreans to the Smith delegation did not correspond to the names provided by the North Koreans. The eleven remains were actually partial sets of 15 remains. The remains showed signs of having been hastily prepared. In contrast to the boxes used a year before, these boxes were roughly assembled. The paint on the boxes was still wet. The remains were arranged in ludicrous patterns. One remains delivered by the North Koreans consisted of a skull and five or six femurs laid end to end.

On May 12 and 28, 1992 the North Koreans returned what was alleged to be 30 remains in two equal deliveries. Work at the Army Central Identification Laboratory is currently underway to determine whether the remains delivered on May 12 correspond to any of the six names the North Koreans associate with them. The North Koreans claimed that all of the remains were exhumed in October 1991 at Namjonggu, Suan County, North Hwanghae Province.

In order to be able to associate an individual with a particular set of remains there must be adequate identification media. In cases such as the remains returned by the North Koreans the forensic anthropologists has no ante mortem evidence to work with besides teeth and bones. In order to match teeth and bones with a particular individual, the anthropologist must have information about the condition of the bones and teeth of the missing individuals.

Each missing person's dental records were requested.
Letters were sent to families asking for information on teeth and bones.

The 46 remains returned by the North Koreans as of July 1992 all show the same degree of preservation. The bones are dry and brittle, showing sign of no

⁷³"N. Korea returns remains of 11 American Servicemen," Korea Herald, June 25, 1991

⁷⁴"N. Korea returns remains of 11 American servicemen"

treatment. Dry bone indicates that the material has been out of the ground and stored. This evidence strongly suggests the bones could not have been exhumed, as claimed, as recently as 1991. In contrast, bones recovered from the Vietnamese show signs of curation--cards and numbers--and variations in color and decomposition. Skeletons returned by the Vietnamese include some that were autopsied--pelvic bones were cut and vertebrae sawed in half. Remains returned by the North Koreans are identical in color and state of preservation.

There is no sign of sophisticated curation or competent forensic science in the remains delivered by the North Koreans. Remains returned by the North Koreans are consistent with having been in the same custody and storage system for many months, if not years. The remains have been carefully cleaned which makes a comparative soil analysis test impossible. The remains were collected and stored by untrained people or inept and uncaring specialists. There is little evidence of professional or academic method evident in the the remains returned by the North Koreans. Signs of unprofessional recovery in the North Korean cases include missing mandibles and new breaks. The skulls of the eleven remains (actually 16 partial sets) returned in 1991 were all missing faces. Since race is determined by examining the face, the explanations for why the faces are missing include carelessness, incompetency, or a deliberate attempt to conceal evidence. The remains are consistent with what one would expect to get if recovery was done using a shovel with no sifting. The bones show signs of shovel trauma, root marks and animal scratchings which indicate the individual was buried without a coffin.

Informed sources in Pyongyang indicate that "there could be three places outside Pyongyang where remains of Americans could be stored thirty meters below ground. The places are Hangdong, Yodok, and Taesuk."

The prospects for identifying remains in the condition of those obtained from the North Koreans are remote. Unless the recovery strategy is changed, from recovery to recovery and identification, the United States should invest in a larger warehouse and accept the fact that the MIA issue will not be resolved through the association of remains with individuals on the MIA roster.

HEARING TO DISCUSS THE ISSUE OF POW/MIAs FROM WORLD WAR II, THE COLD WAR, AND THE KOREAN CONFLICT

WEDNESDAY, NOVEMBER 11, 1992

U.S. SENATE,
SELECT COMMITTEE ON POW/MIA AFFAIRS,
Washington, DC.

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 8:09 a.m., in Room SH-216, Hart Senate Office Building, Honorable John F. Kerry (chairman of the committee) presiding.

Present: Senators Kerry, Daschle, Reid, Robb, Smith, McCain and Grassley.

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. ROBERT H. SMITH, U.S. SENATOR FROM NEW HAMPSHIRE

Vice Chairman SMITH. I think we will get started here because Senator Kerry is en route. Oh, here he is.

Chairman KERRY. Why don't you go ahead, Bob.

Vice Chairman SMITH. We have got a long day ahead of us and we are starting early. I think, based on the four witnesses, it would be best if Mr. Boylan were to start since you are the archivist, as I understand it, and it might put things in perspective for the other witnesses. So why don't you begin, sir, if you would, please.

TESTIMONY OF RICHARD BOYLAN, ARCHIVIST, NATIONAL ARCHIVES

Mr. BOYLAN. Very well. I am Richard Boylan, the assistant chief for military reference of the Suitland Reference Branch of the National Archives and Records Administration, responsible for providing assistance to researchers who want to use a variety of military records dating from World War II through the Vietnam war.

Please notice I am saying I assist researchers. I do not do research for them. As an archivist, I provide information about records, but I do not interpret them. We have records in the National Archives that might help to answer questions about POWs and MIAs in the Korean war and cold war periods. If a researcher wishes to review these records, make judgments and determinations, I and my colleagues will work with him or her—

Vice Chairman SMITH. Mr. Boylan, could you pull that microphone just a little bit closer and talk right into it.

Mr. BOYLAN. I'm sorry, yes. If a researcher wishes to review these records, make judgments and determinations, I and my colleagues will work with him or her to ensure that all the releasable

in accordance with the Freedom of Information Act are made available for research.

In general, when a researcher comes to an archivist, the first thing we do is try to develop a research strategy. To do this, we talk with the researcher and try to determine all the various parts of the Government that might have had something to do with the subject of the research. Then the archivist will identify for the researcher the types of records that the Archives holds from those Government agencies.

Working together, the researcher and the archivist will decide which records appear to be the most pertinent and provide them to the researcher. Once the researcher has identified the priority order of the records he or she wishes to see, the archival staff will pull the records and deliver them to the research room.

Appended to my statement is a list of the military records in my branch of the National Archives that may have documentation relating to MIA and POWs in the Korean war and cold war periods. I want to emphasize that my branch holds only a portion of the military records that may be pertinent. Further, I am not responsible for providing reference service on records of civilian agencies.

The majority of the records on the list are open for research use. I have indicated on the list whether any records in the series remain classified. If security classified records are pertinent to the research topic, the archivist will make sure the researcher understands the procedures for requesting review of the documents for declassification. The actual declassification review is not within my area of responsibility.

Thank you.

[The information referred to follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF RICHARD BOYLAN

I am Richard Boylan, the assistant chief for Military Reference of the Suitland Reference Branch of the National Archives and Records Administration. I am responsible for providing assistance to researchers who want to use a variety of military records dating mostly from the post-World War II period.

Please notice that I am saying that I "assist" researchers. I do not do research for them. As an archivist I provide information about records, but I do not interpret them. We have records in the National Archives that might help to answer questions about POWs and MIAs in the Korean war and cold war periods. If a researcher wishes to review these records and make judgments and determinations, I or my colleagues will work with him or her to ensure that all the records releasable in accordance with the Freedom of Information Act are made available for research.

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Appended to this statement is a list of the military records in my branch of the National Archives that may have documentation relating to MIA and POWs from the Korean war and cold war periods. I want to emphasize that my branch holds only a portion of the military records that may be pertinent. Nor am I responsible for providing reference service on records of civilian agencies.

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records are pertinent to the research topic, the archivist will make sure the procedures for requesting a review of the documents for declassification. The actual declassification review is not within my area of responsibility.

MILITARY RECORDS IN THE CUSTODY OF THE SUITLAND REFERENCE BRANCH, NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION, THAT CONTAIN INFORMATION POTENTIALLY OF INTEREST TO INDIVIDUALS RESEARCHING PRISONERS OF WAR /MISSING IN ACTION/ KILLED IN ACTION—BODY NOT RECOVERED PERSONNEL FROM THE KOREAN WAR

Unless otherwise noted, the volume figures listed below are archives boxes which contain roughly 1,000 pages each.

The files cited below relate to a broad range of topics with varying degrees of relevance to POW/MIA/KIA-BNR research. Those which contain some information which has been withheld from public release are marked with an asterisk (*). Not all withheld material necessarily has any bearing on POW/MIA/KIA-BNR research.

Record Group 92, Records of the Office of the Quartermaster General, 1953-1954

Miscellaneous Files, Korea, 1950-1954:

- Reports relating to searches for and repatriation of American War dead, arranged chronologically
- 6 boxes

Record Group 153, Records of the Judge Advocate General (Army)

* War Crimes Branch, Operation Big Switch Interrogation Reports, 1953-1954:

- Arranged alphabetically by name of interrogated serviceman.
- 6 boxes

* Returned, Exchanged and Captured American Personnel—Korea (RECAP-K) Case Files, 1953-1954:

- Arranged alphabetically by name of serviceman. File pertains to Voluntary Non-Repatriates and individuals accused of improper activity while a POW
- 3 boxes

* International Affairs Division, War Crimes Branch Case Files, 1950-1954

- Arranged numerically by Korean war Crimes Case File number
- Includes a three box history of the activities of this unit
- 95 boxes

Record Group 319, Records of the Army Staff

Army Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Records Section, Retired Records Group Decimal Files, 1950-1956

- Decimal number 383.6 (Prisoners of War)
- Less than 1 box

Army Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Army Attaches Decimal Files, 1943-1956

- Decimal numbers 312.1 (correspondence) and 383.6
- Less than 1 box

* Army Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Counterintelligence Files, Korea, 1950-1958

- Arranged chronologically
- 46 boxes

Record Group 335, Records of the Office of the Secretary of the Army

General Correspondence File, 1950-1960

- Decimal 383.6
- Less than 1 box

Record Group 338, Records of U.S. Army Commands

* Headquarters and Headquarters Detachment, 22nd Prisoner of War/Civilian Internee Information Center History File, 1941-1975

- Arranged according to The Army Functional Files System
- 108 boxes

Record Group 340, Records of the Office of the Secretary of the Air Force

* General Correspondence Files, 1950-1960

- Decimal number 383.6
- Less than 1 box

Record Group 341, Records of headquarters, U.S. Air Force (Air Staff)

* "Wringer" Reports, 1949-1955

- Arranged according to the "Bombing Encyclopedia," an index currently in Air Force custody
- 1682 reels of 35 mm. film

Record Group 342, Records of U.S. Air Force Commands, Activities, and Organizations

* 5th Air Force Interrogation Reports, 1951

- Arranged in rough chronological order
- 7 boxes (roughly 3,000 pages each)

Record Group 407, Records of the Office of the Adjutant General

* Korean war Command Reports, 1950-1954

- Arranged by unit, thereunder chronologically
- Although these files contain minimal information regarding prisoners of war/missing in action personnel, they do document the activities of the Army units to which these men were assigned at the time they were reported missing, and of Operations Big and Little Switch.

- Secret section of files—6,542 boxes
- Top Secret section of files—35 boxes

* Administrative Services, General Correspondence File, 1958-1960

- Decimal number 383.6
- Less than 1 box

Vice Chairman SMITH. Thank you. Do you gentlemen have any preferences as to who would like to go first?

Mr. ASHWORTH. I think Mr. Sanders prefers to go first.

Vice Chairman SMITH. All right, Mr. Sanders the floor is yours.

TESTIMONY OF JAMES SANDERS, AUTHOR, SOLDIERS OF MISFORTUNE

Mr. SANDERS. Good morning. Before I go into what I have written, in light of a couple of things that were said yesterday, I think it's important to note, from my own personal perspective and I'm not talking for anyone else here, that as I went through this almost 7 years of research and writing, that virtually anyone that I can imagine that we're talking about today, from FDR through Eisenhower through Reagan through Bush, I believe they're honorable gentlemen, but I also believe they're human beings.

Human beings sometimes make mistakes. That doesn't make them dishonorable. Sometimes they make the correct decisions, but the entire history hasn't been told and so they look like the incorrect decisions. So it seems to me to be fruitless to get into a debate whether a person is honorable and therefore everything that's said about him means you're attacking him personally. You're not. With that said, I'll go on into my written testimony.

For almost 7 years my co-authors and I have investigated, researched, and analyzed the POW issue. The results of that effort are in a recently released book entitled *Soldiers of Misfortune*. We contacted hundreds of former POWs who were held hostage at the end of World War II, and others who were in a position to know a portion of the story. We reviewed hundreds of thousands of documents looking for pieces of the puzzle.

Here's what we found. There was a hostage crisis during the closing months of World War II. Up to 23,500 Americans and 31,000 British and Commonwealth POWs were kept by the Soviet Union and shipped to the gulag, along with at least 2 million other slaves,

Germans, Austrians, French, Eastern Europeans, and anti-communist Soviet citizens who had fled to the West.

The Korean war was a continuation of World War II. The U.S. Government decided to develop a, quote, cynical attitude, unquote, towards the loss of POWs to the gulag, and President Dwight D. Eisenhower ordered it covered up. Up to 300 POWs from Vietnam were retained by the Soviets.

The U.S. Government has always known what happened, and generally who the Soviets kept. The Government has deliberately lied to the American people, press, and POW families. Whenever a threat surfaced with a potential to discredit and destroy the Government's revisionist version of the truth, it has been actively countered by a cynical bureaucracy.

The disinformation and cover up includes the current Assistant Secretary of Defense for POWs, Al Ptak; former DIA Director, Rear Admiral Ronald Marriott; the President's National Security Advisor, Brent Scowcroft; and goes on into the Oval Office where it has been since 1945, and remains today.

Until the publication of *Soldiers of Misfortune*, it was official Bush administration policy that, quote, not a single shred of evidence has ever surfaced of U.S. POWs in the Soviet Union, end quote. That statement is a flagrant, provable, and intentional lie.

History does not occur in a vacuum. In 1945, Joseph Stalin learned that hostage politics was a good negotiating tool when dealing with the United States, but he also learned it was much more than that. The information inside the hostage's brain was vital to the Soviet military intelligence and civilian economy.

As the hostage crisis developed along the western front in May 1945, Stalin learned another lesson that plagues the U.S. Government to this day. When American diplomats fail to conclude negotiations with the Soviet Union on an honorable basis, they cover up the failure and create a false history reflecting how they wish events had turned out.

When the Korean war began, Stalin told the Red Chinese and North Koreans to hold back 20 percent of the American POWs as hostages for negotiating purposes. Stalin was not acting on a whim; it was good politics. Throughout the Korean war the U.S. Government wrestled with the hostage problem and finally concluded that they would have to walk away from the hostages in order to demonstrate to the communists that hostage politics was not a viable option. The Soviets, once again, watched American diplomats and President Eisenhower cover up the negotiating failure of the U.S. Government.

And then there was the cold war, when U.S. aviators shot down during surveillance flights and U.S. soldiers kidnapped off the streets of Europe were imprisoned in the Soviet Union. The Pentagon told the State Department not to reveal to family members that their loved ones were alive in Siberia.

Indeed, one son of a missing cold war aviator learned of an official 1955 Siberian live sighting of his father only this year and only after he asked us to check our files. Air Force Intelligence had kept the report classified and the Pentagon had never told the family of the evidence.

The Soviets watched as the U.S. Government covered up communist misdeeds. By the time the American involvement in Vietnam began in earnest, the U.S. Government absolutely knew that the Soviet Union would take American POWs and never return them. The only question was whether the North Vietnamese, like the Chinese and North Koreans before them, would take a page out of the Soviet playbook and use the Americans as hostages; they did.

Henry Kissinger faced the reality of Soviet retention of American POWs and a North Vietnamese hostage crisis. A still classified 1969 RAND Corporation study suggested that ransom payments to the North Vietnamese would probably be the least painful means of maximizing the return of American hostages from Vietnam.

The RAND Corporation warned, quote: No matter what terms are agreed upon it would be unduly optimistic to believe that the DRV and the VC will release all U.S. prisoners immediately after the conclusion of an agreement in the expectation that the United States will meet its military, political, or monetary commitments. More likely, they will insist on awaiting concrete evidence of U.S. concessions before releasing the majority of American prisoners and will retain some of them until all U.S. commitments have been fulfilled, end quote.

The RAND report went on to suggest that the ransom be, quote, publicly labeled part of the U.S. contribution to a post-war recovery program, end quote. That is precisely what happened, but Kissinger could not admit to the U.S. Congress that the \$4.25 billion in aid was a ransom demanded by the North Vietnamese in exchange for all U.S. POWs not held by the U.S.S.R. or China. After stories of brutal torture began to appear, humanitarian aid for Hanoi was not a big seller on Capitol Hill. Once again, the U.S. Government walked away from its hostage POWs and the communists watched as U.S. diplomats rewrote history.

When this committee was forming I met with General Counsel William Codinha and offered my services, as did John Brown, as an unpaid consultant to provide the historical precedent which leads to the loss of POWs during the Vietnam war. The answer was thanks but no thanks. Without historical precedent to anchor the committee's work, witnesses were able to appear secure in the knowledge they could with impunity regurgitate the Government's revisionist line.

Kissinger, during his testimony here, said it was absurd to believe any U.S. official would knowingly abandon an American POW. In reality, history clearly states that it would be absurd not to believe that American POWs would be abandoned after a war against a Soviet-backed nation.

In 1954, the Government position on POW losses to the Soviet Union and its satellites became, quote: If we are at war, cold, hot, or otherwise, casualties and losses must be expected and perhaps we must learn to live with this kind of thing. If we are in for 50 years of peripheral firefights, we may be forced to adopt a rather cynical attitude on this for political reasons, end quote.

Unfortunately, even though the cold war is over this cynical attitude is still prevalent within the senior levels of Government. The POWs are officially dead, so why exhume them and damage diplo-

matic and political reputations so carefully crafted over the decades.

And one final point. This is not just a POW issue. What I have outlined is a constitutional crisis. It began in 1945, when the bureaucracy learned it could survive and even thrive by circumventing the Constitution when the going got tough, creating a false and often heroic version of how they wished things had actually turned out. Unless the work of this committee is extended, those lies will stand.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Sanders follows:]

James D. Sanders
104 Arena St.
Williamsburg, VA 23185
(804) 253-6426

EDUCATION: B.S. Business/Economics
Christopher Newport University, VA

EXPERIENCE:

1986-Present Left politics to work full time on research for Soldiers of Misfortune.

1980-1985 Campaign politics: managed Arizona congressional campaign; Organization Director for Gubernatorial and Attorney General's campaigns in Virginia; Executive Director of the Republican Legislative Caucus (VA), two years; political commentary articles published in The Daily Press (VA), 1984; and The San Diego Union, 1986.

1978-1979. Medically retired from California law enforcement.

1966-1977 Seal Beach Police Department (Orange County, Calif.): Traffic Division Commander 1975-1977; Prior to that worked all phases of law enforcement: patrol, traffic and investigation.

ACTIVITIES: Board of Advisors, International Institute of Prisoners of War.
Past President, Seal Beach Police Officers Association.
Past President, Orange County Peace Officers Association.

PERSONAL: Married, age 47, one child.

November 10, 1992

Testimony of James D. Sanders before the United States Senate Select Committee on POW/MIA Affairs.

For almost seven years my co-authors and I have investigated, researched, and analyzed the POW issue. The results of that effort are in a recently released book entitled Soldiers of Misfortune.

We contacted hundreds of former POWs who were held hostage at the end of World War II and others who were in a position to know a portion of the story. We reviewed hundreds-of-thousands of documents looking for pieces of the puzzle.

Here's what we found:

- there was a hostage crisis during the closing months of World War II.
- up to 23,500 Americans (and 31,000 British and Commonwealth POWs) were kept by the Soviet Union and shipped to the gulag along with at least two-million other slaves: Germans, Austrians, French, Eastern Europeans and anti-communist Soviet citizens who had fled to the West.
- the Korean War was a continuation of World War II.
- the United States Government decided to develop a "cynical attitude" toward the loss of POWs to the gulag, and President Dwight D. Eisenhower ordered it covered-up.
- up to 300 POWs from Vietnam were retained by the Soviets.
- the United States Government has always known what happened and generally, who the Soviets kept.
- the Government has deliberately lied to the American people, press and POW families.
- whenever a threat surfaced with the potential to discredit and destroy the Government's revisionist version of the truth, it has been actively countered by a cynical bureaucracy.
- the disinformation and cover-up includes the current Assistant Secretary of Defense for POWs, Al Ptak, former DIA Director Rear Admiral Ronald Marryott, the President's National Security Advisor, Brent Scowcroft, and goes into the Oval office.

Until the publication of Soldiers of Misfortune it was official Bush Administration policy that "not a single shred of evidence has ever surfaced of U.S. POWs in the Soviet Union." That statement is a flagrant, provable and intentional lie.

History does not occur in a vacuum. In 1945, Joseph Stalin learned that hostage politics was a good negotiating tool when dealing with the United States. But he also learned it was much more than that; the information inside the hostages' brain was vital to the Soviet military, intelligence and civilian economy.

As the hostage crisis developed along the western front in May 1945, Stalin learned another lesson that plagues the United States Government to this day. When American (and British) diplomats fail to conclude negotiations with the Soviet Union on an honorable basis, they cover-up the failure and create a false history reflecting how they wished events had turned out.

When the Korean War began, Stalin told the Red Chinese and North Koreans to hold back 20% of the American POWs as hostages for negotiating purposes. Stalin was not acting on a whim--it was good politics.

Throughout the Korean War the United States Government wrestled with the hostage problem and finally concluded that they would have to walk away from the hostages in order to demonstrate to the Communists that hostage politics was not a viable option. The Soviets once again watched American diplomats, and President Eisenhower, cover-up the negotiating failure of the United States Government.

And then there was the Cold War, when U.S. aviators shot down during surveillance flights and U.S. soldiers kidnapped off the streets of Europe were imprisoned in the Soviet Union.

The Pentagon told the State Department not to reveal to family members that their loved ones were alive in Siberia. Indeed, one son of a missing Cold War aviator learned of an official 1955 Siberian live-sighting of his father only this year--and only after he asked us to check our files. Air Force intelligence had kept the report classified, and the Pentagon had never told the family of the evidence. The Soviets watched as the U.S. Government covered-up communist misdeeds.

By the time the American involvement in Vietnam began in earnest, the United States Government absolutely knew that the Soviet Union would take American POWs and never return them. The only question was whether the North Vietnamese, like the

Chinese and North Koreans before them, would take a page out of the Soviet-playbook and use the Americans as hostages. They did.

Henry Kissinger faced the reality of Soviet retention of American POWs and a North Vietnamese hostage crisis. A still classified 1969 Rand Corporation study, suggested that ransom payments to the North Vietnamese would probably be the least painful means of maximizing the return of American hostages from Vietnam. The Rand Corporation warned:

No matter what terms are agreed upon, it would be unduly optimistic to believe that the DRV and the VC will release all U.S. prisoners immediately after conclusion of an agreement in the expectation that the United States will meet its military, political, or monetary commitments. More likely, they will insist on awaiting concrete evidence of U.S. concessions before releasing the majority of American prisoners, and will retain some of them until all U.S. commitments have been fulfilled.

The Rand report went on to suggest that the ransom be "publicly labeled part of the U.S. contribution to a postwar recovery program." That is precisely what happened. But Kissinger could not admit to the United States Congress that the \$4.25 billion in aid was a ransom demanded by the North Vietnamese in exchange for ALL U.S. POWs not held by the U.S.S.R. or China.

After stories of brutal torture began to appear, humanitarian aid for Hanoi was not a big seller on Capitol Hill. Once again, the United States Government walked away from its hostage POWs and the communists watched as U.S. diplomats rewrote history.

When this committee was first forming, I met with General Counsel William Codinha and offered my services as an unpaid consultant to provide the historical precedent which lead to the loss of POWs during the Vietnam War. The answer was: Thanks, but no thanks.

Without historical precedent to anchor the Committee's work, witnesses were able to appear, secure in the knowledge that they could with impunity regurgitate the Government's revisionist line. Kissinger, during his testimony here, said it was absurd to believe any U.S. official would knowingly abandon an American POW. In reality, history clearly states that it would be absurd NOT to believe that American POWs would be abandoned after a war against a Soviet-backed nation.

In 1954 the Government position on POW losses to the

Soviet Union and its satellites became: "If we are 'at war,' cold, hot or otherwise, casualties and losses must be expected and perhaps we must learn to live with this kind of thing. If we are in for fifty years of peripheral 'fire fights,' we may be forced to adopt a rather cynical attitude on this for political reasons."

Unfortunately, even though the Cold War is over, this cynical attitude is still prevalent within the senior levels of Government. The POWs are officially dead, so why exhume them and damage diplomatic and political reputations so carefully crafted over the decades?

One final point. This is not just a POW issue. What I have outlined is a Constitutional crisis. It began in 1945 when the bureaucracy learned it could survive and even thrive by circumventing the Constitution when the going got tough, creating a false and often heroic version of how they wish things had actually turned out. Unless the work of this committee is extended, those lies will stand.

Chairman KERRY. Let me ask you gentlemen if you would stand, if all of you would stand, so that I could swear you since you were unsworn.

Mr. ASHWORTH. We were sworn.

Chairman KERRY. You were sworn, you were sworn yesterday?

Mr. ASHWORTH. Yes.

Mr. SANDERS. Yes.

Chairman KERRY. All right, that is fine. Let me just say that I appreciate it. I was just given a note saying that you were unsworn and I forgot about yesterday.

Why don't we run through each of the testimonies and then we will come back and ask you our questions. Who is next, Mr. Brown.

TESTIMONY OF JOHN M.G. BROWN, AUTHOR, MOSCOW BOUND

Mr. BROWN. Is this loud and clear?

Chairman KERRY. Yes.

Mr. BROWN. To the chairman and members of the select committee, my name is John M.G. Brown. Like several members of the committee, I served in Vietnam, in my case as a rifleman with the 1st and 9th infantry divisions, from 1967 to late 1968, when I was wounded in action.

Prior to my Vietnam service I had been made aware of Korean war veterans—by Korean war veterans that many American POWs had been withheld by the North Koreans and by the Chinese communists in Manchuria. Between 1979 and 1983, while a commercial fisherman and guide in Alaska, I learned that the communists had withheld U.S. POWs in Vietnam and Laos.

I began to investigate the POW/MIA subject while researching my first non-fiction book on Vietnam, *Rice Paddy Grunt*, and helping to support a private intelligence-gathering network in Southeast Asia which was run by Colonel Al Shinkle at the time. I also acquired much information from witnesses at previous Senate hearings, from declassified U.S. documents, and from a series of 1986-1987 meetings with senior U.S. officials.

On October 2, 1986, then Vice President George Bush encouraged me, in a letter to my father-in-law, Mr. Anthony Drexel Duke, a trustee of Duke University, to assist Mr. Ross Perot and to pursue my POW/MIA investigation wherever it might lead, and I quote President Bush, on the assumption that our men are alive.

At the time I hoped that these were Mr. Bush's heartfelt words. I subsequently published a series of reports and articles on Soviet-held U.S. POWs, beginning with the December 1986 American Foreign Policy Newsletter, under the chairmanship of former ambassador Angier Biddle Duke. From 1986 to 1988, my archival and human source research extended back through the cold war, Korea, and World War II to the World War I American intervention in Russia when U.S. documents and human sources reveal that American military POWs and civilians were first secretly withheld by the Soviets under Lenin and Trotsky.

My research among thousands of recently-declassified U.S. documents revealed that since the 1918-1921 Bolshevik period, the Soviets and their later surrogates always demanded diplomatic conces-

sions or financial aid for the release of U.S. and Allied war prisoners and civilian hostages they publicly denied holding.

The repatriation of Russian and Soviet prisoners in Allied control during World War I and World War II was also of great importance, but my research indicates that it was the Soviets who first initiated the reprehensible policy of secretly withholding war prisoners in the 1918-1919 period. Although many of these American POWs were seen alive by an eyewitness a decade later in Moscow's Lubianka Prison and the Solovetski Archipelago forced labor camps, Congress was misled by U.S. intelligence about their existence and they were never freed, even after the United States recognized Stalin's Soviet regime in 1933 under President Franklin D. Roosevelt.

Virtually every American President since Woodrow Wilson has had to deal with classified information and decrypted communications on Soviet and surrogate-held U.S. prisoners of war. Thus, no one President could or should be blamed for this 7-decades-old problem.

In May 1989, with my research colleague Thomas V. Ashworth, I wrote the first documented report on the entire history of Soviet and surrogate-held U.S. POWs of World War I, World War II, the cold war, Korea, and Vietnam, entitled *A Chain of Prisoners, a Secret that Shames Humanity*. This was followed by an article on Soviet-held U.S. POWs in the February 1990 *Veterans of Foreign Wars Magazine*.

In the Sunday Oregonian on December 2, 1990, I wrote the first article to appear in a major metro daily American newspaper on the full history of Soviet-held U.S. POWs from World War I, World War II, Korea, to the Moscow-bound American POWs of Vietnam, assembled from a secret parallel prison system at the Soviet interrogation camp, Tentacle MB at Sam Neua, Laos.

From 1989 to 1991, at the instigation of Senator Charles Grassley and others, I assisted the Senate Foreign Relations Committee Republican staff in their POW/MIA investigation with my research and human sources. And I thoroughly documented the historical section of their May 23, 1991 final report on U.S. POW/MIA policy with declassified U.S. records dated from 1918 to 1980.

Approximately 300 of my declassified U.S. documents were turned over to investigative journalists in the old Soviet Union at the beginning of 1991, and this resulted in several articles published in the Soviet press before Mikhail Gorbachev left office. And later in the year I turned over these same documents to the Disabled American Veterans.

Many of these documents supplied by me were subsequently published by your select committee in November 1991. On July 4, 1991, American Independence Day, I had published an article in the Washington Post, a 70-year-old hostage crisis, which the Post introduced with their own editorial the same day calling for the formation of this select committee.

Of some 25,000 or more American POWs of three major wars since 1945 who came under Soviet and Soviet surrogate control but were never released, many no doubt died in captivity. But to claim all of them are dead defies logic unless they were murdered by Stalin's or Mao Tse-tung's or Ho Chi Minh's successors. The same

must be said for many thousands more British, Commonwealth, French, Dutch, Belgian, and other Allied POWs and displaced persons who vanished in Soviet control in 1945.

The outgoing Bush-Quayle administration should focus on the recovering of live ex-prisoners in its remaining months and the new Clinton-Gore administration should end this tragedy by openly negotiating for all surviving U.S. ex-POWs. It would be premature to reward the Hanoi regime with U.S. diplomatic recognition until the prisoner and missing issue is truthfully resolved.

If, as Ambassadors Strauss and Toon have indicated, the Russian intelligence organs are not cooperating with President Yeltsin in locating American ex-prisoners of war on former Soviet territory, he should exert his authority. Former Soviet officials should not fear retribution if all survivors are allowed to return to America. The United States should continue to supply information on Soviet MIAs of Afghanistan and of earlier cold war conflicts.

I have written a fully documented book on communist-held U.S. POWs since 1918 entitled *Moscow Bound*, an edited version of which I published myself and turned over to this select committee when I testified in July of this year. I have been informed that it has been used by members of the U.S.-Russian Commission on POWs and others, so I hope that my statement here today will call attention to vital unpublished information about U.S. POWs and MIAs, and that my work will get the attention it deserves, even if it might be perceived by some as embarrassing to current or past U.S. officials.

Thank you for giving me the opportunity to appear before you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Brown follows:]

To the Chairman and Members
of the Select Committee on POW/MIA Affairs:
Washington, D.C., November 10, 1992

My name is John M.G. Brown. Like several members of the Committee, I served in Vietnam; in my case as a rifleman with the 1st and 9th Infantry Divisions from 1967 to late 1968, when I was wounded in action. Prior to my Vietnam service I had been made aware by Korean War veterans that many American POWs had been withheld by the North Koreans and by the Chinese Communists in Manchuria. Between 1979 and 1983 while a commercial fisherman and guide in Alaska, I learned that the communists had withheld U.S. POWs in Vietnam and Laos. I began to investigate the POW/MIA subject while researching my first non-fiction book on Vietnam, Rice Paddy Grunt, and helping support a private intelligence-gathering network in Southeast Asia. I also acquired much information from witnesses at previous Senate hearings, from declassified U.S. documents, and from a series of 1986-87 meetings with senior U.S. officials. On Oct. 2, 1986 then Vice President George Bush encouraged me, in a letter to my father-in-law, Mr. Anthony Drexel Duke, a trustee of Duke University, to assist Mr. Ross Perot and to pursue my POW/MIA investigation wherever it might lead, and I quote President Bush, ".....on the assumption that our men are alive." At the time I hoped these were Mr. Bush's heartfelt words.

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My research among thousands of recently declassified U.S. documents revealed that since the 1918-1921 Bolshevik period, the Soviets and their later surrogates always demanded diplomatic concessions or financial aid for the release of U.S. and Allied war prisoners and civilian hostages they publicly denied holding. The repatriation of Russian and Soviet prisoners in Allied control during WW I and WW II was also of great importance, but my research indicates that it

was the Soviets who first initiated the reprehensible policy of secretly withholding war prisoners in the 1918-1919 period. Although many of these American POWs were seen alive by an eyewitness a decade later in Moscow's Lubyanka prison and the Solovetsky Archipelago forced labor camps, Congress was misled by U.S. intelligence about their existence, and they were never freed, even after the U.S. recognized Stalin's Soviet regime in 1933 under President Franklin D. Roosevelt.

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Thank you for giving me the opportunity to appear before you.

John M. G. Brown - Page 3

JOHN M.G. BROWN
BOX 30
PETROLIA, CA 95558

May 7, 1992

To: FAX # 202-224-2300
For: Colonel William LeGro
Attn: Senator John Kerry, Chairman
Senate Select Committee on POW/MIA Affairs
U.S. Senate, Washington, D.C. 20510

Number of pages (1)

Subject: Memo concerning the necessity for declassification of U.S. POW/MIA-related documents and importance of historic U.S. POW/MIA precedents, as requested.

The conclusions I drew in my 133-page POLICY, POLITICS AND THE POW/MIA DILEMMA report, which I sent to the Chairman and to President Bush, based on years of careful research among thousands of declassified U.S. documents and upon human sources, are that the Soviet regime (and Soviet-surrogates) have illegally withheld U.S. (and western Allied) POWs and secretly-held MIAs or presumed-killed soldiers after the WW I Intervention in Russia, World War II, the Cold War, Korea and Vietnam. These American prisoners totaled many thousands, but their existence remained officially secret due to the fact that nearly all substantial information about them remained classified from public view for decades. Human skeletal remains were sometimes assigned to the names of missing U.S. soldiers reported alive in Communist control. The 30-year declassification order and the Freedom of Information Act resulted in substantial information on this matter becoming part of the public record in the late 1980's, but much critical information on American POWs remains classified under authority of the National Security Council, Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), U.S. Army Intelligence and Security Command (INSCOM-NSA), Department of State, Department of Defense, the Justice Department- (Federal Bureau of Investigation) and others, despite Freedom of Information Act requests and appeals by researchers such as this writer. (A full record of these requests and appeals will be supplied to the Committee upon request.) The evidence would tend to indicate that many American POW survivors remain in Russia and the former Soviet Republics such as Kazakhstan, in Communist China, North Korea, and in Indochina. It is possible that at any time a surviving American POW of WW II, Korea or Vietnam may appear publicly in Russia, or in another former or present Communist nation.

The continuous classification of all documentary and human source evidence of Communist-held U.S. POW/MIAs after each war since the precedent-setting 1919-1929 north Russia POW/MIA cases has ensured that U.S. policy towards secretly-held American POWs has remained essentially unchanged after four wars. Presidents Wilson, Harding, Hoover, Roosevelt, Truman, Eisenhower, Kennedy, Johnson, Nixon, Ford, Carter, Reagan and Bush have successively been faced with this dilemma, and during the 1945-1990 Cold War confrontation- which became a nuclear standoff, "national security" was used as justification for continued classification of much U.S. POW/MIA evidence. This classification can no longer be justified with the collapse of the Soviet empire and emergence of a post-Communist Russia. Until the United States Government in some way reveals that many American POWs of several wars remained behind in Communist captivity, it is unlikely that the former or present Communist nations will publicly release the surviving American ex-POWs. The best opportunity in U.S. history, to accomplish such mass-declassification, has been afforded by the current bipartisan Senate Select Committee on POW/MIA Affairs. Such action would ultimately do much to restore public confidence in government. In my view as a researcher and author, it is most important that all remaining classified details (including decoded enemy signals) of the historic precedents of 1919, 1945, 1953, and 1973 be declassified and presented simultaneously by the U.S. Senate, so that no particular President bears an undue portion of responsibility for this seven-decades-old problem. Thus could Congress assist the Executive Branch.

T/Fax 202-224-2300 Personal Add: Col. William Leoro
To be entered in the record as evidence. John M. Brown
P. 1 of 2

JOHN M. G. BROWN
 P.O. BOX 30
 PETROLIA, CA. 95558
 (707) 629-3547

May 8, 1992

Mr. Robert Gates
 Director of Central Intelligence
 CIA
 Washington, D.C. 20505

Dear Mr. Gates:

I sent in your care on April 9 a letter to President Bush dated April 9, 1992, and my 40,000-word study of Communist-held U.S. POW/MIAs entitled: POLICY, POLITICS AND THE POW/MIA DILEMMA (condensed from my unpublished book MOSCOW BOUND). I also supplied this as a briefing-book for Senators Kerry and Smith of the Senate Select Committee on POW/MIA Affairs. It is my intention that this be considered my report to President Bush of my years of investigation and research into the POW/MIA matter, which he urged me to pursue. In an October 2, 1986 letter to Anthony Draxel Duke of New York, no matter where it might lead, "on the assumption that our men are alive." At the time I considered this letter to be a mandate, in Mr. Bush's own heartfelt words, and I have sent it to all who originally received my POLICY, POLITICS AND THE POW/MIA DILEMMA manuscript. I believe it is important to note for the future, within the history of the POW/MIA matter, that even a Vice President or a President, encircled as all of them have been by constraints of policy, politics and national security, can still encourage an effective independent investigation of a national problem that seems to defy resolution.

I have published the findings of my investigation in the December 1986 and October 1991 American Foreign Policy Newsletters, in the September 15, 1990 and July 4, 1991 Washington Post, The December 2, 1990 Sunday Oregonian, February 1990 VFW Magazine and other publications. In addition, at the request of Senator Charles Grassley, I thoroughly documented the historical section of the May 23, 1991 Senate Foreign Relations Committee Republican Staff Report on POW/MIAs with recently declassified U.S. and British documentary evidence dated from 1918 to 1980, and supplied several critical human sources to that investigation. I have continued to supply evidence to the current Senate Select Committee on POW/MIA Affairs at the request of Senator John Kerry and Senator John McCain, and I also sent a list of the names of 20 Americans reported by NSA in February 1973 as transferred to the Soviet Union and Communist China, in a letter to Secretary of State Baker of December 31, 1991. I have found it to be extremely difficult to get a fully-documented piece on U.S. POW/MIAs published in the United States, and I have kept a record of all my efforts over the years, which I will make available to the Committee upon request. I have attempted, unsuccessfully, to have this 40,000-word study published as a major magazine article, in a number of prominent U.S. publications which had already declined to publish medium or short length, edited versions of it, although accompanied by

1: 2 of 2

substantiating declassified U.S. documentary evidence and confirming human sources, and in several cases, the enclosed October 2, 1986 letter from George Bush.

Mr. Anthony Draxel Duke of New York forwarded his copy of this report for President Bush through an assigned Presidential aide, Mr. Gregg Petermeyer, but has not been informed whether the President received it. Likewise, I received no acknowledgement from your office that the copy I sent to you for Mr. Bush was received. I am enclosing by certified mail another copy, in the event that the first one did not reach you, and I hope you can give me some assurance that the President actually receives the full report and attached articles, since he himself encouraged an independent investigation of the matter. (If it is published I intend to include certain substantiating footnotes.) I also enclose, for your information, a copy of a one-page memo on classification of U.S. POW/MIA related documents, and on conclusions drawn in this red briefing book, which was requested of me by the Senate Committee.

Regards,

Confidential Copy to: Anthony Drexel Duke (only)
 File # 516-759-1758
 Senate Select Committee
 Personal Col. eln: 1660
 202-224-2300

JOHN M.G. BROWN
 P.O. BOX 90
 PETROLIA, CA. 95558
 (707) 629-3547

June 21, 1992
 Page 1 of 2

The Honorable President Boris Yeltsin
 c/o the Russian Military Attache
 Attn: The Consul-General of Russia
 San Francisco, California, USA
 Hand Delivered - to: *Aleksandr Suchkov (unnegon)*

Diplomat in Charge
San Francisco Consulate-General of Russia
24 June 1992 - witness: Josephine Duke Brown

Dear Sir,

The great statesmanship and vision you have demonstrated to the people of the United States and Russia, and to all the world, by addressing the American Congress on the subject of U.S. military prisoners of war remaining under control of authorities of the former Soviet Union after WW I, WW II, the Cold War, Korea and Vietnam is of historic consequence. I will entrust to your Consulate-General this letter and attachments consisting of two memos by this writer: #1 dated June 18, 1992, and #2 dated June 20, 1992, forwarded by my wife Josephine's father, Anthony Drexel Duke, and by her uncle, former U.S. Ambassador Angier Biddle Duke to his old friend and colleague Ambassador Robert Strauss in Moscow, following your recent speech in Washington, D.C.

These memos contain expected locations in the former USSR of American prisoners of war from Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia from my best source, Mr. Jerry J. Mooney (former 20-year NSA analyst), who were, according to decoded NSA monitoring of Vietnamese radio transmissions and U.S. tracking of Soviet aircraft, subsequently sent to the USSR, possibly after agreeing to cooperate with the KGB and GRU. (In and around Tyre Tam, Kapustin Yan, Sary Shagan, Novosibirsk, Shull, Semipalatinsk, and Ural'sk, also: KRASNODAR (ICBM missiles, telemetric work, and a Soviet military/industrial think tank); BAKU (carrier a/c landings and other specialties - may be ex-POWs of WW II, Korea and Vietnam in vicinity); ALMA ATA and environs, and again in and around NOVOSIBIRSK, which should also have surviving U.S. and other western Allied ex-POWs of WW II, Korea, Cold War and Vietnam. Also listed are examples of locations of earlier Soviet-held U.S. POWs of WW II, the Cold War and Korea, reported by eyewitnesses who reached the west, but kept classified by the United States Government until the 1990-1991 period, when they were declassified through Freedom of Information (FOIA) request to U.S. Army Intelligence and Security Command, a component of the U.S. National Security Agency. Such as: In and around WW II/Cold War/Korea U.S. POW locations at MAGNITOGORSK where, according to recently declassified (May 1991) INSCOM-NSA documents, in 1952 there was a special camp EXCLUSIVELY FOR WESTERN ALLIED OFFICERS (including American), and TSCHURBAI-NURA, reportedly 40 kilometers sw of KARAGANDA which contained a SPECIAL CAMP FOR FOREIGNERS (including American) in May 1955, and NOVOSIBIRSK administration, Camp 311 near Krasnoe, Siberia containing 1,100 American, British and French POWs (200 U.S. POWs) August 1947 (declassified by INSCOM-NSA 20 Sept., 1991).

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J.M.G. Brown Page 2 of 2

Other examples of older known locations for U.S. POWs recently declassified by U.S. INSCOM/NSA include: OMSK, CHELYABINSK, VERCHNI-URALS, TAISHET, VORKUTA, TOMARI (glush)- SAKHALIN, GORKI, KARAGANDA, NARINSK- (lower Yenisei), NORILSK, No.8 near SARANSK, KIROV- (9 U.S. pilots from Korea January 1955), NAIZURA- (American POWs just arrived from Korea in USSR), KHABAROVSK (12-13 intelligence aircraft POWs 1953-54) and STALINGRAD (see also locations in my March 1992 enclosed red briefing-book: Policy Politics & POW Dilemma). Based upon my years of research and analysis I believe there should be several hundred to 1,000 or more American ex-POW survivors of WW II who were taken to the USSR, including many native-born Americans, some foreign-born and some Jewish-American.

Also enclosed is my red-bound 133-page, 40,000 word briefing-book entitled: POLICY, POLITICS AND THE POW/MIA DILEMMA, which is condensed from my unpublished book MOSCOW-BOUND (eight times as long) which I supplied to Senators Kerry and Smith of the Senate Select Committee on POW/MIA Affairs in March 1992. I also sent this as an interim report to President George Bush, of my investigation of the POW/MIA matter which he encouraged me to pursue, and to assist Mr. Ross Perot's investigation, in an October 2, 1986 letter to my father-in-law, Mr. Anthony Drexel Duke of New York, "on the assumption that our men are alive." (This letter is reproduced at the beginning of the enclosed red-bound 133-page report.) In addition there are enclosed examples of most of my published articles on the subject, which also reflect the efforts of my research-colleague, Mr. Thomas V. Ashworth, such as: The Washington Post of July 4, 1991, Sunday Oregonian of December 2, 1990, February 1990 VFW Magazine and the December 1986 and October 1991 American Foreign Policy Newsletters.

I do not intend to publish my fully-documented and annotated book until after the conclusion of ongoing historic events. I would like to be informed if Russia or the Commonwealth of Independent States believes any former Soviet POWs or captured civilians remain in U.S. control. My own U.S. Infantry platoon in Vietnam captured a slightly-wounded non-Vietnamese appearing prisoner in combat during July 1968, near Song Be River, III Corps zone, RVN, who claimed to our interpreter in poor Vietnamese to be a Soviet adviser to the North Vietnamese Army. I do not know what became of him after he was evacuated by helicopter, but he was interrogated by U.S. intelligence, not identified as a Soviet, according to Battalion records of the 1st Battalion, 16th U.S. Infantry, 1st Infantry Division. In the National Archives, for July 1968 (consulted by the writer in 1984.) I do not know whether he may be alive somewhere in America with a new identity, but may wish to visit his homeland and be received with the honor due to him. I have some personal knowledge of small numbers of American POWs from Vietnam reported as secretly returned to the U.S. and given new identities and have informed the Senate Select Committee. I also am personally uncertain whether any American ex-POWs of Vietnam or earlier wars have been secretly returned to the United States from Russia or C.I.S. territory in recent times, including 1992.

Please excuse my lack of knowledge of the Russian language. My 17 year-old son, John M.G. Brown III, is studying Russian at the University of California this summer, and plans to visit Russia on a senior high school trip next year.

With highest regards and with hope for the future.

Together with 300+ declassified
 U.S. NW-related documents & books. Amb

(The Russian "diplomat" referred to above
 is)

EMBASSY OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
MOSCOW

OFFICE OF THE AMBASSADOR

July 9, 1992

Mr. John Brown
P.O. Box 30
Petaluma, CA 95558

Dear Mr. Brown:

I just received a letter from Mr. Anthony Duke, together with a copy of your recent memorandum on "Soviet-held POWs," as well as a copy of your July 4, 1991 Op-Ed piece in the Washington Post, which, by the way, I thought was very powerful. I immediately passed your memo to the appropriate members of my staff, who, you may be interested to know, are working nearly full-time on the POW-MIA issue. I can assure you that we will look at your information very carefully and follow it up as best we can. You should know that we are doing everything humanly possible to assist Ambassador Toon and his people to find answers to the questions that remain and to finally put this matter behind us.

I realize you may be skeptical, but I promise you, there is no higher priority for us than to face up to this issue and to fully resolve it, if possible. I also believe that President Yel'tsin is equally committed to resolving it, openly and honestly however painful it may prove to be for him and his country, although I should add that not all the bureaucrats in his government feel the same way, and so it will be a struggle to get from them all the information we need. We won't give up though.

With best wishes.

Sincerely

Robert S. Strauss
Robert S. Strauss

Vice Chairman SMITH. Thank you. Mr. Ashworth.

TESTIMONY OF THOMAS ASHWORTH, RESEARCHER, AUTHOR,
SPEAKER

Mr. ASHWORTH. My name is Tom Ashworth. I'm from Fort Smith, Arkansas. Yesterday you had a gentlemen who worked for the RAND Corporation say that he could be blunt because he didn't work for the Government. I not only don't work for the Government, I work for no one who's paid by the Government, I can be even more blunt.

You have a statement by me, 16 pages, that details information that I and John Brown and Jim Sanders have developed over the last half decade. I'm only going to touch on it briefly at this point, but what that says is essentially this.

One, I come from a family who has a proud history of serving this country from the Revolutionary War forward. I am proud that when my time came I also was there, and I am proud of my buddies who were there, and especially proud of the ones who died. Yesterday was the birthday of my Marine Corp. Today is Veterans Day, a day that honors all who have died, all who have served this country. What I'm about to say I say to honor the service of all these people.

Beginning in 1919, the Soviets made a decision, Lenin and the Central Committee, to hold an American as a hostage to force concessions from the United States. It continued all through the years. During World War I, following World War I, this Government made a decision to not make public that information. During the 1930's when American civilians were consumed, apparently by the hundreds, our Government knew that this was occurring in the Soviet Union. They knew what Stalin's great terror was doing, but a decision was made by our State Department to not warn Americans about what was going on. It's intolerable, but it's the truth.

Then when World War II comes, should we be surprised that the communists used the same tactics with us that they had used in prior years, by that time for almost 2 decades, 2 decades of hidden history. Should we be surprised?

Why is it that three researchers paid not a dime by anyone came up with information on this when a whole half century of historians, many working at America's greatest universities, have ignored these things. Many funded—people, organizations, like the RAND Corporation, and one thing that Mr. Cole—I want to point out about his statement yesterday. He is paid—he's paid by this Government to come to you and to tell—give you good, valid information on our missing and our prisoners unreturned.

Are you aware that the RAND Corporation has done studies on this in prior years which have not been made available to Mr. Cole? What are you paying for? What's this Government about? What's the RAND Corporation about? I've even heard that Mr. Cole or another member of his staff has expressed a problem, the problem being that the Pentagon wanted to make sure that his statistics matched theirs. If that's the object, what do need the RAND Corporation for?

The DIA has repeatedly lied to this committee. It's known by the committee members and it's tolerated. We're talking about living Americans abandoned by their country. Can the Senate take action against people who act improperly when they work for this Government? Look at the Tailhook problem. Look what happens when people are physically manhandled. You force admirals to resign. The Secretary of the Navy is gone.

Over and over and over, people have been humiliated and forced out, some justifiably so. But if they help an enemy cover up the destruction of living American servicemen, what happens to them? They receive their pensions, they receive glory, they're repeatedly called to testify and to repeat and to regurgitate their lies.

I became involved in this in 1983 through personal contacts with the Defense Intelligence Agency and I have personal knowledge—I'll not go into it here because you know through my deposition—about my treatment by the Defense Intelligence Agency, their treatment of the informants, the Laotian informants who gave them information. It's despicable, it's criminal, and it's evil, and it's tolerated.

The Senate, I testified in 1986, has known about this at least since that date. We're talking about prisoners from Korea. We had a man testify yesterday that testified in front of a Senate committee in the early 1960's. They always knew, this Senate has always known, but it's classified the information.

We have a problem and a serious one. I—in preparation for my testimony, I reread some of the speeches made by some of America's great heroes and I want to read one paragraph from a speech made a man named John Hancock, who was a great hero from a great State. In times past we had leaders in this country who would stand up and not tolerate injustices by their own Government. I would like to read to you what—in part, small part, what John Hancock said about his leaders who in some way tolerated or participated in the murder of American heroes. Some of this will be paraphrased to put it in modern language.

You dark, conniving criminals, you murderers, you who have killed your brothers, how dare you tread upon the earth which has drunk the blood of slaughtered innocents shed by your wicked hands. How dare you breathe the air which carried to heaven the groans of those who fell victim, a sacrifice to your blind ambition.

But if the good earth does not expand its jaws, if the air you breathe is not commissioned to be minister of death, you hear this and tremble. The eye of heaven penetrates the darkest chambers of the soul, traces the leading clues through all the dark passages which your industrious criminality has devised. And you, however you may have screened yourselves from human eyes, will be arraigned. You will lift your hands red with the blood of those slaughtered patriots before the tremendous judgment bar of God.

Based on this country's performance for the last 70 years, I am no longer convinced any committee, even this one, will touch at the heart of what's going on. I am concerned when I read in American papers about staff members going to Vietnam and talking to the Vietnamese about how this issue can be written off. I hear stories, true stories, about members of the committee talking to the DIA about how best to handle this.

I am ashamed and all America should be ashamed. And we should honor those people who have served this country, we should bring home those who still live, and if we do not have the courage or the integrity to do these things, then surely the judgment of a just God will rest on this country.

Thank you.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Ashworth follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF THOMAS V. ASHWORTH

Mr. Chairman, members of the committee: My name is Tom Ashworth. I am from Fort Smith, Arkansas, where I live with my wife Jane and our three children. I appreciate the opportunity to present evidence which I've developed with the assistance of many friends on abandoned American prisoners of war.

Today is a special day for me. November 10 is the birthday of my Marine Corps—a Corps of American patriots who have been honored to serve their great land for over 200 years—in wars popular and unpopular. All honorable Marines are committed to the death to support and defend the United States of America, its Constitution, and the people of our precious land. A significant part of that commitment is the loyalty Marines are required by tradition and personal honor to display toward each other. Marines do not abandon other Marines—not dead Marines and for damn sure not living Marines. From the time they landed on the shores of Tripoli, Marines repeatedly have demonstrated that they also do not abandon other Americans, be they service personnel or civilians. With these traditions and high standards in mind, 25 years ago I willingly and gladly joined the U.S. Marine Corps in order to serve my country during time of conflict—a divisive and unpopular conflict called the Vietnam war.

At that time I considered it my duty to serve my country as my relatives had done since the Revolutionary War. I was well aware that one of my direct ancestors had served under General Washington. I was proud that my grandmother's grandfather had served under General Grant and helped keep our good country one undivided land. I was proud that a grandfather had served with the American Expeditionary Force in France during World War I. I was proud that my father, who would become disabled because of his service, had served with the U.S. Army at Normandy, at Metz, at the Bulge and during the Battle for Central Europe. I was proud of an uncle who had fought as a teen-age Marine at Saipan and Okinawa. Twenty-five years later, I am proud that I served my country in Vietnam, flying 460 combat missions as a Marine helicopter pilot. I am today proud of a brother who has served as an Air Force officer for the past decade. And I am so very proud of my many buddies who chose to fight, and in many cases died, for freedom in Vietnam rather than avoid service.

But I am not proud that the political and bureaucratic leadership of the United States has a 70-year history of abandoning captured American servicemen and then covering-up their crass betrayals. I am not proud that Government officials have repeatedly proved themselves disloyal to the men and women who serve this great Republic. I am not proud of the pervasive secrecy which the Government has resorted to in order to hide history from the American people. I am not proud that the Congress of the United States has failed to this day to adequately address the repeated betrayals of American heroes. I am not proud that the Congress meekly accepts the lies of liars and coddles bureaucrats, civilian and military, who have a proven history of knowingly misleading the Congress and the American people. I am not proud that U.S. Federal Courts in effect have ruled that it is permissible for presidents to strip abandoned Americans of guaranteed citizenship rights without due process of law. And I am not proud that the honor man from my officer candidate platoon, Bernard Plassmeyer, remains on the "Vespy discrepancy list." I am not proud that American politicians and their attendant bureaucrats abandon to cruel enemies the sons and daughters of America.

To the ill informed, to the misinformed, and to culpable Government officials these statements are undoubtedly unsettling, unduly harsh. Let me explain my reasoning.

For years, I thought that loyalty in America was a two-way street—the people were to be loyal to their leaders and the leaders were in turn loyal to the American people. How wrong I was about our leaders. How bitter is the truth as stated by General George Patton: "There is a great deal of talk about loyalty from the bottom to the top. Loyalty from the top down is even more necessary and much less prevalent." No single issue better illustrates General Patton's disturbing observation

than the matter of Americans abandoned by their leaders to a life of slavery in Vietnam, Laos, North Korea, China and the Soviet Union. As we shall see, the problem began in 1919 and continues to this day. This Select committee is possibly the last chance to expose the truth, bring home those prisoners who still live, and prove to the American people and the world that our democracy still works.

As late as 1982, I was convinced that no American prisoners were left behind in Southeast Asia. I was uninterested in the subject because I was convinced that my country would not abandon those who loved America more than life itself. After being told of living abandoned American prisoners in Laos by several ranking indigenous CIA operatives who monitored the prisoners for the CIA, I tried and failed in repeated attempts to get the agency responsible for accounting for the missing (the Defense Intelligence Agency) to investigate information that showed that Americans in fact had been knowingly abandoned in Laos following the signing of the Paris Peace Agreement. I believed that current sighting reports of living American prisoners would seem more credible if it was responsibly demonstrated that American prisoners had in fact been alive in Laos throughout the war. The DIA personnel, however, were not interested in the information.

Between June and October 1983, the DIA absolutely refused to follow-up on the following information:

- (1) Substantial information possessed by indigenous CIA operatives which told of the captivity of a large number of Americans in Laos, none of whom were ever released.
- (2) Information possessed by General Vang Pao which described exact locations of American prisoners in 1981 and 1982, and a general location in 1983.
- (3) Information from a former ranking Hmong intelligence officer which identified the exact location of a large number of American prisoners then held in Laos (mid-1983).
- (4) Still another person had access to Communist Laotian officials who apparently would assist the U.S. Government in gaining the release of captive Americans.

The DIA proved unwilling to follow-up on any of the above information. Its representatives, however, would lie and claim that they had followed-up on all of the above. This is typical of the Defense Intelligence Agency—a Government Agency which has repeatedly proved itself unworthy of its high task of accounting for America's missing servicemen.

Because of my frustration with the Defense Intelligence Agency I repeatedly attempted to attain the assistance of my Congressman, John Paul Hammerschmidt. I could have done as well had I talked to a blank wall. Had Hammerschmidt and his staff been of assistance, in terms of knowledge and understanding of this tragic matter, we could have known as much about this subject in 1983 as we know today. But 9 years were lost because the good Congressman and his staff did not want "to raise the hopes of the families"—so they refused to act. And the deceit and treachery continued.

I also contacted Ann Griffiths of the League of Families. Although she told me that a person who was at one time a ranking Government official had told her that a "high level decision" had been made to abandon the American prisoners held in Laos, Ms. Griffiths proved willing to accept the inaction of the Government and made excuses for DIA's failure to follow-up on either historical or current information.

Additionally, at that same time (fall of 1983), news organizations such as CNN refused to investigate the real possibility that Americans had been abandoned in 1973.

Facing a stone wall of indifference by the DIA, the news media and my congressman, I decided to follow-up on my own. I felt that a serious research effort would reveal conclusive proof that Americans had been abandoned in 1973, and that such evidence would force the removal of the criminal elements at DIA who were blocking progress on the live POW issue. I was driven in this effort by my ever present memory of many friends who had died in Vietnam.

One of those friends, Staff Sergeant Karl Taylor, my platoon sergeant at Marine officer candidate school, died in Vietnam because he would not abandon wounded Marines under his command. Unable to retrieve four wounded Marines due to intensive enemy fire, Sergeant Taylor charged a Viet Cong machine gun position across an open rice paddy. He died so others could live. It's a demanding example, but one I cannot ignore.

Karl Taylor received the Medal of Honor for giving his young life for others. President Nixon would later state that he wanted to end the Vietnam war in such a

manner that men like Karl Taylor would not die in vain. Nixon then proceeded to abandon living American servicemen. Presidents and other Government officials may care little for the ordinary American who fights for his country, but I, John Brown and thousands upon thousands of other Vietnam veterans have made a pact unto death to honor the sacrifice of our buddies by bringing home those American captives who still wait for freedom.

By mid-1986, I had largely completed my research objectives and was recognized as a leading researcher on the live POW issue by much of the POW activist community.

During August 1986, I testified before the Senate Veterans Affairs committee about information I had on abandoned American prisoners and my knowledge of Government inaction. Again, I and others who testified would have better spent our time talking to a blank wall. The Senators appeared interested only in protecting the Government from criticism. A discredited DIA continued its criminal ways with no serious concern displayed by either the Senate or the House. Besides the lies, the one thing which remained constant was the pay raises for those who abandoned American servicemen and those who tolerated that abandonment.

Deeply disturbed by the obvious lack of concern over abandoned American prisoners by the Executive Branch, by Congress and by the news media, I remained committed to assembling my information and presenting it in a comprehensive format to those Americans who do care about missing service personnel. I failed to complete my work because of one man, Jim Sanders.

Following my 1986 Senate testimony, Sanders contacted me and later provided credible information which showed that thousands of American servicemen had been kidnapped by the Soviet Union at the end of World War II—with the full knowledge of American decisionmakers.

Initially, I was stunned by Sanders' findings and briefly considered dropping the whole matter. I asked myself, "How can an ordinary person with no resources fight year in and year out a massively corrupt Government with limitless resources supported by a legion of officials willing to do whatever is necessary to ensure that the American people never become aware of the sinister history of repeated betrayals of Americans by Americans. I, however, placed my complete faith and trust in a loving God and pressed on.

During 1986, Sanders had discovered hard evidence of the World War II betrayal of over 20-thousand American servicemen, but we didn't know why the men had been abandoned. By mid-1967, I had discovered that the Soviets had held American prisoners "liberated" by the Red Army from German war prisoner camps as hostages in order to force the return of Soviet citizens who fell into British and American hands during and at the end of World War II.

Sanders and I continued our research of wars prior to the Vietnam war through 1987 and into 1988. Jim conducted intensive research in the National Archives, while I primarily read historical works of the period. By the spring of 1988, I had read over 50 books which gave me a general knowledge of the historical setting of the World War II, Korean war and cold war betrayals. (During 1987, I also began a serious study of the possible betrayal of Americans captured in Soviet Russia during and following World War I.)

During the spring of 1988, John M. G. Brown and I teamed-up to conduct intensive research into prior wars. My close working relationship with Jim Sanders also continued.

In time I would go through many hundreds of thousands of pages of declassified documents held by the National Archives which either potentially or in fact pertained to the knowing abandonment of Americans by their Government. I eventually read over 800 books which pertained in some manner to the subject, conducted many interviews and read countless newspaper and magazine articles pertaining to the POW-MIA issue. A summary of my findings follow:

WORLD WAR I

1. At least several score American servicemen were captured by the Red Army during 1918-1920. They were used for propaganda purposes and as bargaining chips to force concessions from the United States. Of approximately 60 men captured in north Russia, fewer than 10 are known to have reached freedom.

2. The use of hostages by Lenin and his supporters to force concessions from their enemies perceived or real, foreign or domestic was commonplace. The first hard evidence I uncovered which shows that an American was held as a hostage to force concessions from the United States pertains to an American intelligence officer by the name of Xenophon Kalamatiano. Kalamatiano was captured and sentenced to death during late 1918. Lenin personally discussed the Kalamatiano case at an

April 18, 1919, Central committee meeting. Concerning Kalamatiano, the Central committee at that time pronounced the following: "In view of the possibility of using him as a hostage in negotiations with the Americans, it has been decided not to shoot him for the time being, but to keep him in prison." Kalamatiano was the first of thousands of Americans to be held as hostages by the Soviets over the years. He, however, was one of the lucky ones for he was released in August 1921.

3. American hostages were held in an attempt to force political recognition of the Soviet Union, to force the release of radicals who had committed crimes in the United States and had been imprisoned, and to force the U.S. Government to allow trade relations with the Soviet Union.

4. In mid-1921, the Soviets appealed to the United States to help feed countless millions of starving Russians. Lenin was desperate for outside aid lest his dictatorial regime disintegrate and fall. America agreed to help if Russia would release the American hostages. In return for approximately \$80 million in assistance, the Soviets publicly released a handful of captive Americans. (All were civilians except for one military "deserter.") Over 100 other Americans, many apparently dual nationals, later were secretly released. It is not publicly known if any of the secret releases were military personnel.

5. Russian prisoners who were returned to the Red Army were sometimes executed in mass.

6. Some captured Russians committed suicide rather than be turned over to the Communists.

7. In the end, the United States failed to recognize the Soviet regime. Possibly in retaliation, but for whatever reason, the Soviets failed to release two score or more American military captives.

8. Information on Americans captured during the 1918-1920 intervention, including eyewitness information emerged from Russia during the late 1920's and early 1930's. During the early 1930's, the U.S. State Department would claim that there was "no evidence" that Americans from the intervention were held in the U.S.S.R.—the same as the State Department now claims that there is no evidence that Americans are being held in Vietnam, China, the former Soviet Union, etc.

THE DISAPPEARANCE OF AMERICANS IN THE SOVIET UNION DURING THE 1930'S

1. During the early 1930's, scores of American firms pushed for recognition of Stalin's Soviet Union. According to countless businessmen and some politicians, that murderous regime was a country just like any other country.

2. Although the Lenin-Stalin regimes were not politically recognized by the U.S. Government between 1918 and 1933, U.S. business firms were permitted to operate in the Soviet Union. During the early years of the first 5-year plan, the United States became Stalin's primary trading partner. This economic cooperation allowed and facilitated the implementation of the 5-year plan which caused a marked increase in police state terror and mandated the formation of the great slave empire now commonly called the GULAG or the GULAG Archipelago.

In order to pay for American and other assistance, Stalin's secret police (known then as the CPU, later as the NKVD and still later as the KGB) took Soviet citizens as hostage then tormented them or their children until valuables were turned over to the Soviet State. Americans were being paid with money extorted from innocent people by means of torture. Even more disturbing, Soviet citizens, especially Ukrainians, were starved to death, in part, so that the food that they would have eaten could be sold in foreign countries in order to obtain hard currency so that Americans and others could be paid. Worse still, the Soviet slave empire was developed to support the economic plans and development made possible by American and Western assistance. Tens of millions would die in the horror which was aided and abated by U.S. business interests, the U.S. news media and the U.S. Government.

3. Specifics of American support and defense of Soviet Terror tactics include:

a. Although aware of the "valuta tortures," (valuta items were items of real value such as gold, silver, art masterpieces, antique religious icons, etc.) American news correspondents in Moscow failed to warn their Western readers of the reality of the situation.

b. Americans, including one newsman and businessmen associated with the American-Russian Chamber of Commerce, worked with the Soviet Government to hide the existence of slave labor camps in the Soviet Union.

c. American newsmen not only hid from their readers the great "terror famine" which cost at least 7 million lives, they also worked in successful concert to discredit newsmen who wanted to tell the truth.

4. Of the almost 15 million people murdered in the Soviet Union during the 1930's, some hundreds were Americans, primarily leftists who were considered by the U.S. Government to be citizens of both the United States and the Soviet Union.

5. The secret "arrest" (an act more closely akin to kidnapping in America) of American citizens living in the Soviet Union was always a problem. To address concerns about unjust Soviet imprisonment of Americans, President Franklin Roosevelt attained Soviet acceptance of a cosmetic agreement concerning Soviet responsibilities regarding informing the U.S. Embassy of the arrest of Americans. This was done in conjunction with the U.S. Government recognition of the U.S.S.R. in 1933.

The Soviets flaunted the Agreement, forcibly stripped Americans of their U.S. citizenship, executed Americans, and imprisoned Americans. Almost unbelievably, the U.S. State Department made a decision to accept the word of Stalin's henchmen concerning an American renouncing his or her citizenship. Additionally, the State Department made a decision to not warn Americans about the dangers the Soviet State presented to Americans.

Among the Americans who were destroyed in the U.S.S.R. during the 1930's were many dual nationals who worked on projects related to American business interests in the U.S.S.R. The American business firms proved willing to remain mute about the Soviet imprisonment and murder of their one-time employees. (Anyone who expects American business interests in Vietnam to be concerned about Americans held secretly in Vietnam would do well to investigate the complicity of American firms in the Soviet destruction of Americans murdered in the Soviet Union during the 1930's. Greed is the master of American business today as it was during the 1930's. Thus we now see numerous American firms lobbying for the opportunity to conduct business in Vietnam regardless of the fact that opening Vietnam up to American business, World Bank and IMF loans will certainly encourage Vietnam to order the murder of all Americans held in Indochina.)

In Moscow during the 1930's, many Americans were arrested after approaching the U.S. Embassy concerning the possibility of their returning to America. The Embassy gained the freedom of some arrested Americans but effectively abandoned many, many others. Why the U.S. State Department, the American news media, and American business interests failed to inform the American public about the Soviet reality remains "a mystery."

6. In 1941, the United States attempted to attain the release of six American prisoners held by the Soviets by exchanging the senior Soviet intelligence officer spying in America, Gaik Badalovich Ovakimian who only recently had been captured. Ovakimian went home in July 1941. The American captives were never released. (Some apparently fell into German hands and others were held back by the Soviets. But who cares?)

WORLD WAR II

1. Months before the end of World War II, the Soviet Government notified the American and British Governments that American and British POWs found in German prisoner of war camps would be held hostage to force the return of Soviet citizens captured or freed by American and British forces. (The Soviets also held hostage Swiss, Suedes, Dutch, Belgians, French and others for the same purpose.) This hostage situation would be kept secret for decades.

2. In the end, the Western states failed to return hundreds of thousands of people demanded by Stalin; and Stalin, true to his word, refused to return countless Western peoples, including thousands of Americans.

3. In February 1945, the Soviet Union signed individual secret pacts with Great Britain and the United States on the reciprocal repatriation of each others nationals. A policy of forced repatriation resulted from this agreement. Since Stalin planned on punishing a great many of his subjects who found themselves in the hands of the Western allies, it should not be surprising that many astute Soviets were reluctant to return to the horror which awaited them. Consequently, numbers of those too be repatriated killed themselves, and in some cases their wives and children. It was a horror, but the United States and Great Britain forced back over 2 million people. As many as 1 million of these people died as a result of being summarily executed or being worked to death in the slave camps.

4. Part of the Yalta agreement on repatriation concerned the right of the United States to send contact officers into the Soviet zone of operations in order to assist American prisoners liberated from German camps by the Red Army. The Soviets immediately violated this agreement by preventing American contact officers to perform their duties. Liberated American prisoners were often in some manner abused by their Soviet liberators. Some wounded allied soldiers were machine gunned by Red Army soldiers. Many were robbed. British women were raped. Cold and hungry

liberated American prisoners were sometimes ignored and provided no assistance. Other times, they were collected in filthy camps where provisions were minimal. And in Washington, a decision was made to prohibit the press from telling the American public about the Soviet treatment of American servicemen under their control.

5. Additionally, records from the National Archives show that significant numbers of Americans began to disappear while in Soviet custody during the January to April 1945 time frame. An interview conducted by Jim Sanders has confirmed that the U.S. Government was aware that the Soviets were kidnapping Americans. This the Soviets were doing openly and blatantly with no apparent fear of retribution from the United States. The number of Americans who disappeared while in Soviet custody at that time could run as high as 2,000 to 2,500.

6. During late April and May, the Red Army liberated as many as 50,000 Americans from German prisoner-of-war camps. Approximately 28,000 would return to the United States.

7. During April-May 1945, "liberated" Americans were held at gun point by the Soviets. The U.S. Government kept this a secret.

8. During mid-May, U.S. General R.W. Barker led a combined British-American negotiating team which unsuccessfully attempted to reach agreement with Soviet representatives on the repatriation of Soviet, British and American nationals. Following the negotiations Barker wrote a 23 May SECRET memorandum to Eisenhower's Chief of Staff in which he stated that the liberated American prisoners were being held "hostage" and used as bargaining chips by the Soviets. He expected the Soviets to make "a show" of releasing the Americans but did not expect the Soviets to release all the American servicemen they held. Eisenhower immediately sent a message to the War Department stating that all was well, and that the Soviets would soon release all Americans in their custody. The cover-up was on.

9. On May 19, General Eisenhower estimated that the Soviets were holding 25,000 Americans. Of that number, only 5,000 would be released. According to U.S. Government records, the Soviets had completed the repatriation of Americans by May 28. Two days later SHAEF medical personnel were still expecting 20,000 Americans to be released.

10. Then on June 2, Red Cross press releases previously approved by the State Department announced that 99 percent of the American captured by the Germans were on their way home. This was not true.

11. At the very time of the June 2 press releases stating that 99 percent of all Americans captured by the Germans were on their way home, American officials were asking the Soviets about 15,597 Americans being held in Austria by the Red Army. These Americans would never be released, but fake documents would be created to show that confusion in the highest commands had caused Russian prisoners to be mistakenly listed as British and American prisoners.

12. By June 5, American officers responsible for the recovery of American prisoners were announcing that the entire American prisoner group had been accounted for it was a lie. A U.S. Government document states that 6,595 Americans were listed as "not yet returned to military control" in Europe as of October 31, 1945—this was 5 months after the American people had been told 99 percent of the prisoners were on their way home. At the end of 1945, 5,414 Americans were listed as prisoners in Europe. Most of the records related to this have either been destroyed or are still classified.

13. Following the war, an organization of relatives of missing American servicemen organized and tried mightily to move the Government to account for the men lost in Soviet territory. Although they developed credible and accurate information on 20,000 Americans kidnapped by the Soviets, their efforts mattered little—politicians and the news media were not interested.

14. Following the war, U.S. intelligence agencies continued to collect information on American servicemen held prisoner in the Soviet Union. This information includes numerous sighting reports of the American captives. Many of these reports remain classified or otherwise hidden from the American people. The Executive Branch refuses to declassify the information because of potential damage to the national security, and the Congress refuses to demand the declassification of documents which in some cases are more than 45 years old. All the while, the U.S. Government maintains that there is no evidence that Americans have been held in the Soviet Union. And politicians wonder why the Government and politicians are no longer trusted by the American people.

And so it goes from World War I to the 1930s to World War II to the cold war to Korea to Vietnam.

Is anyone surprised? Hell no! Listen to the words of General Tighe, written in 1986 before Jim Sanders, John Brown or I found our first document on Americans held by the Soviets:

[Concerning motives of the Vietnamese and Laotians to hold American prisoners]

There has been one frequent and virtually unanswered question of defense and State witnesses before congressional committees: "What is the possible motive of the SRV and the Laotian government for the keeping of POW/MIAs?" Witnesses appear to be confounded and let the matter lie in the famous inscrutability of the east.

But history records the answer. The Russians, during and after WWII, and the Chinese during and after the Korean war expropriated American talent as a natural asset. The SRV and Laotian Governments have a similar motive.

Motives for balking on accountability by the Southeast Asia tri-nation, recalcitrance to account, is historically supported. The motives are political, monetary, technical, and include the acquisition of mere slave muscle.

The history of POWs in Russian hands in WWII, in Korean and Chinese hands in the Korean conflict equates with those of the Vietnamese, Lao and Cambodians in the Indochina wars. Motives follow an historic pattern.

In all three wars live prisoners were kept to take advantage of their superior technical know-how. (Even Garwood was a fixer of generators.) Men as muscle power and food producers in climates and places that challenge endurance are sought. The politically inspired motive of vengeance and the merit of hostages to fulfill "terms of the peace agreement" and promised "Reconstruction of the country" (flatly demanded as a precondition by the Lao before they will assist in POW/MIA accountability); and the patient waiting by officials used to benefit from bribes and corruptive practices, from the U.S.A.—a country that refuses ransom and bartering with bones—is a condition of virtual stalemate.

My family has lived in poverty for years in order to allow me to recreate the wheel. U.S. Government officials have always known everything. Our people die waiting on help that never comes. This Government, this committee continue to hide the true facts from the people of the United States. Documents you stated you would provide to the American people months ago remain in your locked safes. Documents which refute official Government lies are kept off the record. Americans die waiting on you to act. You do not need my testimony. You do not need the testimony of John Brown or Jim Sanders. You need to act. If the program of betrayal—advocated by businessmen, politician and bureaucrat alike—continues, the Vietnam war will never end. Bring all our prisoners home. END THE WAR! BRING MY BROTHERS HOME!

Vice Chairman SMITH. Quite a statement from all of you and I appreciate your comments, understand the frustration, and think you know that, speaking for myself, I have felt the same frustrations over the past several years. There have been examples of, as I have stated publicly before the committee, individuals from the Government who have not, in my opinion, told the truth based on the knowledge that I have had.

You are correct, I believe, that we seem to hold a different set of standards to other people. You mentioned the Tailhook thing. Justifiably you said, and I agree with you, the actions that were taken, but we seem to hold a different set of standards on this issue for the people who are involved with this issue.

And I agree with you and it is damned aggravating for me. I do not really know what to do about it. I hate to admit that it probably is bigger than this committee is going to be able to deal with in the time that we have. Our hands are tied. We have been given a year, and I am not asking for an extension of the committee because I do not think even the extension of the committee would be able to get the job done, but something bigger has got to be able to deal with this and we cannot seem to get to that point.

I think that the committee has done, I believe, a good job in getting at least access to files and information that we have not been able to get access to before the public. But it seems to leave more questions unanswered than it does answer, at least in my mind.

Mr. BOYLAN, I would like to start with you because you are the archivist here for the Government. I do not recall the date but it was early last year, mid-summer last year, June I believe. Someone from my staff went out to—this is prior to the formation of the committee, I believe; no, no, it was not, it was after the formation of the committee—and there were a huge number of boxes of classified materials relating to POWs from the Korean war. Are those—I do not know, 20-some boxes is what I was told, I do not know how many you have. But are those documents still classified?

Mr. BOYLAN. No, they're not. The bulk of them has been declassified. They were declassified within months of their review by your staffer because it was the most important collection we could find regarding POWs from the Korean. There are some that remain—actually, it's around 46,000 pages in that series of records.

Vice Chairman SMITH. So all the documents that my staff saw last year, last summer, in boxes there are now declassified.

Mr. BOYLAN. 99 plus percent, yes.

Vice Chairman SMITH. And then can be—so the committee, as well as the press or the public may have access.

Mr. BOYLAN. Anyone who is interested may look at them, yes.

Vice Chairman SMITH. Are there any other documents that you are aware of, relating to this issue, that are classified?

Mr. BOYLAN. Yes, there are.

Vice Chairman SMITH. Anywhere else in the Government?

Mr. BOYLAN. Every document that I was aware of regarding POWs/MIAs from World War II through Vietnam, I have either made available to the public or, if they were classified, have given the researchers enough information to file an FOIA to have them declassified. That is every document of which I'm aware, no exceptions.

Vice Chairman SMITH. Has any information, to your knowledge, or if you don't have direct knowledge of it have you heard of any information being withdrawn at any time—at any time, not necessarily now, but in the past. Has any information been withdrawn from those files on the basis of national security?

Mr. BOYLAN. Whenever we in the archives, on the instruction of agencies, have to withdraw a document because it cannot be released for whatever reason, we have to put in the place of that document a card which identifies with specificity the document that has been removed. A researcher using that particular file will then know that something has been removed and can, if interested, file an FOIA request for release of that document.

Vice Chairman SMITH. So has any been removed?

Mr. BOYLAN. Yes, Senator.

Vice Chairman SMITH. It has been.

Mr. BOYLAN. That is correct.

Vice Chairman SMITH. What has been removed?

Mr. BOYLAN. Mostly intelligence sources and methods. There are some documents that we've had to remove because release of them would constitute an invasion of personal privacy. In the case of the

Korean war, for example, the files relating to voluntary nonrepatriates and those who were accused of treasonous activity while incarcerated by the North Koreans, contain extensive medical histories, psychological profiling, job histories, educational histories, and so forth. That information is releasable to the individual who is the subject of that file. It would be releasable to this committee, but not to the general public.

Vice Chairman SMITH. So POW debriefings, for example.

Mr. BOYLAN. Most POW debriefings, from what I understand, were destroyed by the Government some 20 years after they were created. However, there are at least 6,000 pages of POW debriefings which still exist and which I've made available to many researchers, including at least one member of this panel, Mr. Sanders. There are other debriefings that are scattered throughout the approximately 95,000 pages of Korean war crimes case files in our custody.

Vice Chairman SMITH. On the basis of national security, and I just want to get it clear as to what was taken out of the files, POW debriefs?

Mr. BOYLAN. Virtually all of those were released.

Vice Chairman SMITH. They were released.

Mr. BOYLAN. Yes, Senator.

Vice Chairman SMITH. Except for the personal aspects.

Mr. BOYLAN. To the best of my knowledge, yes.

Vice Chairman SMITH. Do you have any CIA files in your possession?

Mr. BOYLAN. For the most part, no. We get the occasional CIA document that might be included in Army Intelligence files, for example, but nothing comprehensive. To the best of my knowledge that remains with the agency.

Vice Chairman SMITH. So it would be fair to characterize the status of files on the Korean war—tell me if I am wrong, if I am characterizing this wrong, but it would be fair to say that, as far as what you have in your possession, 99.9 percent is declassified but that there is information available in the CIA files that has not been declassified. Is that correct?

Mr. BOYLAN. That is correct. Yesterday I heard a number of speakers referring to archives and I think it important to note that not all records that are over 30 years old have been retired to the National Archives.

Vice Chairman SMITH. So there is a tremendous amount of information, whether it be CIA or NSA or whatever else, that has not been declassified on this.

Mr. BOYLAN. You're asking about documents that I've never seen, but for the most part CIA, NSA, and Army Counter-Intelligence, normally would not be retired to us after those records become 30 years old.

Vice Chairman SMITH. Do you have some questions that you want to ask? I do not want to take all of the time.

Chairman KERRY. Go ahead, or else I can ask some now.

Vice Chairman SMITH. Mr. Sanders, I want to—there is something that as I have gone through this, the Korean war situation, which I find to be strikingly different than the Vietnam situation,

at least to my knowledge, there may be something to this that I do not know about on the Vietnam war.

But you refer to it in some excerpts from your book and I, in the case of Mr. Markham, have also found the same thing, that there are people who are not on anybody's list, that are not on a missing list anywhere, they are not on an MIA list, they are not on a POW list, they are not on any Government lists yet they are missing. And I just want you to comment on it. Let me just give a couple of examples, and then you can take your comments, just to refresh your own memory because you have got a lot of chapters in your book there.

But there was, quoting from you: Lieutenant Colonel Thomas Harrison indicated that when he was transferred to Kang-dong, apparently camp number 8, on November 6, 1951, Lieutenant Colonel D.H. McClellan, U.S. Air Force, was the senior officer. Lieutenant Colonel D.H. McClellan is not listed as having returned on the Veterans Administration list of all POW returnees, nor is he listed on the publicly available Korean war casualty list. That is one example.

Harrison also indicated that Sergeant William Kennedy, U.S. Air Force, was hospitalized as a result of a forced march from camp 8. Sergeant Kennedy is also not listed as having returned, nor is he publicly on the available Korean war casualty list. Major David F. McGee stated that Captain Hamilton B. Shaw, U.S. Air Force, was sentenced to jail on charges of hostile activities. Captain Shaw did not return and is not listed as a casualty.

How prevalent is that in your research and do you have any explanation as to why that would—why we would have people missing that families know are missing, obviously, because they did not come back, why would they not be on a list? How do you know this?

Mr. SANDERS. Well, the names we pulled out, and there's a quite a number over and in excess of what's in the book or those that you read, are quite prevalent. We went through a small percentage of the debriefing reports and came up with the name, rank, and often serial numbers, of these people known to be POWs, Chinese control, sometimes Soviet interrogation, just disappear off the face of the earth.

We have at least a working hypothesis that there is another list out there because we dealt with such a small number of the debriefings and came up with such a large number of people completely unaccounted for anywhere, that I think it's a reasonable working hypothesis to say that there is a secret list out there probably with at least a few hundred names on it.

Whether those are people that we thought were held by China, the Soviet Union, I don't know. Maybe if I spent enough time inside the beltway breathing the inside-the-beltway air, I can come up with some better theories on that.

But the one thing we do know is there are a significant number of Americans absolutely known to have been in captivity and in good shape not accounted for anywhere, not on the Neil Henderson list, not on the big switch list, the little switch list, the 389, the 944, none of those lists. They just fall off the face of the earth.

Vice Chairman SMITH. Let me just ask you one follow up and then I will yield to my colleagues. What I am getting at is—as you know, the St. Louis fire which is referenced every time we cannot find anything in the Government, everything went up in smoke in St. Louis in 1973. But let us just say that—what I am trying to determine from your own research, and you have done a lot of it, is there any indication that this information may have been available and then was lost in the fire or were these names never turned up at all?

Mr. SANDERS. Now, this really wasn't the kind of information—it may have gone into individual jackets over there, but it would have been and should have been in the intelligence files, of the Army Intelligence and USAF Intelligence and all the intelligence files. We're assuming something other than total and complete incompetence here, and I'm sure that wasn't the case.

They're somewhere, it's just finding them is the problem. I'm still trying to trace it through USAF because I came up with some file codes and file numbers. And now, 2, maybe 3 years down the road, we're still not getting a response on it. But we're trying to develop a trail back to these people and so far I'm going to die of old age before we get there.

But a couple of things real quick. One, just in terms of POW records, there's a vast treasure trove of still classified documents going into the hundreds of thousands of pages in AFHQ files. There's something called the POWX War Room, that its mere existence no one knew about until I forced the documents out in 1989.

And the only documents I could get were the ones that described the function of the POWX War Room under Eisenhower, SAARF. The function of the POWX War Room was to be the central gathering house for all intelligence, all rosters, everything having to do with POWs. It started April 1, 1945. That centralized file is nowhere to be found so far.

Vice Chairman SMITH. How did you know that file existed? I missed that.

Mr. SANDERS. I don't remember how I first found out about it, but I did get a hold of the documents establishing its authority and creating it and outlining what its mission was.

Vice Chairman SMITH. Thank you.

Chairman KERRY. Thank you.

Mr. BROWN. Could I say something about this too? I think that it's important to look at noncombat losses in Korea, 20,000; and look at Air Force noncombat losses, over 5,000 Air Force noncombat dead. And my question is how did they die? And you may find some of these people that are held as prisoners were carried originally as noncombat deaths and they may have been taken prisoner when rear areas were overrun in communist offensives in Korea.

Chairman KERRY. We need to try to keep moving. We have got a number of Senators who I know want to ask some questions. But let me come to a couple of points, if I can. First of all, Mr. Cole yesterday testified that it was his belief that some people indeed were transferred to the Soviet Union. Is that correct?

Mr. SANDERS. Yes.

Mr. BROWN. Yes.

Mr. ASHWORTH. Seriously understated.

Chairman KERRY. Fine. But the basic premise remains the same. He understated the numbers based on his model. He said somebody else may be able to come up with another model. So he is not part of a cover up; he said some people were transferred to the Soviet Union. It seems to me he is arguing the same theory you are.

Mr. ASHWORTH. No. He's selectively using his information. He's purposely not told you about critical information on the subject.

Mr. BROWN. I agree.

Chairman KERRY. Which information has he purposely not told us?

Mr. ASHWORTH. Information from the Red Cross files.

Chairman KERRY. Any other information?

Mr. ASHWORTH. Well, this is information which shows—there are two particular documents, one from the fall of 1945, October 31st, many months after the war was over, which shows that there were prisoners not yet returned to military control. It's 6,595 from Europe, 6,595, but known prisoners of war who did not return.

Chairman KERRY. I understand. But is there evidence that they were transferred to the Soviet Union?

Mr. ASHWORTH. Well, there's evidence they didn't come home and they went somewhere.

Mr. SANDERS. Excuse me. Yes, indeed, there is evidence they were transferred to the Soviet Union.

Chairman KERRY. What is that evidence?

Mr. SANDERS. We have evidence out of Army Intelligence files in multiple cases where between 200 and up to 900 specific Americans, at specific times, liberated by the Red Army, loaded up, and shipped off to Siberia, to specific camps.

Chairman KERRY. These particular people.

Mr. SANDERS. These are particular people who—

Chairman KERRY. No, these particular 6,000 is what I am asking.

Mr. SANDERS. Yes. Well, he's talking about it. I've come up with the raw data on all of that.

Chairman KERRY. I mean it is awful easy to sort of confuse apples and oranges. We know that an awful lot of people were liberated from camps, quote liberated, and were transferred into the Soviet Union.

Mr. SANDERS. Well let me put this in perspective. We're doing this in such an ad hoc manner, it's got to be done a little more organized. But let me finish this one quick thing. Number one, six American POWs from German war camps, before they even left the United States to go to Germany and fight and before they were captured, they had photographs of themselves in U.S. military uniforms. They carried that into slavery.

Let me finish, it's important. They carried that into slavery with them. German POWs coming back from Siberia from the tank factories where these Americans were building tanks for Stalin in 1947 brought those photographs back out. And on the backs of those photographs are their parents names, addresses, their wives, all of that information. We got the pictures but we can't get a hold of the other information on it.

Now let's—

Chairman KERRY. That is as to how many, Mr. Sanders.

Mr. SANDERS. No, that's where I want to go next, but I thought that was an important point to make.

Chairman KERRY. But, no, answer me as to how many people are you referring to.

Mr. SANDERS. How many people?

Chairman KERRY. Yes.

Mr. SANDERS. Shipped to the Soviet Union.

Chairman KERRY. How many people was the information referring to that you just talked about.

Mr. SANDERS. In one case 200, in another case I believe it was 900. The photos, there was six photos.

Chairman KERRY. Six photos.

Mr. SANDERS. In a camp with 200 Americans.

Chairman KERRY. Correct, all right. So there were six photos, correct?

Mr. SANDERS. Correct.

Chairman KERRY. Of how many people?

Mr. SANDERS. Of six Americans.

Chairman KERRY. OK, so you have got six Americans. He is talking about 6,000 over here.

Mr. SANDERS. That's what I'm trying to get back to.

Chairman KERRY. And he is talking about a different 6,000.

Mr. SANDERS. Perhaps, and maybe not.

Chairman KERRY. OK, but we do not know. That is all I am trying to get at, folks. I am not fighting you. I am just saying let us deal with—you know, we throw numbers around and everybody kind of gets confused.

Mr. SANDERS. Well let's go to how the numbers are developed because that's where you've got to start.

Chairman KERRY. I asked if he could show and had proof that those 6,000 went to the Soviet Union. He said no, he cannot.

Mr. ASHWORTH. No.

Chairman KERRY. Can you prove that they went to the Soviet Union?

Mr. ASHWORTH. All 6,000, no. The documents he's talking about I got declassified in 1991. And in that same declassification effort I was turned down on four pages of other information over 40 years old that this Government says should not be made available to the American public on national security grounds. And this Senate and this Government has not moved to get this information to the American people.

Chairman KERRY. Look, we share—Senator Grassley will underscore—we share plenty of skepticism about our own Government's willingness to make documents available and we are fighting it continually. That is one of the main efforts of this committee. So I am not going to fight you about whether or not the Government is withholding stuff.

I just want to know, when you make a statement about the numbers, what the evidence is.

Mr. SANDERS. Senator, up to 23,500 Americans were held hostage by Stalin. We knew—we knew them by name, rank, and serial number almost without exception. Those people did not come home. The hostage crisis started in February 1945; the politics of it started before that. Between February and April 1945 we should

have had 5,159 Americans exit through Odessa on the Black Sea. We had 2,858 exit there.

That was a graphic warning by Stalin of what they were going to do. He then held 25,000 hostage on the western front. They were under his control. We had intelligence officers go in, get the rosters, we knew they were there. They were tabulated at the POWX War Room. Only 4,165 came back. Did they all make it to Siberia? We don't know. They were under Soviet control; we knew it.

Chairman KERRY. I realize we had—I am well aware that a very significant number of Americans were under Soviet control, no question about it. And the question, obviously, is how many were repatriated to where at what time. And the documents, I do not think, are clear on that.

Now I do not want to spend a lot of time on this point. What I do want to know is can we have your documentation?

Mr. ASHWORTH. You already have it.

Mr. SANDERS. Oh, absolutely. I dropped off two briefcases full—well, one a handful and one a briefcase full, over at—

Chairman KERRY. Do we have all the documentation at this point in time?

Mr. SANDERS. Well let me tell you, I gave them to Task Force Russia. Not everything. I have a roomful of documents. I'm trying to weed it down so you don't have to spend 6½ years looking at it like I did.

Chairman KERRY. Fair enough.

Mr. SANDERS. But I'll give you—if you want a roomful, I'll give you a roomful.

Chairman KERRY. This committee's task is not going to be capable, obviously, of processing all of this. What we are trying to do is guarantee there is a process in place to do it.

And I would simply like to know that, whatever it is, that either President Bush before he leaves office or President Clinton when he comes in, creates. And we are going to strongly recommend that something be created, that all those documents will be available so that they can process it.

Now let me come to another point in your testimony. You seem to make the assertion here that we approached Dr. Kissinger and company without historical precedent. I do not think that is accurate. I think the committee did an enormous amount of research and had all the French experience and the other experiences and made its own decisions about what questions and how confrontational we were going to be.

But you are making an assumption there about what the basis of our questioning was, and I can tell you personally that there was considerable knowledge about precedent, but a personal decision about what we would choose to confront on or not confront on. And I might note that of all 12 people here I was probably the only person who asked him some of those questions.

Mr. SANDERS. So you were already up to speed on the fact that Stalin made demands in 1944 and the negotiations that went on at Yalta and brought it all the way through.

Chairman KERRY. Frankly, it was irrelevant—

Mr. SANDERS. It's not irrelevant, it's highly relevant.

Chairman KERRY. Frankly, no, sir, none of that is relevant to the factual situation that we needed to explore with him about 1973. And we could have argued history through the entire day and never gotten to the question of what his knowledge was at the particular time he negotiated.

Mr. SANDERS. We're not asking you to talk to him about it. We're saying if you're not up to speed on all these things, you don't understand how the Soviets got to where they got to and how we got to where we got to.

Chairman KERRY. Sir, that is why you are here today and that is why we have your book.

Mr. SANDERS. And that's why I made that statement.

Chairman KERRY. Well, I take issue with the statement. You also make the point that up to 300 POWs from Vietnam were retained by the Soviets. What is your proof of that?

Mr. SANDERS. Well, I heard someone up here say that that document from 1982 out of the CIA was declassified yesterday.

Chairman KERRY. Up to 300 POWs from Vietnam were retained by the Soviets. What is your proof for that? Not what you heard yesterday; what is the proof? This is your conclusion in your statement.

Mr. SANDERS. OK. We have two NSA analysts and one other gentleman who all were knowledgeable of the Soviet interrogation center.

Chairman KERRY. Who were they?

Mr. SANDERS. Terry Minarcin, Jerry Mooney, and Dr. Pistelli.

Chairman KERRY. OK, now you quote Mr. Minarcin in your book, correct?

Mr. SANDERS. Yes.

Chairman KERRY. Would it surprise you to know that we have deposed eight individuals who Mr. Minarcin said could corroborate his testimony and not one of them have corroborated his testimony?

Mr. SANDERS. Excuse me, give me that one again.

Chairman KERRY. I am telling you that we have deposed, under oath, all eight people that Mr. Minarcin said would corroborate his testimony and not one of them has corroborated his testimony.

Mr. SANDERS. Jerry Mooney corroborated his testimony. Pistelli corroborated his testimony. And Minarcin, on the polygraph, passed that.

Chairman KERRY. Well, you do not cite—

Mr. SANDERS. Now, wait a minute.

Chairman KERRY. You do not cite Mr. Mooney in your book, you cite Mr. Minarcin.

Mr. SANDERS. We cite Mooney as well. He's in there.

Chairman KERRY. But not as a source for 300 POWs being transferred to the Soviet Union.

Mr. SANDERS. No, I'm telling you we're saying that there was a Soviet interrogation center at Rang Rang and we're taking the CIA's own document's word for it, in 1982, where they said that up to 300 Americans had gone to the Soviet Union. And, of course, you know that inside the Soviet Union there are more and more senior ranking KGB, GRU, and other types of people who are now starting to say that those things happened.

Chairman KERRY. But that is not true.

Mr. SANDERS. That is true.

Senator MCCAIN. Who are they?

Chairman KERRY. Who are they?

Mr. SANDERS. Mark Sauter has spent a good deal of time over there talking to these people.

Chairman KERRY. Who are they?

Mr. SANDERS. Well, unfortunately, he's not at the table. Maybe he'll bring me a note and give me some of the names.

Chairman KERRY. Well who, who? I mean your 300 people, this document. We do not have this document.

Mr. SANDERS. It says up to.

Chairman KERRY. Do we have this document?

Mr. SANDERS. Well somebody said yesterday—it was just declassified as of yesterday.

Chairman KERRY. Do we have this document?

Senator MCCAIN. Somebody said—

Mr. SANDERS. I was sitting in the audience, not taking notes, if you don't mind, all right.

Chairman KERRY. But your testimony to us today, under oath, says up to 300 POWs from Vietnam were retained by the Soviets. I am asking you for your proof of that.

Mr. SANDERS. I just told you.

Chairman KERRY. What is your proof?

Mr. SANDERS. I just went through it.

Chairman KERRY. Sir, you quoted Mr. Minarcin.

Mr. SANDERS. And the document, it footnotes the CIA document as being the source.

Chairman KERRY. Who footnotes it? In your book you footnote a San Diego article in the newspaper. In your book you footnote for the notion that somebody was there—chapter 16, footnote number 16, *ibid.* Number 15, U.S. pilot captured in Vietnam reportedly taken to Soviet Union, San Diego Union Tribune, February 28, 1992. That is your documentation.

Mr. SANDERS. Excuse me, I was speaking.

Chairman KERRY. I mean do you think that is a very good thing to do, to document a newspaper article.

Mr. SANDERS. Excuse me, I didn't hear what you were just talking about.

Chairman KERRY. The Soviets once—here it is. You say: The air crew, Majors Robert Morrissey and Robert A. Brown, were also sent to the U.S.S.R. at that time. The documentation for that is a San Diego Union Tribune, February 28 article in which it says: A U.S. pilot captured in Vietnam reportedly taken to Soviet Union. You report it in your book as a fact. You say they were taken to the Soviet Union.

Mr. SANDERS. Both Minarcin and Mooney also are the sources on that.

Chairman KERRY. Well we have not found Mr. Minarcin particularly credible. I mean eight people deposed and not one corroborated him, and these depositions will be made public.

Mr. SANDERS. That's fine, then they'll be made public. And I believe that Senator—I was told that Senator Smith did reference

this document that, unless I misunderstood what was being said, my understand was that the CIA document—

Chairman KERRY. I am not asking what Senator Smith referenced. I am asking—

Mr. SANDERS. Well you were asking me about it and now I'm telling you.

Chairman KERRY. I am asking you what you put out in your book. Your book says: The air crew were sent to the U.S.S.R. according to the former NSA staffers once in the Soviet Union, but then you reference a newspaper article. I am just trying to get the basis of this. I mean we are trying to deal with fact.

Mr. ASHWORTH. May I comment.

Chairman KERRY. Yes, sir.

Mr. ASHWORTH. On this, please. There is substantial information that Americans were taken to the Soviet Union. Some comes from Mooney, some from Minarcin. You may not—may choose to not believe. Vietnamese who have left the country have spoken of it. There is a Czech general, a defector, who works in the Pentagon who has told of it. He works for DIA, yet DIA says they've never heard of it.

I understand that sooner or—you know, maybe sometime very soon, does he not say that: Claimed that 90 Americans had been taken to the Soviet Union according to a recent press report. Works for the Defense Intelligence Agency, he supposedly is going to be deposed by this committee.

Chairman KERRY. He left in 1968.

Mr. ASHWORTH. That's correct. So what, the Vietnam war started before that.

Chairman KERRY. Every name that he gave has not checked out, and I do not mean that as a pun.

Mr. ASHWORTH. Well let's talk about not checked out. Yesterday Senator Smith talked about 54,000 dead from Korea. 54,000. I challenge this committee to tell me within 20,000 how many died in Korea. I challenge you to do it; it can't be done. And this Government—

Chairman KERRY. Sir, I absolutely agree with you. You see—

Mr. ASHWORTH. So if they're not on the list.

Chairman KERRY. Hold on one second here. Now, just understand something. I am trying to deal with numbers that get thrown around. I accept that some people went to the Soviet Union; I do not know how many. I am convinced people went to China. I am absolutely convinced some folks were left behind.

Mr. ASHWORTH. Do you believe that?

Chairman KERRY. So I accept that. I do not know how many, and I get really apprehensive where I hear people 40 years later throwing out numbers with certitude at a point where we just—I don't have that certitude. Now when you say to me 300 from Vietnam were—

Mr. ASHWORTH. I didn't say that.

Chairman KERRY. No, but Mr. Sanders did under oath. And his testimony says 300 from Vietnam—

Mr. SANDERS. No it doesn't, it says up to.

Chairman KERRY[continuing].—Were retained by the Soviets.

Mr. SANDERS. It says up to.

Chairman KERRY. Up to 300.

Mr. ASHWORTH. But when names aren't on a list.

Chairman KERRY. That raises even more questions, frankly, up to 300. So I am going to have a lot of vets running around banging on my office tomorrow saying, Senator, there is a book out that says 300 people were held. And you cannot prove it, I cannot prove it, and I am tired of people throwing numbers around and raising people's expectations on what?

Mr. ASHWORTH. Well, please, sir.

Chairman KERRY. Yes, please.

Mr. ASHWORTH. Do you believe that there's a secret list of the missing?

Chairman KERRY. Sir, I am asking you the questions. It is not up to me what I believe today. I will let you know what I believe in a report in 1 month when this committee finishes its work.

Mr. ASHWORTH. Thank you.

Chairman KERRY. Until then, I want to gather facts, not fiction.

Mr. ASHWORTH. Then let me give you a fact. There is a secret list of the missing. I have Government documents showing over 3,700 missing from the Vietnam war. That's a fact, a fact, and backed up on that document.

Chairman KERRY. What is the fact?

Mr. ASHWORTH. And this committee has had that document.

Chairman KERRY. What is the fact?

Mr. ASHWORTH. The fact is of 3,700 missing.

Chairman KERRY. 3,700.

Mr. ASHWORTH. From Vietnam.

Chairman KERRY. Are what?

Mr. ASHWORTH. What I said.

Chairman KERRY. Are missing.

Mr. ASHWORTH. Yes.

Chairman KERRY. What do you mean by missing?

Mr. ASHWORTH. I don't know, ask the Government.

Chairman KERRY. Well we have a list of 2,266 that we began with.

Mr. ASHWORTH. That's the problem, that's the problem.

Chairman KERRY. And you are saying there were many more than that.

Mr. ASHWORTH. I'm saying—not I'm saying it. I'm saying a Government document says it.

Chairman KERRY. Can you tell me why no parent, no brother, no father, no son, no sister, no wife has come to us and said my husband, brother, son, did not come back and the Government will not tell us.

Mr. ASHWORTH. Yes, I possible can explain that to you.

Chairman KERRY. You can show me an American who has not come forward.

Mr. ASHWORTH. I can show you Americans who didn't come forward for many years, because this Government had threatened—

Chairman KERRY. Now, wait, that is not what I asked you. I asked you, sir, is there an American parent or brother or father or husband today whose son or loved one is unaccounted for who is not on a list?

Vice Chairman SMITH. I talked to one yesterday from Korea.

Chairman KERRY. I am talking about Vietnam. Vietnam is what I am talking about.

Mr. ASHWORTH. Please, may I respond?

Chairman KERRY. I am not talking about Korea. You said Vietnam, sir.

Mr. ASHWORTH. May I respond?

Chairman KERRY. Yes.

Mr. ASHWORTH. Thank you.

Chairman KERRY. I have no doubt about Korea. I have said that before, but you said Vietnam.

Mr. ASHWORTH. May I respond, may I respond.

Chairman KERRY. Please.

Mr. ASHWORTH. Thank you. In 1968, Americans were lost at Pleu Patti, Site 85. Their families were threatened with 10 years in prison if they went public with information on that. I know multiple members from families of that group, and they were terrified of this Government, terrified.

Senator McCAIN. Bring us one. Bring us one, Mr. Ashworth.

Chairman KERRY. I agree. But I am saying to you, sir, are they not on the list? They are on the list.

Senator McCAIN. Bring us one family that was threatened with 10 years in prison.

Mr. ASHWORTH. 10 years in prison, how about Ann Hollin.

Senator McCAIN. I would like to meet that person.

Mr. ASHWORTH. Well, you will meet her.

Chairman KERRY. Sir, let me just ask you something. They are on the list.

Mr. ASHWORTH. They were not on the list for—

Chairman KERRY. They are on the list now. You said—

Mr. ASHWORTH. How many now aren't on the list? Do you think they added them all when they added some?

Chairman KERRY. You are saying to me—I do not want to make this contentious, I want to make this factual.

Mr. ASHWORTH. It's a fact there was a secret list.

Chairman KERRY. You are saying to me there is a list of 3,700 people.

Mr. ASHWORTH. I am saying your Government has provided me a document listing that many and I have back-up documents to support it.

Chairman KERRY. And you can provide this committee with a list of 3,700 people missing in Vietnam that we do not know about.

Mr. ASHWORTH. I can provide you a document, which has already been provided you, saying that there is—that there are 3,700 missing in 1973 after the war was over. If this Government classifies the information, it's not my fault. If this committee can't find out what's going on, it's not my fault, don't blame me for your shortcomings.

Chairman KERRY. That is not what you said, sir. What you said was that there was a secret list of 3,700 people outside of those published.

Mr. ASHWORTH. No. The 3,700 is a total number. The secret list would be between the 2,500 originally listed and the 3,700.

Chairman KERRY. So you are saying that there is a secret group of more than 1,000 people.

Mr. ASHWORTH. Based on Government information.

Chairman KERRY. Based on Government information.

Mr. ASHWORTH. Yes. Maybe the Government also lied about that. I don't know, they're good at lying.

Chairman KERRY. What is the list?

Mr. ASHWORTH. Your committee has it. John Brown, I believe, supplied it.

Mr. BROWN. We supplied many of these documents to the Foreign Relations Committee staff.

Chairman KERRY. Does any Senator here or staff have that list?

Mr. ASHWORTH. I believe it was December 1973.

Chairman KERRY. I am just trying to find out, does any Senator or anybody on the staff have this list? Does anybody on the staff have it?

[Pause.]

Chairman KERRY. Could I have this list still?

Mr. ASHWORTH. I have it in Arkansas.

Chairman KERRY. Can you get it to us within the next hour or so?

Mr. ASHWORTH. As I understand it, they have it. I couldn't get it in the next hour. You know I can't get there and back that quickly.

Chairman KERRY. Well I just figured somebody might be able to fax it up here or something.

Mr. ASHWORTH. Well, there's no one at the house where the list is.

Senator GRASSLEY. I would like to ask Mr. Brown if that was given to the Foreign Relations Committee because we do have two files full of stuff that has come from the Foreign Relations Committee.

Mr. BROWN. I turned over all those documents to the Foreign Relations Committee.

Chairman KERRY. Let me just say to you so that you understand the process, and this will be absolutely open to public scrutiny, when we release our report we are going to release every document we have that we are allowed to. And we are going to press for this on a continued basis.

We have taken every list that existed, every list we could get out of the military, every list that DIA had, every list DOD had, every list every group had. Every POW activist group gave us list. We have taken all those lists, created the broadest data base possible, compared every single name to the names of everybody who went to Vietnam, to the names of everybody on the Wall, to the names of everybody listed as a casualty, to the names of everybody as a POW, everybody as a MIA. And we have cross-tabbed them, compared them, and pared them down to a list.

And we have found a list that differs from DIA, differs from Pentagon. We made it public when we had our first hearing on lists. So when you say to me there is some secret list out there, 1 month before we finish your work, I must tell you, sir.

Mr. ASHWORTH. You should have called me earlier.

Chairman KERRY. I beg your pardon. You said you gave us the list. It is already factored into this.

Mr. ASHWORTH. Well as I understood it, nobody knew about it a second ago.

Chairman KERRY. Every list we have received has been factored in. Now I invite you, in the next week, to bring whatever this list is.

Mr. ASHWORTH. It's a document. It's not a list, it's a document, as I explained.

Chairman KERRY. Well, bring the document which will give us an indication of the existence of any lists. We do not want to leave any list unexamined.

Mr. ASHWORTH. Let me tell you this. The people on the secret list at one time had to give a code word, heavy grain, if they wanted to gain access. Maybe if you talked to Air Force casualty and other people, that they can assist you.

You should also look for a list of missing ground troops in North Vietnam. MACVSOG was responsible for North Vietnam, four provinces of China, Burma. There were starlight teams in Laos. Surely somebody went missing. None are listed as such. After MACVSOG became illegal and they came up with new names and they started using troops secretly on the ground in Laos and Cambodia, people went missing. They aren't on the list; where are they?

Chairman KERRY. That's correct, and that's been declassified I might add.

Mr. ASHWORTH. What are their names?

Chairman KERRY. All of that has been declassified.

Mr. ASHWORTH. Including their names and the missing?

Chairman KERRY. Yes, sir. What happened was this committee showed a number of months ago that the military lied about the location of death of many of those people, and that was one of the early findings of this committee, was that families were told that somebody on one of those kinds of missions had, in fact, died in a different location.

And there was much confusion, I think, created by that. I think you are absolutely right to put your finger on it as a source of contention here because it is a source of contention. But the committee has actually compared all those lists and—to the best of our ability, and I underscore to the best of our ability. I have no doubt that there are documents that may have been deep-sixed, shredded, lost, whatever, a long time ago.

Mr. ASHWORTH. That's what we're talking about right there.

Chairman KERRY. And that is the difficulty in this. Now let me just ask you one other thing. You made a comment about you have heard stories about people talking to the DIA and telling them what to do or something. Now where did you hear those stories?

Mr. ASHWORTH. I heard them from people who are knowledgeable on this issue.

Chairman KERRY. Well give me it a little more precise. Where did you hear that?

Mr. ASHWORTH. In Washington, DC.

Chairman KERRY. But where?

Mr. ASHWORTH. That's all I'm going to tell you.

Chairman KERRY. So you are not going to tell me that somebody on the staff of our committee talked to you about it.

Mr. ASHWORTH. No, I'm not.

Chairman KERRY. OK, but you are here to testify—

Mr. ASHWORTH. I am not going to tell you that the newsman talked to me about it.

Chairman KERRY. You are here to testify under oath, correct?

Mr. ASHWORTH. I am under oath and I just told you the truth.

Chairman KERRY. Did somebody on the staff talk to you about that?

Mr. ASHWORTH. I told you I'll not tell you if it's staff or newsman, because I have—

Chairman KERRY. So you refuse to answer who told you that.

Mr. ASHWORTH. Absolutely.

Chairman KERRY. OK. Let me deal with that right up front because I am one of the people who has talked to DIA and I have instructed staff of this committee to talk to DIA and I will not allow anybody to try to create a new conspiracy or some new notion, because this committee has done good work and we have pushed DIA to give us answers.

And I personally was responsible for pressuring and pushing to get an open hearing, a hearing the Defense Secretary did not want to have that we were initially refused. And I read the riot act and I made a number of phone calls instructing them as they ought to come in here, they ought to have blow ups, they ought to put the lie to it if that is what they think it is. And I am pleased with the work that I have done with regard to that and I am not going to have people trying to create new conspiracies. Our report will lay everything out.

And the reason I called them, and it is in the memorandum of my conversation, was because I was outraged by the scumminess of people who will not live up to their constitutional responsibility and oath in working for the Senate who take it upon themselves to leak material again and again and again solely to put out their point of view, not necessarily to put out what is factual. So I am going to take that on right up front.

Mr. ASHWORTH. Well let me say something then, again under oath.

Chairman KERRY. And as far as I am concerned, your unwillingness to tell the truth about who told you discounts a lot of your testimony, sir.

Mr. ASHWORTH. Let me say one thing, though, about that.

Chairman KERRY. I do not want to hear more from you, frankly.

Mr. ASHWORTH. It was not from a staffer of this committee.

Chairman KERRY. Well, now you want to answer but you do not want to tell us who. Frankly, the whole process of these leaks disgusts me.

Mr. ASHWORTH. If it weren't for the leaks, we wouldn't be where we are today. And, Senator—

Chairman KERRY. Sir, if it were not for the work of this committee, of Senator Grassley who helped get it declassified, of Senator Robb who pushed for it, of Senator Smith, who has pushed for it, of a group of bipartisan Senators who have worked without fail to get this story out to the public, of countless meetings that I have had with General Scowcroft and others insisting on declassification, of the efforts of this committee to force this process. Leaks are not what created this. It is the work of this committee jointly, and staff.

Chairman KERRY. Senator Grassley, do you have any questions?

Mr. BROWN. Could I address the question of 300, Senator?

Chairman KERRY. Absolutely.

Mr. BROWN. My understanding of the number 300 American prisoners reported shipped to the Soviet Union, it was an analytical number that essentially came from putting together information I learned from Mooney, from years and years of working with Mooney. And I want to go on record here today as stating that Mooney's list, his original list of prisoners of war held by the communists in North Vietnam who were not repatriated, was over 1,000. It's called the who to ask list, you're familiar with that.

And Mooney then was told by his superiors at NSA to pare down that list, to reduce it down to a number where they could prove that these people had been taken prisoner and that they have—that the communists would have certain knowledge of what happened to them. And he reduced that list to 450 or so. You're already familiar with this, right? Are you familiar with this, Senator?

Chairman KERRY. I am familiar. Let me say to you further, I find Mr. Mooney's testimony considerably more credible. And I find in Mr. Mooney's testimony a different position. I also want to make it clear, you know, there is a contentiousness that arises here.

Mr. BROWN. I agree.

Chairman KERRY. Because I am looking for facts.

Mr. BROWN. Well, what I'm trying to do.

Chairman KERRY. But I accept the proposition, and I always have since day one, that it is possible, based on the evidence we have, that some of those people were transferred.

Mr. BROWN. I agree with you.

Chairman KERRY. I am just refusing—I am refusing to accept that 300—

Mr. BROWN. I'd like to follow this out a little more, Senator. First of all, I want to make it clear for the record, in case it hasn't been done already, that Mr. Mooney carried a list of between 60 and 75 Moscow-bound prisoners. And that entire list of 60 to 75 out of the 305 that he carried as known prisoners, the 305 came from the 450 list. The 450 list was reduced due to people reported died in captivity by returned prisoners. Are you familiar with that?

Chairman KERRY. Not completely. You have confused me a little bit.

Senator McCain. How many were supposed to have died in captivity?

Mr. BROWN. I believe, in my discussions with Mooney.

Senator McCain. We are not asking for what you believe. I am asking for your facts.

Mr. BROWN. Well I didn't work at NSA, Senator.

Senator McCain. Well you have access to facts, otherwise you would not be here, Mr. Brown.

Mr. BROWN. I am trying to relate them.

Senator McCain. How many died in captivity?

Mr. BROWN. Would you mind letting me finish, Senator?

Senator McCain. How many were supposed to have died in captivity, that is a question, answer it?

Mr. BROWN. Approximately 100 out of that list of 450 died in captivity, that was my understanding.

Senator MCCAIN. Your understanding was wrong.

Mr. BROWN. The list was reduced to 305 and out of that list 75 to 80 were carried as Moscow-bound through an analytical process.

Chairman KERRY. Let me just say to you—

Mr. BROWN. Can I finish, Senator?

Chairman KERRY. Yes, you can. But I think we are going to get into the law of diminishing returns in terms of this. Let me try to explain where we are. This is precisely why the U.S.-Russia Commission exists. Senator Smith and I were appointed to serve on the commission, and I am not sure how long it will go on.

There is not any question in my mind, and I want you to understand this, that huge issues are raised. And there is no question in my mind that people, numbers of prisoners were transferred. I am convinced; the evidence is there. I cannot sit here and start playing with the same numbers, that is the great difficulty.

And the fact is that since it is 40 years later and we are struggling with this, with a lot of research that you have folks have done which is good. I mean you have dug at this, I applaud you for that. But somebody has got to complete this task. This committee cannot do it today. This committee clearly cannot do it in the next month.

And what we wanted to do through these hearings is open the window on this to make people aware that there is a basis of reality here that begs answers, and it is long overdue. And it is our hope that a structure will be created—more than our hope, I think we can guarantee that a structure will be created that will pursue this so that we can pin these kinds of discrepancies and differences down. Does that make sense?

Mr. BROWN. Certainly. Out of the list of 305, approximately 75 were carried as Moscow-bound by Mooney. But Mooney's work only involved 20 percent of the prisoners, approximately 20 to 25 percent. The other people that he worked nearby and worked in his section and in other sections of NSA were carrying other lists of Moscow-bound prisoners.

Mooney's entire list of 75 or so Moscow-bound prisoners came from the southern part of the panhandle of North Vietnam and the adjacent areas of Laos, and it did not include the rest of North Vietnam, most of Laos, all of South Vietnam, and all the prisoners in Cambodia. And in dealing with his counterparts and his colleagues over the years at NSA, he learned that his number was about 20 to 25 percent of the Moscow-bound prisoners. And that is where you would get a number of 250 to 350 or so that were carried as Moscow-bound by NSA.

And I don't think that you are giving credit to the fact that we are not allowed access to these documents. We have had to deal with human sources on this latest part of a 70-year-old problem here.

Chairman KERRY. I agree with that.

Mr. BROWN. And so Mr. Sanders and Mr. Ashworth and I, the further back we go in history the better luck we have in gaining through Freedom of Information Act documents pertaining to Soviet-held prisoners.

I want to go on record here also as saying that the Defense Intelligence Agency, the Department of Defense, the Department of State, the Central Intelligence Agency, have all repeatedly denied my FOIA requests, repeatedly for years. They have obfuscated, lied, denied documents. They sometimes charge me hundreds or more dollars for documents that are unrelated to my request. I've spent thousands and thousands of dollars of my own money playing games with these Federal agencies.

So when you challenge us on the numbers of Moscow-bound prisoners from Vietnam, you have to realize that we can only deal with human sources. We're not being granted access to the kind of documentary evidence on the Vietnam era that you, in your powers, should be able to get.

And I am not finished, Senator. I'm sorry to be rude, but I want to continue along this line. I have had a long relationship with Mooney in learning these facts from him. And I learned that when Mr. Mooney was first deposed by the committee and when he worked with a deputy director of NSA early this year, I believe it was in January, he was re-indoctrinated by NSA for life and that he was sworn to secrecy again for the rest of his life. And that there was an agreement signed by NSA and by him, and the agreement was that they would go for the raw intelligence data.

And my understanding is that the committee has not been getting the raw intelligence intercepts from NSA.

Chairman KERRY. Let me just interrupt there. I am just informed by staff that what you said is, in fact, not accurate. That Mr. Mooney was very happy to meet with NSA, wanted to meet with them, that they reviewed the materials jointly, and that they sort of jointly agreed on what it was.

Let me also say to you—and I have to cut you off here because we agreed that we were going to go until 9:30 and then begin with General Volkogonov. But I want you also to know that Mr. Mooney was never able, in either his testimony before the committee or in his deposition under oath, to provide one name that he could say went to Moscow, yet in the book there is a quote of names.

All I am saying to you is that there is a difference between what sometimes appears in public or in casual conversation and what we get as we investigate, under oath in depositions, extensive inquiries. I am saying to you that Mr. Mooney could not, under oath, give us one name of a person that he could say was definitely transferred.

He gave us leads to follow up, and we are following those up and we will continue to. But I want to emphasize, I am not discrediting what you are saying, I am trying to make sure that the context is correct. I applaud you for working at this. You have kept faith with it and that deserves praise, it really does.

And I am going to recommend, and I think the committee will recommend to President-elect Clinton, that we just end this agony once and for all and get all this stuff out into the open. Let you and let anybody else look at all of these documents so the real history can be written, not somebody's contrived sense of it.

Mr. SANDERS. Just briefly, what you have to remember is that until this committee was formed and got started the standard that

we had to work against for all these years was the Government's statement, time and again, not one shred of evidence exists.

Chairman KERRY. You are correct, that is correct.

Senator McCAIN. No, it is not correct.

Chairman KERRY. It is correct.

Senator McCAIN. There are many times, including—starting with Richard Nixon, that we had not gotten the issue of the Laotian POWs resolved.

Chairman KERRY. He is not referring to that. I think he is referring to Korea and earlier—am I right?

Mr. SANDERS. Yes, World War II/Korea, and that was a congressional statement by Rear Admiral Richard Marriott and it was repeated ad nauseam.

Chairman KERRY. Correct as to that period. Gentlemen, thank you.

Senator GRASSLEY. You interrupted me on my questioning.

Chairman KERRY. I apologize. I thought you had finished, Senator.

Senator GRASSLEY. No, that person wanted to comment on 300.

Chairman KERRY. Go right ahead.

Senator GRASSLEY. I was just starting my period of questioning.

Mr. BROWN. I haven't finished yet either. I want to be on record as saying I was not permitted to finish.

Chairman KERRY. Sir, he is about to ask some more questions. I am sure you will get an opportunity to. Go ahead, Senator Grassley.

Senator GRASSLEY. Well, I want each and every one of you—and I think you were all able to hear Dr. Cole's testimony yesterday. I would like to have you each comment on what Dr. Cole said, and I would like to ask you to be as specific as you could be in reaction or in agreement with anything that he had to say.

Mr. SANDERS. I'd like to cover one point, only one. He made the statement that 14,000 more Americans came home from the European theater, World War II, than were actually listed as POWs. You can only get that kind of information if you go to the official Government history. Now, if you're studying the accusation that the Government may have engaged in a cover up over the years, you have to drop below the official history and prove the official history.

The reality is, and he was depending on the official history which says there were only 76,000 known Americans held by the Germans and we got back 92,000. Well, in fact, there were 99,000—in round numbers there were 99,000 known POWs at the end of the war. And we have the document, I believe it's signed by George Marshall, GM, George Marshall and General Henry saying 8,000 to 9,000 of the returnees were actually MIAs never on the POW list, which means we should have gotten 107,000 to 108,000 back.

We have an Eisenhower document that agrees with that and we have other means of analysis that pull it all together. That was something—I just don't understand how you only go to an official history and not drop down and prove or disprove the official history. I'll let somebody else comment on everything else.

Senator GRASSLEY. OK. Mr. Brown or Mr. Ashworth?

Mr. ASHWORTH. Briefly, I covered part of it. The fact that he apparently is here as an expert and is denied access to information his own agency has. He also talked about the small number who went into the Soviet Union. We do have documents, Government documents, which list more Americans than he talked about having been sighted. There's some by name, some with their addresses blanked out to protect the privacy of their families.

He did ignore Government documents showing over 5,400 Americans currently listed as living American prisoners in early 1946. This committee should be able to get the names of those people, tell what camps they disappeared from. He should be able to do it. He's not done it. We're denied access to that type of stuff. We just know that what he said is inaccurate and it's unfortunate that this Government pays that type of agency money to provide that type of information to you.

Senator GRASSLEY. OK. Like Mr. Brown commented just recently on the 300 prisoners and spoke about the difficulty he had of access or resistance that he encountered, I would like to have Mr. Brown on instances other than the 300 prisoners, or Mr. Sanders and Mr. Ashworth, to talk about any kind of access problems or resistance problems you have encountered while researching this issue, and particularly what recommendations you might have for our committee for improving access and cooperation to archived materials?

Mr. ASHWORTH. Briefly, many of the documents I look for are not available or were not at the time. I spent probably many months, several years, looking for documents. I started with what I thought would be the most comprehensive find, which was SAARF, S-A-A-R-F, Special Allied Airborne Reconnaissance Force, war room. These were people designed to specifically go into camps in the Soviet zones and to protect, to rescue, these Americans. They had briefings on the camps, how many Americans were there and so forth.

These documents apparently disappeared. If they had been found, it's very recently. Possibly, they found the German records. They were reproduced many times. I understand they may now exist, but repeated efforts on my part to gain access to the German records on, supposedly, all of our American prisoners, I can't say it was denied to me, they just said they didn't know where the stuff was. Possibly they now do know; I understand that they may be the case. But for years that was gone.

When we found specific camps, that we knew documents came out with camp lists, Stalag 3A, 4B, the lists disappeared from those camps if we were concerned about them. There's a big problem with both the disappearance of records. We've run into cases where records have been apparently falsified, and in addition to that in one case I tried to get the names of the men who had been held prisoner. There's a logical way to do that. It's go to the adjutant general files and find the letters that the concerned parents wrote. The only problem was they'd been burned, I was told.

And I could probably speak the rest of the day just on this issue, but this touches the surface of the type of frustrations that we live with. There were coherent, consistent files on this at one time. In order for us to recreate, in large measure, those files, we went through hundreds and hundreds and hundreds of thousands of doc-

uments picking up a piece here, a piece there, getting information that somebody would say there was something here or there.

And I would like to say, though, one thing to the chairman at this point. When I said something that apparently referred to you, I was unaware when you were speaking on that—and I'm still not convinced—that what I was talking about was what you were talking about.

Chairman KERRY. No, I understand.

Mr. ASHWORTH. I was not aware of what you said and I did not mean something personal to you on that.

Chairman KERRY. I accept that, I accept. I am concerned about it because I know what has been happening here in terms of the leak process, and the integrity of the committee gets damaged, obviously, when there are leaks. But there is a necessary process by which, even in investigating DIA, as we are, and the rest of Government and whoever touched this issue, we have to talk to them, we have to try to get them to be forthcoming. And some people read into that some sort of relationship that is unholy or something. Let our final report be the judge of our capacity to make conclusions and to be faithful to the charge that we have been given.

Mr. ASHWORTH. Yes. But one reason I said that was I was here last summer when you promised to release documents in early August. And I must say, you know, and I hope it's not in mean way, but it concerns me that we can't gain access, that we have to wait until your final report. And then the press is going to claim it's a done deal, and it's going to be a done deal.

Chairman KERRY. I do not think so, and let me tell you why. First of all, I want those documents as much as anybody. Senator Grassley has been a terrific watchdog on the issue, as has Senator Robb. As you know, they have helped create a process for this declassification. Senator Smith has been urging it for a long time.

You have got too many diverse people on this committee for one Senator or for a group of Senators to somehow stand up and block something from happening. We are all intent on this. The greatest legacy of this committee may well be the measure to which documents are made available to the public.

Now we are strapped. We do, indeed, have some documents up in Senate 407 still which we have been given and they are, quote, declassified for the purposes of our review. Regrettably, that declassification does not pertain to a public declassification so we still have to wait on the appropriate agencies to have declassified them so we can get them out.

They will get out. We are determined that they will get out. And, you know, I am not going to sit here at the end of this thing and have you or somebody else come and say gee, Senator, you are still holding onto this document. I will look silly and I do not want that. I want to get them out. But we are having some trouble, I will tell you, still with some agencies. And it is not as smooth as it ought to be and we are going to continue to press it.

Final comment: No one should believe that the termination of this committee terminates the pledge that the Senators on this committee have made to see this through. And we will still be in the Senate. I still have a committee of jurisdiction, of which I am chairman, on the Foreign Relations Committee. I intend to work

with Senator Smith to guarantee that we will continue the process of making sure that what the select committee started continues. So it is not going to suddenly vanish.

Mr. SANDERS. I'd like to briefly respond to your question.

Senator GRASSLEY. Not only briefly, I want you to do it thoroughly.

Mr. SANDERS. OK, I'll try to do it briefly and thoroughly. First of all, on the Soviet side—I don't know the Soviet pronunciation, but the head of the NKVD, Beria, B-e-r-i-a, was in charge of the Soviet side of the repatriation, and under him was something called the Soviet Repatriation Commission. Under them, the POWs who were held in Soviet control were lined, they were photographed, their family history was given, and they were given things that looked very close to passports.

Now, I assume the Soviets are pretty good record takers. All of this information—they also did the rosters plus the family backgrounds, all those—all that information should be available somewhere over there. You know the Soviet Repatriation Commission has all of that information, and then it's just a matter of cross-referencing with the VA lists.

The second point is that the state—probably the SWP, the State War Problems division, closely monitored the hostage negotiations that were taking place in May 1945. And from documents that we've seen in the Archives referencing back to material that they were collecting, it would seem reasonable that somewhere over in the State Department or somewhere in the Archives still yet to be declassified, the war problems division has most, if not all, of these rosters.

As a for instance, Stalag 3A, at Luchenva, on May 3, 1945 a war correspondent by the last name of Beatty smuggled out the list of 4,894 Americans who were, on that date, still being held by the Soviets. A very important list to cross-reference. We don't have to sit here and argue about numbers. Find that list, and let's just cross-reference it and then we don't have to figure out who's right and who's wrong, we'll know.

And as I mentioned before, the POWX War Room. Virtually every roster that was brought out—and the Soviets did not deny us access to the camps. We took it upon ourselves to go out there and find hundreds and hundreds and hundreds of Americans, British, Canadians, Australians and New Zealanders, many with war diaries from their captivity time. They could go back and just read off of those, they sent some of them to us, and some of them recreate some of the documentation that they had in the Senate.

So we were able to recreate, through their minds and their diaries, what happened. But what we do know is that intelligence officers and regular officers bringing food into these camps from our side of the lines were able to bring all this information out. It is somewhere and it should be in one concentrated area, because also the SAARF teams, all of the intelligence files, all of these were under the POWX War Room, that is somewhere and we can all stop arguing once that's all declassified.

You have the AFHQ files, that I have been denied access to quite a bit of documentation there, which would cover the area down in Austria and cover—heavily cover the forcible repatriations. Those

all need to be declassified without exception, without exception. This is all stuff that happened in 1945, 1946, and 1947, and it's still being denied.

Then you go down, I think you do two things from there. I believe that if you send one of your people to spend maybe half a day or a day wondering around—some of the most productive times any of the three of us ever had—put this one on Richard Boylan. Go down into the Archives and wonder around, because he has a near-photographic memory as he's walking down these aisles. And he looks and he goes, oh, there's—and it comes to him as he gets the aisles. And somebody with a tape recorder follow him around for a while and I have a feeling you'll come up with a vast warehouse of information from that.

And then there's people like Barbara Blanton down at Army Intelligence who, once aware of the problem, have just done an incredible job of digging out this information. You guys can get the stuff that's on the back of the photographs, we can't. If there are more photographs, you ought to be able to get to that.

But, anyway, those are things of things that haven't been done that need to be done, and we can stop speculating and answer conclusively who was left behind, what their names were. We can get all that information out of our own files, and then all we have to do is tell the Soviets, here's the list, we want to know what happened to these guys.

Senator GRASSLEY. Mr. Brown.

Mr. BROWN. I just want to go on record as saying that when Mr. Boylan referred to the withdrawal cards that are scattered throughout the Archives, that for years I have attempted to gain access to those documents through Freedom of Information Act and so on. And it always goes back to the originating agency, whether it's CIA or Army Intelligence or what have you. And they deny my requests. They spend months denying the request and then when I make an appeal they deny the appeals. And so they are deliberately keeping these documents secret, and many of them are World War II, Korean war documents.

And I also want to touch on the question of the Moscow-bound Americans again from Vietnam. And I want to go on record as stating that although Mooney said that he had no information himself on the prisoners shipped from Sam Neua to Hanoi and then on to the Soviet Union, those records are in the NSA files on Soviet shipping, that is Soviet maritime shipping and Soviet civil air and those type of records. That's where the raw intelligence is.

There were different people at NSA monitoring the Soviet transport aircraft leaving Vietnam and going to the Soviet Union, and it's up to the committee to gain access to those documents from NSA or from INSCOM or wherever they are. We can't get them. We had to deal with human sources on the Vietnam part. Everything else we could document, going back through history to the Bolshevik Revolution.

And so we have to depend upon the committee here to say that they got the records of Russian shipping from Haiphong to Vladivostok, or the Soviet air transport from Hanoi that went south of Himalayas and then landed at Tashkent and the prisoners were separated into categories. We can't get a hold of that; you have to.

And what Mooney learned from his contacts at NSA is that this hasn't happened. The NSA is just giving you things from their central reference files. They're not—they're giving you the general data. They're not giving you the real, raw intelligence from the people who decrypted the communications and made the reports.

Senator GRASSLEY. I would say thank you to each of you for the work that you have done in this area over a long period of time, because you surely have had a great deal to do with the committee looking into this to a greater extent. And I apologize for our Government's failure to cooperate with you and be open.

And I think that a major problem that I sense from applause or outbursts from the people in the audience is that maybe we do not express enough sensitivity towards a problem or understanding, or that we do not express enough commitment to doing something about it. Or most importantly, we do not express enough regret of what our Government has done in withholding documents or not leveling, or in some cases just lying. Just like somehow we think our Government is perfect.

And I think this is laid out pretty carefully in this committee's work, you know, that there is a lot of Government policies that have got to be changed. We cannot do much about the past. Hopefully we can answer some questions for our constituent's families that do not have these answers, but beyond that we are just affecting a few thousand, an important few thousand.

But the really important work of this committee is what we do to make sure that these mistakes do not happen in the future. That is really what is important. And I hope that we do leave as a legacy of this committee's work a lot of changed policies. I hope that there will be a commitment on the part of all the people on this committee to make sure that what we have found is wrong, that we change it once and for all.

Mr. ASHWORTH. Senator Kerry.

Chairman KERRY. Thank you, Senator Grassley.

Mr. ASHWORTH. Senator Kerry, very briefly.

Chairman KERRY. Yes, sir.

Mr. ASHWORTH. I'd like to say, with all the contentious remarks we've had here today and maybe the anger expressed at our Government and so forth, what a great country we live in. There's none better. How many countries would you see this occur in? God bless America.

[Applause.]

Chairman KERRY. Well I think—I agree with that. I could not agree with you more. I think that there is not a country on the face of this planet where Government officials, citizens, and others could come in and force the process the way it has been happening here, or be subjected to some of the tough questions that some past office holders have been subjected to.

And this entire process for the year, I think every member of the committee would agree, has been extraordinary and educational in that regard, and I am convinced ultimately will be judged to have been helpful. We certainly will not have answered every question, and we never have held out that we will be able to. But, by God, I will tell you, we will have opened up this process and I am confi-

dent that the book will be open enough that the final chapters will be written and they will be truthful. Senator Smith.

Vice Chairman SMITH. Just a brief comment. I think members of the committee, indeed the committee in general, takes its share of hits on this issue from the press, from witnesses, from others. And some are deserved, some are not. But by the same token the witnesses sometimes take some hits from the Senators.

But the key here is—and I think Mr. Boylan, I would like to thank you for testifying that basically there still are CIA records that are still out. And we are beating on each other, but the fact of the matter is there are thousands of documents still out, still classified, that we cannot get—we have not, for whatever reason, gotten access to.

And the story will be told when they are out and that is what we are trying to do at the committee. The pace is much slower than it should be; I wish we could do them all yesterday. But we are going to do that. If it is humanly possible, we are going to get these documents declassified regarding all of the wars, World War II, Korea and Vietnam, and the cold war as well.

Chairman KERRY. Gentlemen, thank you very very much. We appreciate it, and if we could now move to the next witness.

Chairman KERRY. The next panel will be General Volkogonov. As the General comes in, let me ask if the hearing room would remain in order, please.

General could I ask you to stand, please. Would you raise your right hand, please. Do you swear to tell the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God.

TESTIMONY OF GENERAL DIMITRI VOLKOGONOV, RETIRED, MILITARY ADVISER TO PRESIDENT BORIS YELTSIN AND CO-CHAIRMAN TO THE U.S.-RUSSIAN JOINT COMMISSION; ACCOMPANIED BY COLONEL OSIPOV, TRANSLATED THROUGH JOHN HERSHEY, RUSSIAN LANGUAGE INTERPRETER, WASHINGTON, DC

General VOLKOGONOV. I swear to tell the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth.

Chairman KERRY. Let me just say, as an introduction to this part of the hearing, that we are meeting this morning to hear about the progress and efforts of an adjunct, if you will, of this committee which will help shed light directly on the work of this committee.

A joint commission was created, the U.S.-Russia Joint Commission was established in January of this year. Senator Smith and I were appointed as legislative members of the commission. Ambassador Toon, former ambassador to the Soviet Union, chairs the commission.

And the task of this commission is not unlike the task of our committee. It is to look back at events that happened many years ago but which still echo today, obviously because of their highly emotional nature and because of the truth behind those events has remained hidden. And it has remained hidden to a large degree because, under communist rule, the Soviet Union was frequently described as a place where the present and the future never changed, but where the past is reinvented every day.

Our task and the joint commission's task is to try to reinvent this past—recreate the past I should better say, not reinvent it. But to recreate it according to the truth, to find out what really happened and to lift the veil of secrecy and correct the distortions of ideology that have obscured that reality for so many years.

Over the past several months there have been a great many rumors, and in some cases facts—you are translating as I go, I thought.

Mr. HERSHEY. Yes.

Chairman KERRY. Facts about what may have happened to American prisoners and downed airmen. And these relate to many different periods of war, but most specifically World War II, Korea, and the cold war, and to some degree the war in Southeast Asia. There have already been admissions that some Americans were held after World War II and that captured airmen during the cold war were also held. There are many questions raised, some of them by the preceding panel, about prisoner transfers during Korea, about possible executions, and about the chances of prisoner survival.

Emotionally, our response to all of these questions is obviously complex. We are grateful for the new openness, but we are grateful with a sense of dismay at four decades of lies, and our current hopes are obviously tempered by the past disappointments that we have felt and our inability to be able to answer these questions.

During his visit here, President Yeltsin raised the hopes of Americans and made promises to Americans that every single archive would be analyzed, every document would be made available. We are going to discuss these issues today with members of the joint commission, beginning with General Dimitri Volkogonov, who is military advisor to President Yeltsin and a co-chairman of this joint commission.

I might add this is a historic commission. It is an extraordinary event and it is a remarkable day when on Veterans Day in the United States of America, a day that we remember those who have died and given their life and sacrificed in the course of wars, it is rather remarkable that we should be here, U.S. Senators, facing a former Soviet Union General and a current Russian advocate of democracy and change. And we are obviously mindful of the historic nature of this confrontation.

We are looking today for the truth. I would be remiss if I did not say, Mr. Chairman, General, that we are still not completely satisfied that the process is moving as rapidly as we would have hoped. There are still questions that remain and areas of the former Soviet Union that remain a puzzle to us. Access is not as easy as we would wish it would be in certain cases.

So we look forward today to your important testimony on the status of Americans of any period of time who might have survived a war, who might have been taken prisoner, and, obviously, who might even possibly be alive today. And particularly, we want your views about the transfers of prisoners from the Korean period and also from Vietnam. So we welcome you here today and thank you for taking the time to be with us.

Senator Smith, do you have any opening comments?

Vice Chairman SMITH. No, no opening statement. I just welcome General Volkogonov. We had—when Senator Kerry and I traveled to Moscow earlier this year, we were very impressed with your leadership on this issue and willingness to help your government to uncover facts that our country had long been looking for, and we look forward to your testimony today and your further cooperation.

Chairman KERRY. Does any other colleague wish to make an opening comment?

If not, General, we welcome your opening comments. And if you could bring the microphone closer to you as you interpret, also.

General VOLKOGONOV. Ladies and gentlemen, esteemed Senators.

Chairman KERRY. Would you bring the mike a little closer.

General VOLKOGONOV. I would like to take a few moments, first, to make a preliminary statement. It is truly remarkable that this discussion of the fate of Americans who possibly were located on the territory of the former Soviet Union is being conducted on Veterans Day. I believe it is our honor and our duty to tell the full truth; it is our debt to these people.

All Soviet leaders from Khrushchev to Gorbachev said that this problem did not exist. The new democratic government of Russia has said that this problem exists and continues to exist today. I see in this enormous progress in the desire to tell the truth about the past.

The day before yesterday, on the eve of my departure for Washington, I spoke with President Yeltsin. This was a regular meeting at which I reported the work of our Russian part of this joint commission. During this discussion he gave me a document which he wanted to present to this committee, so I would now ask my interpreter to read it for the committee.

Mr. HERSHEY. The intergovernmental commission established by decision of the U.S. and Russian presidents for the purpose of determining the fate of American citizens missing in action in World War II and later is evidence of the new nature of Russian-U.S. relations. The commission is headed by Colonel General Volkogonov and Ambassador Toon.

Over a short period of time the commission has done a great deal of work in studying Russia's enormous state and agency archives, including those that had been closed to the public until recently, from the ministry of security, the ministry of defense, the foreign intelligence service, the ministry of internal affairs, the foreign ministry, and military intelligence.

It has questioned dozens of participants and witnesses of the events involving American citizens on the territory of the former U.S.S.R. During the plenary meetings held in March, May, and September of this year, the U.S. side was given documents on American citizens who found themselves on the territory of the former U.S.S.R. in World War II and the cold war period, and some documents that contained information on several U.S. citizens who had been taken prisoner during the Korean and Vietnam wars.

The commission has found evidence of American citizens staying in camps and prisoners of the former U.S.S.R., and discovered shocking facts of some of them being summarily executed by the Stalin regime and in a number of cases being forced to renounce their U.S. citizenship. Some of them still reside on the territory of

the former Soviet Union. Their names and addresses have been identified and communicated to the U.S. side.

A number of former U.S. citizens have stayed in Russia voluntarily after World War II and still reside here. Of course, in a democratic Russia they have the right to decide about their live themselves, all their rights are fully guaranteed.

As a result of the work done, one may conclude that today there are no American citizens held against their will on the territory of Russia. However, all the questions have not been fully answered. There are cases that still require additional examination. For my part, as Russia's president, I express the hope that the Joint Russian-American Commission will continue its work and that it will be able to find answers to the outstanding questions. Boris Yeltsin, Moscow, November 5, 1992.

General VOLKOGONOV. Before I answer your questions, I would like to make three points. First of all, we fully understand the enormous moral significance of the possibility of Americans living in the territory of the former Soviet Union, the significance of that here in America, and this is evidence of the enormous devotion to human rights and liberties here in the United States.

Second, this issue is of great significance in our country as well because for many decades human lives and individuals were considered nothing more than statistical data in the Soviet Union. Our efforts to determine the fate of Americans missing in action in the former Soviet Union is a great example to us of how we must be concerned with the fate of individuals. Therefore, as Russia tries to create a democratic state, this issue has enormous humanitarian, moral, and legal significance for us.

Third, Russia, as you understand, is undergoing extremely difficult times. As you evaluate this issue, please bear in mind that the issue of whether reform will continue in Russia or not is itself under very great doubt. Therefore, it is significant that the Russian Government and the President are paying such close attention to this issue.

In essence, we see this work and this task as a test of our honesty. My report has been given to the American side several days ago, and I am prepared to answer your questions.

[The information referred to follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF THE CHAIRMAN OF THE RUSSIAN CONTINGENT OF THE RUSSIAN-AMERICAN COMMISSION

The activities of the Joint Russian-American Commission under Russian leadership can be viewed as evidence of the new relations between Russia and the United States. The transition from confrontation to partnership has made possible what only 2 to 3 years ago would have been unimaginable.

We understand that our efforts are of significant humanitarian interest. We know how painful and sensitive an issue this is to the American public. We recognize that all the activities of the commission carry the echo of the cold war and we are hopeful that you, esteemed Senators, are in agreement with this approach.

In all honesty we must point out that everyone in the new Russia is not of the same mind on the issues faced by our commission. Unfortunately, there are still many among us who are locked into the old way of thinking, with the "image of the enemy" burned into their consciousness. They will never recognize that human life and freedom are of supreme and eternal value. Hence, the activities of our commission are an excellent moral example of the struggle for human rights, of the fate of each individual and the rights of relatives to know the entire truth concerning their loved ones. A concern for every individual is one of the distinguishing characteris-

tics of a genuinely free society. A totalitarian regime is not only uninterested in the fate of a single individual, but is indifferent to the fates of hundreds of thousands or millions of its own citizens, as was the case with us. Totalitarianism is a deadly disease of society. With possible relapses, the new Russia is still in severe crisis which is exacerbated by the increasingly rigid resistance of the opponents of reform.

The work of our commission has demonstrated that today it is possible to achieve effective cooperation in fields that only recently were the forefront of ideological confrontation. All governments of the former U.S.S.R. uniformly refused to even admit the problem existed. B.N. Yeltsin acknowledging the problem exists is significant progress. He made it possible for us to work productively and openly, and focus exclusively on truth rather than on politics. It should be noted that the work of the commission has been of continuing interest to the Presidents of Russia and the United States.

The commission has been operating for a little over 6 months. During this time three plenary sessions have been held, together with 10 working meetings. The working groups have been operating continuously. It was decided at the first plenary session in March to focus on four primary areas: the Second World War; the Korean war; the Vietnam war; and, the "cold war". The Russian contingent of the commission included virtually all the directors of both state and institutional archives in Russia. Archivists, special services staff and historians from both nations functioned as experts for the working groups. American experts were permitted to travel within 24 hours to virtually any location in Russia and to visit any facilities that could have been associated with housing U.S. citizens. A number of public organizations and volunteer groups took active part in the final stage. Specifically, the Party of Economic Freedom under the direction of K.N. Borzoi provided significant assistance.

What are some of the overall results of the efforts of the commission to date?

1. As is evident from the recent announcement of the President of Russia, B.N. Yeltsin, we are nearly convinced that no U.S. citizens are currently being detained within the territory of the former U.S.S.R. This conclusion is based on a thorough analysis of all archival documents, interviews with witnesses, and on site inspections of possible housing sites of Americans.

2. However, I can also report that currently a group of Americans is living in Russia who are either political refugees from the U.S.S.R. period or individuals voluntarily remaining in Russia. A list of these individuals as well as their addresses and agreement to meeting with representatives of the American contingent of the commission have been—obtained and we are prepared to provide this list. In addition Marcus Lee (a businessman from Florida) attested in the spring of 1992 is currently being detained at Lefortovo (Moscow). He is charged with attempted export of contraband icons.

3. As a result of these efforts it was determined that thousands of American citizens traveled overland across the former U.S.S.R. beginning with the Second World War. The majority of these were Americans liberated by the Red Army from Nazi camps and subsequently repatriated (22,454). The second major group consisted of American pilots forced to land within the U.S.S.R. and interned here (730). There were also several dozen individuals who were detained in Germany, in Austria, in the U.S.S.R. and other socialist nations for "espionage" as well as a few pilots from American aircraft shot down over the U.S.S.R. We have succeeded in accounting for virtually all of these individuals and are convinced that they are not presently located (with the exception of those who have died) within the territory of the U.S.S.R.

4. We were successful in identifying the burial sites of virtually all U.S. citizens who died in the U.S.S.R. during the Second World War, with the exception of a few who died en rout to or in prisoner-of-war camps or those buried in mass graves. We will continue our efforts in this area.

5. We were less successful in obtaining information on U.S. citizens missing during the Vietnam or Korean wars. It should be recalled that these events occurred outside the Soviet Union. Nonetheless, we succeeded in locating some documents on the Korean war: information on the numbers of prisoner-of-war camps for Americans in Korea; their location; and, the number of prisoners housed in these camps. Some interrogation materials and fragmentary evidence on 71 American servicemen captured in Korea were found. Unfortunately, virtually nothing was found on the Vietnam war. The only documents concerning the Vietnam war related to the fate of nine American deserters sent by the KGB to the U.S.S.R. and on to neutral countries. We have not been successful in recovering anything new or significant from conversations with eyewitnesses or participants in these events.

6. We are grateful to the American contingent for their willingness to provide assistance in searching for Russian prisoners and MIAs in Afghanistan. It should be pointed out that according to our data, approximately 100 of them are still alive and many are being held under inhumane conditions in prisons belonging to warring Afghani groups. However, we must state that the American contingent has not done everything possible in providing assistance for the liberation of Russian prisoners-of-war in Afghanistan. We hope for complete success in this complex area.

We believe that, on the whole, the commission has made progress. We express our gratitude to the American members for their active participation. We can provide definitive information today on the fate of the majority of American citizens captured and held in the former U.S.S.R. during and after the Second World War. This was made possible by the active participation of archivists, the staff of special services and institutions, as well—as scientists, public figures and businessmen. The primary problem today is to determine the fates of American citizens who vanished during the "cold war."

We still hope that it will be possible to find new information relating to the periods of the Korean and Vietnam wars.

The following will be necessary:

- to continue joint efforts for an additional 3 to 6 months;
- to be able to determine definitively the fates of all American citizens located within the former U.S.S.R., such as those who have died and are buried there, or those who have emigrated and live somewhere else, etc.; and,
- to provide family members and relatives with all information on the lives of their relatives in the U.S.S.R.

It is possible that some may be disillusioned with the results of our efforts. However, we are convinced that we have done everything possible on this side to answer all questions submitted to us.

You should also keep in mind that conducting this work is difficult while attempting to maintain the course of reform. The Government of Russia and President Yeltsin, personally, in spite of his severe work load and difficult problems, continue to devote enormous attention to this effort. President Yeltsin views the work of the commission as a "test" of trust and willingness to work together and to forget former the times when we were enemies.

On behalf of my side, I can state that I will do everything possible to see a successful resolution of the work of the commission.

I am at your service and am prepared to provide answers to any questions.

PRESIDENT OF THE RUSSIAN CONTINGENT OF THE COMMISSION TO
DETERMINE THE FATE OF AMERICAN CITIZENS MISSING-IN-ACTION DURING
AND AFTER THE SECOND WORLD WAR

COLONEL-GENERAL

D.M. VOLKOGONOV

Professor, Advisor to the President of Russia

Translated from Russian

ON THE WORK OF THE JOINT RUSSIAN-U.S. COMMISSION

The intergovernment commission established by the decision of the U.S. and Russian presidents for the purpose of finding out the fate of American citizens missing in action in World War II and later has given proof of the new nature of Russian-U.S. relations. The commission is headed by Colonel General Volkogonov and Ambassador Toon.

Over a short period of time the commission has done a great deal of work in studying Russia's huge state and agency archives, including those that had been closed to the public until recently, from the Ministry of Security, the Ministry of Defense, the Foreign Intelligence Service, the Ministry of Internal Affairs, the Foreign Ministry, and the Military Intelligence. It has questioned dozens of participants and witnesses of the events involving American citizens' on the territory of the former U.S.S.R.

During the plenary meetings held in March, May, and September of this year the U.S. side was given documents on American citizens who found themselves on the territory of the former U.S.S.R. in world War II and the cold war period plus some documents that contained information on several U.S. citizens who had been taken prisoner during the Korean and Vietnam wars. The commission has found traces of American citizens' stay in camps and prisons of the former U.S.S.R. and discovered

shocking facts of some of them summarily executed by the Stalin regime and in a number of cases being forced to renounce the U.S. citizenship. Some of them still reside on the territory of the former Soviet Union. Their names and addresses have been identified and communicated to the U.S. side. A number of former U.S. citizens have stayed in Russia voluntarily after World War II and still reside here. Of course, in a democratic Russia they have the right to decide about their life themselves; all their rights are fully guaranteed.

As a result of the work done one may conclude that today there are no American citizens forcibly held on the territory of Russia.

However, all the questions have not been fully answered. There are cases that still require additional examination.

For my part, as Russia's President, I express the hope that the joint Russian-American Commission will continue its work and that it will be able to find answers to the outstanding questions.

BORIS YELTSIN,
Moscow, Kremlin
November 5, 1992.

Chairman KERRY. General, thank you very much. I also want to thank you—Senator Smith and I thank you for the help you gave us when we were in Moscow. And we appreciate the openness that you personally have brought to this effort and the commitment you have brought to it.

If I may ask you, General, during the period of our war in South-east Asia, what was your responsibility during that period of time, 1964 to 1973?

General VOLKOGONOV. I was a young officer, a lieutenant, at this time in the army. I did not participate in these wars at any time, but was based in the European part of the country and was a very low-ranking officer. I was a tank driver and had finished the tank training not long before that.

Chairman KERRY. In the course of your research for this commission, or in the course of your experience as a higher-ranking officer in the Soviet military, did you ever learn of any Americans who were being interrogated or transferred from Vietnam to the Soviet Union?

General VOLKOGONOV. I became personally aware of this—of these facts only at the beginning of this year when President Yeltsin appointed me to head the Russian side of this joint commission. Since then I have been working personally in the archives. With my own hands, I have gone through, paged through, hundreds and hundreds of volumes of archival documents from various periods.

This issue is extremely complex. For example, my own father was shot in 1937 and to this day I cannot determine or establish where he was shot or where he is buried. The totalitarian system was good at keeping its secrets.

I obtained the most important information on Vietnam and Korea from the archives. I have here four volumes of documents from the archives which I will give to you, Senator Kerry, after the hearings today. Many of these materials are well known already, but there are some new pieces of information here.

[The Russian document is printed in the Appendix of November 11, 1992.]

This folder, for example, is about Korea. A Soviet aviation unit took part in the war in Korea; it was based in China. From the archives I have learned that during the war approximately 1,000 U.S.

aircraft were shot down. The surviving American pilots and other Americans who were taken prisoner were held in camps located in North Korea along the border with China. We have been able to establish the precise numbers of these camps and their locations. We have all this information.

Not long ago we found materials on the interrogation of 49 American pilots who were held prisoner in Korea. After a long search, we finally found two Soviet-Russian citizens who participated in the interrogation of these Americans. They are now retired and in their seventies. They are Korotkov and Orlov, and I have talked to them at great length.

One of them was engaged in interrogation about Pyongyang, another near the Soviet border in the area either of Haf Baraskor or Surisk. They don't remember because they were brought there secretly. From these documents, and also from the correspondence between Chou En-lai and Stalin, we have learned that approximately 3,000 Americans were held in these camps.

Chairman KERRY. Could I just interrupt to ask you, please, were any of these people transferred into the Soviet Union?

General VOLKOGONOV. From Vietnam, we know that nine Americans were transferred across Soviet territory. They were Americans who had rejected the war in Vietnam and, with Chinese and Vietnamese help, were taken to Moscow. And these sent—

Chairman KERRY. Were these people who had come out of Japan?

General VOLKOGONOV. There were some from Japan. Also from Hanoi, some brought directly by aircraft to Moscow where they were used for propaganda purposes.

Chairman KERRY. When you say from Hanoi, were these former American servicemen, deserters?

General VOLKOGONOV. Yes, these were American servicemen who deserted from the war in Vietnam and were taken to Moscow in order to let them speak out against the war in Vietnam. But all the information from our archives indicates that they were subsequently taken out of Soviet territory, mostly to Sweden. All of these documents have been given to the American side.

Chairman KERRY. One last question before I turn to my colleagues. Do you have any evidence of any American prisoners of war, soldiers, who were transferred? Or have you heard of any who were transferred to the Soviet Union?

Mr. HERSHEY. From Korea?

Chairman KERRY. From Vietnam, American soldiers, prisoners of war.

General VOLKOGONOV. There are no prisoners. I emphasize that I'm talking here about deserters who did not fight in the war in Vietnam but were based on aircraft carriers or otherwise had the opportunity to escape military service with the help of the KGB, and they were taken to the Soviet Union. There was a Japanese organization, a pacifist group called Peace in Vietnam, which assisted the KGB in helping them escape.

Chairman KERRY. Senator Smith.

Vice Chairman SMITH. If I could just follow up on the same point regarding Korea. Now the same question, were any American serv-

ice personnel from the Korean war transferred to the Soviet Union?

General VOLKOGONOV. History is a precise science, like mathematics, and takes account only of facts. I have examined an enormous number of documents, including the documents of Stalin, Beria, and all the special services, and these are documents which would have contained evidence of American prisoners being taken through Soviet territory.

I want to bring your attention to one document emphasizing that the leaders of these secret agencies, the KGB, the NKVD, did not lie to one another. They told the truth to one another in the totalitarian system because it was extremely dangerous for them not to do so. They may have deceived America or the Soviet public, but among themselves they were forced to tell the truth.

And here is a document giving evidence to the following. This is document of February 4, 1954 of Interior Minister Krublov, written to him, indicating that in special prisons on the territory of the Soviet Union there are six American citizens being held in special prisons and camps of the Ministry of Internal Affairs. This document was never intended to be made public. It was top secret, and it contains the names of these persons, but, again, was purely for the internal use of the interior ministry.

And this was immediately after the war in Korea. Despite all of our work—and we have many archivists working, dozens of experts searching, on their own time on a volunteer basis, a great many archives. Despite this, we have found no confirmation of the presence of other American citizens located on the territory of the Soviet Union.

Apart from this, we have only a document from the top leadership of our country to the Ministry of Internal Affairs concerning a helicopter which was forced to land in North Korea, the two American pilots were forced to land in North Korea. From the presidential archives, we have a document on the negotiations between Stalin and Chou En-lai on the war in Vietnam. Despite the fact that Stalin was the worse dictator of all times and an extremely bloody man, he nevertheless proposed a full exchange of prisoners from Korea.

Chairman KERRY. Do you have a document?

General VOLKOGONOV. We have the full transcript of these negotiations. It contains no mention of Americans being taken to the Soviet Union. We will leave this document for you. These are from the presidential archives of President Gorbachev and from the Politburo archives, on negotiations between Stalin and Chou En-lai on September 19, 1952. We will give you the documents.

Vice Chairman SMITH. Let me focus on a couple—based on his own archival research, have you determined—have you found any evidence, any indication of Americans moving from Korea or Vietnam to China?

General VOLKOGONOV. These camps were located on the Chinese border and China was participating directly in the war, so there were a large number of them. We know that these camps were guarded by both Koreans and Chinese. We have a list of the five camps and data on a number of Americans, officers and soldiers, who were held in them. We do not have specific information on

how many or whether Americans were transferred to China. The Chinese side has not provided us with this information.

Vice Chairman SMITH. Regarding the two pilots who landed in North Korea, what was the year of that incident?

General VOLKOGONOV. We'll find the document. It was 1954. It's a request by the American Embassy in Moscow to provide assistance in finding these two Americans, Captain Ben Stutz and Captain Carlton Volts. The Soviet Government decided not to respond to this note from the American Government, responding only that it had no information. Therefore, we do not know the fate of these two American pilots who were forced to land in North Korea. I believe this is one of the mysteries and secrets which still remains to be solved.

Vice Chairman SMITH. Were they captured?

General VOLKOGONOV. We have only this document indicating that two American pilots were forced to land in their helicopter in North Korea. We have no other information. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs did not report any other information about their fate.

Chairman KERRY. Thank you, Senator Smith. Senator Grassley.

Senator GRASSLEY. You have testified that there were no U.S. POWs transferred from Vietnam to the Soviet Union. Were any of them transferred through any of the other Eastern Bloc nations like Czechoslovakia, Romania, Hungary, and then, in turn, to the Soviet Union?

General VOLKOGONOV. I have no information about this and I'm hearing about the possibility for the first time in your question.

Senator GRASSLEY. OK. I would like to have the General describe for me what files you have researched so far. Let me give you three questions, so you have got it in a composite. What have you yet to look at that would be—I will wait for an answer.

General VOLKOGONOV. I have worked in the archives of the Ministry of Security, Ministry of Internal Affairs, and Ministry of Defense, and now, by special permission of the president, in the presidential archives, this last archive containing a limited number of especially important documents. I have not yet completed my work in this last archive.

Together with my experts and assistants and members of the committee, we have found in these archives several hundred documents which have direct or indirect implications for American presence in the Soviet Union, but most of them concern World War II and the cold war eras. There have been many other documents found in this presidential archive which have been the object of sensation even here.

For example, the news about the massacre of Polish officers at Katyn in 1940 and on the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact, these are all documents that we've found in the course of our work in the presidential archive. These are all so-called special files which are sealed, and it's impossible to know before opening the seal what documents they contain.

We are continuing our work here. I believe it will take several more months for us to complete it and I do not exclude the possibility that we may find new interesting documents there. There are no archives in Russia that I do not have access to. I'm the chairman of a parliamentary commission on examining the archives of

the communist party and the KGB, so there are virtually none to which I do not have access.

We have even examined the archives of psychiatric hospitals because of the possibility that the KGB would have attempted to hide someone in a psychiatric hospital. Unfortunately, we have found no new information in these archives.

Senator GRASSLEY. I do not question that he has had access to all the files he says he has had access to. But to be very specific, has he had access to the military intelligence files, what we refer to as the GRU?

General VOLKOGONOV. We have examined the archives of the GRU and they, of course, followed the events in Vietnam and Korea, and we have found one interesting document. On January 31, 1951, there was an address from Pyongyang to the leaders of military intelligence. The document asked for help in intelligence work and, in particular, help with interrogating American prisoners. They asked the Soviet side to send English-speaking interpreters. The head of military intelligence at this time was Army General Stenienko.

Senator GRASSLEY. Could we have a copy of that document?

General VOLKOGONOV. Yes, we are going to leave all these documents with you. The order was given to provide assistance with intelligence work, but the telegraphed response also prohibits—prohibited Soviet interpreters from military intelligence from participating in the interrogation of American prisoners. They apparently believe that this should be done by the KGB with their interpreters, and not by military intelligence.

The documents from the interrogation of American prisoners are contained in very broad dossiers. However, they contain mostly information regarding military and technical, tactical and strategic issues. I believe that the general intelligence service, that is the KGB, was more involved in this than the GRU.

Senator GRASSLEY. Did you have access to military operational files such as the files from the Far East High Command?

General VOLKOGONOV. We examined all of these archives relating to the course of the war in Vietnam, but only to the extent that they related to prisoners. We found data on the number of aircraft shot down, the number of attacks. However, we were unable to find any specific information on the names of American prisoners.

Senator GRASSLEY. Do the documents on the interrogation or potential interrogations of Americans in Korea—do the documents indicate when those interrogations ended?

General VOLKOGONOV. We have all the information. I haven't specifically prepared for that, but we have all the data on when they began and we presumably can determine when they ended. We have—perhaps we can even find it now. This is all from the beginning of 1953. The end is about there.

Senator GRASSLEY. OK. You said that most of the references to the American POWs in the presidential special files pertained to World War II and the cold war. Are there any that you have found thus far that pertain to Vietnam and American POWs?

General VOLKOGONOV. The presidential archives contain documents on a very wide range of issues from diplomatic, political, strategic, and military activity. I emphasize that there was a great

deal of sensational material here which has now become known to our country and to the world, but I repeat that we found no new information yet on the wars in Korea and Vietnam, although we still have hope that we may do so because our work there is not yet complete.

We are also working with a new archive, the archive of the border forces, which contains information on all cases of border crossings. We hope that this may shed some new light on our work.

In the archives of the special services we found information on the number of Americans currently living in Russia. However, they are living there voluntarily. We have information on the residence of Americans in Russia but they are, again, not being held against their will. We have information on all of them today, including their names and their agreement to meet with representatives of the American Government or press, if necessary.

These include not only Americans who were deprived of their U.S. citizenship and given Soviet citizenship after the war, but also military personnel, diplomatic personnel, other people who, for political or other reasons, including moral reasons, decided to stay in the Soviet Union.

Vice Chairman SMITH. Thank you, Senator Grassley. Senator McCain.

Senator MCCAIN. General, I want to thank you for coming here today and providing us with this information and the message from President Yeltsin. I would appreciate it if you would tell him I view this as progress on the commitment that he personally made to me when he was here to provide us with the information, recognizing, as you said, there is still more investigations that need to be carried out. Thank you.

General do you have any information of Russian personnel, either civilian or military personnel, interrogating any American POWs in Vietnam?

General VOLKOGONOV. I know two of them myself. They are both orderly and honest people; they tell the truth. They are two retired colonels, Korotkov and Orlov. They know live in Moscow and have already met with Americans. They were interpreters and participated in interrogations. This information is not secret and I tend to trust what they say. We have not yet established the full list of Russian citizens who participated in the interrogation of Americans, but we believe we can establish list.

I would like to take the opportunity to report that there is one American currently being held against his will in Russia, but this does not relate to the work of our commission because it is a criminal case. Mr. Lee Marcus, who in the spring of this year was detained at the airport attempted to remove contraband, an icon, from the country. I reported this case to the president and he has decided to pardon this citizen.

Senator MCCAIN. General, you were in opposition to the attempted military coup to overthrow the government of President Yeltsin.

General VOLKOGONOV. I was the only general who supported Yeltsin before the coup, for which I was fired several times for my democratic views. I bear my share of responsibility for the conservative and totalitarian regime in the Soviet Union, but I was able to free myself of this confusion somewhat earlier than most others. I

said this openly at the Congress and at meetings of the military command for which, again, I was fired several times.

But I was the only general to support President Yeltsin before the coup. By an unhappy coincidence on that very day, August 19, I was in a hospital in London having an operation, so I was able to support President Yeltsin only by radio at first.

Senator McCAIN. General, let me go back to a previous question and make sure I understand your answer. You are saying that American POWs in Vietnam were directly interrogated by Russian either KGB or GRU or Russian military?

General VOLKOGONOV. I did not say that. I said that according to our reports and information, employees of the GRU or the special services did not interrogate American prisoners of war in Vietnam. We have no documents indicating this. It is possible, because in Korea of our special services did interrogate American pilots, so by logic it is possible that the same was done in Vietnam. There is irrefutable evidence that this was done in Korea; we have documents of the interrogations.

Senator McCAIN. But no documentation of the Vietnam war.

General VOLKOGONOV. I repeat that I have no information or data on similar things being done in Vietnam, but I will continue my work and all information which becomes known to me will be given to the American side.

Senator McCAIN. Was military information gained through Vietnamese interrogations sent to the Soviet Union?

General VOLKOGONOV. There were representatives of our special services in Vietnam from both military and special services, so through these channels of the special services information was given to Moscow on the state of affairs and the situation of the war in Vietnam, because we had special representatives there.

We should not forget that these wars were fought in Vietnam and Korea, and not in the territory of the Soviet Union. Therefore, presumably the governments of Vietnam and North Korea would be able to provide more information or significant information.

Senator McCAIN. I understand that there is more work to be done, as you said in your statement. But is it—could you give the committee your personal opinion as to the likelihood that Americans from either the Korean or Vietnam war are alive in the former Soviet Union or were transported to the former Soviet Union?

General VOLKOGONOV. It is my profound conviction that—I am perhaps even more interested in establishing this truth than you are. It is a matter of honor for me. I have worked for many years, written many books, over 30 books. I recognized my confusion and mistakes in supporting the old regime, and it is my goal now, for the sake of honor, to tell the entire truth to the public, including the American public.

I believe that there are no Americans being held against their will in Russia for another reason, and that is this fact, that we have made appeals through the press and on television. Both I personally and my colleagues have made appeals. We have a commercial organization which is offering large rewards for any information on Americans living in Russia.

And in our times everything is open in our country, so I believe we would definitely have heard if there was even one case of an American still been held alive against his will in our country. Unfortunately, several months have passed since we began this and no information has been received yet.

Hypothetically, we cannot dismiss the possibility that several individual American servicemen were taken to the Soviet Union from Vietnam or Korea. But, again, we have no precise information about such cases. It can only be called a possibility and I believe not a very strong possibility.

Senator McCAIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman KERRY. Thank you, Senator McCain. Senator Daschle.

Senator DASCHLE. General, I want to associate myself with my colleagues in commending you for your courage and for the commitment that you have now made to democracy. I think that this is a very momentous occasion and I appreciate your willingness to be as candid as you have been with us this morning.

I wanted to clarify, to begin, a statement you made in the early part of the questioning regarding the status of six Americans in the period just after Korea. You had indicated, I believe, that there were six Americans being held, and I am unclear as to what you indicated was their status at last report.

General VOLKOGONOV. We have a document indicating that six Americans were held in special prisons. At that time, according to the procedures at that time in the Soviet Union, all foreign citizens were held in separate prisoners and separate camps called special camps.

Senator DASCHLE. When you say at that time, could I clarify what that time was?

General VOLKOGONOV. This was January 1954. They were all arrested, as a rule, for espionage or intelligence activities on behalf of the United States of America and detained under those terms. These people were arrested, detained, mostly in Germany and Austria and in several other countries.

I want to, at this time, make a related statement, which is that it was a mark of Soviet propaganda that any foreign citizen who was detained was automatically charged with espionage, was labeled a spy. This was the only charge, virtually, that was given to them, even though many of them had no relation and were totally uninvolved in this kind of activity.

This relates to these two people, Hopkins and Clifford, who were held for 8 years and subsequently shot. This is Mr. Ogins, who served 8 years under an espionage sentence and then after his sentence expired he should have been released, but Bakumov, who was then interior minister, reported to Stalin that this was a person who had seen too much and proposed that he be liquidated, and Stalin gave the order allowing him to be executed.

Senator DASCHLE. So, as I understand it, all six at some point were executed.

General VOLKOGONOV. We do not say that all of them shot. We know that three of them were given back, were released to American representatives in Berlin. Subsequently, two died, one took Soviet citizenship, and the fate of another is still unknown.

Senator DASCHLE. Let me, in the time I have remaining, relate to the process. Are you under any constraints whatsoever, for national security reasons or other purposes, in what information you provide, either through the commission or individually, to the United States?

General VOLKOGONOV. When we began our work I was somewhat concerned that I would be unable to reach understandings with all of our special services. I have since had many conversations with the president, I have met with the security minister and our leaders of foreign intelligence. And as a result of this I can say that I believe I have access to any information and my experts have access to any information which we need in any archive.

Senator DASCHLE. That includes the KGB?

General VOLKOGONOV. Including the KGB archives to the extent they relate to Korea and Vietnam. On the early period, the 1930's and 1940's, these archives are already given for broad access to many specialists who are working in them, including KGB archives.

Senator DASCHLE. My last question, because I am out of time, is do you have any evidence that documents relating to this information have been destroyed?

General VOLKOGONOV. I believe that the only documents that were destroyed, as a rule, are those which relate to the final activities of the Politburo and the Central Committee. After the failure of the coup last August, during 2 days, August 22 and 23, the Central Committee and possibly the special services had the opportunity to destroy documents, but I believe they were most concerned about financial documents, documents about the monetary situation of the party, and orders that were issued more recently.

I don't believe they had time to concern themselves with 40-year-old documents. If these kind of documents were destroyed, then they were probably destroyed back during Stalin's time.

Senator DASCHLE. Thank you, General, and thank you, Mr. Chairman.

General VOLKOGONOV. I think the American press might also be interested in our report, which we have translated into English and have made many copies. So, I think you will find it interesting.

Chairman KERRY. The report is the report that you just issued?

General VOLKOGONOV. Yes.

Chairman KERRY. Do you have the documents that you are providing us? Are those translated? Are the documents translated?

General VOLKOGONOV. They are not yet translated.

Chairman KERRY. Thank you. Thank you very much. I appreciate it. Have those translated in about 5 minutes, will you?

[Laughter.]

Senator ROBB. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. General Volkogonov, I join my colleagues in thanking you for coming here, and I appreciate the candor and the difficulty. I wonder if you could give us some insight into the degree of cooperation between the various agencies and ministries in the Russian Government, and the previous agencies in the Soviet Government, with respect to your current investigation?

You mentioned earlier that the Ministry of Security, Defense or Intelligence Service, Military Intelligence, Foreign Ministry, and

the Ministry of Internal Affairs had all been cited in the communique from President Yeltsin.

I wonder if you could describe both the working relationships between those ministries and the importance of information relative to the inquiry that we are conducting with respect to information any of those particular ministries might hold?

General VOLKOGONOV. I have spoken with President Yeltsin several times about the need to open all information regarding this investigation. He has given several oral and written orders to Minister Baronikov, the Security Minister; to Mr. Yerin, the Interior Minister; to Mr. Premakov, the Head of Foreign Intelligence, indicating that all necessary information should be provided to our investigation.

I have had personal discussions with these leaders as well, and have found no objection from them. On the contrary, they believe they should support me. However, I understand that the most important thing is not the support of top officials, but the cooperation of people who work in the archives themselves, at the lower levels.

I am an advisor to the President, which is a position approximately at ministerial level. I have a team of specialists working with me, and we have access to virtually any archive. I have worked personally in many of the archives in addition to my other duties, from which I am not relieved for this purpose.

I would like to note the high degree of cooperation we have received from our archival personnel, and also from the members of the American commission who are working together with us in Moscow. We have provided them with office space, and the opportunity to visit any point in the former Soviet Union—Habada, Sverkota, the site of any other camps. And we allow them, upon their request, to leave for any site they wish to visit within 24 hours.

We are preparing trips to Kalima and Kamchatka. These were sites of some of Stalin's main camps. We will go to visit these camps to study their archives to see if there are any traces of American presence there.

I am working closely with Ambassador Toon. We have established a good working relationship, and we believe that not all of our work is done. We believe it should continue for perhaps 3 or 6 more months in order that we can establish the fate of each American who was located on Soviet territory to determine whether each individual either left or died or was shot, so we can give a precise answer to the fate of each individual American.

Senator ROBB. General, with respect to the new thinking which you and President Yeltsin profess, you have indicated at the outset that the continuation of that new thinking was not absolutely certain. And that, indeed, the situation remains somewhat fragile.

Would you be kind enough to discuss what kinds of opportunities those who don't share your new thinking might have to influence this process? Either specific documents or individuals who may have relevant information, or those who may have served as interrogators at some point, or would have been expected to have information that would be relevant to this committee or, indeed, to destroy documents if that was part of their particular agenda?

Could you discuss the degree of insulation that your particular commission has from those who do not join you in the new thinking, and what impact that might have?

General VOLKOGONOV. Russia is approaching a moment of culmination in this attack upon the course of reform. I estimate the chances that reform will succeed at about 60-40. That is, 60 percent chance that Yeltsin will succeed with reforms; 40 percent belonging to the opponents of reform.

This is a real, growing threat. If Yeltsin fails to continue his course of democratic reform, it would be a loss not only for Yeltsin himself, but a loss for America and the entire free world because this is perhaps the first serious attempt to move Russia away from totalitarianism toward democracy.

In the worst possible scenario, if the course of reform is stopped, then, of course, all work in attempting to find evidence of American prisoners of war who are missing will be stopped immediately. But I am quite used to being attacked for my political views, and approach this issue with great decisiveness to continue our efforts.

Senator ROBB. General, my time has expired. I think I can speak for all of my colleagues here in saying that we hope your particular mission continues, and that we salute you for the courage under obviously challenging conditions. Thank you.

Chairman KERRY. Thank you very much, Senator Robb. Senator Reid?

Senator REID. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. For those who are watching, I think it is important to note that the General, during his military career, has been an academic. He has written, as he indicated, over 30 books. He has written one on Stalin, one on Trotsky, one on Lenin that was just made public that had many sensational things in it from materials that were available only to someone in the military. And, in fact, the person that is leading this commission, the General that is now before us, is someone that is well qualified, from an academic standpoint, to go through our archives and libraries. And I think that puts us a step or two forward, in addition to the fact that during his entire career he has been involved in the edge of progress; has been very progressive in what he has done and, as a result of that has, as has already been brought out here, been demoted, fired on a number of occasions. So, we recognize that and commend you for that.

How many people, General, are involved? How many Russian citizens are engaged, full or part-time, in the work of the commission?

General VOLKOGONOV. To speak first about people who are involved on a nonpermanent basis, on a volunteer basis, we have several dozen. I would say about 50 people working in this effort. There are about 20 or 22 members of the permanent, the standing commission on the Russian side. We also work with all the archivists and all of the main archival funds.

In order to attract other people to participate, we have been attempting even to provide material incentives. We have a sponsor which is offering rewards, as I said, for anyone who can provide new sensational information that will move our work ahead. This is the Economic Freedom Fund of Mr. Boroboy. He is the sponsor. But many average citizens consider it their duty and are attempting to help us in our work.

Senator REID. In your extensive research on Stalin did you, General, ever encounter evidence of a scheme to withhold American POWs from World War II or Korea for use as bargaining chips, or for any other purpose?

General VOLKOGONOV. At the time I wrote the book on Stalin, I could not write about Korea because this kind of information would not have passed censorship. Now, the book is being published and we believed it will be published with a Korean edition containing a chapter on events in Korea.

While working on the book on Stalin, I came across documents indicating that camps in Germany at the end of the war held approximately 22,000 Americans. Stalin gave the order at this time to check very carefully to see if there were any so-called collaborationists among the people in these camps. That is, Russians who had gone over to support Germany and Hitler, and may have ended up in American camps.

Of these some 22,000 Americans who were then sent home through Odessa and other channels, approximately 100 of them who had Russian, Ukrainian, or Jewish names were detained in the Soviet Union. Some of them—there were 119 of them all together. Of them, 18 subsequently died. Most of them were released after the fervent and continuing demands of the American Government. But some ended up staying in camps for a long period of time.

In terms of the war in Korea, we have only one fragmentary document from a conversation between Stalin and Chou En-lai in which Stalin says, be careful with the prisoners we may have who are Americans because they may be spies. That is all we have from Korea.

Senator REID. Were representatives of the East European Socialist States also active in the handling of the U.S. prisoners of war during the Korean conflict?

General VOLKOGONOV. We have no document indicating participation of these people in the working or the handling of American POWs or citizens. There were some Americans after World War II who were detained in Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland, and other countries by their special services, but we have no evidence of joint work between these special services and Soviet intelligence agencies. We believe that would not have been permitted.

Chairman KERRY. Thank you very much, Senator Reid. I just have a few more questions. I do not know if other colleagues want another round or not. We will try to wrap this up.

In your statement to us, General, you said that you can report there are currently a group of Americans living in Russia. Either political refugees from the U.S.S.R. or individuals voluntarily remaining in Russia. You put together a list of these individuals with addresses and an agreement to meet with U.S. Government representatives. Do we have that list?

General VOLKOGONOV. It is contained in the documents I gave to you.

On the day before I left to come to Washington, we established an additional list of Americans currently residing in Russia. They include James Samuel Star, born 1923. He was alive, we know, sev-

eral years ago. We do not know what his status is now. In 1953, he requested political asylum in Berlin.

We have a Morris Helperin who is currently in the U.S., although he is a Russian citizen and has an apartment in Moscow, but has been living with relatives in the United States for about a year.

A Dean Huxley in 1957 requested political asylum and now lives in Tblisi. A Mr. Tereshinko, we don't know his first name, in 1960 asked for political asylum and became a Soviet citizen in Kiev.

These are the most recent data we have about Americans living in the former Soviet Union. They came and stayed under various circumstances. They include military personnel, diplomats, intelligence agents, business people who came for their own personal motives, but all have expressed their agreement to meet with representatives of the American Government or press.

There are some Americans living in the former Soviet Union who were American citizens from childhood, but after the 1930's there were about 49 who ended up in the Soviet Union and were forced to renounce their U.S. citizenship and become Soviet citizens. Many of them passed through the camps. Many died there. Some made their way back to the United States eventually.

We know of five living currently there, very old, and wish only to receive help in contacting their relatives in the United States.

Chairman KERRY. All of that is very interesting. It is an extraordinary opening up of things that people had heard about or suspected for a long time. The mystery for us still remains prisoners of war, obviously. And I would ask you if there is any possibility that this totalitarian government that you said kept its secrets well could have kept a secret camp where prisoners were sent to outside of your archives and records?

Senator REID. Good question, John. Good question.

General VOLKOGONOV. If you had asked me that question before 1985, I would have allowed for the possibility that such a secret camp could have existed. However, since 1985 such large and dramatic changes have taken place in our country that I can no longer imagine that it would be possible for such incidents or events to be concealed.

Much is written in the press about Americans in Russia, about the work of our commission. And I cannot—I believe that if there were a secret camp, or a jail, or even a single American held against his will secretly, we would know about it sooner or later. The moral climate in our country makes it, I believe, psychologically impossible for this information not to come to light.

I believe we will still find more information about the fate of Americans who were in the Soviet Union. We may find their graves or more information about their tragic fate. Not all the documents have yet been examined, but I can nearly exclude the possibility that we will find any live American being held in Russia against his or her will.

Chairman KERRY. General, you personally have clearly been committed to getting answers. And President Yeltsin, I have no doubts, is a true democrat trying to force the system. But when we were in Moscow, it was clear to us in some of our meetings that the

level of resistance in certain groups is still significant, as you have acknowledged.

I was struck, particularly, by the GRU reluctance to seem to share in the openness. Can you tell the committee that you are, in fact—in answer to Senator Robb's question about open cooperation, are you now getting the cooperation of the GRU, and do you have access to GRU intelligence records?

General VOLKOGONOV. At the beginning of our work in March and April, we had some serious conflicts with our special services, which forced me to go on television and appeal in the press, informing people that obstacles were being set in our path and that people did not want to open their archives. I told President Yeltsin about this. But, more importantly, I informed the public about it.

As a result of the President's getting involved, the situation has improved dramatically. There is a new leader at GRU with whom I have spoken and who has agreed to give us all the documents we need.

I think the main difficulty at this stage is not that obstacles are being intentionally put in our path, but that documents about American POWs may be held in other archives where we don't expect them. You will never find a file folder clearly labeled, information on American POWs. They simply don't exist.

So, what we expect to happen is that documents or files in archives relating to foreign affairs or the special services in general may unexpectedly appear with information about Americans.

The majority of our archives are not computerized. The system of data gathering an analysis is not automated, so we must go through an enormous number of documents by hand, page by page. And your American colleagues who are working with us there know that in the special archives alone we found, when we looked for names of foreign citizens who had been in the territory of the former Soviet Union, literally hundreds of thousands of documents which must now be examined carefully. This is many weeks worth of work.

Chairman KERRY. General, referring back to Vietnam for a minute, the war took place at the height of tensions between our countries, and you have acknowledged the interest your country had in American pilots in Korea and World War II.

The aircraft we were using and the weapons we were using in Vietnam were our state-of-the-art technology. It is very difficult for me to believe that given the amount of support the Soviet Union was giving to Vietnam and the client status, if you will, that there would not have been enormous interest in your intelligence people in our pilots and in our equipment. You had many flights going out of Vietnam and ships out of Haiphong.

Is there anywhere there would be a record that would substantiate what is common sense—that you would have wanted to know about this state-of-the-art technology and these pilots?

General VOLKOGONOV. It is true that the American aircraft used in Vietnam were state-of-the-art. Also, a very high level of technology were the rockets by—the Soviet-made rockets used in Vietnam. There were many cases when American aircraft were destroyed by direct hits by single rockets. This kind of information, of course,

would have been very interesting to both the Soviet and American sides.

We have helped our American colleagues get in contact our people who were in Vietnam at the time, including our ambassador, and we have a list of all the people who were there. They all say unanimously that whenever an American pilot was rescued, the Vietnamese side immediately took control of him and took him away in an unknown direction.

This has been established precisely from the testimony not of individual people but from all of the people who were there at the time from the ambassador to Soviet rocket forces, GRU agents, and economic specialists based in Hanoi.

You are quite correct when you say that Vietnam was a satellite of the Soviet Union at that time. However, Vietnam during this period kept many things secret from the Soviet Union. We have reports from Soviet specialists who worked there that the Vietnamese were often not open to giving information to the Soviet specialists. I believe this is a peculiarity of Eastern society or Eastern psychology in a country which was, itself, extremely closed.

Chairman KERRY. I might add, General, that in all of our discussions in Vietnam, that that is born out that while they were a client, they tried to maintain their independence and sovereignty. And, in fact, none of the debriefings of our prisoners of war indicate any Soviet interrogation.

They do indicate some Cubans which would support some of what you have said. We do have testimony about the KGB interrogating at least one person, and possibly two or three.

General VOLKOGONOV. As I said, the KGB was present and did participate in the interrogation of American POWs in Korea. This is irrefutable and we have documentary evidence. Therefore, I do not exclude the possibility that similar activity went on in Vietnam, although we have no direct documents. But simply by logic we must admit that it is possible.

I think that our continued work in the presidential archives will allow us to establish the truth of this possibility or, perhaps, probability.

Chairman KERRY. General, would you agree that we are somewhat in a race against time because of the problems that President Yeltsin and your country face?

General VOLKOGONOV. I think that despite the domestic difficulties in Russia, I can optimistically say that we will fight and struggle to keep reform on course, and to keep these events under control. We will not step back from the course of reform, but will continue to search the archives until we have established the fate of each American.

As the Chairman of the Russian part of this commission, I assure all of the Senators that we will make all possible efforts to find satisfactory answers to the fate of every American in the Soviet Union.

Chairman KERRY. Senator Smith?

Vice Chairman SMITH. General, I just want to go back specifically to two areas. Number one, in your search methodology, as you looked through the files and archives, it is my understanding that in some of the psychiatric hospitals, as you researched records,

these records were referred to by number and not by name as it pertains to an individual.

If you are looking for an American missing POW, an American citizen in one of those psychiatric wards by name and there is no name on the file, how do you conduct that search? What is your methodology?

General VOLKOGONOV. In the main psychiatric institute where materials were located on people who were in psychiatric hospitals, this institute was a part of the KGB, and everyone who passed through the system had a dossier in the KGB. We found information, files on two Americans who were held in psychiatric hospitals for a short time in the 1950's. They subsequently left the psychiatric hospitals.

Our methodology, therefore, is simple. If a person who was in a psychiatric hospital is indicated in a file only by name, we can search the records of the NKVD and the KGB to which we do have access, and find the corresponding file with the indication of the name. Unfortunately, the examination of these psychological records have so far revealed no new information.

Vice Chairman SMITH. Let me just make sure I understand. Excuse me, let me make sure I understand the semantics here. My indication is that some of these files are numbers only. How do you correlate those to an individual?

General VOLKOGONOV. Whenever someone was sent to a psychiatric hospital, there was a document indicating from where they were sent, from an agency of the Ministry of Health, for example, or from the KGB.

Whenever we found files indicating that a person was sent there to the mental hospital from through the KGB, we became interested, and then went to the KGB and found the file corresponding to that number there. These files mostly contained names, but as you correctly point out, these names are often incorrect or false.

Vice Chairman SMITH. Some have indicated to our investigators in Moscow that there could have been the practice of giving Russian names to American citizens as a way to deceive or make it difficult to trace. Do you have any evidence of that?

General VOLKOGONOV. We allow for this possibility, but we believe it would be extremely difficult. We talked with a great many officers and employees of this camp—of these camps. For example, on the case of David Marken who was held in Verkota.

We talked with many supervisors, officers and employees of these camps, with hundreds of them, and none of them ever indicated hearing any conversation or talk about an American being held in their camp even with a different name. They all said that if an American was held in the camp with an assumed Russian name, it would simply be impossible to hide that from conversation between employees.

In the case of David Marken, there was one former camp prisoner who told us that he served with David Marken in one camp. We went to this camp with our American colleagues, talked with many, many people there and people who had been there. None of them could remember this person.

Several months later our supposed witness said he was actually in another camp with David Marken. This is not a very reliable

witness because he was a criminal himself, so we have found no names and not link whatsoever to this case. We found one person with a Russian name Markin, but he was 30 years younger than David Marken was supposed to be.

Vice Chairman SMITH. I just want to make an observation and then I want to move—I have to ask another question in another area. But on that particular point, why would the name Marken surface? Why Marken? Why did it surface?

General VOLKOGONOV. There was a former Soviet citizen, Pogentsev, who said he knew a fellow prisoner named David Marken who was an American. We got an aircraft and took our team members, with Americans and reporters, to this camp where he said that 2 years ago he had been with this person. No one we talked to at the camp, including prisoners, supervisors, or guards had ever heard anything about it.

Several months later, as I said, this same person, Pogentsev, said that he had actually served in another prison with David Marken. This was a criminal who had a long record and had served in different prisons. So, we went to this other prison and found there no trace of any American by that name. He was supposedly someone who had been brought there after the Korean war.

As a result of this we reached the conclusion that our witness was giving us this information in order to disorient us for whatever personal motives he had.

Vice Chairman SMITH. Let me just ask one followup.

Senator REID. He came in off the street and did this?

Vice Chairman SMITH. Pardon me?

Senator REID. This Russian came in off the street at one of the offices to relate this information?

General VOLKOGONOV. He came on his own initiative to our offices, having read in the press about our committee's work and that we were looking for people. He was a person, in fact, who wanted to come to America very much and said that if we would take him to America he would tell us a lot.

Vice Chairman SMITH. But what is particularly fascinating, just for the record here, about this particular incident is that there is no David Marken listed as an American POW from the Korean war. But there is an David Marken missing because I talked to his fiancée, former fiancée, the day before yesterday who said he did in fact—was, in fact, missing. So it an interesting detail. He does not have to respond to that.

General VOLKOGONOV. We cannot exclude the possibility of a coincidence. We know that many American names are similar. For example, in our lists of missing Americans there are dozens of Smiths, sort of like our name Ivanov. It is a very common name. So the fact that there was a person with this name does not prove that it was the same one we investigated at the specific places and time and found no evidence.

We found in our lists 43 persons with names similar to Marken, more like the Russian name, Markin. But these people were all investigated, and they were all around 30 to 40 years of age. So, unless David Marken was 10 years old when he was flying aircraft in Korea, it cannot possibly be the same.

Nevertheless, we continue to followup every lead that we get, even if they seem impossible or implausible, just to make sure we definitely leave no doubt. We are travelling to all the camps, and I am becoming an expert on the locations of all these former Soviet camps.

Vice Chairman SMITH. Let me ask one final question. We wrote—96 Senators signed a letter in December 1991 to Boris Yeltsin, President Yeltsin, asking for help in identifying or trying to locate Americans. That was followed up on October 27, 1992. And of course we had intermediate—we had a visit in Moscow, Senator Kerry and myself with you. And on October 27, 1992, a letter was written, signed by myself to President Yeltsin referencing a list of five or six individuals that we wanted to come here today to testify.

The names that—and I am not good at Russian pronunciation, but I will try, were Korotkov, Dimitriev, Gregoriev, you mentioned Pogentsev and also Vladimir Bagiev, and General Cherkov. Those individuals, in addition to the ambassador to Laos from the Soviet Union in 1973—we believe his name was Vidovin. I am not certain of that.

We asked that those individuals be allowed to testify. We received word from your government that you were opposed to that. And I am just curious as to why, what your reason for that would be. If you could respond to that, I would appreciate it.

General VOLKOGONOV. I never expressed disagreement with them coming. I was never opposed to them. I expressed doubt only about this Pogentsev who has led us around to all these different camps, and we believe is not worthy of our trust. Some of these people are citizens of other republics, Bagiev, for example. But I said that in principle it would be good for them to come. However, in the 3 to 4 days which we had, it was not possible to fulfill this request.

Moreover, I believe that had they come they would have said essentially the same things I have said, especially Orlov and Korotkov, with whom I have spoken personally. There were also problems with visas in such a short time. This is all done through the Ministry of Internal Affairs, through their own channels. But you were misinformed if you were told that I was against these people coming.

Vice Chairman SMITH. I just want to mention one specific individual out of the group, Lieutenant General Gregoriev. He stated, allegedly stated, in 1970 that many specially selected U.S. prisoners of war were being received from North Vietnam for long-term or lifetime custody and ideological retraining in the Soviet Union.

Have you talked to Gregoriev about that, or do you have any information on that particular point?

General VOLKOGONOV. I am hearing what you are saying for the first time. I have not spoken with General Gregoriev. He has not come to me. What you are saying, of course, is very interesting and even sensational information which, upon my arrival, I will immediately investigate and speak to Mr. Gregoriev. I am, in fact, hearing about Mr. Gregoriev himself for the first time, just now.

Vice Chairman SMITH. Thank you. Thank you, General. We appreciate that.

Chairman KERRY. Senator Daschle?

Senator DASCHLE. General, I would like to followup just briefly, if I could, with regard to the degree of cooperation you believe you received from the North Koreans. To what extent have your interactions with the Koreans given you confidence that they are providing you information adequate to your research and commensurate with the scope of investigation that you have undertaken.

General VOLKOGONOV. We believe we have accurate information. We have been provided with documents and transcripts of interrogations of American prisoners. And we believe that if they give us this information, they would have no reason to conceal from us information about Americans being transferred to the former Soviet Union. So, I have no claims toward these people.

I am working not with the leaders of various agencies and governments, but with lower level officials. I invite them to come visit me. We work together. These are people who work with the files themselves. Our methodologies are such that we try to work not with the ministers but with the people who handle the files and work with the archives directly.

I believe they respect me. I am reasonably well known in my country. And there are many people who are willing to work overtime or as volunteers. They are enthusiasts who are trying to establish the truth.

My answer may be disappointing to you, but I am accustomed to saying only the truth. At the beginning of our work, as I said, we had some conflicts with agencies. But after President Yeltsin's intervention, we now have access to virtually any document we need.

Senator DASCHLE. Would you characterize the cooperation that you received from the Vietnamese equally as generous?

General VOLKOGONOV. We have a representative of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs who works with us on our commission. We have expressed a desire that the Vietnamese representatives and representatives of North Korea have direct contact with the Americans working on this issue. We believe it would be more correct for them to work directly with their American counterparts. We have not yet been able to establish this contact.

Senator DASCHLE. Very well. Thank you very much. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman KERRY. Thank you. Do you have any more questions? Vice Chairman SMITH. No.

Chairman KERRY. General, we want to thank you very much for your testimony today. I think almost more important—the testimony has shed light and been very helpful, but the process is really what is most significant here. To have you here testifying before a U.S. Senate committee, and co-chairing a joint commission between our countries in the aftermath of the cold war, is a major statement about the possibilities.

Already, you have made significant information available to us, giving us names of people who are alive who are American who are living there; allowing the press to have access and the American authorities to have access. All of this very helpful.

Obviously, and you understand this—you said it. The critical question to us is what happened to people who wore the uniform of their country? What happened to people who were captured or who

were missing in action? The evidence is very strong, as you know, from other sources that some of these people went to China; that some of these people may have gone to the Soviet Union.

And we need in the next months to complete the task of getting rid of the secrecy and finding the answers. So, I think what you have helped to do today is underscore the commitment of President Yeltsin, and yourself, and the current government to trying to do that, and that there is a process that a lot of families and others can rely on to try to help make this happen.

So, we want to thank you for travelling this distance, for your courage in speaking out and going to the people, in trying to buck the system and make it work. And we recognize that this is not without some risks still in your country, and that it is still a difficult road to travel.

Clearly we, in this country, are hopeful that the reforms will take hold. We recognize our responsibilities and have ratified that in Senate action last year to try be helpful. And I think that the new administration will want to continue, and try to seek other creative ways to try to guarantee that this process that you and I represent can remain open, but that the larger process that we need to work on between our countries will also prosper.

So, I thank you very, very much for your visit here today.

Vice Chairman SMITH. Thank you, General, thank you.

General VOLKOGONOV. May I add two words?

Chairman KERRY. Absolutely.

General VOLKOGONOV. 3 or 4 years ago, it would have been impossible to imagine that a three-star Soviet General would sit in a U.S. Senate committee and testify on specific issues. This first of all, of course, is evidence as you say, Senator Kerry, of the enormous changes that have happened in our country and in relations between Russia and the United States.

I can assure you, as an old man, that I have valued my honor very highly, and I can tell you that I will do everything I can in order to answer all the questions that are posed to us, and by the times we have come through in the past and the cold war, to prevent a return to those days.

On behalf of the Russian part of our joint commission, I emphasize what President Yeltsin said in his letter about our decisiveness to continue our work until we have found exhaustive and satisfying to all questions which remain before us.

Thank you for your attention and time.

Chairman KERRY. Thank you very much, General.

Vice Chairman SMITH. Thank you.

Chairman KERRY. We look forward to the continued work of the joint commission. We appreciate it. Thank you.

Let me just say to everybody, we have two panels left. I want to notice the panels that, unfortunately, I as chairman have another obligation later this afternoon and I have got to catch a plane in order to do it. I'm going to try to get both panels in before I have to leave. I do not want anybody to take any offense at the fact that one member, in this case the Chairman, has to leave at that point in time. But Senator Smith, as Vice Chairman, will certainly see to it that everybody has an adequate chance to testify.

We are going to recess until the hour of 1:15 p.m., at which time Senator Smith will reconvene. We stand in recess for 1 hour.
[Whereupon, at 12:13 p.m. the committee recessed.]

AFTERNOON SESSION

Chairman KERRY. The hearing will come to order. My apologies for being a few minutes late here. We were having a meeting with colleagues in the back here.

We have Mr. Richard Kauzlarich, the Assistant Secretary of State for European and Canadian Affairs; Major General Bernard Loeffke, the Chief of Task Force Russia; and Al Graham, Senate Select Committee investigator who was posted to Moscow.

Gentlemen, if I could impose upon you to stand and raise your right hand so I can swear you in.

Do you swear to tell the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God?

Mr. KAUZLARICH. I do.

General LOEFFKE. I do.

Mr. GRAHAM. I do.

Chairman KERRY. Who is leading off here? Mr. Secretary, are you? Thank you.

Let me again state to all the witnesses, and including the next panel, and I particularly apologize to the next panel, that I personally have to depart early. Senator Smith is going to close out the hearings. But I can assure any witness that I will clearly pay attention to the record that will be created this afternoon. And I apologize for not being able to be here myself, personally, through all of it.

Mr. Secretary?

TESTIMONY OF RICHARD D. KAUZLARICH, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EUROPEAN AND CANADIAN AFFAIRS

Mr. KAUZLARICH. Good afternoon, Mr. Chairman. I want to thank the committee for inviting me here today, and for providing me with an opportunity to discuss the work of the Joint U.S./Russian Commission on POWs/MIAs.

The Joint Commission has fostered unprecedented cooperation between the U.S. and Russian Governments on the search for U.S. POWs. It is opening possibilities to develop a deeper understanding of a question that was once shrouded in secrecy by the Soviets during the cold war: were any American POWs/MIAs held in the U.S.S.R. since the end of World War II, and if so, what happened to them?

President Yeltsin has declared his full support for the Commission. However, some lower ranking Russian officials, who have been trained to distrust the United States, are obstructing the Commission's work. Hence, while we're making progress, we still have much work to complete, and final judgments about the Commission's efforts, therefore, are premature. But it's not premature to discuss the Commission's work program, its accomplishments and its future objectives.

The compelling need to account for our missing service personnel, and the unprecedented opportunities for cooperation arising

from the demise of the Soviet Union, enabled the U.S. and Russia to establish this Joint Commission. From its inception, the Joint Commission has given priority to determining whether any U.S. POWs and MIAs are being held against their will in the former Soviet Union, and if so, facilitating their immediate return. The Joint Commission's other priorities are locating and identifying the remains of U.S. soldiers, and obtaining information which will account for missing service personnel.

In addition to our work with the Russian Government, we're also working with the other newly independent states of the former U.S.S.R. I describe in my written statement, Mr. Chairman, the Commission, the role of the executive secretariat, and the very important role that Task Force Russia, directed by Major General Bernard Loeffke, plays in this process.

Let me move to some comments about the Commission's work on the Vietnam war and World War II. The Commission's activities relating to POWs from the Korean war, and from aircraft shoot downs during the 1950's and 1960's, is in my written statement, and was covered yesterday by Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense Ptak, one of our fellow commissioners.

Regarding Vietnam, determining whether any U.S. service personnel are still being held in the former Soviet Union against their will is our top priority. We, therefore, emphasize the importance of interviews with former Soviet officials who might have served in a civilian or military capacity in Vietnam or neighboring countries. And jointly with our Russian counterparts on the Commission, we've interviewed ex-Soviet military officers and diplomats who have served in Indochina. And despite having vigorously examined every lead to date, we've found no conclusive evidence supporting claims that U.S. POWs from the Vietnam war were transferred to the Soviet Union. It's important to note, however, that some key individuals, including the former Soviet ambassador to Laos, have refused to be interviewed by the Commission.

We're also examining the data we've received from Russian archives. None of those documents, however, indicate that any U.S. POWs were transferred from Indochina to the U.S.S.R. And furthermore, our Russian counterparts on the Commission maintain that no archival information has yet been discovered indicating that any U.S. POWs from the Vietnam war were interned in the U.S.S.R., or that Soviet personnel ever participated in interrogations of U.S. POWs during the Vietnam war.

If the Soviets did take American POWs to the U.S.S.R. from Vietnam, any documentation of this activity would have been very sensitive, and therefore not stored in normal archives. Even within the Soviet intelligence community, dissemination and storage would probably have been very carefully controlled. Therefore, we expect further progress from Russian archival material to be slow, and consequently believe that personal interviews will prove to be a more important source of immediate information.

Most of the information provided by the Russians to date pertains to World War II. General Volkogonov has said that Soviet authorities may not have repatriated all U.S. servicemen who were found on Soviet-controlled territory at the end of the war. Nonetheless, most of the material that we've received from the Russians

concerns individuals who were returned to American military control, rather than those who were not repatriated.

An important step was taken during the Commission's September meetings in Moscow. The Russians gave us access to the archives of the Soviet Army, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and the Soviet Military Medical Museum, and this should shed further light on the fate of U.S. POWs who found themselves on Soviet territory at the end of the war, and were not repatriated.

Now both as a humanitarian gesture, and as a sign of our desire to be responsive to Russian POW concerns, we've provided the Russians with specific information on Soviet POWs and MIAs. During the Joint Commission's September meetings, Ambassador Toon passed General Volkogonov the names of 17 former Soviet soldiers from the Afghan war, whom the U.S. Government believes are currently living in the West. We've also arranged meetings between our special envoy to the Afghan resistance and Russian officials, to discuss POWs still being held by the mujaheddin. And in addition, we're cosponsoring a U.N. resolution drafted by the Russians, calling for the return of all prisoners from the Afghan war that are still in captivity.

During the September meetings, Ambassador Toon also provided General Volkogonov the names of three Soviet sailors, whose bodies were recovered by the United States in 1974 after their submarine sank in the Pacific in 1968. This information was passed in the hope that it would encourage the Russians to provide similar specific information, allowing us to resolve similarly the fate of U.S. POWs and MIAs.

We've undertaken a range of joint efforts with the Russians. Ambassador Toon and General Volkogonov have appeared together on Russian national television, both in March and September of this year; we've had appeals in Russian newspapers asking Russian citizens to provide the Joint Commission with any information they might have on U.S. POWs. We and our Russian counterparts have also jointly investigated possible leads on U.S. POWs in St. Petersburg, as well as remote Russian sites such as Khabarovsk, Vorkuta, Totma and Pechora. The Russians have worked with us to make these trips quickly and professionally.

As I said earlier, top-level Russian support for our efforts is unprecedented. During Ambassador Toon's meeting with President Yeltsin in September, Yeltsin pledged his full commitment to uncovering the truth about U.S. POWs in the former U.S.S.R. And shortly after that meeting, he issued a directive to all relevant Russian ministries to cooperate fully with the Commission. General Volkogonov's contribution is unquestioned as well. And we've also discussed this with other top Russian officials, such as Vice President Rutskoi, the director of the foreign intelligence service, Primakov, Minister of Security Barannikov, and former head of military intelligence Timokhin.

Now with this high-level support, there has been some movement by Russian security services toward a more cooperative relationship with the Commission. For the first time, in our September meetings, representatives of all Russian security services participated in Commission discussions. But the security services themselves have not been transformed into partners with us in this ex-

ercise. And eliminating bureaucratic inertia and anti-U.S. bias was a major purpose of Ambassador Toon speaking with President Yeltsin in September.

In terms of next steps, we plan another plenary session of the Commission in Moscow during the week of December 14. And this will give us an opportunity to measure our progress during these meetings, and we'll be examining the degree to which Russian ministries have complied with President Yeltsin's directive to cooperate with the Commission.

We see three specific steps in our future work. We want to expand the pilot programs that we've established with individual Russian archives, including those which until now have been off-limits. We've established cooperative programs with the Russian Central State Military Archives, and the archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, in which Russian archivists have been tasked to search for data on U.S. POWs for a 3-month trial period. If these programs are successful, we'll extend them.

Second, we'll follow up on a wide range of individual topics that have surfaced from the documents which we received at our meeting in September, and I suspect the documents that we received this morning. We will also attempt to attract interviewees for our personal contacts, by continuing our public appeals in the Russian media and through the Voice of America.

Third, we're going to continue our joint visits with our Russian counterparts to locations outside of Moscow which we believe may be linked to U.S. POWs. This will keep the public spotlight on our efforts, and encourage those Russians with information to step forward out of humanitarian concern and as their civic duty.

This is only a snapshot of a dynamic process that's unfolding during a period of unprecedented opportunity. This window of opportunity, which may not remain open indefinitely, led us to establish the Commission, and reinforces our conviction that the Commission's work must continue despite the lack of cooperation by some within the Russian bureaucracy. We hope that the support for the Commission demonstrated by President Yeltsin and General Volkogonov will convince those who may be reluctant that it's in the best interests of both of our nations to cooperate.

This is going to require patience and perseverance. But the humanitarian nature of the Commission's objectives has struck a sympathetic note with many Russians, whose own losses and suffering in past wars serve as our strongest ally in our efforts to account for our missing servicemen.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Kauzlarich follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF RICHARD KAUZLARICH

The Joint U.S./Russian Commission on POWs/MIAs, operating since March 1992, has fostered unprecedented cooperation between the U.S. and Russian Governments on the search for U.S. POWs. Archival information provided by the Russians and interviews of Russian citizens are opening possibilities to develop a deeper understanding of a question that was shrouded in secrecy by the Soviets during the cold war: were any American POWs/MIAs held in the U.S.S.R. since World War II, and if so, what happened to them?

President Yeltsin has declared his full support for the commission. However, some lower ranking Russian officials who have been trained to distrust the United States,

are obstructing the commission's work. Hence, while we are making progress, we still have much work to complete. Final judgments about the commission's efforts therefore are premature. But it is not premature to discuss the commission's work program, its accomplishments, and future objectives.

STRUCTURE/WORK PROGRAM

The compelling need to account for our missing service personnel and the unprecedented opportunities for cooperation arising from the demise of the Soviet Union enabled the United States and Russia to establish a Joint Commission on POWs/MIAs. The commission began its work in Moscow on March 26, 1992. From its inception, the Joint Commission has given priority to determining whether any American POWs/MIAs are being held against their will in the former Soviet Union and, if so, facilitating their immediate return. The Joint Commission's other priorities are locating and identifying remains of U.S. soldiers, and obtaining information which will account for missing service personnel.

Ambassador Malcolm Toon chairs the U.S. delegation to the commission. U.S. commissioners include Senators John Kerry and Bob Smith; Congressmen John Miller and Pete Peterson; Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for POW/MIA Affairs Alan Ptak; Defense Intelligence Agency Chief of Staff A. Denis Clift; Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European and Canadian Affairs Richard Kauzlarich; Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs Kenneth Quinn; and the Assistant National Archivist Dr. Trudy Peterson. The Russian delegation is headed by Col.-Gen. Dmitriy Volkogonov, one of President Yeltsin's top advisers, with representation from the Russian Ministries of Defense, Foreign Affairs, Security, Internal Affairs, the Foreign Intelligence Service, and the Russian parliament.

We have had three meetings of the commission: the inaugural session in March 1992, a special meeting held in June following President Yeltsin's comments on POWs at the June Summit with President Bush, and one held in September. Another session is scheduled for mid-December 1992. In addition, a working level meeting was held in May of this year.

Ambassador Toon has designated an Executive Secretariat to coordinate this effort and to implement policy decisions formulated by commissioners. The Secretariat resides in the office of Commissioner and Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for POW/MIA Affairs Alan Ptak. Mr. Ed Ross, Director of POW/MIA Affairs in Mr. Ptak's office, is the Executive Secretary.

The Executive Secretariat provides commission policy guidance and assigns operational taskings to Task Force Russia, the Department of the Army office created to acquire and analyze data provided by the Russian side of the commission. Task Force Russia was established by the Secretary of the Army in his role as the commission's Executive Agent. The task force is directed by Maj. Gen. Bernard Loeffke. Archivists, historians and an interpreter in Task Force Russia's Moscow office pursue all leads concerning U.S. POWs through interviews and access to archival records. The task force's headquarters in Washington translates, analyzes, and compares this information to existing U.S. databases to determine its value and reliability. Once the data's validity is confirmed, it is released to the next of kin through the appropriate casualty affairs office.

Task Force Russia has a combined staff of 35, including 7 persons on the ground in Moscow. It has already analyzed approximately 1600 pages of documentation and conducted 92 interviews. With the addition of this task force, there are now 550 Department of Defense personnel working on the POW/MIA issue.

ACCOMPLISHMENTS TO DATE

A. Vietnam war: Determining whether any U.S. service personnel are still being held in the former Soviet Union against their will is our top priority. We have therefore emphasized the importance of interviews with former Soviet officials who might have served in a civilian or military capacity in Vietnam or neighboring countries. Jointly with our Russian counterparts on the commission, we have interviewed ex-Soviet military officers and diplomats who served in Indochina. Despite having vigorously examined every lead, to date we have no conclusive evidence supporting claims that U.S. POWs were transferred to the Soviet Union. It is also important to note that some key individuals, including the former Soviet Ambassador to Laos, have refused to be interviewed by the commission.

We are also examining data we have received from Russian archives. None of those documents, however, indicates that any U.S. POWs were transferred from Indochina to the U.S.S.R. Furthermore, our Russian counterparts on the commis-

sion maintain that no archival information has yet been discovered indicating that any U.S. POWs from the Vietnam war were interned in the U.S.S.R. or that Soviet personnel ever participated in interrogations of U.S. POWs during the Vietnam war.

If the Soviets did take American POWs to the United U.S.S.R. from Vietnam, any documentation of such activity would have been extremely sensitive, and therefore, not stored in normal archives. Even within the Soviet intelligence community, dissemination and storage of such information would probably have been very carefully controlled. Therefore, we expect further progress from Russian archival material to be slow. We consequently feel that personal interviews will prove to be a more important source of immediate information.

B. Korean war: Both in Russia and here in Washington, the commission is aggressively developing and pursuing leads through documentary and individual sources on the fates of missing Americans from the Korean war.

The Russians have already provided over 700 pages of documents that have allowed us to identify 10 American servicemen, previously listed as unaccounted for, as having been captured and interrogated by the North Koreans and Chinese. But the Russians also maintain that, despite extensive archival searches, they have discovered no documents indicating that Soviet personnel had direct contact with U.S. POWs during the Korean war.

As noted above in connection with the Vietnam war, we believe that interviews of former Soviet officials will be the most fruitful source of information about Korean war POWs. We have interviewed three ex-Soviet military officers who claim to have participated in interrogations of U.S. POWs during the Korean war. The U.S. delegation to the Joint Commission travel led to Khabarovsk in the Russian Far East this past September to investigate these reports. Although we discovered no new information, local Russian prison officials and archivists pledged to cooperate with the commission. Ambassador Toon also broadcast an appeal on Khabarovsk regional radio, calling citizens with information on U.S. POWs to tell their stories.

In view of what we have learned so far, we suspect that information on Soviet treatment of American POWs would have been highly classified and accessible only to key decisionmakers and those directly involved. We will therefore continue to pursue this question vigorously through interviews, public appeals in the Russian media, and cooperative agreements with Russian archives.

C. Cold War Aircraft Downings: We have focused our efforts on 10 shootdown incidents which occurred between 1950 and 1965 involving 90 crew members who remain unaccounted for. Despite the lack of conclusive evidence, we do not rule out the possibility that members of these crews may have survived long enough to be rescued by Soviet units. U.S. debriefs from the 1950's provide second-hand evidence that individuals whose characteristics matched members of a few of these crews were sighted in Soviet prisons; however, we lack conclusive evidence of such prisoners.

In order to expedite archival searches, we have provided the Russians highly specific data—including names of service members involved, dates, last known locations, and aircraft types—on these 10 incidents. Despite this assistance, the Russians have supplied only limited documentation to date on these cases. However, the Russian side of the commission has promised to provide us pertinent information, and now appears more willing to pass data on crew members who did not survive these incidents. Furthermore, we are encouraged that in September, the Russian side included representatives of the Border Guards for the first time in the commission's work. We hope the Border Guards' archives will provide further insight on these shootdowns.

D. World War II: Most of the information provided by the Russians to date pertains to World War II. General Volkogonov has said that Soviet authorities may have not repatriated all American servicemen who found themselves on Soviet-controlled territory at the end of World War II. Nonetheless, most of the material we have received from the Russians concerns individuals who were returned to American military control rather than those who were not repatriated. During the commission's September meetings in Moscow, the Russians gave us access to the archives of the Soviet Army, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and the Soviet Military Medical Museum. We believe that this should shed further light on the fate of U.S. POWs who found themselves on Soviet territory at the end of World War II and were not repatriated.

E. Information Given to the Russians: Both as a humanitarian gesture and as a sign of our desire to be responsive to Russian POW concerns, we have provided the Russians specific information on several Soviet POWs and MIAs.

During the September 1992 meetings in Moscow, Ambassador Toon passed General Volkogonov the names of 17 former Soviet soldiers from the Afghan War whom the U.S. Government believes are currently living in the West. We have also arranged meetings between our Special Envoy to the Afghan Resistance and Soviet/Russian officials to discuss POWs still being held by the Mujahedeen. In addition, the United States is co-sponsoring a U.N. resolution drafted by the Russians calling for the return of all prisoners from the Afghan War that are still in captivity.

During the September meetings, Ambassador Toon also provided General Volkogonov the names of three Soviet sailors whose bodies were recovered by the United States in 1974 after their submarine sank in the Pacific in 1968; Ambassador Toon further noted that the United States recovered three additional bodies which it could not identify. This information was passed in the hope that it would encourage the Russians to provide similar specific information allowing us to resolve the fate of U.S. POWs/MIAs.

F. Joint Efforts: In addition to interviews and archival searches, we have undertaken a range of other joint efforts with the Russians. Ambassador Toon and General Volkogonov appeared together on Russian national television in March and September 1992, appealing to Russian citizens to provide the Joint Commission any information they might have on U.S. POWs. Similar appeals have also been made in Russian newspapers. These appeals resulted in contact from several Russian citizens offering information relating in some way to U.S. POWs.

We and our Russian counterparts have also jointly investigated possible leads on U.S. POWs in St. Petersburg as well as in remote Russian sites such as Khabarovsk, Vorkuta, Totma, and Pechora. The Russians worked with us to make these trips quickly and professionally. During our visit to Khabarovsk, we were accompanied by top officials of Russian security ministries, including a general from the Ministry of Internal Affairs who is the director of the Russian prison system. These officials were professional and helpful.

Top-level Russian support for our efforts is unprecedented. During Ambassador Toon's meeting with President Yeltsin in September, Yeltsin pledged his full commitment to uncovering the truth about U.S. POWs in the former U.S.S.R. Shortly after that meeting, Yeltsin directed all relevant Russian ministries to cooperate fully with the commission. General Volkogonov is also clearly dedicated to working closely with us on the POW issue. Ambassador Toon has also discussed this effort during his meetings with other top Russian officials, including Vice President Rutskoi, Director of the Foreign Intelligence Service Primakov, Minister of Security Barannikov, and former head of military intelligence Timokhin.

With this high-level support, there has been some movement by the Russian security services toward a more cooperative relationship with the commission. For the first time, during our September meetings in Moscow, representatives of Russian security services participated in commission discussions. But the security services have not transformed themselves into partners. We believe that some officials within these services, who have been trained to distrust the United States, continue to obstruct the commission's progress. Eliminating this bureaucratic inertia and anti-U.S. bias was the major purpose of Ambassador Toon's meeting with President Yeltsin. Overcoming this problem will take time and require continued resolve on our part.

NEXT STEPS

The commission is planning its next plenary session in Moscow during the week of December 14. This session will give us another opportunity to measure our progress. During these meetings, we will examine how successful President Yeltsin has been in overcoming Russian bureaucratic resistance to the commission. We will also wish to see whether General Volkogonov achieves his goal of determining by year's end which archives contain material relevant to our work.

We see three specific steps in our future work:

First, we hope to stimulate progress in archival research by expanding our pilot programs with individual Russian archives, including those which, until now, have been off limits. We have already established cooperative programs with the Russian Central State Military Archives and the Archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, in which Russian archivists have been tasked to search for data on U.S. POWs for a 3-month trial period. If the programs prove successful, we will extend them. We hope that evidence arising from these projects will help to reverse Russian bureaucratic inertia by building enthusiasm among Russian archivists to cooperate with the commission.

Second, we will follow up on a wide range of individual topics that have surfaced from the documents we received at our meeting in September. We will conduct further interviews with former Soviet diplomats, representatives from the intelligence community, and military officials whom we met at our last meeting. This will require us to consolidate data we are receiving from knowledgeable individuals throughout the former U.S.S.R. and in the Soviet emigre community. We will also attempt to attract interviewees by continuing our public appeals in the Russian media, and through Voice of America broadcasts.

Third, we will continue joint visits with the Russians to locations outside of Moscow which we believe may be linked to U.S. POWs. Combined with media efforts to publicize the commission's work, we expect site visits to keep the public spotlight on our efforts and encourage those with information to step forward—out of humanitarian concern—as a civic duty.

CONCLUSIONS

This report provides only a snapshot of a dynamic process unfolding during a period of unprecedented opportunity. This window of opportunity, which may not remain open indefinitely, led us to establish the commission, and reinforces our conviction that the commission's work must continue, despite the lack of cooperation by some within the Russian bureaucracy. We hope that the support for the commission demonstrated by President Yeltsin and General Volkogonov will convince those who may be reluctant that it is in the best interest of both nations to cooperate. This will require patience and perseverance. However, the humanitarian nature of the commission's objectives has struck a sympathetic note with many Russians, whose own losses and suffering in past wars serve as our strong ally in our efforts to account for our missing servicemen.

Vice Chairman SMITH [presiding]. Is there any preference, General and Mr. Graham?

Mr. GRAHAM. He outranks me.

Vice Chairman SMITH. General?

TESTIMONY OF GENERAL BERNARD LOEFFKE, USA, CHIEF, TASK FORCE RUSSIA

General LOEFFKE. I think I'm his boss, too, Senator. I'm not sure. Senator Smith, Senator Kerry said this morning, where else can you find Government officials, legislators and the citizenry working together to solve this problem. I think Task Force Russia is a good example of that, sir, because Al Graham, who works for you, also works for us at Task Force Russia. And then in this audience we have the families, the Sandersons, the Reynolds. And all of these people are working together to come up with an answer.

Sir, for brevity's sake, I will just cover some five points. You have my opening statement. Number one—

Vice Chairman SMITH. I will just say that all of the statements will be placed in the record, in full, as if read in full.

General LOEFFKE. Sir, we're the youngest organization in town. We're 4 months old. I'm 2 months old with them. Behind me are all the analysts that are parceled out to each one of the areas of importance, which as you know, are World War II, Korea, the cold war and Vietnam. As the youngest organization in town, we have done much in the limited time that we have been in being. Our purpose is to look at people and documents, and to follow any lead that we can, both in Moscow and anywhere in the United States.

To accomplish this, we have an office here in Washington, DC, with analysts, with translators, with computer experts. And in Moscow, we have personnel. One of these has been Al Graham to our right. We pursue all leads and we also publish, as you know sir, a biweekly report which is unclassified.

We have had remarkable access to the Russians. I was in Moscow in 1977-79, and I can tell you, Senator, that the things that we were being exposed to were unimaginable during that particular period of time. I have also served in other countries that are our allies, and we're not privy to their archives, we're not privy to interviews their citizens. So what we are doing with the Russians is monumental.

Even though we have access, there are still problems. And the problems, I think, have been well-articulated by General Volkogonov this morning. The problem that I'm referring to is that the archives, where the information on U.S. POWs might be known, are still not being made available to us. We have received much help. If we want to visit a specific location, we're allowed to see it. Not that things haven't been changed when we get there, or the things that we were looking for might not be there when we get there.

The point that I want to make too, sir, is that our task force works on a joint process. It has been made very clear to me that we are to work with the Russians. And this has a plus and negative side to it. The positive side is that the Russians know exactly what we're doing. They should have no fear that we're running around Russia without their knowledge. We share what we find with them. We ask them to be with us during interviews. And we find that is very healthy, because Task Force Russia is becoming sort of a role model for how we can do work with the Russians. So in this respect, I think we're doing well.

The negative side is that there are some Russians that are not extremely comfortable in having Russian officials present when they divulge information to us. But I would say that our job is to work with the Russians, and I welcome that, and I think this has given us a great deal of access.

General Volkogonov mentioned Mr. Borovoi this morning, and he's just one of many Russians who are assisting us. We also have a parliamentarian, Yuri Smernov, who is the chairman of the POW/MIA for the Russian parliament. Unfortunately, the committee is not as well-populated as yours, Senator. He is a committee of one. But he is also the founder of Iskatel, the searchers, which is an organization that has 40,000 individuals. They are all volunteers who are actively searching for missing Russians. And as you heard General Volkogonov, his father is one of a million and a half Russians who are still missing. The Russian ambassador here in Washington, he was born in a prison camp. He also knows of the extent of the misery of the missing.

There is an unbelievable amount of work yet to be done. I have in front of me a picture that I took of KGB archives. I know that when you visited Russia you were privy to some of that. This is in a Siberian town. I was asked to go there, and I took these pictures myself, and looked at some of the records. These are 20,000 files here of Russians who were executed in the 1930's. So, they've done bad things to themselves.

However, the archives that I was given access to had nothing to do with American POWs, and had nothing to do with foreign nationals. These were their own people. I do want to make the point that we are being given access, we are being allowed to interview

people. Al Graham, my colleague to the right, and I have been present at interviews in Moscow. So this is happening.

Chairman KERRY. It might, I supposed it should be added that the fact that they are willing to, in a sense, show the sins of the past so clearly with respect to themselves, only underscores the fact that, if they can show what was done to somebody else, that there would be, I suppose, a greater willingness or at least an equal willingness to do that.

General LOEFFKE. Yes, sir. And my colleague, Rich Kauzlarich here in the State Department, has already mentioned all the things that we are doing as a Joint Commission. One of them, and General Volkogonov has stated on several occasions is that he's using us as a role model. Our interest in accounting for every single individual is a lesson for the Russians, who have not accounted for a million and a half of their missing.

I have had the privilege been privy to be the escort officer for General Volkogonov during his 2 days here, and he has continuously asked for information of Russian POWs in Afghanistan. So there is a definite interest in the POW issue. And I'm amazed that with Russia in the midst of all the chaos that it's going through, that the Russians are focusing on POW/MIAs.

I would like to finish this, sir, by giving credit to the families that are here today. The families bring a human face to what would be a long list of statistics. I have been with Al Graham, I have been with Bruce Sanderson who is in the audience here today, and whose father was shot down when he was born. We sat next to General Volkogonov when Bruce asked him about his father. We spent about an hour asking General Volkogonov many questions.

At the end we asked him one particular question: General, what have we not asked that you would have asked if you were sitting in Bruce Sanderson's chair? And the General says, I think you've asked all the questions. I just want to make one comment, and the comment is that as I look at Bruce Sanderson I also see myself, because my father is also missing.

So I know the families play a great role in our work. Task Force Russia is a DOD agency—I respond to Mr. Al Ptak, head of DOD's POW/MIA office. He has encouraged us to work with the families. So the Bruce Sandersons, the Reynolds, are all actively pursuing these cases with us. We consider ourselves defense counsels for the families. We also work closely with the casualty officers in trying to find the answers.

Sir, I would end up by saying that if I turn up missing tomorrow, I would hope that my son would do as much for me as the Sandersons are doing for their father. I would hope my wife would do as much for me as Jane Reynolds is doing, or Pat Service is doing. The role of a leader is to keep hope alive, and that's what Task Force Russia is doing.

Thank you, sir.

[The prepared statement of General Loeffke follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF MAJOR GENERAL BERNARD LOEFFKE

Senator Kerry, Senator Smith, members of the Committee, Ladies and Gentlemen, we feel fortunate that we have the opportunity to explain who we are, our

mission, how we operate, and provide observations on our efforts in Russia. These are based on personal experiences with the Russians during the cold war and my reactions to the Task Force and Commission's current relationships in post-coup Russia.

Task Force Russia is the youngest organization in the structure that has developed to achieve an accounting of America's POW/MIA personnel. The Task Force was established on June 29, 1992 in response to a decision by the Department of Defense to designate the Army as the Executive Agent for the POW/MIA mission as it pertains to Russia.

The Task Force exists to support the U.S. delegation to the Joint US-Russian Commission on POW/MIAs. The Commission, whose inaugural meeting was on 26 March 1992, has three major objectives:

- Pursue all reports* alleging the presence of POW/MIAs in the former Soviet Union and assist in facilitating repatriation if they desire.
- Establish a mechanism* by which remains identified as Americans can be returned to the United States.
- Obtain access* to people and documents in Russia that could shed light on the fate of U.S. service members missing from Four Wars."

To support these objectives, we perform the following functions:

- We support an office in Moscow* that collects information from Russian archives, officials, and citizens.
- We operate a Washington office*, which includes a Translation and Analysis unit. This office is capable of processing information collected in Russia, as well as researching information available in U.S. casualty archives. In addition, our analysts have commenced a useful program of interviewing former U.S. officials, authors and journalists who have specialized in the POW/MIA subject, Russian emigres, and repatriated POWs and the family members of those who are missing. Such persons have much to contribute to our effort.
- The Task Force produces bi-weekly* unclassified reports for the U.S. delegation. These reports consist of a summary of information obtained from archives and interviews in Russia and the United States as well as recommendations for follow-on operations. The Task Force also produces reports, which contain translations of archival documents received from Russian counterparts.
- The Task Force is the repository* for all copies of Russian documents received.
- The Task Force's analytical unit* provides support to the Commission prior to, during and following Commission meetings in Moscow. Such support can include information papers, or the preparation of follow-on issues based upon documents received.
- In Moscow*, our team has established working relationships and agreements with appropriate Russian archivists, interviewed Russian citizens, and when appropriate, conducted follow-on travel, site visits, and interviews.

There are other functions that the Task force performs on a daily basis. In the interest of time, I will move directly to the objective of all of the above activities—accounting for unaccounted for service members. The Task Force is looking for specific information on American service members, be it via lists of names from Russian Archives or, for example, from the memory of a retired Russian officer who might recall the name of an American POW whom he may have encountered during the Korean war. Once we obtain names, we cross-check each name with available lists of unaccounted for American from the Four Wars. When we have a hit (i.e. when a name from a Russian source appears among those classified as unaccounted for), we report the information to the office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense, 15A, (POW/MIA affairs), for possible family notification, while at the same time asking our Russian counterpart for any additional information on that individual.

There are several observations concerning our work that are worth noting:

- Based on my experience*, the access that we enjoy to Russian citizens and archives is unprecedented, and would have been unthinkable 15 short months ago. That is not to say that we are suddenly the beneficiaries of a spirit of 100 percent openness—we are not—but nonetheless, it is very different from what it used to be.
- We have received archival information* pertaining to 11 unaccounted for Americans. In one case, all that had been known about a particular Korean war pilot was that his aircraft had disappeared from the radar scope. Archives obtained in Moscow during the September Commission meeting established that this officer had survived the shoot down of his aircraft, been imprisoned, and

interrogated. True, this is not an accounting for this officer, but it at least tells us more than we had known to date.

c. *Specific accomplishments* include 1,600 pages of Russian Archives received and translated, 92 Russians interviewed and numerous U.S. citizens interviewed. The Task Force has published, eight bi-weekly reports that included, analysis, and recommendations. In addition, our Moscow Team has concluded a research agreement with the Central State Archives which should enhance our efforts and serve as a model for future agreements.

d. *Jointness*: Our work in Russia is accomplished in cooperation with our Russian counterparts. This has its advantages and disadvantages. On the positive side our Russian colleagues need not worry that we are running around in Russia without their knowledge. We have built a sense of trust that is important. There is also the benefit of having Russian officials serve as witnesses to what is being said. On the negative side there is the reluctance of some individuals wanting to divulge information with Russian officials present. From our experience we have found that there is not one Russia but many Russians. One Russia that wants to cooperate and another that does not. The benefit of working with the Russians is that our Task Force is yet another way of building working relationships with Russian officials. This is beneficial for our two nations.

There are two types of Russian reactions to U.S. efforts to find our missing. One is that we play a role model function by showing to the Russians that we care for each missing service member. Several Russians have commented that they wished that there would be that type of interest shown for the 1½ million that are missing in Russia.

The second reaction is that the Russians are annoyed that their government is doing so much to find Americans and so little to find missing Russians.

We are now at a stage where we can ask for cooperation from Russian non-governmental agencies such as *ISKATEL* (the searcher) that has more than 40,000 volunteers actively looking for missing Russians. A Russian millionaire *Borovoi* has also created his own mechanism to search for Missing Americans. Through our contacts and with the assistance of the Russian commission in Moscow we will work closely with these organizations. The truth will be known mainly through our Russian colleagues.

e. *I have been impressed* with the sense of purpose and sincerity that the American, and, in some cases, the Russian side have brought to this issue. In the case of our Russian colleagues, we must temper our impatience with an understanding that change and the need to adjust to change is the dominant phenomenon in Russia. We are working to overcome suspicions that have developed over generations, in an environment that is characterized by tension between competing conservative and liberal approaches to the Commission's work and goals. There is much yet to learn from the Russian side. We need to keep asking, but at the same time reciprocating by making it important for them to cooperate.

f. *Lastly and most importantly the families of our service members*. The family members are the real heroes. They have suffered and continue to suffer waiting for news of their loved ones. The families also provide to our Russian counterparts the human-face dimension to what would otherwise be a cold statistic in a long list of cases. I have personally seen a Russian general be moved when he heard the statements of Bruce Sanderson, the son of a member of the crew of one of our downed aircraft. Bruce was born the day his father was shot down. The family members have assembled the pertinent missing I would hope my son would do as much as the Sanderson brothers are doing. I would hope that my wife would do as much as Jane Reynolds is doing for her missing husband and I would hope that my daughter-in-law would do as much as Pat Service is doing for her missing father-in-law. We have a Pentagon today that is working hard to assure active duty members that if they should ever turn up missing, we would do all we could to assist their return. The basic role of a leader is to keep hope alive. Task Force Russia is helping keep that hope alive.

Chairman KERRY [presiding]. Thank you very much, General. And I certainly think every member of this committee embraces what you have said about the families. They, indeed, have created this committee, and have created the effort. And it is a great tribute to them. There is no question that for years they have been carrying this in a very lonely way.

Mr. Graham, I want to welcome you, and I want to thank you for the effort you have been carrying out in Moscow on behalf of the committee, assigned to the Joint Commission. We are very appreciative for it, and we look forward to your comments.

TESTIMONY OF AL GRAHAM, SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE INVESTIGATOR POSTED TO MOSCOW

Mr. GRAHAM. Good afternoon, Mr. Chairman, Senator Smith.

Chairman KERRY. If you would pull the mike a little closer, please.

Mr. GRAHAM. Good afternoon. As you mentioned before, I was posted to Moscow from May 14 to November 6, 1992 where I represented this committee while working under the aegis of the Joint Commission on POW/MIA Affairs. One of my principal tasks while in Russia was, in conjunction with Task Force Russia-Moscow team members, to arrange for and conduct interviews with Russian officials, Russian citizens, and retired officers who may have served in Southeast Asia and Korea.

In early June, about a dozen Soviet-Vietnamese veterans were interviewed. Among them was a three-star General who was formerly commander of the Soviet military advisory group in Vietnam from 1967 to 1968. The general had previously been interviewed by Senate staffers on March 26, 1992, and told them that he received a report on every American pilot captured, from the Vietnamese and sometimes from his subordinate Soviet units, if they were aware of a capture.

He also recalled that at a May 1975 reception in Vietnam, he asked a high Vietnamese official, whose name he could not remember, if Vietnam still held American POWs. The official answered, yes, they still had them. When the general was reinterviewed by us on June 1, 1992, he denied these earlier statements. But perhaps the most flagrant case of turnaround during a reinterview concerns a well-known Russian colonel, scholar, and renowned Far East expert, who was stationed at Khabarovsk from 1950 to 1954.

This individual had recently been asked by the Chief of the Russian General Staff to review all documents on Korea and Vietnam, currently in their hands for purposes of declassification. During our first interview with the colonel conducted on August 19, 1992, he told five Joint Commission representatives—four U.S., one Russian—that Soviet military specialists had been given approval to interrogate American servicemen in Korea, and that some American servicemen with experience, seniority, and specific specialties were selected for transfer to the U.S.S.R. for further interrogation.

He mentioned—

Chairman KERRY. Why don't you take the, pick up the mike there, and carry it right with you.

Mr. GRAHAM. Yes. He mentioned that in this confluence here between Russia, Manchuria, China and North Korea, there was a base, a naval base called Posyet, which served as a transit point for the movement of Americans north by rail or plane to the Khabarovsk area, which is the Headquarters of the Far East military district headquarters.

He maintained that the number of Americans processed through Khabarovsk was in the hundreds and they were under MGB (KGB) control, both during and after the interrogations. He did not know their fate after the interrogations.

He personally claimed to have interrogated two American POWs. One he recalled was a Lieutenant Colonel Black. Efforts were made according to the Colonel to recruit and gain cooperation of Americans. All interrogation reports were sent to the headquarters of the Far East Military District, the Seventh Directorate of the Main Political Directorate and the GRU.

In a followup interview of this individual held, on September 29, 1992, during which time, General Loeffke was present, he admitted that he received a phone call from a Foreign Intelligence Service representative the night before. He then considerably modified his previous testimony, denying any knowledge of an American POW named Black and the fact that American POWs from the Korean war were interrogated by Soviets in Khabarovsk.

However, he did admit interrogating two American POWs in North Korea and asserted that there were anywhere from ten to 25 Soviet interrogators involved in this process, indicating a large number of American POWs were interrogated during the Korean war.

He now maintained that the interrogation center, which was in existence for at least 18 months, was located at a juncture between North Korea, China and the U.S.S.R. borders. He did not completely rule out that it may have been on Soviet territory.

In addition, he stated that a questionnaire prepared in Khabarovsk containing about 150 questions was used to interrogate American POWs from Korea. He also claimed similar type questionnaires were used to interrogate American POWs from Vietnam.

Possibly, in an attempt to discredit or cast doubt on the previous informant's testimony, the Russian side, in a rare pro-active move, almost immediately brought forward another retired Colonel scholar who admitted that questionnaires were routinely used in obtaining information from American POWs in Korea, but the interrogations were principally carried out by North Koreans.

Moreover, he denied any knowledge of American POWs having been taken to the U.S.S.R. He did admit to having received MGB (KGB) permission, to interview Lieutenant Colonel Black for propaganda purposes. This interview purportedly took place in Pyongyang in July 1951.

One other retired Colonel claimed to have interrogated an American POW Captain who possibly was a unit commander in Korea from the 24th Infantry Regiment. Another colonel claims to have witnessed the capture of an American pilot being brought to a headquarters building in Port Arthur in the summer of 1952.

The above testimonies to the contrary, the Russian side still continues to maintain that they did not directly participate in these interrogations and that no U.S. POWs were transferred to Soviet territory.

Although we have no direct evidence to prove it, there appears to be a strong possibility that at least a handful of U.S. POWs, possibly more, were transferred to Soviet territory during the Korean war.

The Russian side will likely stick to its current line until the body of evidence gathered through a vigorous interview program forces the government and security services to reevaluate their position.

Although doubtful that such individuals could have survived the rigors of the Soviet camp system this long, it is theoretically possible that one or more could still be alive. It is more likely that some former POWs—(and I do not cast any blame here, I can understand the situation)—who chose to cooperate with the Soviets for whatever reason could be alive in Russia and do not desire their presence to be known.

As with the Korean war, the Russians are very sensitive to their possible role in the Vietnamese War. Although they claim that they did not take part in any interrogations in Vietnam and that no U.S. POWs were transferred from Vietnam to the Soviet Union, there is at least some circumstantial evidence that such interrogations did take place and that at least a few U.S. POWs may have been transferred from Vietnam to the Soviet Union.

If so, there is a good chance that some of them could still be alive. Again, there are possibly several former U.S. POWs who might have cooperated with the Soviets and who might not wish to be found. In such cases, it would probably be worthwhile for representations to be made to the Russian Government at the highest levels that such individuals would not be prosecuted by the U.S. and that on humanitarian grounds, it would be quite useful to be able to resolve these cases.

The interview program pursued by the American side of the Joint Commission has been extremely pro-active, while the Russian side's response has been reactionary at best. Correspondence requesting specific individuals such as former correspondents, military advisers, foreign affairs specialists, physicians, intelligence and security officials who served in Vietnam and Korea, be located and available for interviews, has been sent to the Russian side of the Joint Committee months ago.

To date, despite General Volkogonov's September 21 statement that archival information was not consistent with oral interviews which claimed U.S. soldiers from Korea and Vietnam were interrogated by Soviet officers and possibly sent to the U.S.S.R. and has pledge to continue the interview process, none of the requested people have yet to be scheduled for interviews.

In this regard, however, it should be noted that the Russian side of the Joint Commission consists of only two assistants to General Volkogonov, who basically act as facilitators. It would expedite things greatly if the number of staff people on the Russian side were increased.

A request to interview some 20 intelligence and security service officials who served during the Korean and Vietnamese era had been submitted to the Bureau Chief for Public Affairs of the Russian Intelligence Service, (the former KGB) in June.

Several months later, the Bureau Chief called us in, mentioned his surprise that his superiors answered such a request and noted that our CIA would not have. He then proceeded to inform us that the 20 people requested for interviews were either dead, unlocatable—if you can believe that, even though some of them are sup-

posed to be in the Moscow area—had no information on POW/MIAs, did not wish to speak with us or were unavailable at the time.

On several other occasions, the Security Services feigned cooperation in finding requested individuals to interview, but, in reality provided similar flimsy excuses not to locate the individual we sought.

Media appeals for people with information on American POW/MIAs to come forward have also met with limited success. Due to the increasing political instability in the country, many citizens may still feel reluctant to speak out. Several potential interview candidates have requested assurances and guarantees from the highest authorities before they are willing to share the information they claim to possess.

Others may simply be afraid to become involved in any contact with foreigners, either because of the sensitive nature of their employment or because of a general apprehension based on what has happened in the past to Russians who had contact with foreigners.

It should also be mentioned that all letters to the Joint Commission are screened by the Office of the President for letters and appointments first. It would be preferable if they could be delivered to the Joint Commission Office first or directly to the POW/MIA team at the U.S. Embassy.

Some personal observations and recommendations are as follows: the interview program is critical to developing that body of evidence necessary to open the doors to the official records. One key to such an effort is publicity. Therefore, we need to better publicize our efforts and successes both in the United States as well as in the major cities and former concentration camp areas of Russia and the ex-republics.

Moreover, with the breakup of the former U.S.S.R., many of the individuals we should be interviewing and many of the archives of import are now beyond Moscow's control, in countries that should now be less sensitive to the possible negative ramifications of major revelations. I believe that we should be putting more time and assets into developing parallel programs in several of the other ex-republics.

Of course this effort is a two-way street and we may be able to overcome some of the reluctance of the Russian security services by redressing similar Russian POW/MIA issues where possible. We should strive to provide the Russians more feedback from U.S. records on Soviet MIAs from World War II, cold war incidents and Afghanistan.

The current effort is as effective as it is because of the sponsorship of President Yeltsin who is responding to the perceived high visibility and priority of the American POW/MIA issue by the U.S. Government.

I believe it is critical that such visible priority be demonstrated by the newly elected administration and by the Congress.

Thank you.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Graham follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF ALBERT GRAHAM

Mr. Albert Graham holds a bachelor's degree in History and Russian Studies from Rutgers University and a Master's degree in Soviet Studies from Georgetown University. As a retired officer in the Naval Reserves, Captain Graham saw active duty as a Russian Instructor at the Naval Academy and more recently, during the initial days of implementing the INF Treaty, as a U.S. escort officer and inspector in the U.S.S.R., for the on-site Inspection Agency. He also took part in recent U.S. and Soviet ship visits to San Diego, Norfolk, Mayport, Sevastopol and Vladivostok.

In civilian life, Mr. Graham is currently the assistant chief of the European Division of the Library of Congress. Since May of this year, he has been detailed to the Senate Select Committee on POW/MIA Affairs and assigned to Moscow. Here he works with the United States-Soviet Joint Commission on POW/MIA Affairs which seeks information on the possible fate of American citizens who may have found themselves on Soviet territory.

I was posted in Moscow from May 14 to November 6, 1992, where I represented the Senate Select Committee on POW/MIA affairs and worked under the aegis of the Joint Commission on POW/MIA affairs. One of my principal tasks while in Russia was, in conjunction with TFR-Moscow team members to arrange for and conduct interviews with Russian officials, Russian citizens and retired officers who may have served in Southeast Asia and Korea. In early June about a dozen Soviet Vietnamese veterans were interviewed. Among them was a 3-star general who was formerly commander of the Soviet Military Advisory group in Vietnam from 1967-68. The general had previously been interviewed by Senate staffers on March 26, 1992, and told them that he received a report on every American pilot captured from the Vietnamese and sometimes from his subordinate Soviet units if they were aware of a capture. He also recalled that, at a May 1975 reception in Vietnam, he asked a high Vietnamese official, whose name he could not remember, if Vietnam still held American POWs. The official answered "yes", they still had them. When the general was reinterviewed on June 1, 1992, he denied these earlier statements.

Perhaps the most flagrant case of turn-around during a reinterview concerns a well-known colonel-scholar and renowned Far East expert who was stationed in Khabarovsk from 1950-54. During the first interview with him, conducted on August 19, 1992, he told five Joint Commission representatives that Soviet military specialists had been given approval to interrogate American servicemen in Korea and that some American servicemen with experience, seniority etc. were selected for transfer to the U.S.S.R. for further interrogation. He claimed the Soviet naval base at Posyet served as the transit point for the movement of Americans North (by rail or plane) to Khabarovsk. He maintained the number of Americans processed through Khabarovsk was in the hundreds and they were under NKVD (KGB) control, both during and after the interrogations. He did not know their fate after the interrogations. He personally interrogated two American POWs. One, he recalled, was a Lt. Col Black. Efforts were made, according to the Colonel, to recruit and gain cooperation of Americans. All interrogation reports were sent to the Headquarters of the Far East Military District, the 7th Directorate of the Main Political Directorate and the GRU.

In a follow-up interview of this individual on September 29, 1992 during which he admitted that he had received a midnight call from a Foreign Intelligence Service representative the night before, he considerably modified his previous testimony, denying any knowledge of an American POW named Black and that American POWs from the Korean war were interrogated by Soviets in Khabarovsk. However, he did admit interrogating two American POWs in North Korea and the fact that there were anywhere from 10-25 Soviet interrogators involved in this process, indicating a large number of American POWs were interrogated during the Korean war. He now maintained that the interrogation point which was in existence for at least 18 months, was located at a juncture between North Korea, China and the U.S.S.R. borders. He did not completely rule out that it may have been on Soviet territory. In addition, he stated that a questionnaire, prepared in Khabarovsk, containing about 150 questions, was used to interrogate American POWs from Korea. Similar type questionnaires were also used to interrogate American POWs from Vietnam.

Possibly, in an attempt to discredit or cast doubt on the previous informants' testimony, the Russian side, in a rare pro-active move, almost immediately brought forward another retired colonel-scholar who admitted that questionnaires were routinely used in obtaining information from American POWs in Korea but the interrogations were principally carried out by the North Koreans. Moreover, he denied any knowledge of American POWs having been taken to the U.S.S.R. He did, however, admit to having received NKVD/KGB permission to interview a LTC Black for

propaganda purposes. This interview took purportedly place in Pyongyang in July 1951.

One other retired colonel claimed to have interrogated an American POW captain who possibly was a unit commander in Korea from the 24th Infantry Regiment. Another colonel claims to have witnessed the capture of an American pilot being brought to a headquarters building in Port Arthur in the summer of 1952.

The above testimony to the contrary, the Russian side continues to maintain that they did not participate in the interrogations and that no U.S. POWs were transferred to Soviet territory. Although we have no direct evidence to prove it, there appears to be a strong possibility that at least a handful of U.S. POWs, possibly more, were transferred to Soviet territory during the Korean war. The Russian side will likely stick to its current line until the body of evidence gathered through a vigorous interview program forces the government and security services to reevaluate their position. Although doubtful that such individuals could have survived the rigors of the Soviet camp system this long, it is still theoretically possible that one or more could still be three alive. It is more likely that some former POWs who chose to collaborate with the Soviets, for whatever reason, could be alive in Russia and do not desire their presence to be known.

As with the Korean war, the Russians are very sensitive of their possible role in the Vietnamese war. Although they claim that they did not take part in any interrogations in Vietnam and that no U.S. POWs were transferred from Vietnam to the Soviet Union, there is at least some circumstantial evidence that such interrogations did take place, although not in all cases, and that at least a few U.S. POWs may have been transferred from Vietnam to the Soviet Union. If so, there is a good chance that some of them could still be alive. Again there are possibly several former U.S. POWs who might have collaborated with the Soviets and who might not wish to be found. In such cases it would probably be worthwhile for representations to be made to the Russian government at the highest levels that such individuals would not be prosecuted by the United States and that, on humanitarian grounds, it would be quite useful to be able to resolve those cases.

The interview program pursued by the American side of the Joint Commission has been extremely pro-active while the Soviet side's response has been reactionary at best. Correspondence requesting specific individuals such as correspondents, former advisers and foreign affairs specialists, physicians, intelligence and security officials who served in Vietnam and Korea, be located and available for interviews, has been sent to the Russian side of the Joint Commission months ago. To date, despite General Volkogonov's September 21 statement that archival information was not consistent with oral interviews of U.S. soldiers from Korea and Vietnam being interrogated by Soviet officers and possibly sent to the U.S.S.R., and his pledge to continue the interview process, none of the above people have yet been found to be scheduled for interviews. In this regard it should be noted that the Russian side of the Joint Commission consists of only two assistants to General Volkogonov who basically act as facilitators. It would expedite things greatly if the number of staff people on the Russian side would be increased.

Numerous requests for interviews of some 20 intelligence and security service officials who served during the Korean and Vietnamese war era have been submitted to the Bureau Chief for Public Affairs of the Russian Intelligence Service. Months passed before a response ensued. After being lectured about how surprised he was that his superiors would even answer our request and the fact that our CIA would not honor such a request, the Bureau Chief proceeded to tell us that the 20 people who were requested for interviews were either dead, unlocatable, had no information for us, did not want to speak with us or were unavailable at this time. On other occasions, the security services also feigned cooperation in finding requested individuals to interview but, in reality, provided similar flimsy excuses not to locate the individuals we asked to speak with.

Media appeals for people with information on American POW/MIAs to come forward have also met with limited success. Due to the increasing political instability in the country, many citizens may still feel reluctant to speak out. Several potential interview candidates have requested assurances and guarantees from the highest authorities before they are willing to share the information they claim to possess. Others may simply be afraid to become involved in any contact with foreigners, either because of the sensitive nature of their employment or because of a general apprehension based on what has happened in the past to Russians who had contact with foreigners. It should also be mentioned that all letters to the Joint Commission are screened by the Office of the President for Letters and Appointments first. It would be preferable if they could be delivered to the Joint Commission office first or directly to the POW/MIA team at the U.S. Embassy.

Some personal observations and recommendations are as follows:

—The interview program is critical to developing that body of evidence necessary to open the doors to the official records. One key to such an effort is publicity. Therefore, we need to better publicize our efforts and successes both in the United States as well as in the major cities and former concentration camp areas of Russia and the ex-Republics;

—With the break-up of the former U.S.S.R., many of the individuals we should be interviewing and many of the archives of import are now beyond Moscow's control in countries that should now be less sensitive to the possible negative ramifications of major revelations. I believe that we should be putting more time and assets into developing parallel programs in several of the other Republics;

—This effort is a two-way street and we may be able to overcome some of the reluctance of the Russian Security Services by redressing similar Russian POW/MIA issues where possible. We should strive to provide the Russians more feedback from U.S. records on Soviet MIAs from, cold war incidents and Afghanistan;

—The current effort is as effective as it is because of the sponsorship of President Yeltsin, who is responding to the perceived high visibility and priority of the American POW/MIA issue by the U.S. Government. I believe that it is critical that such visible priority be demonstrated by the newly elected-administration and by the Congress.

Chairman KERRY. Mr. Graham, thank you very much. Thank you all, gentlemen. Those are very helpful statements and they help shed a different perspective on the issue obviously.

I would like to—before I have to run along—I would like to ask you questions and just follow-up, Mr. Graham.

First of all, you are painting the picture that is a little more grass roots realistic than that which General Volkogonov painted. But I would take it you do not question the Generals or the upper level commitment to this. Is that correct?

Mr. GRAHAM. Yes. Yes, sir.

Chairman KERRY. What are you running into here? Is this the old regime that just has not melted away or is something else happening that we should be aware of?

Mr. GRAHAM. Well, the General mentions today about people in the archives helping him and whatever. We get another impression when you talk about archives from a parliamentarian, who has been involved in archival matters.

He said about 99.9 percent of these archivists—these are his words—are former security-type people. And they still bristle at things that revolve around Americans. And so, if you are dealing with that type of people and you are putting your trust in them coming up with information, that may be part of the problem right there.

Chairman KERRY. Now, we have asked several times, I know we want to speak with the former Ambassador to Laos; we have asked them a number of times since last March, what is the status of that request now?

Mr. KAUZLARICH. We still get the same answer. He does not want to talk to us. I raised it in June with both the Vice Chairman of the Russian side of the Commission and with the Foreign Ministry. Now I have heard that he is not well in addition. Whether there is a connection between his unwillingness to talk and that, I do not know.

General LOEFFKE. He is on Task Force Russia's top of the list, sir, and we have asked that he need not come forth. He can answer our questions in writing. But he has refused to do that also.

Chairman KERRY. Are there other people that you have tried to talk to that we haven't been able to get to yet?

General LOEFFKE. Yes, sir. We have quite a long list.

Chairman KERRY. Are you able to get to veterans of the Vietnam war period?

General LOEFFKE. Yes, sir. And we have talked to them. And Al, I think you raised your hand, so you might want—but we have talked to Russian Vietnam veterans. They meet yearly.

Chairman KERRY. Are you getting good access to them?

General LOEFFKE. Well, I will let Al answer that.

Chairman KERRY. What do you think, Mr. Graham?

Mr. GRAHAM. Well, we tried to get hold of a navigator who supposedly ferried two Americans from South Vietnam up to Vinh and then to Hanoi. And we have been going around—since I went over there in May—trying to get a hold of this guy, been asking and asking to speak with him.

And just by a quirk, we found out where he lived and went after him ourselves. But we have to work with the Russian side of the Joint Commission. And when we find and talk to these people—all we are asking, is for their address and telephone number, so we can make the arrangement to conduct the interview jointly.

Now after interviewing this navigator Major, who ferried caucians in Vietnam, I wrote the report up. You have it. He gave us other leads. But he mentioned that he was criticized by people after he had spoken out and that he had apparently signed a non-disclosure statement.

Chairman KERRY. Well, let me come back to it, then. I mean, we all are aware the tensions that currently exist in the Soviet Union, the former Soviet Union, which is not an easy place. There is a lot going on.

Some people have weighed—I think General Volkogonov said 60/40 prospects. Some might weigh it differently. There are an awful lot of people there who would like to go back to the old order, correct?

Mr. GRAHAM. Yes, sir. And that is part of the problem, because see the instability in the Government. They see things sort of falling apart. People were a lot more open when I was over there in May and June.

Now people are becoming very reticent to speak because they realize that Yeltsin may be gone tomorrow and if they speak out and say something detrimental to the government, they may lose their jobs pensions or worse.

Chairman KERRY. So, fear is a definite governing factor in terms of our ability to be able to proceed.

Mr. GRAHAM. I think so.

Chairman KERRY. And much greater today than it was a little while ago. Is that correct?

Mr. GRAHAM. I think so, sir, yes.

Mr. KAUZLARICH. At the same time, people are still willing to talk to us. While we have not gotten to the Ambassador from Laos, we have gotten to two officials from the Russian—then Soviet—

Embassy in Hanoi. There are people who are still willing to come forward.

But what you are seeing is part of the problem, which as you state, is a reflection of the tension within the society.

Chairman KERRY. Have you had any first hand reports from individuals of sightings of Americans from either Korea or Vietnam in concentration camps or psychiatric hospitals?

Mr. GRAHAM. Well, yes sir. To being with, there is the David Markin case I was the one that was first contacted about him.

Chairman KERRY. Besides David Markin?

Mr. GRAHAM. There have been reports out mentioning sightings. Yes, sir. There are some that are starting to come out of the republics now. I think maybe General Loeffke can address that.

General LOEFFKE. Sir, right now in Moscow, we have two investigators as we sit here, trying to locate two individuals to get more information on specifically on what you are mentioning. So we are doing that, sir.

Chairman KERRY. A couple of instances, then?

General LOEFFKE. Yes, sir.

Chairman KERRY. What is the status of the David Markin case in your view, Mr. Graham?

Mr. GRAHAM. Well, on one hand, you have the Russian officials saying that the source is not credible, that it was a hoax. On the other hand, many of us have been with the source and, find him credible. We found there was some activity that went on up there before we arrived in Pechora. We had no control over who they paraded before us, what files they gave us to look at. We had to take the word of these prison guards and inmates that they actually were there at the time and that no one named David Markin was there.

They came up with a list of 23 Markins and Markin is a very strange, unusual name. There were just a lot of quirks to it that do not measure up.

Chairman KERRY. And you are left with a lot of questions in your mind?

Mr. GRAHAM. We also—

Chairman KERRY. You would say it is not resolved in your mind.

Mr. GRAHAM. Yes, sir. The interesting thing we developed—we thought there were records up there. We found out that medical records were kept. We knew that Markin, the source and the second source all were in the camp hospital at the same time. We thought we had a solid lead here. We asked to see the medical records. Word quickly came back that all the medical records were burned up in a 1989 fire. And so we met that type of thing.

Chairman KERRY. Sounds like they were talking to the DIA.

[Laughter.]

Chairman KERRY. Sorry about that.

[Laughter.]

Mr. KAUZLARICH. Mr. Chairman, I think this is one of the frustrations for the investigators, because we are in a Joint Commission. And we cannot simply pick up and go out and just simply act unilaterally.

And as General Loeffke pointed out, there are good things and bad things about that. But what we ought to try to do is to capital-

ize on the good side of this and make every effort to make the process work.

Chairman KERRY. Understood. And I think we all agree with that. I am not trying to—I am just trying to—

I think we need to understand, though, what is realistic here and what hopes we can have. And I think it is good to understand there is still real difficulties.

I also think that, as you said, this is a model. And to the degree that this model is running into difficulties, it is extremely helpful in shedding light on overall policy issues with respect to the former Soviet Union, because it says a lot about their capacity to get things done, the state of their society today and what the difficulties are that we face ahead of us.

You are a real test operation over there. There are others, but you are a very real one in a lot of ways and it says some real things about the transitional process. Would you not agree?

General LOEFFKE. Yes, sir, I would. And I would like to emphasize what Al has just stated, that I think we are going to the truth through the interviews. They will lead us to the archives. But they are complementary. Through the archives, we have found a great deal. For example, we found 12 unaccounted for personnel that we know now lived long enough to be interrogated.

We have gotten this information from the archives. We have received the information of an aircraft that all we knew was that it had disappeared from the radar. Now the Russians are telling us they shot it down.

Chairman KERRY. I think it is important to take note that despite the difficulties, General Volkogonov was forthcoming today. President Yeltsin was in the information he gave us. We got a lot of new today that we have not known before. And there are things that are happening.

So if we can keep the process going, we will be greatly helped. Let me turn to my colleague, Senator Smith. Before I go, let me just, first of all, thank you, all of you. And I want to make one comment since I will not be here later.

I am glad this hearing is taking place today on Veterans Day. Instead of marching in a parade, which is not inappropriate, but instead of that we are here doing business to keep faith, if you will, with people who wore the uniform.

And I think that the work of this committee and the effort of the families that you paid tribute to appropriately, General, is a very special kind of statement on a Veterans Day. The final marker of this committee, hopefully will be a process that never allows us to ever again, 20 years after the fact or 40 years after the fact, have to be struggling to just get a list, to just know what the baseline of reality is, what we are dealing with, let alone many of the other questions about information that is not kept and so forth.

And I can certainly guarantee that this committee is going to make very strong and specific recommendations about process and procedures that will hopefully eliminate that from happening.

I think this is a fine way to be marking Veterans Day and I think it is a good thing that we are looking back 50 years and trying to keep faith, if you will. So I salute you for your efforts in that. To a lot of people, they always wonder, you know, hey, what

is the big deal? I mean, you hear that. And some people say, God, it happened 40 years ago or 20 years ago. Maybe they will never understand.

But I think for people who have worn the uniform or for people who are sent in harm's way, it is critical for a Nation to keep faith with the danger that it asks people to walk into and with the notion of service to country and this is the highest obligation. So, I thank you.

Senator Smith?

Vice Chairman SMITH. Thank you, Mister Chairman. This can be directed to any of you who would like to answer the question, but Mr. Graham and to some extent General Loeffke, what you folks said was let us say fairly substantially different than the picture painted by General Volkogonov in terms of what is going on over there.

The question that I have, I guess, is, is he not getting access to files and documents and people that he—is somebody holding back from him or is he holding back from you, I guess is the blunt way to put it? What seems to be the problem?

Obviously, you are not getting witnesses that you want to talk with. You are not getting files and documents that you want to see. And, at the same time, we realize it is a sovereign nation. I mean, you know, we are not going to open up our FBI files to people either. So I understand the limitations here.

But, what, in your opinion, is the problem or where does it lie, any of you?

Mr. GRAHAM. I personally think it is a hot political issue. I think the answer is probably going to come from the former republics. This is where you're going to get the archival records and, knowledgeable people to come forward. This is how we'll eventually get at the truth.

I don't think at the point that Russia is politically stable. Moreover, I don't think the time is right. I think it's a matter of time, but I—

Vice Chairman SMITH. I know you want to respond and that is OK. But this is what I am trying to get at. It is, to say the least, an unstable situation over there domestically. We know that. And, at the same time, I do not get the impression—I may be wrong, you know better than me, but I get the impression that General Volkogonov does not have a lot of control, if any at all, over the access to the other states in the CIS. Is that not correct?

Mr. GRAHAM. I believe so, yes.

Vice Chairman SMITH. We do not have the same—we do not have a Volkogonov in Kazakhstan and Georgia and all of the other places in the Soviet Union, do we?

Mr. GRAHAM. But look at the Katyn Forest massacre. That information they had been denying for years and it just came out, the truth just came out. So that's an example of maybe what we're faced with.

Mr. KAUZLARICH. Mr. Chairman, I think the point about the other states is a good one, because we do have to make sure we're in touch with the authorities in Kiev and other of the newly independent states.

But I wonder if, in terms of the psychology of the society, we're not going to face the same kinds of problems over a general reluctance having grown up under this system where dealing with your government is not a natural fun thing to do for citizens.

And, these countries, these new states, are going through their own birthing pains. I know in Ukraine, when I was there, I raised the issue of our interest in POW/MIA issues. Ukrainian authorities said, at the governmental level they're quite prepared to cooperate. They too are interested in knowing what happened to the Ukrainians who were in Afghanistan and are still missing, so we're trying to work with them on that.

I think if we have specific issues to take to these new governments that we're going to find at least a willingness to work with us. But we may end up finding in these countries, too, a reflection of the same tensions that we are seeing in Russian itself between pro-reformers and those who are resisting reform.

Vice Chairman SMITH. General, when Mr. Graham testified about a couple of witnesses who came forth and gave very specific information and then recanted, did you share his impression at the time, the first meeting, that there seemed to be sincerity? Did you have any reason to doubt the credibility of the witness the first time in when he said what he said?

General LOEFFKE. Senator, I would say that the witness, of course, knew that whatever he said would be transmitted to the official government, so he was under a great deal of pressure. And I for one think he's a very brave man. But he did change his story.

And we know that someone contacted him the evening before. He even told us the name. And yet he continued to state that he was not aware of where this interrogation took place. And I find that very difficult to accept. Yet he did not want to go on record that it did not occur in Russia, but he did, as Al Graham pointed out, that it occurred somewhere within the borders of Russia, China and Korea.

So, to answer your question, I trust but I verify. And that's what the Russians have as a proverb. I would think that the Colonel in mention, he's a brave man and he told us somewhat the truth. He was not able to tell the whole truth.

As far as your question on General Volkogonov, he himself stated to you, Senator, this morning, that he was the only General out of many Generals who supported Mr. Yeltsin. So I don't think General Volkogonov is also among many Russians. So he will have difficulty in obtaining some of the access that we're looking for.

Vice Chairman SMITH. If Yeltsin wanted to make it happen in terms of providing information to you, are you basically saying that he could not do that, he could not deliver?

General LOEFFKE. Being that Mr. Yeltsin is the President, I think I will let my colleague from the State Department answer that, if I may, Senator.

Vice Chairman SMITH. Smart man.

Mr. KAUZLARICH. I think the one thing that we have going for us in this exercise is the wholehearted commitment of President Yeltsin to helping us find out the truth. And I think it's going to be

his—if you will, the weight of the presidency of Russia on these ministries that's going to get the cooperation that we need.

Vice Chairman SMITH. Let me see if I—and I know you have a very capable staff there behind you, as well, and I guess—let me see if I can—and I would like to reference something to them. But let me see if I can summarize. There have been no documents that you and/or General Volkogonov have brought forth specifically penning the fact that there are or may have been American POWs from either Vietnam or Korea transferred to the Soviet Union and/or China, however—and I want to make sure, if I am wrong, say so. I am trying to summarize here. But you are telling me that you have witnesses who have come to you, later recanting, but coming to you saying the exact opposite?

Mr. GRAHAM. Yes, sir.

Vice Chairman SMITH. Is that correct?

Mr. GRAHAM. Yes, sir.

Vice Chairman SMITH. I just want to make sure I understand that for the record.

Mr. GRAHAM. That's what happened at the last Joint Commission meeting. It surprised the security service representative that this had come out, and that's when Volkogonov made his statement on September 21 that we've got to look at other avenues, one of which was the interview program.

Vice Chairman SMITH. When I mentioned—and the name escapes me now, which was the name of the—I mentioned a witness that you had talked to or tried to talk to, and General Volkogonov was quite surprised, indicating this was new to him. Does anybody remember the name?

Mr. GRAHAM. Yes, Gregoriev?

Vice Chairman SMITH. Lieutenant General Gregoriev, yes.

Mr. GRAHAM. Yes, sir.

Vice Chairman SMITH. He had no—he seemed to be surprised by that.

Mr. GRAHAM. Well, his name has been on the plate. We have sent correspondence over to the Russian side with names of several KGB generals we wanted to interview. We also called the Russian retired intelligence association and talked to the Chairman and asked him for Gregoriev replacement. Likewise we, talked to the man who heads the foreign intelligence service press bureau and told him we were looking for Gregoriev, because he was one of the guys you wanted in Washington to testify. So we've been talking this up for months, and Gregoriev's name has been out there. So it's hard to understand why General Volkogonov was surprised at this.

Vice Chairman SMITH. I think he was aware of the name, but he said he was not aware of what the content of the story that he was telling.

Mr. GRAHAM. That could be.

Vice Chairman SMITH. Your staff and yourselves have—realizing it is a new entity, as you said, General, but I have to say that I just want to compliment you all because when Senator Kerry and I went over there in April to Moscow—I believe it was April. Was it April or February? February? There was really very little happening. You have really moved this process along very, very well and

have come a long way. And Al, you have been very good at communicating back to the committee on a regular basis, which we appreciate.

But with your staff and all of you, what is your gut instinct here? We heard testimony yesterday from Mr. Ptak—and I do not want to get you into any problem with the chain of command here, but then again, I do not mind if you want to answer—that essentially the jury was still out, that we are still looking into this. What conclusions have you drawn, based on what you have seen and heard about whether or not American POWs were, in fact, transferred from Korea and Vietnam—and/or Vietnam—into the countries in question, specifically in this case, the Soviet Union?

General LOEFFKE. Senator, if I may, I'd like to develop that answer, and the fact that as you've heard General Volkogonov, we know that in World War II they did keep some. He, this morning, mentioned in 100's figures. As far as the shootdowns during the cold war, he has also given us information on an aircraft that previously they had denied having shot down. So they have lied to us, and they have said openly that they have lied to us. So we know if you develop that historically, they did keep some in World War II, they did keep them in the shootdowns, because they've already said that, that they had them. So if you develop that line, you could go on and say that we believe that they did that in Korea also.

As far as Mr. Ptak is concerned, I must emphasize that Mr. Ptak has never asked me to change anything that our analysts have come up with. On the contrary, we publish a biweekly report and you have access to that report. Our analysts who are all here, take great pride in telling it as it is and no one in the Defense Department has asked me to make them change any analysis.

So if you look at it historically, the Russians lied and did keep some of our people in World War II. They did lie to us in the shootdowns in the cold war. They, themselves, said that they did lie to us, so, you could say that that it was possible. But this morning, Senator Kerry was saying we are dealing with facts, hard evidence, and we're looking at that. And what Mr. Ptak is doing, and I think the Defense Department is doing, is correct. They're holding a very conservative view until we can come in with some very facts.

As I mentioned to you today, Senator, we have two investigators interviewing people in two different cities, and one of them is outside of Russia. And General Volkogonov this morning in his testimony to you—I was writing what he was saying so that I could quote him—he said that through archives he doesn't see anything at this time. But he left the door open.

Al Graham and I were questioning this Russian colonel, and at the end of an hour and a half I asked if I could record his statements on tape, and we did, and he on tape said yes, I interrogated American POWs in Russian uniform. And he did it more than once. And he said his colleagues did it, too.

Vice Chairman SMITH. Where was that?

General LOEFFKE. Sir, this is during the Korean war, and he said—

Vice Chairman SMITH. In Korea or in Moscow?

General LOEFFKE. His latest version, it was in Korea. And in all fairness to the Russians, he was in the Far East, and he says the

Khabarovsh area. So the Khabarovsh area is larger than just the city of Khabarovsh. So it could have been in another area near the city. He did mention a specific base which is in Russian territory.

However, the Russian side said that at the previous interviews, there were no Russian officials present. At the interview that I was in there was a Russian active duty Lieutenant Colonel and a Russian Secretary present so they could not deny it.

Four or five days later we received a list of 10 other Russians that General Volkogonov suggested that we interview.

I think we're at a point that it's important that we do our homework, that we research very deeply what it is that we want the Russians to look at, and those that want to assist us, then, have a better way to doing it.

Mr. GRAHAM. Can I add to that?

Vice Chairman SMITH. Sure, but I just want to clarify a comment. I did not imply nor say that anybody from DOD was asking you to change any information. In the exchange that I had yesterday with Mr. Ptak, it dealt more with going back into the historical analysis of all of the information that was provided in our own records and our own documents regarding transfers, et cetera. And rather focusing on what the Russians have, the former Soviets have, and trying to see how that correlates with our own stuff, and then moving on to try to find out what happened to these people rather than to go back and question and challenge all of this stuff in a contemporary fashion. That is all. I just want to make sure that you have the clear authority right down the line to do that. That is what I was getting at yesterday and what I am getting at today.

You know, they are revising Columbus, but I do not know we have to revise all the truth regarding this issue, although there are some who may—who would probably like to do that.

General LOEFFKE. Senator, and if I may, Al—

Mr. GRAHAM. Sure.

General LOEFFKE[continuing]. I think what we're dealing with in Task Force Russia is a lot of raw material. We deal with the raw material and we have to publish a document every 2 weeks. And that doesn't leave much time for our analysts to do a dissertation on it. At times we become like journalists, we just don't have time to double check until we produce our biweekly report.

Mr. Ptak and DOD takes a view, and I agree with them, that we need to do a lot more research before we come up with a very definite statement. The Task Force deals every day with raw material, and the biweekly report that you receive, Senator, forces us to do some analysis that perhaps it would be best not to make a statement, a definite statement, until we research it even more.

Vice Chairman SMITH. Sure. The only—I would challenge you only to this extent, and I think it is a major extent, and that is when you go back and look at the statements made by Mark Clark, general commander of the U.S. Command in Korea, quote, we do have certain evidence that indicates there are additional prisoners alive who should be returned.

And I guess my position if I were in your shoes in the investigative end of it, I would be inclined to go ahead and take that statement as face value and move on and try to see what the Russians

have that would substantiate that rather than to go back and take the position, which is what I disagreed with Mr. Ptak on yesterday that in essence, unless we can prove General Clark is right, he is wrong.

And I think that has been the problem in the issue all along, as far as I am concerned. But that is not to challenge the job you are doing or to criticize the job you are doing, because I think you are doing a heck of a good job. That is just my position.

And then the other thing, too, is intelligence, itself, not just General Clark's statement. A compilation of reports indicate that during the past 2 years several POWs have been transferred from POW camps in North Korea to points in Manchuria, China, and Siberia. Memorandum of the U.S. Army Combined Command for Reconnaissance Activity, Korea, August 19, 1953.

I mean, we had a lot of data then, and all I am saying is why not just move with that data as your base. If it turns out that you cannot substantiate that data, then so be it. But rather than to try to take the position that that data is wrong and we have got to reinvent the wheel, prove that Clark was right, prove that the intelligence was right. If the Soviets provide us this information we will prove it is right rather than have to try to go back and do all that.

That is just an opinion in terms of how you conduct it.

Mr. Graham?

Mr. GRAHAM. One of the things I find most troubling is that reports are now coming out from Soviet citizens who claim they, were either in psychiatric hospitals or prison camps with Americans. Most of them allege the Americans were Korean war vets. Some they say served in Vietnam. When you get the mindset from contemporary Russian officialdom which says basically these citizens were criminals and can't be trusted, it is disturbing. How can you believe them, they say. They're criminals. They're not trustworthy. That's their mindset. So you're faced with that sort of a dilemma.

I don't know if someone else would care to comment on this.

Mr. KAUZLARICH. Mr. Chairman, I think that, again, is one of the benefits of the work of this commission: we can demonstrate to the Russians how to work with people who come forward with information. Historically, the old system poorly treated people who had concerns or questions about their Government in U.S.S.R. But we have made these points to the Russians when we've found out how they've behaved unacceptably in some of the specific cases that you've mentioned. It's an education process for them, as well.

Vice Chairman SMITH. I just have two quick questions and we will wrap it up. I will put out the first one so you can be thinking about it while I ask the other question. The first question is in regard to how you might recommend to us to change the structure of your commission. What assets do you need that you do not have that you might be able to—that might help you better to deal with some of the other nations in the CIS? What is it that you need in terms of resources that you do not have that would make your job a little easier to get the answers. And while you are thinking of that, I just want to ask, and maybe you would be best to answer it, Mr. Graham, would be—you mentioned stonewalling regarding

cold war incidents. And I know there are families here today in this audience, some are going to testify, who have loved ones missing from cold war incidents; that is, after the Korean war.

There is really no question. Some may argue about whether or not somebody is a POW or not, but there is not any question in terms of argument as that somebody is missing is missing in the cold war and did not come back in an incident. Now, how are you being—are you—where are you being stonewalled on these cold war incidents?

One other point. I had known the answer before yesterday, but when I found it out was really surprised to hear about the number of people missing from the cold war. If somebody had asked me that 3 years ago or 3 months ago how many people are missing from the cold war I might have said 25 or 30. There are 133, which really surprised me.

What do we know about these? What are the Russians telling us? We know some of these people survived to be imprisoned. Now, what happened? What are they telling us?

Mr. GRAHAM. Well, one of the things we're having trouble with, you stay in Volkogonov's—General Volkogonov's bailiwick and talk about archives and documentation. One of the problems we're having is getting documentation, for instance, on shootdowns. We've asked, you know, they've had cameras and recorders on these planes. We know they keep that information somewhere. We are not really getting any help in that area.

We know that there were patrol boats out there that when some of these planes went down that they reported that logbooks—the border troops had their particular patrol boat element, and, you know, we're asking for that type of material to look at the logbooks, and we haven't gotten anywhere in this regard.

Mr. KAUZLARICH. May I just add a footnote to that? During the last commission session, I went to St. Petersburg with the group that met with the archivist from the Russian Navy, and they did go over a number of these incidents. Their bottom line was we recovered no Americans live or dead. But as you go through them—

Vice Chairman SMITH. All 133?

Mr. KAUZLARICH. Sorry?

Vice Chairman SMITH. They are saying that in all—

Mr. KAUZLARICH. We were talking about the shootdowns, the 10 shootdowns that we presented to the Russians.

But as you talk to them, you get a sense that there was a fair amount of compartmentalization that was going on in some of these activities where the border guards may have had vessels out and the Navy wouldn't have even known that they were out there.

Part of our problem, I think, when we try to measure cooperation or lack of cooperation, is that we have to recognize, too, that a lot of these people are dealing in very clearly defined compartments. They, in fact, may not have the full picture. They may be telling us what they really believe is true, but based on information that we may have that has a broader context to it, we understand that they are only seeing part of it.

So I think we really have to be careful that we do not we try to make this too much of a black and white judgment of cooperation

or stonewalling. Obviously, we've had problems with elements who are trying to block this, but there may be other explanations, too, as to why we're not getting a complete picture.

And I would say from some of the archives, particularly going back to the World War II period, if you look at the archives of the Russian Medical Museum in St. Petersburg and sort of the World War II period of border guard records, they seem to be quite willing to open these up to us. Again, it may be understandable because that's 50 years ago rather than 15 or 20.

Vice Chairman SMITH. General, would you like to answer that previous question? And then we will wrap it up.

General LOEFFKE. Senator, I just wanted to, for the record because I know the people that work for me would not rest until this is said, and I didn't mean for you to think that we were saying that they were not transported to Korea at all. I have in front of me here an American embassy message of 1954 in which the U.S. embassy tells the Soviet Government that it was their belief then that U.S. POWs were transported to Korea.

As far as Korea is concerned, I have 10 items here that lead us to believe there is no factual data that Russians transported U.S. POWs to the U.S.S.R. What we're saying is that we are leaning to that conclusion. But we are dealing with raw data. But we're not resting, Senator. We're moving ahead on that particular point.

As far as what can we do to better our effort, I think, Senator, by having this committee and by having the families involved, you are focusing the attention and that is extremely important. I think as I began my testimony, this is the only time that I know that Congress and the executive and the families are working together to come up with an answer. I think if Al Graham were not in my team you would look at me with a little bit more suspicion. I think with Al working for us as well as you we're all in the same boat, trying to look for the truth.

So what should we do? I think keep it up, Senator. Give us another Al Graham to work with us in Task Force Russia. Give us Bruce Sandersons that are interested enough and trust us in our effort to look for the truth. We have with us some of the best analysts and Defense Department has given me a blank sheet to ask for them. I have the money to get this done. So, Senator, all we need is your support, and you are doing this by having this committee and the American people as our allies.

Vice Chairman SMITH. How do you think a task force identical to yours focused on China would be as a suggestion? Do you think they would let us in?

General LOEFFKE. Sir, I was the chief of military mission in Beijing for 2½ years. Everything is possible, sir. Let's just ask them. Another question that was asked is do we need Task Force Russians in the other republics. I think Task Force Russia is becoming mature now. I would recommend that we consider subtask forces in the other republics.

Vice Chairman SMITH. In terms of transportation, assets, accommodations, all the grunt things that you need to get the job done, do you have the resources you need to do it or would you like more? Not that I have the power to give it to you unilaterally, because I do not. But we are trying to write a final report here which

will make some recommendations as to how this process can continue after the committee is finished, and anything you can tell us along these lines either later for the record or now would be helpful.

General LOEFFKE. Senator, the Army has been given the responsibility as executive agent and Mr. Stone, our Secretary of the Army, frequently calls me on the telephone and asks me to come up and see him and says how can I help? What can I do for you? And we give a biweekly update to an assistant secretary who informs to the Secretary, and, of course, I report to Mr. Ptak on a daily basis and I report to you through the executive secretary. So to answer your question, I have the money, I have the people, and now we just need the time, sir.

Mr. GRAHAM. One of the problems I see, sir, is the logjam. The logjam is not on our side. The logjam is on the Russian side. They've had only two people, and I think they just committed another one to this effort. They are so backed up. We've got like 37, 38 pieces of request correspondence on the table. Some of them have been answered but the most important haven't.

It seems that when General Volkogonov goes off and does his Archival research, he's only got these two staff people, Colonel Osipov and Ms. Kolovich to man the office. They sometimes, don't even have the time, to come with us on interviews. We call them up to schedule an interview, since we need to have a Russian representative there due to the bilateral nature of our work as well as for purposes of making our reports credible. On several occasions they said they couldn't be present because they were simply too busy.

So I think maybe somebody should ask General Volkogonov to commit some more people to this effort.

Vice Chairman SMITH. Well, I want to—excuse me. Go ahead.

Mr. KAUZLARICH. Let me pick up on that point, because the problem that General Volkogonov faces in Moscow is not unlike the one which we face here, which is a budget one. And it's even worse for him and the other archivists. I think one thing, Al, you probably have noticed is that there simply aren't the resources to do the kinds of checks that we would like to have done.

There's no money for overtime, there's no money for xerox paper, there's no money for xerox machines. And obviously, I don't think you would want to be in the business of paying all these bills, but one thing that we are trying to do through these pilot programs with the archives is seeing if we can, for a few months help them out. And if this provides access to information that we couldn't get otherwise, that might even be money well spent.

Vice Chairman SMITH. Well, I just want you all to know that I respect what you are doing and am very proud of what you are doing. I know for a fact that some of you have been out of pocket for expenses that you really should not have to be out of pocket for as you have done your job, and I would hope that if this is, and it should be, the highest national priority of our Government to get some answers, that you would get more support. And I think the committee will make that recommendation in one form or another, that you will get more support for what you are doing.

A final question: Are the families, when you come up with a name like a Markin, or a name some how comes across your desk

as a result of your research, are the families notified of this? Or how do you work that? I mean, in the Vietnam situation they are supposed to be notified. It is not always the case.

General LOEFFKE. Sir, the responsibility still lies with the services. We provide the information to Mr. Ptak who then contacts the services to do it. But to answer your question, we are very intimately involved with the families. They assist us our research.

I have personal knowledge of Mr. Sanderson and Mrs. Reynolds' cases. The information is copious and we've used information.

Vice Chairman SMITH. So as far as you know, everything has been provided?

General LOEFFKE. No, sir. I wouldn't say that everything has been provided. It is still too early to give some very definite statements. We're still looking for information. But the families that are intimately involved in specific cases are working hand in hand with us.

Vice Chairman SMITH. Well, I want to thank you all for the job you are doing and your staff, as well. Keep up the good work and stay in touch. Thank you. Thank you, very much.

I think we will move now to the next panel, the family members panel. Do we have all the family members in panel up here?

[Pause.]

Before you all sit down, I want to swear you in, but I'm still waiting for Ms. Alfond.

[Pause.]

I'd like for you all to stand, please, and raise your right hands so I can swear you in.

Do you swear that the testimony you are about to give is the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God?

Mrs. HOWARD. I do.

Ms. ALFOND. I do.

Mr. SANDERSON. I do.

Mr. SKAVINSKI. I do.

Mr. DUMAS. I do.

Vice Chairman SMITH. I would also like to welcome Senator Burdick here this morning. I know you have a family member from your State that is here today. Right, Mr. Sanderson, is that correct?

Senator BURDICK. Yes, that's correct. Thank you.

Vice Chairman SMITH. Please feel free to ask any questions that you like during the course of the hearing. You're more than welcome to do that. Glad to have you here.

Ms. Alfond, I'm going to proceed with you first, since you represent the National Alliance of Families on the Korean war.

Ms. ALFOND. I appreciate that, thank you.

TESTIMONY OF DELORES ALFOND, CHAIRPERSON, NATIONAL ALLIANCE OF FAMILIES

Ms. ALFOND. Mr. Chairman, Mr. Vice Chairman, respected Senators, thank you for the invitation to address your committee and to comment on various aspects of the POW/MIA issue as the chairperson for the National Alliance of Families, which, as you all know, represents American sons, daughters, wives, mothers, sisters,

and brothers and other family members whose loved ones are among those American servicemen from World War II, the Korean war, the Vietnam war, and the cold war, whose fate has yet to be determined.

The National Alliance of Families is very concerned with discovering the fate of thousands and thousands of U.S. servicemen known to be captured, but who were never repatriated by communist forces at the conclusion of World War II, the Korean war, the cold war, as well as the Vietnam war.

Mr. Chairman, so that I will not be reading my testimony verbatim, so that I may summarize that I testify, that my written testimony be accurately recorded, may my testimony be entered into the committee record at this time, as if read?

Vice Chairman SMITH. Without objection, it will be.

Ms. ALFOND. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

[The prepared statement of Ms. Alfond follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF DOLORES APODACA ALFOND

Mr. Chairman, Mr. Vice-Chairman, respected Senators, thank you for the invitation to address your committee and to comment on various aspects of the POW/MIA issue as the Chairperson of the National Alliance of Families—which as you all know—represents American sons, daughters, wives, mothers, sisters, brothers, and family members, whose loved ones are among those American servicemen from World War II, the Korean war, the Vietnam war and the cold war, whose fate has yet to be determined.

The National Alliance of Families is very concerned with discovering the fate of the thousands and thousands of U.S. Servicemen known to be captured, but who were never repatriated by Communist forces at the conclusion of World War II, the Korean war and the cold war, as well as the Vietnam war.

Mr. Chairman, so that I will not be reading my testimony verbatim, and so that I may summarize as I testify and know that my written testimony will be accurately recorded, may my testimony be entered into the committee record at this time as if read?

[Without objection, your testimony is entered into the record as if read].

Thank you Mr. Chairman.

Senators, it has not gone unnoticed by POW/MIA family members that it has taken 11 months for the Select Committee to even give a cursory hearing and quasi-review of the evidence that thousands of Americans who fought in World War II, the Korean war and the cold war were abandoned. With the exception of the excellent effort and chronology of documents on the Korean war released yesterday by Senator Smith, the National Alliance of Families would give the committee's work on these wars a letter grade of D-.

We are very disappointed that General Major Jan Sejna, the highest level Communist military officer to ever defect, and who has been in employ the DIA for decades and has passed numerous polygraphs, is not testifying at these hearings. As you know Senators, General Sejna was personally, directly involved in the transfer of 3 groups of U.S. POWs from Vietnam to Prague to the Soviet Union.

Notwithstanding the outright propaganda purchased by the Defense Department in the form of a "study" contracted by the Rand Corporation, by far, the best and most persuasive evidence that our men were abandoned—as a U.S. Government policy—are the documents so far uncovered from the National Archives from the Second World War, and the Korean and cold war period in our history.

About half of the National Alliance family members have loved ones from these wars. The National Alliance of Families views the Select Committee's cursory treatment of these wars with alarm, since a decision by the committee to shut down with out adequately following up on the leads and other evidence that can be gleaned from a review of the thousands of pages of documents now available to the public would signal a willingness by the Select Committee to leave at least this aspect of the POW/MIA issue unresolved.

Furthermore, a delay or shut-down of the committee would mean that as time marches on, those still alive to relay, first-hand, the course of events during WWII and the Korean war may not be alive in the months and years ahead. Given that a

few months ago, Russia pledged the release of several dozen Japanese POWs held since World War II, may be repatriated back to Japan to live out their life in their homeland, the National Alliance of Families views this issue with the utmost seriousness, and one which is of great concern to our members and the honor of our country.

The historical significance and historical precedent of the U.S. Government policy of abandoning hundreds of its fighting men, thousands in the case of World War II and the Korean war, makes it all the more clear that the government's abandoning of men in South East Asia after Operation Homecoming was Standard Post-War Operating procedure for the U.S. Government.

This largely ignored part of American history is only now beginning to be explored, and uncovered, in large part because of the efforts of the handful of researchers you heard testimony from yesterday. I personally know that historians and doctoral students in countries all over the world are beginning to pry the lid back on this painful chapter in our history, as these historians should.

One of the reasons this committee was formed was to put this POW/MIA issue to rest. In my view, unless these underlying historical questions from World War II, the Korean war and the cold war are addressed, your job will not be done, and the committee's task to resolve this issue will be left undone.

If the committee shuts itself down in December, it will become more apparent to the general public as more becomes published on the POW/MIA issue—and the public begins to comprehend the magnitude of the numbers of Americans abandoned in World War II, and the Korean war—that your committee's work was woefully inadequate.

The committee may take quiet satisfaction by shoveling this issue into the equivalent of a political Siberia, by leaving all future POW/MIA details to the United States-Russian Commission, but the family members of the National Alliance of Families are resolutely against such an arrangement.

The National Alliance of Families demands that the Senate Select Committee extend its mandate, by using the discretionary funds of the Majority Leader, until the underlying historical questions of the POW/MIA issue are addressed.

However, there are many other reasons the committee should continue its work. First of all, not all of the documents the Select Committee has requested from the various government agencies have been forwarded by those agencies to the committee. Why should these agencies forward embarrassing documents to a committee it knows is going to declare itself finished with the POW/MIA issue? These agencies are just waiting out the last few weeks of the committee's existence.

It is likely that many of these agencies even have convinced themselves that the Select Committee really does not want to see these documents since, if the committee felt the documents were crucial, the committee would wait to receive and evaluate these outstanding documents before the Select Committee issued its final report. For example, it is my understanding, and correct me if I am wrong, that the committee still does not have in its possession the 50-page study done in April 1974, by the then Deputy Director of DIA, for the then Director of DIA, which concluded that approximately 350 U.S. POWs were still held in captivity at that time, mostly being held in Laos.

Why has the Select Committee not reviewed this document?

Why has the Select Committee not retrieved the White House tapes of April 1, 1973 and reviewed the tapes and their transcripts? April 11, 1973, is the day before Roger Shields told the world and the American people that all the U.S. POWs were dead, and it is the day he met with Nixon on the POW issue. Why has the Select Committee not retrieved this tape and listened to it, and released the transcript?

These recommendations I am making to the Select Committee come from one of the country's two major POW-family groups, and should not be ignored or belittled. The documents recommendation, we view with great importance, because unless this committee renews its mandate in order to evaluate the documents it has requested but not received from various U.S. Government agencies, these agencies will simply stall you out. The committee will run out of time and mandate and money, and the documents will never see the light of day.

For the Select Committee at that point to pretend it can write the final chapter in the POW issue will be a sham. The only way for the committee to write the final chapter on this issue, is for the committee to renew its mandate, in order to, among other things, review all the relevant documents it has requested.

Furthermore, as a general criticism, the Select Committee, in the view of many of the family members I represent, refuses to entertain, or actively pursue, or confirm any evidence that U.S. POWs were held captive after they were abandoned.

While the Select Committee has publicly stated that men were abandoned—the committee seems to steadfastly refuse to agree with any evidence that men left behind continued to be held prisoner.

Mr. Chairman, I have received disturbing information, that in March of this year, a high level Vietnamese official desiring to defect, promised to bring information with him about the number of U.S. POWs being held by the Vietnamese, the health of these men, and the locations of the prisons in which these Americans were being held.

Apparently, the staff director of this committee, allegedly acting on behalf of you, Senator Kerry, told the messenger who carried this high level Vietnamese official request's to defect, that the defector was not wanted, nor was his information.

I should add, Senator Kerry, that the messenger of the Vietnamese official's request to defect was apparently a Democratic Congressman, who was just reelected to Congress.

Allegedly, shortly after the senior Vietnamese official was recalled to Vietnam, and he has not been seen or heard of since his return. Apparently, there are indications this senior Vietnamese official, who wanted to defect, was shot for treason upon his return to Vietnam.

I wanted to ask you Senator Kerry, is this true?

Are you also going to deny Senator Kerry, that the U.S. Government has 13 reports that during the Chinese-Vietnamese border clashes in 1979, Chinese armed forces nearly over ran camps which were holding U.S. POWs?

That is interesting since it is my understanding that the most recent report that the Chinese nearly captured U.S. POWs being held by the Vietnamese in 1979 came from the senior Vietnamese official who you deny wanted to defect.

Why won't the committee release even redacted versions of these 13 reports? The answer in the minds of most family members is: any evidence that U.S. POWs were held captive after the war is discredited by this committee.

Another example, the Government's possession that U.S. POWs were held captive after 1973 is PAVE SPIKE intelligence. PAVE SPIKE, as you Senators may know, was an electronic intelligence operation of the U.S. Air Force. The Air Force would drop electronic motion detection sensors along the Ho Chi Minh trail that would stick into the ground. These sensors looked like large spikes with an electronic pod attached to it, and extending from the pod was a large antenna.

These PAVE SPIKE sensors would store this raw ground movement information, which was interpreted to determine the type of movement, be it tanks, jeeps, trucks or whatever, and then, this data was transmitted by the PAVE SPIKE sensors to U.S. Air Force jets which would electronically interrogate the PAVE SPIKE sensors, and instruct them to transmit their stored data.

Data could be input into PAVE SPIKE sensors on the ground by personnel who understood how to input such data. U.S. pilots were among those trained to input such to the PAVE SPIKE pod in case they were shot down in order to communicate with U.S. forces.

In 1974, after the return of some of the U.S. POWs in March 1973, during routine U.S. Air Force electronic interrogation of PAVE SPIKE sensors by U.S. planes flown out of Thailand, our planes picked up no less than 20 authenticator numbers that corresponded exactly to the classified authenticator numbers of 20 U.S. POW/MIA's who were lost in Laos.

Now, I know that you Senator Kerry, and you Senator McCain, have been on the forefront of those Senators who have discredited the overhead satellite "symbol" pictures, arguing there is no way to be sure that the symbols were made by U.S. POWs.

However, there is no room to argue interpretation of data with PAVE SPIKE. There can be no mistake, no argument about shadows, and no argument between DIA and Search Escape Evasion and Rescue officials about whether the symbols comply with the secret walking 'K' symbol or not. There can be no arguments about whether the data transmitted was or was not authenticator numbers.

This PAVE SPIKE intelligence is seamless, but the committee has not discussed it or released what it knows about PAVE SPIKE, as the committee has remained silent about the numerous reports about the POW camps the Chinese nearly over ran in 1979, nearly capturing U.S. POWs who were rapidly removed from the area by Vietnamese forces.

Another example—blatant and inexcusable—of the Select Committee's refusal to aggressively pursue information or evidence that U.S. POWs who were held prisoner after the war is the committee's steadfast refusal to enforce its subpoena of the Secret Service agent who was present at two National Security Council meetings in 1981 where Bill Casey, Richard Allen, James Baker, Ronald Reagan and George

Bush were discussing a Vietnamese offer to repatriate live U.S. POWs for 4.5 billion dollars.

The committee's refusal to act on its own subpoena and to depose the Secret Service agent is sickening. I watched you, Senator Kerry, as Chairman, tell Ross Perot that the committee has not been able to confirm that these 1981 National Security Council meetings took place.

May I suggest, Senator Kerry, that the reason you can not confirm that the meeting took place is because you and the committee you chair, refuse to depose the Secret Service agent.

Family members are thoroughly disgusted by these and other instances of duplicity by your committee. According to you Senator Kerry, on August 4th and 5th of this year, you publicly stated that you would declassify all of the documents in the committee's possession. These documents were not only to be declassified, but were to be made available to the family members for review, neither of which has yet to happen.

The National Alliance of Families believes that your committee has discredited or concealed particularly persuasive information which shows U.S. POWs being held prisoner in South East Asia.

The recent 4,800 photograph fiasco is yet another example of committee duplicity. Less than 2 percent of the 4,800 photographs are of people, half are duplicates and the vast majority are of holes in the ground made by impacting airplanes, in other words crash sites.

From way the press was managed from the White House and from the sound bites you and Senator McCain gave to the press, the American people were misled into thinking the United States had been given the equivalent of access to King Solomon's mines, when in fact, it is likely only MIA cases will be resolved from the 4,800 photographs.

This is hardly the "break through" you and Senator McCain, along with President George Bush, gushed about to the media and to the American people.

Let me give two other examples information indicating live U.S. POWs were being held by the Vietnamese well after Operation Homecoming. One example is the existence of the former bomb shelter turned into a prison in Hanoi under Vietnam's Armed Forces Headquarters. The committee has numerous reports that the prison exists, and that it may have held U.S. POWs. The most recent report about the prison came from the same senior foreign source who relayed the recent information about the 1979 near capture of U.S. POWs by Chinese forces. Yet the committee refuses to act upon the information, and ridicules it.

The other example of information and evidence supporting the fact that live U.S. POWs were or are being held by the Vietnamese is the evidence the committee has that many of the live-sighting reports collected by the U.S. Government are sent by the Vietnamese government hoping to convince the United States take one simple step: to ask for the live prisoners the Vietnamese government may now hold.

This simple act of asking for the live POWs now held by the Vietnamese has never been done by the U.S. Government, because to ask for these POWs is to tacitly acknowledge the U.S. Government knows they are alive. This is exactly the point, Senators, that the committee has worked so hard to deny, that any live U.S. POWs have been held prisoner since they were abandoned in 1973.

Will you, Senator Kerry, get clearance from President-elect Clinton to demand that the Vietnamese return any criminals or other prisoners they now hold who were at one time U.S. servicemen, the next time you go to Hanoi?

And Senator, if the Vietnamese, or for that matter, the Russian, North Koreans, Chinese, Laotians, or Cambodians do in fact hand over some Americans, please do not let the same thing that happened to Robert Garwood happen to them. These men should not be court martialed, and held incommunicado upon their return.

In other words, any men who are returned, be it from North Korea, Russia, Laos, Cambodia or Vietnam will have been broken by their captors. As everyone knows, anyone can be broken. Should any men be returned, or "found in the bushes" the U.S. Government should be prevented from turning these men into traitors when, in fact, they were likely just survivors who were abandoned by their country.

I have one final point. It is the view of the National Alliance of Families that there is no way on God's green earth that the Select Committee can finish its job, close its doors, and write its report by Christmas, and do justice to the committee's charter, or to the remaining questions on the POW/MIA issue.

The committee can not have it both ways. On one hand the committee admits men were left behind. On the other hand, the committee says none were held alive after Operation Homecoming, all the while refusing to release and credibly review

and follow-up on key evidence that U.S. POWs were held captive after Operation Homecoming.

All the while, not one single U.S. Government official ever has been held accountable for the abandonment of our men. The Select Committee has Executive Branch officials on record, lying to the committee, Pentagon Spokesperson Strednansky issuing out right lies, and yet—even though these offenses have been committed, never is any one held accountable for their actions. It is as if the committee reports a crime, knows who committed the crime, but refuses to act against the perpetrators. The signal to family members is loud and clear: the Senate club, the world's most exclusive, won't lift a finger against any responsible U.S. official.

You Senators on this committee have been dealing with the POW/MIA issue in detail for less than 11 months. I have been dealing with the POW/MIA issue in detail for more than two decades, and some of the family members I represent as the Chairman of the National Alliance of Families have been dealing with the issue in detail, in some cases, for four decades.

Let me finish today with a warning and a prediction. Woe be unto you Senators if you close this committee down with out satisfactory answers to the points I have raised today—you will not be able, Senators, by shutting down this committee, to put the POW Genie back in the bottle. Unless these specific examples I raised today are addressed, I guarantee family members across this country will wage a holy war to pry these answers out of our Government, and finally put to rest these questions. That was my warning.

My prediction is that—if this committee shuts down in December—the POW/MIA issue will inflict itself with a greater vengeance on Washington, DC than ever before, because the American public will conclude only one thing: the powers that be in Washington—both parties, Republican and Democratic—have done it again. They have tried to fudge on the POW/MIA issue.

The vast majority of the public will see right through the Select Committee's effort to hermetically seal off the political fall out from the POW issue, without resolving it.

I respectfully suggest you Senators keep your noses to the grind stone and get the job done. The Select Committee's deadline of a life of 12 months is arbitrary and unrealistic. The American public will not fault you for extending the life of the committee. On the contrary, the American public will likely applaud your honesty and appreciate the fact that you can not be expected to solve this resolve this issue and package it up and present in a nice and neat and tidy report by Christmas.

Thank you, Senators.

Ms. ALFOND. Senators, it has not gone unnoticed by the POW/MIA family members that it has taken 11 months for the Select Committee to even give a cursory hearing or quasi review of the evidence that thousands of Americans who fought in World War II and the Korean war and the cold war were abandoned. With the exception of the excellent effort in the chronology of documents on the Korean war released yesterday by Senator Smith, the National Alliance of Families would give the committee's work on these wars a letter of grade D minus.

We are very disappointed that General Major John Sejna, the highest level communist military officer to ever defect, who has been in the employ of the DIA for decades and has passed numerous polygraph tests is not testifying at these hearings. As you Senators know, General Sejna has personal knowledge and was directly involved with the transfer of three groups of U.S. POWs from Vietnam to Prague and then other Soviet—and to the Soviet Union.

Notwithstanding, the out propaganda purchased by the Defense Department in the form of a study contracted by the RAND Corporation is by far the best and most persuasive evidence that our men were abandoned as a U.S. Government policy. The documents that were uncovered in the National Archives from Second World War, the Korean war, and the cold war period in our history.

About half of the National Alliance Families members have loved ones from these wars. The National Alliance of Families

views the Select Committee's cursory treatment of these wars with alarm. Since the decision by the committee to shut down without adequately following up on the lead and other evidence that can be gleaned from a review of thousands of pages of documents now available to the public would signal a willingness by the Select Committee to lead at least this aspect of the POW/MIA issue unresolved.

Furthermore, a delay or a shutdown by the committee would mean that as time passes on, those still alive to relay first-hand the course of the events during World War II and the Korean war may not be alive in the months and the years ahead. Given a few months ago Russia pledged the release of Japanese POWs held in World War II and they have been repatriated back to Japan to live their live in their homeland, the National Alliance of Families views this issue with the utmost seriousness, and which is one of the great concerns of our members and the honor of our country.

The historical significance and the historical precedence of the U.S. Government policy of abandoning hundreds of its fighting men—thousands, in the case of World War II and the Korean war—makes it all more clear that the Government abandoning of the men in Southeast Asia after Operation Homecoming was standard postwar operating procedure of the U.S. Government. This largely ignored part of American history is now being explored and uncovered in a large part because of the effort of a handful of researchers you heard testimony from this morning. I personally know that historians and doctoral students in countries all over the world who are beginning to pry the lid back on this painful chapter in our history as a historian should do.

One of the reasons this committee was formed was to put the POW/MIA issue to rest. In my view, unless these underlying historical questions from World War II, the Korean war, the cold war, are addressed, your job will not be done and the committee's task to resolve this issue will be left undone. If the committee shuts itself down in December, it will become more apparent to the general public as more becomes published on the POW/MIA issue and the public begins to comprehend the magnitude of the numbers of Americans abandoned in World War II and the Korean war that your committee's work was woefully inadequate.

The committee may take quiet satisfaction by shoveling this issue into the equivalent of a political Siberia, by leaving all future POW/MIA details to the U.S.-Russian Joint Commission, but the family members of the National Alliance of Families are resolutely against such an arrangement. The National Alliance of Families demands that the Senate Select Committee extend its mandate by using the discretionary funds of the Majority Leader until the underlying historical questions of the POW/MIA issue are addressed.

However, there are many other reasons that the committee should continue its work. First of all, not all the documents of the Select Committee—that the Select Committee has requested from various Government agencies have been forwarded by those agencies to the committee. Why should these agencies forward embarrassing documents to a committee it knows is going to declare itself finished with the POW/MIA issue?

These agencies are just waiting out the last few weeks of the committee's existence. It is likely that many of these agencies even have convinced themselves that the Select Committee really does not want to see these documents since if the committee felt the documents were crucial, the committee would wait to receive and evaluate these outstanding documents before the Select Committee issued a final statement.

For example, it is my understanding—and correct me if I'm wrong—that the committee does not have in its possession the 50-page study done in April 1974 by the Deputy Director of DIA for the Director of DIA which concluded that approximately 350 U.S. POWs were still in captivity at that time, mostly being held in Laos. Why has the Select Committee not reviewed this document?

Why has the Select Committee not retrieved the White House tapes of April 11, 1973, and reviewed the tapes and their transcript? April 11, 1973 is the day before Roger Shields told the world and the American public that all the U.S. POWs were dead and is the day he met with Nixon on the POW issue. Why has the Senate Select Committee not retrieved this tape, listened to it, and released the transcript?

These recommendations I am making to the Select Committee come from one of the country's two major POW/MIA family groups, and should not be ignored or belittled. The documents recommendations we view with great importance, because unless this committee renews its mandate in order to evaluate the documents it has requested but not received from various U.S. Government agencies, these agencies will simply stall you out. The committee will run out of time and mandate and money and the documents will never see the light of day.

For the Select Committee at that point to pretend it can write the final chapter on the POW/MIA issue will be a sham. The only way for the committee to write the final chapter on this issue is for the committee to renew its mandate in order to, among other things, review all relevant documents it has requested.

Furthermore, as a general criticism, the Senate Select Committee, in the view of many of the family members I represent, refuses to entertain or actively pursue or confirm any evidence that the U.S. POWs were held captive after they were abandoned. While the Select Committee has publicly stated that men were abandoned, the committee seems to steadfastly refuse to agree with any evidence that men left behind continued to be held prisoner.

Mr. Chairman, I have received disturbing information that in March of this year a high-level Vietnamese official desiring to defect promised to bring information with him about a number of U.S. POWs being held by the Vietnamese. The health of these men, the locations of the prisons in which these Americans were being held.

Apparently, the staff director of this committee, allegedly acting on behalf of Senator Kerry, told the messenger who carried this high-level Vietnamese official's request to defect that the defector was not wanted nor was his information. I should add, and I would like this answer from Senator Kerry, that the messenger of the Vietnamese official's request to defect was apparently a Democratic Congressman who was just reelected to Congress.

Allegedly, shortly after, the senior Vietnamese official was recalled to Vietnam and has not been seen or heard from since his return. Apparently, there are indications this senior Vietnamese official who wanted to defect was shot for treason upon his return to Vietnam. And I want this question answered by Senator Kerry. And since he isn't here, I would like it in writing. Is this true? At least, it will be on the record.

I'd also like to know if the U.S. Government has 13 reports that during the Chinese-Vietnamese border clashes in 1979, Chinese armed forces nearly overran camps which were holding U.S. POWs. This needs to be answered. Are there documents of such? It is my understanding that the most recent report that the Chinese nearly captured U.S. POWs being held by the Vietnamese in 1979, it came from a senior Vietnamese official who you deny wanted to defect. Why won't the committee release even redacted versions of these 13 reports? The answer, in the minds of most family members, is any evidence that U.S. POWs were held after the war is discredited by this committee.

Another example of evidence in the Government's possession that U.S. POWs were held captive after 1973 is the PAVE SPIKE intelligence. PAVE SPIKE, as you Senators may know, was an electronic intelligence gathering operation of the U.S. Air Force. The Air Force would drop electronic motion-detection sensors along the Ho Chi Minh Trail that would stick in the ground. These sensors looked like large spikes with an electronic pod attached to it, and extending from the pod was a large antenna.

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As the committee has remained silent about the numerous reports about the POW camps the Chinese nearly overran in 1979, nearly capturing U.S. POWs who were rapidly removed from the area of the Vietnamese forces.

Another example, blatant and inexcusable, of the Select Committee's refusal to aggressively pursue information and evidence that U.S. POWs were being held after the war is the committee's steadfast refusal to enforce its subpoena of the Secret Service agent who was present at two National Security Council meetings in 1981 where Bill Casey, Richard Allen, James Baker, Ronald Reagan, and George Bush were discussing a Vietnamese offer to repatriate live U.S. POWs for several billion dollars.

The committee's refusal to act on its own subpoena and to depose the Secret Service agent is sickening. I watched while Senator Kerry, as the Chairman, told Ross Perot that the committee has not been able to confirm this 1981 National Security Council meeting that took place. May I suggest that maybe the reason that Senator Kerry could not confirm that meeting that took place is because as the committee chair he refuses to depose the Secret Service agent.

Family members are thoroughly disgusted by these and other instances of duplicity by the committee. According to you, Senator Kerry, and I'd like this answered, on August the 4 and the 5 of this year Senator Kerry publicly stated that he would declassify all the documents in the committee's possession. These documents were not only to be declassified, but were to be made available to the family members for review, neither of which has yet happened.

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Let me give two other examples, information indicating live U.S. POWs were being held by the Vietnamese well after Operation Homecoming. One example is the existence of the former bomb shelter turned into a prison in Hanoi under Vietnam's armed forces headquarters. The committee has numerous reports that the prison exists and it may have held U.S. POWs. The most recent report about the prison came from the same senior foreign source who relayed the recent information about the 1979 near capture of U.S. POWs by the Chinese forces, yet the committee refuses to act upon the information and ridicules it.

The other example of information evidence supporting the fact that live, living U.S. POWs were or are being held by the Vietnamese is the evidence the committee has that many of the live sighting reports collected by the U.S. Government are sent by the Vietnamese Government, hoping to convince the United States to take one simple step, to ask for live, living prisoners the Vietnamese Government may now hold. This simple act of asking for live POWs now held by the Vietnamese has never been done by the U.S. Government, because to ask for these POWs is to tacitly acknowledge the U.S. Government knows they are alive.

This is exactly the point, Senators, that the committee has worked so hard to deny that any live U.S. POWs have been held since they were abandoned in 1973. And I hope that Senator Kerry will get the message on his way to Hanoi that we would like to ask the Vietnamese the return of any criminal or other prisoners they now hold who were at one time U.S. servicemen.

And if, Senator, if the Vietnamese or for that matter the Russians, North Koreans, the Chinese, Laotians, or Cambodians do in fact hand over some Americans please do not let the same thing that happened to Robert Garwood happen to them. These men should not be court marshalled and held incommunicado upon their return.

In other words, any men who are returned from North Korea, Russia, Laos, Cambodia or Vietnam—these men have been broken by their captors. As everyone knows, anyone can be broken. Should any men be returned or found in the bushes the U.S. Government should be prevented from turning these men into traitors when, in fact, they were likely just survivors who were abandoned by their country.

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The committee cannot have it both ways. On one hand, the committee admits men were left behind. On the other hand, the committee says none were held alive after Operation Homecoming, all the while refusing to release and credibly review and followup on key evidence that U.S. POWs were held after Operation Homecoming. All the while, not one single U.S. Government official has been held accountable for the abandonment of our men.

The Select Committee has executive branch officials on record lying to the committee, Pentagon spokesman Strednansky issuing outright lies, and yet even though these offenses have been committed, never is any one of them held accountable for their actions. It is as if the committee reports a crime, knows who committed the crime, but refuses to act against the perpetrators.

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National Alliance of Families have been dealing with this issue in detail in some cases for four decades.

Let me finish today with a warning and a prediction. Woe be unto you, Senators, if you close this committee down without satisfactory answers to the points I have raised today. You will not be able, Senators, by shutting down this committee to put the POW genie back in the bottle unless the specific examples I raised today are addressed. I guarantee family members across the country will wage a holy war, an American jihad, to pry these answers out of our government, and finally to put to rest these questions. That was my warning.

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I respectfully suggest you Senators keep your noses to the grindstone and get the job done. The Select Committee's deadline of a life of 12 months is arbitrary and unrealistic. The American public will not fault you for extending the life of the committee. On the contrary, the American public will likely applaud your honesty and appreciate the fact that you cannot be expected to resolve this issue, and package it, and present it in a nice, neat, and tidy report by Christmas.

Please remember that facts are relevant, but the truth is absolute. Thank you very much.

Vice Chairman SMITH. Before I receive the testimony from the members of the families who are here, I tried to keep a running record of the particular points that you made in regard to the committee, Ms. Alfond. But, frankly, I do not have answers and responses to all of the things that you mentioned.

But let me just make a couple of comments regarding some of the things that you said, and then move on to the other witnesses.

Part of the greatness of the American process, which we have already discussed here on a number of occasions today—certainly in our process there's ample opportunity for citizens to express their views. There are 12 Senators on the committee, 6 of each political party. There are times when we have sat in various meetings over the course of the past 11 or 12 months and had some disagreements. That would be obvious with 12 different people.

But I must say to you, in all honesty, although I am willing to try to respond to your criticisms and you are entitled to make them, some of them are simply not true. And they have cast bad reflections on individuals who serve on the committee and who serve on the staff, and they are not accurate.

I cannot respond to them all because I do not have the documentation to respond to them all. But one thing, first and foremost, I do not think there is anybody in the room who does not know where I am coming from on this issue. I have devoted the last 8 years of my political life, in addition to serving in Vietnam, to

trying to resolve this issue, frankly to the personal sacrifice of my own family. And I am not making any statements that that should not be the case. That is my problem. I serve here and I accept that.

But this committee does not have the power to shut itself down or extend itself. The U.S. Senate does that. Would I have liked to have had 4 years to resolve this, or 3 years? Sure. We got 12 months, and we were told that we had to shut down and close shop on December 31. And with that in mind, this committee has tried, within the limits of 12 people and the limits of approximately a 20 member staff to do what we have to do.

Where we have not been able to get answers that we know we are not going to be able to get, and we are looking now at four different wars—three wars plus the cold war: World War II, Korea, Vietnam, and the cold war. All of those areas are within the scope of this committee.

When I wrote the legislation to create this committee, I did it because there were not answers forthcoming from the American Government to the families and to the people. That is why I wrote the bill, that is why 60 or 70 Senators cosponsored it, and that is why it is law today, and that is why the committee is here. If the job had not been done by the government, we would not have a committee; we would not be here dealing with this issue.

We cannot extend our committee. We do not have the power to do that. The Senate can do it, but his committee does not have the power to do that. That is number one.

Number two, regarding General Senja, General Senja has been interviewed by this committee, by investigators on the committee. He will be deposed on November 19. So, we will get his story. No, he is not testifying here today because he has not—we want to depose him first because he has some very significant information.

Specifically he has, for the record—he has information which he alleges regarding Czechoslovakia and doctors in North Korea who may have treated and perhaps experimented on U.S. and South Korean POWs. That is his testimony. Some may have been taken to Czechoslovakia, some may have been taken to Russia. When he was still in Czechoslovakia he saw documents.

And between 1966 and 1968, when he left, 2 to 3 groups of 25 U.S. POWs may have been taken to Russia via Czechoslovakia. So we have talked to him, and we will be deposing him, and we will be following up on that information.

Regarding declassification, we want all documents declassified. That has been my goal for 8 years. It is the goal of the committee. There is a pace regarding declassification that we are not happy with. There are documents that ought to be declassified. The committee wants them declassified. I discussed this with the chairman yesterday. We want the documents declassified, but we do not have the power to declassify them. We can ask that they be declassified. The executive branch has to declassify them.

I guarantee you that every document that is our possession in this committee will be declassified. I wish it had been done yesterday. I wish it had been done 20 years ago. If they are not declassified, the final report will say that, either by me or someone else, that those documents were not declassified and they should be. And here are the documents that ought to be declassified that are

not declassified, and they will be listed. I give you my assurances on that.

Regarding the photographs, the Vietnamese 4,800 photographs, I would be the first one to admit it might—I think to date it has resolved 4 cases. That is not exactly dramatic. I understand that. But we are ready to take all information, all information that we can get to resolve these cases. In this particular case, they were four people who died. I wish they were four people who lived. But at least we have that information.

Now, it is not meant that this information is it; it is exclusive. It is certainly not my position that it is. I am interested in live sighting reports. I am interested in live Americans first and foremost. That what I have fought to try to get the answers on for the past 8 years.

Now, regarding the staff director and this business, I am just astonished by it. I just talked to the staff director who indicates to me that it is simply not true. And there is simply no truth to this story. I am aware of Congressman Torricelli, who I assume you are referring to, who did go to Vietnam, and I do not want to mention the individual's name, the Vietnamese individual in question here. I am aware of the background of that.

But regarding your statement that somehow we refused to grant asylum, I know nothing about it. And so I cannot say anything other than that at this point. I just simply do not know anything about that.

Now, the study, the 1974 study that you referred to regarding POWs left in Laos, we have the study. We have read the study and I cannot discuss it here because it is classified as far as what is specifically in it at moment. We hope to get it declassified, which is part of the problem.

But I would hope that you would understand that this committee was organized to try to—yes, to try to resolve this; to try to find out what happened to the Americans who were left behind in all of those wars that we are talking about, and in the cold war. But we are not superhuman people. Some of us are giving 17 or 18 hours a day on this issue, trying our utmost to get answers, in some cases from a recalcitrant government who is not really all that amenable to providing declassification of documents, and—

Ms. ALFOND. Excuse me, Senator, I just want to say something. You know that the family members and the activists support you. We know that you are giving 150 percent. We are disappointed that you are the only one that is here today.

Vice Chairman SMITH. Well, I think, Senators—you know, all I can is that the record is kept and that all of the information is there. I cannot speak for others. Senator Kerry has been here at every single hearing that we have held; every single minute of every hearing with the exception of this one where he had a conflict and he asked me to finish it. It happens from time to time.

And I do not think that it is fair in this particular case to characterize—when you say all of the other Senators, Senator Kerry has been here and there are other Senators who have been here. Senator McCain is here at this time. Senators have, you know—I understand it does not mean because you are not here that you are not committed to the issue. Would I like to have 12 people here all

the time? Certainly I would. Absolutely. But it is just not in the cards.

I cannot speak for other Senators. Senator McCain has been here almost every—as far as I know, every single hearing we have had at some point or another. So, I do not think that really is the issue.

Ms. ALFOND. I think the issue here today—

Senator SMITH. Wait.

Ms. ALFOND. Excuse me. I'd just like say, sir, and I am sorry, the Senate Select Committee is ending, and I understand that if the Senators would support a continuance of it, that it would be funded and we could continue on.

Vice Chairman SMITH. I am not convinced of that. We have been pretty bluntly told by the powers that be in both parties of the Senate that it is not going to be extended.

Senator MCCAIN. May I comment on that?

Vice Chairman SMITH. Now, if Senator McCain here has some different information, I would be happy to hear it.

Senator MCCAIN. As on several other issues, you are misinformed Ms. Alfond. The fact is this committee was formed by a resolution of the entire Senate, not by Senator Smith who has done an outstanding and dedicated job, in my view, not only on this committee but for many, many years. And the people that would be required to approve the continuation of this committee would be the Senate Majority Leader, Senator Mitchell, and the Senate Minority Leader, Senator Dole.

So, for you to somehow allege that members of this committee are ready to shut down, of course, is incorrect. I want to finish, Ms. Alfond. Do not interrupt me like you did Senator Smith.

So, for you to allege that, along with many other allegations that you have made that are patently and totally false and deceptive to the American people, especially—especially your allegation that what was achieved by the recent agreement with the Vietnamese as being a fiasco, et cetera, et cetera, as you were quoted in the media is, of course, patently false as well.

Now, I would like to finish Ms. Alfond. I would like you to direct the witness to let me finish, Mr. Chairman.

And the fact is, Ms. Alfond, that according to General Vessey, a man who served 46 years in the U.S. military, received a battlefield commission at age 17, worked up to be chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and as the President's emissary to Vietnam viewed this as a significant breakthrough in his view—not mine, his view—a man whose credentials are unimpeachable even by someone like you, I find insulting to him and the efforts that he has made for all these years as the President's emissary.

Now, you are entitled to your opinions. You are entitled to your views. You get them aired frequently, and that is entirely appropriate in our society. But for you to say, for you to allege, two families who I happen to know whose long nightmare is over, is finally over after 20 years, the wife of an Air Force Major that I recently talked to, that this means nothing, of course, is an outrageous insult not only to them and their families but to those individuals themselves.

You allege that you have been working on this issue for many years. I certainly know that and appreciate it. So have a lot of us,

Ms. ALFOND. A lot of us have been working on it for a long period of time. And I do not denigrate your efforts, and your patriotism, and your beliefs. And I am sick and tired of you denigrating mine and many other people's who happen to have different views than yours. And now I am finished, Mr. Chairman.

Ms. ALFOND. I would just like to comment that the family members have been waiting for years.

Senator McCAIN. I am aware of that, Ms. Alfond.

Ms. ALFOND. And now you are shutting down. What method are we going to use in order to resolve this issue?

Vice Chairman SMITH. Ms. Alfond, let me—let us see if we can just get back on track here. Nobody wants to shut this issue down, not on this committee. It has been a source of, for us—to be very frank, it is a lot easier for somebody in the executive branch of government, whoever controls that government, to provide access to documents than it is for this committee to get the access to documents, as far as what we have in America. We do not know what they have in Vietnam, or Laos, or Cambodia, or Russia, or China. But we have got to get out the truth as we know it in this country. That is what we are trying to do so we can face the Vietnamese and the other countries in a united fashion. And tearing each other apart here, at this hearing, I do not think is productive.

All of us have had differences on this issue. You know that, and I know that. The differences are minor compared to the big picture of the issue here. And I think it is important that we try—you have the perception that somehow we are going to shut the committee down on December 31, and not search for all the answers. That is simply not true. If we do not have answers when the committee goes out and ends its life, we are going to say we do not have answers, and here are the answers we do not have, and hope that there will be something created in the executive branch of government to resolve it.

God knows we know what you have been through. You are a family member. You have been through—Senator McCain was a POW. You all have been through more than I have. But I just—you have a right to your opinion. I don't quarrel with your opinion. I respect you. I am not hurt or insulted by your opinions, but I just feel that it is not productive.

I thought we were going to have testimony here today on how we were going to resolve the fate of Korean war veterans. That is what you said in the beginning, that for 11 months we have not dealt with it. I have been dealing with it for 6 or 7 years myself.

Ms. ALFOND. I know and I respect that.

Vice Chairman SMITH. And I am trying to get—we have been working on the background of this for several months on a parallel basis. I wish we could have spent more time on it, and I wish the committee had had more time in its life so that we could have done it properly. I would have loved to have given 6 or 7 months to World War II, a year or 2 to Korea, and a year to Vietnam, and perhaps another year to the cold war. But we just do not have that jurisdiction to do it.

And the only issue I am taking with you is to say that the committee is somehow responsible for the end of its life is just simply

not accurate. We had to fight to get what we got. We barely got the committee.

Ms. ALFOND. We were there too. We were there too. We supported it.

Vice Chairman SMITH. I think we have come a long way.

Ms. ALFOND. We have.

Vice Chairman SMITH. And we are not perfect, and we have made a lot of mistakes, and we will make a lot more, and we are not finished, but you know—

Senator McCAIN. Mr. Chairman, could I make one more comment, again? The reason why I obviously appear upset is because I have respected the views and opinions of those who are in disagreement on ways to approach this issue; on information that we have and evaluation of it. But I have not denigrated their character, their patriotism, nor anything else.

And I resent it when a person like General Vessey, former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, his efforts for all these years as the President's emissary doing the best that he could at age 70, who served his country with distinction and with valor, is somehow denigrated by someone who does not even know what information he receives nor what he has accomplished.

And I would urge, no matter what happens with this issue or this committee, is that we finally lift this issue up to some degree where we respectfully disagree with one another on certain specifics. And to allege that someone like General Vessey and General Scowcroft and others, who spent their entire lives in the military, are guilty of some conspiracy without proof, and some coverup, frankly does a great injustice to them and their service, and also to this issue.

And so I would hope that if this committee continues, and that is the judgment of the elected leadership of the Senate, then I will be the first to volunteer, along with Senator Smith, under his leadership, to serve longer. If the committee is not kept in existence, I will again volunteer to work as hard as I can with Senator Smith to move this issue forward.

But let us show a little respect when we have differing views. And that way I think we will much easier accomplish the goals that all of us seek. Senator Smith and I have disagreed seriously on several issues. We have maintained the respect that we have for one another. Many other people who have disagreement—let us stop tearing people down who have disagreements on specifics of this issue and work together to get it resolved.

And I thank you, Mr. Chairman. And I want to take this opportunity again to thank you for all of your hard work on this effort. I wish you every success in your next trip to Vietnam on Saturday.

Vice Chairman SMITH. Thank you.

Ms. ALFOND. Sir, may I make one comment.

Vice Chairman SMITH. Just one further comment. Then I want to get to the other witnesses.

Ms. ALFOND. I didn't bring up the issue of General Scowcroft or General Vessey. I asked—I said, this information has come to me, and I am asking if it is true, and I would like some answers. That is what I am asking.

Senator McCAIN. That is not what was reported in the newspapers.

Ms. ALFOND. And family members have waited a long time. We respect the fact that the Senate Select Committee has come a long, long way compared to all the other committees that have been in the past. We are just concerned, as you just mentioned—well, it's the executive branch, now. You are our representatives. How are we going to impress upon the executive committee that this is important to us?

Now, I have gone to both the majority and the minority persons, and they tell me that if I get a recommendation from the Senate Select Committee to continue this on, then they would look into it. I've talked to the Rules Committee. They said they need a recommendation. The money is there and they will continue it.

So, I am hoping that I can speak with several people on the Senate Select Committee, and we can get a consensus that this can go on, if not with the Senate Select Committee, maybe a subcommittee with the Foreign Relations. Thank you.

Senator McCAIN. May I say, Mr. Chairman, that Ms. Alfond's remarks in her written statement are far stronger than what she just alleged. Quote: the recent 4,800 photograph fiasco is yet another example of committee duplicity. I would like you to tell that to some of the families who have finally had this nightmare ended, Ms. Alfond. I would like to tell it to them.

Ms. ALFOND. I have been speaking to them, sir. I have been speaking to them.

Senator McCAIN. No, I have been talking to them, and they are grateful, and they are happy. And this is, in the view of most experts, a significant breakthrough. Now, when you call it a fiasco and committee duplicity, then you and I have strong disagreement, Ms. Alfond.

Ms. ALFOND. Sir, it was not the fiasco of the four or whatever remains came back, or information on remains. The fiasco was the people that stepped out and said, we have written the end, the final chapter to Vietnam.

Senator McCAIN. No one said that.

Ms. ALFOND. That was in the statement the first day. The final chapter is coming to its end. And we have not even come close to the final chapter of Vietnam, World War II, Korea, or the cold war.

Senator McCAIN. No one said what you are saying they said, Ms. Alfond. I have no more questions, Mr. Chairman.

Vice Chairman SMITH. I am going to have to ask for order in the committee. This is a Senate committee, and I am going to ask you once, politely, please to refrain from the outbursts. Otherwise, I will have to have the Sergeant At Arms maintain order. I mean, that is the way it is going to have to be.

The opinions that have been expressed have been heard. I will personally look at every comment that you make in here and research it myself, with the help of the staff, and try to get answers to those questions.

Ms. ALFOND. Thank you.

Vice Chairman SMITH. There is one thing, before we go to the other witnesses, that I want to respond to, and I know I am not getting them all. And that is with regard to the Secret Service

agent, because I have been personally involved in that one, as you know.

I originally met with that man some 4 or 5 years ago, in which he indicated to me the information which is out in the public regarding this meeting that took place in the White House in 1981. The committee has been trying for months to take a formal deposition, but understandably, because of the situation where he is now an employee of the Treasury Department, he, with his attorney, has not agreed to come unless the executive branch of the government gives him clearance to do it, is the best way to say it. They will not do that. And the reason that they will not is because of the fact that it sets a precedent regarding Secret Service agents testifying.

My position is that he should testify. My position is that he should be deposed. At some point, the committee will have to vote to subpoena the Secret Service agent. We are just simply trying to resolve it without a subpoena so we can get him voluntarily to come forth. He does not want to do that. I understand his reason for that. I do not criticize him for it, I understand, because he fears retribution. And I understand that.

But we do know not all, but most of—not all, but some of what—most of what he has to say, but he has more, and I want to talk with him. But that will have to take a vote of the committee, and Senators are going to have to make a determination as to whether they want to go with the evidence of having his testimony, or break the precedent of Secret Service agents basically giving information that they heard while in their role as a Secret Service agent in terms of what they hear when they are guarding a President of the United States. It is a significant issue.

I have already stated publicly that I am coming down on the side of having him testify even though I realize the danger of that precedent. But I think the issue is paramount and that we need to get his information. So, at some point a decision will be made on that, but we have not voted on it because we are trying to get it worked out without—so that he can come on a voluntary basis.

So, nobody has deliberately tried to stop him. On the contrary, we have tried to get him here. And I think that he would tell you that or his attorney would tell you that, but I have talked to both of them—excuse me, I have talked to his attorney directly.

Ms. ALFOND. I would just like to ask a question. When the Senate Select Committee came to be, they said they had subpoena power. And it seems to me the committee has been very reticent to use that, and why is that?

Vice Chairman SMITH. No, we have not—we have not been reticent to use it. Every witness, and counsel may correct me if I am wrong, but almost every witness, and I think the Secret Service agent may be one of the few exceptions, has agreed to come voluntarily.

We have the subpoena, but no one has, except in this case. Am I right? No one has refused to come. It has not been a problem. Every witness has come voluntarily, even though we have the subpoena authority. We have indicated to them that we have the power of subpoena, but they have come.

And I just want to say, I am not criticizing the Secret Service agent for not coming without a subpoena. I understand his dilem-

ma. It is a very serious one. He works for the Treasury Department. If anybody wanted to commit any type of retribution they could do so. He works there.

It is a problem for him, but it is also a problem for the committee. We are trying to work it out with the executive branch so that it does not set that precedent. Apparently, that is a deadlock. And at some point in the very near future, the committee is going to have to vote. And whatever happens in the vote will be the decision regarding whether or not he comes in and puts his statement on the record.

I volunteered to be the intermediary. I volunteered to take the testimony myself and then provide that to the committee—anyway that it could be done to avoid a confrontation, but it has not come to pass.

All right. We are going to run out of time here. Let me move to the other witnesses. Who would like to go next? OK.

TESTIMONY OF ROBERT DUMAS, FAMILY MEMBER

Mr. DUMAS. Yesterday we had a gentleman by the Steve Kiva, who was prisoner in China, and he waited 40 years to come before a committee like this, whether it be 1 man or 12 men. I waited 42 years to get here.

Vice Chairman SMITH. I might just state for the record that this is Mr. Bob Dumas. I am sorry.

Mr. DUMAS. I am sorry. I was thinking about all the evidence that I have to present. My name is Bob Dumas. I am from Canterbury, CT. I was a Korean war veteran; two tours of duty in Korea. I had four brothers on the front line at one time. My youngest brother was captured on November 4, 1950 at Anju, northeast of Anju, right up here on the map.

In 1953, when the last group of prisoners of war were released on September 3 or 4, and I looked at the television set after I had gotten home—I came out all right—and I didn't see my brother's name on that list, I told my mother and father there are three things wrong here. You have to be a prisoner of war, killed in action, or missing in action. That's three categories. And I'm sure he was one of those three, and I was hoping he would have been alive, and is still alive today.

So, I made a promise to my mother and father in 1950 that I would never stop looking for him until I brought him home, dead or alive. And I think we are about ready to bring them all home.

First of all, in 1953, when he was getting on a truck to go to Freedom Village, a gentleman by the name of Bobby Caruth in California, in Redding, CA, who called me just the other night and said, Bob, please get it across to the committee that I went to pull him on the truck with me to go to Freedom Village and a Chinese guy with a bayoneted stuck him in the back and moved him up a hill. And when Bobby said, Rog, where are you going? He just put his hands up and said, I don't know.

Four years later, in 1957, he was seen again in Pyoktaek. From that day forward, everything started to fall in place. But it took almost 40 years for it to fall in place. Now, I want to give you a

summary of 42 years and about 15 minutes, if you will allow me, and I will show you where we went wrong for 42 years.

First of all in 1953—this is his picture right here. This is 17 years old when he was captured. He laid on the floor of a hut. This is the map. This is a picture never seen before in this country. This was smuggled out by an ex-POW from Miami, Florida, and he's right here. After he got better in 1953 to go home he—I'm sorry.

This is his hut, right here. Three years he laid on the floor of that hut without moving, and he was cared for by all the other prisoners of war like Lloyd Pape from Grovetown, Georgia who testified in my 1982 case in Federal court. Bobby Caruth has never got over that he never came home, and he keeps reminding me of it. He says, when are we going to bring these men home? I was with him. I saw him. I went to pull him on a truck. They pulled him off. And there were thousands of others that were pulled off and never went home that day.

This is the last group that was ever released in North Korea. And on September 9, the last meeting on prisoners of war was held. And the Admiral of the United Nations said, I demand you turn over over 3,000 prisoners of war. And if you don't give us an answer soon, then we'll have to discuss this further.

So this is what happened back then. OK, let's go along a little further. I am going to jump along about 20 years or more. In 1981—1981, Senator Strom Thurmond, a good friend of mine, by the way—Senator Strom Thurmond set a meeting up for the President of the United States. President Reagan and myself. When I got in the West Wing of the White House the President came out. And I said, hello, Mr. President, he said, hi. He went one way, and this gentleman came the other way. This is Admiral Bud Nance. This was taken in the White House on December 22, 1981. We had a 4 hour meeting between him and I, Colonel Bonanzi, and a couple of other gentlemen.

At that time, I showed the Admiral his picture. This is he, right here, sitting down before he was supposed to be released in 1953. And the Admiral said, Bob, what do you want us to do about it? We left me behind in 1953. We can't start a war over this. I said, we don't have to start a war. All we have to do is sit down with the North Koreans and ask for him. Don't go through the 38th Parallel you went every time you want to talk to the North Koreans because they're not made that way. Orientals are different than we are. If you don't sit down and talk to them directly—and you have talked to them directly because you went there this past year. In 1990—what was it? In 1991, I believe.

So, anyway, he said to me, what do you want me to do? And I said, well, if you don't get them out I have no choice but to go to Federal Court in 1982. He said, if you go to Federal Court, you are going to embarrass the whole country, especially the President of the United States. Well, I said, don't you think thousands of American boys have been embarrassed all these years waiting for somebody to come and get them? He said, well don't go to court, and that's it. So I said, can I have a picture taken with you? And that's the picture I just wanted to mention.

A few months later, I went into Federal Court and I got a phone call from Senator Strom Thurmond. Bob, he said, I'm sorry. I had

that meeting set up with the President. You got the other man, the National Security Advisor. But he said, anytime you want help from me, just pick up the telephone and you've got it. This is the judiciary chairman telling me this in 1981.

In 1982, I went into Federal Court and within 3 days the judge ordered the U.S. Army to change his status to prisoner of war, which they were carrying him as missing, Presumed Dead in 1953 up until then. What I didn't know was when I won the case in 1982, I did not know they were still carrying him as a prisoner of war in North Korea all those years, but my mother was never told. We were never told. He was just listed missing, Presumed Dead.

While in Federal Court, the judge ordered Army to turn over all these documents that I have right here. Every one of these men are prisoners of war. They're not MIA. It doesn't say MIA, it says, captured. This is 389 prisoners of war that were not released in 1953 that Colonel Schlatter said never existed. These men never, never existed. They were either killed on the battlefield, or they never were in North Korea.

These men—all this comes from Admiral Storms on the 38th Parallel when I was in Federal Court. And he said, Bob, anything else you want, you've got it. Now, when these were turned over to me in Federal Court, they only turned over 189 Army men. That's all I asked for at the time, and the judge only allowed it. But they have 200 more Air Force prisoners in a safe in New Haven, CT.

And I've told one of your investigators about this shortly—a few weeks ago, and he can have them all. And the U.S. Attorney called me and said, you can have these documents. All you have to do is subpoena them. You won't turn them over because the Army called him 2 weeks ago and said, do not turn these documents over to the Select Committee. This is it right here. These are the ones we're talking about, seen alive in Prison Camp 5 in North Korea.

OK, now we jump along. I want to show everyone the prisoner of war medal that the Army gave me in 1988 after they had to change it to prisoner of war, and they paid me \$2,800. Never before in history has anyone ever collected a prisoner of war pay for a man who is still in a prison camp. And this is the only medal out of 91,000 in the country. And I had to go to court almost 5 years to get it, but I got it.

Now, this doesn't belong to me, Mr. Chairman. I'd like to pin it on him. If someone will get him out of North Korea, I'll pin this on him.

A few weeks ago, a few months ago—this is the Ambassador of North Korea, Ho Jong. I have known the ambassador for 4 years. I have known the previous ambassador for 5 years. Unbeknownst to a lot of people, I do a lot of things behind the scenes with the ambassadors no one knows about. And on July 17 of this year, I met for 2½ hours in New York with Mr. John Holland and myself, and the Vietnam Coalition, and AFA, I think it's called, here in Washington.

At that time he said to me, the first thing he said to me was, Bob, all you want is your brother home. That's all. And he said talk to the man in the White House, get somebody to sit down with us, and let's go over the whole thing, the whole category. Let's go

over everything, the whole category. And I said yes, sir, that's a good idea. We should do that.

I want to jump back to 1987, this is very important. But first I'd like to read a letter that I received in Federal Court from the Pentagon, and I'll tell you who signed it. It's a short letter.

This is to the secretary of the military board of review. It's a memorandum from—a U.S. Government memorandum. It says: I have received your memo of November 27, 1982 concerning the case of Roger Dumas which is presently being pursued by his brother, Robert Dumas, and Mr. Frank Balotti, a law student. We are in agreement that every effort to keep this matter out of the public eye should be made. It is clear from your memo that you wish no additional information be provided to the Justice Department. It is also my understanding from a conversation with Major John Burton of the litigation division, that the Army will not turn over these documents under a court order.

Because of the nature of this case and the undesirable precedent that might occur, your course of action seems appropriate. Signed, William Clark. W.C. is William Clark, the Board Chairman at that time of the Military Board of Review.

Now, this was presented to the Federal judge, and the Army said it was a lie until someone slipped this in my file in Federal Court, which verifies what this says. There is a Colonel Merrill on here who testified that my brother was never a prisoner of war. But if you notice, on the bottom I'll read, this is to former Senator to New York—excuse me. Senator Buckley, Jim Buckley, who is now a Federal judge here in Washington, DC. And this was written to him but never got to him.

It says: to change Roger Dumas' status to prisoner of war will cause a precedent for all other cases in this country. Signed by Mr. William Plant, Board Chairman. OK? And I received this 9 months ago. State Department. 1985 this is.

And I'll tell you why it will never get nobody back from Korea, Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia, and all the other countries, China and Russia. As August approaches, we face again the annual presentation of a letter to the North Korean and Chinese side of the Military Armistice Commission requesting information on 2,233 prisoners of war, military personnel and 18 civilians known to have been captured by the Chinese forces and the NKA but never accounted for following the armistice. We are aware that UNC attempted in 1991 to terminate the annual submission of letters, but was instructed by Defense to continue with the—now, get this word, Mr. Chairman—ritual. R-i-t-u-a-l.

We are aware that—I'm sorry. Although there may be lingering bureaucratic reasons for perpetuating the submission of these letters, we now think it is time to stop. If thought necessary, the embassy could support the submission this year of one last letter to the North Korean and Chinese side requesting information as usual, and stating that UNC does not intend to send the annual letter in the future. This is 1985.

The last paragraph: embassy would appreciate sounding out appropriate contacts and Defense Department to assess the possibilities for movement of this issue. Signed Mr. Gleysteen. G-l-e-y-s-t-e-

e-n. And I don't even know who he is, but he works for the State Department. All right.

I'm going to save the biggy to last, but I want you to see this. This is Red Cross, American Red Cross. This is December 30, 1991. The same year you went into North Korea. Dear Bob, we received today a letter from our international social service director stating she has been advised by the International Committee of the Red Cross that contact has been made with their office concerning Korea. This is the prisoners of war that we are talking about here. I was assured that we would be kept informed of any developments. And I won't go all the way down, but it's signed Geils Norington, an former prisoner of war in Vietnam who is a very good friend of mine, and backs me up 100 percent.

Now let's get to 1987. I want to jump forward and back here because a lot of things happen in between. If I am going to stay here for 5 more minutes, I want to make sure you hear this one, because this is the biggest one of all.

Vice Chairman SMITH. I do not want to shut you down, but we have three other families here.

Mr. DUMAS. All right. I just want to go through 1987, which is only 5 years ago. The Ambassador of North Korea asked me to set up a meeting with the Reverend Jesse Jackson, running for President of the United States in 1987, and I said I would try to do that. So I had a friend of mine in New York, a South Korean businessman, who called Reverend Arne in Chicago, who was the right hand of Reverend Jackson at that time. He asked me to send him about 200 documents so the Reverend could look at it.

About a week and a half later they're talking to me and Reverend Arne in Miltown, NJ, at 11 o'clock at night in a hotel, which I did. I got on a train from home, went all the way out there. When we met for 7½ hours, he said the Reverend could not believe what he was looking at and he will meet with the North Korean Ambassador. You set up the meeting, and we'll tell you the time and place, and the hour.

So I set up the meeting with the Ambassador on December 9, 1987, at the hotel Hyatt Regency in New York City. There were no American newsmen there but one lady who is my best friend who has been writing about me for 20 years. She was the only one the North Koreans would allow because of myself. And there were 25 South Korean reports from South Korea and in the United States on the West Coast and the East Coast.

A Chinese coalition supporter of Reverend Jackson said Bob, it's time to get upstairs. The Ambassador's on his way up with you and we'll meet with the Reverend. So, we get upstairs and the Reverend was introduced by myself to Ambassador Pak Del Yan and Mr. Chang Yung Cho. We went in and sat down and the Reverend said, you're the guy I want to meet, meaning me.

But we sat down, and the Reverend says to the Ambassador of North Korea—he said, Mr. Ambassador, if you have live prisoners in North Korea right now, I will come to North Korea on Christmas Eve and bring them home, I'll bring some home alive. And in the springtime, if you have any remains, we will go back in the spring and exhume those with an organization of human rights people from our side and your side. And the first thing the Amba-

sador said, yes, Reverend, that would be good for both our countries.

So, I put him on the elevator after about an hour's meeting with the Reverend. There were more things said. I don't want to go into that. But when I got downstairs, the Reverend came down and grabbed me by the arm and said, get upstairs right away. I want to talk to you.

When I got upstairs and sat down he turned to me, and he had a bowl of chicken soup in his hand. And he took that chicken soup and drank it all the way down. He didn't say another word for 2 minutes. And he says, oh my God, we've got live prisoners of war in North Korea in 1987. I said, that's right, Reverend. There are 300 men, over 350 men still on those collective farms.

Mr. Oprika told me yesterday of 50 that he saw in 1979, and I've got evidence right now, and I show it to you—I'll have the depositions within 7 more days, and I'll send them to you, I'll send a copy to the committee—that the counsel for the U.S. Army, Mr. Grayson spoke in Evansville, Indiana several weeks ago on a Saturday night and says, fellows, I've got tell you this. We still have over 400 men still alive on collective farms in North Korea.

Well, one of your committee members, I won't say who, an investigator, called Mr. Grayson in Washington and he said, I never said that. But you had a thousand veterans that were there that night and heard him on microphone say those words. And there will be seven depositions coming to this committee shortly. Now who are you going to believe? One man or a thousand veterans? I'll believe the veterans. I'm a veteran and I don't think they'd lie about something like that. So, these are coming from Chicago and different areas.

I would like to show the two pictures. This is the picture of myself, Reverend Jackson, Peter J. Bo Ha, Ambassador Pak Del Yan and Chang Yung Cho that we took in a room that day when this meeting was taken. And I must read this, Mr. Chairman. It's the last thing I'll say, and you can shut me off. I've got a lot more, but you can shut me off after this.

This is a letter that Reverend Jackson wrote and had it hand delivered the following morning to Ambassador Pak Del Yan. It wasn't sent. It was hand delivered.

He says: Dear Ambassador Pak, let me express my gratitude for taking the time to meet with several members of my Rainbow Coalition and me on December 9th. I believe we had a very frank and fruitful discussion on a matter of great humanitarian concern.

Let me assure you that the Rainbow Coalition, an organization concerned with peace and justice, is prepared to send a delegation of Korean war veterans, relatives of U.S. prisoners, ministers, and others to the Democratic People's Republic of Korea.

It is my understanding that our Rainbow Coalition delegation will meet with a similar humanitarian body in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. Our Rainbow Coalition delegation is prepared to discuss several important matters to both of us. The return of remains of U.S. servicemen who died in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea—and, by the way, they have 2,500. I know this because they're all marked on the map. 2,000—the return of any U.S. prisoners of war still alive, and any appropriate

matters of mutual concern which would further better relations between our two countries.

I am willing to send a delegation to the Democratic People's Republic of Korea for Christmas, preferably on the 24th, approximately 2 weeks from today, to establish the process of exhuming the remains of prisoners in the spring.

I am willing to go to the Democratic People's Republic Korea, if it is possible that one or several U.S. prisoners of war will be returned with my delegation and myself.

Such humanitarian acts would be the best Christmas present possible for the American people. It would open a door and a window of opportunity which could lead to more dialogue and greater exchanges.

Please communicate with my designated representative, the Reverend Joseph Arne, who will be in charge of the organizing of our Rainbow Coalition delegation.

I look forward to the opportunity to visit the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and the return of all remains, as well as all live prisoners of war. Our delegation's visit can send a message of peace and reconciliation which will be broadcast throughout the world.

I thank you again for meeting with me today. I believe we share similar concerns for peace. Sincerely, Reverend Jesse Lewis Jackson.

But, do you know what happened? He called Secretary Baker on the phone. And when he got off the phone he said, we're leaving on the 24th. Get prepared. So, we were going to leave on the 24th. I said, we're not going anywhere. He said—you know how he is—I'll go anywhere in the world. No you're not. You can go to China, you can go to Russia, you can go to Cambodia, you can go to Vietnam, you can go to Laos, but you're not going to North Korea.

He said, how much do you want to bet? I said, I don't have any money after all these years, but if I did, I'd bet you everything you own. So the next day, Reverend Arne called me from Chicago. He said, Bob, the trip is going to be off. We just got word they put sanctions on North Koreans travel to the United States in 1987. They couldn't even come here. So, what did the North Koreans do? They had no choice, they put sanctions on us, so we couldn't go to North Korea. That was the end of it right there. Never heard another word. That was the end of the trip to North Korea in 1987.

So, I want to close by saying, Mr. Chairman, I appreciate you allowing me to come here. I have a lot more. The newsmen will have it all. Newsweek's got everything now. There's one of the Newsweek photographers right there. I spent 4-1/2 hours with him and the Newsweek people this week.

I just want to say, thank you for allowing me to come here. And I've got a lot more evidence that's all stacked up in my files here. I mean, anything you want to look at, I've got to prove they're there.

Vice Chairman SMITH. Thank you, Mr. Dumas.

Mr. DUMAS. You are welcome.

Vice Chairman SMITH. We are more than happy to accept any other information you may have that would help us to get anything on the record. We will come back to the questions in a few moments. I would like to hear from the other family members first.

Does anybody have any particular interest? OK, Mr. Sanderson, and Senator Burdick, please feel free to interject questions if you like, because I know this is a constituent of yours.

TESTIMONY OF BRUCE W. SANDERSON, FAMILY MEMBER, FARGO, NORTH DAKOTA

Mr. SANDERSON. Good afternoon. I am Bruce Sanderson, son of First Lieutenant Warren Sanderson, a crewmember of an RB-50 reconnaissance aircraft.

On July 29, 1953, at 6:15 a.m., the U.S. Air Force RB-50, tail number 47-145A, was attacked by two Soviet MIG-15 fighters over the Sea of Japan. The RB-50 crashed into the Sea of Japan approximately 40 miles southeast of Vladivostok.

The co-pilot, Captain John E. Roche, was rescued by the U.S. Navy 22 hours after the crash. He was picked up 17 miles from the Siberian coast. Three crewmembers are confirmed dead, 13 are unaccounted for.

From the date of the incident until June 1992, very little information was released to the families of the crew. Requests for information received replies that informed us that the incident was still classified and under further—and further information was not available.

On March 28, 1992, we submitted a letter to the Office of Senator Kent Conrad of North Dakota requesting his assistance in obtaining information concerning the loss of our father, Lieutenant Warren Sanderson.

From the documents received, it was confirmed that live survivors were sighted in the water by search and rescue aircraft. These sightings were documented in the Continuation of Missing Status beyond 12 months and in the State Department documents.

On June 13, 1992, Russian President Boris Yeltsin announced that as of August 1, 1953, the Soviet Union held 12 U.S. servicemen, eight in prison camps and 4 in psychiatric hospitals. The release of this information with a date so close to the shootdown of the RB-50 brought hope that our father and members of the crew may have survived the attack and the crash.

In July 1992, we visited Washington, D.C. to attend a meeting with the National Alliance of Families. During the meeting with the Air Force Casualty Office and Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense representatives, it was apparent that we had more detailed information about the RB-50 incident than was being represented to us at the meeting.

We showed that the RB-50 incident had several factors that would make it a good priority case. It was an admitted shootdown by the Soviets. Survivors were observed in the water by search and rescue aircraft. NKVD Soviet patrol boats were observed in the area both moving to and from the crash site, and we rescued the co-pilot 22 hours after the shootdown 17 miles from the coast.

The representatives from the Department of Defense agreed that the RB-50 case did have these merits and would press to have it handled as a priority.

We met with Bill LeGro, an investigator assigned to this select committee. In our meeting with him, we stressed the need for this

select committee to extend its existence beyond the December 31, 1992 expiration. The issue before this committee is extremely complex and will require years of oversight to ensure a full accounting is provided on the fate of the POW/MIAs.

We visited the National Archives and requested to view 10 boxes of documents from Record Group 59, State Department documents. We located approximately 50 pages of related material, including withdrawal notices. Much of this material augmented the information we had received earlier that survivors were sighted in the water and that the U.S. believed that the Soviet Government had custody of some of the crew.

In mid-August 1992, my family decided that a trip to Russia to meet with members of the Task Force Russia and others involved in the search for POW-MIAs was necessary. I left for Russia September 2, 1992.

Upon my arrival in Moscow I met with Ed Pusey, Bill Saxe, and Al Graham, Task Force Russia. At this point, I turned over copies of the most pertinent documents that demonstrated the facts to show why the RB-50 incident is an excellent model for the task force to use as its lead case. The information was discussed and the task force members took possession of the documents.

After the discussion, Ed Pusey stated that because of my detailed understanding of the facts I should present the RB-50 case to the Russian members of the joint task force. This was agreed to. A meeting was arranged with Russian General Dmitri Volkogonov and his staff.

On September 16, I met privately with a Russian citizen. We discussed his personal involvement with interrogating U.S. servicemen from 1950 to 1954 in the U.S.S.R. One of the main focuses of the discussion concerned the flow of documents pertaining to the interrogation of the U.S. servicemen from the initial processing to their current location.

On September 18, 1992, a meeting took place with General Volkogonov and his staff. This meeting was attended by General Bernard Loeffke, Ed Pusey and Al Graham. At this meeting, I was able to directly address the RB-50 incident and also to request specific information from the Russian Archives confirming the incident.

I requested the names of the MIG-15 pilots involved in the shoot-down and the pilots' debriefing reports. I also requested information detailing the activities of the NKVD border patrol boats observed going to and from the crash site of the RB-50.

On October 7, 1992, I met Russian Lieutenant Colonel Osipov of the joint task force. I was accompanied by Ed Pusey, Al Graham and Valery Smirnov, who acted as my personal translator.

At this meeting I inquired as to the status of the request for information that was referred to in the meeting with General Volkogonov. They had no new information to deliver at this time. Lieutenant Colonel Osipov then gave his personal word of honor that these documents would be supplied within a month's time.

On October 12, 1992, I met with the Russian citizen I referred to earlier. At this meeting, we went over the various methods in which the documents were routed through local and regional archives to the central archives. He described how various Govern-

ment agencies such as the KGB, Army, Navy, or Politburo had local, regional, and central archives for information.

He also reaffirmed the information from the first meeting that all U.S. personnel under Soviet control were photographed, fingerprinted, and given Russian names, that these men were then moved frequently from camp to camp. It was a common practice to create a false death certificate or record when a prisoner was moved from camp to camp.

Most of these men were sentenced to long prison terms under the worst conditions. Examples are uranium mines, coal mines, and salt mines. Some of the men with technical skills and knowledge were forced to work in prison factories.

It is his belief from his preliminary investigation that crewmembers from the RB-50 were captured July 29, 1953.

I returned to the United States on October 13, 1992.

Thank you.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Sanderson is printed in the Appendix of November 11, 1992.]

Vice Chairman SMITH. Thank you, Mr. Sanderson. I think we will just finish up the other two family members and then we can ask some questions. Mrs. Howard.

TESTIMONY OF JANE REYNOLDS HOWARD, FAMILY MEMBER, MIDDLETON, WISCONSIN

Mrs. HOWARD. Senator Smith, colleagues, I have just received faxes from the two daughters of my first husband, Robert D. Reynolds, whose case brings me here today. I have attempted to shorten the testimony that I gave to you so as to add parts of theirs on at the end.

I want to thank you for giving those of us concerned about the older men lost a chance to express our concerns. The main point I wish to convey to you today is that we are just beginning to uncover the facts that will lead us to the knowledge of what happened to the POWs, MIAs, KIAs, and Presumed Deads of the last five decades. We must not let anything stop the search now, for some of these men are still alive, without question.

My name is Jane Reynolds Howard. I am legally the widow of Robert Durward Reynolds, whose Navy plane disappeared over the Baltic Sea April 8, 1950. My life was shattered on that day when I learned of Bob's being missing and I was left with a toddler and an unborn baby.

Even when the Navy declared Bob Presumed Dead 1 year later, I could not accept that designation. However, I tried to summon the courage to get on with my life and I buried my memories of Bob deep in my subconscious.

Five and ½ years after Bob's disappearance I married again. My second husband raised Bob's two daughters along with the four of our own union, and he died suddenly in 1985.

Fifteen months ago a friend sent me an article from the L.A. Times entitled, American Ghosts in the Gulag; and I learned to my surprise that Bob had been involved in electronic surveillance work around the northern and southern rims of the Iron Curtain.

Suddenly, I understood why Bob had become so moody and quick to anger during those last months we had together. For 40 years I had felt that I had failed him as a wife, and I didn't know why.

I never dreamed of the strain he was under, flying those secret missions; but what really blew my mind was the statement that both the State and Defense Departments had maintained from the start they felt the crew probably had been captured by the Soviets. For 40 years, my daughters and I had believed a lie!

When I read the Senate Foreign Relations Committee statement on the Government's abandonment of service people since World War I, I began to realize the enormity of the tragedy my family, and countless others, had been put through. Since it is hard to condense 15 months' effort into 5 minutes, I will mention only a few of the things I did before going to Russia this past August. I hope when I finish you will question me about my activities while in Russia.

(1) I contacted my Congressman, Scott Klug, and my Senator, Herb Kohl, for help. Both have been very supportive in my search. (I have learned that many of the families have not had the good fortune I did in having sensitive and responsive Congressmen and Senators). (2) Through the National Alliance of Families, which is concerned about service people from all wars, I was put in touch with other POW families who began to send me pertinent papers. (This is Dolores Alfond's group). (3) I did library research on concentration camps and life in the Soviet Union. I received permission from Avraham Shifron in Israel to use his material in any way if it would help to bring people out of the Gulag.

(4) I began to utilize the local newspaper and Madison TV. (5) I solicited John Noble's own memories and received the facts from Dresden, Germany, September 9. (6) I wrote letters to Vadim Bakatin, head of the KGB at that time, and to President Boris Yeltsin.

(7) Mark Sauter took four pictures of Bob (as he appeared at age 29 in 1950) to Moscow when he went in December 1991. I ran an ad (with this picture) on Bob's behalf in a Russian human rights newspaper on Christmas Day and received a response. (8) Mark gave the other pictures to his counterparts. Valery Rudnev, an Izvestia reporter, got one.

(8) In January 1992, I opened a Search Fund for Robert D. Reynolds, since xeroxing, postage, and phone calls were too much for my limited income; and I had exhausted what savings I had.

(10) In February, I sent a massive mailing to Bob's classmates from the Naval Academy, some of whom are here in the audience today, and to those members of Squadron VP-26 that I could reach.

(11) A Madison, Wisconsin TV crew made a 12-minute tape of me appealing to the Russian people, which they took to Moscow in April. (12) The Izvestia reporter I mentioned did an article about Bob and his crew, and this was sent to me in March but it appeared in Izvestia on February 4.

(13) Senator Kohl had the FBI age Bob's photo to how he would appear at the age of 70. (When I first got these aged photos and put them alongside the young Bob, I was uncomfortable for a few days, but very soon I put away the young Bob's picture and kept this one out, because I thought well, I'm not young any more, and I'm more comfortable with a man my own age. I get great comfort from this

picture now. Even if Bob is not alive, I know to some degree what he would have been like).

This photograph was taken to Russia, to Moscow, in May by Susan Mesinai, Director of the ARK project, and it was shown on Trans-Union TV in Russia.

(14) When President Yeltsin came to the States in June, USA Today, the London Sunday Times, Canadian and U.S. radio stations, the Today TV show, People Magazine, etc. picked up on my quest and I gave interviews.

Some wonderful soul donated a ticket to Moscow to the ARK project, earmarked for me; and thanks to an invitation from Izvestia, my daughter and I were able to stay in a Russian home instead of going in as tourists.

I have just returned from Russia, essentially for two reasons: one to vote, and one to appear here today. While there, my daughter and I (the daughter that was born 6 months after Bob disappeared) my daughter and I went to follow down clues that developed from newspaper publicity.

After 10 weeks I came home—this is Carolyn (indicating). After 10 weeks I came home with the *firm conviction* that Americans are there, and given half a chance they could have survived; but I honestly don't believe some of them have even a clue to the fact that we are searching for them.

Consider this: having been abandoned by their own Government many years ago, and living since then in fear of any authority figure under the old Soviet regime; they are probably afraid, of bringing any notice to themselves or their families.

I learned while I was there, in the 10 weeks, that everyone still lives with some of that fear. They have been conditioned for so long to not be able to trust the Government, and to be afraid, that it's still there. My hostess had it; my host did too. When I was in St. Petersburg, they had it there, too.

So if these men are aware that we are searching, they are also aware that the old KGB, the GRU of the military, the hard-core Communists, and the new Nationalists are working to bring Yeltsin's regime down and get back into power themselves.

As you noticed this morning in General Volkogonov's testimony, he is very much aware of this. This would be disastrous for Russia, and the United States, and for the world; for it would mean a return to the cold war.

When President Yeltsin flung open that window of opportunity last June, it became obvious to me that we were dealing with a new kind of leader, one who felt that truth and integrity had merit.

But time to accomplish the ends we seek may be very short. The process should be accelerated by every means at our command. Private organizations such as the Alliance of Families, the ARK project, Amnesty International, and Memorial could facilitate the search for these people.

Forty years ago, world affairs were very different from now. With prospects, today, of a slowly developing, world unity and a greater cooperation among the nations, it is unthinkable *not* to investigate this subject to its utmost conclusion. It is only just and right that, in the light of the service these men have performed for

their country, they should receive proper recognition and honor for their sacrifices.

If this is done honestly and expeditiously, the U.S. Government might begin to regain its credibility in the eyes of many citizens. Families who have lost a loved one might begin to heal the deep wounds in their psyches. Therefore, I strongly recommend two things to this committee:

I recommend that either a new Senate Select Committee be established with a mandate to cover the missing from all wars and also the many civilians who were caught in these situations, or that this committee be funded again for an additional 2 years at least; and I would suggest that under the circumstances, with the three wars, the cold war, and I'm suggesting covering civilians who were caught in situations over which they had no control, I would suggest establishing maybe 5 subcommittees.

I also recommend to you that you apprise President-elect Clinton that we, the people, demand that all information regarding POWs, MIAs, KIAs, and 'Presumed Dead' be declassified and be made available to families and concerned friends immediately. National security is no longer a valid excuse for events that happened 40 years ago.

Now, I wish to add parts of my daughters' statements to mine. I feel the American people need to understand some of the anguish that families experience when a father is taken away and there's no explanation given to the child as to why.

This is Carolyn, the daughter that went over to the Soviet Union with me for 2 weeks. When she came back, she didn't realize it but she was in a state of shock, and she had to stay out of work for almost 2 weeks because she couldn't utter a word.

She writes, "I recently returned from Russia where I spent 2 weeks with my mother searching for clues regarding my father's disappearance. I found no answers, just more questions. I don't know what to say, except that as I write this memories of my childhood haunt me, and I am crying. They are tears of sadness, for I never met my father.

I grew up wondering what he was like. I was told he was dead. Then, a year ago, I found out he was probably taken prisoner of war at the time of the incident and might still even be alive.

These days I cry, wondering about all the pain and suffering he must have endured; and I wonder if he's still alive somewhere in Russia. Or maybe someone else is still alive. Please keep working on the exchange of information between our two countries. There are many good people on both sides willing to help." Sincerely, Carolyn P. Reynolds, San Diego, CA.

This—

[Indicating.]

—Is from the daughter who is a doctor in Brazil, who was 3½ at the time Bob's plane was shot down. And I could never give her an answer as to what had happened to him because I never knew myself.

Christine says: "I was 3½ years old when my father went away for the last time. As time dragged on and I could see he wasn't coming back, I started a process of closing off my feelings; for the

pain of having to accept that half of me, that is my father, would never be there again was unbearable.

I learned to live in my head, became a straight-A student and never gave anyone any trouble. But I also gave up living my own life, being me; I was always motivated by trying to please others. Even today, understanding the process and the implications, it is still very difficult to express my views when I anticipate any kind of criticism.

I grew up with mixed feelings about my father. On one hand, I hated him for having gone off and left me when I needed him so much. On the other, I had the deep feeling I had been responsible for his death. To this day, this feeling generates guilt and a sense of unworthiness.

But in my case I didn't give up. All during my childhood and for years afterwards I tried to be 'better and better'; maybe if I was good enough, he would give me another chance and come back. Needless to say, this subconscious drive affected my relations with other people, especially my family.

I never had a close relationship with any of my brothers and sisters, not even my mother, much less my stepfather, even though I couldn't deny that he really loved me and wanted the best for me.

The disaster spread to my marriage. Only because my husband is such a wonderful person, always trying to understand me and give me support, were we able to survive until after the 'storm'.

After many years of various kinds of treatment, we have finally gotten to the point where I can let myself get a little bit close. All my life I have had an image of being alone and on the outside. I haven't completely gotten rid of this feeling yet.

Jane (I only found this out about my daughter yesterday when I received this, so you'll forgive me if I'm a little touched by it too). It follows that I wasn't the best of mothers. I've done all I can, and my four daughters know that, and know I love them, in my own way; but I have never been able to be close and affectionate and that always leaves a scar.

Of course, this has to do partly with my own personality and partly with my role model. My mother had to be strong to face life with a newborn baby, a preschool child, a sick mother, the recent loss of her own father, besides the strange situation of being 'declared a widow'.

Thank God, there were many factors in my life that led me to positive outlets for so much pain. I became a medical doctor, specializing in Obstetrics and Gynecology and, later on, Homeopathy. But the personal side of my life is an ongoing search for the 'lost child'.

I was over 40 years old when I finally let myself cry out my anguish and accept the fact that my father had drowned in the freezing, cold waters of the Baltic Sea. It was only after this point that I began to feel something positive or to at least accept him and try to understand his side of the story. But to this day it is very, very hard for me to get in touch—with myself, on a feeling level; so I still carry physical symptoms that are clearly psychosomatic.

I'm not bitter anymore, just very sad, but grateful to my mother and others who were role models throughout my life. I feel that all things considered, I am able to give back positively to humanity,

which I believe to be one way of really 'turning the other cheek'. In other words, since there's no way to undo what was done to me in my childhood, I'm going to do everything I can to prevent this kind of suffering in others.

Since we are living in a very special time in history when clearly the megatrends are carrying us toward the consciousness of the organic unity of humankind, and since we can only constructively change the future (trying to change the past is destruction and leads nowhere unless we build something new in its place) I would like to see each individual who is touched by this or by any other human drama of real life, do his or her utmost, according to his or her conscience, to deliberately help bring about world peace and understanding.

Sometimes, it helps to ask yourself if you are actively contributing to the solution, or if you are unwittingly part of the problem. I believe the most important aspect is the part each individual plays in his or her daily life, whether at work, in the family, or in any other situation which arises.

The ocean is made of drops of water and humanity is made of individual people. Decisions policies, trends depend on the sanction of people. We must contribute as best each one can to enlightened and constructive participation. In the words of Baha'u'llah, 'All men have been created to carry forward an ever-advancing civilization. Let us live up to our birthright'. Christina Reynolds Gonçalves.

Thank you.

[The prepared statement of Mrs. Howard follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF JANE REYNOLDS HOWARD

I, Jane Reynolds Howard, Soc. Sec. Num. 378-12-1842, residing at 6710 Elmwood Avenue - Apt. 201; Middleton, WI 53562, do hereby depose and attest that I met my husband, Robert Durward Reynolds, at the University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, Michigan, in the fall of 1940 when we were both Freshmen. Bob was a farm boy, born in Cuylerville, N.Y. and graduated from Genesee High School. He enrolled in Engineering School at U. of M. and also became a member of the N.R.O.T.C. In the spring of 1941, he took a competitive exam for entrance to the Naval Academy at Annapolis, Maryland, which was given at N.R.O.T.C. units all across the States. His score was among the highest in the country, so he was offered a 'merit appointment' to the Naval Academy starting in July, 1941.

Bob graduated the morning of June 7, 1944 (Class of '45) as a result of an accelerated '4 years in 3' program due to World War II. That same afternoon, we were married, with Abie Shepard (later Admiral Alan B. Shepard, the astronaut) and Morrie Lax among Bob's groomsmen, and Abie's father, Col. Shepard, playing the organ, to Dad Reynolds' violin.

After a summer in Jacksonville, Florida in a pre-flight program, we had a few weeks together in San Francisco before he shipped out to the battleship Washington on which he spent the rest of the war. In January, 1946, he started primary flight training at Corpus Christi, Texas, together with Abie Shepard and others of his class. Our daughter Christina (Tina, who is now a doctor in Brazil and mother of four) was born during that period. In early winter of '47 Bob went into training in the heavy bombers (Privateers) at Pensacola, Florida. When he received his wings, he was assigned to Squadron VP-26, variously stationed at Atlantic City, New Jersey, Newfoundland and Port Lyautey, French Morocco.

When Tina and I joined him at Port Lyautey, he had already been on several 'training flights' as he called the 7-10 day periods when he left us. Since he was the most honest person I'd ever met (my dad called him the 'salt of the earth') I never questioned that he was doing anything other than what he told me he was.

However, during the twenty months we three had together at Port Lyautey, there were two distinct things that I remember. First, while lying in bed one night soon after Tina and I arrived, he said to me "If anything were ever to happen to me I wouldn't want you to mourn me too long. I'd want you to marry again and get on with your life." The second was that where previously he had been a remarkably congenial companion, even during flight training at Corpus Christi and Pensacola, during those twenty months in Port Lyautey, he became increasingly withdrawn and short-tempered, which was totally unlike him. For example, when I would try to discuss something about child rearing, he'd invariably imply he couldn't be bothered and stalk out of the quonset hut, effectively ending the conversation. I

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loved him ; but in the last few weeks before he disappeared, when I realized another child was on the way, I began to wonder if the marriage could hold together with so little genuine communication or if it would end in divorce.

Other than the reference to his own death and the change of personality, I had no clue as to what the government was asking him to do on those 'training flights'. Bob's plane, a PB4Y2 (Privateer) with a 10 man crew was shot down in the Baltic Sea on April 8, 1950 by 4 Soviet MIGs. According to what Stalin told the world, when he decorated 4 fighter pilots a day or so later, a "B-29" had wandered into Soviet territory, refused to land when ordered, and the last they saw, it had gone 'smoking at the tail' back to sea". This, and the fact that Squadron VP-26 sent several planes up to the Baltic Sea area to search for Bob and his crewmates was all I knew (the planes found nothing) during the year they were carried as Missing in Action. On April 9, 1951 Bob and his crewmates were declared 'Presumed Dead' by the government. I became legally his widow and Tina, and Carolyn (born 6 1/2 months after his disappearance) became legally fatherless.

At this point I wish to state that I have asked several of Bob's classmates from the Naval Academy as well as Squadronmates from Squadron VP-26 to write short affidavits regarding their knowledge of Bob's character as an individual and friend and their knowledge of his value as a military man in the service of his country. These are areas that I have known little about; but I assume they will be corroborative of him as the kind of person it is hard to forget!

So far as I know, there has been no effort on the part of the U.S. government to contact me through the years - until recently, and that was at my own insistence.

On August 2, 1991 I received the attached article numbered 1 from the Los Angeles Times of 7/29/91. It was written by their Washington correspondent, Doyle McManus, and is titled 'Ghosts in the Gulag'. On the back page-middle of second column, it states words to the effect that the government had known from the start that the men had been captured by the Soviets. I was utterly amazed as the implications of that statement penetrated my consciousness. "My God, Bob could be ALIVE still in the Soviet Union!"

Since that date, I have been in contact with many people, among them Senator Herb Kohl. At my request, he queried the Central Intelligence Agency, the Defense and State Departments about Bob's case. Both he and I were less than impressed with what answers we received. As a result, on November 15, 1991, Sen. Kohl, who had been appointed to the Senate Select Committee on POW/MIA Affairs, brought up Bob's case with Carl Ford, Jr. of the Defense Dep't. Mr. Ford promised Sen. Kohl that he would cooperate with him in every way possible for the benefit of his constituent...me. In three months I have received not one word

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from him!

Congressman Scott Klug's Madison office has also been very helpful, especially in arranging T.V. opportunities for me. Since I started searching for Bob six months ago, I have been on all the live stations in Madison at least two or three times, explaining about the possibility of Bob or some of his crew members being alive still in the Soviet Union. I have told about the hundreds, possibly thousands, of other Americans from World War II, the Cold War, the Korean and Viet Nam Wars, who are undoubtedly still struggling to stay alive in a very tortured economy.

A local PBS producer/director has interviewed me for three hours and done a lot of research for a 'documentary' he hopes to make on the POW/MIA issue.

In early December of '91, Brandon Scholz, Congressman Klug's Chief of Staff, carried two letters and corroborative packets from me to Moscow for the Honorable Boris Yeltsin, President of the Russian Federation, and for the Honorable Vadim Bakatin, designated by Yeltsin and Mikhail Gorbachev last September after the attempted coup to be new head of the KGB...with orders to dismantle it. On December 10, 1991, he explained about the two letters and packets with which he had been entrusted to Vyacheslav A. Zagulyaev, his counterpart in the newly-formed Russian government. He explained that each letter carried a joint, cover letter from his boss and from Senator Herb Kohl. 'Slava', as Brandon called him, promised to get the letters and packets to their designated recipients. Brandon also took a packet from me to Ambassador Robert Strauss, apprising him of Bob's situation.

A week before Christmas, '91, I had an opportunity to get several pictures of Bob (as he appeared at age 29 in 1950) into the hands of Moscow reporters and the Editor in Chief of the weekly Moscow newspaper, Express Chronicle, thanks to Mark Sauter, investigative reporter from Seattle. At that time, I placed a quarter-page ad in Russian in the Express Chronicle, which ran Christmas Day, New Year's and the following Wednesday. It is estimated that between 45 to 60 million people read this paper all across the continent each week, since it is highly respected and was the first 'alternative' newspaper to start up (in 1987) after former President Gorbachev stated his idea of 'glasnost' on coming to power in '85.

I have belonged to a group called the National Alliance of Families for the Return of America's Missing Servicemen (founded by Dolores Alford, whose brother's plane went down in Southeast Asia; he may be in Russia, now) since early on in my search. Mark Sauter has become a friend and it was on the behalf of the Alliance of Families that he went to Moscow and suggested the formation of a Joint Russian-American Commission on POW/MIA Affairs. He also offered the government an up-to-date list of 121 Americans legitimately known to be in the Soviet Union (of

which Bob and his crew constitute ten) when he found they were working with the 'Pentagon list of 50' whose first two names are of people back in the United States for more than thirty years.

While Mark was in Moscow, besides giving the Express Chronicle the picture designated for them, he made photocopies from the other pictures (before giving them to local newsmen who wrote stories in the area papers, using Bob's picture) and, as he told me when he got back, "Jane, Bob's face is posted all over Moscow!" In addition, that same photo went all across the Commonwealth of Nations three times in the aforementioned ad. Please see item 'Y-Z' attached.

At the same time Mark Sauter was in Moscow, and my ad for Bob was running, the Express Chronicle carried articles on 'American Prisoners in the Gulag' by Susan Mesina (Program Director for the Raoul Wallenberg Committee of the United States) and Mikhail 'Misha' Kazachkov (presently at Harvard Law School in the Human Rights Department) until a little over a year ago, an inmate in the Gulag for some fifteen years himself. These articles were part of an ARK Project plan to prepare the people of the Commonwealth of Nations (most of whom have 'lost' at least one member of their families for the last two or three generations to the dreaded, slave-labor, camp system) to understand that the islands of the Gulag Archipelago are all around them and will only be opened up with their help. We (the ARK Project members) plan to show a video on continent-wide T.V. in the near future with aged pictures of Raoul Wallenberg and Robert D. Reynolds, among others.

Between this series of articles about Americans in the Gulag, my ad for Bob and Wm. Sowles' ad for his father (missing since the Korean War years) and for POW/MJAs in general, a lot of memories are being 'jogged' and statements are flowing in to the Express Chronicle.

A very brave soul by the name of Igor Evgenyevitch Privalov came forward with his knowledge of Bob and three other Americans (from the Viet Nam era) as a result of the first article and my ad for Bob. Please see item 'S' and item 'Z' attached. Misha Kazachkov sent me a FAX of Igor's statement (paraphrasing it as best he could) on January 6, 1992. Item 'Z' is Igor's own statement in his own words, which I received several weeks later in the January 9, 1992 English language edition of the Express Chronicle (which is sent to the States regularly for university libraries and human rights organizations). At the time I made up item 'Z' I thought it might be wise to not include Igor's name; but I have since been informed by someone who has worked with the Express Chronicle since the start that the wider his name is known (especially abroad) the safer it will be for him!

All I know about the REALITY of what Bob was doing on what he called 'training flights' to Weisbaden and Ishtambul, I have learned bit by bit during the last six months...and none of it has come straight from the government. The Los Angeles Times

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article (#1) made it clear that Bob's plane was on a 'ferreting' mission, flying close to the Soviet controlled borders...sometimes within them...to rouse radar signals which they could then monitor on the plane. This was what Bob and his crew were being asked to do by their government; without any means of protecting themselves, they were 'sitting ducks'. In addition, because these 'intelligence gathering' missions were covert (hidden even from Senators and Congressmen according to my perusal of Congressional Records of the '50s) the men probably were not even drawing 'hazardous duty' pay. According to item '4' attached, it was government policy to declare people dead (even though it was known to the government that they were alive still) if they were on covert missions. This was neater, essentially, to 'write the men off'; and it was cheaper than carrying them as MIAs, a statement I have come across often, usually by an unidentified, government spokesman.

Around mid-January, after he had returned from Moscow, Mark testified in Washington, D.C. before the Senate Select Committee on POW/MIA Affairs; and he also went to the State Department to inform them of Yeltsin giving the 'green light' to the formation of the Joint Russian-American Commission on POW/MIA Affairs, which he had suggested on behalf of the National Alliance of Families for the Return of America's Missing Servicemen. He informed them of the list of 121 persons (known to be in Russia) which he had also given them.

Before Mark had left Moscow, he had informed diplomats at the United States Embassy (Strauss was not there at the time) of what he had done. He also informed the U.S. Military Attache's Office in Moscow; so, theoretically, the Pentagon should now know about his efforts...both for Robert D. Reynolds, as an individual, and for POW/MJAs, in general.

In answer to my queries, on September 9, 1991, John Noble sent me a FAX from Dresden, Germany, in which he explained all that he could remember from his four years in the Vorkuta prison camp complex (200 camps with about 500,000 prisoners) about a group of prisoners who were reported to be from a plane shot down in the Baltic Sea in April of 1950. Just before he was released four years later, another prisoner told him that the Americans were still where they had been reported previously. In January, 1955 he gave this same information to several government departments, one of which showed him pictures of the men being taken off a still-floating plane. Years later, he found that all trace of his debriefings had disappeared from government files. See item 'F'. However, since Noble had not accepted the government's admonition to 'keep his mouth shut' about other Americans in the Gulag, there are, fortunately, articles in the Reader's Digest, and books which he wrote, available for anyone who wishes to read them. In his FAX to me he states that since the men are about his age and they seemed to have survived the first two years, he believes many of them could still be alive.

Recently, I have had two articles sent to me which

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corroborate much of the previous information I had. The first is from a flier who was in Bob's squadron and who was scheduled to be on that last, fateful flight with Bob but was bumped from it to allow two new officers to go. The article he includes with his letter is from the magazine, 'The Hook', Summer 1987, and tells openly about what the PB4Y2s were doing in the European Theater. See attached article #24. It includes some details about Bob's plane and the search for survivors.

The second article is from Shipmate, January-February, 1992 (a magazine for and about graduates of the Naval Academy at Annapolis) and deals with the experiences of Captain William C. Chapman, USN (Ret) when he was Assistant Naval Attache in Moscow to then American Ambassador to the Soviet Union, Admiral Alan G. Kirk. Chapman starts his reminiscences telling of the morning of April 9, 1950 when Adm. Kirk had been summoned to the office of Foreign Minister, Andrei Vishinsky, to be informed that Soviet MiGs had shot down a United States Navy patrol plane which, according to Vishinsky, had intruded into Soviet airspace. Kirk was furious to be caught unawares; the U.S. government hadn't notified him of the 'incident', yet. Chapman remembers his wrath, vividly, and the fact that Adm. Kirk had, until that morning, been 'totally ignorant...of the SESP (Special Electronics Search Program) operation of which the P4Y had been a part'. See attached article #25.

In my mind, there is not one shred of doubt about Bob and his crew having been captured by the Soviets. The fact that Mark Sauter met with a college professor who has been researching in the KGB archives in the past year and has found a number of Japanese who had been taken captive in the last few days of the Second World War still ALIVE and some French prisoners taken in 1943 still ALIVE gives me a strong conviction that Bob, himself, MAY STILL BE ALIVE!!! In any case, without question, some of his crew members have survived. Extrapolating from these facts, it stands to reason that there must be hundreds, even thousands, of Americans still alive (please see item #4 at this point...referring to the many POWs and MIAs left behind during the various wars) somewhere in the present Commonwealth of States. We MUST locate them! We, the American people, owe it to all these unfortunate ones to make every effort to find them while they are still ALIVE and to assure them of an honorable return...together with their loved ones, if they have wives and children. We also must put to rest the anguish of the families of those who didn't survive and render their loved ones the honor that is their due.

I am dedicated, as are the founders of the ARK Project, to working by every means possible to alert the American public to these facts and help them to "break through the cobwebs of seeing these men as 'history' and picture them in a living struggle to survive, with decapitated...perhaps now silent...hopes of return" to use Susan Mesina's words. The ARK Project (Susan Mesina and Misha Kazachkov, founders) has been of immeasurable help to me so far in my struggle to trace Bob. I am attaching papers to

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explain the ARK Project further. See items 'U', 'V' and 'W'.

As of this date (2-13-92) Misha Kazachkov is voluntarily back in Moscow, with the objective of helping Senators Kerrey and Smith and the staff of the Senate Select Committee on POW/MIA Affairs make the most useful contacts possible to their finding LIVE Americans and the truth about what has happened to the others. After the Committee leaves to return to the States, Misha will stay on for a while (on behalf of the ARK Project...which is dedicated to bringing back LIVE Americans) to establish centers to receive the outpouring of information that is anticipated from the people of the Commonwealth of Nations when our video is shown across the continent in the near future.

From my own experience, I know that the ARK Project and the Alliance of Families for the Return of America's Missing Servicemen are GO-GETTERS. They should both be on the soon-to-be-formed Joint Russian-American Commission on POW/MIA Affairs. They are concerned with the return of LIVE Americans which the government has shown little interest in until lately. See item #4 and especially #5 at this point.

While I recognize that the return of Viet Nam vets was the issue around which the Senate Select Committee was created, I hope that whoever reads this document will realize how important it is to find these many others souls from previous wars who, in some cases have no family members to fight for them. The Committee must either voluntarily expand its horizons or the Senate MUST create an additional Committee whose primary purpose is to look into the 'forgotten POWs and MIAs of previous wars'. If the latter path is taken, God forbid, how many more of our loved ones will die waiting for this to happen?

Although I am presently recovering from two heart attacks, a light stroke, and finally, triple by-pass, heart surgery, I am well enough to come to Washington to testify if necessary, provided funds can be furnished for my transportation, hotel and food. I would come on my own, at the drop of a hat, if I had the means. However, I live on a fixed income based on Social Security benefits and Veterans Administration Survivors benefits. This has been adequate for everyday needs until recently; but it has not allowed me to amass any savings. Since last August 2nd, when I learned Bob might still be alive, I have had a horrendous phone bill, high xeroxing and postage costs, as I have put together letters and packets of information to send throughout the country and even some outside the United States. As of the first of 1992, I have opened a 'Search Fund for Robert D. Reynolds' at the Valley Bank in Middleton, W.I. 53562 and am accepting modest donations. I will not accept cash as I am keeping receipts for all expenses in case the IRS wants to audit me one day. However, checks can also be made out to me and earmarked for Bob's Search Fund. Since I will not have time or energy to thank each contributor individually, you have my heartfelt thanks in advance and my promise that all monies will be used wisely.

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This may seem like a strange way to end an affidavit, but it is my way.

Dear Friend, (these are words from my letters to Yeltsin and Bakatin, and I share them freely with others) We have been designated players on the same field and for the same goal...that of striving for the freedom and human dignity of mankind, for the integrity and trustworthiness of the nations and for Justice, Peace and a 'morally oriented' New World Order. None of us chose the paths we have been obliged to tread; all of us have felt very alone at times, I'm sure. But I truly believe there is a wonderful purpose working itself out at this stage of history, and we have had (and are having) the privilege of being human tools in the process.

And I closed my letters to the aforementioned gentlemen with the final verse of a poem I wrote more than a decade ago, entitled 'To a Searching Soul':

Come, let us join history's pioneers,
who light the way for generations yet unborn.
God's invitation awaits us each and every one,
to join with Him in His Great Plan
to bring about the 'Golden Age' of Man.
Let us heed well His clarion call,
nor forfeit this great chance.
God calls to us, insistently:
"I have USE for man as he has NEED for Me".

Judy Morgan-Wesberg

Subscribed and sworn to before me this
21 day of Feb. 1992
James J. [Signature]
Notary Public, Dane Co., State of Wis.
My commission expires 4/4/93

Vice Chairman SMITH: Thank you, Mrs. Howard. I know that was a very difficult testimony for you to give. Certainly, it was a very powerful statement. All of you so far have given very powerful statements to the pain that you all feel over the loss. And the fact that somehow, although we can never make it right, hopefully somehow we will be able to get the answers that you should have gotten years ago and that you deserve to have.

Let me move to Mr. Skavinski. He is the last family member to testify here today, and then we will move to some brief questions.

TESTIMONY OF GREG SKAVINSKI, FAMILY MEMBER, HERNDON, VIRGINIA

Mr. SKAVINSKI: Thank you. My name is Greg Skavinski and I'm the nephew of Master Sergeant William R. Homer. Mr. Vice Chairman, Senator Smith, members of the select committee, thank you for the opportunity to testify on this Veterans Day before such an important forum as this.

It is both appropriate and ironic that these hearings are being held on Veterans Day. It is appropriate because today is set aside to remember this nation's veterans. It is ironic because this thought seems to have been forgotten as it relates to Korean war and cold war POWs and MIAs.

Before I begin, I would like to publicly recognize those family members present and absent who, because of their dedication and perseverance, would not let this issue fade from the public conscience. I would also like to recognize those people too numerous to mention here who believed in our cause. They gave us information and support, they published our story in their newspapers and magazines, and aired our story on television. We are forever in your debt.

40 years ago this year, on 13 June 1952, a U.S. Air Force RB-29, alone, unarmed, and unafraid, left Yakota Air Force Base on a classified reconnaissance mission over the Sea of Japan. It was a high-risk business. The plane did not return. Thus began a 40 year vigil on the part of the families of the crew. Hopefully these hearings will mark the beginning of the end of that vigil.

The Air Force considered the plane's disappearance as an accident, a non-battle casualty. The crew was carried in a missing status until 15 November 1954 when this status was terminated by a presumptive finding of death. Now normally this should have been the end of this story, but it wasn't. What follows is what I consider pieces of the puzzle, unanswered questions, and bits of information that, over the years, have kept the families walking on emotional tightrope.

Number one, search aircraft sighted an empty six-man life raft but could not identify it as belonging to the plane. Number two, a report that a radar operator on duty in Japan saw two radar blips approach the plane, an indication that the plane was under attack. Number three, during the pre-flight briefing prior to the search mission a statement was made that a Russian radio transmission had been picked up which indicated that a single officer/airman had been rescued.

Number four, information supplied by Mr. William Kosky, who participated in the rescue mission. He was subsequently shot down over Korea and ended up in a Red Army jail in Sheng Yang, Manchuria. He was continuously interrogated about Major Sam Bush, the air commander of the RB-29. If Major Bush was dead at the bottom of the ocean, why all the interest?

Number five, the Department of State's diplomatic demarche to the Soviet Union on July 16, 1956 declaring that the Soviet Union was holding at least 10 officers and enlisted men from two missing U.S. planes. The United States said it had obtained information about the detained airmen from persons of various nationalities freed from Soviet Government imprisonment during the last several years.

Reports that they had conversed with, seen, or heard reports concerning U.S. military aviation personnel belonging either to the U.S. Air Force or to the U.S. Navy air arm in actual detention in the Soviet Union. The reports concerning such personnel have now become so persistent and detailed and so credible that the Department of State sent the demarche.

Specifically, the U.S. Government is informed and compelled to believe that the Soviet Government has had and continues to have under detention the following, one or more members of a U.S. Air Force B-29 which came down on June 13, 1952, over the Sea of Japan. And finally, President Yeltsin's statement this past summer that the Soviet Union had taken American servicemen prisoner and that some of them might still be alive.

Each of these pieces of the puzzle singularly stands on its own merit. Each of these pieces of the puzzle, when viewed collectively, leaves no doubt that some or all of the crew of the RB-29 were captured by the Soviets.

I submit to you the following question. How is a nation's greatness measured? Is it measured by its gross national product, is it measured by its literacy rate, or is it measured by the number of automobiles it produces each year? I think no. A nation's greatness is measured by its citizens, those men and women who, throughout our history, have sacrificed their lives in the defense of our freedom. Such is the case of the crew of the RB-29 for whom I speak today.

When I was in Vietnam I had a cigarette lighter engraved with the following quotation. Its message served me well on more than one occasion, and I quote: And coward's funerals, when they come, are not wept so well at home. Therefore, though the best is bad, stand and do the best, my lad.

My uncle and the other crewmembers stood and did their best. It is now time for our Government to stand and do its best. These men deserve better than to be relegated to some forgotten file on some dusty shelf somewhere. We want answers. We want the truth. We want nothing less than a fanatical commitment on the part of the Government to find the truth. Spare no expense, spare no effort, whatever it takes, however long it takes. Nothing less will suffice.

In closing, I will read the individual names of the crew so that they become part of the permanent record of these hearings. I do this because their names appear on no monument nor are they

listed in any history book. A eulogy of sorts, perhaps, but more of a statement of faith and support from those of us who have not forgotten them.

Missing RB-29 crew: Samuel N. Bush, Major, U.S. Air Force, Philadelphia, PA; James A. Sculley, First Lieutenant, U.S. Air Force, Philadelphia, PA; Samuel D. Service, First Lieutenant, U.S. Air Force, Berkeley, CA; Robert J. McDonald, First Lieutenant, U.S. Air Force, Oceanside, NY. William R. Homer, Master Sergeant, U.S. Air Force, Jeannette, PA; David L. Moore, Master Sergeant, U.S. Air Force, Ashland, KY; William A. Blizzard, Staff Sergeant, U.S. Air Force, Arlington, CA; Miguel W. Montserrat, Staff Sergeant, U.S. Air Force, Philadelphia, PA; Eddie Ray Berg, Staff Sergeant, U.S. Air Force, Blackduck, MN; Leon F. Banura, Staff Sergeant, U.S. Air Force, Beaumont, TX; Roscoe G. Becker, Staff Sergeant, U.S. Air Force, Tillamook, OR; Danny H. Pillsbury, Airman First Class, U.S. Air Force, Orange, TX.

Thank you.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Skavinski follows:]

TESTIMONY BEFORE
THE SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON POW-MIA AFFAIRS
WEDNESDAY, 11 NOVEMBER, 1992
WASHINGTON, D.C.

Mr. Chairman, Senator Kerry, Mr. Vice-Chairman, Senator Smith, members of the Select Committee.

Thank you for the opportunity to testify, on this Veteran's Day, before such an important forum as this.

It is both appropriate and ironic that these hearings are being held on Veteran's Day. It is appropriate because today is set-aside to remember this nation's veterans. It is ironic because this thought seems to have been forgotten as it relates to Korean War and Cold War POW's and MIA's.

Before I begin I would like to publically recognize those family members, present and absent, who, because of their dedication and perseverance, would not let this issue fade from the public conscience.

I would also like to recognize those people, too numerous to mention here, who believed in our cause. They gave us information and support. They published our story in their newspapers and magazines and aired our story on television. We are forever in your debt.

Forty (40) years ago this year, on 13 June 1952, a United States Air Force RB-29, "Alone, unarmed, and unafraid", left Yokota Air Force Base on a classified reconnaissance mission over the Sea of Japan. It was "a high-risk business". The plane did not return. Thus began a forty year vigil on the part of the families of the crew. Hopefully, these hearing will mark the beginning of the end of that vigil.

The Air Force considered the plane's disappearance as an accident, a "non-battle casualty". The crew was carried in a "missing" status until 15 November, 1954, when this status was terminated by a "presumptive finding of death".

Now normally this should have been the end of this story. But it wasn't. What follows is what I consider "pieces of the puzzle". Unanswered questions and bits of information that, over the years, have kept the families walking on an emotional tightrope.

1. search aircraft sighted an empty six-man life raft but could not identify it as belonging to the plane,

2. a report that a radar operator on duty in Japan saw two radar blips approach the plane, an indication that the plane was under attack,

3. during the pre-flight briefing prior to the search mission a statement was made that a Russian radio transmission had been picked-up which indicated that a single "officer-airman" had been rescued,

4. information supplied by Mr. William Koski who participated in the rescue mission. He was subsequently shot down over Korea and ended up in a Red Army jail in Shen-Yang, Manchuria. He was continuously interrogated about Major Sam Busch, the Air Commander of the RB-29. If Major Busch was dead at the bottom of the ocean why all the interest?

5. the Department of State's diplomatic demarche to the Soviet Union on 16 July, 1956 declaring that the Soviet Union was holding at least ten officers and enlisted men from two missing United States planes. The United States said it had obtained information about the detained airmen from "persons of various nationalities freed from Soviet Government imprisonment during the last several years, reports that they have conversed with, seen or heard reports concerning United States military aviation personnel, belonging either to the United States Air Force or to the United States Navy air arm, in actual detention in the Soviet Union. The reports concerning such personnel have now become so persistent and detailed, and so credible that the Department of State sent the demarche.

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1. One or more members of a United States Air Force B-29 which came down on 13 June 1952 . . . over the Sea of Japan . . .

6. President Yeltsin's statement this past summer that the Soviet Union had taken American servicemen prisoner and that some of them might still be alive.

Each of these "pieces of the puzzle", viewed singularly, stands on its own merit. Each of these "pieces of the puzzle", when viewed collectively, leaves no doubt that some, or all, of the crew of the RB-29 were captured by the Soviets.

I submit to you the following question. "How is a nation's greatness measured? Is it measured by its Gross National Product? Is it measured by its literacy rate? Or is it measured by the number of automobiles it produces each year?"

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MISSING RB-29 CREW

Samuel N. Busch	Major	Philadelphia, Pa
James A. Sculley	1st Lt.	Philadelphia, Pa.
Samuel D. Service	1st Lt.	Berkeley, Calif.
Robert J. McDonnell	1st Lt.	Oceanside, N.Y.
William R. Homer	M/Sgt.	Jeannette, Pa.

David L. Moore	M/Sgt.	Ashland, Ky.
William A. Blizzard	S/Sgt.	Arlington, Calif.
Miguel W. Monserrat	S/Sgt.	Philadelphia, Pa.
Eddie Ray Berg	S/Sgt.	Blackduck, Minn.
Leon F. Bonura	S/Sgt.	Beaumont, Tx.
Roscoe G. Becker	S/Sgt.	Tillamook, Ore.
Danny H. Pillsbury	A/1C	Orange, Tx.

Greg Skavinski, Nephew of
M/Sgt. William R. Homer
Flight Engineer
RB-29, SN: 44-61810
Missing 6-13-52
Sea of Japan

BIOGRAPHYPERSONAL

Greg Skavinski
12805 Wrexham Road
Herndon, Va. 22071
(703) 391-0592

Wife - Connie
Daughter - Sarah (16)

EDUCATION

University of Pittsburgh - 1972

MILITARY

United States Marine Corps
1966 - 1969
Honorable Discharge

United States Marine Corps Reserve
1977 - 1979
Honorable Discharge

EMPLOYMENT

Federal Government

Vice Chairman SMITH. Thank you. Thank you very much, Mr. Skavinski. I just want to say that all of you have given a very powerful testimony to your missing loved ones, probably an opportunity that you should have had years ago to do, obviously. I hope that we will be able to, in some way, find the answers that you have been looking for. That is what we are trying to do with the limited resources that we have.

Hopefully we can get more resources in order to do that, whatever it may be, whether it be an extension of the committee, an executive—some time of executive entity or more money or more personnel or whatever it takes. We will recommend, this committee will recommend whatever it takes to get those answers.

I want to give each of you the opportunity to respond to some questions before we complete the testimony today. Senator Burdick, do you have any questions you would like to ask of Mr. Sanderson or any of the other witnesses?

Senator BURDICK. Well, I—

Vice Chairman SMITH. Pull it right up close.

Senator BURDICK. It was a very moving experience to hear each of your testimonies and no one could realize, who was not affected personally. But we all have been as a part of this country, known those who were missing in action and many of us have lost family members in action. And so the point is how can we go farther now.

And when we talk about this committee and the work that has been done I am wondering if, as a part of this committee, we must ask for an executive order to declassify all Korean war and cold war documents as soon as possible.

[Applause.]

Senator BURDICK. And that might be an opportunity to gain additional information that may assist all of you who have people missing in action and all in finding your missing family members, or at least finding out what happened to them. And that is the thing I would like to suggest.

Vice Chairman SMITH. Thank you very much, Senator Burdick. I might say on that point that I totally support that effort and would do everything in our power to encourage, persuade, whatever the word may be, to get the executive department of the U.S. Government to do just that as soon as possible.

It would have obviously helped us if that had happened prior to this investigation beginning, but there are still documents that we have not seen, as you know, and there are just reams of documents that we have not seen, that you have not seen, that the press has not seen. And this information must get out in the public, except for the very sensitive matters that should go only to the families.

So you have my full support in that and we will do—and I think the committee will support that. I feel very confident that the committee will support that effort and do that as soon as possible.

Mrs. HOWARD. Senator Smith, may I ask, please, that you don't forget the fellows from the Second World War because they're still alive too. If 70 Japanese from 1945 were still alive, I'm sure some of the Americans are too.

Vice Chairman SMITH. Now, all of these documents from—in my opinion all the way up through Vietnam should be released. I do not see any reason to withhold documents at this time. The infor-

mation is—especially in the cases of World War II, the cold war, and Korea, not to mention Vietnam which is now 20 years behind us, there is no justification other than a very few sensitive sources and methods that we have, and I emphasize very few.

Everything else should be released to the public. It is what we have been—it is what I have wanted for all the years that I have worked on the issue. I had legislation in the House when I was there to do it, but we could not get it passed. And I think that if you would hopefully look at this committee not be considered the end result, but the starting point finally. Too late, 40, 50 years too late, but the starting point of getting this information out.

Now on that point I would like to start with Mr. Skavinski since you had to go last, sir. Is it your judgment that—and I ask for as honest an evaluation as you can, is it your judgment that the Pentagon today is keenly aware of the fact that—you have a personal interest in this case, obviously, but in terms of getting the information to your family that is available to them?

Mr. SKAVINSKI. Yes, sir, I am. I've spoken to various members of Task Force Russia and I have come back with the impression that these gentlemen are sincere. If I heard it once, I heard it a half-a-dozen times, that they are here to assist the families. And that is what I want to hear and that is what other family members want to hear.

So if I'm any judge of character, then I really believe that finally after such a long time, that this issue is now in the public eye and that our Government is making a concerted effort to resolve it, albeit 40 years. But nonetheless, I feel that an effort is being made by this committee and by Task Force Russia.

Vice Chairman SMITH. There are, as you are well aware, all of you, two areas that we have to deal with as we try to find the truth. One is the secret files of our own Government, obviously, and the other is the secret files—are the secret files belonging to the communist governments who are involved here.

I do not condone the secrecy or the fact that individuals over the past, going back to World War II, 50 years have not been provided information that they should have been provided. That is simply wrong. We can never make it right, but we can hopefully avoid it from happening in the future.

But what is significant here, and I know it is painful for all of you, but what is very significant is the cooperation—even no matter how limited, the cooperation we are getting from the old Soviet Union or from Russia. This gives us access that we never had before, and I hope that it will be good solid information that will help to account for your loved ones.

I might also say that it is certainly somewhat ironic if, in fact, we wind up getting that information from the Soviet Union or the old Soviet Union when, in fact, our own Government has had it for the past 40 years. That would truly be a sad, sad commentary. But at this point I just want the information. I am not particular about where it comes from as long as we get it, and the sooner the better.

You are raising your hand, Mr. Dumas. I will be happy to hear you.

Mr. DUMAS. I can't wait any longer. Mr. Chairman, I met with Governor—President-elect Clinton and his next Secretary of Veter-

ans Affairs, whom no one knows here but I do. I met for 4 hours in Chicago in a hotel at the American Legion Convention. A gentleman called me at 10 o'clock at night and said can I come up and talk to you; I can't believe what you just said today, this afternoon, and what you showed those legionnaires in Chicago. I said come on up.

And so his top aide came up, sat on a bed for almost 4 hours, went over this. I argued with him for 2 hours, he argued with me for 2 hours. But in the end, he gave me his word—and I had witnesses with me, Vietnam Veterans—and he says when President—if the Governor is elected President of the United States, I will be the next Veterans Affairs Officer after January 20th and you, pointing to me, of all people in this country will be the first man that I take and declassify every single document on Korea and World War II and Vietnam, all three wars.

Mr. DUMAS. Now, he's been in touch with me constantly on this. I know a lot of people ask me who is he, but I told a couple of close friends but I wouldn't say it here, but they're going to be very happy.

Vice Chairman SMITH. Better make sure you have the clearance to do it if you do.

Mr. DUMAS. Well, I never have a clearance to do anything; I just go ahead and do it. Now there's one more thing and I'll cut it short, Mr. Chairman.

This picture here that you're looking at, my brother's picture, this is very important. The Ambassador of North Korea asked me for this picture and sent it back to Pyongyang. I'll be receiving it back on the 26th of this month, the same picture you're looking at, when he was 17. He's now 61. But he's still young enough to play ball like me.

So I'm hoping that I get the picture back and that I get the invitation that we've asked for to bring him home myself. I'm not waiting any longer after 42 years. I will bring him home.

And you know what I'm going to do, I'm going to put this net around him when I get there. Because this belongs to him, not me.

Thank you very much.

Vice Chairman SMITH. I have one further question of you, Mr. Dumas. You have done something that I have done on several occasions, which is a little unique, but interesting. And that is to meet one on one, personally, with North Vietnamese—I mean North Koreans—in New York.

What is your impression of those meetings very briefly, in terms of what their reaction is to cooperation on this issue? As you know, we have low level meetings in Beijing. We have the military armistice commission problem in the sense that you already addressed, so I do not need to go back through it again; and that they want to go one on one rather than going through the Military Armistice Command.

What is your reaction to the people that you have talked with in terms of their resolve here?

Mr. DUMAS. Well, I've had 19 meetings with them in person. And I've had 250 phone calls, all tape recorded—if anybody wants to listen to them—with the Ambassadors. And they allowed me to do this.

Secondly, I must say this before I answer the question you want me to answer. In 1987, the same year I introduced Reverend Jackson to the Ambassador, I tape recorded a conversation at the Pentagon and I have it with me now, with the Pentagon, a Colonel Henry Land.

Colonel Henry Land, DIA's office, investigating POWs in Korea. It took me 5 days to get this out of him, but at the end of 5 days he got so frustrated with me, he told me what I wanted to know. And what he said was, when the North Koreans get to a position and they want to release the prisoners and the remains that are up there, they will do it when it's to their advantage.

And I said, Colonel, it's to their advantage to do it now. He says, you don't have to convince me. Convince the North Koreans.

And he said one more thing. They want us to pull our troops out the 38th parallel. Once they get all our troops out, they'll come home. It's right here in black and white and it's right on tape.

Now I'll answer your question. All these meetings and all these taped conversations that I made in the past 12 years, 11 or 12 years, they have never wavered from the issue of POWs and MIAs and they never asked for any money. They never asked for anything but someone like you.

You were the first man to walk into North Korea in the history of the North Korean government; a Senator, a U.S. Senator, and you talked with these people. So if you can talk with them, why can't the President of the United States talk with them or the Vice President of the United States or the Secretary of Defense or the Secretary of State? This is all they ever said all these years, one on one.

You're one on one with them. You know. You speak to them. You know how they are. They're one on one. That's the answer I can give you on that.

Ms. ALFOND. Senator?

Vice Chairman SMITH. Yes.

Ms. ALFOND. I'd like to ask a question concerning the Executive Branch documents. With the change of the administration now, how does one go about asking for the declassification of those documents?

Vice Chairman SMITH. Well, you are talking about the Korean documents?

Ms. ALFOND. No, I'm talking about—

Vice Chairman SMITH. Old documents?

Ms. ALFOND [continuing].—old documents pertaining to POWs and MIAs.

Vice Chairman SMITH. I am—I will speak for myself, but I am certain that the committee will agree, probably unanimously, but I cannot speak for the other members because I have not discussed it with them at this point. But I am certain, relatively certain, that the committee will take a position shortly that will recommend that these documents all be declassified from World War II right to the present. Now, regarding—up to the Vietnam war, rather—regarding Americans missing.

We cannot, we can only recommend—the Executive Branch has released a tremendous number of documents thus far. More than ever before there are more. There are some right now in Senate

security, live sighting reports, which we want released to the public. The Executive Branch has got to release those documents so that we can put them out in the public as promised. And I am going to try to get that done within the next few days, if it is humanly possible.

In addition, as far as the Korean war, I found—I was somewhat, to be very candid, my initial involvement in this issue was Vietnam. I did not know a lot about the Korean war situation when I came to Congress 8 years ago. As basically, Vietnam got most of the focus, obviously, because it was the most recent war and so forth. We all know the history on that.

But when I began to look into it and I started with the contacts with the North Koreans and then looking into our own files and our own documents, I was shocked. First of all, there was very little realization that we had any documents. In some cases, documents that we thought existed that we requested regarding POWs initially were denied in the sense that they said there were not any.

And then, I do not say that that was a deliberate lie, I am just saying I do not think they thought. I do not think they knew in many cases. They may have known, but in many cases they were just all over the place, all over the U.S. Government in boxes and everything, list just POW information from Korea. It has been an unbelievable effort, with frankly no more than three or four people; a couple of staff people from the committee, a staff person from my own personal staff and myself.

Because the focus was so much here on the committee. And I know your frustrations and I have heard it and I understand them. And they are justified, absolutely. And I frankly, for one, did not have any idea how deep the problem was, especially on Korea or Vietnam either, for that matter, but especially on Korea.

And when the Soviets broke up and began to help us, through General Volkogonov and now our people over there, our staff people over there on Task Force Russia, we are just getting reams of information. General Volkogonov gave us four folders full today. These folks call us almost daily with more information that they are getting on a day to day basis as they investigate.

But it has to be, in my personal opinion, and I am not trying to pass the buck, it has to be an Executive Branch action or operation. We can oversee it.

Ms. ALFOND. But they are denying us?

Vice Chairman SMITH. Well, they have got to come forth with it and that is where you have, I think by forming the committee and supporting the formation of this committee, have gotten this issue out there on the front burner, even though there are disagreements as to what we might have done differently or what we might have done and should not have done, whatever.

The issue is on the front burner finally, finally. It is wrong that it has taken all this time to get there. But I assure you, with every ounce of strength that I have and resolve that I have, that I will keep it there until we get the answers that our Government have and hopefully what the foreign Governments have that they have not shared with us. And maybe between the two, when the two bits

of information meet in some way, something will happen and we will get the answers.

But I have to tell you, I have been working this issue a long time.

Ms. ALFOND. I know.

Vice Chairman SMITH. The Task Force Russia, considering the amount of time they have been on the job, have really done a fabulous job. They really have. They are very committed. These people are in Moscow under harsh conditions, traveling—I traveled those roads myself, they are not even roads in some areas. You travel along, you run into a 60 foot pothole. That is a pretty deep pothole. The conditions are terrible and they are traveling out, trying desperately to get this information with limited resources and limited personnel.

And I am not going to ask you to be patient. You have been patient long enough. That is not the point I am making. But I will desperately try, through the committee—the committee will try—to get this information declassified in our Government to give our people who are out there on the front lines with the Soviets and hopefully someday the Chinese and the North Koreans, to give us the information.

But we cannot do it without the facts. And even this committee has not had all of the facts. We have been trying to get them. But we have not had them. Those facts are classified and we are fighting to declassify them, at the same time staying on a pace which gives us a sunset on December 31. It is an impossible task to do it all ourselves.

So what we cannot do, we will say, this must be done. And that will be in our final recommendation, that this must be done. We insist that this be done. And if it takes legislation, legislative follow-up on the floor of the Senate, I for one will do it, to see that it gets done, whether it is a formal vote to declassify. If they will not declassify voluntarily, then we will try to pass a Senate resolution to force them to declassify. I hope they will do in voluntarily.

We have got an outgoing administration and a new administration. Between the two of them, we ought to be able to get it done, I hope. So that is what we will try to do.

Mr. DUMAS. Mr. Chairman, just a minute. One more thing. The 389 documents here are declassified. I had them subpoenaed in Federal Court. What about the 389 men who are prisoners of war and not missing in action? What are we going to do about these guys? They're in North Korea.

Vice Chairman SMITH. That is a list of 389 POWs?

Mr. DUMAS. POWs.

Vice Chairman SMITH. POWs. We have the documents on those documents.

Mr. DUMAS. Right, OK. So what are we going to do? We have got to sit down with the North Koreans, right?

Vice Chairman SMITH. I cannot negotiate, unfortunately.

Mr. DUMAS. I can't, but you can.

Vice Chairman SMITH. Well, I cannot as a legislator. I am precluded by law, but I can make the information available to those who can. So I can only do what I am constitutionally allowed to do, unfortunately.

Mr. DUMAS. I know. What I'm saying, Mr. Chairman, is these are prisoners of war that were seen in the camps and never came out. Vice Chairman SMITH. That is correct.

Mr. DUMAS. And the whole country should come down if these guys are not out shortly.

Vice Chairman SMITH. Well, that is the point, I understand that. They have imprisoned. They are prisoners of war. They are listed as prisoners of war. That is what they were listed as in 1953 when the armistice was signed and they are still missing.

Mr. DUMAS. Right.

Vice Chairman SMITH. We know that.

Mr. DUMAS. Some of the men are only 57, 58. Don't forget now, now, we had 10 men who were 14 years old in that camp. And nine of them were 15 years old captured. That's their ages, 14 and 15.

In those days, when you joined the service, if you looked old enough and big enough, they took anybody. Because we were losing so many men so fast that we couldn't keep up with the manpower. We couldn't even keep the ammunition flowing, really. We were fighting 700,000 Chinese and about 300,000 Koreans. And I was up and down that peninsula like a chicken with his head cut off.

Ask the Korean veterans if we've got some here, they'll tell you how bad it was. We lost 54,000 men in less than 3 years, just like you said the other day, 210,000 wounded. And now we don't even know if we've got 8,000 men prisoners of war or 30,000 in Korea. When the Chinese overran our position, they slaughtered and took as many prisoners as they could get their hands on. Boy, there was a lot of guys lost that day, November through December of 1950. That's all I have to say.

Vice Chairman SMITH. Mr. Sanderson and Mrs. Howard, you both gave very powerful and very personal statements. And I would just like to ask you, currently are you satisfied with the co-operation that you are getting now from Task Force Russia in regards to what they are doing?

Mrs. HOWARD. When I went over—

Vice Chairman SMITH. Do you have any recommendations that you might make in that regard to my question?

Mrs. HOWARD. When I went over to Russia, during the first 2 weeks, when my daughter was with me, we went over to follow up on clues that resulted from an ad that I ran in the Christmas, '91 Express Chronicle, a human rights newspaper.

And someone replied to that ad. He took his life in his hands to do it; because he was, then, and is, now, being watched by the KGB. His name is Igor Evgenievich Privalov. And I say that out loud, and I'll say it again, Igor Evgenievich Privalov; because he is a very courageous and humane person who came forward to tell what he knew about four Americans that he'd heard of over there. And my husband was one of those four!

Igor, himself, was thrown into a KGB psychiatric prison in 1977 or 1978, because he tried to escape over the border from Russia and he was caught. And he was placed in the same cell with an older gentleman, in his early 40's, by the name of Mr. Alexander.

Mr. Alexander, in the course of their talking—because, you know, you don't have TV and radio and magazines and stuff like that in these KGB prisons—in the course of talking, told Igor about

the fact that when he had tried to leave Russia, he had been caught by the KGB and he had been thrown into a psychiatric prison cell with two other people. And he remembered one of them vividly.

He was an American by the name of Reynolds who had been shot down in the Baltic Sea in the spring of 1950. He said he'd been separated from his crew and he'd been recruited by the KGB to become a counter-intelligence agent. And when he had adamantly refused to do that, then he'd been thrown in the psychiatric prison.

Now, when we went over to Russia, I had a chance to talk with Igor at length, myself, and ask him questions that I had been wondering about, such as, how did Bob, (Robert Reynolds) how did Bob communicate with Alexander? And Igor said, "In Russian".

Well, that corroborated something that I had thought, that if Bob had survived, he would have learned the language as rapidly as possible; because as soon as he knew that he was not getting back to the United States, he would have reasoned, well, if I want to survive, I need to learn the language.

And being a good linguist in French, I think he might have learned Russian fairly quickly, at least oral Russian.

My daughter and I went out to the area of Sychevka, which is where this KGB prison hospital is. During that first couple of weeks—we did not come in contact for several days after we got there with the members of the—well, Task Force Russia hadn't really started over there. It was the working members of the Joint Commission.

But when we did, I felt that they were very sincere in what they were doing. I felt they were somewhat handicapped because of lack of space and lack of—it's very hard to get through to them, to get through to the embassy. With nine lines, you can wait for an hour to get through on any of them. And this isn't conducive to people responding to requests by General Volkogonov and Ambassador Toon to give information.

When you cannot get through to the embassy, this is not a good thing. When you cannot get through to the Joint Commission, this is not a good thing. And I tried once myself. It was supposed to have had an answering machine. And I rang for 15 times twice in a row, didn't get anybody or anything. I don't know what happened.

Vice Chairman SMITH. Well, I would urge you, before you leave, there are some folks here from the commission.

Mrs. HOWARD. Yes, I know.

Vice Chairman SMITH. And maybe you can make some direct contact with someone to help you. I think you need to get in touch.

Mrs. HOWARD. Well, I would like to tell you that there are some things which came out of my 10 weeks over there, which I think are encouraging.

I came back with the firm conviction of a 30 or 40 percent chance of Bob, or some of his crewmembers, being alive. I still have it. In fact, I have it more strongly than ever.

And we went not only to the hospital which some of you may have seen on the Tom Brokaw Show (about a 5-minute episode with Carolyn and myself September 11, 1992); part of it was about Sychevka and part of it was because we went over to Riga, Latvia. There, we met with a Soviet general who had contacted me and

said he believed that he had given the order to shoot Bob's plane down; and he wanted to know if we came to Russia, whether we would want to meet with him.

Well, I told him, yes, that I didn't hold it against him for doing what his Government expected him to do. And so we went over and we had about a 5-hour interview with him, which is recorded by NBC TV over there, and it's also recorded by Wisconsin Public Television, Channel 21.

We learned certain things through that. Later, I began to work with the Joint Commission people. They went with me—(General Volkogonov was out of town at that time) to an appointment with Sergei Koslov, who works underneath the general, who is a historian and an archivist. And he gave us a ½ hour appointment; but it ended up that we spent 2 hours with him.

It was very hard for the Russians to understand that the plane, and the situation I was trying to trace down, was a Navy plane; because the Foreign Minister, Andrei Vishinsky, at that time (1950) wrote in his statements to the American Government that it's a B-29. He gives the coordinates of the Privateer, but he calls it a B-29.

And so, the Russians believe it's a B-29, and they're convinced it's a B-29; and they said, "How can you prove to us it's not, that's it something else, you know?" And I said, "Well, my daughter is here. For 42 years she's had no father, because her father's plane was shot down. I said, is that proof?"

Well, they're archivists and they believe very much in the written word. And I pointed out to them that the Soviet Government, they must be aware by now, sometimes played around with words in those days, just like my Government did. My Government had lied to me. Their Government had lied to them.

So he admitted that, but he still insisted that I had to prove to him that there was such a thing as a Navy Privateer. Well, eventually, I, through phone calls and things like that, began to get some materials from the States here through friends. Then I—Oh—I'm sorry, because I wish I had known that Colonel Osipov was the man on the left of General Volkogonov. I got the impression it was the man who was translating, and then I had to leave to go with Senator Kohl.

So I'm sorry, because I wanted to ask Col Osipov something. He turned over material to the American side of the Joint Commission, to Colonel Pusey; and these were things that had to do with Bob's plane. And when they were translated, it comes out they are statements reports of the flyers who shot down the plane. And all of them say the same thing in their reports, exact same wording, that it was a four engine plane with American markings.

Now, that isn't a B-29. It can be a PB4Y2. In any case, having these statements enables Colonel Ed Pusey to make the requests now of Colonel Osipov (who is his equal, his peer) that we may have now the Board of Inquiry, that we receive the Board of Inquiry statement on this violation of their border, as they called it. Because they do have that statement, there's no question, some place in their records.

The fifth paper that I received was a statement from the man who was in charge of the searching. He was in charge of the Naval fleet in the Baltic area. And he—this is to Comrade Stalin and

Comrade Bulganin—and he's reporting that during the period from April 22 to June 14, there were some 45 ships, 160 divers, 757 dives and so forth.

But during all this time, though they found the hulls of two German, transport ships and raised up two aviation motors from the Second World War, and so forth, they had found nothing about the plane that was supposed to have gone down in this area on April 8, 1950.

So, the Commanding Officer is asking leave to stop this search. The point I'm trying to make is Bob's plane was shot down on the 8th; and this search began on the 22nd. What happened in that 2 weeks in between, this is the question?

Well, as a result of the information which I got from General Shinkarenko over in Riga, Latvia, he had indicated—one of the generals that he was in contact with says him that 'they found a plane and we brought it ashore'. And this was within 3 or 4 days after the time Bob's plane was shot down.

The government had planned to show it to the UN, but they decided not to, because there was a lot of secret material aboard. Now, they do not tell the general whether or not there were any people, live people, found or not; and he thinks they would have told him. But I frankly think they wouldn't. They wanted to keep everything 'Top Secret'.

Anyway, all of this gives us the right now to ask for the Border Patrol records. The Border Patrol is known to be NKVD (KGB), on the land, in the sea and the air; and they are not required to submit reports to—well, the general who was a colonel at that time.

So, I feel as though we're making progress in getting at the original what happened at that stage. Where we go from there, I don't know, because I'm waiting for that kind of information. I was hoping that General Volkogonov had brought it over with him today, and I don't know whether it's in that material that you received today or not.

Vice Chairman SMITH. I don't know. I haven't looked at it yet.

Mrs. HOWARD. But I feel very positive about having gone over to Russia. I feel that by family members being there, like Bruce Sanderson was over there part of the time I was, and Bruce Brown was over there when I left, I think that this helps a great deal in putting pressure on the Russians to come up with some of this material.

I don't know how fast it will happen. I think it's very important for the committee to continue. I would like to see you Senator Smith as the head of the new committee when it comes into being, because I feel that your interest in what happened during the other wars and to the older men is really sincere. And perhaps with Senator Grassley, the two of you could combine.

I think that's really about as much as I should say.

Vice Chairman SMITH. I want to give Mr. Sanderson a chance to respond to the same question and then we have to wrap up here.

But before, one second, I just want to say that one of the things that the committee members have talked about and have not voted or formalized the recommendation yet, but individuals members of the committee have discussed, is a repository of information so that

a family member, when some new information comes in on a circumstance—it may or may not—if it's related to, let's say it's a shoot down in the same vicinity of where your loved one is missing or anything that may relate to that, that you be able to go to one place in the U.S. Government, one location, be able to get any and all information available to you, that you can call up, but not somebody else can call up, but you as the family member.

And I hope that we can do that. That would be a way to pull all of this together so that you don't have to go to casualty officers, DIA, CIA, NSA, Senate, some place else. I mean, you should be able to go to one place and get the information. I hope that we are going to be able to do that.

Mrs. HOWARD. The truth of the matter is I never got any information from any of those places. I ended up sending my information to them.

Vice Chairman SMITH. I know that. That's wrong. That's wrong. There is no way that that should be the case, obviously, and it is wrong and it is a wrong that unfortunately has happened and there is nothing we can do except to change it for the future, I hope.

Mr. Sanderson, maybe you briefly could just—

Mr. SANDERSON. Yes. One of the first things I tried to accomplish was to find my father's identification, his fingerprints and his dental records. And the Air Force casualty office told me that these records were burned, that they were either lost in the 1973 fire in St. Louis, or that the FBI had destroyed the fingerprints after his presumptive finding of death.

Now just recently we find out that this is false. And I personally called the FBI and asked. I gave them his Social Security number and service number. And they told me they're gone. Well, one of the task force members just recently found out that they've still got the fingerprints. And the Russians are asking for sets of fingerprints to run as a test set against the fingerprints that they took off of these men.

Now, that I find very hard to accept. How else are we going to find these men?

Vice Chairman SMITH. I do, too. There have been numerous cases cited before this committee, some in testimony, some in depositions, about individuals who are missing from one war or the other, with no fingerprints in the file. I know when I went into the military, one of the first things they did after the physical was to give me, take my fingerprints. And I assume they are still there. I do not know why they are missing on people who are missing.

Mr. SANDERSON. Especially on cold war cases where there are unaccounted for men, and they are open-ended cases, really. And the State Department is involved in almost every cold war incident. And I think we're going to find that the documents that the families of cold war cases have been searching for, and searching for and not finding, still reside with the State Department. And they are still classified.

Vice Chairman SMITH. Right. Hopefully, they won't be too much longer.

Mr. SANDERSON. This needs to be straightened out. The documents need to be physically found, and then find out who controls them and get them declassified.

Thank you.

Vice Chairman SMITH. Thank you very much. Mr. Skavinski, I have one brief question I wanted to ask you.

Did you get any documentation from the Government at any time regarding the circumstances, specific circumstances of the loss of your uncle? Or did your family get it?

Mr. SKAVINSKI. My aunt, my uncle's wife who has since passed away, got the standard presumptive finding of death document.

Vice Chairman SMITH. What about how the incident occurred? Any information on that?

Mr. SKAVINSKI. Well, I have information to that effect, yes, sir.

Vice Chairman SMITH. Were you told anything about a Soviet MIG involved in the incident?

Mr. SKAVINSKI. No, absolutely not. It was an accident. A life raft was sighted. You know, the families heard rumors. And it was always, it was always their feeling that the plane was shot down. But absolutely nothing about a shoot down. And I understand, speaking with Dino earlier this morning, that that has now been confirmed.

Vice Chairman SMITH. Well there is a report—

Mr. SKAVINSKI. A report.

Vice Chairman SMITH. Rather than to go into the personal part, because it is personal with your case, I would rather not do it in public. But there is a report involving a MIG in your uncle's incident. And I would just urge you to contact the Defense Department and try to get that report, because you should have it, and I am surprised you do not have it already. But you should have that.

Ms. ALFOND. Senator—

Mr. SKAVINSKI. Shouldn't they be contacting me?

Vice Chairman SMITH. Yes, they should.

Mr. SKAVINSKI. And again, that has not been done.

Vice Chairman SMITH. Well let me, they have had the report since June. And I am just passing along here something, which is sharing my frustration with the way things operate. But I will be happy to provide you with a copy of what I have, but I do not want to do it publicly, that is all.

Mr. SKAVINSKI. I'd like that very much, thank you.

Ms. ALFOND. Senator, I just want to make a comment. The only way—and it's a travesty—the family members have been able to get any information is through networking, and through the researchers and the investigative reporters, and networking among the families. And it's a disgrace.

I think we have several families that have come in here today, asking questions. They get no answers at the Pentagon. But they come and they find us, and we're networking, and this is how these people have found each other, through networking. And that's not right.

Vice Chairman SMITH. No, it is not. And I think in some cases information, however late, has been shared. In many cases, I have talked to dozens of families where it has not been. That is wrong. That is why I am hopeful that the committee will make a firm,

solid recommendation that this documentation must be put in a central repository or location where you, the family members, can get at it, all of it.

There are cases of families traveling to Korea. Some have given up their life savings—

Ms. ALFOND. It's disgraceful.

Vice Chairman SMITH.—indeed devoted their entire lives, like Mr. Dumas, to trying to find their loved ones. That is not your job, frankly.

Ms. ALFOND. That's right, and it's disgraceful.

Vice Chairman SMITH. That is the job of the U.S. Government, because they sent them there. And I understand that. And I hope that we are going to be able to put something in place that will allow you to get the information we have. And any new information that comes in, you should be informed of it immediately, even if it may not be solid. If it references an incident that involved your loved one, or a name, you ought to have the information, with a reasonable explanation as to whether it is good or bad. But you still should have it.

You do not want to hear it on the street, or hear it from somebody in the network. You want to hear it from the U.S. Government, because they sent your loved one into battle, and they are the ones that ought to—or into the situation that caused him to be lost—and they ought to be the ones responsible for giving you the answers.

Ms. ALFOND. Well, we have this wonderful Task Force Russia. Why don't we have a Task Force China, and a Task Force North Korea?

Vice Chairman SMITH. I think we should. But I would just say—

Ms. ALFOND. And that way they'd get their answers. Families could go there.

Vice Chairman SMITH. I think that is where we are headed. The difficulty with China is that they are not as accessible right now, nor is North Korea as accessible. But that does not mean that we shouldn't be trying to do that. And I think that, I think you are going to see that happen. I think you are going to see that evolving.

But let me just close by saying that this has been extremely emotional for all of you, and for the audience. It has certainly been emotional for me. Although I don't have the circumstance that you have, I did lose a dad at the end of the Second World War. After he flew combat missions, he was killed in a plane crash in the United States. But my mother was never told what happened. I didn't find out what happened to him until I became a U.S. Congressman and looked it up myself.

And I grew up without a dad. My mother never remarried. I do not mean to identify with the problems you have. They are much more serious, and there is no comparison. But I do understand your feelings. I truly understand what it is like. And it is worse. We were lucky, they found his body 2 days later. Some of the people on the plane were not found.

So I know, I understand your feelings. There are, unfortunately, in wartime situations, situations where we may never know. But when we do know, and we can get information, then we should

devote the highest national priority to it. And I think that my frustration over the years, in the 8 years that I have been a Congressman, is that I have heard over and over again, from different administrations, that it is the highest national priority. I heard it before I came to Congress, and I have heard it since I have been in the Congress. And it has not been the highest national priority.

I think it has been in statement, and maybe in intent. But in fact, it has not been, because we have not applied the resources to get the answer. So we have let off a lot of emotion here today. And it is good that we were able to do that. We will try to get answers to the questions that have been posed. I want to thank all of you for the personal, the very personal statements that you made. And I know in all of the family cases it was very difficult to do that. And we appreciate it.

VOICE. May I—how long will it be to get copies of the folder today that was given to you?

Vice Chairman SMITH. Good question. Those were presented to us in Russian. We have to have them translated. And unless there is something extremely classified in them, I am sure that we can—I do not know how much of it we can make public immediately.

VOICE. It can't be classified, because they're not from our Government.

Vice Chairman SMITH. I believe that we can release them, but we have to translate them. They are not translated.

VOICE. Well, one of the main things that we were told before we even came was that that information was going to be brought. And I saw, as some of the people flipped through those documents, that there are pictures in them. The pictures do not need to be translated. The families are waiting, moment by moment—

Vice Chairman SMITH. I understand.

VOICE [continuing].—to look at the pictures.

Vice Chairman SMITH. Give us just enough time to get it analyzed and back to you as quickly as we can.

VOICE. Are we talking days, weeks, months?

Vice Chairman SMITH. I don't think it will be days. I think we can do it very shortly. It doesn't take that long to translate. If there are photographs, maybe we can make those available. I did not know there were photographs. I have not seen the documents.

Mr. DUMAS. Let me tell where the documents are, and let me tell you where the records are. You want the records? I'll tell you where they are. Walk in there and pick them up. Go into Hoffman Building No. 1 in Alexandria, Virginia. I was in there a few months ago with Mr. John Holland, a Vietnam veteran, World War II and Korea, by the way—15 when he was in his first battle.

And we walked in there. And right on the board, on the right-hand side, it says, casualty records of the Army, Navy, Marines and Air Force. So when I asked the colonel about the records, I was told they have orders not to talk to me at all. So I called the Defense Department when I left. I got ahold of Cheney's office. And one of the guys in the office said, Bob, you want the records, call St. Louis right now.

So I called St. Louis. And the operator in St. Louis, I said, put this on the computer. She put it on the computer. And she came back, Mr. Dumas, we got a big problem here. I said, why? And she

said, we got two records on your brother, one in building 1, and one in building 2 in St. Louis, MO.

I said, does that mean one in each building for all prisoners of war, or just missing in action? She said, well I'll tell you right now, you're the first person ever to ask me to look up this on a computer.

Go into those two buildings there, two in St. Louis. You may get them all right there.

Ms. ALFOND. Senator—

Vice Chairman SMITH. Thank you.

Ms. ALFOND [continuing]. I applaud you, and the staff and your investigators. Thank you very, very much. We're very grateful.

Vice Chairman SMITH. Senator Burdick, do you have any other questions?

Senator BURDICK. No, that's just fine.

Vice Chairman SMITH. We thank Mrs. Burdick for coming here today, and participating in the hearing. We welcome your participation and your interest.

The hearing is adjourned. And I thank you all for your cooperation here today.

[Whereupon, at 5:30 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.]

HANDLING INSTRUCTIONS

This volume of translations has been prepared for the use of the Commission in pursuit of our mission. While it is an unclassified document in accordance with Department of Defense classification guidelines for POW/MIA information, it nonetheless contains casualty-related information and should not be disseminated outside of Commission channels pending efforts by the Department of Defense Executive Agent to locate and notify as many of the next of kin as feasible.

APPENDIX

RUSSIAN DOCUMENTS

TASK FORCE RUSSIA
(POW/MIA)

TRANSLATIONS

11 May 1993
VOLUME I

(444)

INTRODUCTION

1. General

a. This is Volume I of a two volume set of translations and contains translations of two of the four batches of documents presented by General Dimitrij Volkogonov to the United States Senate Select Committee on POW/MIA Affairs at the Select Committee hearing on 11 Nov 92. Finally, there is a four page glossary of abbreviations at the end of the volume.

b. Translations were accomplished by U.S. Army and Air Force linguists on temporary duty with Task Force Russia (TFR). In accordance with TFR policy, accuracy in translations took precedence over style. The methodology employed requires a strict page by page translation so as to account for every page of material passed to TFR. With few exceptions, each page of Russian text is matched with a page of English translation. Suffixed numbers indicate that either two pages of Russian material were used to render one page of English translation or one page of Russian material was rendered in two pages of English. A TFR number consists of the batch number followed by the page number of the text (i.e., TFR 36-1 corresponds to page one of batch 36). Batch numbers are assigned a one up number in the order that the documents are received by TFR. Any translator notes are enclosed within brackets "[]" and are there to provide clarification or doubt in the translation due to poor or illegible readability of the original. Pages which contain only translator's notes bear the TFR number without a page number.

c. The names of the same servicemen are repeated numerous times in this publication. They are referenced in various documents from several different original sources. The names as they occur are reproduced here in transliteration as accurately as possible. Obvious misspellings reflect the nature of the original documents. If the translator felt comfortable in rendering a possible English language version it is enclosed within brackets, with a question mark, as a translator note. If the translator was sure of the spelling of a name, it is transliterated as well as rendered within brackets without a question mark. Some transliterations are obviously close to the English language spelling of the name and are left as is without a translator note.

2. Documents

This volume contains 202 pages of translations and notes in addition to the introduction, disclaimer, and glossary in the following TFR document batches.

- a. TFR 36 contains 118 pages of translation related to the Cold War Era.
- b. TFR 37 contains 102 pages of translation related to the Korean War.

[TFR 36-1]

INFORMATION

RELATED TO THE 'COLD WAR' PERIOD

1. Information from the KGB dated 16 May 1955 regarding Cherne Rudol'fe, born 1910, a native of Staryj Tabor (Yugoslavia), who lived in the USA until 1939 and was confined in one of the MVD camps.
2. A letter to the US Embassy from American citizen Vil'fred Kumish, released from imprisonment by the Decree of 22 Aug 1955 and subject to transfer to US authorities in Berlin.
3. Information from the MVD Prison Bureau on the transfer of American citizens Fridrikh-Charl'z Gopkins, Vil'fred Kumish, and Merrej Filde, also known as Fajngersh, to American authorities in Berlin on 5 Sep 1955.
4. Information from the KGB dated 28 Oct 1955, that American citizen Baumajster - also known as Bomajster Uil'yam, Uilli, Dzhordzh - is not listed among those arrested and serving sentences on USSR territory.
5. A request for pardon written by American citizen Sidnej R. Sparks on 11 Sep 1953 to the USSR Supreme Court, a copy of the sentence, and a report on his transfer to US authorities in Berlin on 17 Feb 1956.
6. A MID USSR demarche containing information regarding the existence of US citizens Charl'z Dempter, Uirt Ehlizabet Tompson, Uil'yam Dzhordzh Baumejster, Serni (Gzherni, Cherni, Chenni), and Kushman (Koshman, Kochman) on USSR territories on 4 Feb 1956.
7. TsK KPSS decision regarding the transfer of American citizens V.T. Marchuk, U.EH. Verdin, and J. Nobl' to American authorities.
8. MO USSR report to the TsK KPSS regarding the recovery of an American non-commissioned officer, Majkl Dou, in the Pacific Ocean, and the willingness to transfer him to an American naval vessel.
9. Information from the KGB on Fabert Khasenzar - an American policeman, born 1927, a native of New York - who crossed into the Soviet zone of occupation in Germany.
10. Information from the KGB on Ehddi Dzhejms Braun - an American Sergeant, born 1923, a native of Birmingham - who crossed into the Soviet zone of occupation in Germany on 14 Jan 1951.

[TFR 36-1a]

11. Memorandum from the KGB to the MID dated 27 Mar 1951 on the inadvisability of releasing from custody the American citizens Uil'yam Verdin, Gommer-Garol'd Koks, and Vil'yam Dzhej Peterson, who crossed into the Soviet zone of

[TFR 36-2]

- 2 -

occupation in Germany and a recommendation to convict and send these citizens to the USSR to serve their sentences.

12. Marshal Vasilevskij's report to the Politburo TsK KPSS on 10 Jan 1951 regarding the confinement in the Soviet zones of occupation in Germany and Austria of 18 military deserters from US occupation forces.

13. Report from the Command Staff, Occupation Forces in Germany on Robert Gester Vil'son - an American citizen, born 1927, a native of San Francisco - who crossed into Soviet territory in Vienna.

14. KGB report on Stefan Veksler - an American airman, born 1923, a native of New York - who crossed over to the Soviet Military Commandant Staff territory on 17 Aug 1953.

15. Information from January 1954 on the confinement of American citizens: Fridrikh Charl'z Gopkins, Marrej Filds, Vasilij Timofeevich Marchuk, Uil'yam Ehndryu Verdin, Androsh Berkesh, Nikolaj Mikhajlovich Skorodinskiy, and Rudol'f Cherne.

16. Information from the MVD regarding the discovery in February 1954 of information about the confinement of 6 US citizens on USSR territory and one freed citizen wishing to remain in the USSR (Skorodinskiy).

17. Information on the detention of American citizen Lilend Lorch Tauehrz - born 1924, a native of San Francisco - when he crossed the Soviet-Finish border, his conviction to 3 years, and his transfer to US authorities in 1954.

18. Correspondence on the transfer of American citizens Marchuk, Noubi, and Verden, to US authorities.

19. Correspondence relating to American citizens, Russians, Ukrainians, Belorussians, and Lithuanians who ended up on the territory of the USSR as a result of post-war border changes.

20. Information on American citizens: Annabel Iren Bokar-Lapshinaya, Vil'yam Klejton Ternor, Berne Forgussen Metchel, Marii Vasil'evna Bilak, Sesil Avgustovich Stouner, and Mikhail Emel'yanovich Kopov (Kovdynskij), who either requested political asylum in the USSR or remained in the USSR for other reasons.

[handwritten "No. 1"]

[TFR 36-3]

azh-3

[handwritten "139"]

Copy
~~Top Secret~~
 copy No. 2

16 May 55
 [handwritten "2557/1"]

TO THE DEPUTY MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, USSR

Comrade V.A. ZORINReference: No. 078/osa dated 14 December 1953

In a memorandum presented by the US Ambassador in Moscow to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs USSR on 2 November 1953, it was stated that American Army Colonel SERNI is confined in one of the MVD, USSR camps.

A check has established that there is no SERNI among those convicted American citizens in camps of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the USSR. In one of the camps there is a CHERNE Rudol'f - born 1910, a native of Staryj Tabor (Yugoslavia) - who lived in the USA until 1939, but did not receive American citizenship.

While serving his sentence, CHERNE passed himself off as an American Colonel, an FBI employee, calculating this would secure him more favorable relations with prisoners.

This false information about CHERNE as a Colonel in the American Army, became known to the

[TFR 36-4]

[handwritten "140"]

2.

US Government from former German prisoners of war who served their sentences with him and returned to West Germany. This served as the basis for including him under the name of SERNI in the memorandum from the US Embassy in Moscow.

DEPUTY CHAIRMAN OF THE COMMITTEE FOR STATE SECURITY
 ATTACHED TO THE COUNCIL OF MINISTERS, USSR

P. IVASHUTIN

[handwritten "No. 2"]

[TFR 36-5]

[handwritten "91"]

Secret
copy No. 1[stamp "MID-USSR
SECRET
DEPARTMENT OF
Countries of America
Entry No. 2174
"29" Aug 1955"][illeg] -2
USSR
MINISTRY OF
INTERNAL AFFAIRS
Prison Bureau
"27" August 1955
K-No. 28/3/4829
city of MOSCOWTO THE HEAD, COUNTRIES OF AMERICA DEPARTMENT
MID OF THE USSR

Comrade A.A. SOLDATOV

A letter from American citizen KUMISH Vil'fred,
addressed to the US Embassy in Moscow with a request
for material assistance, is being sent for your
discretion.KUMISH was released from imprisonment early by a
Decree dated 22 Aug 1955 and on 5 September of this
year is subject to transfer to representatives of US
authorities in Berlin.ATTACHMENT: as stated above, 1 page.DEPUTY HEAD, PRISON BUREAU
MVD OF THE USSR

Colonel [signature] (GROMOV)

Comrade Karav..v.
[remainder of handwriting illegible]
[dated 1 Sept, initialed by Soldatov]

[along left edge "When replying, refer to our No. and the date"]

[TFR 36-6]

[handwritten "No. 2174 osa"]
[handwritten "65"] [handwritten "92"]

[letter is typed in English]

Wilfred Cumish

ASN 14208431

M I S.

Dear Sir

Just a few lines I would like to say and that is
I would like the Ameriken Embassy to release a little money
for my expense while traveling for the states for I've been
released and am waiting for my departure please do not fail
me for I will be waiting to hear from you.

Money in Rubels only.

Sincerely, very much respectfully

[signature of Wilfred Cumish]

th
26 of August, 1955.[This is a verbatim copy to include the misspellings, lack of
punctuation, and grammar errors.]

[TFR 36-7]

[handwritten "No. 3"]
[several illeg. handwritten numbers]

[handwritten "96"]

Secret
copy No. 1

[stamp "MID-USSR
SECRET
DEPARTMENT OF
Countries of America
Entry No. 2305
"10" Sep 1955"]

USSR
MINISTRY OF
INTERNAL AFFAIRS
Prison Bureau
"8" September 1955
No. 28/3/5111
city of MOSCOW

TO THE HEAD, USA DEPARTMENT, MVD OF THE USSR
Comrade BAZYKIN

Copy to: Head, 1st Special Department, MVD of the USSR
Comrade Colonel A.P. SKROTTIN

Reference: No. 40/5-34486 dated 24 Aug 1955

I am reporting that US citizens: GOPKINS Fridrikh
Charl'z, born 1921; KUMISH Vil'fred, born 1915; and
FILDE Merrej, also known as FAJNGERSH, born 1919;
released from confinement early by Decree of the
Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR dated 22
August 1955, were transferred on 5 September 1955 to
Mr. DYUBUA, a U.S. representative.

No claims were lodged during the transfer.

DEPUTY HEAD, PRISON BUREAU, MVD OF THE USSR
[signature] (F. EVSEININ)

[handwritten "It was reported to the
US Embassy in Demarche No. 82/osa dated
14 Sep 55 that Kumish, Filde, and
Gopkins were transferred to
representatives of American Authorities
in Berlin on 5 Sep 55

[signature] ZHINERIN"]

[illegible handwriting along left margin]
[printed along left margin "When replying, refer to our No. and
the date"]

[TFR 36-8]

[handwritten "No. 4"]

USSR
COMMITTEE
FOR STATE SECURITY
ATTACHED TO THE
COUNCIL OF MINISTERS
28 October 1955
No. 5214/L
City of Moscow

[handwritten "137"]
TOP SECRET
Copy No. 1

[several illeg. handwritten numbers
above this stamp.]

[stamp "MID USSR
Top Secret
Entry No. 011502
"28" Oct 1955"]

[stamp "MID-USSR
SECRET
Countries of America
Department
Entry No. 03026
"29" Oct 1955"]

[illeg. handwriting on left side
with dates "19 Oct 55" and "4 Jan 56"]

TO THE DEPUTY MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, USSR

Comrade V.A. ZORIN

Reference: No. 959/osa dated 15 October 1955

BAUMEJSTER, also known as BOMISTER, BOMEJSTER
Uil'yam, Uilli, Dzhordzh, is not among those arrested
and serving sentences on USSR territory.

DEPUTY CHAIRMAN, COMMITTEE FOR STATE SECURITY
ATTACHED TO THE USSR COUNCIL OF MINISTERS
[signature] (K. LUNEV)

[illeg. handwriting dated 28 Oct]

[TFR 36-9]

[handwritten "127"]

[handwritten "169"]

SECRET
Copy 2[Remainder of header missing]
of the Countries of America"20" December 1955
No. 1243/osaTO THE HEAD, 2ND CHIEF DIRECTORATE, COMMITTEE FOR
STATE SECURITY ATTACHED TO THE USSR COUNCIL OF MINISTERS
Comrade P.V. FEDOTOVReference: your No. 5214/1 dated 28 October 1955

The US Embassy in Moscow delivered to MID USSR a new demarche containing a request for information relating to US citizen Baumejster, who is supposedly imprisoned in the Soviet Union. The demarche claims that Baumejster worked in one of the foundries near Kujbyshev in 1949.

In connection with this new appeal by the US Embassy, I request that you issue instructions to conduct an additional inquiry regarding Baumejster. Please report the results of the inquiry to the MID of the USSR.

Attachment: US Embassy demarche dated 17 December 1955 on one page (unclassified).

DEPUTY DEPARTMENT HEAD, COUNTRIES OF AMERICA

Original Signed (V. BAZYKIN)
True Copy: [signature "Ponerishov"]

Typed -tb/LZh
1 - address
2 - case file
No. 15/osa
20 Dec 55

[TFR 36-10]

[handwritten "128"]

Reference: No. 1243/OSAUSSR
COMMITTEE
FOR STATE SECURITY
USSR COUNCIL OF MINISTERS-----
2nd CHIEF DIRECTORATE
"31" December 1955
No. 2/I-2772
city of Moscow[handwritten "168"]
TOP SECRET
Copy No. 1[stamp "MID-USSR
SECRET
Countries of America
Department
Entry No. 03026
"31" Dec 1956"]TO THE DEPUTY HEAD, COUNTRIES
OF AMERICA DEPARTMENT, USSR
Comrade V.I. BAZYKIN

As a result of the supplemental inquiry conducted, BAUMEJSTER Vil'yam was not found to be residing in the city of Kujbyshevskaya in Kujbyshevskaya Oblast.

The Committee for State Security attached to the USSR Council of Ministers has no information regarding his employment in establishments in Kujbyshev or his being confined in an ITL.

[handwritten "Deputy"] DEPARTMENT HEAD, 2ND CHIEF DIRECTORATE,
COMMITTEE FOR STATE SECURITY ATTACHED TO
THE USSR COUNCIL OF MINISTERS
[signature] (GORBATENKO)

[printed along left margin "When replying, refer to our No. and the date"]

[TFR 36-11]

[handwritten "30"]

Secret

Copy No. 1

[handwritten "25"]

3-og [stamp "MID-USSR
SECRET
DEPARTMENT OF
COUNTRIES OF AMERICA
USSR
MINISTRY OF
INTERNAL AFFAIRS
"22" February 1956
No. 79/d
City of MOSCOW

[stamp "MID USSR
Secret
Entry No. 2521
"22" Feb 1956"]

to the DEPUTY MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS USSR.
Comrade A.A. GROMYKO

Reference No. 168/osa

The MVD USSR reports that the American Sidney
Reh SPARKS was transferred by decree to
Lieutenant Colonel KHAMONDS, a representative of
US authorities in Berlin, on 17 February of this
year.

No claims were made during the transfer.

MINISTER OF INTERNAL AFFAIRS, USSR

[signature]
(DUDOROV)

[handwritten on left side of page
"to Zhinerin from 22 Feb 56
[illeg]
case [illeg] by Demarche No.21/osa
dated 24 Feb 56 the MVD USSR
reported to the US Embassy that
Sidney Ray Sparks was transferred
to a representative of American
authorities in Berlin on 17 Feb 56.
27 Feb 56 [signed "Zhinerin"]"]

[TFR 36-12]

[handwritten "N5"]

[handwritten "4"]

[The following document is handwritten.]

To the Supreme Court of the USSR

prisoner Sparks, Sidney Ray
German citizen

[stamp "[illeg.] 0299
4 January 54
Military Board
USSR Supreme Court"]

I, Sidney R. Sparks, born 1932 in America, was sentenced on
14 April 1953 by the military tribunal in Berlin to 15 years in a
correctional labor camp under Article 58-6.

In December of 1951 I deserted from the US Army and
requested political asylum from the Soviet Control Commission.
The Soviet Control Commission held me for three months under
investigation. Afterwards, the commission gave me a job in the
city of Bauttsen (Soviet occupation zone in Germany). I worked
there until July 1952. At that time I went to West Berlin to
visit my future wife and her son. I stayed there five days and
on one occasion happened to meet an American soldier who was
serving in the "Secret Service." I went to visit a friend, where
I saw him again. I was there only 15 minutes. He asked me to
work for American counterintelligence. I told him that I did not
know anything about that work or how to do it.

I never saw that American agent again after I left there. I
went back to Bauttsen and started working again.

I was arrested on 17 October 1952. I explained to the
Soviet control commission investigator everything that happened.
but he said that I was a spy. I was in prison for six months.
On 14 April 1953 I was sentenced by the military tribunal to 15
years.

I feel that my sentence is too great for

[TFR 36-13]

someone who is not guilty and ask that you release me and give me work in Vorkuta as a free worker.

I also ask that the photographs taken from me in Berlin be returned.

I await your response.

November 11, 1953
City of Vorkuta, Komi ASSR

[signature of Sidney Ray Sparks
in Russian and English]

[TFR 36-14]

[handwritten in English]

[handwritten "5"]

11/XI 1953

Sparks, Sidney Ray
Born - 1932
for 58-6 - 15 years
Begin 1953 - end 1968
Camp No. 3

To The Military Collegue
The Highest Court The U.S.S.R.

I Sidney Ray Sparks Born 1932 in America was sentenced to 15 years on April 14th 1953 on the following grounds.

In December 1951 I deserted the American army and came to the Soviet Control Commission and asked for political protection. There I was held for 3 months for investigation, and after that I was put to work in the Russian zone of Germany in the state of Bautzen. There I worked until July 1952 and then went to West Berlin to visit my fiancée and my son, I stayed there five days and in the 5 days I met one time, accidentally an American Soldier, who was from Secret Service I went to a friend of mine's house and he was there. I stayed about 15 minutes and in that time he asked me if I wanted to work for the American Secret Service, I told him I did not know anything about that kind of work, and then I left there and never met him again.

I went back to Bautzen and started to work again, I was arrested the 17 of October 1952, and I told the men from the Soviet Control Commission about it and then they told me that I was a spy. I sit for 6 months [under] investigation and on the 14 of April 1953 Sentenced to 15 years for spying, and I think that that Sentence is [too] large for a man who is not guilty, and ask you please to make it smaller, or to set me free in Vorkuta [as a] free worker, and again I ask you please to send to me if possible my photographs that were taken from me in Berlin [I] wait impatiently for an answer.

[signature of Sidney Ray Sparks]

[This is a verbatim copy to include misspellings, punctuation and grammar errors.]

[TFR 36-15]

COPY
[stamp "Attachment
TOP SECRET
One Copy
to Entry No. 007930
27 February 1954
Military Board
USSR Supreme Court"]

SENTENCE

IN THE NAME OF THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS
On 14 April 1953, the Military Tribunal of the Soviet Sector
Garrison in the city of Berlin, consisting of:

Chairman: Guards Lieutenant Colonel (Legal) GUSEV
and members: Senior Lieutenants ZOTOV and ILYASHENKO,
with Senior Lieutenant ZAGORODNOV acting as secretary,
in closed session considered the case charging stateless person

SPARKS Sidnej Rehj, born 1932, native of Rajtsvill
[Wrightsville] USA, not a party member, nationality
American, 9th grade education, served in the US
Army from March 1950 through December 1951, no
previous convictions, unmarried,

with a criminal offense under Article 58-6, Part 1 of the RSFSR
Criminal Code.

FINDINGS:

SPARKS, while serving as a US Army soldier in West Berlin, in
December 1951 crossed over into GDR territory where he was
granted asylum.

While residing in a city in the GDR, SPARKS in July 1952
travelled to West Berlin, where he met with a representative of
American intelligence. That individual proposed that SPARKS
engage in espionage activity in GDR territory.

Having received this offer, SPARKS stated that he would
consider it and would return later with a response.

After returning from West Berlin and having decided to
accept the offer from the representative of American
intelligence, SPARKS at different times during 1952 recruited
Americans Dori, Blejk and Skotti, who had crossed over to the GDR
from the U.S. Army, to engage in espionage activity against the
USSR and the GDR on behalf of American intelligence. [SPARKS]
intended to travel to West Berlin to meet with the representative
of American intelligence and to report information on the
stationing of a Soviet troop unit in a GDR city and on the mood
of the local population of the GDR.

[TFR 36-16]

[handwritten "10"]

2.
SPARKS' guilt in establishing contact with a representative
of American intelligence, in accepting [that person's] proposal
to engage in espionage and the intent to travel to West Berlin to
meet with him, was proven by [SPARKS'] own admission of guilt.
SPARKS did not admit guilt in recruiting Dori, Blejk and Skotti
to engage in espionage, but his guilt to this charge is proven by
testimony of witnesses Dori, Blejk and Skotti, who confirmed the
circumstances involving their recruitment for espionage activity.

On the basis of the aforementioned, the Military Tribunal
found SPARKS guilty of establishing contact with a representative
of American intelligence, of deciding to accept his proposal to
engage in espionage, of recruiting other persons for espionage
activity, of intending to travel to West Berlin to meet with a
representative American intelligence, and of reporting to him
information of an espionage nature, that is, a crime provided for
under Article 58-6, Part 1, RSFSR Criminal Code.

Guided by Articles 319 and 320 of the UPK RSFSR,

SENTENCED:

SPARKS, Sidney Ray, under Article 58-6, Part 1 of the RSFSR
Criminal Code, to incarceration in a correctional labor camp for
a term of 15 (fifteen) years, with confiscation of the valuables
taken from him.

Term of incarceration shall be counted from 31 January 1953.

Custody under guard is to be continued as preventive
punishment until entry of the sentence into legal force.

The sentence may be appealed to the Military Tribunal of
military unit 48240 through the Military Tribunal that handed
down the sentence within 72 hours of the time the convicted
person is informed of the sentence.

Original properly signed.

True Copy: Original Signed CASE CHAIRMAN,
GUARDS LIEUTENANT COLONEL (LEGAL) - GUSEV

True Copy: SECRETARY, MILITARY TRIBUNAL
TROOP UNIT 48240
MAJOR (ADMIN SERVICE) [signature] (EVSEENKO)

[stamp "Military Tribunal, Military Unit 48240"]
[In the margin to the left of the three underlined names is the
handwritten word "no".]

[TFR 36-17]

Chairman GUSEV
Entered 22 Apr 1953
[stamp "ATTACHMENT
to Entry No. 007930
27 Feb 1954
Military Board
USSR Supreme Court"]

DECISION No. 91/94

MILITARY TRIBUNAL, TROOP UNIT 48240

Consisting of:

Chairman: Colonel (Legal) KONDRATIEV
Members: Colonel (Legal) ALEKSANDROV
Lieutenant Colonel (Legal) DENISOV

reviewed in court on 25 April 1953 the appeal by convicted person SPARKS of a sentence delivered by the Military Tribunal of the Soviet sector garrison in Berlin on 14 April 1953, to wit

SPARKS Sidney Ray, under Article 58-6, Part 1 of the RSFSR Criminal Code, sentenced to FIFTEEN years confinement in an ITL, with confiscation of his valuables.

In his appeal, convicted SPARKS requests a reduction of punishment.

Having heard the report by Comrade KONDRAT'EV and the conclusion by Lieutenant Colonel (Legal) KOSTACHUK, assistant military prosecutor of troop unit 48240, who believed that the sentence should be left in force,

THE MILITARY TRIBUNAL HAS ESTABLISHED that:

SPARKS was serving in the U.S. Army in West Germany in December 1951. He crossed the border into GDR territory, where he was granted asylum.

He was convicted of having voluntarily travelled to Berlin in July 1952 where he met with a representative of US intelligence from whom he received the mission to engage in espionage against the USSR and the GDR.

After returning from West Berlin, SPARKS at various times during the summer of 1952 attempted to persuade Dori, Bleik, and Skotti - who had also crossed over from the US Army - to engage in espionage.

SPARKS intended to travel to West Germany and to report to American intelligence on the stationing of a Soviet troop unit in a GDR city and about the mood of the local population.

SPARKS' guilt is upheld by his own admission of guilt and by testimony of witnesses: Dori, Bleik, and Skotti, who were questioned in court.

SPARKS' offense is correctly characterized, and the prescribed punishment corresponds to the seriousness of the

[TFR 36-17a]

crime. There are no grounds for changing the sentence as requested by the convicted person. Therefore, in accordance with

UPK RSFSR Articles 410 and 412, -

[The word "No" is handwritten in the margin next to the underlined names]

[TFR 36-18]

[handwritten "12"]
2.-

HAS DETERMINED:

The sentence given to SPARKS Sidney Ray shall remain in force and his appeal is denied.

Original properly signed.

True Copy: CHAIRMAN FOR CASE
COLONEL (Legal) (KONDRATIEV)

True Copy: COURT SECRETARY, VT Troop unit 48240
MAJOR (Admin) [signature]

(EVSEENKO)

[stamp "Military Tribunal, Military Unit 48240"]

[TFR 36-19]

[handwritten "16"]
COPY Form No. 5[State Emblem]
SUPREME COURT OF THE USSR

DECISION No. 1n-012244

THE MILITARY BOARD OF THE USSR SUPREME COURT

Consisting of: Chairman Colonel (Legal) KONOVA

members: Lieutenant Colonels (Legal) SVIRIDENKO
and ROMANOV

examined in a meeting on 29 October 1955

THE APPEAL BY THE CHIEF MILITARY PROSECUTOR

of the sentence of the military tribunal of the Soviet sector of Berlin, 14 April 1953 and

the decision on the case by the military tribunal, Unit 48240,
25 April 1953

SPARKS Sidney Ray, b. 1932, native of Rajtsvill, USA,

sentenced under Article 58-6, Part 1 of the UK RSFSR to
confinement in an ITL with confiscation of valuables upon his
arrest.By a decision of the military tribunal of unit 48240,
SPARKS' sentence was allowed to stand.Having heard Comrade KONOVA's report and the conclusion of
the Assistant Chief Military Prosecutor, Colonel (Legal) MOROZOV
who proposed to reduce SPARKS' sentence to 5 years incarceration
in a correctional labor camp,

it has been established that:

SPARKS, while serving as a soldier in the US Army in West Berlin
in December 1951, crossed into GDR territory, where he was
granted asylum.In July 1952, SPARKS travelled from the GDR to West Berlin,
where he met with a representative of US intelligence who
proposed that SPARKS engage in espionage in GDR territory for the
Americans. SPARKS stated at the time that he would consider this
proposal, after which he would come to West Berlin and report his
decision.

[TFR 36-20]

[handwritten "17"] 2.

After returning from West Berlin to the GDR, SPARKS decided to accept the US intelligence representative's offer. At various times during 1952 he attempted to persuade Blejk, Dori and Skotti, who crossed over from the American Army to the GDR, to conduct espionage against the USSR and the GDR. He intended to travel to West Berlin to meet a US intelligence representative and report information on the stationing of a Soviet unit in a GDR city and the sentiments of the local population.

The appeal requests a change in SPARKS' sentence on the following grounds:

The evidence shows that in July 1952 after arriving in West Berlin to visit his acquaintance, Ehlfride Koop, SPARKS happened to meet a serviceman from the unit SPARKS had fled in December 1951 to GDR territory. This serviceman, a corporal, suggested that SPARKS engage in espionage, promising that if he agreed, SPARKS would be introduced to an American intelligence officer.

SPARKS did not give his consent to engage in espionage, but he did state to the corporal that he would give it some thought and report his decision on his next visit to West Berlin. In late 1952 SPARKS, in the presence of US deserters Dori, Blejk and Skotti, expressed an intention to collect espionage information and establish contact with an American intelligence officer. SPARKS did not take any action to carry out his intentions.

Given these circumstances of the case, the appeal says the court ruled correctly on SPARKS' guilt since he intended to conduct espionage for US intelligence, but that the offense was incorrectly carried under Article 58-6, Part 1, of the UK RSFSR and that the sentence was excessively harsh. The appeal indicates that, in this instance, SPARKS' offense should be under Articles 19-58-6, Part 1, of the UK RSFSR.

In consideration of this and the degree of SPARKS' guilt, the Chief Military Prosecutor in the appeal requests a reduction of the sentence to five years in an ITL.

Having considered the evidence of the case and concurring with the appeal, the Military Board of the USSR Supreme Court

has determined that:

The sentence by the military tribunal of the Soviet sector garrison, Berlin, dated 14 April 1953, and the decision of the military tribunal, troop unit 48240, dated 25 April 1953, in the case of SPARKS Sidnej-Rehj will be changed to: reclassify his offense from Article 58-6, Part 1, to Articles 19-58-6, Part 1, of the UK RSFSR and the sentence is to be reduced to FIVE (5) years confinement in an ITL. The remainder of the sentence is to be unchanged.

In light of Articles 1 and 6 of the Decree of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet, dated 27 March 1953 "On Amnesty,"

[TFR 36-20a]

SPARKS is to be released from confinement and conviction is to be expunged.

Original properly signed.

True Copy: Senior Officer, Military Board
Major (Administrative Service) [signature] (SAVENKOV)

[TFR 36-21]

[stamp "declassified"] SECRET
 copy No: 1
 [handwritten "22"]

[stamp "Troop unit
 Field post office
 48240
 17/19 March 1956
 No. 0380"]

Attachment to entry no. 03303

To: Chairman, Military Board
 USSR Supreme Court

Re: No. 1n-012244/55/028346

Copy to: Office of Chief Military
 Prosecutor

Re: No. 5g-19975/55
 City of Moscow

I am reporting that according to a message from the Chief of Special Department No. 14 of the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs, the convicted Sidnej Rehj SPARKS, a US citizen, was transferred to a representative of the United States of America in Berlin on 17 February 1956.

DEPUTY CHIEF TROOP UNIT
 FIELD POST OFFICE 48240-A

Guards Colonel - [signature]

(V. Kondratiev)
 [illegible stamp]
 [handwritten "6158"]

Typed in 3 copies
 originator Spasskaya
 typed by Aksyonova
 Copy No. 1-2 to addressee
 Copy No. 3 to file
 17 Mar 1956 No. 558
 [The above listed number "1n-012244/55" has been circled]

[TFR 36-22]

[handwritten "No. 6"] [handwritten "23"] [handwritten "25"]

No. 14/osa

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics presents its respects to the Ambassador of the United States of America and in regard to the Embassy's demarches No. 314 dated 9 November and No. 348 dated 23 November 1955, has the honor to report the following:

1. In the Embassy's demarche dated 9 November is a request to present information about a number of American citizens, supposedly imprisoned by Soviet authorities. In connection with this request the following information is presented.

As a result of a inquiry conducted by the responsible Soviet agencies, it has been established that American citizens Charl'z Demmler, Uirt-Ehlizabet Tompson, and Uil'yam Dzhordzh Baumejster are not on Soviet territory.

As was already reported in the Ministry's demarche No. 75 dated 19 August 1955, it was also confirmed by this additional inquiry that American citizens Serni (or Gzherni, Charni, Cherni, Chenni) and Kushman (or Koshman, Kochman) are not on USSR territory.

With regards to Uinter, a reply was given to the Embassy in the Ministry's demarche dated 22 November 1955, which reported that American citizen Richard S. Uinter was not imprisoned by Soviet authorities in Austria and did not apply to Soviet representatives with a request for political asylum.

The inquiry, which was conducted by responsible Soviet agencies, established that American citizen Sidnej Rehj Sparks is serving a sentence in the Soviet Union for a crime against the USSR. At this time, measures are being taken to release Sparks and transfer him to American authorities.

TO THE EMBASSY OF THE
 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
 City of MOSCOW

[TFR 36-23]

[handwritten "22"]

[handwritten "26"]

2.-

As for the remaining American citizens listed in the Embassy's demarche from 9 November, inquiries are being made and the Embassy will be notified of the results.

2. In the Embassy's demarche dated 23 November, which is the response to the Ministry's demarche No. 75 dated 19 August 1955, there is some information on a number of Soviet citizens imprisoned by American authorities in West Germany.

The Ministry demarches that the American side did not present timely information to the Soviet side about the arrest and conviction of the Soviet citizens listed in the mentioned demarche, as required in accordance with the obligations [set forth] by the Litvinov-Roosevelt Agreement.

The Ministry expresses hope that the US Government will find it possible to transfer to Soviet authorities those Soviet citizens serving sentences by the verdict of the American courts and who are listed in the Embassy's demarche dated 23 November.

As for the Soviet citizens who as indicated in the Embassy's demarche have been released by American agencies from imprisonment, we request that Soviet authorities be presented the opportunity to meet with them.

We also request that an additional investigation be conducted with regard to Valetin Petrovskij, who, according to testimony the Ministry has, was seen in a prison in the city of Straubing, West Germany and information on whom was requested in the Ministry's demarche dated 19 August.

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs, USSR brings to the attention of the US Embassy that the Embassy's demarche dated 23 November deals only with Soviet citizens who are listed in the Ministry's demarche dated 19 August, and does not have a response to the request to present information on other Soviet citizens imprisoned by American agencies.

The Soviet Government expects, in accordance with the Litvinov-Roosevelt Agreement, the

[TFR 36-24]

[handwritten "21"]

[handwritten "27"]

3.-

US Government to take the necessary measures in presenting the Soviet Government with information regarding those Soviet citizens who are imprisoned by the American authorities or may be imprisoned by them in the future.

Moscow, 4 February 1956

True Copy: [signature "Zhilirin"]

[TFR 36-25]

[handwritten "No. 7"]

SPECIAL FOLDER

Top Secret

[stamp "SUBJECT TO RETURN
3769
-5 Jun 1954
Taken from Inventory-BO
in group "SPECIAL FOLDERS"
of the GENERAL DEPARTMENT
TsK KPSS"]

[remainder is illegible xerox copy - probable duplicate of TFR 36-26 which follows, but has extraneous handwriting which is also illegible]

[TFR 36-26]

[stamp "SPECIAL FOLDER"
[handwritten "35"]]

[stamp "Removed from Special Folder"]

Top Secret

[stamp "SUBJECT TO RETURN
3769
-5 Jun 1954
Taken from Inventory-BO
in group "SPECIAL FOLDERS"
of the GENERAL DEPARTMENT
TsK KPSS -- TsK KPSS"]

The US Embassy in Moscow has repeatedly applied to the MID USSR with a request to release from imprisonment and transfer to them the American citizens confined in an ITL:

V.T. MARCHUK, born 1917, former Russian translator of an American military intelligence agency in Berlin, arrested in Germany in 1949 and sentenced to 25 years imprisonment;

U. Eh. VERDIN, born 1926, former radio operator in a police squadron, arrested in Germany in 1949 and sentenced to 25 years imprisonment;

D. NOBL', born in 1923, arrested in 1950 in Germany on the grounds of the Control Council Directive No. 38 dated 12 October 1946 and sentenced to 15 years imprisonment.

On 8 April of this year, the TsK KPSS accepted the proposal of the Committee for State Security, attached to the USSR Council of Ministers, for the early release of the above-mentioned Americans with subsequent transfer to American authorities.

In accordance with this decision, the release of MARCHUK, VERDIN, and NOBL' is legalized by the Supreme Court of the USSR and in the near future they will be sent to Moscow from [their] places of confinement, from there

[no pages follow]

[TFR 36-27]

[handwritten "No. 8"] [handwritten "46"] [handwritten "34"]

Workers of the world unite!TOP SECRETCommunist Party of the Soviet Union, Central Committee
No. P30/XXXIII

To Comrade Shepilov (MID)

Extract from Protocol No. 30 Presidium TsK Session on 3 August 1956The telegrams of Comrade Degtyar' in Kabul dated 25 July 1956 No. 468-469 and 27 July 1956 No. 477.

Instruct the MID USSR to inform the USSR Ambassador in Kabul, Comrade Degtyar', that the persons mentioned in his telegrams have not crossed the Soviet border.

TsK SECRETARY

4-ak

[along left side of page "Subject to return within 7 days to Section 1 of the General Office of the TsK KPSS"]

[TFR 36-28]

[stamp illegible]

TsK Presidium Protocol No. 30 PXXXIII

Cipher Telegram

Top Secret

Do not copy

Copy No. 1 [illeg]	No. 11 Suslov	No. 21 Fedorenko
No. 2 Bulganin	No. 12 Khrushchev	No. 22 Zamchevskoj
No. 3 Voroshilov	No. 13 Khrushchev	No. 23 Il'ichev
No. 4 Kaganovich	No. 14 Shepilov	No. 24 Kozyrev
No. 5 Kirichenko	No. 15 Dudorov	No. 25 Kostylov
No. 6 Malenkov	No. 16 Gromyko	No. 26 Tsarapkin
No. 7 Mikoyan	No. 17 Kuznetsov	No. 27 Copy
No. 8 Molotov	No. 18 Zakharov	No. 28 10th Dept.
No. 9 Pervukhin	No. 19 Patolichev	No. 29 Case file
No. 10 Saburov	No. 20 Semenov	No. 30

KABUL No. 29779 8 hrs 00 min 26 VII 1956 copy No. 12
29780

Special Numbers 468,469

The other day during a conversation in the office of the advisor to the US Ambassador in Kabul, in connection with the impending arrival of American construction experts, Mejer expressed his opinion regarding the construction of an irrigation system in Gil'mend. He mentioned that construction was started in 1946 without well-laid plans, therefore a lot of money has been invested and the economic returns have been nil so far and there is no end in sight to this project. The experts will have to rework the proposal for implementation of the irrigation system and project the end of construction.

The American reiterated what he had said earlier, that the USA will not make it an objective to involve Afganistan in the Baghdad Pact, but is interested in the development of economic

[illeg. handwriting on left side]

29779

- 2 -

copy No.....

cooperation. He then demarched that the Americans are interested in the establishment in Afghanistan of greater mutual understanding between countries.

We are noticing some lessening of the publicity directed against us by the Americans in their information bulletin.

Mejer asked me, stipulating that he was doing it in an unofficial capacity, if I could obtain information from our border troops about whether an American citizen Piter Voinait (about 32 years old) and a Swiss citizen Gunnell Gutmison [female] had crossed the border. These people arrived in Kabul from India, and at the end of May left Afghanistan by bus for Baliah and Mazari-Sherif. There is no information about them to date.

Making no promises, I said that if the opportunity presents itself, I would examine this case.

We believe it is possible, if you deem it expedient, to address the issue broached by the Americans, after obtaining the information from the border troops.

25 Jul 56 DEGTAR

29-copies.es
typed 26 Jul 23-10
Released Plotnikov

True Copy: [initials]

[stamp illegible]

CC Presidium Protocol No. [illegible]

Cipher Telegram

Top Secret

Do not copy

Copy No. 1 [illeg]	No. 11 Suslov	No. 21 Fedorenko
No. 2 Bulganin	No. 12 Khrushchev	No. 22 Zamchevskoj
No. 3 Voroshilov	No. 13 Khrushchev	No. 23 Il'ichev
No. 4 Kaganovich	No. 14 Shepilov	No. 24 Kozyrev
No. 5 Kirichenko	No. 15 Dudorov	No. 25 Kostylov
No. 6 Malenkov	No. 16 Gromyko	No. 26 Tsarapkin
No. 7 Mikoyan	No. 17 Kuznetsov	No. 27 Copy
No. 8 Molotov	No. 18 Zakharov	No. 28 10th Dept.
No. 9 Pervukhin	No. 19 Patolichev	No. 29 Case file
No. 10 Saburov	No. 20 Semenov	No. 30

fm KABUL No. 0044 rcvd 18 hrs 05 min 27 VII 1956 copy No.

Ref our No. 468-469

Special No. 477

Mejer also stated that the Undersecretary of the American government, traveling with a representative of the Afghan authorities, was on a trip to the northern provinces searching for Vajnajt and Gutmison, but was also unsuccessful in finding any traces of those who disappeared. It has been established that on 27 May these persons were headed for Mazari-Sherif Province, after which there is no other information about them.

Mejer asked for information from relatives, whether or not they knew if Vajnajt and Gutmison were in the Soviet Union. He added that they might also cross the border for political motives.

[TFR 36-30a]

[printed along left side "18 hours from the moment of receipt, this telegram is subject to [illeg] to the 10th Department MID USSR]

[TFR 36-31]

[handwritten "38"]

00044

- 2 -

Copy No.

The American stated that if we cannot talk about it unofficially, then the US Embassy can report it to Washington and the American Government would officially address the USSR with a request on the issue.

Mejer emphasized that given the growing establishment of mutual understanding between our countries and between the Embassies in Kabul, it would be preferable if the request was fulfilled.

Please advise on how to answer Mejer.

27 Jul 58 DEGTYAR'

Information: No. 468-469 (Entry No. 29779) dated 25 Jul 58
Comrade Degtyar' reports that in a meeting with the US Embassy advisor in Kabul, Mejer requested information on whether or not American citizen Piter Vojnajt and Swiss citizen Gunnell Gutmison had crossed the border.

29-copy ab
typed 28 Jul 19-00
Released Nikitin

True Copy: [signature]

[Handwritten on reverse
"Arkhiv Prezidenta RF, f. 3, op. 66, d. 369, l. 34-38"]

[TFR 36-32]

[handwritten cover sheet]

No. 103 op. (7 1.)
ch

98

No. 33265

To Comrades N.B. Podgornol
I.T. Mazurov1 Oct 73
(to Griemko)
Reference No.: 782-op.

[handwritten "73"]

[TFR 36-33]

[illeg handwriting dated 1 Oct 73]

[stamp "TsK KPSS
28 Sep1973 33265
SUBJECT TO RETURN TO THE
GENERAL DEPARTMENT TsK KPSS"]SECRET
copy No. 1

TsK KPSS

I am reporting:

On 28 September 1973, our military ship in the Pacific Ocean picked up NonCommissioned Officer Majkl Dou, who supposedly fell [overboard] from the American flagship "Blue Ridge" while refueling at sea.

The noncommissioned officer was in the water for 16 hours. He was given first aid on our ship.

I consider it possible to transfer the non-commissioned officer to the Americans after some time.Instruct the MID, USSR to tell the State Department that the American sailor was given first aid and we are prepared to transfer him to the American side.[handwritten "Accomplished 1 Oct 1973, I. Kurniz"]
[Demarche: underline is in pen/pencil]

The transfer can take place to an American vessel in the Pacific ocean.

[signature]
A. GRECHKO

"28" September 1973

[handwritten "Entry No. 201/0105"]

[handwritten demarche

"Agreement reported to
Comrade V.A. Sidorov (MO USSR)1 Oct 73 V. Palkin [signature "Comrade [Brezhnev?] [votes] for"]
No.: 782-op. (1 pg.)

[handwritten on reverse

"Arkhiv Prezidenta RF, f. 3, op. 89, d. 132, l. 98-99]

[TFR 36-34]

13

[handwritten "No. 9"]

[handwritten "394"]

Top Secret
copy No.-3TO THE MINISTER FOR STATE SECURITY, USSR
Comrade V.S. ABAKUMOVAND TO THE DEPUTY MINISTER FOR STATE SECURITY, USSR
Comrade N.N. SELIVANOVSKIY

According to a report of the MGB Counter-Intelligence Directorate, Group of Soviet Forces, Germany, on 5 January of this year, two British Army soldiers and one US Army soldier who had crossed into the Soviet Zone of occupation Germany were handed over by the German police.

The soldier, FABERT Khasenzar, born 1927, a native of New York State, from American Police Unit No. 24, who had crossed into the Soviet Zone on 1 December 1950, stated that in the near future he was to be discharged, but afraid of being unemployed, decided to cross into the Soviet Zone.

The British soldiers of the 23rd Field-Engineers unit in Dortmund crossed into the Soviet Zone on 12 December 1950. TOFEN ALLEN born 1929, native of Birmingham (England), by profession a mechanic; and DZHEN ROSROSEL, born 1926, a native of the Shetlands, revealed during questioning that they crossed into the Soviet Zone because of a disagreement with the politics practiced by England.

HEAD, CHIEF DIRECTORATE OF THE MGB, USSR

"14" January 1951
No. 3/5064

[TFR 36-35]

36

[handwritten "No. 10"]

[handwritten "370"]

Top SecretTO THE MINISTER FOR STATE SECURITY, USSR
Comrade V.S. ABAKUMOVAND TO THE DEPUTY MINISTER FOR STATE SECURITY, USSR
Comrade N.N. SELIVANOVSKIY

According to a report of the KGB Counter-Intelligence Directorate, Group of Soviet Forces, Germany, an American Army service member; Sergeant EDDI Dzhems BRAUN, 29th Independent Transport Battalion, born 1923, a native of Birmingham, Alabama, college educated, a member of the negro organization "Union of the Future", crossed from the American into the Soviet Zone of occupation in Germany on 14 January of this year, in the vicinity of the city of Plauen.

The reason for his crossing into the Soviet Zone, as revealed by BRAUN, was disagreement with the politics of US right-wing circles with regard to the Soviet Union, China, and Korea, and also racial discrimination. Assisting in crossing the line of demarcation was a German forester - German VAL'TE, a resident of the city of Gef in the American Zone.

After crossing the demarcation line BRAUN went to the border police of the German Democratic Republic, where he was taken to a Soviet military unit.

At this time BRAUN is at the Military Commandant's Office in the city of Potsdam; a representative of the Political Directorate is working with him.

HEAD, CHIEF DIRECTORATE OF THE MGB, USSR

"31" January 1951
No. 3/10931

[TFR 36-36]

[handwritten "No. 11"]

[handwritten "528"]
 [handwritten "17"]
 Copy
 Top Secret
 Copy No. 2
 [handwritten "5"]

[handwritten "25 Apr 51"]
 [illeg. handwriting "3536"]

TO THE MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, USSR

Comrade V.A. Zorin

Reference No. 638/3eo dated 27 March 1951

The MGB USSR agrees with the proposal of Comrades SEMICHAISTNOV and IL'ICHEV on the inadvisability of releasing foreign army deserters from custody in Berlin: the Americans: VERDIN Uil'yam, KERIK Gaj, KOKS Gomer Garol'd, and PETERSON Vil'yam Dzhej; the Englishmen: PEDDINGTON Vil'yam Ehrnst, EUGEL'TON Denis, and BEJKEK Al'bert; and Frenchmen: DITINGER Otto, GOMTEN Andre, and RENARD Lyuis.

We believe it necessary to try the above mentioned deserters and send [them] to the Soviet Union to serve their sentences.

As for the Americans held by Soviet military authorities in Austria - ATERTESOV Desh and VIL'SON Robert Chester, we consider it advisable to grant them asylum in the Soviet Zone in Austria.

DEPUTY MINISTER
 FOR STATE SECURITY, USSR

[TFR 36-37]

[handwritten "No. 12"]

Copy
 Top Secret
 Copy No. 2
 [handwritten "7"]

TO THE POLITBURO TsK VKP(b)

In accordance with the instructions of the Politburo TsK VKP(b) dated 12 December 1951, we report:

As indicated, as of 10 January this year there are 46 military defectors in the Soviet Zone of occupation in Germany to include: from US occupational forces - 18, England - 14, France - 13 (including 5 Morrocans, 2 Negroes, 1 Dutchman). In addition, there is 1 defector from the Dutch army.

The following numbers of defectors crossed into the Soviet Zone: in 1947 - 1, in 1948 - 3, in 1949 - 8, in 1950 - 3, in 1951 - 30, in 1952 - 1.

It has also been established that in addition to the mentioned defectors are 28 people who had crossed into the Soviet Zone of occupation in Germany [Unknown number of words missing, whited-out] and crossed back at another time into West Germany. [Remainder of page whited out]

[TFR 36-38]

As of this date, it has been determined that there are 22 defectors residing in the city of Bautzen, and that they have been given work in their various specialties. One deserter has been convicted, and an investigation has been started to bring criminal proceedings against 5 people. There are 18 people are undergoing screening.

[A portion of the text has been whited out]

S. IGNAT'EV

A. VASILEVSKIY

" 17 " January 1952

[handwritten "No. 2076/1"]

True Copy:

[TFR 36-39]

[handwritten "No. 13"]

[handwritten "106"]

Copy

Top Secret

Copy No. 5

[handwritten "11"]

To Comrade G.M. MALENKOV
Comrade L.P. BERIA
Comrade N.A. BULGANIN

I am reporting that, according to the Directorate for Counter-Intelligence MGB, Central Group of Forces, an American citizen - VIL'SON Robert Gester, born 1927, a native of San Francisco, a ship's mechanic by profession, requested the Soviet Commandant's Office in Vienna to grant him political asylum in February 1951.

By order of the Commander-in Chief, Central Group of Forces Comrade Lieutenant General SVIRIDOV, VIL'SON was put in the garrison detention cell [Unknown number of words missing, whited-out].

The Directorate for Counter-Intelligence, Central Group of Forces, repeatedly informed Comrade SVIRIDOV of the illegal confinement of VIL'SON in the detention cell; however, VIL'SON continues to be under guard at this time and his status as a deserter remains undecided.

The MGB USSR considers it advisable to question Comrade SVIRIDOV regarding the reasons for confining VIL'SON in a detention cell for 16 months and his opinion on the possibility of granting VIL'SON asylum in the Soviet Union.

S. IGNAT'EV

"21" July 1952

Distributed to

Comrades: Malenkov

Beria

Bulganin

No. 5231/I

[Underlined text appears to have been typed over white out]

[TFR 36-40]

[handwritten "156"]

Copy
Top Secret
Copy No. 5To Comrade G.M. MALENKOV
Comrade L.P. BERIA
Comrade N.A. BULGANIN

We are reporting that according to the instructions of the Council of Ministers, USSR the matter of the case of the illegal detention in a garrison detention cell of the Directorate of the Soviet Military Commandant in Vienna since February 1951 of American citizen VIL' SON Robert Chester, born 1927, a native of San Francisco, has been reviewed by us.

According to VIL' SON, he is subject to draft in the American service, but in order to avoid being sent to Korea, he had left the USA for France and then to Vienna, where he requested Soviet authorities to grant him asylum.

As long as VIL' SON declines military service in the American Army it is advisable to do the same thing that the Soviet military authorities in Germany and Austria do in relation to military deserters, ie; transfer VIL' SON to the MGB USSR authorized agent in Germany for examination and further resolution of the matter in accordance with available guidance.

This proposal is agreeable to Comrade VYSHINSKIY.

S. IGNAT'EV

V. SOKOLOVSKIY

"30" July 1952
Distributed to
Comrades: Malenkov
Beria
Bulganin

No. 5391/I

Basis: No. S-22266 dated 24 Jul 52
from the Affairs Directorate of
the Council of Ministers USSR.

[TFR 36-41]

[handwritten "268"]

[handwritten No. 14]

Copy
Top Secret
Copy No. 5
[handwritten "11"]To Comrade G.M. MALENKOV
Comrade L.P. BERIA
Comrade N.A. BULGANIN

We are reporting that, according to the Directorate of Counter-Intelligence, MGB Central Groups of Forces, on 17 August of this year, the Austrian police arrested and took to the Soviet Military Commandant Staff, an American Army private of the 169th Infantry Regiment, 43rd Infantry Division, VEKSLER Stefan, born in 1923, a native of New York, and an American citizen.

During questioning, VEKSLER said that from 1945 up to 1949 he studied at Harvard College, where he joined the Communist Party. Upon graduation, by the order of the Communist Party, he carried out propaganda work at various institutions in the city of Buffalo.

In January 1951, he was drafted into the American Army, hid his party affiliation, served in Virginia and in October 1951 arrived in West Germany with the 49th Infantry Division. He was initially in Munich, then moved to Nurnberg.

VEKSLER handed over two copies of a letter of the Procurator, Military Department of the USA, in which he is accused that while a member of the US Communist Party he signed testimony [illeg], [illeg] information on his active work in the Communist Party and a request to give clarification of this matter.

VEKSLER went on to say that in order to escape the ramifications of membership in the Communist Party, he left the unit and went

[TFR 36-42]

[handwritten "269"]
2.

by train to Lipets, then swam across the Dunaj into the Soviet Zone of Occupation in Austria with the intention of receiving asylum.

VEKSLER is being sent to a screening point run by the authorized agent of the MGB USSR in Germany for a check.

S. GOGOLIDZE

"22" August 1953

[TFR 36-43]

Top Secret[handwritten "1 copy to the MID"]
[handwritten "128"]

[handwritten "No. 15"]

REPORT

At this time, the following American citizens are serving sentences in the prisons and special camps of the MVD:

GOPKINS Fridrikh-Charl'z, born 1921, native of New Jersey, USA, American, US citizen, high school education, prior to arrest was an official employee of the British intelligence agency "Intelligence - Team 130/131" which operated in West Germany.

Arrested in 1947 by the SVA Operations Sector in the State of Meklenburg (Germany).

In the course of the preliminary and legal investigation, it was established that GOPKINS lived in the USA until 1935, after which, he left with his parents for Britain where he finished high school.

In 1938 GOPKINS entered service in the King's Guards, was immediately sent for training in the "Secret Service" school, and upon graduation worked about 6 months for the criminal police in Glasgow.

Showing his worth in police work, GOPKINS was sent to the intelligence school "Intelligence Service" in London. Upon graduation, he left for illegal intelligence work in Germany, where he managed to enter the German army and then German military aviation intelligence agencies.

After the end of the Second World War, from May 1945 up to the day of his arrest, GOPKINS served in British Intelligence in West Germany, carrying out active intelligence activities against the Soviet Union.

[handwritten "747708"]

[TFR 36-44]

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[handwritten "129"]

In July 1947, GPKINS was detained by Soviet authorities while carrying out a routine mission for British intelligence. He had illegally crossed from the British into the Soviet Zone of Occupation in Germany with a group of subordinate agents.

At a session of the Military Tribunal SVA Meklenburg, GPKINS pleaded guilty to conducting espionage for the British against the Soviet Union and was sentenced to 25 years confinement in an ITL. The sentence is being served in one of the MVD camps.

FILDS, also known as FAJNGERSH. Marrel, born 1919, native of Brooklyn USA, American, US citizen, high school education, prior to arrest was a Private First Class in the American Occupation Forces in Germany.

In June 1948, FILDS was detained on Czechoslovakian territory by security organs of the Czechoslovakian People's Republic. In September 1950, FILDS was transferred by these authorities to the command staff of military unit No. 32750. He was arrested in September 1950 by the counter-intelligence section of military unit No. 32750.

During the course of the investigation, it was determined that FILDS lived in Brooklyn until 1945 under his father's name - FAJNGERSH. From September 1940 until September 1941, he served in the American Army. Fired from the army, he changed his last name from FAJNGERSH to FILDS and arranged to work as a sailor in the US Merchant Marine. In 1947 he was dropped from the crew in an Antwerpen port for a breach of discipline. Not wanting to return to the USA, he used a mooring line in one of the ports of West Germany, went ashore and requested the American military command to include him in the occupation forces.

[As a member] of the 5th Police Regiment (Augsburg), FILDS finished a three month course in an engineer school and was appointed a cartographer-drafter in the Operations Section, Headquarters 5th Police

[TFR 36-45]

3.
[handwritten "130"]

Regiment, which was subsequently changed to the 2nd Police Regiment.

Working in this position, FILDS carried out the tasks of the regimental headquarters intelligence section and the Augsburg section of the 'SIS', creating location charts of military-industrial and other facilities located in the territory of the Soviet Zone of Occupation in Germany and in countries of the people's democracies on which information was received from agents.

FILDS pointed out that the idea of deserting from the American Army came to him when he was persuaded by a soldier in the same police regiment, RASSIPIOLO. RASSIPIOLO intended to flee to Italy; they accomplished this on 1 June 1948. RASSIPIOLO was allegedly afraid of crossing the border illegally and came back, however FILDS crossed into Czechoslovakian territory and was detained.

After giving testimony on the kind of work he carried out in the police regiment, FILDS denies that he was transported onto Czechoslovakian territory by American Intelligence.

In March 1951, by decision of the Special Session of the Minister of State Security USSR, FILDS was sentenced to 25 years prison confinement for espionage. The sentence is being served in one of the MVD prisons.

MARCHUK Vasilii Timofeevich, born 1917, a native of Mejnar (USA), Belorussian, a US citizen with a high-school education, and until his arrest was a Russian language translator in the Berlin section of the American Military Intelligence organ G-2.

Arrested in January 1950 by [members of] the Brandenburg State Operations Sector (Germany).

The case investigation established that in February 1949 MARCHUK was detained by the Soviet Commandant's Staff in Potsdam in the vicinity

[TFR 36-46]

[handwritten "43"]
4. [handwritten "131"]

of a railroad station during an endeavor to become acquainted with Soviet service members.

MARCHUK pointed out that he lived in the USA with his parents until 1939, then volunteered to enter the American Army. He served until 1945 in aviation units as a mechanics assistant. After discharge from the Army, he lived with his parents and in 1948 again entered Army service and was sent to Germany. He initially served in Marburg, and then, in November 1948, as a Russian speaker, was sent to work as a Russian language translator in the Berlin Military Intelligence Section, cover name G-2.

As a translator, he took part in questioning Soviet citizens who had betrayed the Motherland and obtained during the course of this questioning espionage material about the Soviet Army.

After giving testimony on his service in American intelligence as a translator, MARCHUK denies the charge under Article 58-6 Section 1 of the UK RSFSR, since, in his opinion, he personally did not commit espionage and arrived in Potsdam in a drunken state.

In July 1950, by decision of the Special Session of the Minister of State Security USSR, V.T. MARCHUK was sentenced to 25 years confinement in an ITL for service in an American Intelligence agency. The sentence is being served in one of the MVD camps.

VERDIN Uil'van Ehdri'vu, born 1926, a native of Stark (USA), Hindu, a US citizen, prior to arrest served as a radio operator in the American Army Headquarters Regiment, 6th Police Squadron in Koburg (Germany).

Arrested in February 1952 by organs of the authorized agent of the MGB in Germany.

[TFR 36-47]

5.
[handwritten "132"]

Investigation into the case established that VERDIN was detained in February 1949 by German national police on the territory of the Soviet Zone of occupation in Germany without any identification. He was transferred to Soviet authorities.

During questioning, VERDIN revealed that he crossed into the Soviet Zone of occupation in Germany with the goal of being discharged from the Army, ie; he presumed that the Soviet Command Staff would transfer him to the American Command, who would then discharge him from the Army for unauthorized crossing into the Soviet Zone and send him [back] to the USA. He explained the destruction of his identification as a thoughtless action.

In confinement, VERDIN carried out anti-Soviet agitation among his foreign cellmates, broke regulations, threw demarches out of the cell window, made anti-Soviet remarks on the cell walls, and yelled.

As explained by VERDIN in court, these actions were a protest on his part against his illegal and lengthy confinement under guard and that he was so bitter, he told his cellmate, the Frenchman RANAR, of his intention to kill the first Russian he happened on as soon as he was released from prison.

On one occasion, VERDIN struck the duty overseer in the face when told to cease yelling from the cell by the prison administration. Afterwards, isolated in the bathroom, VERDIN broke off a piece of the plumbing and attempted to threaten the overseer. Later, when he was placed back in the cell, VERDIN again struck the overseer.

During the investigation, no information about the affiliation of VERDIN with American intelligence has been obtained.

On the basis of the above, VERDIN was accused of crimes covered by statutes 16-84, 58-8, and 58-10 Sect. II of the UK RSFSR and in April 1952 was sentenced under the above statutes to imprisonment for 25 years by Military Tribunal of the garrison of the Soviet Sector of Berlin. The sentence is being served in one of the MVD camps.

6.
[handwritten "133"]

BERKESH Androsh, born 1914, a native of Budapest, Magyar, considers himself a US citizen, prior to arrest was an orchestra musician in the restaurant "Moulin Rouge" in Budapest.

Arrested in May 1945 in Budapest by the counter-intelligence section "SMERSH" of the 46th Army.

In the course of the investigation, it was established that BERKESH Androsh was born in Budapest to a family of musicians and is a Hungarian citizen. After graduating the 8th term [high school equivalent], he began working with his father as a musician in a cafe. In 1937, BERKESH Androsh worked as a musician on one of the steamships of a German steamship society, making the Europe-USA run.

On one of the trips, BERKESH became acquainted with a girl - Constance SALAI, in New York. She came with him to Hungary from the USA. They were married soon after in Budapest. In 1939, with permission of the Hungarian Government and the US Embassy in Hungary, BERKESH and his wife left for America where he lived until the summer of 1941. After which he returned to Budapest in connection with his father's failing health, apparently leaving his wife in the USA. The start of the war prevented him from returning to America.

While living in the USA from 1939 until 1941, BERKESH apparently received American citizenship.

Not subject to military service, BERKESH spent the entire war in Budapest. With the approach of Soviet Army units, BERKESH was recruited in December 1944 by German Intelligence into a saboteur-terrorist detachment "Kyuleg legesh chopor" whose mission was to conduct sabotage against the rear of Soviet held territory in Hungary.

BERKESH admitted that he had been recruited into that 'partisan' detachment and on that basis was sentenced to 15 years confinement in an ITL in July 1945 by the Military Tribunal of the 46th Army. The sentence is being served in one of the MVD camps.

7.
[handwritten "134"]

SKORODINSKIY Nikolai Mikhailovich, born 1923, a native of New York City, US citizen. Arrested in December 1945 by the Military Procuracy of the MVD Troops for Rear Security, Central Group of Soviet Forces. In January 1946, he was sentenced by the Military Tribunal of MVD Troops for Rear Security, CGF to 8 years confinement for crimes under Articles 77-59-3 of the UK RSFSR. The sentence is being served in one of the MVD camps.

[handwritten entry: On 7 Dec 53 Skorodinskiy was freed from confinement and at this time lives in the city of Spilv, Rezanskaya Oblast working in a rock [quarry]. The matter of issuing him a visa from the USSR as a person without citizenship is not [illeg] USSR [illeg] (No. 18/10-10 6 Jan 54 UMVD Rezanskaya Oblast)]

KUMISH Vil'fred, born 1915, a native of New York City, Polish, US citizen, high school education, speaks Polish, prior to his arrest was an official employee of American Military Intelligence (MIS) in Vienna.

Arrested in September 1948 by the Directorate of Counter-Intelligence, military unit Border post 32750.

The investigation determined that from January 1947 as an official employee of the American Military Intelligence (MIS) KUMISH carried out duties as a Polish translator, a mailman, a manager of a clothing warehouse for an intelligence organ, a chief guard for prisoner security at the intelligence agency prison, and an employee of one of the intelligence agency sections ("Center of Documentation") which processed topographical maps obtained from German archival materials.

As KUMISH pointed out, the intelligence agency in which he worked conducted reconnaissance against the Soviet forces in Austria and against production facilities under control of the Soviet Command, by extracting interesting information from agents living in the Soviet Zone of Occupation in Austria and simultaneously practicing the sending of official intelligence employees to our side.

KUMISH by his own statement did not engage in espionage activity, however he was detained on Soviet territory

[TFR 36-50]

8.
[handwritten "135"]

in Austria in the vicinity of oil factories wearing civilian clothing.

Explaining the reason for his appearance in the Soviet Zone, KUMISH said that he had deserted from the American army and had intended to go to Czechoslovakia, where he planned to settle.

On that basis, KUMISH was found guilty under Article 58-6 of the UK RSFSR and by decision of the Special Session attached to the Ministry of State Security USSR, was sentenced to 15 years confinement in prison. The sentence is being served in one of the MVD camps.

CHERNE Rudol'f, born 1910, a native of Stary Tabor (Yugoslavia), a Yugoslav-German with no citizenship, high school education, by profession an auto mechanic, prior to his arrest was a resident agent of the American intelligence agency "CIC" in Vienna.

He was arrested in August 1948 by Soviet Military Counter-intelligence organs in Austria during an attempt to illegally return to the British Zone of Occupation in Austria after conducting an American reconnaissance mission on the territory of the Soviet Zone of Occupation in Austria.

Investigation of the case established the following:

CHERNE comes from a family of Yugoslavian landowners. His father left for the USA in 1910 and around a year later the entire family arrived. They lived in Chicago. In 1926, CHERNE graduated from high school, after which he worked as a mechanic in various local firms. In 1939, CHERNE Rudol'f returned to Yugoslavia and petitioned for restoration of Yugoslavian citizenship, since he intended to remain and live in Yugoslavia. Petition was necessary due to the fact that he had not lived in Yugoslavia for 28 years.

CHERNE said that he had not received American citizenship and had lived in the USA listed as a Yugoslavian citizen.

[TFR 36-51]

9.
[handwritten "136"]

That same year, in 1939, CHERNE was drafted by the Yugoslavian Army as a soldier in the 19th Infantry Regiment. In 1941, the entire regiment surrendered to the Germans and CHERNE was taken to Vienna. Shortly after having escaped from prison, CHERNE crossed into Yugoslavia, where he was interned by Italian forces and sent to Rab Island where he stayed until September 1943.

With the capitulation of Italy, he was freed and returned to Yugoslavia, where he joined the Lyublyanskaya Partisan Brigade. In December 1944, he became a prisoner of the Germans a second time.

After the end of the war, he returned to Yugoslavia where he lived until August 1946 working as hired help on a farm. That same year he left Yugoslavia for Austria with the intention of settling in the USA.

In the British Zone of Occupation in Austria, CHERNE was placed in a camp for displaced persons, where he established a tie with a representative of British Intelligence, who quickly recommended him for use by American Intelligence in Vienna.

Arriving in Vienna for this purpose, CHERNE was greeted by an employee of the "CIC" - Captain EHRLAND, who made him his resident agent and transferred almost 30 secret agents [to his control].

With the help these secret agents, CHERNE worked for almost two years on assembling espionage information concerning units of the Soviet Occupational Forces and Soviet administration in Austria.

Upon completing the latest mission of American intelligence on territory of the Soviet Zone of Occupation in Austria, CHERNE was arrested, gave a confession, and in February 1949 was sentenced by the Military Tribunal of Military Unit 28990 to 25 years confinement in an ITL.

In the ITL, CHERNE showed himself to be the sworn enemy of Soviet authorities. Among the population he said that he had been sentenced

[TFR 36-52]

[handwritten "137"]

10.

by Soviet Court as an agent of American Intelligence, but in actuality was an official employee of [American] Intelligence. He said he had the rank of Colonel and that the documents he was captured with, in the name of Rudol'f CHERNE, were fictitious. They were issued by the "CIC" to hide his real name in the event that his cover was blown, since his real name would identify him as an official employee of American Intelligence.

HEAD, CHIEF DIRECTORATE OF THE MVD, USSR

January 1954

[TFR 36-53]

Copy

Top Secret
copy No. 3
[handwritten "50"]

[handwritten "126"]

MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, USSR

to Comrade V.A. ZORIN

4 February 1954

[handwritten "No. 326/K"]

Reference: No. 078/osa

In addition to No. 8395/s dated 3 Dec 1953 we are sending information on the American citizens GPKINS, FIELDS, MARCHUK, VERDIN, KUMISH, and BERKESH, who are currently in confinement in special camps and prisons of the MVD USSR and on SKORODINSKIJ, who was released from confinement in December 1953.

Based on the existing cases of FIELDS, MARCHUK, VERDIN, and KUMISH, the MVD USSR considers it necessary to bring before the Procuracy of the USSR a petition to review their cases and lower their sentences to time served, then to question these people as to where they want to go and not hinder them if they wish to be repatriated to the USA.

The MVD USSR considers it possible to satisfy the request of SKORODINSKIJ, who, after his release, declined departure from the Soviet Union and requested that he be issued documents as a person without citizenship.

[handwritten 1 illeg.]

The American citizens KUSHMAN and SERNI, supposedly incarcerated on USSR territory, have not been located. As seen in the attached report, Rudol'f CHERNE is serving his sentence in

[illeg. stamp]

[TFR 36-54]

2.
[handwritten "127" and "51"]

one of the camps. He is a stateless Yugoslav-German, who passes himself off as a Colonel in the American Army. It cannot be ruled out that the American Embassy in Moscow, in asking the MID USSR about SERNI, is basing their inquiry on information they received concerning CHERNE. In connection with this, measures have been taken for a fuller and more exact identification of CHERNE.

The MVD USSR considers it inadvisable to review the cases of GOPKINS and BERKESH.

In the opinion of the MVD USSR it is useless to inform the American Embassy in Moscow regarding the designated persons until a decision and resolution of the above matters is reached.

[handwritten "Attachment: A report on 10 pages."]

MINISTER OF INTERNAL AFFAIRS, USSR

S. KRUGLOV

4 Feb 1954

True Copy: [signature]

[TFR 36-55]

[handwritten "No. 17"]

Top Secret
copy No. 2

Copy
[handwritten "58"]

Chief Directorate
13 March 54
I/I/-213

TO THE DEPUTY HEAD OF THE MVD DIRECTORATE,
LENINGRAD OBLAST
- Colonel

city of Leningrad

On 13 October 1951, American citizen TAUHRZ Lilend Lorch, born 1924, a native of the city of San Francisco, was arrested by the UMVD of the Leningrad Oblast for an illegal crossing of the State border from Finland into the USSR.

On 22 January 1952, the Leningrad Oblast Court sentenced TAUHRZ to 3 years confinement under Article 84 UK RSFSR.

There is no archival investigative file or any other material in the 1st Special Section of the MVD, USSR on the TAUHRZ's confinement.

In order that TAUHRZ might be released early from confinement and transferred to the Americans, I request that you to issue an order to immediately find the American passport belonging to TAUHRZ, which was taken from him during confinement, and send it to him.

DEPUTY HEAD, CHIEF DIRECTORATE OF THE MVD, USSR

[TFR 36-56]

[handwritten "No. 18"]

Delivered to Comrade Zorin
by O'Shonesi during 5 February
1954 meeting

Translated from English
[handwritten "139"]

No. 660

The Embassy of the United States of America presents its compliments to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and has the honor to refer to the aide-memoire, delivered by Ambassador Bolen Sobolev on 2 November regarding American citizens held in confinement in the USSR.

Although the American citizens Koks and Tauehrs were returned to American authorities in Berlin, the Soviet Government, as far as the Embassy is aware, has not taken any measures regarding the other American citizens that it holds. In addition to those persons who are mentioned in the aide-memoire, the Embassy is arranging at this time verification of the information that the Soviet Government is holding the following American citizens.

1. Vil'iam T. Marchuk (Marchenko) from Breckenridge, Pennsylvania, a soldier in the United States Armed Forces, identification number [English "R"] RA 6949875, who was arrested in the Soviet sector in Berlin on or about 1 February 1949 and has been in a correction camp for at least two years near Vorkuta, Komi ASSR. -The name of this camp is given in various reports as "Camp Four" and "Citizens Correctional Camp of the MGB No. 222/R" [English "R"]. The last time Marchuk was seen at this location was in June of 1953 by several people.

2. Vil'iam A. Verdin from Starks, Louisiana, a soldier in the United States Armed Forces, identification number [English "R"] RA 88693686 was arrested in Germany on or about 3 February 1949

[TFR 36-57]

[handwritten "53"]
[handwritten "140"] 2.

and was confined in a prison near Weimar, Germany. In 1952, he was transferred to Lichtenberg Prison in Berlin and later in the same year was transferred to the USSR where he was in a correction camp near Vorkuta, Komi, ASSR. The last time he was seen in "Camp Four" near Vorkuta was in June 1953. His prisoner number is 1-2-667.

3. Dzhen Khellmut Noubl, about whom the Embassy reported in demarches No. 200 dated 29 August 1953, No. 446 dated 14 November 1953, and No. 567 dated 30 December 1953. At this time it has been established that he was confined by Soviet authorities in a correction camp near Vorkuta, Komi ASSR. His last address was reported in the Embassy's demarche No. 446.

The Government of the United States views the confinement in prison or detention of American citizens by the Soviet Government as an exceptionally serious matter.

The Embassy requests the Ministry undertake an immediate investigation into this situation and report in detail any related information to the Embassy.

AMERICAN EMBASSY
Moscow, 5 February 1954

[TFR 36-58]

Top Secret

11 February 54
[handwritten "121"]

[handwritten 1/1s/831]

TO THE DEPUTY HEAD, PRISON DIRECTORATE OF THE MVD, USSR
Colonel

At the direction of the Minister of Internal Affairs, USSR Colonel General Comrade KRUGLOV, I request you to reveal all American citizens held in general and special camps and prisons of the MVD USSR, and report to us fundamental data on each American with an indication as to when, where, and by whom he was arrested, by which agency and to what term he was sentenced, where the sentence is being served, the condition of his health, and in what type of work he is employed.

DEPUTY HEAD, CHIEF DIRECTORATE OF THE MVD, USSR
Colonel

[TFR 36-59]

Top Secret

[handwritten "The minister agrees with these proposals. The first copy of this document with the minister's concurrence was sent to the Department of Investigations, 1st Chief Directorate for implementation of the proposals with regards to VERDIN, FILDS, KUMISH, MARCHUK, and CHERNE."]

[handwritten "115"]

TO THE MINISTRY OF INTERNAL AFFAIRS, USSR

Comrade S.N. KRUGLOV

In connection with the demarche from the US Embassy in Moscow, the MID USSR requested that the MVD, USSR to report information on American citizens imprisoned in the Soviet Union.

Via the Prison Directorate of the MVD USSR, 6 American citizens who were arrested at various times on the territory of Germany and Austria have been identified, and are imprisoned in special camps and prisons of the MVD USSR. There is also one American, who was released in December 1953 and wished to remain in residence in the Soviet Union.

Given the information on these persons, it would be considered advisable:

1. To petition before the Procuracy USSR for a review of the cases on VERDIN, FILDS, MARCHUK, and KUMISH regarding reducing the sentences to actual time served with further repatriation to a place of residence of their choosing.

2. To satisfy SKORODINSKIY's request and allow him to remain for permanent residence in the USSR.

[handwritten along left side of page "The first copy of the [illeg] with the minister's instructions and a ten-page report on the American citizen on 10 pages has been received." [signature]]

[TFR 36-60]

2.

[handwritten "116"]

3. In view of the fact that CHERNE is passing himself off as a Colonel in American intelligence, transfer him under guard to Moscow to investigate him thoroughly, after which [we will] resolve the matter.

Instruct the Prison Bureau of the MVD, USSR to identify all American citizens held in camps and prisons of the MVD USSR, since there have been situations when the presence of American citizens in camps became known only when the US Embassy in Moscow posed questions about them to the MID, USSR.

Request your instructions.

HEAD, CHIEF DIRECTORATE OF THE MVD, USSR

" February 1954

[TFR 36-61]

[handwritten "6 Feb 54"]
Secret Copy No. _____

USSR
Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Department of the Countries of the Americas
Moscow, 200 Smolenskaya Sennaya Square Index/Date Index/Date
House 32/34. Telephone G 4-24-69

"18" February 1954
Iss. No. 255/osa

TO THE MINISTER OF INTERNAL AFFAIRS, USSR
Comrade S. N. KRUGLOV

Reference: No. 145/k dated 16 January 1954 and No. 326/k dated 4 February 1954.

On 5 February of this year, the interim US Charge D'Affaires handed Comrade V.A. Zorin an aide-memoire which contained a request to conduct an investigation regarding the imprisonment in the Soviet Union of American citizens Vasilij Marchuk, Uil'yam Verdin, and Dzhon Noubi.

Keeping in mind that the US Government published the text of the above mentioned aide-memoire, apparently striving to cause a sensation surrounding this matter, I request that the MVD USSR take measures in order to speed up the review of the cases of Marchuk and Verdin, and also to report what response, in the MVD USSR's opinion, should be given to the Americans' requests on the location of Noubi and status of his case.

Along with this, the MID of the USSR is taking into account that in accordance with the Roosevelt-Litvinov [Agreement] from 1933, the Soviet Government took upon itself the responsibility to keep the American Embassy abreast of all occurrences of arrests of American citizens and to not hinder meetings of an Embassy representative with American citizens imprisoned in the USSR.

Attachment: US Embassy aide-memoire dated 5 Feb 1954
on 2 pages (addressee only)

DEPUTY MINISTER OF
FOREIGN AFFAIRS USSR

[signature]

(V. KUZNETSOV)

[handwritten "MVD USSR informed MID USSR
about Marchuk and Verdin
No. 325/b dated 4 Feb 54
R. Sokolev"]

[illeg. stamp]

[handwritten "preparation of the answer on
[illeg] of Noble delivered [illeg]
No. 31/k fm 12 Oct 46, tel. 48-26
[illeg] in special camp No. 6."]

[TFR 36-62]

[handwritten "142"]
Top SecretMEMORANDUM

255

The letter from the MID, USSR No. 225/osa from 18 February 1954 regarding the Americans MARCHUK, NOUBL, and VERDIN imprisoned in the USSR is to be delivered to employees of the [white-out] Department of [white-out] and of the [white-out] Department of [white-out] of the Chief Directorate of the Committee for State Security attached to the Council of Ministers, USSR.

The archival investigative file on MARCHUK along with our conclusion of 8 March of this year for No. I/9/357 was delivered to the Main Military Procuracy, USSR through whom a petition was submitted before the Supreme Soviet, USSR on changing the decision of the Special Session of the MGB, USSR dated 29 July 1950 regarding Marchuk; in particular, reducing his sentence to time served and releasing him from custody.

A similar conclusion prepared for the case of NOUBL on 25 March of this year was transmitted to [white-out].

A letter is being prepared for the VERDIN case by the Main Military Procurator USSR Comrade RUDENKO, which was [white-out] transmitted on 24 March of this year.

The prepared draft of the response to the MID USSR, according to a statement of Comrade SOKOLOV to the Directorate administration, did not report the completion by the 9th section of Comrade SHUBENYAKOV's instruction concerning the designated cases of Americans.

[handwritten 1 illeg. and initials across text]

"25" March 1954

[handwritten "Noubl Dzhon Khelmut, born 1923, arrested 11 Mar 39.
[illeg] lands [3 wds illeg]
Control Council in Germany No. 38 [illeg]
Sentenced to 18 yrs in an ITL. [remainder illeg]"]

[TFR 36-63]

[handwritten "31-7275 lokh.
22 Feb 54"]

USSR
Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Department of the Countries of America

Secret Copy No. 1

Moscow, 200 Smolenskaya Sennaya Square
Index/Date
House 32/34. Telephone G 4-24-69

Index/Date

"23" March 1954
Iss. No. 371/osa

TO THE CHAIRMAN OF THE COMMITTEE FOR STATE SECURITY
ATTACHED TO THE COUNCIL OF MINISTERS, USSR

Comrade I. A. SEROV

In connection with the new appeal from the US Embassy on the Americans Verdin, Marchuk, and Noubi, who are imprisoned in the USSR, I request that you speed up the reply to the letter from the MID, USSR, No. 225/osa dated 18 February, on this matter.

255

DEPUTY MINISTER OF
FOREIGN AFFAIRS, USSR

Distro 2-tb/SB
No. 463
21322-10000 18 Mar 54

[stamp: whited out]

(A. GROMYKO)
[signature]

[TFR 36-64]

[handwritten "Reference No. 255/osa and No. 371/osa"] Copy
 Top Secret
 copy No. 3
 [handwritten "144"]

"30" March 1954 TO THE DEPUTY MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS
 USSR

No. 479-s

To: Comrade A.A. GROMYKO

As per your request, the investigative material in regards to the convicted American citizens VERDIN, MARCHUK, and NOUBL was reviewed by us.

A examination of the material shows that VERDIN, MARCHUK, and NOUBL were sentenced to long terms without sufficient basis. Therefore, we have presented appropriate sentences to the USSR Procuracy with a request to repeal the sentences.

The response to the US Embassy may be given after the decision by the Supreme Court USSR to repeal the sentences is carried out.

CHAIRMAN, COMMITTEE FOR STATE SECURITY
 ATTACHED TO THE COUNCIL OF MINISTERS, USSR

I. SEROV

[stamp: mostly illeg
 "No. 12-13030
 31 March 1954"]

[TFR 36-65]

USSR
 MINISTRY OF
 INTERNAL AFFAIRS
 Prison Directorate
 " 2 " April 1954
 K-No. 28/1/10
 MOSCOW

[handwritten "1st Dept."]
 Top Secret
 copy No. 1
 [handwritten "125"]

DEPUTY HEAD, 2ND CHIEF DIRECTORATE OF THE
 COMMITTEE FOR STATE SECURITY ATTACHED
 TO THE COUNCIL OF MINISTERS, USSR

Reference: No. 1/1s/831 dated 11 Feb 1954

Supplemental to our No. 34/1/2378 dated 27 Feb 1954, I am reporting the health conditions of the convicted American citizens:

1. GOPKINS Fridrikh Charl'z, born 1921, physically fit, may be employed for any heavy physical work. Currently used in assembling boxes. He is not satisfied with the work.
2. VERDIN Uil'yam Ehndr'yu, born 1926, ill with chronic bronchitis. First labor category. He works as a rock sampler in the enrichment section of Mine No. 4, "Vorkutugol'" combine.
3. KUMISH Vil'fred, born 1915, ill with ichthyosis (a chronic skin disease) and hypertension.
4. MARCHUK Vasilij Timofeevich, born 1917, ill with hypertension in the transitive stage. Second labor category. He works as a KEhCh brigade carpenter.
5. FILDS, also known as FAJNGERSH Marej, born 1919, in the second physical labor category. Confined in Aleksandrovskaya Prison.

HEAD, PRISON DIRECTORATE OF THE MVD, USSR

Index No. 23-13353

[TFR 36-66]

copy
Top Secret
 copy No. 3
 [handwritten "145"]

TsK KPSS

We are reporting that during the years 1949-1950, the American citizens MARCHUK, VERDIN, and NOBL' were arrested by Soviet organs in the German Democratic Republic.

In March 1954, the US Embassy in Moscow transmitted to the MID, USSR an aide-memoire with a request to conduct an investigation concerning the detention of these people in the Soviet Union.

Simultaneously, not waiting for a response, the US Government published the text of the mentioned memorandum in the press.

The USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs addressed to the MVD, USSR a request to report their opinion regarding the cases of the mentioned people.

In connection with this, the Committee for State Security attached to the USSR Council of Ministers and the USSR Procuracy examined the cases of these Americans and established the following:

MARCHUK Vasilij Timofeevich, born 1917, native of Mejnar (USA), Belorussian, US citizen, Russian translator for a military intelligence organ in Berlin, was detained by the Soviet Commandant Staff in Potsdam in February 1949 during a drunken attempt to become acquainted with Soviet service members.

Until January 1950, MARCHUK was in the status of a detainee, after which his arrest was processed by the Brandenburg State Operations Sector. The investigation established that MARCHUK lived in the USA with his parents until 1939, then voluntarily entered

[stamp:

"Secretariat, 2nd Main Directorate
 of the Committee for State Security
 attached to the Council of Ministers, USSR
 Entry No. 12-15007
 16 October 1954"]

[TFR 36-67]

2.
 [handwritten "146"]

the American service until 1945 as an assistant mechanic in aviation units. After his discharge he lived with his parents, and then in 1948 again entered the service and was sent to Germany and served in Marburg. In November 1948, because he spoke Russian, he was sent to work as a translator in intelligence.

As a translator, he took part in the interrogations of Soviet citizens who had betrayed the Motherland, obtaining information about Soviet forces in Germany.

MARCHUK, giving testimony about his service in American intelligence as a translator, denied the charge of espionage since in his opinion he personally did not commit espionage and had arrived in Potsdam from Berlin in a drunken state.

In July 1950, by decision of the Special Session of the Ministry of State Security USSR, V.T. MARCHUK was sentenced to 25 years confinement for service in an American military intelligence organ. Serving his sentence in a camp, MARCHUK is currently working as a carpenter, ill with hypertension.

VERDIN Uil'yam Ehndr'yu, born 1926, native of Stark (USA), Hindu, US citizen, prior to arrest, a soldier in the American military serving as a radio operator for Headquarters Company, 6th Police Squadron in Koburg (Germany). Was detained in February 1949 by German national police on the territory of the Soviet Zone of occupation in Germany without any identification and was transferred to Soviet authorities.

Until February 1952, VERDIN was in the status of a detainee, after which his arrest was processed by the authorized representative of the MGB USSR in Germany. During confinement

[TFR 36-68]

3.
[handwritten "147"]

as well as during the investigation, VERDIN stated that he crossed into the Soviet Zone with the goal of getting discharged from the military, since he assumed that the Soviet Command Staff would transfer him to the American Command, who would then discharge him from the military for unauthorized crossing into the Soviet Zone and send him to the USA. VERDIN explained the destruction of his identification as a thoughtless action.

Being under guard for an extended period of time and considering his detention and arrest unlawful, VERDIN made terrorist threats among the foreign prisoners in relation to Soviet citizens and made slanderous insults against the KPSS.

In April 1952, VERDIN was sentenced by the Garrison Military Tribunal of the Soviet Sector of Berlin to 25 years confinement for terrorist utterances, anti-Soviet agitation, and unlawful crossing of the demarcation line.

Serving sentence in a camp, VERDIN works as a rock-sampler in Mine No. 4 of the "Vorkutugol" combine. He is ill with chronic bronchitis.

NOUBL' Dzhon, born 1923, a native of Detroit (USA), German, US citizen, detained in July 1945 in Germany by the Dresden Operations Group of the NKVD, USSR. After interrogation he was sent to a special camp at Buchenwalde, where in March 1950, he was sentenced under Control Council Directive No. 38 dated 12 October 1946.

The investigation established that NOBL' was a US citizen who lived in Detroit until 1938 and then together with his father Charl'z NOUBL' (also known as SHPANKNOBL' Karl) and other close relatives moved to Germany, where his father founded a factory for producing cameras and a factory for treating leather.

[TFR 36-69]

4.
[handwritten "148"]

While living in Germany during the war, NOBL's family was not interned because they were US citizens. The camera factory, ran by NOBL's father, produced precision instruments, searchlight apparatus, and filled German military production orders of various items for designated military vehicles in addition to producing cameras.

At the factory, Dzhon NOBL' carried out duties as a salesman of produced goods and ran other errands of a commercial nature for his father. His father was simultaneously arrested with Dzhon NOBL' and accused of criminal responsibility by the Control Council Directive. He was released from custody in June 1952.

Dzhon NOBL' did not plead guilty. In July 1950, by Special Session of the Ministry of State Security USSR, he was sentenced to 15 years confinement.

Based on existing factual material and keeping in mind -

that MARCHUK was in American intelligence for an short span of time and did not conduct active enemy activities against the USSR;

that Charl'z NOBL', as the owner of the camera factory, was producing military products for the fascist army and that Dzhon NOBL' only carried out his fathers instructions;

that there was no information regarding criminal activities against the USSR up to the moment of VERDIN's arrest and also considering that the measure of punishment does not correspond to the crime committed, we believe it is possible to approach the Supreme

TFR 36-70]

[handwritten "149" "5"]

Court of the USSR with a petition for review of their cases with the goal of reducing the terms to time served, and with subsequent expulsion of MARCHUK, NOBL', and VERDIN from the USSR.

Request your concurrence.

GENERAL PROCURACY
OF THE USSR

CHAIRMAN, COMMITTEE FOR STATE SECURITY
ATTACHED TO THE COUNCIL OF MINISTERS, USSR

(R. RUDENKO)

(I. SEROV)

" 14 " April 1954
No. 681-s

[handwritten "TsK KPSS concurs with these suggestions, and in connection with this Comrade Rudenko sent the corresponding material to the Supreme Court on Marchuk, Verdin, and Nobl' -[signature] 14 May 54"]

[TFR 36-71]

[illeg stamp]

Secret Copy No. _____

USSR

Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Department of the Countries of the Americas

Moscow, 200 Smolenskaya Sennaya Square

Index/Date

Index/Date

House 32/34. Telephone G 4-24-69

[illeg. handwriting with initials]

[handwritten "Ministry of" 1 illeg.]

"26" May 1954
Iss. No. 566/osa

TO THE CHAIRMAN, COMMITTEE FOR STATE SECURITY
ATTACHED TO THE COUNCIL OF MINISTERS, USSR

Comrade I. A. SEROV

According to a report from the Military Board of the Supreme Court USSR, on 19 May of this year the [Board] decided to release from custody with subsequent expulsion from the USSR the American citizens Verdin, Marchuk, and Nobl'.

It cannot be ruled out that upon leaving the USSR, these people may hand over information to the American authorities about other American citizens who are in prisons in the Soviet Union.

[handwritten "Comrade" name illeg. and initials]

As long as the Soviet Government takes upon itself the obligation not to hinder meetings of US Embassy representatives with American citizens under the Soviet-American agreement of 1933, I ask that you report the current status of the cases pertaining to American citizens Filds and Kumish. In letter No. 326/k dated 4 February 1954, the MVD USSR reported to the MID its intention to petition before the USSR Procuracy for a reduction in their sentences to time served and subsequent repatriation to the USA.

MEMBER OF THE BOARD OF THE MID, USSR

[signature]
(A. SOBOLEV)

[stamp "Secretariat, 2nd Chief Directorate of the Committee for State Security attached to the Council of Ministers, USSR Entry No. 31-19581 27 May 1954"]

[TFR 36-72]

[1 illeg. ".2"]

USSR
MINISTRY OF
INTERNAL AFFAIRS
Prison Directorate
" 16 " June 1954
No. 28/3/4827
City of MOSCOW

Top Secret
copy No. 1
[handwritten "150"]

HEAD, 2ND CHIEF DIRECTORATE OF THE KGB
ATTACHED TO THE COUNCIL OF MINISTERS, USSR

[illeg. handwritten comments or instructions]

In accordance with the rulings of the Military Board of the Supreme Court, USSR dated 19 May 1954, the American citizens currently serving sentences: NOBLE Dzhon, MARCHUK Vasilij Timofeevich, and VERDIN Uil'yam Ehdn'r'yu, are subject to expulsion from the USSR.

At this time, the above mentioned American citizens have been delivered to Moscow and are temporarily located in the Butyrskaya Prison of the MVD, USSR. These rulings have not yet been revealed to them.

I request you immediately report when it will be possible to organize the transfer of the listed Americans to American representatives and when, in your opinion, it will be advisable to reveal to them the rulings of the Military Board of the Supreme Court, USSR.

I consider it expedient to accomplish the transfer of NOBLE, MARCHUK, and VERDIN to representatives of the American authorities through Comrade SEMENOV, the High Commissar of the Soviet Administration in Berlin.

[1 handwritten name illeg. in left hand margin]

HEAD, PRISON DIRECTORATE OF THE MVD, USSR

[stamp "Secretariat, 2nd Chief Directorate
of the Committee for State Security
attached to the Council of Ministers, USSR
Entry No. 28-21889
12 June 1954"]

[handwritten along left side "When answering refer to our number and date"]

[TFR 36-73]

Reference: No. 28/1/862 dated 16/Jun-1954

Copy.
Top Secret
copy No. 1
[handwritten "151"]

To: HEAD, PRISON DIRECTORATE OF THE MVD, USSR

2nd Chief Directorate
28 June 54
2/1-1681

In accordance with the decision of this instance, the American citizens: NOBLE, MARCHUK, and VERDIN will not be transferred to American authorities before special instructions.

In connection with this, we consider it necessary to accommodate the mentioned Americans in the Mordovskaya ASSR at an assembly point for foreigners who are subject to repatriation.

HEAD, CHIEF DIRECTORATE OF THE COMMITTEE FOR STATE SECURITY
ATTACHED TO THE COUNCIL OF MINISTERS, USSR

[TFR 36-74]

[handwritten "No. 18"]

Workers of the World, Unite!

TOP SECRET

Communist Party of the Soviet Union, CENTRAL COMMITTEE

No. P101/V

To: Comrades Molotov (MID), Kruglov, Korobov.

31 Dec 1954

Extract of Protocol No. 101 Presidium TsK Session, 30 December 1954On the transfer of three American citizens to American Authorities

1. Permit the MVD of the USSR (Comrade Kruglov):
 - a) to transfer the American citizens Marchuk and Noubl, who are serving sentences in the Soviet Union to the American authorities in Berlin;
 - b) to transfer American citizen Verdin 2-3 weeks after the transfer of Marchuk and Noubl.
2. Concur with the proposal of the MID USSR to put forth a request regarding the repatriation of eleven children of Soviet citizens detained by American authorities simultaneously with the report to the American Embassy regarding the release of the American citizens Marchuk and Noubl.

TsK SECRETARY

-KP

[handwritten "Report SM USSR dated 30 Dec 54 No. 13833rs"]

[along left side of page "Subject to return within 7 days to Office of the Presidium TsK KPSS"]

[TFR 36-75]

[handwritten "37"]

Top Secret
DraftRESOLUTION

OF THE PRESIDUM OF THE TsK KPSS

On the case of RASTVOROV

Accept the proposal of the MID, USSR (Comrade ZORIN) and the Committee for State Security attached to the Council of Ministers, USSR (Comrade SEROV) regarding the call for clarification by the US Ambassador in Moscow to the MID, USSR concerning the case of Soviet diplomat RASTVOROV, who is being detained by US authorities.

Instruct the MID, USSR (Comrade ZORIN) to tell the US Ambassador during the talks that a positive response by the US Government to the request of the Soviet Government in relation to RASTVOROV, as presented in the Soviet demarche dated 15 February 1954, would result in the US Embassy in Moscow quickly receiving interesting information about the American citizens MARCHUK, VERDIN, and NOBL.

Until the position of the US Government on the matter of the transfer of RASTVOROV to Soviet authorities is clear, refrain from transferring the mentioned Americans to the US Government.

[TFR 36-76]

[partial stamp "No. 112350(op)
TsK 7610"][handwritten "198"]
SPECIAL FOLDER
Removed from "Special Folder"
SECRET

TsK Presidium Protocol No. 101 P.V.

[stamp "SUBJECT TO RETURN
7610
30 Dec 1954Taken from Inventory-AK
TsK KPSS in group "SPECIAL FOLDERS"
of the GENERAL DEPARTMENT
TsK KPSS"]

In a memorandum dated 23 October and in a demarche dated 29 December 1954, US Ambassador Bolen requests a quick decision on the matter of releasing the three American citizens Marchuk, Verdin, and Noubl, who are imprisoned in the USSR.

The indicated personnel were arrested by Soviet security organs on the territory of the GDR and sentenced to long imprisonment.

Marchuk was detained by the Soviet Commandant's Staff in Potsdam in February 1949. In July of 1950, he was sentenced to 25 years in an ITL for participation as a translator in interrogations of several Soviet citizens who had betrayed their homeland. At that time Marchuk was serving in the American Intelligence Services.

Verdin was detained in February 1949 by German national police. In April 1952, he was sentenced by Soviet organs to 25 years in an ITL for crossing into the Soviet Zone of Occupation in Berlin; prior to crossing into the Soviet Zone Verdin served in an American Police Squadron in West Germany.

Noubl was detained by Soviet organs in July 1945 and placed in a special camp in Buchenwald. In June 1950, he was sentenced to 15 years in an ITL for having his family camera shop in Germany produce several items for military vehicles along with cameras and for Noubl's apartment being used after the capitulation of Germany to hide his relatives over some time, who had earlier engaged in espionage activities for the benefit of fascist Germany.

Bearing in mind that Marchuk, Verdin, and Noubl were sentenced to long terms of imprisonment without sufficient grounds, the TsK KPSS on 8 May 1954 decided to reduce the term of imprisonment to time served and release them from custody with subsequent expulsion from the territory of the USSR.

However, in connection with the delay by the Americans in answering our request concerning Rastvorov, the MID was given instructions not to conduct the transfer of these

[handwritten "Distribute to the members of the Presidium of the
TsK KPSS. 30 Dec 54 V. Molotov"]

[TFR 36-77]

[handwritten "49"]

2.

three Americans at this time, and if the US Ambassador brings up the matter again, then to tie it in with the matter of Rastvorov.

It should be demarched that the US Embassy did not bring up the matter of Marchuk, Verdin, and Noubl until after the State Department had notified our Embassy in Washington that Rastvorov had been granted 'political asylum' in the USA and that representatives of the Soviet Embassy can meet with him at any time.

Under difficult circumstances, the MID suggests as possible to not detain the three Americans further and in accordance with the earlier decision, to release and transfer them to American authorities.

However, it would be advisable at first to transfer only Marchuk and Noubl (sentenced by a Special Session) in order to show that the indicated people are being released in the individual order in which their cases are reviewed, and not as a result of an official request by the American side regarding the release of the entire group. As for Verdin (sentenced by a military tribunal), he may be transferred 2-3 weeks after the transfer of Marchuk and Noubl and until then, the US Embassy will not be given any information about him.

Taking into consideration that the Americans will continue to detain the eleven children in West Germany and the USA, the MID, USSR believes it would be advisable to raise the question regarding the repatriation of the Soviet children to the USSR in connection with the transfer of Marchuk and Noubl; and attempt to challenge the Americans to [take] reciprocal measures in satisfying our claims. By detaining Verdin, we are letting the Americans know that we expect reciprocal measures on their part to satisfy our claims regarding the repatriation of the children of Soviet citizens.

The draft of the resolution is attached.

Request review.

[signature]
(V. MOLOTOV)

" 30 " December 1954
No. 1027/M

[TFR 36-78]

[handwritten "50"]

Draft

Secret

RESOLUTION OF THE TsK KPSS

1. Allow the MVD USSR (Comrade Kruglov):

- a) To transfer to American authorities in Berlin American citizens Marchuk and Noubl, who are serving sentences in the Soviet Union;
- b) To transfer American citizen Verdin to American authorities 2-3 weeks after transfer of Marchuk and Noubl.

2. Concur with the MID USSR proposal to simultaneously present a request regarding the repatriation of eleven children of Soviet citizens detained by American authorities in the report to the American Embassy concerning the release of American citizens Marchuk and Noubl.

[TFR 36-79]

Reference No. 566/osa

Top Secretcopy No. 2
[handwritten "154"]Chief Directorate
23 July 54
2/I-1929

MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, USSR

Comrade SOBOLEV

The case concerning American citizen FILDS has been reviewed by the Investigations Directorate of the Committee for State Security attached to the Council of Ministers, USSR and on 30 June of this year was sent to the Main Military Procuracy with a proposal to reduce his sentence to time served.

We consider it possible to refrain at this time from reviewing American citizen KUMISH's case to reduce the sentence, since it is subject to review on general grounds in the order of review of investigated cases. These decisions were pronounced in due course by the Special Session attached to the Ministry of State Security.

HEAD, CHIEF DIRECTORATE OF THE COMMITTEE FOR STATE SECURITY ATTACHED TO THE COUNCIL OF MINISTERS, USSR

[TFR 36-80]

73533

Top Secret

[handwritten numbers "373 15-20002 20-401 20-50"]

MEMORANDUM sent via "VCh"

City of KIEV,
CHAIRMAN, COMMITTEE FOR STATE SECURITY, Comrade NIKITCHENKO

In connection with the US Embassy's request and the review of the matter on the possibility of arranging a meeting for US Embassy representatives with several Soviet citizens, who in their opinion are American citizens, we request that you supply us with the following information on the people listed below within five days: their current place of residence, what type of socially beneficial work they do, what property (personal and real) they have, what other sources of income they have, the composition of their families with indication of their citizenship and brief, basic information on the family members, and types of identification documents they have on hand (when, where, in what capacity, numbers and reason for issue) on the following personnel.

BERKO Irina Mikhailovna, born 1925, lived in Rodatychi, L'vovskaya Oblast; SEMKO Mikhail Ivanovich, born 1919, and SEMKO Ivan Ivanovich, born 1922, lived in Petrichi, L'vovskaya Oblast; KORETSSKAYA (KOLODIJ) Mariya Vasil'evna, born 1919, lived in Slovita, L'vovskaya Oblast; KAZANSKAYA Sofiya Vikent'evna, born 1913, in 1945 was arrested by the UMGB L'vovskaya Oblast, and in 1949 upon finishing her sentence was released from prison and according to available data lives in Ukraine; DOVGULEVICH Stepan Stepanovich, born 1927, in 1953 was arrested by the MVD USSR, was released in 1945 for inadequate [proof] and according to inexact information lives in Stalino; DRAGULA Vasilij (Charli) Fedorovich, born 1923; DRAGULA Stepan Fedorovich, born 1930, DRAGULA Fedor (Frehnik) Fedorovich, born 1930, DRAGULA

[TFR 36-81]

[handwritten "357"]

2.

Mariya (Mehri) Fedorovna, born 1925, DRAGULA Margarita Fedorovna, born 1929, DRAGULA Ivan (Dzhon) Fedorovich, born 1928, lived in Mukachevo, Zakarpatskaya Oblast; FEDAK Mariya Petrovna, born 1903, lived in Shishlovtsy, Zakarpatskaya Oblast; RUDYK Lueta Artunovna, born 1890, lived in Mlynov, Rovenskaya Oblast, GITSKA Ivan Vasil'evich, born 1917, and GITSKA Mikhail Vasil'evich, born in 1920 lived in Vijsko Drogobychskaya Oblast; KRIVENKO Yuri (Georgij) Mikhailovich, born 1924, lived in Beregovo, Zakarpatskaya Oblast; BLYAKH Genrikh Pavlovich, born 1932, lived in Strievka, Ternopol'skaya Oblast; MEGITS Vasilij (Bazil') Dmitrievich, born 1915, MEGITS Stepan Dmitrievich, born 1918, MEGITS Fedor Dmitrievich, born 1920, lived in Tarnava Drogobychskaya Oblast; YAREMA Dzhon Andreevich, born 1918, lived in Pyatnitsa Drogobychskaya Oblast.

It is also necessary to provide a socio-political profile of these people with a listing of the sources used as its basis.

5 November 1954

No. 2/I- 3021

[signature]

[TFR 36-82]

USSR
MINISTRY OF
INTERNAL AFFAIRS

Prison Bureau
" 19 " November 1954
No. 28/1/2710
city of MOSCOW

Secret
copy No. 1
[handwritten "339"]
[illeg. handwriting]

HEAD, 2ND CHIEF DIRECTORATE OF THE KGB
ATTACHED TO THE COUNCIL OF MINISTERS, USSR

The American citizens: NOBLE Dzhon, MARCHUK Vasilij Timofeevich, and VERDIN Uil'yam Ehndr'yu, who, in accordance with the judgement of the Military Board of the Supreme Court USSR dated 19 May 1954, are subject to expulsion from the USSR, are at an assembly point for foreigners in a camp section of the MVD Mordovskaya ASSR.

In connection with your letter No. 2/1-681 dated 28 June of this year, the ruling by the Military Board has not been revealed at this time to NOBLE, MARCHUK, or VERDIN.

Taking into consideration that the confinement of the above-mentioned Americans in the camp section without revealing the ruling to them is illegal, I request that you quickly resolve the matter regarding the possibility of transferring them to representatives of the US authorities.

HEAD, PRISON BUREAU OF THE MVD, USSR
Colonel

[stamp "Issue No. 23-42125
" 20 " Nov 1954 "]

[TFR 36-83]

Top Secret

73532

[handwritten "409?"]

[handwritten numbers "15-20002 20-121/3/XI 20-201"]

MEMORANDUM sent via "VCh"

City of MINSK,
TO THE CHAIRMAN, COMMITTEE FOR STATE SECURITY

Comrade PEREPELTSIN

In connection with US Embassy's request and with the review of the matter concerning the possibility of an arranged meeting for US Embassy representatives with several Soviet citizens, who in their opinion are American citizens, we request that you supply us with the following information on the people listed below within three days: their current place of residence, what socially beneficial work do they do, what property (personal and real) do they have, what other sources of income do they have, what family do they have with indications of their citizenship and short list of basic information on the family members, what type of identification do they have in hand (when, where, for whom, number and basis for issue).

KAZUN Valentina Vasil'evna, born 1933, and KAZUN Vladimir Vasil'evich, born 1935, lived in Shepets, Ostrinskoj village, Vasilizhkovskoj Rajon, Grodnenskaya Oblast;

TSESLYAK Mechislav Vatslavovich, born 1910, in 1945 was arrested by the UMGB Grodnenskaya Oblast, sentenced to 5 years in an ITL, released in 1949 and according to available data lives in Belorussia.

It is also necessary to provide a socio-political profile of these people with a list of sources used as its basis.

" 15 " November 1954

No. 2/I- 3020

[signature]

DEPUTY HEAD, CHIEF DIRECTORATE OF THE COMMITTEE FOR STATE
SECURITY ATTACHED TO THE COUNCIL OF MINISTERS, USSR

[handwritten "No. 20"]

MEMORANDUM

BYUKAR-LAPSHINA Annabel Iren, born 1915, a native of Trafford, Pennsylvania, USA, and a former employee of the US Embassy in Moscow.

On 27 February 1948, she left the Embassy and asked for political asylum in the USSR.

In July 1950, by Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet USSR, Byukar received Soviet citizenship.

Currently retired, living at: Moscow, Serafimovich St, house 2, apt. 463. Repeatedly went to the USA to [visit] relatives, the last time in 1990 to Trafford to [see] her sister.

There are no objections from A.I. Byukar-Lapshina on providing information on herself to the American side.

MEMORANDUM

TERNER Vil'yam Klejton, born 1922, a native of Koffilvil, USA, and a former US Army service-member, sergeant. On 15 October 1954, he deserted from his unit, crossed the FRG border, and arrived in East Germany, from where he emigrated to the USSR.

By Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, Turner received Soviet citizenship.

He currently lives in the village Srednij Burluk Shipovatskoj Sel'sovet Velliko-Burlukskoj Rajon, Kharkovskaya Oblast.

Relatives of Turner:

- father- Turner Zhan Vol'ter, born 1884, died 1934
 - mother- Turner Salli Ehn, born 1886, lived in Bunevil, Mississippi, USA
 - sister- Emma Sarber, born 1919, lived in Chicago USA
 - sister- Lyusi Tru, born 1915, lived in Vaternal USA.
- Turner does not object to information on himself being provided to the American side.

[TFR 36-86]

MEMORANDUM

MITCHELL Bernon Ferguson, born 1929, previously an employee of the National Security Agency, USA. Arrived in the USSR in 1960, received Soviet citizenship.

Currently living at: St. Petersburg, Rimskij-Korsakov St., house 12/2, apt. 1.

He has no objections to information on himself being provided to the American side.

[TFR 36-87]

MEMORANDUM

BILAK Mariya Vasil'evna, born in 1919, a native of Pitson, USA.

In 1920 Bilak arrived with her parents from the USA to reside in the Zakarpatskaya Oblast, where in 1936 she got married. In 1939 she returned to the USA, leaving her husband and daughter in the Zakarpatskaya Oblast.

In November 1956, she again travelled to the USSR and sent a letter to the US Embassy in Moscow declining American citizenship.

Currently a pensioner living in the village Zarech'e, Irshavskoj Rajon, Zakarpatskaya Oblast, Lenin St, house 40.

She has no objections to information on herself being provided to the American side.

MEMORANDUM

STOUNER Sesil Avgustovich, born 1912, a native of Springfield Missouri, USA.

Moved to the USSR in 1953 in the region of Bol'shoi Diomid Island (Far East). On 16 June 1953, a criminal case arose against Stouner for illegal crossing of the USSR border. It was dropped on 14 December 1953. Stouner was released from custody on 16 December 1953.

After receiving political asylum, Stouner lived in the Lenin Kolkhoz, Kirsanovskoj Rajon, Tambovskaya Oblast. However, in 1959 S.A. Stouner and his wife Ehmma Khristoforovna, born in 1915, left for residence in Estonia (Tartu).

According to information of the MVD RF, on 2 July 1964, Stouner was arrested by the KGB of the Lithuanian SSR SM and, on 15 September 1964, was sentenced by the Lithuanian SSR Supreme Court under Article 62, Section 1 of the Lithuanian SSR Criminal code (treason) to 6 years confinement. He died 9 May 1965 in a prison in the Mordovskaya ASSR.

MEMORANDUM

KOPOV (KOVYNSKIY) Mikhail Emel'yanovich - also known as Majk, Michel - born 1895, a native of the small town of Matsiev, b. Volynskaya Guberniya.

Lived in the USA until 1930. In 1916, graduated from a technical training course in Detroit. In 1918, over a period of 6-8 months, he served in the field as an auto mechanic instructor in the US Army Reserves, with the rank of private. Until 1921, worked in the Ford factory in Detroit as a shop chief, from 1921 to 1923 at the Keglik firm, from 1923 to 1925 at the Fisher Firm in Detroit as Chief Expediter of the wood-working shop, and from 1926 to 1930 in the Moris Chejn firm as a mechanic. In 1930, under contract with 'SoyuzStroem' he arrived in the USSR for work at the Gor'kovskoj factory. He received Soviet citizenship in 1934.

His wife - Dunaeva (Dunaj) Ol'ga Ivanovna, born 1909, a native of Riga, a son Teodor born in 1932.

Father - Kovdynskij Andrej, a farmer. Mother - Kovdynskaya Elizabeta. Brother - Stefan, lived in Detroit, 7507 Vyher St. His sister - Yadvanskaya Ehn lived in Detroit 7222 Vajks St., Sister - Kovanskaya Nehl, lived in Detroit, 7224 Vehler. Sister - Kovdynskaya Roza.

M.E. Kopov, accused of 'damaging anti-Soviet activity', was sentenced by a Special Board of the Supreme Court, Tatarskaya ASSR on 2 August 1937 to 10 years in an ITL.

On 17 February 1943, for anti-Soviet agitation, he was sentenced to death by firing squad by the Military Tribunal NKVD forces. However, by decision of the Military Board of the Supreme Court USSR, the sentence was changed to 25 years in an ITL.

By resolution of the Military Board of the Supreme Court USSR on 27 June 1957, Kopov was rehabilitated.

In 1958, he lived in Ordzhonikidzhe, Nikopol'skoj Rajon, Dnepropetrovskaya Oblast, at Sportivnaya St., house 6, apt. 8. [handwritten "(died)"]

[TFR 36-90]

[stamp mostly illeg [illegible handwriting]

"201
2 Feb 1950
4 40 m."]

MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, USSR

Reference: your No. 44 MID/

1. American soldier KERIK GAJ, born 1920, was detained 8 February 1949 upon crossing the demarcation line into the Soviet Zone. Deserted from the American Army and requested asylum.

2. French soldier GOMPTEN ANDREH, born 1921, voluntarily crossed into the Soviet Zone on 15 Jun 49. He explained his reason for crossing as political.

3. French soldier RENARD LYUIS, born 1924, crossed over to Soviet authorities on 6 Apr 49. His reason for crossing was explained as an unwillingness to leave for a second tour in Vietnam for participation in military action.

MEL'NIKOV believes that KERIK GAJ, GOMPTEN ANDREH, and RENARD LYUIS should be transferred to the western occupational authorities since they present no interest for organs of the MGB.

SEMICHASTNOV, IL'ICHEV

No. 65

1 Feb 50

1 Feb 50 1900 SAMOKHIN

[Archival citation on back "f. 5, op. 178677, d. 1404, l. 480"]

[TFR 36-91]

MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS USSR

[illegible handwriting]

On the night between 2 February and 3 February of this year, a private of the American Armed Forces - Dzhonson Karlos, born 1927, North Carolina, crossed the demarcation line and went to the Soviet Military Commandant's Staff building in the city of Urfar.

Dzhonson stated to the commandant staff that he did not want to return to his homeland and requested that the Soviet authorities in Austria grant him asylum. He put this in a written statement. Dzhonson stated that he has been in the service since 1946 with short breaks. He served with American forces in Korea and was twice wounded. He arrived in Austria at the end of June 1953. In July, he went through a month-long course on military reconnaissance.

The Special Department for the Group of Forces is conducting the interrogation.

No. 321/VK
3 Aug 53

IL'ICHEV

[Archival citation on back "f. 5, op. 178677, d. 1899, l. 215"]

[TFR 36-92]

[handwritten "46"]

Workers of the World, Unite!

TOP SECRET

All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks). CENTRAL COMMITTEE
No. P73/99

[handwritten "67"]

To Comrade Vyshinskiy.

28 Feb 1950

Extract from Protocol No. 73 Politburo Session TsK VKP(b)
Decision of 25 February 195099. - The matter of the MID, USSR

1. Acknowledge the presentation of the MID USSR draft in response to the US Embassy's demarche dated 4 October 1949 and the memorandum dated 12 December 1949 (attached).

2. Publish the contents indicated in para. 1 of the response.

SECRETARY of the TsK

5-11

[along left side of page "Subject to return no later than 7 days to Section 2 of the General Office of the VKP(b) (resolution [illeg] 5 V- [illeg] Draft No. 100, para. 5)"]

[TFR 36-93]

[handwritten "68"]

Reference: paragraph 99 protocol PB No. 73

MEMORANDUM

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, in response to the letter from United States Ambassador in Moscow A. Kehrke dated 4 October 1949 and to the US Embassy memorandum dated 12 December 1949, brings to the attention of the United States of America the following.

1. In connection with the US Embassy's requests to establish the location of a number of people who, according to the Embassy's opinion are American citizens, competent Soviet agencies have in each case ascertained the location and citizenship of those people and have notified the Embassy of the results. The results of the investigation indicate that those persons mentioned in the US Embassy's appeals, whose presence on USSR territory has been established, are, with individual exceptions, either USSR citizens or third party citizens.

In those situations, when American citizenship is established, the requests submitted by the Embassy for those to exit the USSR were satisfied and these persons received permission to leave the Soviet Union. For example, petitions to leave the USSR for the United States were satisfied for Teodor Lyuboki (left the USSR 27 September 1947), Dzhon Lyuboki (left the USSR 29 September 1947), Sali Vajtsner (left the USSR 4 February 1948), Zhanetti Stillman Braun (left the USSR 18 August 1948), and Gizella Kovtyuk (left the USSR 3 December 1948). Soviet authorities even gave permission to the young son of a Soviet citizen, Allan Karl Khalm, to leave due to the fact that his mother, an American citizen - Alli Iren Khalm, wished to return to the United States after the death of her husband. Both did so on 1 December 1947.

2. As for those personnel listed in the letter from Mr. A. Kehrke and in the US Embassy memorandum, according to information of competent Soviet authorities: 23 are citizens of a third party country; 13 are Soviet citizens; 3 are not

[TFR 36-94]

[handwritten "69"]

- 2 -

found on the territory of the USSR; one is a stateless person; and one is an American citizen (female).

a) the 23 third party citizens left the confines of the USSR and went to the following countries:

Rumania - 17 people, namely Bajer Maria Anna, Khaas Tereza, Khellman Katerina, Dukarm Dzhon (Gans), Ketch Anna Maria, Khuber Eva Tereza, Anton Anna, Vagner Khil'da Elizaveta, Vol'fart Luiza, Gross Ottiliya Gerbst, Kirshner Mehri Ioganna, Klejn Anna, Formittag Magdalena, Fisher Margaret, Zil'man Anna, Shuster Vil'gelmina, Zaltner Khelen Magdalena.

Germany - 4 people: Shuller Khermin, Bassler Keht, Miller Antoni (junior), Khenkel' Katerina.

Poland - one person: Mulava Zenon.

Hungary - 1 person: Benga Dzhon.

b) Determined to be Soviet citizens are: Genri Blakha, Valentina Katsun, Vladimir Katsun, Daniel' Nikitchik, Fedor Nikitchik, Iren Berko, Dzhon Yarema, Dzhosef Marshall, Paulina Marshall, Aldona Marshall, Anna Shpigel', Mechislav Tselyak, and Sofiya Kazanska.

Competent Soviet authorities, however, are prepared to issue permission to exit the USSR for the USA to: Anne Shpigel' in consideration of her advanced age and that her husband permanently lives in the USA together with six children; for the underage children of citizen V.D. Katsun - Valentina and Vladimir, whose father is permanently living in the USA; Genri Blakha, 18 years old, in consideration that his parents permanently reside in the United States.

c) Regarding Vladislav Lazarska, Mikhail Latskievich, and Dzhosef T'ierdzhung (Junior), the Embassy has been notified that they were not found on USSR territory.

d) As for Georgij Krivenko who was mentioned in the memorandum, although a Hungarian by nationality, he is a stateless person. He, as the Embassy well knows, does not want American citizenship. In his statement from 30 October 1949 in the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet USSR, Georgij Krivenko petitioned for granting of Soviet citizenship. Simultaneously, Georgij Krivenko reported that he even wrote to the US Embassy in Moscow on 30 September 1949 regarding his

[TFR 36-95]

[handwritten "70"]

- 3 -

decision to remain in the USSR and take Soviet citizenship.

e) Regarding Adel' Sagatas, in view of the additional information received about her American citizenship, competent Soviet authorities are ready to issue A. Sagatas an exit visa.

In this manner, the facts seem to indicate that the allegation contained in the Embassy memorandum, i.e. the unilateral actions of the Soviet authorities allegedly interfered with several American citizens' return to the USA, is completely groundless.

3. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs demarches that the Embassy's allegation (that 32 American citizens were allegedly kept by Soviet authorities in confinement and used for "forced labor" in the Soviet Union) is but one of the malicious fabrications already referenced in a letter from the Minister of Foreign Affairs A. Ya. Vyshinskij to the US Embassy dated 30 August 1949.

4. As regards the reference in the Embassy's memorandum, that the Embassy had registered certain individuals as if they were American citizens, and in view of the unsubstantiality of the claim of these people to American citizenship, the Ministry does not consider it possible to enter into a review of this matter. In addition, insofar as the Embassy indicating in the memorandum that among these people there may also be those who have Soviet citizenship, the Ministry considers it necessary to bring to the attention of the Embassy that a decision on the matter regarding Soviet citizenship is exclusively the prerogative of Soviet authorities.

5. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs considers it necessary to bring to the attention of the US Government the numerous acts of tyranny carried out by American authorities with respect to Soviet citizens. American authorities are detaining the three young children of Soviet citizen Ambartsum Cholokyan in the USA: Dzhordzh, 12 years old; Al'bert, 10 years old; and Alisa, 5 years old. At the time of Cholokyan's departure from the USA to the Armyanskaya SSR in November 1947, the children were in a Catholic childrens' home and did not depart the US, despite the categorical demands of their parents.

[TFR 36-96]

- 4 - [handwritten "71"]

Although the Ministry brought this matter to the attention of the US Embassy (the illegal detention of the Cholokyan children in the US), not only was nothing accomplished on the part of the American authorities to eliminate such tyranny, but on the contrary, a US Embassy demarche dated 27 May 1948 contained the primary defense of these illegal actions which were committed by the American authorities in this matter.

The tyranny carried out in the US by American authorities regarding Soviet citizens is also attested to by this fact: the 1949 arrest and imprisonment of Soviet citizen P. But'ko for a period of almost 7 months and in violation of the Soviet-American Agreement of 1933, the American authorities did not even inform the Soviet Embassy in the US about the arrest of citizen But'ko.

The American authorities systematically hinder the reunification of long separated family members of Soviet citizens numbered among the so-called displaced people, and do not allow the return of Soviet citizens to their families in the Soviet Union. The American authorities illegally and forcibly detain in the American Zone of Occupation in Germany and Austria tens of thousands of Soviet citizens, so-called displaced people, and at the same time have the audacity to speak of alleged obstacles raised by Soviet authorities preventing several people, who are allegedly American citizens but in actuality are Soviet citizens or citizens of third parties, from exiting the Soviet Union.

All of the above attests to the fact that the claim of the US Embassy is lacking any basis.

Moscow, " " February 1950

True Copy: [signature]
5-ns.

[Archival citation on back "f. 3, op. 66, d. 366, l. 67-71"]

[TFR 36-97]

[Two photos, one full face and one right profile, of a Caucasian male approximately 40 years old. Right profile has the number "834" written at the bottom left corner.]

[TFR 36-98]

[typed form with handwritten entries]

USSR
MINISTRY FOR STATE SECURITY

WARRANT NO. F-24

30 August 1951

Given to: Comrade Captain
I.S. MamaevFor: The Search and Arrest of
Braun-Klifford Charl'z

Address: Wherever he may be

[Seal "Minister of State Security of the USSR"]
[Stamp "Minister of State Security of the USSR"]
Certificate 225

[Signature]

Arrest sanctioned (by the General Procurator of the USSR)

Assistant to the Chief Military Procurator, Soviet Army
Colonel (Legal Service) Comrade Varakii

[TFR 36-99]

[handwritten "4"]

[typed form with handwritten entries]

NKGB Agency

It is forbidden to give the questionnaire to the
arrested to complete. Complete the form using
the words of the arrested and verify with
documents.

ARRESTEE QUESTIONNAIRE

QUESTIONS

ANSWERS

1. Last name

Braun-Klifford

2. First name and
patronymic

Charl'z

3. Year and place of
birthBorn in 1918, village/city Los Angeles
(America)Oblast
Kraj4. Permanent place of
residence before 27
arrest (full
address)village/city Hamburg, area of AnderalsterOblast
Kraj5. Profession and
specialty

Engineer

- Draftsman

6. Last place of work
or type of
business prior to
arresta) Establishment German firm
enterprise "BLOM-FOOS"

b) job

Draftsman

c) title

d) if not working -- when and from where
dismissed

[TFR 36-100]

QUESTIONS	ANSWERS
7. Nationality	American
8. Citizenship (if lacking passport, show which document certifies citizenship or describe in words)	a) citizenship (subj.) <u>German</u> b) passport serial <u>No</u> by whom and when issued _____
9. Party membership	a) past <u>no party affiliation</u> b) present _____ card No. _____
10. General and special education (underline and show what was completed)	higher, middle, lower <u>2 years</u> special _____
11. Social origin (what were father and mother)	Peasant origin
12. Convictions (where, when, for what prosecuted and investigated, sentence)	
13. Detentions (by which organization, when, on suspicion of what crimes, under what name)	

[TFR 36-100a]

Relationship	Last name, first name and patronymic	Year of birth	Place of birth	Residence, job and position
Father	Braun-Klifford Rutiart	56 yrs		in America
Mother	Braun-Klifford Bar-para	54 yrs		in America
Wife (husband)	Bachelor			
Children	None			
Brothers, sisters	None			
Place for photo	Print of the index finger of the right hand (if missing, use the next finger -- with a corresponding mark). Fingerprint must be clear and fully rolled (from one edge of the nail to the other)			
[stamp "Processed at Butyrskij prison MGB" 31 August 1951 Duty photographer [signature]]				
Personal signature (of the arrestee)	[signature]	[fingerprint]		

[TFR 36-101]

15. WRITTEN DESCRIPTION (Underline as appropriate)

1. Height: tall (171-180 cm), very tall (over 180 cm), short (155-164 cm), very short (up to 154 cm), medium (165-170 cm).

2. Figure: fat, stout, medium, lean, thin.

3. Shoulders: raised, fallen, horizontal.

4. Neck: short, long, noticeable goiter, projecting Adam's apple.

5. Hair color: blond, very light brown, light brown, dark brown, black, red, graying, gray.

6. Eye color: blue, gray, greenish, light brown, brown, black.

7. Face: round, oval, rectangular, triangular, pyramidal, diamond-shaped.

8. Forehead: high, low, straight, receding, protruding.

9. Brows: straight, arched, twisting - thick, thin, connected.

10. Nose: small, large - thick, thin, broad. Bridge of the nose: concave, straight, [illegible]. Base of the nose: raised, horizontal, fallen.

11. Mouth: small, large. Corners of the mouth: drawn down, raised.

12. Lips: thin, thick, pendulous lower lip, raised upper lip.

13. Chin: receding, straight, protruding, cleft, dimpled, with a transverse cleft.

14. Ears: small, large - oval, triangular, square, round. Protrusion of the ears: upper, lower, overall. Ear lobes: attached, detached, sloping, angular, oval.

15. Distinctive marks

(physical deficiencies, mutilations, injuries, appendages: growths, warts, extra digits,

stains, weals, scars, painful movement of the body, baldness, asymmetry of the face, different color eyes, etc.)
tattoos (description)

16. Other peculiarities and habits

(burr, stutter, bites nails, different finger manipulations, gesticulates (show how),

tics, clears throat, spits, etc., etc.)

[TFR 36-101a]

16. When arrested "30" August 1951, order No. F-24.

17. Reason for arrest Decree (on selected methods of suppression) (indicate document name) (name of [1 illeg.] and date)

18. By whom enrolled 2nd Main Directorate of the MGB of the USSR

Form filled out At Butyrskii prison of the MGB, USSR (name of prison or KPZ)

City, village, railroad station MOSCOW

By whom Jr. Sergeant Mitrakov (position, rank, last name)

Signature [signature]

Registration Materials:

Alphabetical card -- " " copies

Fingerprint card -- " " copies

Photograph -- " " copies

Passed to Department "A" NKGB-UNKGB

Given (title) [signature]

Accepted (title) [signature]

"31" August 1951

[TFR 36-102]

[handwritten "Archive M-4527"]

ms-5

Extract from Protocol Number 57

[handwritten "224"]

Special Session of the USSR Ministry for State Security
on 17 November 1951

HEARD

DECREED

7. Case No. 5142 of the 2nd
Chief Directorate, MGB, USSR,
on the charge --

BRAUN-KLIFFORD Charl'z,
born in 1918, birthplace Los
Angeles, American, citizen of
Germany, with a secondary
school education.

Accused under Art. 58-4 UK
RSFSR.

BRAUN-KLIFFORD Charl'z
for participation in preparing an
aggressive war against the Soviet
government is sentenced to PRISON
for a term of TWENTY FIVE years,
counting the term from 28 August
1944.

[Seal of the Special Session
of the Ministry for State
Security, USSR]

Head of the Secretariat of the Special Session
[signature]

[handwritten "5"]

6006

[TFR 36-103]

[handwritten "52", "60"]

[handwritten "Archive M-4527"]

[handwritten "Died 17 May 53 in V-Ural'sk prison"]

DECISION NO. 3478/N

Military Board of the Supreme Court of the Union of SSR
composed of:

[stamp "Demarched in OSK

"5" January 1955"]

[handwritten "participated"]

Presiding - Major General (Legal Service) MATULEVICH
members Major General (Legal Service) ZARYANOV and
Major General (Legal Service) DMITRIYEV

We have reviewed the material on the early release of BRAUN-
KLIFFORD Charl'z, born in 1918, American, citizen of Germany, in
a court session on "25" May 1953. He was sentenced by a Special
Session of the MGB, USSR on 17 November 1951 under Article 58-4
of the UK, RSFSR to 25 years imprisonment. Taking into account
that further confinement in prison of the convicted BRAUN-
KLIFFORD is not necessary -

IT IS DECIDED:

BRAUN-KLIFFORD Charl'z is released early from further
serving his sentence.

Certified as duly signed --

True Copy:

typed in 3 cop.

copy No. 1 in the VK roster
copy No. 2-3 in the MVD USSR

Held at: Verkhne-Ural'sk prison.

[Seal of the Military Board
of the Supreme Court, USSR]
[signature]

[TFR 36-104]

CERTIFICATE
[of rehabilitation]

[seal]

PROCURACY GENERAL
OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION
CHIEF DIRECTORATE FOR SUPERVISING
THE IMPLEMENTATION OF LAWS
IN THE ARMED FORCES
"24" July 1992
No. 2-25427-46
103160, Moscow, K-160

This is to certify, that US citizen Braun-Klifford Charl'z Artur, (born 16 November 1918 in Los Angeles, California, USA, received "German national citizenship" in 1939, former engineer of the firm "Blom and Foss" in Hamburg, Germany) was detained on 8 Aug 44 by Soviet state security in Rumania and was later confined in prison.

He was arrested with the approval of the procurator on 29 August 1951. He was sentenced to imprisonment for a term of 25 years without grounds on 17 November of that year by a non-judicial decision of a Special Session of the Ministry for State Security, USSR, charged with participating in preparation of aggressive war against the Soviet Union under Article 58-4 of the UK, RSFSR,

In accordance with Article 3 of RSFSR Laws dated 18 October 1991, "On the rehabilitation of victims of political repression", Braun-Klifford Charl'z Artur is rehabilitated.

[Seal of the Main Military Procuracy]
MILITARY PROCURATOR OF THE DEPARTMENT
FOR REHABILITATION

[signature] S. V. Lebedev-Gorskiy

[TFR 36-105]

[First photograph is a side and front view of a lean dark-haired man in his 40's dressed in a dark jacket and white shirt without a tie. Across the bottom of the photograph is written: "568. Ehgon-Ogens Khain-Sal Samoch."]

[Second photograph is a front view possibly of the same individual dressed similarly but with a tie. There is no writing on this photograph.]

[seal]
RSFSR

CERTIFICATE OF DEATH

TsZ No. 008576

Mr Oggins
Isai Salomonovich
died the thirteenth of January one-thousand
nine hundred forty seven 13 Jan 1947
age 49 years
Cause of Death paralysis of the heart owing to acute sclerosis of
the coronary artery with associated angiospasm and papillary
carcinoma of the urinary bladder
which is recorded in the Civil Registry Office Book of Deaths
19 47 year January month 30 date
Completed corresponding entry No. 25
Place of Death: city, village Penza
region oblast', kraj
republic
Place of registration Northern ZAGS Regional Bureau
Issue date "20" January 1948

[place for
seal]

Manager, Civil Registry Office

[signature]

m.p.

[TFR 36-106]

Copy [handwritten "284"]
Top Secret
 copy No. 4

COUNCIL OF MINISTERS, USSR

21 May 1947
 No 2773/A

To Comrade I.V. Stalin.
 To Comrade V.M. Molotov

[Underlined sections of the text are filled in by hand.]

I am reporting to you on the following:

In April, 1942 the American Embassy in the USSR, by a demarche addressed to the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the USSR, reported that according to information possessed by the Embassy, the American citizen Oggins, Isai is imprisoned in a camp in Noril'sk. On behalf of the State Department, the Embassy asked for a report on the reason of his arrest, the term to which Oggins was sentenced and the condition of his health.

In connection with the requests of the American Embassy, two meetings took place on 8 December 1942 and on 9 January 1943 on the orders of Comrade Molotov with Embassy representatives and the convict Oggins. During these meetings, Oggins [Unknown number of words missing, whited-out] told the Representatives of the American Embassy that he was arrested as a Trotskyite illegally entering the Soviet Union on someone else's passport to contact the Trotskyite underground in the USSR.

In spite of such a declaration, the American Embassy in Moscow repeatedly raised the question before the MID, USSR on the review of the case and the early release of Oggins and forwarded Oggins' letters and telegrams to his wife, who lives in the USA. They also told the MID, USSR that they recognize Oggins as an American citizen and are ready to repatriate

[TFR 36-107]

[handwritten "285"]
 2.

him to his homeland.

On 9 May 1943, the American Embassy was told that corresponding Soviet agencies do not consider it necessary to review Oggins' case.

On 20 February 1939, Oggins [section of text whited-out.] was in reality arrested on the charges of espionage and treachery.

[A large section of text appears to have been censored/ whited-out.]

While investigating these suspicions, we did not find corroboration and Oggins pleaded not guilty. However, a Special Session for the NKVD, USSR sentenced Oggins to 8 years in the ITL, counting the term from 20 February 1939.

[A large section of text appears to have been censored/ whited-out.]

the appearance
 of Oggins in the USA might be used by persons hostile to the Soviet Union for active propaganda against the USSR.

[TFR 36-108]

[handwritten "286"]

[underlined text is handwritten entries]

Based on this, the MGB, USSR considers it necessary to execute Oggins, and then to report to the Americans, that after the meeting with Oggins and American Embassy representatives, in June 1943 he was returned to the place of confinement in Noril'sk where he died in 1946 in a hospital as a result of aggravated tuberculosis of the spine.

In the Noril'sk camp archives of the we will reflect the course of Oggins' illness and medical and other aid rendered to him. Oggins' death will be recorded officially in his medical records along with an autopsy and burial certificates.

Since Oggins' wife [large section of text appears to have been censored/ whited-out] is in New York, she has repeatedly asked our consulate for information about her husband, knowing that he was arrested, [large section of text appears to have been censored/ whited-out] - we consider it useful [appears to have been censored/ whited out] to summon her to the consulate and tell her of the death of her husband.

I request your instructions.

ABAKUMOV

[TFR 36-109]

[handwritten "4"]

USSR
PEOPLES COMMISSARIAT FOR INTERNAL AFFAIRS

WARRANT NO. 2643

20 February 1939

Given to: Comrade VLASOV of State Security

For: The Search and Arrest of
KHEJN, Ehgou, also known as
OGGINS, Isaj (Saj) Sajmonovich

Address: Hotel "Moscow", room #1035

[Seal "Ministry of Internal Affairs of the USSR"]
[Stamp "Peoples' Commissar of Internal Affairs of the USSR"]

Certificate 35

[Signature]

HEAD, 2ND DEPARTMENT OF THE 1ST DIRECTORATE OF THE NKVD, USSR

[TFR 36-110]

[handwritten "162"]
[handwritten "145"]

Extract from protocol No. I

Special Session of the Peoples Commissariat of Internal Affairs

am. dated 5 January 1940

HEARD

DECREED

3. Case No. 85/Investigative
unit GUGB NKVD USSR versus
OGGINS, Isaj Samojlovich, born
1898, native of the state of
Massachusetts (USA), Jew,
American citizen.

OGGINS, Isaj Sajmonovich to
be sentenced to a term of 8
years for espionage, starting
20 February 1939. Case to be
passed to the archives.

[Seal of the People's Commissariat for Internal Affairs]

Head, Secretariat of the Special Session,
People's Commissariat for Internal Affairs, USSR
[Signature] (IVANOV)

[TFR 36-111]

[typed document with handwritten entries]

I [signature] Ogins. Sy Sajmonovich
am familiar with the decree of the
Special Session of the NKVD of
5 January 1940.

Special Session Decree announced by:
Operations representative [signature]
(Office, rank and signature)

15 January 1940

[Seal of People's
Commissariat for
Internal Affairs]

Received
16 January 1940
[Signature]

[TFR 36-112]

[Seal of
Russian Federation]

General Procuracy of the
Russian Federation

103793 Moscow K-9 Pushkinskaya St. 15-a

28 July 1992 No. 13/3-3940-92

CERTIFICATE OF REHABILITATION

Citizen Oggins, - Khejn Isaj Sajmonovich
Year and birthplace 1898, Willimatik, USA
Place of residence before arrest Moscow, Hotel "Moskva"
Place of work and duties (kind of work) before arrest USA subject
When and by which agency was he sentenced (repressed) arrested on
20 February 1939 under Article 58-6 of the RSFSR Criminal Code
under suspicion of espionage. A prison term of 8 years was given
for espionage by a Special Session of the NKVD, USSR on 5 January
1940.

It is the determination of the USSR Procuracy on 20 June
1989 that Khejn Isaj Sajmonovich Oggins falls under the action of
Article I of the Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet,
USSR dated 16 January 1989 "On the supplementary measures towards
restoring justice for the victims of repression from the 30's,
40's and the early 50's."

Citizen Oggins, Khejn Isaj Sajmonovich is rehabilitated.

Assistant General Procurator
of the Russian Federation

[seal of RSFSR]
[initials]

[signature]
G.F. Besnovskaya

[TFR 37-1]

INFORMATION relating to the Korean War period

1. A KGB report on the capture of the Commander of the 24th Infantry Division, Major General Dean, on 25 Aug 50.
2. Report from 6 Dec 51 on the shootdown of 569 American planes over North Korean territory.
3. Information on 5 camps for American prisoners of war on the territory of North Korea and the number of prisoners of war confined in them (2257 Americans in all).
4. Information from an interrogation of an American prisoner of war on 26 Jun 52 about the presence of a group of US intelligence agents in Vladivostok.
5. Data on an American prisoner of war in Korea, Harding Djeck Ehrving, dated 25 Jun 52.
6. Cover letter to the record of the meeting between Stalin and Chou En-lai dated 19 Sep 52.
7. Record of the meeting between Stalin and Chou En-lai on 19 Sep 52.
8. Special report on the arrest of two American intelligence agents by state security agencies of Northeastern China on 3 Dec 52.
9. Report on the capture of 9 aircrew members of an American Strategic Aviation aircraft of the 91st Intelligence Detachment shot down on 12 Jan 53.
10. Stalin's correspondence with Mao Tse-tung and Kim Il Sung on the exchange of prisoners of war.
11. Correspondence and a report of the GRU regarding the operation of the Residency in North Korea (containing instructions from the GSh VS USSR, forbidding use of GRU personnel in work with American prisoners of war).
12. Information on the capture of two American citizens - Captain Ben Uikli Statts and Captain Karlton Volts on 17 May 63 by authorities of the KNDR.
13. Information regarding 71 American prisoners of war confined on North Korean territory (including interrogation material from 49 of the 71).

[TFR 37-2]

[handwritten "No. 1"]

17 Sep 50

No. 7134/0

TsK VKP(b)

COUNCIL OF MINISTERS USSR
to Comrade I.V. STALIN
to Comrade V.M. MOLOTOV
to Comrade L.P. BERIA
to Comrade G.M. MALENKOV
COUNCIL OF MINISTERS USSR
to Comrade N.A. BULGANIN

Regarding the detention on Korean
territory of the former Commander of the American
24th Infantry Division, Major General DEAN

I am reporting that, according to a report of the MGB USSR
advisor attached to organs of State Security of the Democratic
People's Republic of Korea [white-out, possible name], the former
Commander of the American 24th Infantry Division, Major General
(Infantry) William Frichi DEAN, was detained on 25 Aug 50.

General DEAN was detained under the following circumstances:

The 24th Infantry Division Headquarters was routed on 21 Jul
50 during a breakthrough in the front line near Tehzhon by forces
of the People's Army of the Democratic People's Republic of
Korea. In connection with this, the Americans initially reported
in the press and by radio that the 24th Infantry Division
Commander, General DEAN, was missing in action during this
operation, then later reported that he was killed.

Since DEAN's body was not found, an intensive search for it
was undertaken by the MVD Border Troops of the Democratic
People's Republic of Korea.

On 25 Aug 50, while the mountainous area was being
thoroughly searched, a disheveled American army soldier came out
from the hills, stopped an elderly peasant on the road and
demanded at gunpoint that the peasant take him to the front line.

The elderly peasant, realizing that a fugitive American
stood before him, took him to a Korean Border Detachment, where
DEAN

[TFR 37-3]

was detained.

The identity of the detainee was established as American
General DEAN.

During capture, DEAN attempted to use a weapon.

From the moment of capture until 8 Sep 50, DEAN was not
interrogated because he was seriously ill.

While being interrogated from 8-10 Sep 50 by organs of the
MVD Korea, DEAN testified that he was born in 1899 in Illinois
(USA) into the family of a private doctor. He entered the Army
in 1922 after completing a degree in literature and has served
continuously since then. During his period of service, he has
completed three military schools and also the military industrial
and the military infantry academies. He served in the US and on
the Hawaiian Islands until 1944. In 1944, first as second-in-
command and then as an infantry division commander, he
participated in allied airborne operations in France, where he
remained until the end of the war. In July 1945, he returned
with his division to the US. In 1947, he was appointed chief of
the American military administration in Korea. From August 1948
to January 1949, he commanded the 7th Infantry Division in Seoul.
In January 1949, he was transferred with his division to Japan,
and from there arrived in Korea on 2 July and took command of the
24th Infantry Division.

During the interrogations, DEAN at first attempted to resist
giving any testimony. But, after he was told that the American
Government considers him dead and that he is completely in the
hands of the Korean People's Army Command, he began to testify.
So far, only insignificant testimony, in particular, the number
of personnel and armaments of the 24th Division, which he
commanded, was given.

The interrogation of General DEAN continues.

Further results of Dean's interrogation will be reported to
you.

Typed 7 copies

- addressees
- Secretary, MGB USSR
- 1st Directorate, MGB USSR

DEPUTY MINISTER OF STATE SECURITY
USSR

(S. OGOL'TSOV)

[TFR 37-4]

[handwritten "No. 2"]

to Comrade A. N. POSKREBYSHEV

At your request, I am reporting that during all the battles for the period from 1 Nov 50 through 6 Dec 51, our air forces and anti-aircraft artillery in Korea shot down 569 enemy aircraft.

Our fighter aviation has shot down 510 aircraft:

B-29	-	40
B-26	-	1
B-45	-	2
F-94	-	8
F-86	-	172
F-84	-	132
F-80	-	101
F-51	-	22
Meteor 4	-	32

Our anti-aircraft artillery has shot down 59 aircraft.

Our losses were 63 MiG-15 and MiG-15bis, and 30 fliers. In anti-aircraft units there were 29 men killed and 53 wounded.

SHEMENKO

9 Dec 51

2-p

[TFR 37-5]

[handwritten "No. 3"]

[handwritten "Document given by the Chinese side in 1951"]

TABLE
on the number of prisoners of war
in North Korean camps

Name of Camp	Nationality	Number of POWs Officers	Sergeants	Enlisted	Total
1. Khakiseki	American	108	819	811	1738
	Negroes	5	236	148	389
	British	-	2	2	4
	Turkish	2	27	86	115
2. Ts'kotsin	American	-	-	369	369
	British	-	-	7	7
	French	-	-	12	12
3. Sukan	American	8	-	116	124
	British	5	-	125	130
4. Kinka	American	-	-	1	1
	Negroes	-	-	1	1
5. Pyongyang	American	13	6	6	25
	Negroes	-	-	5	5
	British	-	1	4	5
Total	American	119	825	1303	2257
	Negroes	5	236	154	395
	British	5	3	138	146
	Turkish	2	27	86	115
	French	-	-	12	12
OVERALL TOTAL		141	1091	1693	2925

[handwritten "No. 4"]

MEMORANDUM

from MAKAROV's enciphered telegram addressed to KRYMOV
dated 25 Jun 52 No. 20850/1844

MAKAROV reports that he received from our Chinese friends the following information:

The American prisoner of war [handwritten in English "Harding Djek Erving"] was interrogated by our Chinese comrades. He testified that, in 1950, he served in the intelligence section of the Headquarters of the Commander-In-Chief of the American Army in the Far East. As an intelligence officer, he knew of the presence of a group of US intelligence agents in Vladivostok. The group consisted of four persons: two Americans and two Russians. The prisoner remembers that one Russian had the last name PROVOZNIK: 40 years old, 5 feet 10 inches tall, thin, and had blond hair. This agent often traveled to Vladivostok and had direct contact with the Commander-In-Chief's intelligence section. The others operated from Manchurian territory.

In the opinion of our Chinese comrades, they cannot fully believe [handwritten in English "Harding"], although they have obtained much additional information from him.

MAKAROV reports that this information was not received in a special meeting, but rather in a general conversation about the work with prisoners of war.

True Copy: [signature] B. ZANEGIN

"26" Jun 52

see reverse
[There is nothing on the reverse of this copy.]

[handwritten "No. 5"]

[handwritten "Comrade Zanegin, acquaint the workers[?] [cut-off] of Comrade Konovalov's[?] department [cut-off] 14 Jul 52 [illeg. signature]"]

[handwritten in left-hand margin "Konovalov? 15 Feb 52"]

INFORMATION
ON AN AMERICAN PRISONER OF WAR IN KOREA

First Lieutenant, USAF, GARDING, Dzhek Erving [handwritten in English "HARDING, Djek Erving"], 34 years old, white American, member of the American Legion. He has 12 years of schooling. His father is a locomotive engineer, presently not working, retired. His mother is 58 years old and divorced from his father. His father is remarried and his step-mother is 52 years old. He has several sisters.

In 1937, he raped a girl, who became pregnant. He joined the service in order to avoid culpability. Fearing discipline, he resigned a short time later. He lived some time with his parents. Then, he again committed a crime: an automobile accident in which he was at fault. The result of the accident was that a woman who was riding with him became maimed (she lost an arm). Fearing culpability, he again joined the service and served until 1945, primarily in aerial reconnaissance. He participated in the war against Germany as a flier in a reconnaissance aircraft under the 4th Tank Division. He ended the war in Czechoslovakia.

as a First Lieutenant.

In 1945, he was discharged and worked at various jobs - flight instructor and secretary to the Chairman of the Lejkdaun [Lakedown?] Chapter of the American Legion.

In 1946-47, he again began service in military aviation. Then, under the protection of his uncle, a member of the American Congress and well-known police commissar[sic], he entered the CID intelligence school, followed by the intelligence school of a Washington military academy, where he studied for several months. In 1948-49, he was sent to Japan, where he served in special security detachments (apparently military counter-intelligence), then as chief of the secret clerical information-administration group of the intelligence section of the Commander in Chief, American forces in the Far East.

In 1950, he was again transferred to reconnaissance aviation and sent to Korea, where his aircraft was shot down in Apr 52, and he was taken prisoner.

Our Chinese comrades consider him very cunning and treacherous, however he has weaknesses: he is a coward, he likes to drink wine and when drunk he may disclose everything. Using these weaknesses, our Chinese comrades obtained significant material from him: mainly on organization, personnel, operations of headquarters of the Commander in Chief.

of American forces in the Far East, and especially on the intelligence section headquarters. In addition, he gave some factual material on American intelligence in Korea, Hong Kong, Burma, Indonesia, and other countries.

He also told about how American intelligence is interested in our Far East. According to him, a secret service intelligence group (in Chinese - intelligence station) was created in Vladivostok to conduct reconnaissance against the USSR. The group consists of four people directly subordinate to the headquarters intelligence section. The group has agent informers. Two of the four are American, the other two are White Guardsmen. One of the group is often in Vladivostok and maintains communications with the headquarters intelligence section, the other three operate from Manchurian territory. The prisoner personally saw one of the four, and knows that his name is PROVOZNIK - 40 years old, 5 feet 10 inches, blue eyes, light hair. This person at one time worked in the headquarters intelligence section.

Our Chinese comrades have not yet decided how to use this prisoner. They are not sure that the information which he gave them is factual. On our advice, they have taken all possible measures to cross-check the information he gave them. If his information is confirmed as accurate, they believe that he will submit to recruitment out of fear of being exposed.

[signature] (MAKAROV)

"25" June 1952

[TFR 37-10]

[handwritten "No. 6"]

Top Secret
Copy No. _____

Comrade A.N. POSKREBYSHEV

I am sending two copies of the minutes of the meeting between Comrade Stalin and Chou En-lai of 19 Sep 52.

[signature]

"30" Sep 52

[handwritten "1061-VK"]

[TFR 37-11]

[handwritten "No. 7"]

MINUTES OF THE MEETING

BETWEEN COMRADE STALIN with CHOU EN-LAI

19 Sep 52

Attending: Comrades Molotov, Malenkov, Beria
Mikoyan, Bulganin, Vyshinskij

Li Fu-Chun', Chzhan Behn'-Tyan',
Su Yuj, Shi Chzheh.

STALIN, beginning the meeting with the Mexican proposal on the exchange of prisoners of war, says that we agree with Mao Tse-tung that the Mexican proposal is unacceptable because it reflects the US position in the Korean negotiations. If the Mexicans bring up their proposal in the UN, then the Soviet delegation will veto the proposal, as it is not in accordance with the interests of ending the war in Korea. The Soviet delegation will then add the following:

"1. Immediate cessation of hostilities in the air, on the land, and on the sea.

"2. Return of all prisoners of war to their homelands in accordance with international standards.

"3. Withdrawal from Korea of foreign troops, to include the Chinese volunteer units, over the course of 2-3 months; and peaceful settlement of the Korean matter in the spirit of Korean unification conducted by the Koreans under the observation of a commission consisting of directly interested parties and other governments, to include governments not participating in the Korean War."

He adds that which and how many governments should participate in this commission can be discussed and decided as well.

Concerning the proposal that both sides temporarily withhold twenty percent of the prisoners of war and that they return all of the remaining prisoners of war - the Soviet delegation will not

[TFR 37-12]

touch this proposal and it remains in reserve for Mao Tse-tung.

CHOU EN-LAI asks what we think about the possibility of the Chinese Government concluding a nonaggression pact with India and Burma. Mao Tse-tung believes that concluding such a pact would be expedient.

STALIN replies that we adhere to the opinion of Comrade Mao Tse-tung. It goes without saying that there cannot and will not be any obstacles.

CHOU EN-LAI asks if it is possible to delay proposal of the second position, to wait 2-3 weeks.

STALIN answers that this is a matter for Mao Tse-tung. If Mao Tse-tung desires, then at the Assembly we can introduce a discussion of the second position on the percentage to be withheld.

CHOU EN-LAI raises a question regarding the third position, about the possibility of handing over prisoners of war to neutral countries in order that their fates be decided independently. He says that this is being discussed in international circles. He asks if Comrade Stalin considers it possible to support this position.

STALIN replies that we want a return of all prisoners of war. This corresponds with the Chinese position. If an agreement cannot be reached on the basis of this, then prisoners of war cannot be handed over to the UN because the UN is a combatant.

[TFR 37-13]

3.

He asks to which country the prisoners of war should be sent, based on the opinion of our Chinese comrades.

CHOU EN-LAI answers, Mao Tse-tung instructed me to say here that he has in mind India.

STALIN asks at whose expense will the prisoners of war be maintained. Apparently, at the expense of each of the appropriate parties?

CHOU EN-LAI answers that it is understood that if prisoners of war are to be handed over to India, then after some time they will be transferred through India to China. Then the Chinese and Korean sides will pay for the maintenance of the Korean and Chinese prisoners of war.

STALIN says that the proposal could be accepted, but one must keep in mind that the Americans do not want to hand over all the prisoners of war. The Americans will keep some of them, intending to recruit them. It was like this with our prisoners of war: every day now we catch several [former] prisoners of war whom the Americans send to our country. They detain prisoners of war not because, as the Americans often claim, the prisoners say that they do not want to return, but in order to use the prisoners for espionage.

CHOU EN-LAI acknowledges that this is exactly how it is.

He raises a question about the next point: to cease fire, and then discuss the issue of prisoners of war altogether later. He reminds us that Comrade Stalin has agreed to such a position if no proposal can be reached regarding the percentage of prisoners to be withheld.

STALIN acknowledges that this proposal can be interpreted as one of several possible positions, however the Americans are not likely to agree.

[TFR 37-14]

CHOU EN-LAI says that the Americans may propose this at the Assembly.

STALIN: That would be fine.

CHOU EN-LAI says that in the previous meeting, Comrade Stalin mentioned that China should take the initiative in creating a continental or regional UN. He asks if there will be any further guidance on this matter.

STALIN answers that he has not changed his point of view. He adds that in addition to the existing UN, there should be an Asian UN, a European UN and so forth. This is not to replace the UN, but to operate parallel to the UN. Let the Americans create an American organization, the Europeans - a European, the Asians - an Asian; but parallel with the UN and not against it.

CHOU EN-LAI says that China has no personal interest in the UN. To the Chinese it is clear: the initiative in creating a continental organization must be taken.

STALIN emphasizes that the UN is an American organization, and that it must be destroyed, but under the guise of respect for the UN. We do not say that it must be undermined, that this organization must be weakened; but in reality we weaken the organization.

He reminds us that during the war Churchill proposed the creation of a continental UN, but he met resistance from the Americans. We kept silent while listening to this argument, but then the British abandoned their position; and we supported the proposal for the creation of the UN.

[TFR 37-15]

CHOU EN-LAI asks if there will be a letter from Comrade Stalin to Mao Tse-tung on this issue.

STALIN explains that it is better to manage without a letter; that he sees that Chou En-lai is taking notes and that he trusts him fully.

CHOU EN-LAI touches on the Peace Congress in Peking, set to begin at the end of September, saying that the Congress must be moved to the beginning of October. He adds that China is fighting for Japanese and Indian participation at the Congress.

STALIN asks if Pakistan will be there.

CHOU EN-LAI acknowledges that Pakistan should also take part and that the Pakistanis have been invited; however, the Pakistani government is not issuing passports. As regards India, some members of the Indian delegation have already departed for the Congress. The Japanese are arriving via Hong Kong.

STALIN further says that a policy in which the main role belongs to the KNR must now be pursued, because:

- 1) initiative in convoking the Congress belongs to China;
- 2) it would be better, since the USSR is only partially in Asia, but China is entirely in Asia, that China have the main role.

CHOU EN-LAI asks what concrete measures will be taken by our delegation.

STALIN answers, "peace."

CHOU EN-LAI talks about Nehru's proposal on convoking a conference of five countries - the Soviet Union, China, England, France and the US.

MOLOTOV explains that it was the proposal of the Party Committee of the National Congress.

[TFR 37-16]

STALIN says that this proposal must be supported.

CHOU EN-LAI emphasizes that at such a conference, India without a doubt will be on England's side; however, it appears that it would be expedient to use this proposal.

STALIN agrees with this.

CHOU EN-LAI says that in light of the note published on the Port Arthur position, which the KNR must take in relation to Japan, it is completely clear. The KNR must show that Japan does not want to conclude a peace treaty with China and the Soviet Union.

STALIN adds, "and is preparing for aggression." He emphasizes that our position is not directed against the Japanese people.

CHOU EN-LAI raises the question on Formosa. He says that since the Japanese government has concluded an agreement with Chiang Kai-shek, it has thus confirmed that it ignores the interests of the Chinese people. This prohibits the possibility of concluding a peace treaty. As long as a treaty exists with Formosa, a peace treaty between Japan and the KNR is not possible.

STALIN emphasizes that the note on Port Arthur is directed against America, and not against the Japanese people. America maintains a fleet in Taiwan and exploits Taiwan. He supports the correctness of Chou En-lai's point of view on the impossibility of a peace treaty between the KNR and Japan, as long as Japan keeps a peace treaty with Chiang Kai-shek. He indicates that the fact that the treaty was signed between Japan and Chiang Kai-shek only worsens Japan's position.

CHOU EN-LAI asks what will be the further development of events on the matter of Germany.

[TFR 36-17]

7.

STALIN says that it is difficult to predict. Evidently, the Americans will not agree to a unification of Germany. They were plundering Germany; if the West and East Germans unify, then it will not be possible to plunder Germany. Therefore the Americans do not want a unified Germany.

CHOU EN-LAI expresses the opinion that although the Americans are rebuilding the armed forces of West Germany and Japan, in hopes of using them, the weapons may be turned against them.

STALIN says that this is absolutely possible, even if Germany will be headed by nationalists and Hitlerists.

CHOU EN-LAI turns to the situation in Sin'tsryan [Sinkiang?]. He says that the work in Sin'tsryan is going well overall and that agricultural reforms are being realized in Sin'tsryan. Leftist excesses, however, are taking place in the illegal confiscation of livestock, in the area of religion, and in the area of lowering interest on loans and land rents. In an effort to do away with these excesses, a TsK plenum was convened. At the plenum, Van Chzhen was removed from the duties of secretary of the Sin'tsryan Podburo[sic] of the TsK KPK, and a number of TsK members were sent to liquidate excesses on the spot. In general, the dissatisfaction, which had a place here, has been liquidated; the instances of defection, to include those to the USSR, have been put to an end.

STALIN says that the excesses are a result of attempts to quickly obtain land and livestock which had been confiscated from the wealthy.

CHOU EN-LAI remarks that, as soon as the rumour of reform spread, hostile elements immediately began to slaughter livestock.

[TFR 37-18]

STALIN remarks that similar incidents even took place in the corresponding period of our experience. Reform must be speeded up. If agrarian reform is not carried out, then such looting will continue into the future.

CHOU EN-LAI clarifies that agrarian reform is being carried out in agricultural regions; however, distribution and its accompanying excesses are done in other, livestock-rearing regions. Since shepherds participate in the distribution, the Chinese leadership has adopted the decision to improve the shepherds' condition, which should improve the general condition.

STALIN says that you [the Chinese], of course, know best.

CHOU EN-LAI says that according to Lyu Shao-tsi's report, two Indonesian Communist Party representatives should come to the XIX Congress. He asks whether it will be timely to discuss party matters with them in Moscow.

STALIN says that for now, it is difficult to say. It depends on whether they turn to the TsK for advice. He points out that when the Indian Communist Party representatives came, they asked us to help them in the matter of determining a Party program; this had to be done, despite our heavy workload.

CHOU EN-LAI reports that our Japanese comrades should also come, and more than likely will also want to discuss party affairs.

STALIN answers that big brothers cannot refuse their little brothers in such a case. He says that this will need to be talked over with Lyu Shao-tsi because he has much experience, and we will need to clarify how our Chinese friends feel about this.

CHOU EN-LAI points out that Lyu Shao-tsi intends

[TFR 37-19]

[handwritten "99"]
9.

to take appropriate materials with him in order to discuss a number of matters.

STALIN remarks that if our Chinese comrades want to discuss these matters, then of course there will be no objections from our side; and if they do not want to, then there will be no need to talk.

CHOU EN-LAI says that the Chinese comrades, without a doubt, will want to talk.

STALIN answers that in that case, time will be found.

CHOU EN-LAI says that it cannot be excluded that our Vietnamese friends will also come.

STALIN remarks the Vietnamese comrades are our friends and will be our guests.

CHOU EN-LAI, concluding the meeting, says that these are all the matters on which they would like instruction.

STALIN asks, "instruction or advice?"

CHOU EN-LAI answers that from the point of view of Comrade Stalin, this is perhaps advice, but in its presentation it is instruction.

STALIN remarks to this that we only give advice, we lay out our opinion. Our Chinese comrades can take it or not. Instruction carries with it an obligatory character.

CHOU EN-LAI repeats that from the Chinese point of view, it is instruction, and most valuable instruction at that. He remarks that they do not blindly accept these instructions, but consider it necessary to understand and consciously accept these instructions.

STALIN emphasizes that we know little about the Chinese and therefore are careful about giving instructions.

[TFR 37-20]

CHOU EN-LAI says that they are basing this on the fact that without a doubt, Comrade Stalin is quite familiar with precisely those matters which we are addressing. He again asks whether there will be any instructions.

Comrade STALIN answers that our advice is this: one must remember that the British and Americans will be trying to supply the Chinese government apparatus with their own people, their own agents. It is all the same whether they are Americans or French. They will carry out subversive work, attempt to corrupt from within, and may even resort to criminal action, such as poisonings. Therefore, caution is required. He says that this must be kept in mind. These are the only instructions.

CHOU EN-LAI says that these are very valuable instructions. He agrees that not only may the Americans, British and French resort to vile deeds, but they may also incite the Chinese to such deeds.

STALIN adds, "and their own agents from the national bourgeoisie."

MOLOTOV returns to the matter of military credit, concerning payment of the cost of arming 60 Chinese divisions. He asks whether he correctly understood Chou En-lai the last time in that the cost of the delivery for 60 divisions does not apply to the military credit given by the Soviet Government to China under the agreement of 1 Feb 51. The delivery of arms for 60 Chinese infantry divisions will be paid in full by credit being given under special agreement between China and the Soviet Union.

CHOU EN-LAI answers that Comrade Molotov correctly understood him, and once again acknowledges that the calculations

[TFR 37-21]

[handwritten "101"]

11.
relating to arming the 60 Chinese divisions should be carried out with a complete payment, and not with a half payment, as it was not established for China.

STALIN says that in that situation it is necessary to sign a special agreement.

Further, he touches on the gifts from the Chinese Government to representatives of the Soviet Union, and points out that there are very many gifts.

CHOU EN-LAI explains that they were unable to present gifts to Comrade Stalin in time for his 70th birthday. They were in the gift museum, saw the gifts sent from other countries, and decided that they had to make up for what they could not do on time.

STALIN says that we would also like to present the Chinese Government delegation with automobiles of Soviet make. He says that we have "ZIM" automobiles, which are smaller than the "ZIS", but are very attractive, and we would like to present these "ZIMs".

Then the matter of relations with Sun Tsin-lin was touched upon.

CHOU EN-LAI says that she is working on becoming more in touch with herself; that she gradually is switching from bourgeois ideology to their camp; [that she] makes good speeches based on our ideology. He says that Sun Tsin-lin is proud that she is a Laureate of the International Stalin Peace Prize. The Meeting began at 1030 and ended at 1230.

Recorded by: [signature] (A. Vyshinskij)
[signature] (N. Fedorenko)

[handwritten on reverse "Arkhir Prezidenta RF, f. 45, op. 1, d. 329, l. 90-101"]

[TFR 37-22]

[handwritten "No. 8"]

December 1952

3/[handwritten "5/36712"]

[handwritten "Copy"]

[handwritten "Top Secret"]

[in a typeface different from the rest of text
"SPECIAL ADVISORY"]

on the detention of two American intelligence officers
by state security organs
of Northeast China.

On 5 Dec of this year, LI-NAN', Head of the Directorate for State Security, Chinese People's Republic, Port Arthur Region, informed the Department Head of the Counterintelligence Department, MGB, 39th(?) Army that on 3 Dec of this year in the province of Girin, as a result of a game [literal translation of original "igra" - in this case connoting ploy or subterfuge] conducted by the Department of State Security, Northeast China (city of Mukden), an American aircraft was allowed to land.

Among the aircraft crew members were two intelligence officers, Lieutenant Colonels of the American Army, who arrived to brief agent-saboteurs that were earlier airdropped into Northeast China.

The above-mentioned American intelligence officers are in Mukden.

DEPARTMENT HEAD, CHIEF DIRECTORATE
OF THE MGB, USSR

Printed 5 copies:

- 1st - [handwritten "Comrade Goglidze"]
- 2nd -
- 3rd -
- 4th -
- 5th -

[handwritten "to Goglidze and Comrade Ogol'tsov"]
[There appears to be some missing handwritten instructions below this heading]

[TFR 37-23]

[handwritten "No. 9"]

[handwritten "Copy"]

[handwritten "Top Secret"]

to: Comrade G.M. MALENKOV
Comrade L.P. BERIA
Comrade H.A. BULGANIN

I am reporting that, according to the report from the MGB USSR advisor in China, 9 crewmembers of an aircraft from the 91st Reconnaissance Detachment, American Strategic Aviation, which was shot down in the area of An'dun on 12 Jan 53, were taken prisoner. The chief of communication services and supply, Colonel KHNNOT, and the staff officer of operational reconnaissance service, 91st Detachment, Major BAUL (last names were given in Chinese transcription), were also on the aircraft. On the instructions of the TsK Communist Party of China, they will be sent to Peking and subjected to interrogation.

The Minister of Public Security of China, having reported on 27 Jan 53 to our advisor on this decision of the TsK KPK, requested that our advisor help the Chinese investigators organize the interrogation of the prisoners of war and check their work.

The MGB USSR advisor was ordered by us to render such help.

S. IGNAT'EV

"29" Jan 53
No. 333/I

[TFR 37-24]

[handwritten "No. 10"]

[handwritten "28"]
[handwritten initials "DS"]

Subject to return within 24 hours to the
Special Sector, Directorate of Affairs
of the Council of Ministers of the USSR

Top Secret
(Special Folder)
[handwritten "60"]

to Comrade G.M. MALENKOV

COUNCIL OF MINISTERS, USSR
DECREE
dated "19" Mar 53 No. 858-372ss
Moscow, The Kremlin

The MID Issue.

The Council of Ministers of the USSR DECREES:

1. Approve the attached draft of the letter from the
Government of the USSR addressed to Mao Tse-tung and Kim Il Sung
(Attachment No. 1).

Transmit this letter to Comrade Mao Tse-tung through Comrade
Chou En-Lai and Comrade V.V. Kuznetsov, and to Comrade Kim Il
Sung through Comrade Malik, who will be sent immediately to
P'yongyang.

2. Approve the Soviet delegation directive at the General
Assembly (Attachment No. 2).

[Circular seal for "DIRECTORATE OF AFFAIRS, COUNCIL OF MINISTERS
USSR - PROTOCOL SECTION"]

Chairman	
Council of Ministers, USSR	G. Malenkov
Director of Affairs	
Council of Ministers, USSR	M. Pomaznev

[along left edge of page "Note: It is categorically forbidden to
make copies or extracts of this Decree. The comrade to whom the
document is addressed is to personally sign and date each
document."]

Copy No. 2

[TFR 37-25]

Attachment No. 1

The Soviet Government has thoroughly examined the Korean War
issue in the context of the present situation while taking into
account the entire course of events of the previous period. As a
result, the Soviet Government has come to the conclusion that it
would be wrong to continue the policy which has been pursued
until recently without incorporating into that policy those
changes which apply to the current political situation and
proceed from the deep interests of our peoples - the peoples of
the USSR, China and Korea, who are interested in securing peace
for the entire world and have always searched for acceptable
means to the quickest possible end to the war in Korea.

There is no need to dwell at great length on what the
aggressor has committed during the war in Korea. In the eyes of
honorable people from all over the world, the actions of the
aggressive Anglo-American block in Korea - especially the
aggressive US forces - more and more expose this block as an
international factor which carries out the politics of preparing
a new war and is ready to move to the politics of spreading war
for the sake of dictating to the people its aggressive
imperialistic will that expresses a striving for world domination
and for the subjugation of peoples to their imperialistic goals.

The Soviet Government believes that we must henceforth deal
with all these important circumstances of international order,
just as we have dealt with them up to now. This does not mean,
however, that under the conditions of the current

[Second page is missing]

- 3 -

4. We also believe it expedient that the speech of the USSR Minister of Foreign Affairs, which accordingly fully supports the Peking and P'yongyang speeches, should take place in Moscow immediately after the speeches stipulated above in Peking and in P'yongyang.

5. In accordance with the four measures listed above, the Soviet delegation at the UN General Assembly in New York must do everything necessary to appropriately support and advance this new political aim which has been stated above.

We consider it necessary to give the following clarification of the above statement:

First. On the response to General Clark. We feel that in Kim Il Sung's and Pyn De-khuh's letter in answer to General Clark, it is necessary to express complete approval with Clark's proposal to conduct an exchange of sick and wounded prisoners of war, with added instructions that a favorable resolution of this matter in accordance with Article 109 of the Geneva Convention must be kept in mind.

Point out in the response to Clark that the issue of exchanging sick and wounded prisoners of war is of very important significance for the successful resolution of the overall prisoner of war issue, and hence, for the successful resolution of the issue regarding ceasing the war and concluding a truce. With this in mind, suggest renewing the negotiations between the chief representatives of both parties on the armistice talks in Panmunjom.

Propose that liaison officers from both parties establish the date of these negotiations.

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During these negotiations on the exchange of sick and wounded prisoners of war in accordance with Article 109 of the Geneva Convention which stipulates that "not one sick or wounded prisoner of war will be repatriated against his will during a time of military action," obtain a guarantee from the American Command Staff that, as regards the stated prisoners of war, under no circumstances will coercion be employed with the aim of hindering their return to their homelands.

Also propose establishing a commission of representatives from Poland, Czechoslovakia, Sweden and Switzerland to render assistance in returning sick and wounded prisoners of war to their homelands.

In the negotiations on exchanging sick and wounded prisoners of war, proceed from the fact that the task is not only to achieve a positive resolution of the matter mentioned above, but also to achieve a positive resolution of the entire prisoner of war issue, and hence, to remove obstacles to achieving an agreement on ceasing military action and concluding an armistice. Article 109 of the Geneva Convention must be used for this, and especially the second paragraph of the Article stipulating for the conclusion of an "agreement on the repatriation or internment in a neutral country of healthy prisoners of war who have spent long periods in captivity."

During the negotiations, propose that all prisoners of war insisting on repatriation be immediately

repatriated, while the remainder are to be transferred to a neutral country in order to secure an equitable resolution of the matter of their repatriation.

As regards these prisoners of war, strive to achieve a classification by nationality and by place of residence, as was proposed in the letter from Kim Il Sung and Pyn De-khuh of 16 Oct 52 to General Clark (this also corresponds to the Indian draft on Korea).

After classification receive the assistance facilitated by the assistance of all interested parties.

Second. On the statement in Peking. In this statement, it would be expedient to say that the KNR Government discussed the issue posed by General Clark with the KNR Government. Both the KNR Government and the KNR Government came to the same conclusion on the necessity to give their representatives in Panmunjom instructions to enter into negotiations with General Clark on the exchange of sick and wounded prisoners of war, while bearing in mind the attainment of a positive resolution on the prisoner of war issue as a whole. Point out in the statement that during the negotiations between both sides in Kason and Panmunjom, both parties reached an agreement on all matters except on the matter of prisoners of war.

Thus, an agreement was reached that the commanders of the armed forces of both parties "will issue an order on the

complete cessation of all types of military action in Korea by all armed forces under their commands, to include all units and personnel of ground, air and naval forces. [The order] will enter into force twelve (12) hours after the signing of the armistice agreement. The fulfillment of the aforesaid order is to be ensured".

The following important conditions of the armistice were also agreed upon:

1) On the establishment of a military demarcation line which is to run along the line of contact of forces fighting on the day the armistice enters into force, that is the front line; and from which "forces of both parties will withdraw 2 kilometers in order to form a demilitarized zone..." (paragraph one of the draft agreement on the armistice).

2) On the establishment of a military armistice committee made up of 10 senior officers, five of which will be appointed by the commander-in-chief of UN forces, and five will be appointed by the command staff of the Korean People's Army and the command staff of the Chinese volunteers (paragraph 19). The commission is to oversee that the armistice agreement is observed, to include overseeing the committee's work on prisoner of war repatriation and to regulate, by means of negotiation, possible armistice agreement violations (paragraphs 24 and 25).

3) On creating a commission of neutral countries to oversee the armistice. [The commission] is to consist of representatives of Sweden and Switzerland, appointed by the commander-in-chief of UN forces

[seventh page is missing]

- 8 -

... The KNR Government (KNDR Government), for its part, is prepared to take measures to eliminate disagreements on this matter, which presently are the only obstacles to concluding the cease fire and armistice agreement. To this end, the KNR Government proposes that all prisoners of war insisting on repatriation be immediately repatriated, and the remaining prisoners of war be sent to a neutral country in order to ensure a fair resolution on the matter on their repatriation.

It is also necessary to talk about the following in the Peking statement:

Our new step, directed towards ending the war in Korea, must also serve towards the positive resolution of a number of important and pressing international matters and, above all else, towards the restoration of the rights of China and Korea in the UN.

Third. On the statement in P'yongyang. We believe that Comrade Kim Il Sung should indicate in this statement that the above mentioned statement of the KNR representative was mutually worked out by the KNR and KNDR governments and is in complete agreement with the evaluation of the political situation and the specific conclusions and proposals contained in the Peking statement. Moreover, emphasize not only the full support but also the fairness of the statement by the KNR representative.

Fourth. On the statement in Moscow. We believe it expedient that the statement of the USSR Minister of Foreign Affairs in Moscow should follow immediately after these speeches in Peking and P'yongyang. We see the purport of the Moscow statement as being to stress before the whole world the complete

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solidarity and coordination of actions between the USSR, KNR and KNDR on the Korean War issue.

Fifth. On the Soviet delegation at the UN General Assembly in New York. It is incumbent on the Soviet delegation at the General Assembly to act in conformity with the entire political plan stated above as regards the war in Korea. In this connection, it is imperative that, as soon as discussion arises at the General Assembly on the Polish draft of the resolution "on averting the threat of a new world war," the Soviet delegation provide the inclusion of corresponding changes to the draft in the part that concerns Korea. The speeches from the Soviet delegation and the delegations of Poland and Czechoslovakia are also necessary.

Sixth. Additional remarks. It goes without saying that we are unable to foresee at this time all the steps and measures which must be taken by representatives of the USSR, KNR and KNDR. However, if full coordination is achieved between our representatives in pursuing a general policy on the given matter, and we fully hope for this, then everything else can be agreed upon as this affair progresses.

5-p

DIRECTIVESFOR THE SOVIET DELEGATION AT THE UN GENERAL ASSEMBLY

1. Instruct the USSR delegation (Comrade Vyshinskij) to speak in strong support of the recent KNR and KNDR proposals and statements at the forthcoming discussion of the Polish delegation's proposals, especially those concerning the Korean issue, at the General Assembly.

After expounding the Soviet Union's position on the exchange of prisoners of war as being a position which fully conforms to universally recognized principles of human rights and to the provisions of the 1949 Geneva Convention that require the repatriation of all prisoners of war, the USSR representative should point out the following: the Soviet Union has repeatedly proposed recommending to the warring parties in Korea to immediately and completely cease hostilities on the ground, on the sea, and in the air.

At the Soviet Union's initiative, in June of 1951 in Kaesong, negotiations were started between the warring parties regarding the cease fire and an armistice in Korea. These negotiations led to an agreement by the parties on all issues, except on the issue regarding repatriation of prisoners of war. The Soviet Union continues to believe that the position taken by the People's Republic of China and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea is fair and fully meets the principles of international rights and international practices, and also meets the provisions of the 1949 Geneva Convention. The Soviet Union completely supports this position.

The only unresolved issue in the negotiations between the warring parties in Korea is the exchange of prisoners of war. The KNR and KNDR Governments have stated their willingness to take measures towards settling this matter in order to remove the last obstacle to the cessation of war in Korea and the conclusion of an armistice.

The Soviet Union welcomes the noble initiative of the People's Republic of China and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea in this matter. The Soviet Union fervently supports the proposal to resume negotiations in Korea aimed at achieving an agreement on exchanging sick and wounded prisoners of war and also on settling the entire prisoner of war issue and, consequently, on ceasing the war in Korea and concluding an armistice.

Instruct the Soviet delegation at the General Assembly to come to an agreement with the Polish delegation on including the following changes to the draft of the Polish resolution on averting the threat of a new world war in the section concerning the Korean issue: In place of the old text paragraph "b)" (on the return of all prisoners of war to their homeland) include the following text: "b) the immediate resumption of armistice negotiations with the concurrent intent that the parties will exert maximum effort to achieve an agreement both on exchanging sick and wounded prisoners of war and on the entire prisoner of war issue; thus, they will exert efforts to remove the obstacles hindering the cessation of the war in Korea.

[TFR 37-34]

[handwritten cut-off no.]

Workers of the world, unite!TOP SECRETCommunist Party of the Soviet Union. CENTRAL COMMITTEENo. P14/I9 Jul 53Extract from Protocol No. 14 Presidium TsK Session on 4 Jul 53On the draft of Kim Il Sung's and Pyn Deh-khuai's response to Clark's letter dated 29 Jun 53.

Instruct Comrades Malenkov and Molotov to answer our Chinese comrades on the Soviet Union's agreement with their evaluation and their projected measures for the armistice negotiations in Korea in regard to Clark's letter dated 29 Jun 53.

SECRETARY of the TsK

[Printed along left-hand margin "Subject to return to the office of the Presidium of the TsK KPSS within 7 days"]

- 4-p

[handwritten "Response - look at the file for outgoing cipher from Molotov to Peking No. 13464 dated 4 Jul 53"]

[TFR 37-35]

Cipher Telegram

Top Secret
DO NOT COPY

Copy No. 1-t Lay out	No. 10-t Pervukhin	No. 19-t File
No. 2-t Malenkov	No. 11-t Vyshinskiy	No. 20-t
No. 3-t Molotov	No. 12-t Gromyko	No. 21-t
No. 4-t Voroshilov	No. 13-t Zorin	No. 22-t
No. 5-t Krushchev	No. 14-t Pushkin	No. 23-t
No. 6-t Bulganin	No. 15-t Podtserob	No. 24-t
No. 7-t Kaganovich	No. 16-t Grigor'yan	No. 25-t
No. 8-t Mikoyan	No. 17-t Copy	No. 26-t
No. 9-t Saburov	No. 18-t 10th Department	No. 27-t

from PEKING No. 17286 23 hrs 40 min 3 Jul 53 copy No. 21
 17281 17289 17306
 17287 17307 17309
 17315 17308 17313

Special Nos. 1211-1220

EXTRAORDINARY

On 3 Jul at 0330 hrs, Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs U Syu-shchoan', on the instructions of Chou En-lai, arrived at the Embassy and delivered Kim Il Sung's and Pyn Deh-khua's draft response to Clark's letter of 29 Jun (it is proposed to send the response to Clark on 5 Jul). Syu-schoan' also delivered a note which expounds the KNR Government's evaluation of the current status of armistice negotiations and states the measures planned in regard to Clark's letter.

The full text of these documents is produced below.

"The present status of the armistice negotiations and the measures in regard to Clark's letter."

Status of negotiations. During the last 12 days, while Syngman Rhee has freed prisoners of war and has been spreading

[Printed along left-hand margin "Subject to return to the 10th Department of the MID USSR within 18 hours from receipt"]

[TFR 37-36]

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copy No. 2

a campaign against the armistice, the US, after having reached a deadlock in the Korean war, is on the whole exhorting Syngman Rhee to lessen his campaign against the armistice and to come to a compromise.

In order to placate Syngman Rhee, the Americans are attempting to conclude a temporary agreement with him. This would afford the opportunity to sign an armistice agreement and would permit the US a way out of this current difficult situation. However, Syngman Rhee is seriously endeavoring to involve the Americans in his plans. He cannot content himself with the signing of a temporary agreement. He continues to put forth demands that the political conference be limited to three months, after the expiry of which hostilities would resume. He also demands the right to veto at the conference. These demands run contrary to US resolve to cease the war. Moreover, the two-day negotiations between the US and Syngman Rhee on this matter have reached an impasse. The Americans are now leaning towards putting pressure on Syngman Rhee.

Given the situation stated above, Clark suddenly on 29 Jun answered Kim Il Sung's and Pyn Deh-khwa's letter. The aim of his letter was as follows: First, to show Syngman Rhee that concessions have limits and that the US cannot concede any further; and to attempt to sign the armistice agreement without paying attention to Syngman Rhee's opposition. Second, to show us which limitations

[TFR 37-37]

[handwritten "138"]

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he (Clark) has in his guarantees; to strengthen his position, he hopes, in negotiations with Syngman Rhee by signing the armistice agreement (after the armistice it will be easier to limit arms shipments to Syngman Rhee); and to drop the issue of 27,000 prisoners of war. Third, to show the entire world that the US wants to end the war.

It can be presumed that Syngman Rhee, fully understanding the US's weak points, will not compromise. However, the US plays the leading role in the Korean War and, for the sake of their own personal interests, they may increase pressure on Syngman Rhee at a critical moment. Therefore, despite the great disagreements between the US and Syngman Rhee over the armistice, it is still possible to speak about the potential of achieving an armistice in Korea and, in light of this, it can be contended that Syngman Rhee will continue minor provocations after the realization of an armistice.

Counter-measures.

Proceeding from the situation given above, and also taking into account the vacillation in US politics brought about by the complicated internal and external differences in relations with South Korea, we intend to adhere to the following line:

Maintain the initiative in achieving an armistice; secure a united position with the US as regards the armistice in order to isolate Syngman Rhee and deliver a blow to him, and also to force the US to exert pressure on Syngman Rhee;

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copy No. 2

deepen the external and internal differences of the Americans. In accordance with this line, it is presupposed that the following steps be taken:

1. Prepare and send an answer to Clark from Kim Il Sung and Pyn Deh-khua on 5 Jul. In the reply, agree to resuming negotiations, subject the American side to criticism and also point out the possible consequences to the political connivance carried out by the US.

The text of the response letter is attached.

2. Prepare and deliver a strike against Syngman Rhee's puppet forces before the signing of the agreement in order to move the front line south. After resumption of the meetings, point out to the opposing side that through the fault of Syngman Rhee the signing of the agreement has been protracted and therefore the situation has changed. Proceeding from the understanding that the settlement must be brought about based on the actual situation, propose readjusting the demarcation line.

One can suppose that the opposing side will agree with this proposal as a consequence of the present, difficult mutual relations with Syngman Rhee. However, it is also highly important that the opposing side not make concessions and resort to propagandistic subterfuge. In this event, we are prepared to select the appropriate moment and finally compromise, determining the demarcation line.

[handwritten "X" marks in the left margin next to the last three paragraphs]

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as was agreed on 17 Jun 53.

3. Prepare for the resumption of the delegation meetings after 5 July. At the meetings, the following questions will be put to the opposing side concerning the realization of the armistice agreement:

- 1) Adjusting the demarcation line;
- 2) Whether Syngman Rhee will take part in the armistice and, in this connection, the matter of a timely evacuation of forces from the demilitarized zone in accordance with the armistice agreement;
- 3) Will the Syngman Rhee cabal take part in the joint inspection team of the military armistice commission;
- 4) Laying responsibility on the American side for the return of 27,000 prisoners of war; if the American side refuses to take responsibility, then we reserve the right to raise this question for discussion at a political conference;
- 5) Guaranteeing security to joint teams of the Red Cross while they are questioning prisoners of war and to representatives conducting fact-finding work.
- 6) Ensuring that prisoners of war insisting on repatriation are not subjected to forced detention;
- 7) How to ensure the realization of "the rights of the commission of neutral governments for repatriation" during its resolution of the matter on the immediate repatriation.

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of prisoners of war and how to guarantee security to the personnel and forces of this commission;
 8) On the starting time for the work of the observation commission composed of neutral governments;
 9) On the armistice entering into force.

4. With the start of the delegation meetings, staff officers and translators will begin preparing for the signing of the armistice agreement. Construction of the building where the signing of the agreement will take place will also resume.

5. It can be assumed that the signing of the agreement may be projected for approximately 15 Jul. It must be announced that the Polish and Czechoslovakian representatives and their deputies in the observation committee composed of neutral governments, the members of approximately 20 inspection groups, and also the minimum number of working personnel necessary for the initial period will be arriving in Peking approximately 10 Jul. Prepare to announce this to the opposing side at the delegation meetings."

"To the Commander in Chief, United Nations Armed Forces General Clark.

In your letter of 29 Jun 59 you admitted that the Syngman Rhee cabal's compulsory release of Korean National Army prisoners of war from prisoner of war camps and the forced detention of these prisoners of war is a serious and grievous incident. This is true.

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[Pages 7 and 8 are missing]

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...to abandon the prisoner of war camp and thus conclusively frustrate the agreement on prisoners of war which was already achieved by both sides. We believe that, as regards this incident, your side must assume total responsibility and guarantee that such incidents will no longer arise.

A guarantee is contained in your letter that UN forces will at necessary points undertake feasible military measures of a preventive nature in order to ensure the realization of the armistice agreement. We consider this imperative. However, your side is declaring that it cannot reliably guarantee that the South Korean Government and Forces will observe the armistice agreement achieved by the delegations of both parties. Along with this, the Syngman Rhee cabal still continues to clamor that it "will unite Korea by military means." This statement alone is enough to testify as to who it was that initiated the aggression three years ago. If the UN forces presently continue to pander to the Syngman Rhee cabal and permit it to engage in all sorts of criminal activities in order to undermine the potential for a peaceful solution to the Korean matter, then, after the signing of the armistice agreement in Korea, just as before, this will lead to flareups of armed aggression against the Democratic People's Republic of Korea at any moment. Therefore, we believe that your side must employ effective measures in order that the South Korean Government and Forces

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observe the armistice agreement and all other agreements relating to it. Only then will it be possible to guarantee that the armistice in Korea will not be violated.

Proceeding from the above, although your answer cannot be considered completely satisfactory, however, considering that your side expressed a desire to apply force for a quick attainment of a truce and also focusing attention on your positive statements, we agree that delegations of both sides should establish a time to meet and agree on the practical realization of the issues relating to the armistice agreement and on the various preparatory measures preceding the signing of this agreement. The date of the meeting should be set by the heads of both delegations through liason-officers.

The Supreme Commander, Korean National Army
 Marshall Kim Il Sung
 Commander in Chief, Chinese National Volunteers
 Pyn Deh-khuanj
 5 July 1953."

After having delivered these documents, U Syu-tsyuan', on the instructions of Chou En-lai, orally reported the following: In the opinion of the KNR government, Syngman Rhee's recent provocative actions can be explained, on one hand, by his attempts to bargain for more US aid and, on the other hand, by his fear of the Chinese volunteers in Korea and his fear of China in general. Syngman Rhee so doggedly insists

[TFR 37-43]

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on concluding a "mutual defense" pact with the US precisely for this reason.

Syngman Rhee's statements that if the US does not meet his demands halfway, then he will issue an order to the South Korean forces to fight to the end are mere words.

The KNR Government believes that the US will render Syngman Rhee only limited help. The US fears that if Syngman Rhee receives help on a large scale, then he may plunge into perilous, risky ventures and draw the US in also. However, it does not suit the Americans to be drawn into some kind of grand risky venture in the Far East right now. In this respect, the Americans have [illegible, perhaps an entire line missing].

There are also differences between Syngman Rhee and the US regarding the policy at the next political conference. Syngman Rhee believes that if the conference does not accept his (Syngman Rhee's) demands, then he should abandon the conference and resume a broad offensive against North Korea right up to the Yalutszyan River, or in other words up to the Korean-Chinese border. The Americans for their part think that the negotiations at the political conference should be ended only if it becomes obvious that the Korean/Chinese representatives at this conference achieve what North Korea and China could not achieve through armed means. Taking into account all of the above, the KNR Government believes it necessary in the interests of peace to sign the armistice agreement. "In this instance, - jokingly...

[Remainder of this document not available]

[TFR 37-44]

MEMORANDUM

from the enciphered telegram of Lieutenant General SHALIN
addressed to Lieutenant General RAZUVAEV dated 17 Jan 51

No. 382

In telegram No. 77/sh to Comrade RAZUVAEV, an order is given
that our translators are categorically forbidden to interrogate
American and British POWs, or prisoners of any other
nationalities.

True Copy [signature]

(B. ZANEGIN)

20 Jan 51

Printed 1 copy
Originator: Major Zanegin
17 Jan 51

[handwritten "Opis" 23481, delo 1, l. 7*]

[TFR 37-45]

MEMORANDUM

from the enciphered telegram of Lieutenant General Razuvaev
addressed to Lieutenant General Shalin
No. 500077/sh-77sh

Comrade RAZUVAEV raises the question on reinforcing the
group of advisors attached to the Intelligence Directorate of the
KNA General Staff with advisors (at the expense of regular
advisory group positions in Korea) and with English language
translators.

In view of the lack of qualified English translators in the
KNA, Comrade RAZUVAEV is petitioning to enlist the services of
our translators for the interrogation of American prisoners.

NOTE:

General of the Army Comrade SHIMENKO has written
instructions on this telegram which forbids
interrogation of American and British prisoners by
our translators.

True Copy: [signature]

(B. ZANEGIN)

31 Jan 51

[handwritten "Opis" 23481, delo 1, l. 6*]

[TFR 37-46]

[handwritten "34"]

From a list of particular informational issues subject to examination in the first quarter of 1951. Dated 6 February 1951. [The above type is different from the original portion of this document below.]

- 2 -

5. Size of the aircraft fleet, and also number of tanks and artillery guns in the Kuomintang forces.

6. Determine air fields capable of basing jet-engined aircraft and aircraft with a take-off weight of 60[?] tons or more.

ON KOREA

1. Ascertain the latest measures of the South Korean command towards building up the armed forces.
2. Ascertain the latest organizational changes in tactical formations and units of the South Korean army; verify data concerning the presence of tank and anti-tank battalions in infantry divisions.
3. Determine the organization of the higher military administration (ministry of defense, general staff, and others).
4. Ascertain the number and organization of personnel in the American advisory apparatus of the South Korean Army.
5. Ascertain the number and types of tanks in tactical formations and in units of US ground forces.
6. Ascertain air raid bombing routes and American air losses, separately by anti-aircraft fire, fighter planes, etc.
7. Through interrogation of prisoner pilots, ascertain the morale of flight personnel, intensity of aircraft flights by type (heavy and medium bombers, fighters), personnel, deployment, turn-around time and the tactical nature of the 6002ND, 6140TH, 6131ST, 6138TH, 6147TH tactical support wings, quantity of B-45 jet-engined bombers and F-84 jet fighters, and to which units they are attached and deployed.
8. Through interrogation of prisoners and by other means, ascertain which American forces are in Japan, and whether or not combat training for Koreans against the KMA and Chinese volunteers in Korea takes place in Japan.

NOTE: Interrogation of POWs is to be conducted within the capabilities of KMR intelligence. Participation in the interrogations by officers of the advisory group is categorically forbidden.

[handwritten check mark next to the above note]
[handwritten "Opis" 22571, delo 3, l. 94"]

[TFR 37-47]

Originator. our entry No. 282

To Comrade S.R. SAVCHENKO

In response to No. 1218/s from 7 Mar 51

Concerning those POWs which you have indicated by nationality who are being detained in camps of the Democratic Peoples' Republic of Korea: the 2nd Chief Directorate of the General Staff of the Soviet Army is not conducting secret operational intelligence.

Original Signed M. SHALIN

"10" Mar 51

True Copy: [signature] Zamtsov

No. 998787

[handwritten "opis" 23481, delo 1, l. 12"]

[TRF 37-48]

[illegible handwritten instructions to Comrade Ivanov]

REPORT

of the senior advisor on the status
of intelligence in the KNDR.

Colonel SEREGIN reports: I presented myself to the Senior Military Adviser, Comrade Lieutenant General RAEUVAEV, on 3 Jan 53. I received instructions to become familiar with working conditions by 15 Jan 53 and not to undertake any measures. In the course of becoming acquainted with the work, I am able to report the following preliminary findings:

1. The Korean Peoples' Army is operating in the secondary sector of the front and is fully subordinate to the Combined Staff. It does not have the right to independent planning and conducting of operations.
2. The intelligence directorate, and intelligence forces in general, do not receive due attention from the military command. The primary leadership staff changes often. The intelligence directorate is extremely poorly supported with materials, in particular with transportation vehicles and communications equipment. Reconnaissance missions are not assigned by the commanders of tactical formations, but by intelligence officers who, not having proper authority, do not always have at their disposal the means for organizing effective reconnaissance. Signals intelligence is extremely poorly organized. Air reconnaissance does not exist. The intelligence directorate does not have communications with partisan detachments operating in the enemy's rear. In view of the lack of communications and the difficulties of sending agents across enemy lines, covert intelligence does not have the necessary effect. The largest percentage of prisoners and captured enemy equipment goes to the Combined Staff; very little goes to our Korean comrades.

[handwritten text in margin "Instruct Comrade Seregin through the office of the Senior Military Adviser to present a detailed report on working conditions of the subadvisory organ with concrete suggestions for a fundamental improvement of the work in the intelligence directorate by 15 Mar 53.

Study the possibility of the intelligence advisory command group attached to the headquarters of the Chinese volunteers in KNDR to render assistance in organizing and conducting intelligence operations and of the use of Chinese military intelligence in KNDR in order to obtain ..." document ends in middle of a word. Possible completion of the word: 'information' or 'foreign'.]

[handwritten "Opis" 23481, delo 3, 1. 8" 1-2 crossed out]

[TFR 37-49]

COMMUNIST PARTY OF THE SOVIET UNION. CENTRAL COMMITTEETOP SECRET

No. P104/24

To Comrades Suslov, Andropov, Gromyko

Extract from protocol No. 104 of the session of the Presidium of
the TsK KPSS dated 28 Jun 63

On the US Government's appeal for assistance in returning crew
members of the American military helicopter that landed on KNDR
territory 17 May 63.

1. Inform the KNDR Government about US Government's appeal to the Soviet Government for assistance in returning two crew members of the US Armed Forces helicopter that landed on KNDR territory 17 May 63 (a draft of instructions to the Soviet Ambassador in P'yongyang is attached).
2. Leave the US Government's appeal unanswered. If the Americans bring this issue up again, inform them that their appeal has been brought to the attention of the KNDR Government.

SECRETARY OF THE TsK

Subject to return within a 7-day period to the TsK KPSS (General
Department, 1st Sector)

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ap

[TFR 37-50]

Reference: para. 24 of protocol No. 104

Secret

P'YONGYANG

SOVIET AMBASSADOR

Visit the Minister of Foreign Affairs or his deputy and, after citing your mission, inform him of the following:

"The US Government through the American Embassy in Moscow has appealed to the Soviet Government with a request to show 'goodwill' and render assistance in the return of American citizens - Captain Ben Uikli Statte and Captain Karelton Volts, crew members of the US Armed Forces helicopter which on 17 May 63 allegedly made a forced landing on KNDR territory.

I have been tasked with informing you about this appeal from the US Government and to let you know that for our part, it goes without saying, no promises whatsoever were given to the Americans.

We have left the American appeal unanswered. If they bring up this matter again, we intend to answer that their request has been brought to the attention of the KNDR Government."

Telegraph completion of assignment.

504-ae
ap

[TFR 37-51]

Secret. Copy No. 2

TsK KPSS

The US Government, through the American Embassy in Moscow, appealed to the Soviet Government with a request to show "goodwill" and render assistance in the return of two crew members of a US Armed Forces helicopter which made a "forced landing" on the territory of KNDR on 17 May 63.

According to available information, the helicopter was forced down by the Armed Forces of KNDR after it had violated the demarcation line and appeared over KNDR territory.

In a verbal report on this matter by the US Embassy it was noted that attempts by American representatives to obtain the return of the helicopter and its crew through the military armistice commission in Korea were unsuccessful; however, the American side was expecting a positive solution to the matter, especially since "UN Command Forces in Korea" on 27 May 63 transferred several North Korean fishermen who had been detained earlier to KNDR authorities.

We are unaware of the details of the incident with the American helicopter and also the intentions of our Korean comrades in connection with the incident.

MID USSR suggests it would be expedient to inform our Korean comrades about this appeal by the US Government, emphasizing during this that the Soviet side of course did not make any promises to the Americans.

It is expedient to leave the US Government's appeal unanswered. If the Americans raise this matter again, then it may be reported to them that the KNDR Government was informed of their appeal.

The draft of the Resolution is attached.

Please review.

Original Signed A. GROMYKO

" 25 " Jun 63

No. 1957/GS

6-th/VK

No. 7950ssha

18 Jun 63

True Copy: [signature]

[signature] [handwritten "[1 illegible] 173-46, TsK-22515"]

[handwritten on reverse "Arkhir Presidenta RF, f. 3, op. 66, d. 372, 1. 18-20"]

[TFR 37-52]

[stamp "DECLASSIFIED
3 Jul 92"]SECRET Copy No. 15
16 "Feb 68
No. 73/dv[handwritten "Zinchuk, Fedoseev, Sol'nov, Porshakov, [illegible
signature], 19 Feb"][stamp "MID USSR
USA Department
SECRET
Entry No. 219
"16" Feb 68"]ON THE DETENTION BY KNDR AUTHORITIES
OF TWO AMERICAN PILOTS IN 1963
(Brief Summary)

On 17 May 63, KNDR authorities detained two American citizens - Captain Ben Uilki Statts and Captain Karelton Vol'tts, US Armed Forces helicopter crew members who allegedly made a forced landing on KNDR territory.

On 28 Jun 63, MID KNDR reported through our Embassy in Peking that the US Government approached the Soviet Government with a request to show "goodwill" and assist in the return of these American citizens. It was reported also that no promises were made to the Americans from our side and that we have left their request unanswered. If the Americans bring this matter up again, then we intend to respond that the KNDR Government has been informed of their request.

KNDR Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs Kho Dam stated that the American helicopter intentionally, with intelligence-gathering aims, violated KNDR air space and therefore the American pilots, as criminals, will answer in accordance with KNDR laws. He also said that the USSR Government should not assume the role of intermediary and receive such requests from the Americans, and that this matter pertains solely to the KNDR sphere of authority.

Neither the US nor the KNDR made any further appeals to Soviet representatives concerning this matter.

dv

[TFR 37-53]

2.

On 3 Dec 63, the US representative delivered to UN Secretary-General U. Tan a letter of protest against the seven month detention of the indicated American pilots in North Korea. It said in the letter that the flight of the American helicopter over the demilitarized zone was the result of an error.

On 17 Feb 64, the Commander of the Korean Peoples Army, responding to the letter dated 6 Nov 63 from the "UN Forces" Commander in South Korea, American General Khauz, stated his willingness to favorably review the matter concerning the pilots if the "UN Forces" Command Staff admits to the violation of the Korean armistice agreement and makes a promise not to allow such actions in the future.

On 5 Mar 64, General Khauz sent a letter to the KNA Commander which noted in particular:

"In view of your demand, the UN Forces Command Staff confesses to the intrusion by the two stated servicemen in the area of the demilitarized zone on 17 May 63. Moreover, we guarantee that the UN Forces Command, while taking all necessary measures in accordance with our desire to strictly adhere to the conditions of the cease fire agreement, is making every effort in order to avoid the reoccurrence of a similar situation in the future."

On 23 March 1964, the leaders of the KNA stated in their response that the head of the Korean-Chinese side of the military commission is fully authorized to conclusively resolve the matter regarding the transfer of the pilots.

A year after their detention, in May 64, the pilots were returned to the American side in Panmunjom.

FAR EAST DEPARTMENT
MID USSR

[TFR 37-54]

MEMORANDUM

from MAKAROV's enciphered telegram addressed to KRYMOV
dated 26 Jun 52 No. 20850/1844

MAKAROV reports that he received from our Chinese friends the following information:

The American prisoner of war [handwritten in English "Harding Djeck Erving"] was interrogated by our Chinese comrades. He testified that, in 1950, he served in the intelligence section of the Headquarters of the Commander in Chief of the American Army in the Far East. As an intelligence officer, he knew of the presence of a group of US intelligence agents in Vladivostok. The group consisted of four persons, two Americans and two Russians. The prisoner remembers that one Russian had the last name PROVOZNIK: 40 years old, 5 feet 10 inches tall, thin, and had blond hair. This agent often traveled to Vladivostok and had direct contact with the Commander-in-Chief's intelligence section. The others operated from Manchurian territory.

In the opinion of our Chinese comrades, they cannot fully believe [handwritten in English "Harding"], although they have obtained much additional information from him.

MAKAROV reports that this information was not received in a special meeting, but in a general conversation about the work with prisoners of war.

True Copy: [signature] B. ZANBGIN

"26" Jun 52

[There is nothing on the reverse of this copy.]

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[TFR 37-55]

LIST
of USAF aircrew members participating in
combat in North Korea, 1950 - 1953,
information about whom is found in documents
of the 64th Fighter Aviation Corps

No.	Last, First Middle Name	Name of Unit served	Duty, Rank, Specialty	Year/place of Birth, Nationality	Address of family and relatives	Date of capture or death	Remarks
1	2						
1.	CHARL'Z Yudzhin Stool ID AO-1911688	52nd IAG	Flier, 2nd Lieutenant	born 1923, American	Father, wife daughter, live in Pelling OH	7 Jan 52 shot down in aerial combat in Oinglsyu region	
2.	GAROL'D Britslav K'yubisek	93rd BAEH 19th BG 20th VA	Radar Observer, Captain	--	None	23 Jan 52 taken prisoner	
3.	CHARL'Z Yehjn Moltebi	35th IBBH 8th Fight. Bomb. Grp.	Flier, 2nd Lieutenant	--	None	5 Jan 52 Shot down by AAA in Kunuri region	
4.	TOMAS Alyullin Ajris ID V 0695638	93rd BAEH 19th BG	Navigator, 1st Lieutenant	born 1922, American (white)	None	23 Jan 52 during aircraft crash in Dzyngsan region, taken prisoner	
5.	KHENDERSON Dzhek Eh.	8th IAG 8th IAK	Flier, 2nd Lieutenant	age 25 yrs	None	31 Aug 51 Shot down by AAA in air battle	
6.	UULKENS Dzhenis	42nd AEH 33rd AG 1st Marine Wing	Captain	NoneNone31 Jul 51 shot down by AAA			

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1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
7. MAK-LELLAN Dokal'd Dzh.	729th ABH 452nd BAK	Commander LtCol	33 yrs	none	no dates		
8. SMIT Dzh.B.	8th ABH 543 (67) Tac Recon Group	Flier Captain	32 yrs American	none	Shot down 25 Dec 52 by AAA in the Pyongyang region, interrogation page of the POW		
9. VERNON L. Rajt	25th ABH 51st IPG	Flier, 2nd Lieutenant	born 1929 American	none	shot down in air combat 16 Jan 52 near Kunuri		
10. DANIEL Delong Peterson	51st IPG	Flier, 2nd Lieutenant	born 1927 American	none	17 Jan 52 near Tejssu		
11. KENET Lloyd Inok	8th BAEH 3rd BAG	1st Lieutenant	born 1925	Mother Helen D. Inok lives: Ohio Youngstown No. 18 Osborn	13 Jan 52 shot down near Tehjsyu		
12. DZHON S. Kuin	8th BAEH 3rd BAG	Flier, 1st Lieutenant	born 1922 American	Married, one kid, Sacramento Saint Altadena, California	shot down by AAA 13 Jan 1952		
13. UUL'YAM Dzh. Trehsh ID 05141	33rd AG 1st AK	ABH Commander LtCol	born 1917 American	married, two kids, address: Bijssari Altate Georgia USA	shot down by AAA 21 Dec 51 Samdong- Ni		

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1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
14. DZHADSON Ch. Richardson	513th ABH 12th GAK Marines	Chief of Staff Major	born 1920 American	no information	Shot down by AAA 14 Dec 51 near Singosan		
15. ROLBIN Bilem Parks	51st IAKR 5th VA	Flier, 2nd Lieutenant	1 Feb 1929	married, 2 kids, lives in Omaha Kennolzhe Dzhofefen	4 Sep 52 picked up in Sincharou region (1062) Bailed out		
16. VANS R. Frik	4th IPAG 336th ABH	Flier, 2nd Lieutenant	born 11 May 1928 Lenejgton American	none	21 Jun 52 shot down in aerial combat in Bikhien region 10-15 km NW		
17. MAJK Ehdvard Dermond	4th IPG	Flier, 1st Lieutenant	born 10 May 1928 American	none	21 Apr 52 shot down in aerial combat in Syukusen region		
18. ROLAND Villiam	16th ABH 51st AG	Flier, 2nd Lieutenant	Age 22 yrs American	Sherli Street, Omaha Nebraska	Shot down in aerial combat 4 Sep 52 taken prisoner		
19. DZHON UEHs11	36th ABH 8th IAG	Flier	born 1927 American of Swiss descendant	Father-Swiss Mother-American Address of fiance: Oklahoma City, 12th St North- East, 128	shot down in aerial combat 30 Apr 52 in the Kajsen region		

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1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
20. DZHON Dzh. Khllis ID 2222083	336th ABH 4th IPG	Pflier, 1st Lieutenant	born 1927	father and mother live in Virginia, not married	20 Jul 52 shot down in air battle in Singileyu region		
21. Arnol'd ID 1212 A	581st Comm Wing & Supply Wing	Commander Colonel		father govt employee. Silver Springs, Maryland, 8709 Sandale Dr.	12 Jan 53 B-29 shot down in Ulumbey region		
22. DZHON Uehiker Tomson	91st EHSR	Private 2nd Class Engine Observer	21 yrs		13 Jan 53 taken prisoner		
23. DZHON U. Bak ID 787245	91st EHSR	Bombardier Nav, 1st Lieutenant	33 yrs American		13 Jan 53 taken prisoner		
24. EHL'MER Fred Alluvelin ID AO 20723360	91st Rece Sq	Navigator Captain	27 yrs American	married, has a son, family lives in Missoula, Montana Kaut-6 St. 308	13 Jan 53 taken prisoner		

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1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
25. YUDESHIN T. Vadi ID AO-02500	91st Strat Recon Sq	Airship Commander Captain	31 yrs	married, father is a farmer, Klatjon, New York	13 Jan 53 taken prisoner		
26. DANIK Ch. Shmidt A.E. 1939147	91st Strat Recon Sq	Engine Observer	age 20 years	father-farmer, married, Okotia California	13 Jan 53 taken prisoner		
27. KHERRI Martin Bedshamin ID A.E. 2734502	91st Strat Recon Sq	Engine Observer	age 20 years	father-farmer Minnesota, San Vertigton, 1124 Shervud	13 Jan 53 taken prisoner		
28. STIV E. Kiba	91st Strat Recon Sq	Private First Class	age 20 years	father-Swiss, Ohio	13 Jan 53 taken prisoner		
29. UIL'YAM G. Bower ID AO 733786	no	Major	age 30 years	declined to fill out the form. Cited the international law on treatment of servicemen (prisoners).			

30. BRAUN
Govard U.
ID AE 368099

no

Sergeant
Technical
Services

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[TFR 37-60]

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
31. UOLLES L. Braun ID AO222192	no	2nd Lieutenant	age 25 years	declined to fill out the form. Cited the intn'l law on treatment of POWs.			
32. KHART	no	Private		killed (under what circumstances not specified)			
33. VISS	no	Private					
34. BORIS	no	1st Lieutenant					
35. BRAZIL	RB-29 Radar Operator	1st Lieutenant	no	none		4 Jul 52 in the area near Khakusen	
36. MAKENZI Ehndros Robert	51st IPG 5th AA	Flier, Major	32 years, Canadian	married, 4 children who live in England Supun		15 Jun 52 in area 10km SE of GEHS	
37. OSBORN Dzhon Artur ID 796188	311th ABH 58th IBG	Flier, Captain	33 years, American	none		19 Sep 52 shot down by AAA in Vonsan Genzan region	
38. EHDVIN Lyuis Geller	16th ABH 51st AG	Lieutenant- Colonel	no	none		23 Jan 53	

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[TFR 37-61]

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
39. EHVARD Dzh. Izbiki	336th ABH 4th IPG	Flier, 2nd Lieutenant	25 years	Father Frehnk- Izbeki Nort Kizar Avenue Chicago Illinois		shot down in air combat 19 Feb 53 in Sanchau region	
40. DONAL'D L. Pehjt	25th ABH 51st IPG	Flight Commander, 1st Lieutenant	born 1929	none		15 May 53 shot down in air battle in region of the Yalu River Delta	
41. DEHURADO Dzhon ID A-16292	25th ABH 4th Ftr Intercept Group	Commander 25th ABH Lt. Colonel	born 10 Feb 1923 in California, American	Phoenix, Ariz. Palmikto St 1312, Father-60 Mother-56 Brother-17 Married: 2 kids father, mother, sister, wife- Ellen Bettinger lived at 1219 Lejden St. Denver Colorado		16 Jun 53 shot down by AAA in Long-Dongli region	
42. STEFAN L. Bettinger	4th Intercept Wing	Flier, Major	28 Apr 1924 American	4 brothers, Ellen Bettinger lived at 1219 Lejden St. Denver Colorado		Shot down in air combat 20 Jul 53	
43. ROBERT A. Kovri ID AO 68768	12th ABH 18th Ftr	Flier, Captain	22 Jan 23 American	married, two kids daughter- 7, son-4		shot down by AAA on 20 Jun 53	
44. AL'BERT Khodzher ID AO 2244077	36th ABH 8th Ftr EmbrGroup	Flier, 1st Lieutenant	24 Dec 28	father, mother, brother, wife live on Uorton Ave., Matlej New Jersey		shot down by AAA 19 Jun 53	

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1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
45. EHDVARD Dillon AO2225458	12th AEh 18th PTr Bomber Group	Flier, Lieutenant	Catholic		father-64, 4 sisters, 2 brothers lived at 421 North Spring St. Hojchetok Connecticut	shot down by AAA 15 Jun 53, taken prisoner by KNR soldiers	
46. DONAL'D Pinkstoun Vil'yam	77th AEh	Flier, Sergeant	born 1928, Sidney			shot down 15 Jun 1953 by AAA	
47. FORNES Vil'yam L.	69th AEh 58th IEG	Flier, 1st Lieutenant	born 1928, Afaka city			6 Aug 52 shot down in Khungon region	
48. SHVEJEL Fran Kh.	1st Marine Wing	Chief of Staff, Colonel	born 1908 Virginia			8 Jul 52 shot down by AAA	
49. DZHOKHEINSON		Camera Operator RB-29 Sergeant				4 Jul 52 shot down	
50. GABRIEL' L.	334th AEh	Chief of Operations Section	born 1923			18 Oct 52 shot down by fighters	
51. DZHONSON	307th BK	Senior Sergeant Operator				10 Jan 53 B-29 aircraft shot down 29 Jan 53 shot down in Pkhem'yan region	
52. ABRAHAMSON	28th BAEh						

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1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
53. VANSIAJKA	28th AEh 19th BAG	Radio Operator				30 Dec 52 taken prisoner	
54. GAROL'D Ehvard Fisher	39th AEh 51st AG	Flier, Flight Commander				7 Apr 53 shot down	
55. KHAMIL'TON Brushchev	8th Flight Reserve 5th VA	Flier Junior Lieutenant				1 Dec 50 taken prisoner in the region of Singisyu	
56. CHAL'SA Maktonata	5th AEh 363rd Det	Flier Captain				4 Dec 50 shot down	
57. FRANK S. Denstekh	B-29 aircraft	Flier, Captain				10 Dec 50 shot down	
58. KHERN Dzhosel Selmoehl'		Navigator 371st ABh 307th AG				12 Apr 51 shot down in the Singisyu region	
59. OL'VICH Daniehl' Genri		Gunner, Sr. Sergeant				12 Apr 51 shot down in the An'dun' region	
60. METU Genri Khav'er		Gunner, Sr. Sergeant				12 Apr 51 shot down	

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[TPR 37-64]

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
61. KING	Marvin Yudzhin	B-29 aircraft	Gunner, Private First Class	-	-	12 Apr 51 shot down during descent, had serious injuries	-
62. KNEDO	Dzhorzh Dzhosef	-	Aircraft Navigator Lieutenant	-	-	12 Apr 51 shot down in An'dun' region	-
63. MORI	Leonard Leri	371st AEH 307th AG	Operator Sergeant	-	-	12 Apr 51 shot down	-
64. DZHEHT	Dzhon K.	B-29 aircraft 93rd AEH 19th AG	Gunner Sergeant	-	-	12 Apr 51 shot down in Singisyu region	-
65. MILVORD	Dzhordzh Eliason	93rd AEH 19th AG	Gunner Sergeant	-	-	12 Apr 51 shot down in Singisyu region	-
66. BERGMAN	Luis Genri	93rd AEH 19th AG	Radio Operator Sergeant	-	-	12 Apr 51 shot down in Singisyu region	-
67. UL'RIKH	Khol'bert	Flier B-26 aircraft Khakusen	-	-	-	4 Apr 51 shot down in Khakusen region. Died.	-

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[TPR 37-65]

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
68. VEHSLEI	Din	39th AEH 35th AG	Flight Commander Captain	-	-	22 Apr 51 shot down	-
69. OBNI		40th AEH 35th AG	Deputy Commander 40th AEH, Major	-	-	12 (14) Mar 1951	-
70. GOVARD P.	Miller	336th AEH 4th AG	Flier, 1st Lieutenant	-	-	22 Jun 51 shot down	-
71. KHARM		B-29 of the 307th BAG	Gunner, Sergeant	-	-	Sep 52	-

ACTING HEAD OF THE 4TH DEPARTMENT

Major [signature] A. Lebelev

"2" Jun 92

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[TFR 37-66]

[handwritten "No. 13"]

SECRET
Copy No. _____

REPORT

THE INTERROGATION OF A CAPTURED F-86-F-30 PILOT OF THE 12TH AIR
SQUADRON, 18TH FIGHTER-BOMBER GROUP, CPT ROBERT A. KOVRI,
DOWNED BY AAA FIRE 20 June 1953
SERVICE NUMBER AO 687678

1. Biographical data

Born 22 Jan 23

Nationality - American, white.

Student before joining the army. Religion -
Protestant. Married. Drafted 20 Oct 42.

Family: Wife - 26, housewife

Daughter - 7

Son - 4.

Career profile:

Date	Location	Unit	Acft	Flight Hrs	Rank
1	2	3	4	5	6
20 Oct 42	San Antonio, Texas	Cadet Aviation Center. Ground School	--	--	Cadet
Dec 42	Victory AFB Vernon, TX	Pre-Flt School	RT-19	60	Cadet
Feb 43	Enid AFB Enid, OK	Basic Flt School	BT-13	60	Cadet
May 43	Redick AFB, OK	Adv. Flight School	AT-17	60	Cadet

[TFR 37-67]

Jul 43	Kornay AFB, Nebraska	B-17 Tng Unit	B-17	80	2LT
Dec 43	Poddington, England	92nd Bomber Group	B-17	200	1LT Flier
Jul 44	Bryan AFB, Texas	Instructor Tng & Instrument Flight	AT-6	60	1LT Student
Sep 44	Lakehurst AFB Ohio	Instructor Tng on the B-17	B-17	90	1LT Student
Feb 45	Boca Raton AFB Florida	--	B-17	350	1LT Instruct. Flier
Aug 45	Homestead AFB, Florida	Transport Aviat. Schl, C-54	C-54	80	Student
Sep 45	Fairfield AFB California	Transport Aviat. Command Base	C-54	250	Flier
Feb 46	--	--	C-54 C-47	50 150	Instr Link Trainer
Sep 46	Palm Bch AFB	Continental Division Staff School	--	--	Student Admin. Officer
Oct 46	Gen Hospital, Letterman	--	--	--	Patient
Feb 47	Fairfield, California	1500-3 Detachment. Training Unit	C-47	100	OIC of Personnel, Admin Off.
Jun 48	Scott AFB, Illinois	Communication School	C-47 T-6	100 50	--

[TFR 37-68]

1	2	3	4	5	6
Jul 49	Wiesbaden, Germany	333rd Transport Squadron	C-54	200	1LT, Flier, Berlin Airlift
Sep 49	Landsberg Germany	20th Comms Sq. Staff 2nd Air Division	C-47 T-6	300 50	CPT, Admin. officer
Aug 52	Moody AFB, California	Jet Tng School	F-30 T-33	15 5	CPT, Flier
Sep 52	Nellis AFB Nevada	Jet Fighter School	F-86	80	CPT, Flier
Feb 53	K-55	18th Wing	F-86	100	CPT, Flier

On arrival in Korea he started flying the F-86-F-30.

LAST COMBAT SORTIE

The preparatory brief was given by the Operations Officer, of the South African Military Forces, Major GOBARD EMBERSOL. Mission Number 02.

The targets were two rows of 9-10 buildings, 15 miles north of Papazan Mountain (eastern sector of the central front).

The sortie consisted of 12 fighter-bombers from the 12th Squadron. Engine start at 1635 hrs, take-off at 1640 hrs. We were over the target at 1700. The leader of the sortie was Major EMBERSOL. I flew number three in the sortie leader's Flight.

Our check (reading) during the flight was done by a control station with callsign "Wildfire" (central sector of the front). The flight route was directly from the airfield to Papazan, then west to the lake not far from the target. Above the lake we made a 180 degree turn and started dropping bombs, diving at intervals of 5 seconds. Every aircraft dropped two 500-pound bombs.


[TFR 37-69]

My aircraft was hit by anti-aircraft artillery immediately after I dropped my bombs. The aircraft's tail end caught fire. I made a 180 degree turn in an attempt to cross the front lines.

Within a minute and a half, control of the plane was lost, probably because of the loss of thrust and control surfaces. I ejected and landed 5 miles north of Papazan. I contacted the lead plane by radio (type IRS-4) and asked for help and a helicopter. There was one plane remaining in my area but he could not help me. Within 2-3 minutes after touching down, I was captured by Chinese soldiers.

Unit information

The organization of the 18th Fighter-Bomber Wing.
(Hand-drawn organizational chart)



[TFR 37-70]

Wing totals: officers 100
 fliers 140
 enlisted 1600
 planes 75 F-86
 2 T-33
 2 C-47
 1 T-6
 vehicles 300

Wing Headquarters:

Post	Officers	Enlisted
Commander	1	
Deputy-Commander	1	
Operations section	4	6
Personnel section	3	8
Adjutant	1	6
Intelligence section	3	8
Supply and repair section	4	12
Chaplain	1	1
Post office detachment	1	3
Surgeon	1	1

Group Headquarters
 [hand drawn organization chart]

Group Commander	Colonel Martin
Deputy Group Commander	LT Colonel Stell

T.O.E.

MAJ	CPT	CPT	CPT	MAJ
Operations	Personnel	Adjutant	Intelligence	Supply/repair
CPT Kharper	LT Uinsship	LT Krist	LT Dyuk	LT Marrou

[TFR 37-71]

Group totals:

	3 officers	6 enlisted
Operations	2	5
Personnel	1	4
Adjutant	2	6
Intelligence	3	8

A Group could allocate a maximum of 48 planes for one sortie. It could make 4 sorties in one day.

Organizational chart of the 12th Air Squadron

Commander AEh				
Deputy-Commander AEh				
Sections				
Personnel/admin	Operations	Repair/services	Supply	Weapons
LT Khoftizer	MAJ Ebersoul	CPT Iton	LT Murrej	
		CPT Lyuis		
Intelligence section	Flight	Flight	Flight	Flight
	LT Kehmpotorn	LT Rozheri	CPT Mejn	LT Kheller

[TFR 37-72]

Section totals:

	Officers	Enlisted
Personnel & administration	1	6
Operations	1	3
Supply	1	8
Repair & services	2	80
Weapons	1	35
Intelligence	1	1
In a Flight	9	--

Total in air squadron:

Planes	25
Fliers	36
Enlisted	160

Details on the flight personnel of the 18th Group

a) Total flight hours

10 fliers with 3000-5000 hours
 40 fliers with 1000-3000 hours
 100 fliers with less than 1000 hours

b) Details on officer personnel

Colonel PERIGO - Wing Commander, age 42, has 10 combat sorties.

LT Colonel EHVANS - Air Squadron Commander, age 33, 3500 hours logged, approximately 40 combat sorties.

Colonel MARTIN - Group Commander, age 37, has approximately 20 combat sorties.

Fliers	Age	Hrs. Logged	Number of sorties
MAJ EBERSOUL	31	2100	90
CPT NIL	30	450	25
LT DILLON	25	450	15
LT BARTOLAMA	25	500	22

[TFR 37-73]

LT KHARRISON	25	500	22
LT BARBER	24	500	24
LT BAUSER	23	500	24
LT KRISTANSON	24	400	5
LT PATTI	23	400	5
LT FORBES	25	500	25
LT MEJS	25	500	25
LT ALKSTON	25	400	10
LT BIVER	24	400	10
LT BRENC	24	500	25
LT VAN KHELLEN	30	1800	70
LT RODZHERS	28	1900	70
LT STOTIS	26	1000	70
LT KHUK	24	450	20
LT KHELLER	25	500	25
LT BELLOUS	25	500	25
LT ROSSEL	26	700	40
LT SVORTS	27	1000	10
LT DOSON	27	500	25
LT DORRIS	25	500	25
LT SMIT	27	600	40
LT KROKKER	25	500	25
LT SHATTOK	24	450	20
LT VESTKOT	23	400	15
LT MEJER	24	400	5

LT BAURN

23

400

5

[TFR 37-74]

LT BEJTS	26	500	25
LT HAJD	26	500	25
LT TAJNOS	26	450	15
LT KHEJMEJKEK	24	400	15
LT KHASKING	24	400	15
LT DEGNER	26	800	90

Our group received the F-86-F-30 at the end of January and beginning of February 1953.

Other than my aircraft, I know nothing else about other F-86 and F-30 losses.

Training of new arrivals

Flights on the T-33 - 1 hour flight to the front line.
(Familiarization flight)
- 3 hour flight on instrumentation.

Flights on the F-86-F-30

- 2 solo flights
- 3 flights in formation
- 2 flights with fire (camera-gun)
- 3 flights with instrumentation
- dive bombing until the flier shows satisfactory results.

Ground preparation (10 days)

- familiarization with the area of operations;
- rescue and escape measures;
- aircraft electronic equipment.

Characteristics of the K-55 Airfield (Usan)

1. The runway:

- a) Orientation - 90-270 degrees
- b) Surface - concrete
- c) Width - 150 feet
- d) Length - 9000 feet

2. Taxiways:

- a) Surface - concrete
- b) Width - 50 feet

3. Aircraft hardstands:

- a) Type: open concrete covered pads with an earthen embankment on one side. Purpose of this embankment - protection from accidental gunfire while taxiing. Height of the embankment is 10 feet. Dimensions of the pads are 100 x 50 feet.

[Drawing of an aircraft hardstand]

embankment

embankment

Anti-aircraft batteries are situated around the airfield. The guns are 20mm and 12.7mm machine guns.

Navigational facilities:

- a). "Homing" type - low frequency radio beacons
- b). Location:
 - 1. "ZX" (frequency 392 KHz) 7 miles to the west of the runway.
 - 2. "NV" (frequency 1675 KHz and power 50) at the airfield.
- b). Radar.

There is no direction finder on the airfield

IV. INFORMATION ABOUT BASE K-55 USAN

[Hand-drawn diagram follows]

- 1. Hospital [Depicts a hill- reads "300 feet"]
- 2. Church [On hill- reads "searchlight"]
- 3. Officer's Club
- 4. Officer's Mess
- 5. Group Headquarters
- 6. Wing Headquarters
- 7. Fighter Wing Headquarters
- 8. Finance
- 9. Post Office
- 10. Base Exchange
- 11. Hanger
- 12. Base Operations
- 13. 2nd Squadron South African AF Operations
- 14. 10th Squadron Operations
- 15. 67th Squadron Operations
- 16. Hanger
- 17. Ground troops area
- 18. Ground troops area
- 19. Enlisted quarters
- 20. Officers quarters
- 21. Warehouse

[Depicts a hill- reads "500 feet"]

radio direction-finder

Tactical-technical data on the F-86-F-30

The F-86-F-30 was sent to the 18th Wing at the end of January 1953 and F-51s were turned over in November-December 1952.

At first the Wing was armed with F-86-F-25s, and later they received F-86-F-30s.

In my opinion, the use of F-86-F-30s as attack planes was the result of a desire to have a single type of plane for tactical aviation.

- The F-86-F-25 has leading-edge flaps in the wings.
- The F-86-F-30 does not have leading-edge flaps.
- The engine type is [in English "J-47-GE-27"] with 6000 pounds of thrust.
- It does not have water injection.
- There are no modifications for increasing the engine's thrust.
- [in English "ARC-3"] radio.
- [in English "ARP-7"] radio compass.
- A-4 sight.
- Sight range is 6000 feet.
- The mobile antenna slew angle is 15 [degrees].

Distinctive features of the F-86-E and F-86-F-30:

F-86-EF-86-F-30

- no air cleaner
- no anti-icing modifications
- has leading edge flaps
- one hard point for fuel tanks
- slower speeds at sea level than the F-86-F-30

- has air cleaner (filter)
- has anti-icing modifications
- no leading edge flaps
- two hard points for fuel tanks or bombs
- the climb rate is better than the F-86-E. More maneuverable.

25000 feet is the best height for combat -

- better maneuverability at 12000 feet. - also at 14500 feet.

Reserve fuel for the F-86-F-30

The main tanks hold 470 gallons. External tanks: 2 with 120 gallons and 2 with 200 gallons.

Fuel type - JP-4.

Fuel weight - one gallon weighs 6.5 pounds.

Location of fuel tanks:

[Hand-drawn diagram of a plane]

The engine type is a [in English "J-47-GE-27"]. Axial air flow. 6000 pounds of thrust. The air in the intake is cleaned by the air filter. There is an anti-icing modification in the air intake. 11 stage compressor.

At 100% engine revolutions the temperature of the expelled gases is 690 degrees.

The length of the plane is 37 feet, the wing span is 35 feet, height 14 feet. The area of the wing is approximately 184 square feet.

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Horizontal stabilizer with a slew of +/- 20 degrees, area of 18 sq. ft. Vertical stabilizer with an area of 18 sq. ft. (3x6).

Rudder - +/- 30 degrees, approximately 3 square feet area (6 inches x 6 feet).

Ailerons - +/- 45 degrees, 10.5 sq. ft. area (18 inches x 7 feet).

Flaps with a slew of 70 degrees with a 14 sq. ft. area (20 inches x 7 feet).

Airbrake panel deploys to a 45 degree angle, with an area of 4 square feet (24 x 24 inches).

Trimmer rudder with a size of 3 x 12 inches.

4. The unloaded weight is 14500 pounds. The take-off weight is 19000-20000 pounds.

Equipment:

Radio - an 8 channel, line-of-sight, UHF (in English "ARC 3").

Radar - A-4 sight, operational radius 6000 feet, effective radius 1900 feet.

Transponder - IFF.

It has these positions:

Position "normal".

Position "2" - 1 signal.

Position "3" - 2 signals.

Emergency position - 3 signals.

Armor plating - behind the flier.

Six 12.77 caliber machine guns.

350 rounds of ammunition per machine gun.

Camera gun - mounted in the nose under the screen or in the cabin next to the aiming sight.

Bombs: 2x500 pound bombs with instantaneous and delayed fuses, and also 2x1000 pound bombs with instantaneous fuses were used.

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Rockets were never hung on the plane.

The oxygen system with a 450 pound tank works automatically. A fixed pressure is maintained in the cabin:

Altitude:

Pressure in the cabin corresponds to the altitude:

40000 feet

22000 feet

30000 feet

16000 feet

20000 feet

12000 feet

10000 feet

9000 feet

Personal emergency equipment:

- Radio IRS-4, works in UHF or ultra UHF.
- One-man life raft.
- 10 minute tank of oxygen.
- Signal mirror.
- Signal flare.
- Maps.
- Compass.
- Rations.

Stability and maneuverability

The plane is particularly stable under 30000 feet. A weak shudder is felt when the speed of the plane is decreased to the point of entering into a spin. The plane breaks out of the spin by itself.

Bombs and tanks are not taken above 30000 feet.

Take-off occurs at 96% of maximum engine power, at a speed of 350 knots per hour. This RPM is maintained up to 20000 feet.

At 25000 feet - Mach .73
 30000 feet - Mach .77
 35000 feet - Mach .81
 40000 feet - Mach .85

Altitude	Negative G-Forces
5000 feet	12 G
10000 feet	10 G
15000 feet	8.5G
20000 feet	6.5G
25000 feet	4.5G
30000 feet	3.0G
35000 feet	2.0G
40000 feet	1.5G

Critical Mach number is .95 below 15000 feet.
 Above 15000 feet critical Mach does not exist.

The F-86-F-30 is not allowed to fly inverted for more than 10 seconds.

Ceiling - maximum 50000 feet. The most effective working ceiling is 25000 feet.

Maximum diving speeds.

- | | |
|--------------------------|---|
| - without tanks or bombs | - Mach 1.2 |
| - with tanks | - Mach 0.85 |
| - with 500 pound bombs | - Mach 0.85 |
| - with 1000 pound bombs | - Mach 0.75 (with a square vertical stabilizer) |

Cruising speed

Altitude in feet	Engine performance	Instrument speed
5000	82%	260 knots
10000	83%	220 knots
15000	84%	.64 Mach
20000	86%	.63 Mach
25000	87%	.72 Mach
30000	89%	.77 Mach
35000	91%	.83 Mach
40000	92%	.87 Mach

9. Ascent speed at 100% engine power:

Altitude in feet	Rate of ascent feet per minute	Required time for ascent
5000	6000	1 min
10000	5300	2 min
15000	4700	3 min
20000	4000	5 min
25000	3400	7 min
30000	2900	11 min
35000	2500	14 min
40000	2000	20 min

[TFR 37-83]

With 96% engine power

5000	5800	1 min
10000	5100	2 min
15000	4500	3.5 min
20000	3600	6 min
25000	3000	8.5 min
30000	2400	13 min
35000	1900	18 min
40000	1600	25 min

Altitude/distance ascension chart:

[Hand-drawn diagram with altitude on top and distance below]

10. Speed

<u>Speed</u>	<u>Engine power</u>	<u>Instrument speed</u>
5000 feet	100%	500 knots per hour
10000 feet	"	.82 Mach
15000 feet	"	.83 Mach
20000 feet	"	.84 Mach
25000 feet	"	.85 Mach
30000 feet	"	.86 Mach
35000 feet	"	.88 Mach
40000 feet	"	.9 Mach

[TFR 37-84]

Fuel usage

with tanks and without tanks with two 500 pound bombs.

Altitude in ft.	<u>Cruising speed</u>			<u>Horizontal</u>		<u>Diving</u>	
	<u>RPM</u>	<u>With</u>	<u>W/out</u>	<u>100%RPM</u>	<u>80%RPM</u>	<u>100%RPM</u>	<u>80%RPM</u>
		With	W/O	With	W/O	With	W/O
		tanks					
Sea level							
5000	76	2600		3400	3600		2700
10000	77	2350		2850	3000		2400
15000	79	2100		2400	2600		2150
20000	81	1900		2100	2150		1950
25000	83	1700		1850	1900		1650
30000	85	1500		1600	1700		1400
35000	87	1350		1450	1550		1200
40000	89	1200		1300	1400		1000
45000	92	1000		1200	1300		850

Ascending speed with varied engine power.

Altitude	<u>Time</u>		<u>Distance on the</u>		<u>Ascension speed</u>	
	<u>100%</u>	<u>97%</u>	<u>ground in miles</u>		<u>feet per minute</u>	
			<u>100%</u>	<u>97%</u>	<u>100%</u>	<u>97%</u>
Sea level						
with tanks	20 sec	20 sec	4	4	3000	2800
without tanks	20 sec	20 sec	4	4	3100	2900

[TFR 37-85]

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1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
5000 with tanks	1 m. 30 sec	1 m. 35 sec	10	11	4500	4300	
5000 w/o tanks	1 m. 20 sec	1 m. 30 sec	9.5	10	4800	4500	
10000 with tanks	3 m. 30 sec	3 m. 50 sec	32	35	3900	3600	
w/o tanks	3 m. 20 sec	3 m. 40 sec	22	24	4200	3900	
15000 with tanks	6 m. 30 sec	7.00	56	60	3400	3000	
w/o tanks	6	6.30	36	42	3600	3100	
20000 with tanks	9	10	84	90	2800	2400	
w/o tanks	8	9	75	82	3000	2600	
25000 with tanks	12.30	14	112	120	2100	1600	
w/o tanks	11	12.30	100	108	2500	2100	
30000 with tanks	17	20	145	155	1700	1100	
w/o tanks	15	17.00	120	130	2100	1800	
35000 with tanks							
w/o tanks	20	22.30	145	160	1800	1600	
40000 with tanks							
w/o tanks	25	28.00	190	210	1500	1300	
45000 with tanks							
w/o tanks	30	33.30	240	265	1300	1000	

[TFR 37-86]

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Speed

Altitude	with or w/o tanks and 2-500lbs bombs	Flight at 100% engine power	Ascend		Cruising with diff. ratings		Mach
			100%	97%			
Sea level	with tanks	450 knots	300 knots	300 knots	-	-	-
	w/o tanks	450 "	350 "	350 "	-	-	-
5000	with tanks	400 "	300 "	300 "	76%	240 knots	
	w/o tanks	440 "	350 "	350 "	76%	280 "	
10000	with tanks	375 "	300 "	300 "	77%	220 "	
	w/o tanks	425 "	350 "	350 "	77%	260 "	
15000	with tanks	.72 Mach	.7 Mach	.7 Mach	79%	200 "	
	w/o tanks	.72 "	.7 "	.7 "	79%	.69 Mach	
20000	with tanks	.73 "	.7 "	.7 "	81%	.70 "	
	w/o tanks	.76 "	.7 "	.7 "	81%	.71 "	
25000	with tanks	.74 "	.7 "	.7 "	83%	.72 "	
	w/o tanks	.79 "	.74 "	.74 "	83%	.73 "	
30000	with tanks	.76 "	.7 "	.7 "	85%	.74 "	
	w/o tanks	.82 "	.77 "	.76 "	85%	.76 "	
35000	with tanks		.85 "	.8 "	87%	.79 "	
	w/o tanks	.85 "	.85 "	.8 "	87%	.79 "	
40000	with tanks		.86 "	.84 "	89%	.80 "	
	w/o tanks	.86 "	.86 "	.82 "	89%	.80 "	
45000	with tanks		.88 "	.85 "	92%	.82 "	
	w/o tanks	.88 "	.88 "	.84 "	92%	.82 "	

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Tactical operationsReceiving and planning order of combat missions

A combat mission is planned by the joint operations center. Before receiving the combat orders, the OOTs sends a warning order to the units. The wing commander, having received the order, informs squadron headquarters.

The aircraft roster, the type of bombs, the amount of fuel, the mission number, and the take-off time are usually included in the warning order.

Wing headquarters organizes the preparations for the next day's sorties and gives orders on the necessary preparations for the sorties to the wing department chiefs. For example:

The intelligence section prepares the maps, gives information about enemy anti-aircraft battery locations and emergency measures in case of a shoot down.

The munitions supply chief determines the type of bombs and fuses, gives information to the munitions officers on the provisions of the combat sortie.

The weather service prepares information about weather conditions.

At 1900 the order is brought to the attention of the squadron operations chief, who assigns flights to missions. The flights are assigned so that each flight completes the same number of sorties per month. The take-off time is announced and the mission briefing is given at approximately 1930 hrs.

During the briefing, course altitude, initial point of departure, orientation points on the route, take-off time, speed, mission objectives, and the direction for the run on the target are defined for the flight leaders and the formation commanders.

As a rule, the briefing ends 2 to 2 1/2 hours before take-off.

Typical sorties to target areas in North Korea (variations)

A) SUPUN Reservoir power station.

Aircraft roster:

- ground attack aircraft - 48 (F-86-F-30)
- interceptors - 96 (F-86)

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- flight time of ground attack aircraft - 0800 hrs with a one minute interval between squadrons.

- flight time of interceptors - 0800 hrs for 48 planes
0820 hrs for the remaining 48 planes.

- initial point of departure - Sakusyu.

Assembly point - 5 miles south of Namsan-ni.

The K-55 flight route, salt plants (south of Khejdzhu), the mouth of the Tsinnampo River, a protruding section of coastline (toward the southeast of Tehsyu), the starting point of the bombing run.

- the return route: assembly point, the protruding section of coastline to the southeast of Tehsyu, the mouth of Tsinnampo, salt plants, then K-55.

- Ground attack aircraft's combat formation: usual flight combat formation.

Altitude on the flight route is 30000 feet, from Tehsyu we descend to 18000 feet and at that altitude we approach the target. From this altitude we begin to dive the target and drop bombs at an altitude of 2500-3000 meters. The flight speed on the route is Mach .7, during the dive - Mach .8.

B) Singisyu (bridge)

- Number of ground attack aircraft - 48 (F-86-F-30)
- Number of interceptors - 96 (F-86)
- flight time of ground attack aircraft - 0800 hrs with a one minute interval between squadrons.
- Flight time of ground attack aircraft - 0800 hrs for 48 planes
- 0820 hrs for remaining 48 planes
- Initial point - island near the mouth of the Yalu River.
- Assembly point - the mountain southeast of Singisyu.

[TFR 37-88a]

The flight route - K-55, salt plants (south of Khejdzhu)
Seki-to island, the initial point (the island at the
mouth of the Yalu River).

[TFR 37-89]

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SKETCH

Routes for fighter-bombers and fighter-interceptors to the
Supun area (power station).

[hand-drawn diagram of Korea follows]

Yalu River
target
initial
point
assembly
point

K-14
K-13 *Secul
*[illeg]

--- Ground attack aircraft
--- Interceptors

*K-55 USAN

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- Return route - assembly point, Tan-to Island (second assembly point), Seki-to Island, salt plants south of Khejdzhu, K-55.

- Ground attack aircraft combat formation - the usual combat formation of columnar flights.

- Flight altitude on the route is 30000 feet from (Tetsuzan Peninsula) "Appendicitis" to the target descending to 18000 feet and from that altitude we dive on the target. All the remaining elements are the same as the flight to the Supun hydroelectric power plant.

Routes for fighter-bombers and fighter-interceptors to the Singisvu area (bridge).

[Hand-drawn diagram of Korea follows]

Yalu River

initial point *target
assembly point

*Khejdzhu

*K-14
*K-13
*[illeg]

Ground attack aircraft *K-55 Usan

---- Interceptors

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C) "Appendicitis" (Tetsuzan Peninsula)

- Number of ground attack aircraft - 48 (F-86-F-30)

- Number of interceptors - 96 (F-86)

- Flight time for ground attack aircraft - 0800 hrs with one minute interval between squadrons.

- Flight time for interceptors - 0800 hrs for 48 planes
- 0820 hrs for remaining 48 planes

- Initial point - Sinmi-to.

- Assembly point - Tejge-to (see diagram below).

- Route to the target K-55, salt plants south of Khejdzhu, the mouth of Tsinnampo, Sinmi-to.

- Return route - Tejge-to, the mouth of Tsinnampo, salt plants south of Khejdzhu, K-55.

- Combat formation of ground attack aircraft - columnar flights.

The flight altitude remains as before. Leaving 40 km. from Tsinnampo, we begin the descent to 18000 feet. At that altitude we approach Cholsan, we turn to the left 90 degrees, and dive for the target.

We return to our base by this same route. Altitude is about 30000-35000 feet.

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[TFR 37-92]

Sketch of routes for fighter-bombers and fighter-interceptors to the Tetsuzan area during fighter-bomber runs

[hand-drawn diagram of Korea follows]

target
*
Tejzan

Sin-bi-to

Chodo

Kehson
area

*K-14
*K-13
*Che[illeg]l'po

Ground attack aircraft *K-55 Usan
----- Interceptors

[TFR 37-93]

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D) Railway junction in Kuson (Kudzio)

- Number of ground attack aircraft - 48 (F-86-F-30)
 - Number of interceptors - 96 (F-86)
 - Flight time for ground attack aircraft - 0800 hrs with one minute interval between squadrons.
 - Flight time for interceptors - 0800 hrs for 48 planes
- 0820 hrs for remaining 48 planes
 - Initial point - the point between the two islands northwest of Kuson.
 - Assembly point - the island northwest of Kuson.
 - Route to the target - K-55, salt plants south of Khejdzhu, a point 10 miles east of Tsinnampo, the mouth of Chen-Chen, initial point.
 - Return route - assembly point, the mouth of Chen-Chen, a point 10 miles east of Tsinnampo, salt plants south of Khejdzhu, K-55.
 - Ground attack aircraft's combat formation: usual combat formation - columnar flights.
- The flight altitude is 30000 feet, north of Tsinnampo we begin the descent to 18000 feet and from the initial point we conduct the bombing.
- In all the mission variations, the dive is conducted under a 60-65 degree angle at a speed of Mach .8.

Sketch of routes for fighter-bombers and fighter-interceptors in the Kuson (Kidzjo) area during fighter-bomber runs

[Hand-drawn diagram of Korea follows]

*target Kidzjo

Chodo

*Khejdzhu Kehson area

*K-14

*K-13

*Chemul'po

Ground attack aircraft K-55* Usan

Interceptors

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During the run on the target the interval between the flights is 30 seconds to 1 minute. This interval stays constant, regardless of how many flights are in the ground attack force.

It is considered normal weather when the cloud cover is not below 20000 feet.

Flights go on bombing runs in columns. Sometimes it seems that flights fly in another kind of formation, but this is done when a flight does not maintain the needed interval and breaks formation.

Other times the leader will order to increase speed, but not all the fliers do this immediately, since some fliers at this time are searching for targets, and have to either decrease or increase speed, in order to correct the interval.

Why these routes are chosen:

The Kaesong area is not crossed.

They are almost straight and at the same time do not go over large cities.

There are good orientation points along the route.

An escort patrols around the area on the south shore of the Yalu River, in the target area or at a range of 50 miles in any direction from the target area. Direct escort is not sent out, since the North Korean AF rarely appears south of the Chen-Chen river. The speed of the patrol is Mach .8-.88.

The planes on duty in the group

1. "Alarm OOTs" - planes ready to take-off for direct support.
2. "Alarm for vehicles" - planes ready to take-off for bombing of vehicles.
3. "Alarm on the runway" - planes ready to take-off to intercept enemy planes.
4. "Alarm Chodo" - planes planning to patrol over the island of Chodo.

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Planes that are dispatched for patrolling (to combat MiGs) have the same formation as during a sortie to an assault, but the second pair flies alternately at the same level with the lead pair, then higher by 2000 feet.

In pairs the planes fly at one altitude. Usually the second pair flies 1000-1200 feet higher than the lead pair. The flight commanders usually decide between themselves who will patrol in which area.

The flights leave on a direct course to the patrol areas and separate accordingly to the patrol areas.

Experienced fliers with 200 gallon drop tanks.

The goal of this sortie was to establish flying data of a plane with two 200 gallon drop tanks, namely: altitude, speed, range, leftover fuel, flight duration.

Bomb loads consisted of two 500 pound bombs. The route: climbing to 30000 feet, they went toward the airfield located approximately 20 miles southeast of Vonsan, then straight to the protrusion of land north of P'engneng - before that area, we began the descent and went on a course to Sarivon, where we had an altitude of 18000 feet. From Sarivon we went to the target area, which is approximately 15 miles east of Sarivon. Again we climbed to 30000 feet. We climbed at a speed of 300 knots until the plane achieved Mach .7, at 30000 feet the speed worked out to approximately 165 miles per hour. The plane climbed to 30000 feet in about 21 minutes after take-off.

We were in the air a total of 1 hour 50 minutes. Drop tanks were used up after about 5 minutes from when we had begun the climb after the bombing raid. The flight landed, having on average 900 pounds of fuel.

Engine start checklist:


- The external power supply is connected.
- The main switch is turned on.
- The battery starter is turned on for 3 seconds.

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- at 6% revolutions the throttle is pumped slightly.
- at 10% revolutions the throttle is moved forward, until the fuel pressure reaches 35-40 pounds.
- Until the engine reaches 35% revolutions it is necessary to maintain the exhaust temperature at 600 degrees.
- Upon reaching 35% revolutions the throttle is set to idle.
- The external power supply is disconnected at 22% revolutions.

Differences between the A-4, A-1a and A-1st sights.

A-4 sight [Hand-drawn diagram]



1. Indicate the wing span of the enemy plane.
2. Indicate the distance to the target.
3. The switch to the left - the sight is fixed, to the right - the sight calculates.
4. When the radar is in contact with the target the light is illuminated.
5. The brightness of the scale controls the firing.

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Control panel of the A-4 sight
[hand-drawn diagram follows]

1	2	3	4
	5		7
	6	8	9
10		11	

1. Bomb knob - for wind corrections.
2. Rocket knob - for various types of rockets.
3. Sight on/off button.
4. Machine gun heating switch - for pre-heating machine guns.
5. Bomb switch - for dropping bombs.
6. Rocket switch - for dropping rockets.
7. Sight scale switch - primary and reserve lamps.
8. Gyroscope on.
9. Machine gun filling switch - loads the machine guns.
10. Cabin light rheostat - lights the cabin.
11. Converter switch - chooses the converter.

My first acquaintance with the A-4 sight was upon arrival in Korea. Since it works identically to the A-1sm, there is no need for any kind of special instructions for working with it.

The main difference of this sight, as far as I know, is the redistribution and rearrangement of parts of the sight so that its maintenance is lowered.

I heard that the bomb and rocket switches were improved, but I do not know how. I never heard about the difference between the A-1s and A-1sm sights.

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The F-86f is equipped with the A-4 sight.

The [in English "APG-30"] range finder is used in the A-4 sight.

The APG-33 is the other range finder that I know. This range finder gives information about range on the operator screen. The APG-30 range finder has information about range sent to the computer and from there to the flier's scale.

As far as I know, the advantages of the A-4 sight over the A-1s and A-1sm are the A-4's maintenance and repair work is less. I do not know the rest of the information, since I never bombed or fired rockets with the aid of the A-4 sight.

The A-4 sight is not a new invention. This is an improved modification of the A-1sm.

Location of the A-4 sight in the plane

Location of the A-4 sight in the plane
[hand-drawn diagram of a plane]

sight
switch
antenna
computer
and power unit

[hand-drawn diagram follows]

Reflector plate

Wind
shield

head of
the sight

Sight
panel

An image of the enemy plane is projected on the reflector screen.

Personally I have not found any deficiencies in the A-4 sight.

The A-1s, A-1sm and A-4, in comparison with the K-14 and Mark-18, are better in the sense of firing, since they give better information about distance, but in the sense of maintenance and repair these sights (A-1s, A-1sm, A-4) are more complex and difficult.

A pilot prefers to use the A-4 sight, since this is the latest sight model and it breaks down less on the job.

The job of the A-4 sight during firing is similar to the job of the A-1cm sight: to acquire the target with the sight and hold it until the light blinks. When the range indicator shows that you have achieved the desired distance, open fire.

Firing on ground targets with the A-4 sight is the same as with the A-1cm. The sight is located in a fixed position.

A pilot aims the sight at the target and opens fire, if he thinks that he is at the required distance.

[2 hand-drawn diagrams follow - side by side]

firing on an aerial target

firing on a ground target

CHIEF OF INTELLIGENCE, FIELD POST NUMBER 54892

Lieutenant Colonel: [signature] (SAN'KOV)

[handwritten on reverse: TsA MO, f. 64 IAP, op. 174045 ss, d. 143, l. 135-169.]

GLOSSARY

AD	Air Division
ASh	Aviation Squadron
AK	Possibly Alphabetic Catalog or Administrative Committee
AP	Aviation Regiment
APG	Army Mobile Hospital
A/S	Administration Service
AVMB	Not defined
BF	Byelorussian Front
BSSR	Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic
CC	Central Committee
CINC	Commander-in-Chief
CIS	Commonwealth of Independent States
CP	Command Post
CPSU	Communist Party of the Soviet Union
CM	Council of Ministers
DKA	Not defined
DPNK	Not defined
DRV	Democratic Republic of Vietnam
DVO	Far East Military District
EH	Evacuation Hospital
EhG	Evacuation Hospital
EhPK	Expert Verification Committee
ER	Clearing Station
FL	Not defined
FNOYUV	National Front for Liberation of South Vietnam
FPL	Not defined
FPPL	Not defined
FRG	Federal Republic of Germany
GAU	City/State Vehicle Inspection
GCI	Ground Controlled Intercept
GIAP	Guards Fighter Aviation Regiment
GIAPb	Undefined subunit at a Guards Fighter Aviation Regiment
GIAVP	Probably Guards Fighter Aviation Regiment
GIT	Not defined
GLR	Hospital for the Walking Wounded
GOM	City Militia Station
GRU	Main Intelligence Directorate
GSh	General Staff
GSOV	Group of Soviet Occupation Forces
GUGB	Main Administration of State Security
GUIN	Main Directorate of Foreign Affairs
GUM	Main Directorate of Militia
GUPM	Not defined
GUPV	Main Directorate of Border Troops
GUPVI	Main Directorate of the Military Inspectorate
GUUIS	Not defined
GUV	Probably Main Directorate of Troops
Hrs	Hours
IAD	Fighter Aviation Division
IAP	Fighter Aviation Regiment

GLOSSARY (cont'd)

IB	Not Defined
IG	Hospital for Contagious Diseases
illeg.	Illegible
IPK	Iranian Border Commissioner
isl.	Island
ITK	Corrective Labor Colony
ITL	Corrective Labor Camp
KA	Red Army
KARLAG	Karaganda Corrective Labor Camp
KGB	Committee for State Security
KhPPG	Mobile Field Surgical Hospital
KNDR	People's Democratic Republic of Korea
KNR	People's Republic of China
KOKh	Not defined
KSG	Not defined
KP	Communist Party
KPPG	Not Defined
KPPT	Not Defined
KPSS	Communist Party Soviet Union
KPZ	Preliminary Detention Cell
KU	Probably Sector Commander
LVMB	Not defined
MASH	Mobile Army Surgical Hospital
MERF	Ministry of Security of the Russian Federation
MD	Military District
MEhP	Local Evacuation Station
MFA	Ministry of Foreign Affairs
MGB	Ministry of State Security
MGU	Moscow State University
MGSh	Naval General Staff
MKKK	International Red Cross
MID	Ministry of Foreign Affairs
MINGEOLO-	
GORAZVEDKI	Ministry of Geological Survey/Research
MO	Ministry of Defense
M.P.	Place for Seal
M/S	Medical Service
MVD	Ministry of Internal Affairs
NFO	National Liberation Front
NKO	People's Commissariat of Defense
NKVD	People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs
OBLASTAT	Oblast Statistics
OBLDOROTDEL	Regional Department of Highways
OD	Duty Officer
ODVO	Odessa Military District
OKR	Counter-Intelligence Section
OMG	Operational Maneuver Group
OP.	Inventory
ORO	Separate Service Company
OROP	Not Defined
ORS	Separate Supply Company or Separate Signals Company
OSA	Not defined (Probably Department of American

GLOSSARY (cont'd)

OSK	Countries
OT	Not defined
OVIR	Rear Services Section
OVP	Visa and Registration Department
PEhP	Harbor Defense
PA	Field Evacuation Station
PAL	Mailing Address
PDRK	Laboratory of Pathological Anatomy
PK	Peoples Democratic Republic of Korea
PL	Border Commissar
PO	Mobile Laboratory
PP	Border Guard Detachment
P.P.	Field Postal Service
PPG	Original signed
PPV	Mobile Field Hospital
PRVO/PVO	Not defined
PSEhO	Air Defense
PZ	Mobile Sanitary-Epidemiological Detachment
RAJFROMKOM-	Frontier Post
BINAT	Regional Industrial Combine
RAJVOENKOMAT	Regional Military (Commissar)
RF	Russian Federation
RFSFR	Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic
RK	Rajon Committee
R.O.	Rajon Department
ROM	City District Militia Station
RTP	Radio Technical Regiment
RVK	Rajon Military Commissariat
SEhG	Clearing and Evacuating Hospital
SEL' SOVIET	Village Council
SD	Rifle Division
SEhG	Clearing and Evacuation Hospital
SEN	Senior
SID&SR	Not defined
SM	Council of Ministers
SMU	Construction and Installation Department
SNK	Council of People's Commissars
SPV	Not defined
SSK	Not defined
SSR	Soviet Socialist Republic
SV	Medical Platoon
SVERRF	Foreign Intelligence Service of the Russian Federation
TASS	News Agency of the Soviet Union
TEhG	Therapeutic Evacuation Hospital
TOP	Pacific Ocean Fleet
TPPG	Therapeutic Field Mobile Hospital
TsAMO	Central Archive of the Ministry of Defense
TsAPV	Central Archives of the Border Troops
TsGASA	Central State Archives of the Soviet Army
TsK	Central Committee

GLOSSARY (cont'd)

TsKI	Central Design and Research
TsKP	Central Command Post
TsOG	Not defined
TsVG	Central Military Hospital
TsVKVP(b)	Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks)
TsZ	Not defined
u/i	unidentified
UID	Not defined
UK	Criminal Code
UM	Directorate of the Militia
UMGB	Directorate of the Ministry of State Security
UMVD	Directorate of the Ministry of Internal Affairs
UNKGB	Directorate of People's Commissariat of State Security
UPPG	Not defined
UPT	Directorate of Public Transportation
UPVI	Not defined
USKh	Not defined
USSR	Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
UT	Directorate of Rear Services
UVD	Directorate of Internal Affairs
UVV	War-time Record
VCh	High Frequency
VCh	Military Unit
VG	Military Hospital
VIA	Vietnamese Fighter Aviation
VK	Military Medical Commission
VKh	entry, input
VKP	All-Union Communist Party
VKP(b)	All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks)
VNF	Navy
VNS	Naval Hospital
VNM	Military Medical Museum
VMS	Naval Forces
VNOS	Aircraft-warning Service
VORKUTLAG	Vorkuta Corrective Labor Camp
VS	Armed Forces
VSU	Military Medical Directorate
VT	Military Tribunal
VVK	Military Medical Commission
VVS	Air Force(s)
ZAGOTZERNO	Grain Procurement Point
ZAGS	Civil Registry Office
ZAKVO	Zakavkaz Military District



TASK FORCE RUSSIA (POW/MIA)

TRANSLATIONS

11 May 1993
VOLUME II

HANDLING INSTRUCTIONS

This volume of translations has been prepared for the use of the Commission in pursuit of our mission. While it is an unclassified document in accordance with Department of Defense classification guidelines for POW/MIA information, it nonetheless contains casualty-related information and should not be disseminated outside of Commission channels pending efforts by the Department of Defense Executive Agent to locate and notify as many of the next of kin as feasible.

INTRODUCTION

1. General

a. This is Volume II of a two volume set of translations and contains translations of two of the four batches of documents presented by General Dimitrij Volkogonov to the United States Senate Select Committee on POW/MIA Affairs at the Select Committee hearing on 11 Nov 92. Finally, there is a four page glossary of abbreviations at the end of the volume.

b. Translations were accomplished by U.S. Army and Air Force linguists on temporary duty with Task Force Russia (TFR). In accordance with TFR policy, accuracy in translations took precedence over style. The methodology employed requires a strict page by page translation so as to account for every page of material passed to TFR. With few exceptions, each page of Russian text is matched with a page of English translation. Suffixed numbers indicate that either two pages of Russian material were used to render one page of English translation or one page of Russian material was rendered in two pages of English. A TFR number consists of the batch number followed by the page number of the text (i.e., TFR 36-1 corresponds to page one of batch 36). Batch numbers are assigned a one up number in the order that the documents are received by TFR. Any translator notes are enclosed within brackets "[]" and are there to provide clarification or doubt in the translation due to poor or illegible readability of the original. Pages which contain only translator's notes bear the TFR number without a page number.

c. The names of the same servicemen are repeated numerous times in this publication. They are referenced in various documents from several different original sources. The names as they occur are reproduced here in transliteration as accurately as possible. Obvious misspellings reflect the nature of the original documents. If the translator felt comfortable in rendering a possible English language version it is enclosed within brackets, with a question mark, as a translator note. If the translator was sure of the spelling of a name, it is transliterated as well as rendered within brackets without a question mark. Some transliterations are obviously close to the English language spelling of the name and are left as is without a translator note.

2. Documents

This volume contains 320 pages of translations and notes in addition to the introduction, disclaimer, and glossary in the following TFR document batches.

- a. TFR 38 contains 93 pages of translation related to the loss, damage of forced landings of U.S. aircraft over the Soviet Union.
- b. TFR 39 contains 227 pages of translation related to WW II.

[TFR 38-1]

INCIDENTS ASSOCIATED WITH THE LOSS, DAMAGE OR
FORCED LANDINGS OF AMERICAN AIRCRAFT OVER THE
TERRITORY OF THE FORMER USSR

1. Baltic Sea, 8 Apr 1950, a PB4Y2, crew of 10, one rescued by the Americans, fate of the remainder is unknown.

There are reports from four fliers who participated in the interception which confirm that the American aircraft fired first. After fire was returned, it steeply descended and disappeared into the clouds. In addition, there is a report to Stalin about the search from 22 April to 14 June 1950 of the area where the aircraft fell. There were 160 divers who completed 754 dives and found nothing of the aircraft other than a rubber piece from a fuel tank.

2. Pacific Ocean, 26 Dec 1950, a B-29, fate of the crew is unknown.

There is no information other than a report on a pair of Soviet MiG-15s firing on this aircraft. As a result, the American aircraft's wing caught fire and the aircraft went into a steep descent.

3. Cape Ostrovnoj, Kamchatka, 6 Nov 1951, a "Neptune", fate of the crew is unknown.

It is known that the aircraft was shot down by a pair of LA-11s 7-8 miles from shore. The Soviet aircraft returned fire. The aircraft crashed into the water and exploded at 1018 hrs, 18 miles from shore.

4. Valentin Bay, Sea of Japan, 13 Jun 1952, a B-29, fate of the 12 crew members is unknown.

There is only information from the KGB about the shoot down of an American aircraft at 1735 hrs south of Valentin Bay and information that aircraft wreckage and crew members were not discovered.

5. Yuriy Island, Kurils, a B-29, 7 Oct 1952, body of one crew member was picked up (where was it taken?). The fate of the rest of the crew is unknown.

There is information about a shoot down of an American aircraft at 1530 hrs Khabarovsk time. The aircraft crashed into Soviet territorial waters, 3 kms southeast of Yuriy Island. A headless body (supposedly BUNKER [DUNHAM] John Robertson) and some aircraft wreckage was retrieved at the crash site. The remaining crew members were not discovered.

6. Askol'd Island (Vladivostok), 29 Jul 1953, a B-50, fate of the 13 crew members is unknown.

Other than draft demarches and correspondence with the MID, there are no documents. It is evident from this correspondence

[TFR 38-1a]

that our fighters shot down the aircraft inside territorial waters.

7. Southern Kurils, 7 Nov 1954, a B-29, 9 crew members bailed out and were saved, but their subsequent fate is unknown.

There is information about the pilots that shot down this aircraft over Tanfil'ev Island, as well as American information on the rescue of 9 of the 12 crew members and acknowledgment that the aircraft fired on Soviet fighters.

8. Kuril Islands, 18 Apr 1955, a B-47.

There is extensive correspondence of the MO, MID, and TsK KPSS from which it follows that the aircraft was shot down by Soviet fighters at 1127 hrs and crashed within Soviet territorial waters, 13 kms west of the town of Nikol'skoe (Bering Island). Molotov and Zhukov proposed that this fact be hidden from the Americans.

9. Agdam area, Armenia, 27 Jun 58, a "Douglas-118". Forced to land, 5 crew members bailed out and four landed in the burning aircraft; all survived.

All last names are given. Turned over to the Americans.

10. Brevan, 8 Sep 1958 - C-130, there were 13 crew members, 5 bodies were discovered, 6 ???[sic] were turned over.

The aircraft was shot down by Soviet fighters and crashed in the area of the village of Verkhni; Talin (35 kms from the border). It follows from these documents that 5 bodies were discovered at the crash site, but the MID demarche mentions 6 bodies. There is no further information.

11. Barents Sea, 1 Jul 1960, an RB-47, fate of 3 crew members is unknown, two were picked up alive and one dead. They were turned over to the Americans.

The aircraft was shot down within Soviet territorial waters.

[entire page handwritten]

Senior Pilot v/ch 40585
Guards Lieutenant Tezyaev
Ivan Ivanovich
8 Apr 50

Top Secret
to the Commander v/ch 19011
11

Report

As I was the wingman of the first pair of the duty flight, I received the command to take off.

I took off with the flight at 1724 hrs. We climbed to an altitude of 4000 meters and headed north.

Contact with the violator was made at [1736?] hrs at the coastline. It was a four-engine aircraft with American markings at an altitude of 3700 meters. On the leader's command, I took a position directly on the violator's tail.

The leader was on the right of the violator and fired a warning burst. After the violator opened fire on my leader, I fired a 15 shell burst at the violator. He sharply descended with course of 270 degrees and disappeared into the clouds, which were at an altitude of 500 meters over the sea and reached as far as the coastline. Presumably, the violator crashed into the sea 5-10 kilometers from the coastline of the western point of [Tsenkon'?).

Guards Senior Pilot-Lieutenant [signature]

[TFR 38-4]

[entire page handwritten]

Flight Commander
v/ch 40585 Guards
Senior Lieutenant
Gerasimov
Anatoliy Stepanovich
8 Apr 50

Top Secret
To the Commander,
v/ch 19011 [1 word illeg.]
10

Report

As I was in the duty flight in readiness condition 1 and received the command to take off, I took off at 1724 hrs. After I received the command from group leader Guards Senior Lieutenant Dokin to gain altitude, my wingman, Lieutenant Sataev, and I climbed to 4200 meters and took a position to the left of and 200 meters higher than the lead pair.

At 1739 hrs, we made contact with a four-engine aircraft with American markings at the coastline south of Liepaja. The American aircraft was at an altitude of 3700 meters on a course of 135 degrees. We received the command from group leader Senior Lieutenant Dokin to force the violator to land. My wingman, Lieutenant Sataev, and I went to the right of the violator at the same altitude as the violator and I rocked my wings. I pulled ahead and started to make a left turn, that is, I gave the command to follow me. The violator did not respond to this; on the contrary, he began to sharply turn towards the sea and to take a course of 270 degrees. At that time, group leader Senior Lieutenant Dokin fired a warning burst parallel to the violator. In response, the violator opened fire on group leader Senior Lieutenant Dokin, who was flying to the right and behind. On seeing this, Senior Lieutenant Dokin's wingman, Guards Lieutenant Terzaev, opened fire on the violator. The violator sharply descended and entered the clouds on a course of 270 degrees. Presumably, the violator crashed into the sea 5-10 kilometers from the coastline.

[signature]

[TFR 38-5]

[entire page handwritten]

Pilot, v/ch 40585
Sataev, Evgraf
Rofimovich
[cut off] Apr 50

Top Secret
[1 word illeg.] 9
to the Commander
v/ch 19011

Report

As I was in the duty flight in readiness condition 1, I received the command to take off. At 1724 hrs I took off. I received the command from the pair leader to climb to an altitude of 4200 meters. I flew at this altitude with my leader to the left of the lead pair. At 1739 hrs, at the coastline south of Liepaja, we made contact with a four-engine aircraft with American markings at an altitude of 3700 meters. The violator was on a course of 135 degrees. I heard the command from the group leader to force it to land. My leader and I came from the right side, rocked our wings and even flew ahead, and made turns to the left. The violator did not respond to this, and turned to the right and descended on course of 270 degrees. The group leader was behind. At that time the [1 word illeg.] burst at the group leader. The group leader's wingman opened fire

[TFR 38-6]

[entire page handwritten]

at the violator. After this the violator sharply descended with a course of 270 degrees into the clouds. The violator presumably crashed into the sea 5-10 kilometers from the coast.

[signature] (Sataev)

[TFR 38-7]

[entire page handwritten]

Flight Commander
v/ch 40585, Guards
Senior Lieutenant
Dokin, Boris
Pavlovich
8 Apr 50

Top Secret
to the Commander v/ch 19011 [1 word illeg.]
8

Report

As I was in the duty flight in readiness condition 1, I received the order to take off. After the take-off, I received the command to assume an altitude of 4000 meters at a course of 360 degrees. I flew for 4 minutes on this course. At 1733 hrs, I received the command from the control point to take a course of 340 degrees. At 1737 hrs, I received the command to take a course of 360 degrees. At 1739 hrs, I made contact with a four-engine aircraft with American markings on a course of 135 degrees south of Liepaja, 8-kilometers from the settlement of Tsenkon'. After I sighted the aircraft, my pair approached from behind and to the right, and told the second pair, led by Senior Lieutenant Gerasimov, to force the violator to land. Gerasimov flew ahead and sharply rocking his wings, turned to the left. The violator took a course of 270 degrees toward the sea and did not follow Senior Lieutenant Gerasimov's pair. I then gave a 12-shot warning burst. The violator began firing at me. Seeing this, my wingman, Lieutenant Tezyaev, fired at the violator. The violator steeply descended and entered the clouds at an altitude of 500 meters. Presumably, the aircraft crashed 5-10 kilometers from the shore.

Flight Commander Senior Lieutenant Dokin

[TFR 38-8]

[entire page handwritten]

Operations Duty Officer
Bespalov
April 1950

To the Commander
223 GIAP
Guards Lieutenant Colonel Comrade Kovalenko

[stamp "Entry No. 0508
13 Apr 50
3 Guards Fighter Aviation Regiment, VVS, USSR"]

08 Apr 50

I am reporting that while on duty on 13 Apr 50, two R-39 aircraft were launched to intercept a violator under the following circumstances:

At 0558 hrs, I received a report via telephone from OD AVMB, which had in turn received it from Kaliningrad, that a violator was in grid 555178. After I reported this, the AP Chief of Staff made the decision for a pair of R-39s to assume readiness condition 1 with motors off until the command due to this grid being far from our airfield. This was immediately transmitted to the commander of the duty AEh.

At 1625 hrs, since there were no more reports from the VNOS posts, the Commander of the duty AEh was given the order to move the pair of aircraft from readiness condition 1 to readiness condition 2.

At 1707 hrs, I received from the OD 211 FL VNOS the signal "Launch" to quadrant 523548-040-01-1706 and immediately reported this to the AP Chief of Staff. The Chief of Staff ordered the pair of aircraft from the duty AEh to go to readiness condition 1 with engines running, but to taxi on command. At 1712 hrs, the AP Chief of Staff ordered the duty squadron commander to turn off the engines since there was fog on the airfield and take-off was impossible.

At 1720 hrs, the AP Chief of Staff passed on to OD AVMB that the planes could not take-off because there was fog on the airfield. At 1722 hrs, I passed the same message to OD 211 FL VNOS. At 1738 hrs, the Regimental Commander arrived at the command post and since the fog had somewhat lifted from the airfield, he decided to launch a pair of planes.

At 1740 hrs, two R-39 planes, Major Didenko in aircraft No. 46 and Major Blokhin in aircraft No. 51, took-off.

At 1749 hrs, Colonel Bychkov from Palanga telephoned for the AP Chief of Staff and relayed to him the command to land our pair of planes. The Regimental Commander immediately radioed to both aircraft, Nos. 46 and 51, the command to return to the airfield and land.

At 1812 hrs, aircraft Nos. 46 and 51 landed. According to the crew debrief, nothing was detected during the flight.

[TFR 38-8a]

Operations Duty Officer 223 GIAPb

Major [signature] Bespalov

Enclosures:

1. Extract from the Warning System Duty officer logbook
2. Tracing of the map-board

[stamp "Central Naval Archives"]

[handwritten "Basis: f. 4144, op. 029251, d. 10, l. 31"]

[TFR 38-9]

To Comrade STALIN
To Comrade M.A. BULGANIN

I am reporting that the search conducted by the 4th Navy for the American plane which sank on April 8 of this year to the west of Liepaja did not yield positive results.

During the period 22 Apr to 14 Jun of this year, the search employed 45 different vessels, 33 of which were trawlers. There were 160 divers involved in the underwater portion of the search.

The area where the aircraft was assumed to have sunk, a general area of 48.9 square miles (166.4 square kilometers), was patrolled and investigated by trawlers and metal detectors. Divers made 757 descents and searched an area of 1,337,500 square meters.

During the search, the divers found and searched two German transports (displacing 4000-5000 tons) which were sunk during the Great Patriotic War. Additionally, two aviation motors, which were manufactured in 1943 by the German firm "BMW" and which had been lying on the bottom for no less than 5 years, were found and raised.

In spite of the large effort and resources spent on the search for the American plane, no pieces of it were found.

Discovery of the aircraft by additional searches also appears unlikely.

In addition, the diversion of 33 trawlers for a prolonged period from the work of clearing mines from the Baltic Sea puts the 1950 Plan for Mine-sweeping in jeopardy.

Therefore, I consider it expedient to discontinue the search for the American plane in the area of Liepaja and to use the trawlers for mine-sweeping.

Request your approval.

14 Jun 50
No. 1275242

Original Signed YURASHEV

True copy: [signature]

HEAD OF THE CHIEF OPERATIONS DIRECTORATE MGSh
VICE-ADMIRAL

[signature] (POKIN)

14 Jun 50

[seal "Central Naval Archives"]

[handwritten "Basis: P. 14, op. 52, d. 254 l. 123"]

[TFR 38-10]

There were no remarks made in the TsK KPSS.

Copy 24
Secret
Copy No. 2

24 Nov 75

17 Nov 75

TsK KPSS

No. 2877-A

The declarations of several
US propaganda organs regarding
the fate of American fliers.

The American propaganda organs have recently published a number of reports on the crew of an American plane shot down over our country in 1950. The crew members are allegedly imprisoned in the Soviet Union. Moreover, these reports makes reference to John NOBLE, an American citizen who maintains that he heard about this from other prisoners when he was imprisoned in the USSR.

Official documents on hand testify that on 8 Apr 50 an American B-29 violated the airspace of the USSR over the Baltic Sea and was driven off by Soviet fighters. The crew observed radio silence while approaching the State border and while in USSR airspace. The subsequent fate of the plane is unknown.

As has been established, none of the crew members the Americans are looking for were prosecuted or held in prisons in the USSR.

The US Embassy in Moscow appealed for an explanation concerning the fate of the crew members. They received the appropriate answers.

On 27 Oct 75, White House Press Secretary NESSEN announced that official US organs repeatedly investigated this matter. He said that in 1974 the State Department came to the conclusion that all possible means to search for the fliers have been exhausted and that there is no evidence that they are located in the USSR.

[TFR 38-11]

[handwritten "247"]

2.

He said that there is, therefore, no basis to return to this matter again.

An inquiry on the individual that the US propaganda organs are referring to shows that John NOBLE, born in 1923, was sentenced in 1950 to 15 years in a penal labor camp by a special session of the Ministry for State Security of the USSR in accordance with the directive of the Control Council. He was convicted of having been a joint owner of a business that produced supplies for the German Fascist forces and of having maintained contact after the war with people suspected of espionage against the Soviet forces in Germany. NOBLE was expelled from our country by the decision of the Military Board of the Supreme Court of the USSR.

Original Signed THE CHAIRMAN OF THE COMMITTEE FOR
STATE SECURITY

ANDROPOV

[TFR 38-12]

[handwritten "No. 2"]

[handwritten "21 Dec 50"]

"27" Dec 50

No. 7390/A

[handwritten "Entry 00/37
4 Jan 51"]

Copy

Top Secret

Copy No. 6

[handwritten "50"]

TO THE COUNCIL OF MINISTERS OF THE USSR
Comrade I.V. STALIN
Comrade V.M. MOLOTOV
Comrade L.P. BERIYA

TO THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE VKP(b)
Comrade G.M. MALENKOV

I am reporting that, according to a report from the Chief of the Directorate of Border Troops of the MGB on the Pacific Ocean, on 26 Dec at 1400 hrs an unidentified aircraft was detected by PVO Fleet radar approaching from Korea toward the State border of the USSR.

Four "R-63's" from the Pos'et area and two "MiG-15s" from the Vladivostok area were scrambled.

Near the mouth of the Tumen-Ula River the "MiG-15s" spotted an American B-29 approaching from Cape Sosura (Korea). The B-29, as the fliers later reported, closed on our fighters and opened fire.

Return fire from our fighters set the left wing of the B-29 on fire. The plane turned towards the sea and sharply descended. This was also confirmed by information from the PVO Fleet radar station "Dove's Cliff."

Based on our pilot's claims and the conclusions of the HQ, Naval Aviation, the American B-29 aircraft was shot down and crashed into the sea 50 miles south of Cape Sosura.

It is also noteworthy that on the morning of 27 Dec, American B-29's were flying in groups of 2-4 in the area where the plane went down. Presumably, they were looking for the downed plane.

ABAKUMOV

typed 6 copies

Stalin

Molotov

Beriya

Malenkov

Sec MGB USSR

MGB Directorate of Border Troops

[Originator?] Stakhanov

[TFR 38-13]

[handwritten "No. 3"]

[handwritten "10"]

[handwritten "6 Nov 51"]

Top Secret
Copy No. 1

To Comrade I.V. STALIN

As a supplement to my report on the American plane shot down on 6 Nov 51 near Cape Ostrovnoj, I am reporting:

Radio intercepts from our stations have established that the American "Neptune" aircraft No. 5 from the USAF 6th Patrol-Bomber Aviation Squadron took off from Atsugi Airfield at 0626 hrs on 6 November, Vladivostok time. It flew to the northern part of the Sea of Japan for reconnaissance.

Towards the end of the day, the American Air Force Command gave orders to aircraft of the 2nd Group of the 96th Operational Group (aircraft carriers) to conduct a search for "Neptune" No. 5 in the Sea of Japan between the 40th and 44th parallels.

At the same time, ships of the 77th and 95th Operational Groups located near the coast of Korea were informed that "Neptune" aircraft No. 5 was missing.

According to the Americans, the last time that aircraft No. 5 was noticed was at 0840 hrs on 6 Nov, 30 miles to the west of Okusira-Sima Island.

On the night of the sixth, two "Mariner" aircraft and one "Neptune" aircraft flew to the Sea of Japan to search for the American plane.

On 7 Nov, five "Neptunes", five "Mariners", two "B-29s" and two helicopters were noted searching for the downed American plane.

The American planes conducting the search did not come closer than 100 miles (180 kms) to our shores.

Based on this, I conclude that the downed American plane did not manage to report the incident with our fighters.

[signature] N. KUZNETSOV

"7" Nov 51

No. 141136 se.

[handwritten "passed by 132"]

[TFR 38-14]

[handwritten "34"]

[handwritten "11"]

TOP SECRET

Workers of the world, unite!The All-Union Communist Party (bolsheviks), CENTRAL COMMITTEENo. PR4/312
7 Nov 51

To: Comrades Malenkov, Beriya, Gromyko

Extract from protocol No. 84 of the session of the Politburo TsK VKP (b)

Decision of 7 Nov 51

312. - on the violation of the Soviet border in the Far East by an American bomber.Confirm the text of the demarche to the US Government (attached).

Deliver the demarche to the temporary US charge d'affaires in Moscow.

SECRETARY TsK

4-ks

[handwritten "Demarche [illeg. word] 30 Nov 51"]

[Printed along the side of the page, "Subject to return within 7 days to the Office of the Politburo TsK VKP (established 5 May 27, pr. No. 100, p. 5)"]

[TFR 38-15]

[handwritten "12"]

Reference: para. 312 from Protocol No. 84 of the Politburo

Demarche to the US government.

The Government of the Union of the Soviet Socialist Republics considers it necessary to announce the following to the Government of the United States of America:

According to confirmed information received by the Government of the USSR, at 1010 hrs Vladivostok time, on 6 Nov 51, an American dual-engine "Neptune" type bomber violated the State border of the USSR near Cape Ostrovnoj.

Two Soviet fighters approached the American aircraft that had violated the border with the intent to force it to land at a Soviet airfield. The American aircraft opened fire. The Soviet aircraft were forced to return fire and the American aircraft turned off towards the sea and disappeared.

Bringing this to the attention of the US Government, the Soviet Government is announcing a strong protest against this new, flagrant violation of the State border of the USSR by an American military aircraft. The Soviet Government insists that those responsible for this violation be made to answer for this act and expects that the US Government will immediately take appropriate actions to ensure that there are no violations of the State border of the USSR in the future.

5-ae

[TFR 38-16]

[handwritten "84" and "312"]
[handwritten "13"]

Top Secret

To Comrade I.V. STALIN

I am reporting:

According to the report from the Commander of the 5th Navy, on the morning of 6 November, an A-20-J (Boston) aircraft conducted a reconnaissance of a 12 nautical mile frontier area to the southwest of Cape Ostrovnoj. It was covered by 2 "LA-11" fighters from the 5th Navy.

At 1010 hrs Vladivostok time, our aircraft detected the American aircraft within the boundaries of our territorial waters, 7-8 miles (10-15 kms) from the shore.

Once they spotted the intruder, our two fighters (the leader was Lykshov, wingman was Shchukin) closed on and identified the American patrol aircraft. It was a "Neptune" type bomber.

Upon approach of our fighters, the American plane opened fire on them.

The intruder was shot down by return fire from our fighters. At 1018 hrs it fell, burning, into the water and exploded 18 miles (32 kms) from the shore.

Our fighters returned to their airfield undamaged.

Three torpedo cutters that were sent to the crash site did not find any remains of the aircraft.

[TFR 38-17]

[handwritten "14"]

- 2 -

After the crash, according to the 5th Navy's signal intelligence assets, American and Japanese radio stations on Khokkajdo [Hokkaido] Island persistently called the plane on the radio. (The plane evidently did not manage to report in.)

As established by radio intercepts, the plane was No. 5 and belonged to the 6th Patrol-Bomber Aviation Squadron based at Atsugi Airfield (Honshu Island).

I believe that the actions of our fighter planes were proper, considering that the American plane violated our territorial waters and opened fire on our planes first.

- ENCLOSURES: 1. Sketch of the flights of the 5th Navy aircraft on 6 Nov 51. [handwritten "not included"]
2. Basic tactical-technical data of an American "Neptune" aircraft.

[signature] N. Kuznetsov

[handwritten "6 Nov 51"]

6p

[TFR 38-18]

[handwritten "15"]

SecretMEMORANDUM

Tactical-technical data on the "Neptune" type aircraft.

The basic patrol aircraft Lockheed R u 2-1 "Neptune"

Crew	- 5-7 people
Maximum speed	- 480 kms/hr
Maximum range	- 8000 kms
Service ceiling	- 7000 meters
Maximum overall weight	- 26300 kg

Armaments:	20mm canon	- 6
	12.7mm machine guns	- 4
	127mm rockets	- 16

Maximum bomb load	- 3600 kg
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Wright 2800hp engines	- 2
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6p

[handwritten on reverse "Arkhiv Prezidenta RF, F. 3, Op. 66, d. 390, l. 10-15"]

[TFR 38-19]

[handwritten "No. 4"]

[handwritten "13 Jun 1952"]

[handwritten "3"]
 Top Secret
 Compartment "A"
 Copy No.1

[stamp "USSR
 MINISTRY
 OF STATE
 SECURITY
 25 Jun 52
 No. 5421\st
 Moscow"]

[stamp "MID USSR
 SECRETARIAT
 Comrade Zorin
 SECRET
 Entry No. 2344
 25 Jun 52"]

TO THE DEPUTY MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS
 OF THE USSR

[illeg. handwriting]

To Comrade V.A. ZORIN

[stamp "MID-USSR
 USA SECTION
 SECRET
 Entry No. 863/USA
 26 Jun 52"]

We are reporting that demarche No. 689 dated 18 Jun 52 from the American Embassy says essentially the following: on 13 Jun 52 at 1735 hrs a US B-29 aircraft was shot down by an aircraft of the Soviet Army Air Force over our territorial waters south of Valentin Bay.

The location of the unidentified aircraft's wreckage is listed in the American Embassy's demarche as 41°39' N 133°55' E. This is located 80 miles south of Valentin Bay (105 miles east of Vladivostok).

No wreckage of the aircraft, pieces of equipment, or crew members were found by the coast guard or the shore patrol.

THE DEPUTY MINISTER OF STATE
 SECURITY OF THE USSR

[signature] N. STAKHANOV
 [handwritten "6-12057"]

[TFR 38-20]

[handwritten "entry 003998/27 June"]
 [handwritten "171"]

Copy

Top Secret
 Compartment "A"
 Copy No. 3

[illeg. handwriting]
 25 Jun 52
 [handwritten "5421\st"]

TO THE DEPUTY MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE USSR

Comrade V.A. ZORIN

We are reporting that the American Embassy's demarche No. 689 dated 18 Jun 52 says essentially the following: A US B-29 aircraft was shot down by a MiG-15 aircraft of the Air Force of the Soviet Army over our territorial waters south of Valentin Bay at 1735 hrs on 13 Jun 52.

The location of the unidentified aircraft's wreckage is listed in the American Embassy's demarche as 41°39' N 133°55' E. This is located 80 miles south of Valentin Bay. (This is 105 miles east of Vladivostok).

No wreckage of the aircraft, pieces of equipment, or crew members were found by either the coast guard or the shore patrol.

Original Signed THE DEPUTY MINISTER OF STATE
 SECURITY OF THE USSR

N. STAKHANOV

True Copy: [signature "CPT 2nd Class Staran"]

typed 4 copies
 1st to addressee
 2nd to Sec MGB USSR
 3rd and 4th - file,
 2nd section, HQ GUPV
 Originator Bychkov
 Typist Kovalenko
 MB-3791 24 Jun 52

[stamp "12 ss, 829" remainder illegible]

[TFR 38-21]

[handwritten "N 5"]

[handwritten "7 Oct 52"]

[handwritten "74"]
TOP SECRET
Copy No. 1

To Comrade STALIN

We are reporting:

Two LA-11 fighters from the 368th Air Defense Fighter Aviation Regiment shot down an American B-29 on 7 Oct of this year, at 1530 hrs Khabarovsk time, in the southeastern part of the Malaya Kurilskaya Island Chain. It violated our State border 12-15 kms southwest of YURIJ Island.

The B-29 aircraft was discovered by a radio-technical post at 1431 hrs in the immediate proximity of our State border. Consequently, a pair of fighters that was on duty from YUZHNOKURIL'SK Airfield was scrambled. The fighters were piloted by Senior Lieutenant ZHERYAKOV and Senior Lieutenant LESNOV.

At 1529 hrs, the B-29 aircraft violated the border and flew over the territorial waters of the USSR in the direction of YURIJ Island. Since the violator fired first, it was attacked by our fighters at 1530 hrs.

As a result of the attack, the B-29 aircraft caught on fire, fell, and

[TFR 38-22]

- 2 -

[handwritten "75"]

sank in our territorial waters three kilometers southeast of YURIJ Island.

A headless body wearing a deployed parachute was picked up by cutters of the 114th Frontier Guard Detachment in the area where the aircraft went down. A map of HOKKAIDO Island and Kuril Islands, a ripped piece of an unidentified document with the signature of DZHEMS SMIT - Captain, Intelligence Officer, US Armed Forces - four fuel tanks, and a torn inflatable rubber boat were also picked up.

Documents with the name Senior Lieutenant BUNKKEN Dashon Robertson, American Army, were found in the corpse's clothes.

From dawn until midday on 8 Oct, American F-86 fighters patrolled along our State border southwest of YURIJ Island in groups of four to eight. Individual aircraft violated the border three times at high speed and flew past the area where the aircraft went down.

Measures have been taken to heighten the combat readiness of all systems in the Sakhalin-Kuril Border Region of Air Defense.

[signature] VASILEVSKIJ

[signature] SOKOLOVSKIJ

8 Oct 52
No. 50136

[handwritten on reverse, "Arkhiv prezidenta RF, F. 3, op. 66, d. 391, l. 74-75"]

[TFR 38-22a]

[Note - There is no connection between TFR 22 and TFR 22a - the documents were inadvertently misnumbered.]

[handwritten "7 Oct 52"] [handwritten "34"] [handwritten "16"]

Workers of the world, unite!

TOP SECRET

The Communist Party of the Soviet Union. CENTRAL COMMITTEE

No. P102/2
31 Dec 54

To: Comrades Molotov (MID), Korobov

Extract from Protocol No. 102 of the session of the Presidium of the TsK on 31 Dec 54

On the reply to the demarche from the US
Government dated 25 Sep 54.

Approve the draft of the demarche made by the MID in reply to the US Government's demarche dated 25 Sep 54 (attached).

SECRETARY TsK

3 11

[handwritten "Order of the SM USSR
from 31 Dec 54 No. 13827-rs"]

[written along the left margin "Subject to return within 7 days
to the Office of the Presidium TsK KPSS"]

[TFR 38-23]

[handwritten "17"]

Reference: Paragraph 2, Protocol No. 102
Enclosure

Draft of Demarche to the US Government

With regard to demarche No. 270 from the Government of the United States of America dated 25 Sep of this year, the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics considers it necessary to announce the following:

We have examined the aforementioned demarche from the US Government concerning the violation of the State border of the USSR by an American "B-29" bomber in the area of Yuriy Island on 7 Oct 52. The Soviet Government points out that this demarche, in comparison with what the US Government has previously announced on this matter, in essence, contains nothing new. The US Government's demarche reiterates versions of the incident that contradict with the facts, makes unfounded suppositions concerning the fates of the crew members of the aircraft, and also raises questions that are unrelated to this matter.

In its demarches dated 12 Oct and 24 Nov 52, the Soviet Government has already set forth, on the basis of factual information, the circumstances concerning the violation of the Soviet State border by the American military aircraft. In addition, information concerning this incident is contained in the extract from the Report on the Circumstances of the Violation of the State Border by an American "B-29" Aircraft in the Area of Yuriy Island on 7 Oct 52. The extract is attached to this demarche.

[TFR 38-24]

[handwritten "18"]

- 2 -

The circumstances of this incident, set forth in the aforementioned demarches of the Soviet Government, and also in the aforementioned report, show that the American aircraft violated the State border of the USSR on 7 Oct 52 in the area of Yuriy Island and opened unprovoked fire on Soviet fighters which were protecting the State border of the USSR.

The Soviet Government, in its demarche dated 24 Nov 52, has already reported that it does not have any information on the fate of the American "B-29" aircraft or its crew.

As for the question touched on by the US Government's demarche on state ownership of the Yuzhno-Kuril'skiy Islands, the position of the Soviet Union was set forth in Soviet demarches to the US Government dated 24 Nov 52 and 11 Dec 54.

As it is firmly established that the American military aircraft violated the border of the USSR and for no reason opened fire on Soviet fighters, the responsibility for the incident that took place and its consequences falls completely on the American side. Under these conditions the Soviet Government is not able to discuss the pretension contained in the US Government's demarche dated 25 Sep of this year. The US Government's suggestion to transfer this matter to the International Court is considered unwarranted.

As concerns the US Government's attempt to use the incident of 7 Oct 52 to present the Soviet Union's position with respect to Japan and the Japanese people in a false light, the Soviet Government considers it necessary to

[TFR 38-25]

[handwritten "19"]

- 3 -

point out that the Soviet Union's relations with Japan and the Japanese people are well known.

The position of the Soviet Union was in particular echoed in kind in the Joint Declaration of the Government of the USSR and the Government of the KNR dated 12 Oct 52 on relations with Japan. In this declaration it is pointed out that although 9 years have passed since the end of the war, Japan has not gained independence and remains a partially occupied country. The territory of Japan is covered with a multitude of American military bases, Japan's industry and finances are dependant on American military purchases, and her external commerce is under the control of the United States of America. All of this has caused the difficult economic situation that continues to exist in Japan.

In the aforementioned declaration, the Soviet Union expressed sympathy for Japan and the Japanese people as they are in a difficult situation owing to the San Francisco Treaty and other agreements that were thrust upon them by the United States. The Soviet Union announced its readiness to take steps to normalize relations with Japan. Moreover, the Soviet Union noted that Japan will be given full support in its attempt to establish political and economic relations with the Soviet Union, just as any steps taken by the Japanese directed at providing the conditions for Japan's peaceful and independent development will be given full support.

18-gz

[TFR 38-26]

[stamp "Protocol of the Presidium of the TsK No. 102 Para 2"]

[handwritten "24"]

Subject to return
to the Office of the
Presidium of the TsK KPSS
 No. P2342

Distributed to members
of the Presidium of the
TsK KPSS

TOP SECRET

TsK KPSS

An American "B-29" bomber violated the border of the USSR near Yurij Island and was shot down by our fighters on 7 Oct 52. In demarches dated 12 Oct and 24 Nov 52, the Soviet Government announced a protest to the Americans regarding this violation. In replying demarches dated 17 Oct and 16 Dec 52, the Americans refuted the border violation, attempted to dispute the Soviet Union's ownership of Yurij Island, and demanded compensation for the aircraft and the deaths of the crew members.

On 25 Sep of this year, the US Government sent a demarche which once again raised the question of this incident. The demarche extensively sets forth the American version of this incident. It expresses the unsubstantiated supposition that the crew members of the aircraft may have been picked up by a Soviet vessel and that they are in Soviet custody. As far as the substance of the incident is concerned, this demarche contains nothing new in comparison with previous American demarches.

The US Government points to a sum of claims in connection with the loss of the aircraft and members of its crew and suggests, in the event of the Soviet Union's refusal to satisfy these claims, that this matter be turned over to the International Court of Justice for consideration.

The Soviet Union's right to ownership of the Malaya Kuril Island chain (Habonai), which includes Yurij Island, was once again disputed in the demarche. In connection with this, a number of demagogic declarations were made which allege that the Soviet Union

[TFR 38-27]

[handwritten "25"]

- 2 -

was trying to bring the Japanese people to ruin, by impeding Japan's normal commerce, by intimidating the government and the Japanese people, etc.

The text of the demarche was published by the State Department and at the request of the American representative to the UN was circulated to the members of the Security Council.

The MID USSR considers it advisable to send a demarche in reply to the US Government, attaching an extract from the report on the circumstances of the violation of the State border by an American "B-29" aircraft in the Yurij Island area on 7 Oct 52.

As the position of the USSR on the Soviet Union's ownership of the Malaya Kuril'skaya Island chain was stated in demarches from the Soviet Government dated 24 Nov 52 and ___ Oct of this year, the MID USSR considers it advisable, in the given demarche, not to touch on the substance of this matter and only to refer to our two aforementioned demarches.

As concerns the demagogic statements of the US Government about the Soviet Union's relations with Japan, an appropriate response to these statements should be given in the demarche.

Taking into account that this incident happened over two years ago and that at the present time it is not necessary to draw the public's attention to this incident, it is the opinion of the MID that it is not advisable to publish said demarche.

A draft of the resolution is attached. [illeg. handwriting]

Please review.

V. Molotov

29 Dec 54
 No. 1020/M

Note
 The demarche from the US Embassy No. 270 dated 25 Sep. Circulated to members of the Presidium TsK KPSS 26 Sep 54 under No. 624/M

18-p

[handwritten on reverse, "Arkhir Prezidenta RF, F. 3, Op. 66, D 392, l. 16-19, 24-25"]

[TFR 38-28]

[handwritten "No. 6"]
 [handwritten "29 Feb 53"]
Workers of the world, unite!

[handwritten "22"]

[handwritten "34"]

Top SecretThe Communist Party of the Soviet Union, CENTRAL COMMITTEE

No P21/9
30 Jul 53

to Comrade Korobov

Extract from Protocol No. 21 of the session of the Presidium
 of the TsK on 30 Jul 53.

On the demarches to the US Government regarding the violation
 of the Soviet border by an American aircraft and the attack on a
 Soviet aircraft by American fighters over Chinese territory.

1. Approve the drafts of the attached demarches to the US
 Government on this matter presented by comrades V.M. Molotov and
 N.A. Bulganin.

2. Deliver the demarche regarding the violation of the
 Soviet border by an American aircraft to the American Ambassador
 in Moscow on 30 Jul and publish it in the press on 31 Jul 53.

Deliver the demarche regarding the attack on a Soviet
 aircraft by American fighters over Chinese territory to the
 American Ambassador in Moscow on 31 Jul and publish it in the
 press on 1 Aug 53.

SECRETARY TsK

[Printed along the left side "Subject to return within 7 days to
 the Office of the Presidium of the TsK KPSS"]

[handwritten notations below]

Post. SM USSR
 N 2018 - 827 ss dated 30 Jul 53
 2-ns.

Published:
 Attachment No. 1 31 Jul 53
 Attachment No. 2 1 Aug 53

[TFR 38-29]

[handwritten "23"]
Attachment No. 11

Draft of the demarche to
the US Embassy in Moscow

The Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
 considers it necessary to declare the following to the Government
 of the United States of America.

According to confirmed information, on 29 Jul of this year
 at approximately 0700 hrs Vladivostok time, a four-engine "B-50"
 type bomber with US markings violated the State border of the
 USSR. Starting near Cape Gamov, it continued its flight over the
 territory of the USSR near Askol'd Island, not far from
 Vladivostok. Upon approach of two Soviet fighters whose mission
 was to indicate to the American aircraft that it was within the
 borders of the USSR and to order it to leave Soviet airspace, the
 American aircraft opened fire and inflicted serious damage to one
 of the Soviet fighters by piercing the fuselage and left wing and
 also by breaking the hermetic seal of the cockpit. The Soviet
 fighters were forced to return fire, after which the American
 aircraft withdrew in the direction of the sea.

The Soviet Government declares a strong protest to the US
 Government against this flagrant violation of the Soviet border
 by an American military aircraft. It insists that the people
 responsible for this violation be held strictly accountable and
 expects the US Government to take immediate steps to forbid
 American aircraft from violating the State borders of the USSR in
 the future.

9-18

[TFR 38-30]

[handwritten "24"]
Attachment No. 2Draft of the demarche to
the US Embassy in Moscow.

The Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics considers it necessary to declare the following to the Government of the United States of America.

According to confirmed reports from competent Soviet agencies, on 27 Jul of this year, at 0628 hrs Moscow time, 4 American fighters violated the borders of the People's Republic of China. Near the city of Khuadyan', 110 kms from the Sino-Korean border, the American aircraft attacked and shot down a Soviet passenger aircraft over Chinese territory. The Soviet aircraft was making a scheduled flight along an established flight route from Port Arthur to the USSR. The fifteen passengers and six crew members on board perished together with the aircraft.

The Soviet Government declares a strong protest against this piratical attack by American warplanes on a Soviet passenger aircraft over the territory of the People's Republic of China. The Soviet Government expects the US Government to take steps to severely punish those responsible for this attack and to not permit henceforth similar criminal acts by the American military command.

The Soviet Government reserves the right to demand compensatory payment for the deaths of the aforementioned 21 Soviet citizens and the loss of the aircraft.

9-11

[TFR 38-31]

[stamp "Protocol of the Presidium of the TsK No. 21 Para. 9"]

[handwritten "25"]
Top Secret Copy No. 1TO THE PRESIDUM OF THE TsK KPSS
to Comrade G.M. MALENKOV
to Comrade N.S. KHRUSHCHEV

According to a report from the Pacific Ocean Fleet Air Forces Command, on 27 Jul of this year at 0628 hrs Moscow time, 4 American fighters, after crossing the border of the KNR, attacked and shot down a Russian IL-12 transport aircraft that was flying from Port Arthur to Vladivostok. This occurred near the city of Khuadyan', 110 kilometers from the Sino-Korean border. The aircraft burned up and the six crew members and 15 passengers on board were killed.

On 29 Jul of this year at approximately 0700 hrs Vladivostok time, an American B-50-type four-engine bomber violated the State border of the USSR. This occurred in the area of Cape Gamov and Askol'd Island not far from Vladivostok. The American aircraft opened fire on two approaching Soviet fighters inflicting serious damage to one of them. The American bomber was shot down by return fire from the Soviet fighters and crashed into the sea.

With regard to the aforementioned, the MID of the USSR and the Ministry of Defense of the USSR consider it expedient to send protest demarches to the Americans. It is expedient to deliver the demarche concerning the violation of the Soviet border by an American aircraft (attachment 1) to the American Ambassador in Moscow on 30 Jul and to publish it in the press on 31 Jul.

[TFR 38-32]

[handwritten "26"]

2.

It is expedient to deliver the demarche concerning the attack on the Soviet aircraft over Chinese territory by American fighters (attachment 2) to the American Ambassador on 31 Jul and to publish it on 1 Aug.

We also consider it expedient to inform the KMR Government that we have sent these latest demarches to the US Government and to recommend that the Chinese Government protest to the Americans this violation of the KMR border by an American aircraft, tying in other KMR border violations by American aircraft.

[signature]
(V. Molotov)

[signature]
(N. Bulganin)

30 Jul 53

[handwritten on reverse, "Arkhiv Prezidenta Archives RF, P. 3, op. 66, d. 391, 1-22-26"]

[TFR 38-33]

[handwritten "69"]

[handwritten "30 July"]
No. 23/osa

The Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics considers it necessary to declare the following to the Government of the United States of America:

According to confirmed information, on 29 Jul of this year at approximately 0700 hrs Vladivostok time, a four-engine "B-50" type bomber with US markings violated the State border of the USSR. Starting near Cape Gamov, it continued its flight over the territory of the USSR near Askol'd Island, not far from Vladivostok. Upon approach of two Soviet fighters whose mission was to indicate to the American aircraft that it was within the borders of the USSR and to order it to leave Soviet airspace, the American aircraft opened fire and inflicted serious damage to one of the Soviet fighters by piercing the fuselage and left wing and also by breaking the hermetic seal of the cockpit. The Soviet fighters were forced to return fire, after which the American aircraft withdrew in the direction of the sea.

TO THE EMBASSY OF THE UNITED STATES
OF AMERICA
Moscow

[handwritten initials in left margin]

[TFR 38-34]

[handwritten "23 Jul 53"]

[handwritten "71"]

Delivered by US Ambassador
Bolen to Comrade A.A. Gromyko
during a discussion on 31 Jul 53

Translation from the English.

MEMORANDUM

My government has instructed me to convey the strongest possible protest against the fact that on 29 Jul, a Soviet aircraft shot down a USAF R-50 aircraft which was on a routine navigational training flight over the Sea of Japan.

The copilot of the American aircraft, who was rescued by a US ship approximately 40 kilometers from the Soviet coast south of Cape Povorotnyj, verified that his aircraft, with a crew of 17, was attacked by one or more Soviet MiG-15 aircraft. They shot at its engines, causing a fire, which led to the American aircraft's crash.

Information was also received that other crew members who survived were picked up by Soviet ships in the crash area. My Government has instructed me to ask that the Soviet authorities immediately report the condition of these people as well as the steps they are taking for their timely repatriation.

AMERICAN EMBASSY
Moscow, 31 Jul 53

Translated by: [signature] (Alekseeva)

[TFR 38-35]

[handwritten "34"]

[handwritten "29 Feb 53"]

[handwritten "34"]

Workers of the world, unite!TOP SECRETThe Communist Party of the Soviet Union. CENTRAL COMMITTEE

No P24/1
4 Aug 53

to Comrades Molotov, Korobov

Extract from protocol No. 24 of the session of the Presidium
of the TsK of 4 Aug 53.

On the draft demarche from the Soviet Government to the US
Government in reply to the US Embassy's memorandum of 31 Jul 53.

Approve the draft demarche presented by the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs of the USSR on this matter.

SECRETARY TsK

[Printed along the left side "Subject to return within 7 days to
the Office of the Presidium of the TsK KPSS"]

Z-p
[The remainder of the page is handwritten.]
Order of the SM, USSR
No. 102/31-rs 4 Aug 53

Published
5 Aug 53

[TFR 38-36]

[handwritten "35"]

Reference: Paragraph 1, Protocol No. 23
Draft Demarche from the Soviet Government
to the US Government

In connection with the US Embassy's memorandum of 31 Jul of this year, the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics considers it necessary to declare the following to the US Government.

Confirmed reports, cited in the Soviet Government's demarche of 30 July of this year to the US Government, testify that on 29 Jul of this year, a four-engine "B-50" type bomber with US markings violated the State border of the USSR. Starting near Cape Gamov, it continued its flight over the territory of the USSR near Askol'd Island, not far from Vladivostok. Upon approach of two Soviet fighters whose mission was to indicate to the American aircraft that it was within the borders of the USSR and to order it to leave Soviet airspace, the American aircraft opened fire and inflicted serious damage to one of the Soviet fighters. The Soviet fighters were forced to return fire, after which the American aircraft withdrew in the direction of the sea.

The facts cited above contradict the assertion in the US Embassy's memorandum alleging that an American aircraft was attacked by Soviet fighters during a routine flight over the Sea of Japan.

[TFR 38-37]

[handwritten "36"]

- 2 -

The Soviet Government does not have any further information concerning the crew or the whereabouts of the aforementioned American aircraft which withdrew in the direction of the sea.

The Soviet Government confirms its demarche of 30 Jul, insists on strict accountability of the people responsible for this violation, and expects that the US Government will take steps to henceforth not permit American aircraft to violate the State borders of the USSR.

The Soviet Government rejects the protest contained in the Embassy's memorandum as lacking in any basis.

3 Aug 53

5-p

[handwritten on reverse, "Arkhiv Prezidenta RF, F. 3, op. 66, d. 391, l. 34-36"]

[TFR 38-38]

[handwritten "78"]

No. 25/osa

In connection with the US Embassy's memorandum of 31 Jul of this year, the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics considers it necessary to declare the following to the US Government.

Confirmed reports, cited in the Soviet Government's demarche of 30 July of this year to the US Government, testify that on 29 Jul of this year, a four-engine "B-50" type bomber with US markings violated the State border of the USSR. Starting near Cape Gamov, it continued its flight over the territory of the USSR near Askol'd Island, not far from Vladivostok. Upon approach of two Soviet fighters whose mission was to indicate to the American aircraft that it was within the borders of the USSR and to order it to leave Soviet airspace, the American aircraft opened fire and inflicted serious damage to one of the Soviet fighters. The Soviet fighters were forced to

To the Embassy
of the United States of America

Moscow

[TFR 38-39]
[handwritten "79"]
2.-

return fire, after which the American aircraft withdrew in the direction of the sea.

The facts cited above contradict the assertion in the US Embassy's memorandum alleging that an American aircraft was attacked by Soviet fighters during a routine flight over the Sea of Japan.

The Soviet Government does not have any further information concerning the crew or the whereabouts of the aforementioned American aircraft which withdrew in the direction of the sea.

The Soviet Government confirms its demarche of 30 Jul, insists on strict accountability of the people responsible for this violation, and expects that the US Government will take steps to henceforth not permit American aircraft to violate the State borders of the USSR.

The Soviet Government rejects the protest contained in the Embassy's memorandum as lacking in any basis.

Moscow, 3 Aug 53

True copy: [signature]

Distributed: to Comrades Molotov
Vyshinskij
Gromyko
Zorin
Pushkin
Podtserob
Il'ichev

DVO
Embassy of the USSR
in Washington
case file (2)

[handwritten "420"]
 Delivered by US Ambassador Bolen
 to V.M. Molotov 4 Aug 53

[TFR 38-40]
 [handwritten "80"]
 Secret
 Translation from the English

[stamp "MID-USSR
 USA DEPARTMENT
 SECRET
 Entry No. 757088
 4 Aug 53"]

MEMORANDUM

The US Government has the following information regarding survivors of the incident involving the "B-50" aircraft.

1. The copilot was rescued by an American ship 40 miles from the Soviet coast to the south of Cape Povorotnyj.
2. The pilot bailed out at the same time as the copilot and it is assumed that other members of the crew bailed out as well.
3. The aircraft carrying out search and rescue operations dropped a life raft to other survivors. The crews of these aircraft are more or less certain that there were at least four and possibly more survivors sitting in the life raft.
4. The same American aircraft spotted approximately 9 Soviet "PT" type boats in the area and at least 6 of these "PT" boats were heading to the location where debris from the aircraft was later discovered. A Soviet trawler was also spotted in the approximate area.

On the basis of the aforementioned observations and the testimony of the rescued copilot, it is highly likely

[TFR 38-41]

[handwritten "81"]

2.

that other crew members survived and that they were possibly rescued by the Soviet ships. In view of this, the US Government urgently asks the Soviet Government to conduct a further investigation on the whereabouts of these or other surviving crew members.

Translator: [signature] (O. Troyanovskij)

Distributed
 to Comrades: Molotov
 Gromyko
 Zorin
 Podtserob
 Department of American countries
 [handwritten "596/M"]

6 copies

[TFR 38-42]

[stamp "Secret
Entry No. 765/
10 Aug 53"]

[stamp "Secret
Entry No. 3461
8 Aug 53"]

Secret
Copy No. 1

[stamp "Ministry of Defense
of the USSR
MAIN STAFF
OF THE NAVY
8 Aug 53
No. 5/15272a"]

TO THE DEPUTY MINISTER OF FOREIGN
AFFAIRS OF THE USSR
Comrade A. A. GROMYKO

[handwritten "case file
10-Aug-1 word illeg."]

The assertion in the American demarche of 5 Aug 53 - which alleges that on 29 Jul 53 the copilot of an American B-50 aircraft was sighted by an American surface ship and that 12 Soviet "PT" type boats were observed allegedly retrieving surviving crew members - does not correspond to the facts.

On 30 Jul, at approximately 0400 hrs Vladivostok time, Soviet fishing trawler No. 423, engaged in fishing, was passing through the area where the Americans were searching for their aircraft.

As has already been pointed out in the report from the Commander-in-Chief of the Navy, Admiral of the Fleet Comrade N.G. Kuznetsov, dated 30 Jul 53, two American destroyers approached the aforementioned trawler at approximately 0400 hrs.

American and Japanese officers, onboard a cutter launched from one of the destroyers, tried to obtain information from the trawler regarding the B-50 aircraft and its crew. However, they were unable to get any kind of information since the trawler did not see any aircraft debris and was not engaged in recovering the crew.

The attempts of the Americans to carry on a conversation with the trawler were in vain since the Americans did not have a Russian translator with them.

With the exception of this trawler, there were no other Soviet ships in the area where the Americans were searching for their aircraft.

CHIEF OF THE MAIN STAFF
ADMIRAL

[signature] V. FOKIN

[TFR 38-43]

[handwritten "16"]

Secret. Copy No. 1
"24" Nov 54
Issue No. 1174/osa

[handwritten "Return"]

to Comrade A. A. GROMYKO

We submit to you the drafts of the memorandum to the TsK KPSS, the TsK's decree and the demarche to the US Government in response to the US Government's demarche dated 9 Oct 54 regarding the incident with the American aircraft which violated the State border of the USSR in the Vladivostok area on 29 Jul 53.

Please review.

[signature] (G. Tunkin)

[signature] (V. Bazykin)

3 copies typed ms/VB.
1-to Comrade Gromyko
2-to Comrade Tunkin
3-to the case file
No. 1691.
24 Nov 54

[stamp "MID USSR
Comrade Gromyko's Office
SECRET
Entry No. 6490- of
24 Nov 54"]

[handwritten "9629"]

[TFR 38-44]

[handwritten "17"]

Secret Copy No. 5

TsR KPSS

The United States Government, in its demarche dated 9 Oct 54, is again raising the issue involving the American B-50 warplane that violated the State border of the USSR in the vicinity of Vladivostok on 29 Jul 53. This demarche essentially contains nothing new about this incident as compared to previous US demarches. It presents a lengthy US version of the incident as well as unfounded suppositions that the crew members of the violator aircraft may have been picked up by Soviet ships and are in Soviet custody.

The US Government raises a number of claims associated with the loss of the American warplane and its crew members. In the event the Soviet Union refuses to satisfy these claims, the US proposes to refer the issue to the International Court of Justice.

At the same time, the US Government in its demarche raises the issue of the extent of the Soviet territorial waters, asserting that territorial waters of 12 nautical miles in width as established by the Soviet Union are inconsistent with conventions of international law. The United States asserts that it "does not recognize the Soviet Government's claim to territorial waters beyond three miles from its shore."

The text of the US demarche was published by the State Department, and at the request of US representatives in the United Nations was distributed to members of the Security Council.

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the USSR considers it expedient to send a report to the US Embassy and attach to it an excerpt from the "Report on the Circumstances of a US B-50's Violation of the State Borders of the USSR Near Vladivostok on 29 Jul 53."

In the opinion of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the USSR, the US Government's claim of possible loss and its proposal to submit this case to the International Court of Justice for consideration should be dismissed as unfounded.

With regard to the US Government's statement about

[TFR 38-45]

[handwritten "18"]

2.

the width of Soviet territorial waters, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the USSR deems it expedient to respond to the substance of this statement.

Because a considerable amount of time has passed since the incident and there is no need to draw public attention to it, the opinion of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the USSR is that it would be inadvisable to publish this note.

A draft of the decree is attached.

Please review.

Nov 54
No. _____

[handwritten "pr 1266-ag
24 Nov"]

[TFR 38-46]

[handwritten "19"]

Draft
Secret

RESOLUTION of the TsK KPSS

Concerning the response to the US Government's demarche from 9 Oct 54

Confirm the draft of the (attached) demarche presented by the MID USSR in reply to the US Government's demarche dated 9 Oct 54.

[handwritten "Reference: Pr. 1266-ag"]

[handwriting illeg.]

[TFR 38-47]

[handwritten "20"]

Draft.

With regard to the demarche dated 9 Oct 54 from the Government of the United States of America, the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics considers it necessary to report the following.

In demarches dated 30 Jul, 3 and 26 Aug 53, the Soviet Government has already set forth the circumstances of the violation of the Soviet Union's national borders in the region of Vladivostok on 29 Jul 53 by the American B-50 bomber.

It is evident from the above-mentioned Soviet Government demarches and also from the "Report on the Circumstances of a US B-50's Violation of the State Borders of the USSR near Vladivostok on 29 Jul 53," an excerpt of which is attached, that the American B-50 bomber on 29 Jul 53 was located over the territory of the Soviet Union near Vladivostok, and upon the approach of Soviet fighters opened fire first. The Soviet fighters, defending the State borders of the USSR, were forced to return fire. At the time it fired on the Soviet fighters, the intruder was located at coordinates: longitude 40°39'3" latitude 132°20'9", in other words, near the Soviet island of Askol'd, not far from Vladivostok and not 40 miles south of Cape Povorotnyj as is maintained in the US Government demarche. The Soviet fighters returned to their air base as the violating aircraft withdrew towards the sea to the southeast,

The Soviet Government has already reported that Soviet authorities do not have any information regarding the fate

[TFR 38-48]

[handwritten "21"]

2.-

of the above-mentioned American aircraft or its crew. There has been no additional information on this matter to date.

Considering the following, responsibility for this incident rests with the US Government: The facts are firmly established, there was a violation of the State borders of the USSR by an American aircraft, and the American aircraft fired on Soviet aircraft which were carrying out their duties of defending the Soviet Union's State borders. The Soviet Government cannot consider the claim levied in the US Government demarche dated 9 October and does not see a basis for transferring this matter to the International Court of Justice.

The US Government's demarche dated 9 Oct asserts, as if it is international law, that there is a limit on the width of territorial waters to 3 nautical miles. In connection with this, the Soviet Government considers it necessary to turn the US Government's attention to the widely known fact that no common measures of international law exist establishing the width of territorial waters. The establishment of territorial waters is dependent on the competence of the coastal government which determines the width in consideration of their national interests and also in the interests of international maritime navigation. It is known that more than 30 governments currently have territorial waters with a width of more than 3 nautical miles. Thus, the US Government's assertion that the establishment of Soviet territorial waters to 12 nautical miles is contradictory to the norms of international law does not have any basis.

[TFR 38-49]

[handwritten "No. 7"]
[handwritten "7 Nov 54"]

[handwritten "128"]

TOP SECRET
copy No. 9

to MARSHAL OF THE SOVIET UNION
Comrade N. A. BULGANIN

I am reporting:

The USSR maritime State border was violated by an American "B-29" in the region of Tanfil'ev Island, 70 kms south of Yuzhno-Kuril'sk on 7 Nov 54, from 1241-1242 hrs and again from 1247-1250 hrs Vladivostok time.

Fighters of the 610th Fighter Aviation Regiment, 110th Fighter Aviation Division, 29th Air Army were scrambled from the Yuzhno-Kuril'sk Airfield (Mendelevo): the first pair of MiG-15s at 1242 hrs, the second pair of MiG-15s at 1225 hrs, a third pair of MiG-15s at 1248 hrs, and a fourth pair of MiG-15s at 1329 hrs.

The pair of MiG-15s which took off at 1225 hrs (the leader was Aviation Squadron Commander Captain KOSTIN, the wingman was Senior Lieutenant SEBERYAKOV) met the intruder at 1248 hrs at an altitude of 4500 meters over Tanfil'ev Island. When our fighters approached, the intruder opened fire from the upper turret. Our fighters returned fire and set the violator's left motor on fire. In the three attacks made by the fighters, forty-two 37mm shells and sixty-three 23mm shells were expended.

[TFR 38-50]

[handwritten "129"]

- 2 -

The following is a radio-intercept of the press by "OSNAZ" units - "7 Nov 54, Associated Press. A "B-29" reconnaissance aircraft was crashed today in the eastern part of Hokkaido Island several miles from Russian islands. Nine of the twelve crew members bailed out of the aircraft and were rescued."

Weather: 90% cloud cover, lower edge 1000 meters, visibility 6-10 kms.

Measures have been taken by the command to increase the combat readiness of the PVO forces.

GENERAL OF THE ARMY [signature] (S. BIRYUZOV)

"7" Nov 54
[handwritten "No. 50366"]

Distribution:

Comrade K. E. VOROSHILOV
Comrade L. M. KAGANOVICH
Comrade G. M. MALENKOV
Comrade V. M. MOLOTOV
Comrade A. I. MIKOYAN
Comrade M. G. PERVUKHIN
Comrade M. Z. SABUROV
Comrade N. S. KHRUSHCHEV

[handwritten "No. 16" and "566"]

[TFR 38-51]

[handwritten "141"]

THE MEETING OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL ON 10 SEPTEMBER

NEW YORK, 10 Sep (TASS)

... Afterwards, US representative Lodge spoke and stated the US arguments. Lodge said, "...The first reports of the attack indicated that not once did the American aircraft fire on the attackers. However, further reports showed that this statement was in error."

(TASS, 10 Sep 54, p. 125-126)

ON THE AMERICAN PROVOCATION IN THE FAR EAST

NEW YORK, 7 Sep (TASS). A Washington correspondent for the "New York Times" newspaper reports that on 6 Sep the Department of the Navy revealed that an American patrol bomber shot down near the Siberian coast on 4 Sep by two Soviet fighters had opened return fire, but only after it was attacked. ... The announcement by the Department of the Navy caused some confusion in the State Department since the second of the two demarches of protest to Moscow maintained the assertion that the "American naval aircraft never opened fire on the Soviet aircraft."

As officials here point out, this declaration was based on the initial report of this incident that the Pentagon received from the Far East. It was only after the nine surviving crew members were thoroughly debriefed, that the Department of the Navy was able to establish that one of the gunners on the aircraft opened return fire on the Russian pilot...

(TASS, 7 Sep 54, l. 21-d)

True copy: [signature "M. Davilov"]

[handwritten on reverse "Arkhiv Prezidenta RF, P. 3, op. 66, d. 391, l. 129-129, 141"]

[TFR 38-52]

[handwritten "N8"]

[handwritten "18 Apr 52"]

[handwritten "32"]

[stamp "USSR
Ministry of
Internal Affairs
April, 1955
No. _____
Moscow"]

Secret
copy no. 1

TO THE DEPUTY MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS
USSR

to Comrade V.V. KUZNETSOV

[handwritten "see reverse"]

On 18 April of this year, at 1057 hrs Kamchatka time, PVO technical posts detected the flight of an American jet aircraft 43 miles southeast of Cape Vasil'ev (400 kms southwest of Petropavlovsk-Kamchatskiy). The American aircraft, which had not violated the border, was being tracked at 1110 hrs 16 miles southeast of Cape Lopatka.

Two VVS aircraft were scrambled to intercept the aircraft. At 1130 hrs, at an altitude of 12,200 meters, 32 miles east of Cape Kronotskiy (340 kilometers northeast of Petropavlovsk-Kamchatskiy) one of the aircraft spotted the B-47 type American jet aircraft and photographed it. Upon approach of our aircraft, the American aircraft opened fire. After return fire from our aircraft, the American aircraft disappeared in the clouds.

At 1150 hrs, 5 miles west of Bering Island, the crew of the Soviet fishing boat "Komandor" saw flashes and a column of smoke over the water that lasted two minutes.

It cannot be ruled out that the fishermen witnessed the American aircraft fall.

DEPUTY MINISTER OF INTERNAL AFFAIRS, USSR

(PEREVERTKIN)

[stamp "Dept 6 HQ GUPV
Entry No.. 012899
12 May 55"]

[handwritten "Ts.A.P.V. f. 14, op. 5, d. 5634, l. 32"]

[TFR 38-53]

[handwritten except where noted]

Basis. Report of Okrug No. 00140 and 0014 [cut-off]
from 19 and 20 Apr 55 (Sector 60 p.o.)

Report

23 Apr 55 Colonel Comrade Ionov stated that this document has been reported to Deputy Minister Comrade Perevertkin. It was decided not to send it.

LTC [illeg. signature]

No. 00152 of 22 Apr 55, the Okrug reported that crew members of the boat "Komandor" P[cut off] Vasilij at a distance of 10 miles, observed a flashing column of fire and a column of smoke over the water which dissipated after 5 minutes. Scientific [cut-off] Danilov, located on the cutter, photographed the column of smoke. Two residents of the settlement Nikol'skoe (sector 451mz 60po) observed and heard an explosion. Border troops did not [cut off]

On 21 Apr 55 [1 cut-off] of the Kamchatka Flotilla went to the area of the explosion. The [1 illeg.] headquarters reported [1 illeg.] [G4GI?].

[illeg. signature]

Information. 21 Apr 55 at 1340 from the report of the PVO General, Major Yur'ev (Kremlin, 33-62) reported that there is no information regarding the appearance of an American aircraft near the coast of Kamchatka or regarding the contact between it and our aircraft.

[signature] (Zarovskij)

[Distribution notes are typed.]

3 copies typed

1- addressee

2- Sec. MVD

3- file, 1st

Dept. HQ GUPV

Originator Zarovskij

typist Ermakova

to 3567 21 Apr 55

[handwritten "1st copy - file. 2nd and 3rd
copies sent for destruction.

2nd and 3rd copies destroyed iaw Act 10"]

[signature]
25 Apr 55

[handwritten "TsAPV f. 14, op. 5, d. 5634, l. 32"]

[TFR 38-54]

[handwritten "18 Apr 55"]

[handwritten "34"]

[handwritten "11"]

Subject to return in 24 hours
to Office of the Presidium of the TsK KPSS
Workers of the world, unite!

TOP SECRET
SPECIAL FOLDER

The All-Union Communist Party (bolsheviks), CENTRAL COMMITTEE

No. PB4/312
7 Nov 51

To: Comrades Molotov (MID), Zhukov.

Extract from protocol No. 117 of the Presidium of the TsK on 22
Apr 55

The issue of the MID USSR and Ministry of Defense.

Approve the proposal of the MID USSR and Ministry of Defense
set forth by comrades Molotov and Zhukov in a memorandum dated 22
Apr 55, No. 602/M.

Secretary of the TsK

3-nb

[Printed along left margin]

"Note:

A comrade receiving secret documents may not transmit or
acquaint others with them without a special stipulation from the
TsK.

Making copies of or extracts from these documents are
categorically forbidden.

Each document is marked and dated personally by the comrade
to whom the document is addressed and by whom the document is
signed."

[TFR 38-55]

[stamp "Protocol of the Presidium TsK No. 117 p.24"]
[handwritten "12"]

Copy
Secret copy No. 3

TsK KPSS

According to a report by Comrade Malinovskij, the Commander
of the Far East Military District, an American B-47 type aircraft
was spotted near the Kuril Islands on 18 Apr of this year, at
0943 hrs Khabarovsk time. Our pilots reported that when two MiG-
15s closed with the B-47 at an altitude of 12,000 meters, the B-
47 opened fire. One of our fighters returned fire after which
the B-47 descended at a great speed into the clouds in a
northeast direction.

In the second report from Comrade Malinovskij (dated 21
Apr), it was reported that our fighters attacked an American
aircraft from 1125 to 1127 hrs Khabarovsk time. Fifteen minutes
after the attack, radars lost track of the aircraft. It no
longer showed up on the radar screen. This report also says that
at 1150 hrs Soviet fishermen observed an explosion and a black
column of smoke in the ocean. This was in our territorial waters,
13 kms west of the settlement of Nikol'skoe, which is located on
Bering Island.

The engagement area between the Soviet fighters and the
American aircraft is being determined. At the present, it cannot
be determined whether the engagement took place in the Soviet
Union's airspace or over neutral waters.

According to available information, it can be surmised that
the Americans do not have information regarding the location or
cause for loss of their aircraft.

This conclusion is corroborated by the following:

The American aircraft was obviously conducting a special
mission and did not maintain radio communications with the
ground. In addition, our radio-intelligence did not notice any
type of transmission from the aircraft during its flight, upon
encountering the Soviet fighters or after the engagement. It is
also noteworthy that American searches for the aircraft were not
in the region of the supposed point of impact

[TFR 38-56]

[handwritten "13"]

2.

of the aircraft, but along the aircraft's flight route and especially intense - in a region 500-600 kms from the aircraft's supposed impact point.

While it can not be confirmed that radars on an American ship, which could have been located in that region, did not follow the flight of the American aircraft and the Soviet fighters; it should also be taken into account that American ships could not have visually observed the engagement with the Soviet fighters, as the flight of the aircraft took place above a dense cloud cover.

Considering the above, the MID USSR and Ministry of Defense consider it inadvisable to make any kind of statement at the present time to the US Government as regards the flight on 18 Apr of this year of the American B-47 military aircraft near the Kuril Islands and Kamchatka Peninsula.

Moreover, the MID USSR and the Ministry of Defense are of the opinion that the Americans obviously do not consider it possible to raise this matter with us. Under these conditions, notifying the Americans would be premature and could damage us.

Request consideration.

V. Molotov

G. Zhukov

22 Apr 55
No. 602/M

True copy: [illeg. signature]

Distr 4 copies.nt/vn
No. 364sm

[TFR 38-57]

Special Folder
[handwritten "14"]

Top Secret
copy no. 1

TsK KPSS

[handwritten "see P 117/24op"]

In addition to the memorandum by Comrades V.M. Molotov and G.K. Zhukov dated 22 Apr 55 No. 602/M, I am reporting a telegram from Captain First Rank Razumnyj, Chief of Intelligence, Pacific Fleet, concerning the American searches for the B-47 type aircraft which was shot down by our fighters on 18 Apr of this year near the Kuril Islands.

[signature]
G. ZHUKOV

"28" Apr 55
[handwritten "Issue No. 102ss"]

[handwritten "In the archives of the Presidium of the TsK [illeg. signature] 3 May 55"]

[TFR 38-58]

[handwritten "15"]

[handwritten "to Comrade Sokolovskij"]

SECOND DEPARTMENT MAIN HEADQUARTERS, NAVAL FORCES

Do Not Copy

TOP SECRET

(when filled in)

ENCIPHERED TELEGRAM NO. 1495.1496.

Copy No. 3

Copy No. 1 Comrade Sokolovskij

Copy No. 4 Comrade Shalin

Copy No. 2 Comrade Malinin

Copy No. 5 Comrade Shashenkov

Copy No. 3 Comrade Pavlovskij

Copy No. 6

From VLADIVOSTOK Received 13 hours 05 minutes, 25 Apr 55

[written in left-hand
column "For notes and
resolutions"][stamp "Subject to return to the IV
Sector of the General Office of the
TsK KPSS
Issue 2728/she 3 May 55"]

[handwritten "10"]

By Cable

TO THE ACTING CHIEF OF INTELLIGENCE, VMS
Captain 1st Rank Comrade SHASHENKOV.

I am reporting supplementary and generalized information on the RB-47 aircraft. According to intercepted radiograms to the Commander of the 10th Air Rescue Group and the 5010th Air Base Wing, on 18 Apr an RB-47 aircraft of the 4th Aviation regiment, 26th Reconnaissance Wing disappeared. It was flying along the route Eielson-Unalaklit-Attu in an area 100 miles east of Hokkaido-Unalaklit-Eielson.

The last time the aircraft was noted was at 0810 hrs, 18 Apr in an area 100 miles southwest of Attu, after which contact was lost. All bases in the Aleutian islands were queried about the aircraft. Answers were negative.

A search for the RB-47 aircraft began on 19 Apr. The Commander of the Joint Search and Rescue Center (Elmendorf AFB) ordered the Commander of the 3rd Search and Rescue Region (Elmendorf AFB) to assign 4 SA-16s and one SC-54 for search and "not to raise unnecessary noise about it." A notice was transmitted to the Chief of Search and Rescue, Johnson AFB, requesting a search by forces of the 3rd Rescue Aviation Group. The commander of the 4th Search and Rescue Region (Adak) was responsible for conducting the search mission in the region of the Aleutian islands. The region was ordered to carry out a watch on emergency frequencies

(see next page)

[along left side of page "Subject to return in 6 days to the 8th
Section of the Second Department Supreme Headquarters VMS"]

[TFR 38-59]

[handwritten "16"]

TOP SECRET

Copy No. 3

CONTINUATION OF ENCIPHERED TELEGRAM NO. 1495

Page 2

and to plan a wide search using aircraft of the 3rd Region.

The search was conducted with the following number of aircraft: 19 April, four SB-29 26-240 miles east of the Kuril Islands to the 100th parallel, one "Neptune" in the region of Adak-Attu;

On 20 April, three "Neptunes" along the Aleutian Islands to a region 120 miles east of Cape Lopatka, three "Neptunes" in the eastern section of the Bering Sea, two "Neptunes" in the western section of the Bering Sea, and one RB-47 along the missing aircraft's flight route. In addition, on 20 April one B-36 was noted at Attu at an altitude of 5000 meters on a west-southwest course and one B-29 at an altitude of 3000 meters on a southwest course. Possibly these aircraft were en route to the search area. On 21 April, five "Neptunes" in the central section of the Bering Sea; 22 April, the Adak Region; 23 April, one "Neptune" noted at 08 hours 38 minutes 5515N 17040E and at 09 hours 40 minutes at 5325N 17210E eastern, and one "Neptune" in the region of the central section of the Bering Sea.

In addition to the aircraft, the icebreaker "Burton Island" and the tug "Takelma" participated in the search.

On 21 April, an unidentified official ordered the commander of the Neptune flights conducting the search "not to fly over the KOMANDORS."

On 22 April, five "Neptunes" flew from Adak to Kodiak, suggesting that the search had ended.

Conclusion: results from the analysis of the radio communications and the character of the search would suggest that the Americans do not know where, the reason, or the time the aircraft was lost.

CHIEF OF INTELLIGENCE TOP
Captain 1st Rank RAZUMYJNo. 3563, 25 April
Deciphered by Zyablinsksev
1630 hrs 25 April
Typed by Tajdakova
1730 hrs 27 April
No. 515

3 copies typed

Checked: [illeg. signature]

[handwritten on reverse, "Arkhiv Prezidenta RF, P. 3, op. 66, d.
393, l. 11-16"]

[TFR 38-60]

[handwritten "27 Jun 58"]

[handwritten "1st Section"]
[handwritten "4"]THE CHIEF DIRECTORATE OF BORDER TROOPS OF THE KGB
ATTACHED TO THE COUNCIL OF MINISTERS OF THE USSRDISTRIBUTION:

Comrade I.A. SEROV

SECRET

Copy No. 1

THE CHIEF OF THE GUPV
OF THE KGB ATTACHED TO
THE COUNCIL OF MINISTERS OF THE USSRLieutenant-General [signature] SPECIAL REPORT

(ZYRYANOV)

"28" Jun 58

[initials]

A border detail from Outpost No. 12 of the 40th Border Detachment, Armenian Okrug, spotted an aircraft approaching the border from Turkey at an altitude of 4500 meters at 1825 hrs on 27 June 58. The aircraft violated the State border of the USSR in the Lake Ada-Ehri area (sector of Outpost No. 3, 125th Border Detachment, Armenian Okrug) at 1830 hrs, and at an altitude of about 2000m, continued its flight on the route: Artashat, Beyuk-Vedi, Sevan Island, Agdam. Posts of the radio-technical forces were notified by the compartmented system "Vozdukh" [air] in a timely manner.

Two Air Force fighters were scrambled and forced the four-engine "Douglas-118" American military transport aircraft to land at 1857 hrs in the Agdam area. The crew, consisting of four American servicemen, bailed out of the burning plane.

Five parachutists, who jumped prior to the plane's landing, were arrested in the Agdam area by 2100 hrs on 28 June. All of the detainees were taken to Kirovabad in the Azerbajdzhan SSR. They were US military personnel: Colonel BRENNEN BRAZH, aircraft commander, Major LAJZ, Major KRENTS, Major SHUL'TS, Captain KBJN, Lieutenant LYURER, Sergeant OL'MEN, Sergeant RIMER, Sergeant SEJPO.

Based on the crew's initial testimony, the aircraft was flying on the route: Nicosia (Cyprus), Teheran, Karachi. However, it strayed from its course and violated the State border of the USSR.

[handwritten "04091"]

[TFR 38-61]

[handwritten "5"]

2.

According to their testimony, only the aforementioned crew was on the aircraft. Search groups, in conjunction with organs of the KGB, are conducting an inspection of the areas along the aircraft's flight route and of the landing area.

All of the Armenian Okrug Border Detachments - the 41st, 127th, 42nd, and 43rd - were transferred to augment the border defense.

ATTACHMENT: A sketch map for the addressee only.

CHIEF OF STAFF, GUPV OF THE KGB
ATTACHED TO THE COUNCIL OF MINISTERS OF THE USSR
Lieutenant-General[signature]
(BANNYKH)

[handwritten "TsAPV, P. 14, op. 5, [cs?] 5676, 1. 4, 5."]

[TFR 38-62]

[illeg. handwriting]
[handwritten "P218/XI, 21 May 59"]

[handwritten "OSA 24"]
Secret. Copy No. 10
[illeg. handwriting]

[stamp "[illeg.] of the USSR
SECRET
THE COUNTRIES OF
AMERICA SECTION
Entry No. 1125
18 May 59"]

TsK KPSS

American Ambassador Thompson delivered a memorandum to Comrade N.S. Khrushchev on 4 May of this year. It expresses the US President's anxiety over the fate of the 11 American fliers who were supposedly on an American C-130 that violated the State border of the USSR and crashed near the city of Brevan on 2 Sep 58. The possibility that the Americans will publish their memorandum cannot be excluded.

The MID of the USSR considers it expedient to deliver our memorandum on this matter, which could be published if necessary, to US Charge d'Affaires ad interim Davis. The answer that Comrade N.S. Khrushchev gave to US Ambassador Thompson should be stated in our note.

A draft of the resolution is attached.

Please review.

Original signed
V. KUZNETSOV

15 May 59
No. 1200/GS

True copy: [signature "Semenov(?)"]

additional copies
6- NS
mb-2152/ga
16 May 59

[TFR 38-63]

[handwritten "D 420 USA"]

[handwritten "OSA 36"]
Secret. Copy No. 11
[illeg. handwriting]

[stamp "MFA of the USSR
SECRET
THE COUNTRIES OF
AMERICA SECTION
Entry No. 1930
18 Aug 59"]

TsK KPSS

US Vice-President Richard Nixon sent Comrade N.S. Khrushchev a letter on 1 August of this year. A request was made in it to provide information on the fate of the 11 Americans who supposedly were on board the USAF plane which crashed near Brevan on 2 Sep 58. In his letter, Mr. Nixon raises the issue of the fate of the 11 crew members of this aircraft as a "serious impediment to improving" relations between the USSR and the USA.

In accordance with its instructions, the USSR MID is presenting Comrade N.S. Khrushchev's draft answer to Nixon's letter mentioned above.

The draft decree is attached.

Please review.

Original signed A. GROMYKO

17 Aug 59
No. [illeg.]/GS

True copy: [signature]

[handwritten "File copy
[illeg. signature]
9 Dec 59"]

additional copies
6th NS
mb-3736/ga

[TFR 38-64]

[handwritten "2 Sep 58"]

CHIEF DIRECTORATE OF BORDER TROOPS OF THE KGB
ATTACHED TO THE COUNCIL OF MINISTERS OF THE USSR

[handwritten "To file No. 26.
Illeg signature, 13 Sep."]

Distribution:

Secret
Copy No. 2

to Comrade P.I. IVASHUTIN
Original signed

THE HEAD OF THE GUPV OF THE KGB
ATTACHED TO THE COUNCIL OF MINISTERS OF THE USSR
Lieutenant-General

(P. ZYRYANOV)

"3" Sep 58

SPECIAL REPORT

Based on a report by the Chief of Border Troops of the Armenian Okrug, an American C-130 "Hercules" transport plane was detected violating the Soviet State border inbound from Turkey on 2 Sep 58 at 1508 hrs, flying a course of 140° at an altitude of 10,000 meters. It was detected by border details of the 21st and 22nd Outposts of the 39th Border Detachment (City of Leninakan).

The border outposts quickly reported the violation to the VNOS radar post in Leninakan via the compartmented system "Vozdukh."

When the border violation was confirmed by radar at the VNOS post, two jet fighters from the Erevan Airfield were scrambled. They were piloted by Senior Lieutenants LAPOTKOV and GAVRILOV. Having approached the intruder, they ordered it to follow them back to the airfield. Not receiving a response, they opened fire on the enemy plane. As a result, the plane caught on fire at an altitude of 5000m and crashed 10 kms southeast of the village of Verkhniy Talin (35 kilometers from the border).

An inspection of the area revealed parts of the burning aircraft, the remains of 5 human bodies, and documents. One of the documents contained a special secret order in which

[TFR 38-65]

[handwritten "8"]
2.

the crew, which consisted of 5 people (Captains EDVARD DZHO-DZHEROS, RUDE DZH-SVIESTRA, Lieutenants DZHON IRSIMSON, VILLARD MANUEHL, REKARDO and Senior Sergeant LEROU PRAJSS), was ordered to fly from Rhein-Main to Turkey to complete a special mission during the period from 1-10 Sep of this year.

Identification cards were found for Captain RUDE and Lieutenant VILLARD. All crew documents were given to the KGB attached to the Council of Ministers of the Armenian SSR. Their contents are being verified.

The Okrug command moved units of the 39th Border Detachment and the 12th Outpost of the 40th Border Detachment to strengthen border defense. A border search was conducted in conjunction with organs of the KGB. The search was conducted along the American aircraft's flight route to try to find any possible parachutists or objects thrown out of the aircraft.

The Border Details observed the following:

On 2 Sep 58 at 1525 hrs, after the American plane was met by our fighters, two soldiers took a light machine gun out of a building at the Turkish Post KYZYL (across from where sectors 23 and 24 of the 39th Border Detachment meet) and fired two shots in the direction of our planes.

At 1700 hrs, five soldiers from this post approached to within 50m of the border and fired one rifle shot in the direction of the 24th Outpost's border detail, which consisted of Privates KUZ'MIN and DMITRIEV. These facts are being verified and then a protest will be declared to the Turkish Border Commissar.

The American aircraft's violation of the border is being investigated by a commission chaired by Major-General BADAMYANTS.

The remnants of the aircraft and the bodies of the crew are being held by border details commanded by officers.

Attachment: Sketch map

Original signed

THE CHIEF OF STAFF OF THE GUPV KGB
ATTACHED TO THE COUNCIL OF MINISTERS OF THE USSR
Lieutenant-General [BANNYKH]

[handwritten archival citation "TsAPV, f. 14, op. 5, d. 5676, l. 7,8"]
[illeg. handwriting]

[TFR 38-66]

[This entire page is handwritten except where noted.]

Okrug No. 792 reported on 4 Sep 58 that during a thorough search of the plane wreckage, the following was found: two more charred bodies, a medallion with the inscription Duncan, Paul E., No. AO-961, and a burnt "Colt" pistol. A government commission chaired by Major-General Tsetrik has taken over the investigation of the border violation and the guarding of the aircraft wreckage, the bodies and other material evidence. The documents that were removed were passed on to this commission by the KGB.

Colonel [signature] Lykov

1st Copy to Comrade Ivashutin
Reported on 3 Sep 58
Colonel [signature] Lykov

[stamp "1st Copy Act No. 26
destroyed on 13 Sep 58
Chief Clerk [Initials]"]

[Distribution notes are typed.]

2 Copies
1st - to addressee
2nd - 1st Department of GUPV 11/1/012329
originator Lykov
typed by Yakovleva
3 Sep 58
mb 8616

[handwritten "TsAPV, f. 14, op. 5, d. 5616, l. 8 oot"]

[TFR 38-67]

[handwritten "osa"]
[handwritten "74"]

[handwritten "No. 14"] [handwritten "85"]

[stamp "SECRET
AMERICAN COUNTRIES
SECTION
Entry No. 1977
16 Sep 58"]

Secret. Copy No. 9

TsK KPSS

On 12 Sep of this year, the MID of the USSR passed a demarche to the US Embassy with regard to the American plane that crashed 55 kms northwest of the city of Brevan.

In reply, the US Embassy sent a demarche on 13 Sep, in which an attempt was made to portray the incident as if Soviet fighters intercepted the American plane on the Turkish-Soviet border near Kars. A request was also made for information concerning the 17 crew members and for permission for an Embassy representative, accompanied by technical experts, to investigate the crash site, identify the bodies, and make arrangements for the transfer of the remains of the crew members to the proper American authorities. This reply takes an obviously provocative tone.

The MID of the USSR, the Ministry of Defense, and the KGB of the Council of Ministers of the USSR prepared a draft reply to the American demarche. Our reply strongly rejects the fabrications in the Embassy's demarche. The American's request to land at the crash site was ignored in our reply. Bear in mind that the area where the plane went down is considered a border region where foreigners are not allowed and access by Americans would be nonproductive.

As regards the Embassy's request for a transfer of the remains of the crew to the American side, the request is confirmed. The transferring of the bodies has been entrusted to the KGB.

The draft is attached.
Please consider.

Original signed
V. KUZNETSOV

Original signed
I. KONEV

Original signed
R. KRUSHUTIN

Sep 58
No. 2441/ga

[handwritten "True Copy: N. Fedorov"]

[TFR 38-68]

[handwritten "2 Sep 58"] [handwritten "85"]

[handwritten "75"]

Secret. Copy 9
Draft

RESOLUTION OF THE TsK KPSS

The reply to the US Embassy's demarche of 13 Sep concerning the American military aircraft that crashed near the city of Erevan.

1. This is to confirm the draft of the reply constructed by the MID of the USSR, the Ministry of Defense, and the KGB attached to the Council of Ministers of the USSR. The demarche is to be passed to the US Embassy in Moscow.

The text of the demarche is to be printed in the Soviet press with a short account of the American demarche of 13 Sep.

2. The KGB of the Council of Ministers of the USSR and the Ministry of Defense have been instructed to conduct the necessary preparations to transfer to the Americans the remains of the six crew members of the American aircraft that crashed near the city of Erevan.

[The remainder of this page is handwritten.]

P151/14 XIV 18/9

N 2441/ga
15 Sep 58
To 1977-osa

[TFR 38-69]

[handwritten "87"]

[illeg. handwriting]
[handwritten "76"]Attachment
Draft

In response to the US Embassy's demarche No. 270 dated 13 Sep 58, the MID USSR feels that it is necessary to reaffirm its demarche dated 12 Sep about the USAF plane which intentionally crossed the USSR State border and went down 55 kilometers to the northwest of Erevan.

The Ministry's demarche reported that this aircraft crashed and burned, and the remains of bodies were found at the crash site. It was determined from the remains that six crew members perished. The Soviet side does not possess any other information about the crew members.

The assertion made in the US Embassy's demarche purports that Soviet fighters intercepted this aircraft near the Soviet-Turkish border around Kars. The Soviet Government strongly rejects this assertion as groundless and provocative in nature.

Such an unworthy attempt to lay the blame for the loss of the American aircraft and its crew on the Soviet side has, apparently, been made in order to justify the very obvious fact that this aircraft intentionally crossed the national border of the USSR.

The Soviet Government has repeatedly stated that the US Government is fully responsible for the consequences of US aircraft illegally crossing the Soviet national border. There is one thing that the US Government must do. It must once and for all prohibit its air force from illegally crossing the State border of the Soviet Union. It is precisely these types of measures which the Soviet Government expects from the US Government.

As far as the Embassy's request to transfer the remains of the six crew members of the burned aircraft, the appropriate Soviet authorities are ready to transfer them to a representative of the American Government.

[handwritten "2441/ga"]

[TFR 38-70]

[handwritten "108"
[handwritten "Reference copy"]
[handwritten "420"]
[handwritten "AS"]
[handwritten "9 Dec"]]

[handwritten "109/OSA"]
Secret. Copy No. 9

[stamp "MID USSR
SECRET
COUNTRIES of AMERICA
DEPARTMENT
Entry No. 2596
7 Dec 58"]

TeK KPSS

Comrade Menshikov, the USSR Ambassador to the US, reported that he was invited to the State Department by Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Murphy, who gave him an oral presentation about the American aircraft which violated the USSR border near Brevan on 2 Sep of this year (Telegram No. 2196 from Washington).

During his presentation, Murphy asserted that the aircraft which crossed into Soviet air space was supposedly following a Soviet radar beacon and was downed by Soviet fighters. "Eyewitnesses" supposedly saw parachutists jump from the plane.

Murphy also said that since the remains of only six crew members of the aircraft have been sent to the Americans, and there were 17 people on board, there should still be 11 individuals on Soviet territory, some of which are possibly still alive.

Murphy further announced that the 19 and 20 Sep issues of the newspaper "Sovetskaya Aviatsiya" [Soviet Aviation] published articles written by Major A. Voshchikov entitled, "Vysokoe Masterstvo," [Advanced Skill] which, in Murphy's opinion, confirm the fact that the American aircraft was downed by Soviet fighters. Murphy announced that the Americans allegedly have a taped recording of the conversation between the Soviet fighter pilots and the ground [controllers].

Comrade Menshikov declined to discuss the issue raised by Murphy and announced that as concerns the American aircraft which violated the USSR border near Brevan on 8 Sep, the appropriate answer was already given by the Soviet side in Moscow. He categorically denied Murphy's assertions that the Soviet pilots shot down this American aircraft, refused to listen to the taped recording fabricated by the Americans, and rejected the Americans' conjectures relating to the article in the newspaper "Sovetskaya Aviatsiya."

[TFR 38-70a]

It is completely obvious that the American side is using various fabrications to draw us into a new discussion of this issue in order to rid themselves of the guilt for the American aircraft that violated the USSR border and also to lay the blame on the Soviet side.

[TFR 38-71]

[handwritten "107"]

[handwritten "110"]

2.

The position of the Soviet Government on this issue has already been detailed in three demarches sent to the US Embassy and published in the Soviet press. Therefore, the MID USSR believes it would not be expedient to enter into a discussion of this issue with the Americans at the present time and will limit itself to the reply which was given by Comrade Menshikov in his discussion with Murphy. If the Americans should mention this matter, they should be told that the demarche sent by the Soviet side on this issue as well as the reply to Murphy's announcement by Ambassador Menshikov on 14 Nov completely settled the matter, and the Soviet side has nothing further to report.

Please review.

Original signed
A. Gromyko

"6" Dec 58
No. 3169/GS

True copy: [signature]

G-checked GI/ach
No. [Illeg]/osa
28 Nov 58

[TFR 38-72]

[handwritten "38"]
[handwritten "entry No. 193 osa"]

DRAFT

Dear Mr. Nixon,

I have familiarized myself with your letter of 1 Aug 59 in which you again raise the issue of the USAF aircraft which crashed on 2 Sep 58, 55 kilometers to the northwest of Erevan.

I will tell you candidly that the fact that you have raised this issue after the Soviet Government has done all it possibly could to clarify the circumstances of this crash and has fully informed the American side of the findings of its inquiries causes, at the very minimum, perplexity on our part. We cannot view this as anything but an attempt to artificially create barriers toward improving US-Soviet relations.

The Government of the United States has already been informed that on 2 Sep 58 no Soviet fighter downed an American aircraft and that on that day a US military aircraft crashed near Erevan. Bodily remains were discovered at the site. After an examination of the remains, which were sent to the American side on 24 Sep 58, it was possible to conclude that 6 crew members perished. No other American aviators from the aircraft were found in the Soviet Union, and therefore, we do not have them.

I understand the feelings of the relatives of those who perished when the plane crashed. However, it is completely obvious that those who are in charge of flights of such American aircraft are responsible to the American public and to the relatives of those who perished.

I would like to point out to you, Mr. Vice President, that such issues would never come up in the relations between our two countries if US military aircraft did not fly so close to the Soviet border and if they did not cross the border for purposes which are incompatible with improving Soviet-American relations. Moreover, such flights of American aircraft and their illegal crossings of the Soviet border are still taking place.

To Richard NIXON
Vice President USA

[TFR 38-73]

[handwritten "18"]

[handwritten "39"]

2.

In particular, our country recorded these flights into the eastern sector virtually on the eve of your visit to the Soviet Union.

I inform you of this with the hope that the American side will curtail such activities. Such curtailment would indubitably make a very important contribution towards developing and improving relations between our countries. In other words, curtailing such activities will be conducive to achieving the noble goals of "ending the cold war" and reinforcing peace. We both have devoted many hours to such discussions during your stay in our country.

With sincere respect,

N. Khrushchev

No. 2062/GS

[TFR 38-74]

[handwritten "10.60"]

[handwritten "166"]

CERTIFICATE

on the transfer of the body of Captain PALM Willard Dzhordzh [George Willard Palm], US Air Force.

This certificate was compiled as witness to the fact, that on 25 Jun 60, in Moscow, representatives of the Soviet side: from the Ministry of Defense USSR - Colonel P.A. GRECHISHKIN and Lieutenant-Colonel V.I. NOSOV and from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs USSR - A.G. ABRAMOV transferred,

and representatives of the American side: Assistant Air Force Attache attached to the US Embassy in the USSR - Major J.P. MAKKEHM and Captain D.K. MARTIN and the Second Secretary to the US Embassy in the USSR - R.E. SNYDER accepted:

1. The body of US Air Force Captain PALM Willard George, dressed in an American military pilot's uniform - grey flight suit and black leather boots, in a soldered zinc coffin.

2. A certificate of the forensic medical investigation of the corpse of Captain W.G. PALM from 4 Jul 60, on 10 sheets, signed by the forensic medical experts B.D. LEVCHENKOV, V.I. ALISIEVICH and G.P. PEGOV.

3. An identification card in the name of Captain PALM Willard George, ID number AO 2087476, which was issued by the US Department of the Air Force 5 Feb 55 and numbered 1417806, with a photograph, a description of PALM's appearance and finger prints. ID card form No. 528 in the name of US Air Force Captain PALM Willard George, born 1921, ID No. AO 2087476, issued by the US Department of Defense.

In accordance with the wishes of the US representatives, the coffin with the body of Captain W.G. PALM was not opened and was transferred in a soldered condition.

[TFR 38-75]

[handwritten "167"]

2.

During the transfer, the American representatives lodged no claims regarding the transfer of the body of CPT PALM Willard George and the documents.

This certificate was compiled in two copies, in Russian and English, in Moscow on 25 Jul 60.

Original Signed
REPRESENTATIVES
OF THE SOVIET PARTY

Original Signed
REPRESENTATIVES
OF THE AMERICAN PARTY

[TFR 38-76]

[handwritten "1 Jul 60"]

[handwritten "89"]

Copy
No. 147/12

Not subject to publication

RESOLUTION
OF THE PRESIDIUM OF THE SUPREME SOVIET OF THE USSR

On the release
of American fliers D.R. Makkoun and F.B. Olmsted
from criminal proceedings
.....

On 1 Jul 60, American military pilots Makkoun Dzhon Richard and Olmsted Frimen Brus violated the State border of the USSR in an RB-47 aircraft to perform reconnaissance. They were arrested and criminal proceedings were initiated.

Having considered the petition of the Government of the USSR and having been guided by desires to improve relations between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America, the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR
RESOLVES: to release MAKKOUN Dzhon Richard and OLMSTED Frimen Brus from criminal proceedings and transfer them to the American authorities.

**CHAIRMAN OF THE PRESIDIUM
OF THE SUPREME SOVIET USSR**

L. BREZHNEV

**SECRETARY OF THE PRESIDIUM
OF THE SUPREME SOVIET USSR**

M. GEORGADZE

Moscow, Kremlin
24 Jan 61

[TFR 38-77]

[handwritten "90"]
[handwritten "91"]

CERTIFICATE

We, the undersigned representatives of the MID USSR, party of the first part, and representatives of the US Embassy in the USSR, party of the second part, compiled this certificate to certify that the representatives of the MID USSR transferred, and the representatives of the US Embassy accepted, OLMSTED Frimen Brus and MAKKOUN Dzhon Richard, crew members of the US Air Force RB-47 aircraft, who were freed according to the Resolution of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet USSR dated 24 Jan 61.

REPRESENTATIVES
MID USSR

Deputy Chief
Department of the Countries
of America

[signature]
(L. ZAMYATIN)

Deputy Chief
Legal Review Department

[signature]
(G. VILKOV)

Moscow, 25 Jan 61

REPRESENTATIVES
US EMBASSY IN THE USSR

[Entire column written in English]
Minister-Counselor
Embassy of the United States

America
[signature]
(Edward L. Freers)

Air Attache
Embassy of the United States
America

[signature]
(Col. Melvin J. Nielsen, USAF)

[Circular stamp -
US Embassy Moscow]

[TFR 38-78]

[handwritten "91"]
[handwritten "92"]

RESOLUTION

on the closing of the case

Moscow, "28" Jan 61.

Having reviewed the materials of criminal case No. 45 concerning the accused MAKKOUN Dzhon Richard, born 1932, native of Kansas City, Missouri, America, US citizen, 1LT US Air Force, navigator, and OLMSTED Frimen Brus, born 1935, native of Elmira, New York, US citizen, 1LT US Air Force, copilot, - The Chief Investigator of the Investigation Department of the KGB attached to the Council of Ministers USSR [Area whited out, probably a name]

FOUND:

J.R. MAKKOUN and F.B. OLMSTED intruded into the air space of the Soviet Union, on 1 Jul 60, in a USAF RB-47 military reconnaissance aircraft. The RB-47 was shot down by a Soviet fighter. Having parachuted to safety, MAKKOUN and OLMSTED were arrested and criminal proceedings were instituted under Article 2 of the Law of the USSR "Criminal culpability for crimes against the State."

The investigation of the case established that MAKKOUN and OLMSTED flew in a RB-47 over a border area of the USSR on 1 Jul 60. They violated the Soviet State border, 22 kms north of Cape Svyatoj Nos, intending to collect military reconnaissance information about radar installations and other military objectives of the Soviet Union.

The RB-47 was equipped with special radio-electronic reconnaissance equipment and armed with two cannons.

In the course of the investigation it was also established that MAKKOUN made a series of flights in an RB-47 aircraft over border areas of the Soviet Black Sea and Baltic Sea coasts in 1959.

[TFR 38-79]

[handwritten "92"]

2.

His intent was to collect information on strategic military objectives of the Soviet Union.

Having been guided by desires to improve relations between the Soviet Union and the United States of America, the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet USSR, on 24 Jan 61, adopted the resolution regarding the release from criminal culpability of D.R. MAKKOUN and F.B. OLMSTED and their transfer to American authorities.

On the basis of the aforementioned and guided by Article 5 paragraph 4 UPK RSFSR, -

IT IS RESOLVED:

To close the criminal case against MAKKOUN Dzhon Richard and OLMSTED Frimen Bruce.

CHIEF INVESTIGATOR, INVESTIGATION DEPARTMENT, KGB
ATTACHED TO THE SM USSR CPT
[signature "A. Yur'evich"]

"AGREED"

CHIEF OF THE 2ND SECTION OF THE INVESTIGATION
DEPARTMENT KGB ATTACHED TO SM USSR
COL
[illeg. signature]

CHIEF OF THE INVESTIGATION DEPARTMENT KGB
ATTACHED TO THE COUNCIL OF MINISTERS USSR
Major-General (Legal)
[illeg. signature]

[TFR 38-80]

[This page has illegible handwritten instructions to Kal'ts(?) from Vasilevskij dated 20 Nov 51.]

[handwritten "93"]

No. 1289715

TO THE MILITARY MINISTER OF THE USSR

20 Nov 51

Marshal of the Soviet Union
Comrade A.M. VASILEVSKIJ

At 1814 hrs on 19 Nov 51, the main VNOS post of HUNGARY reported to the Acting Commander of the 59th Aviation Army, Major-General (Aviation) KOTEL'NIKOV, that a dual-engine plane crossed the border from Rumania near KIEHINY-KRISH. The aircraft was then noted by VNOS posts as flying the following route: UJKID'ESH, SENTESH, CHONGRAD. The aircraft was picked up by radar of the 59th Aviation Army at KECHKEM'T.

Major-General (Aviation) KOTEL'NIKOV decided to send up a MiG-15bis at 1922 hrs. It was piloted by Senior LT KALUGIN, a Flight Commander in the 5th Guards Fighter Aviation Regiment of the 195th Fighter Aviation Division.

Senior Lieutenant KALUGIN intercepted the intruding aircraft at 1930 hrs, near VESPREM.

The intruder was escorted to and landed at PAPA Airfield at 1955 hrs.

It was established after landing that the plane and its crew were American. The crew consisted of two officers, Captains, a flight engineer Sergeant and a radio operator Private. The crew commander was Captain KHANDERSON, born 1919.

The following was found on the aircraft: eleven 1:10 kilometer maps of areas of West Germany, ITALY, AUSTRIA, YUGOSLAVIA, HUNGARY, CZECHOSLOVAKIA, and one 1:50 kilometer map of the Soviet Union up to the URALS.

[illegible/cut-off handwriting]

[stamp "Entry No. 8913ss
26 Nov 51
Secret Section v/ch 78150"] -3 pages

[TFR 38-81]

[handwritten "24"]

In addition, six parachutes, two tool cases, and two packages of blankets were discovered.

All of the aircraft's navigation instruments are in working order.

There were about 200 liters of fuel remaining in the tanks.

According to information from the VNOS OMA service the intruder violated the Rumanian border with YUGOSLAVIA near DZHEBEL at 1723 hrs. From there its route was to RESHINA, SIBIU, ABRUD, and then across the Hungarian border 30 kms southwest of BEKESH.

Questioning of the detained crew revealed that they are from the 85th Base Supply Group.

The crew received a mission from the Commander of the 12th Air Army at EHRDING Airfield, located 30 kms to the northeast of Munich, to deliver a load to BELGRADE.

The established flight route was MUNICH, BOL'TSANO, VENETSIYA, YDIBE, LYUBLYANA, ZAGREB, BELGRADE.

During the mission, the crew lost orientation near ZAGREB. The crew allegedly could not regain orientation.

The crew confirms that while landing at PAPA Airfield the radio operator called the FRANKFURT Station with the following message: "We are being forced to land."

The aircraft is under guard and the crew is isolated.

CONCLUSIONS:

1. The correspondence in data reported on the intruder by the VNOS OMA and the VNOS of HUNGARY gives reason to believe that the American plane, having completed its mission in RUMANIA, was returning to its home base through HUNGARY.

[TFR 38-82]

2. Based on the crew's testimony the plane was to take a load to BELGRADE, but the plane did not make a stop in BELGRADE. During an inspection of the aircraft no cargo was found, except for two tool boxes and two packages of blankets. It follows that the crew's testimonies should be considered false.

3. The purpose of the American aircraft's flight over RUMANIA and HUNGARY needs to be investigated further.

ATTACHMENT: A one page chart, only for the addressee.

Original signed
LIEUTENANT-GENERAL

BATITSKIY

[stamp illegible]

[illeg. signature]

[handwritten on reverse "F. 187, op. 173015, d. 5, l. 23, 24, 25"]

[TFR 38-83]

[handwritten "10.60"]
nv.3

TOP SECRET

Copy

Copy No. 3
[handwritten "76"]
Especially urgent17 Oct 60
[handwritten "2703-1"]

To Comrade N.S. Khrushchev

I am reporting that on 14 Oct of this year, while fishing, trawlers of the Murmansk Economic Council raised parts of an aircraft. They were located at coordinates 69° 12' north latitude, 40° 11' east longitude; 69° 15' north latitude, 40° 20' east longitude; 69° 05' north latitude, 40° 26' east longitude, at a depth of 60-140 meters 60-70 miles north of the Cape Svyatoy Nos (35-40 miles from territorial waters). The following was found:

A wingtip 12 meters long with US Air Force markings, wreckage of the tail unit 1 meter long, an ejection seat, a metal frame and plastic with stenciling (presumably from a camera), a small turbine with a radiator, a damaged conduit and many small pieces of aviation equipment. Many of the pieces found have factory markings.

In addition, a human skeleton in a flight suit with a parachute was raised. Upon examination of the clothing, documents were discovered in the name of the USAF flier POZA Evgenij Ehrnest [POZA, Eugene E.], born 1922: ID No. AO 2088613 with a photograph, fingerprint and a description of distinctive marks; identification card and instructions (probably about the use of the parachute).

On 17 Oct the remains of the pilot and the parts of the plane that were recovered will be delivered to Severomorsk.

Measures are being taken toward furthering the search for the remainder of the plane.

CHAIRMAN OF THE COMMITTEE FOR STATE SECURITY
[initials]

(A. SHELEKIN)

True copy: [illeg. signature]

[illeg. handwriting]

[TFR 38-84]

[entire page handwritten]

From Polyashov, captain of the RT-194 [fishing trawler] Yalta

[Eyewitness] Report

While fishing on 13 Oct 61, we raised the trawl from the depth of 130 meters and brought it aboard at 1045 hrs. In the stern wing of the trawl we discovered a parachute of foreign manufacture. In the parachute shroud we found a human leg (a foot and part of the shin) with one shoe and a dark blue wool sock. Since the leg was decomposed, we threw the leg and the sock into the sea. We also discovered items of unknown purpose: Small canisters, a jacket, a metal box without a lid, and a bag containing documents.

The trawl was raised in quadrant No. 946 69° 12' N, 40° 04' E. We were headed on a compass course of 310° (+ 17°) with the trawl and covered a distance of eight miles. There was a foreign trawler about one mile ahead of us following the same course.

25 Oct 61

[signature "Polyashov"]

[TFR 38-85]

[handwritten "204"]

Copy:
Secret
Copy No. 2[handwritten "16 Aug 63"]
[handwritten "13-a"]

To Colonel-General Comrade P.I. IVASHYTIN

An American military aircraft crashed into the Atlantic Ocean on 16 Aug 63 at coordinates: 41° 03' N 68° 35' W. The pilot, KH'YU M. LAVELLI ejected into the ocean and was rescued by crew members of the tender "Iokhannes Vares" of the Tallin base of the ocean fishing fleet.

[It appears that the remainder of the text on this page has been whited out]

S. BANNIKOV

16 Oct 63
No. 2800/B

[This section also whited out.]

[TFR 38-86]

[handwritten "195"]
Translation from the English

Received by mail

17 Jul 56

THE FOREIGN SERVICE
OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

No. 42

The Embassy of the United States of America presents its compliments to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and has the honor to refer to the question of the detention of United States military personnel in the Soviet Union. The United States Government has for some time received from persons of various nationalities, freed from Soviet Government imprisonment during the last several years, reports that they have conversed with, seen or heard reports concerning United States military aviation personnel, belonging either to the United States Air Force or to the United States Navy Air Arm, in actual detention in the Soviet Union. The United States Government has sought in all such cases to obtain, if possible, precise identification of American nationals detained by the Soviet Government, although it notes by international law and international practice the Soviet Government is obliged to inform the United States Government first of any American nationals which the Soviet Government holds in custody or to permit such nationals to communicate with the proper United States authorities.

The reports concerning such personnel have now become so persistent, detailed and credible that, although the United States Government is not able to identify by name these American nationals now detained by the Soviet Government, it requests the Soviet Government to inform the United States Government in detail concerning each American military person

TsK KPSS 26169

[TFR 38-87]

[handwritten "196"]

2..

who has been detained in the Soviet Union at any time since January 1, 1949 about whom the United States Government has not heretofore been informed by the Soviet Government, giving in each case the name of the person and the circumstances underlying his detention.

Specifically, the United States Government is informed and is compelled to believe that the Soviet Government has had and continues to have under detention the following:

1. One or more members of the crew of a United States Navy Privateer-type aircraft which went down in the Baltic Sea area on April 8, 1950. The United States Government has since that time received reports that various members of the crew of this aircraft were and are being detained in Soviet detention areas in the Far Eastern area of the Soviet Union. In particular, it is informed and believes that in 1950 and in October, 1953 at least one American military aviation person, believed to be a member of the crew of this United States Navy Privateer, was held at Camp No. 20 allegedly near Taishet and at Collective Farm No. 25 approximately 54 kilometers from Taishet. This American national was said to be serving a sentence for alleged espionage and was described as having suffered burns to the face and legs in the crash of his aircraft and using crutches or a cane.

Reports have been received from former prisoners of the Soviet Government at Vorkuta that in September 1950 as many as eight American nationals, believed to be members of the crew of the United States Navy Privateer to which reference is made, were seen in the area of Vorkuta. And specifically, one person who was interned at Vorkuta in September 1950 stated that he was serving a twenty-five year sentence for espionage

[TFR 38-88]

[handwritten "197"]

3.

and was a crew member of a downed United States aircraft.

For the information of the Soviet Government, the crew of the United States Navy Privateer when it departed for its flight over the high seas of the Baltic consisted of the following United States Navy personnel, all nationals of the United States:

Name	Rank	Serial Number
Fette, John H.	LT	320676 USNR
Seeschaf, Howard W.	LT	264095 USN
Reynolds, Robert D.	LT JG	368573 USN
Burgess, Tommy L.	ENS	506762 USN
Danens Jr., Joe H.	AD1	3685438 USN
Thomas, Jack W.	AD1	2242750 USN
Beckman, Frank L.	AT1	2799076 USN
Purcell, Edward J.	CT3	2540438 USN
Rinniar Jr. Joseph Norris	AT3	2542600 USN
Bourasa, Joseph Jay	AL3	9539864 USN

2. One or more members of the crew of a United States Air Force B-29 which went down on 13 June 1952, either over the Sea of Japan or near the Kamchatka area of the Soviet Union and an officer, believed by the United States Government to have been a member of this crew, were observed in October 1953 in a Soviet hospital north of Magadan, near the crossing of the Kolyma River between Elgen and Debin, at a place called Narionburg. This officer stated that he had been convicted, wrongfully, under Paragraph 6 of Article 58 of the Soviet Penal Code.

For the information of the Soviet Government, the United States Air Force personnel on board the B-29 which has been missing since June 13, 1952 were as follows:

[TFR 38-89]

[handwritten "198"]

4.

Name	Rank	Serial Number
Busch, Samuel N.	MAJ	AO 733811
Scully, James A.	1LT	AO 693414
Service, Samuel D.	1LT	AO 752509
McDonnell, Robert J.	1LT	AO 2222264
Homer, William B.	MSG	AF 7025704
Moore, David L.	MSG	AF 15229915
Blizzard, William A.	SSG	AF 19244175
Monserrat, Miguel W.	SSG	AF 13164064
Berg, Eddie R.	SSG	AF 17281746
Bonura, Leon F.	SSG	AF 18359162
Becker, Roscoe G.	SSG	AF 19391813
Pillsbury, Danny H.	A1C	AF 18245964

3. While the foregoing specific cases involve the crew members of two aircraft, it may well be that the Soviet Government has in its custody members of the crews of other United States aircraft, particularly crew members of aircraft engaged in military action in Korea since 1950 on the side of the United Nations Command.

The United States Government desires that the Soviet Government conduct its inquiry on the foregoing subject as thoroughly as possible, and that it keep this Embassy informed of its progress as soon as possible.

AMERICAN EMBASSY
Moscow, 16 Jul 56

Translated by [signature] G. Tsygehnki

[handwritten on reverse, "Arkhiv Prezidenta RF, f. 3, op. 58, d. 511, l. 195-198"]

[TFR 39-1]

Information concerning US citizens
missing in action during the Second World War

1. Documents containing information on interned American pilots.
2. Materials from the Central Military Medical Museum (lists and questionnaires of wounded and sick Americans who were located in hospitals and base infirmaries of the Northern Fleet for treatment).
3. Documents concerning the 9 Jun 45 death of a B-25 crew in the area of Cape Lopatka, and the burial of American fliers on the Kamchatka Peninsula.
4. Documents containing information on Americans who were located in Camp No. 188.

[TFR 39-2]

(stamp "TsGASA
32900
1
75
3")

2-3
TOP SECRET

INFORMATION

In No. 817 from 12 Dec 44 the Commander of the 25th Nizhnednestrovsk Red Banner Border Regiment of the NKVD Troops Lieutenant Colonel CHERNYSHEV reports that:

The detained parachutists, 10 in all, are the combat crew of an American "Douglas" aircraft. Completing a bombing mission in the area of Vienna, they made a forced landing due to a malfunction of the aircraft caused by German [fire]. The aircraft burned in the air, the entire crew is at your disposal. Stamp - CHERNYSHEV.

True Copy: D-L'-Typist RO UV
NKVD PO OT 3 UF

Sergeant Major (Admin) [signature] (GOVOROVA)

12 Dec 44

[TFR 39-3]

[handwritten "5-5"]

[The left-hand side of the original is cut off.]
[This page is handwritten in English except where noted.]

ohn A Jarrett / [signature]

FOGGIA		[handwritten in Russian "service number"]
[dzornet]	1st Lt	0-1172088
hn A. Jarrett	2nd Lt	0-766875
owen Griffith	1st Lt	0-2058582
alter A. Terwelp	1st Lt	0-707538
noz B. Magee	2nd Lt	0-712327
nald B. White	T/sgt	3321596
l F. Engel	T/sgt	20408091
ay J. Maantolff	S/sgt	34279453
vit L. Martin	S/sgt	37477745
enth L. Nelson	S/sgt	16113860
nelius Wolk		

(stamp "TsGASA
fund32900
opis' 1
delo 75
list 5")

5 Air Force Bori
5 Wing Foggia
5 Air Force Wing of the 1st Air Army

[signature]

[handwritten "Iowa"]

[TFR 39-4]

[handwritten "- 6 -"]

[stamp "TSGASA"
fund32900
opis' 1
delo 75
list 6"]

LIST

The crew of an American "B-17" detained
at 1700 hrs 11 Dec 1944 - "x/
(5th Air Group, 15th American Air Army).
Group Headquarters is deployed in the city of Fodz
(Italy).

1. Crew commander -DZHON DZHER, born 1920
Sr. Lieutenant
2. Copilot -BOVEHN GOFET, born 1923
Jr. Lieutenant
3. Navigator -MEHGI DZHEMS, born 1924
Sr. Lieutenant
4. Engineer -EHNGOL PAUL, born 1920
Sergeant
5. Radio Operator -MEHKTOP PERSI, born 1917
Sergeant
6. Bombardier -DONNOL UAJT, born 1923
Lieutenant
7. Gunner -NAL'SON, born 1919
Sergeant
8. Gunner -MARTIN, born 1925
Sergeant
9. Gunner -UOLK KONNEHLIOS, born 1920
Sergeant
10. Navigator -VAL'TER TSHVAP, born 1923
Sr. Lieutenant

Lt. Colonel (Sokolov)
[handwritten "and sent to Bucharest 17 Dec 44"]

[TFR 39-5]

[handwritten "12"]

DIRECTORATE OF NKVD TROOPS
REAR GUARD OF THE 3RD UKRAINIAN FRONT
(INTELLIGENCE DEPARTMENT)

"17" December 1944
No. 7/00 957
Field Army

SECRET:
Copy No. _____

TO THE CHIEF OF STAFF OF THE THIRD UKRAINIAN FRONT
GUARD LIEUTENANT GENERAL

[stamp "TSGASA"
fund32900
opis' 1
delo 75
list 12"]

Comrade IVANOV

The order of the Front Commander, Marshall of the
Soviet Union Comrade TOLVUKHINA, has been carried out.
The 10-man crew of the American "B-17" aircraft,
accompanied by an officer, has been sent to the city of Bucharest
to Comrade Lieutenant General VINOGRADOV for transfer to the
American Military Mission.

[handwritten "original signed"]
COMMANDER OF NKVD TROOPS
REAR GUARD OF THE THIRD UKRAINIAN FRONT -
MAJOR GENERAL (I. PAVLOV)

[handwritten "True Copy: Junior Assistant
Commander of the 1st Section Captain Najdenov"]

Typed 2 copies
rch.-

[TFR 39-6]

[poor copy, many illegible letters]

[handwritten "- 13 -"]

STATEMENT

On 21 December 1944 the Commander of Military Unit 51867, Major Pleskachov M.M., "SMERSH" Counterintelligence Representative Senior Lieutenant A.P. Fipat'ev, and Detachment Commander of Military Unit 51867, Senior Engineer Lieutenant Kornienko, report that on 20 December 1944 a US "Flying Fortress" type aircraft crashed 6 kilometers southeast of Mohács (Hungary). Detachment Commander of Military Unit 51867, Senior Engineer Lieutenant Kornienko, composed a list for record of eight airmen:

Lieutenant Robert Karel	5. Corporal Vil'gel'm Stejsi
Corporal Nambel Lovin	6. " " Namen Kharmen
" " Keles Tajsen	7. " " Lyuf've Firt.
" " Dzheims Fraj	8. Lieutenant Roj Audlend

Commander of Military Unit 51867
Major [signature] Pleskachov

"SMERSH" Counterintelligence
Representative [signature] Fipat'ev
Senior Lieutenant

Detachment Commander of
Military Unit 51867 [signature] Kornienko
Senior Engineer Lieutenant

[stamp "TsGASA"
fund32900
opis' 1
delo 75
list 13 "]

Tb

[TFR 39-7]

[handwritten "-15-"]

STATEMENT OF THE CREW COMMANDER OF THE "LIBERATOR" AIRCRAFT
AMERICAN ARMY AIR CORPS LIEUTENANT
RICHARDS VIL'YAM

18 December 1944

On 17 December, we received the order to bomb oil refineries in Germany. All was going well, but approximately five minutes after the bombs were dropped, the third engine malfunctioned. We then fell behind the rest of our planes and went on what was, in our opinion, the shortest route home. Due to the complete lack of visibility, we lost our orientation. Near Lake BALATON, three or four German fighters attacked us, putting our radio out of order and setting fire to the first engine. Efforts to extinguish the fire were unsuccessful. At that time, I gave the order to jump. Everyone managed to jump, but the copilot's parachute did not open. The navigator and I identified the body. He will be buried today. At this time, we still have no information about three crew members - Senior Sergeants PAPIA and AMUNTSON, and also one of the gunners whose name I do not know because he was not a regular member of our crew. Since these three men were the first to jump from the plane, it cannot be ruled out that they landed in German occupied territory. All the other crew members are in Russian hands and feel fine.

VIL'YAM RICHARDS, 1ST LIEUTENANT
Service number - 0829585

Headquarters 15th Army Air Corp.
ITALY

Translated written statement from English

TRANSLATOR, RO, 46TH ARMY HQ
JUNIOR LIEUTENANT [signature] (SHAJKEVICH)

[stamp "TsGASA"
fund32900
opis' 1
delo 75
list 15 "]

[TFR 39-8]

[handwritten "-17-"]

LIST

CREW OF A "LIBERATOR" AIRCRAFT WHICH CRASHED 17 Dec 44

1. Pilot- Lieutenant RICHARDS - present
2. Copilot - 2nd Lieutenant DZHEKOVSON - deceased
3. Bombardier - 2nd Lieutenant KH'YUIT - present
4. Navigator - 2nd Lieutenant ROKKET - present (wounded)
5. Gunner Senior Sergeant - CHERVIONKA - present
6. Gunner Sergeant AMUNSON - present.
7. Gunner Senior Sergeant PAPIA - present.
8. Gunner Senior Sergeant ROBERTS - present (wounded).
9. Gunner Senior Sergeant - SLOMSKIJ - present (wounded)
10. Gunner Senior Sergeant - NAK-GUAJR - present
(severely wounded)

[stamp "TsGASA"
fund32900
opis' 1
delo 75
list 17"]

[TFR 39-9]

[handwritten "-18-"]

LIST

CREW OF "LIBERATOR" AIRCRAFT WHICH CRASHED 17 Dec 44

1. Pilot- Lieutenant Charl'z V. LEHNG - present
2. Copilot - 2nd Lieutenant Oliver MAGGARD - present.
3. Navigator - Lieutenant Artur V. MOL'MAN - landed in GERMANY.
4. Bombardier - 2nd Lieutenant Herbert MANSON - "
5. Gunner - radio operator - Sergeant - Vil'fred A. ANGEL'KE[?] - landed in GERMANY.
6. Gunner Sergeant Harold E. NORTON - landed in GERMANY.
7. Corporal Yalmer O. IOGANSON - landed in GERMANY.
8. Corporal D'yu V. BOSSO - present.
9. Gunner - Corporal Len RID - present.
10. Gunner - Corporal Dzhejms M. RUTTER - landed in GERMANY.
11. Photographer (name unknown) - "

[stamp "TsGASA"
fund32900
opis' 1
delo 75
list 18"]

[TFR 39-10]

[handwritten "-24-"]

DIRECTORATE OF NKVD TROOPS
REAR GUARD OF THE 3RD UKRAINIAN FRONT
 (INTELLIGENCE DEPARTMENT)

22 December 1944
 No. 7/00 961
 Field Army

TOP SECRET:
 Copy No. 2

TO LIEUTENANT GENERAL
 Comrade VINOGRADOV

[stamp "TAGASA"
 fund32900
 opis' 1
 delo 75
 list 24"]

By the order of the Commander of the Third Ukrainian Front, Marshall of the Soviet Union Comrade TOLVUKHINA, I am sending you 76 American and English airmen, who were shot down in the rear of the 3rd Ukrainian Front, FOR TRANSFER TO THE AMERICAN MILITARY MISSION.

ATTACHMENT: - List of 76 men.

[signature]

COMMANDER OF NKVD TROOPS
 REAR GUARD OF THE 3RD UKRAINIAN FRONT -
 MAJOR GENERAL

(I. PAVLOV)

DEPUTY COMMANDER OF NKVD TROOPS
 REAR GUARD OF THE 3RD UKRAINIAN FRONT -
 LIEUTENANT COLONEL
 [original signed]

(A. SOKOLOV)

[handwritten "True Copy: Junior Assistant Commander of the 1st Section Captain Najdenov. (Najdenov)"]

Typed 2 copies
 1.g.

[TFR 39-11]

[handwritten "-25-"]

[stamp "TAGASA"
 fund32900
 opis' 1
 delo 75
 list 25"]

LIST

Crew members of American aircraft and technical personnel of an English airfield detained by the 57th Army of the Third Ukrainian Front

[handwritten "and sent to [Bucharest?] 22 Dec 44"]

Technical Personnel of the British Airfield

- | | |
|------------------------------|------------------------------------|
| 1. Airfield Commander | - KUJNET Noel, born 1913
Major. |
| 2. Air Traffic Controller | - KRISTI Tomas - Sergeant |
| 3. Radio Operator | - FERGUSON Alesto - Corporal. |
| 4. Radio Operator | - KIJ Len - Corporal. |
| 5. Radio Operator/Technician | - SHO Redzhinal'd - Corporal. |
| 6. Medic | - LEZLI Dzhok - Corporal. |
| 7. | - STARI Robert - Private. |

Crewmen of an American "LIBERATOR" aircraft.

- | | |
|-------------------|---|
| 1. Crew Commander | - VORGOTROM, Tomas, born 1923
Lieutenant. |
| 2. Copilot | - STAN, Ivan, born 1921
Lieutenant. |
| 3. Navigator | - Krajzlo Dzhan, born 1923, Lieutenant. |
| 4. Bombardier | - GOBSON Kristafer, born 1922, Lieutenant. |
| 5. Engineer | - GONDEK Dzhon, born 1924, Senior Sergeant. |
| 6. Gunner | - DZHONS Aira, born 1920, Sergeant. |
| 7. Gunner | - FODERGIL' Gordon, born 1924, Senior Sergeant. |
| 8. Gunner | - BLYANCHOD Paul, born 1912, Senior Sergeant. |
| 9. Gunner | - GRAJNER Lesto, born 1925, Senior Sergeant. |

[handwritten "15"]

[TFR 39-12]

2/-

10. Radio Operator - MAJVAGOL' Cheryj, b. 1925 Corporal
 11. Photographer - DOVENPOT Danil, b. 1925

[stamp "TsGASA
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 delo 75
 list 2505"]

2nd Crew of an American "LIBERATOR" aircraft

1. Crew Commander - SKINSON Robert, b. 1912
2. Copilot - HARRIMAN Bruce, b. 1922 - Lieutenant.
3. Navigator - RANDEL Robert, b. 1923 - Lieutenant.
4. Bombardier - SCHUARTS Ergen, b. 1924 - Junior Lieutenant.
5. Engineer - KOVAR Chaus, b. 1923 - Sergeant.
6. Gunner - KUBITS Karl, b. 1924 - Sergeant.
7. Gunner - KHAMAN Karl, b. 1926 - Sergeant.
8. Gunner - KHAN Dzhen, b. 1912 - Sergeant.
9. Gunner - PEREL Halij, b. 1918 - Sergeant.
10. Radio Operator - SVAN Raj, b. 1923 - Sergeant.

3rd Crew of an American "LIBERATOR" aircraft.

1. Crew Commander - BODAKOM Rassa, b. 1919 - Sr. Lt.
2. Copilot - KUPPA Al'ba, b. 1924 - Lieutenant.
3. Navigator - KAUTS D ZH, b. 1921 - Lieutenant.
4. Bombardier - UKER Dzhalja, b. 1918 - Captain.
5. Engineer - RIDZHADZON Del', b. 1923 - Sergeant.
6. Radio Operator - LEU Sam, b. 1911 - Sergeant.
7. Gunner - VAJNSTAN' Mal, b. 1920 - Sergeant.
8. Gunner - BIYUFOD Charus, b. 1925 - Sergeant.
9. Gunner - KHOL' Kartis, b. 1925 - Sergeant.
10. Gunner - KOL' IER Kenant, b. 1918 - Sergeant.
11. Photographer - LEVIN DZHODZE, b. 1922 - Sergeant.

[handwritten "23"]

[TFR 39-13]

[handwritten "26"]

3/-

[stamp "TsGASA
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 opis' 1
 delo 75
 list 26"]

4th Crew of an American "LIBERATOR" aircraft.

1. Crew Commander - PARCHENSON Khdvun, b. 1918 - Lieutenant.
2. Copilot - VRANCH Robert, b. 1921 - Lieutenant.
3. Navigator - TAMET Dzhen, b. 1921 - Lieutenant.
4. Bombardier - KONLI Dzhen, b. 1922 - Lieutenant.
5. Engineer - TRUDO Donal'd, b. 1920 - Sergeant.
6. Radio Operator - PEDERSAN Rychad, b. 1924 - Sergeant.
7. Gunner - PRESTON Douglas, b. 1922 - Sergeant.
8. Gunner - BROILZA Siso, b. 1918 - Sergeant.
9. Gunner - BEL'SHO Robert, b. 1923 - Senior Sergeant.

5th Crew of an American "LIBERATOR" aircraft.

1. Engineer - GAMFRIJ Eh., b. 1917 - Sergeant.
2. Radio Operator - PERANS A., b. 1923 - Sergeant.
3. Gunner - ADINTON Dzhen, b. 1918 - Senior Sergeant.
4. Gunner - MONN ME, b. 1924 - Sergeant.
5. Gunner - MODIKA Majk, b. 1925 - Sergeant.
6. Gunner - KOLOSANTE Dzheri, b. 1924 - Sergeant.
7. Gunner - MARSANO F., b. 1923 - Sergeant (from aircraft "Fortress").
8. Fighter Pilot - KHARISON Ehl'uin, b. 1922 - Lieutenant (from fighter "Lightning").
9. Fighter Pilot - VANDERMIR'E - Lieutenant (from fighter "Maston" [Mustang]).

6th Crew of an American "LIBERATOR" aircraft.

1. Crew Commander - LEJNO CHAUS, b. 1920 - Sr. Lieutenant.
2. Copilot - MEGAOD ALIVER, b. 1922 - Lieutenant.

handwritten "20"]

[TFR 39-14]

4/..

3. Engineer - VASO Gaj, b. 1916 - Corporal.
4. Gunner - RID Lon, b. 1920 - Corporal.

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delo 75
list 2605"]

7th Crew of an American "LIBERATOR" aircraft.

1. Crew Commander - RIDCHAS Ulim, b. 1912 - Senior Lieutenant.
2. Bombardier - KHUVET Liroj, b. 1922 - Lieutenant.
3. Engineer - CHERVENKA Fred, b. 1916 - Senior Sergeant.
4. Radio Operator - AMUNZDEN Edlen, b. 1924 - Sergeant.
5. Gunner - PAPIER Deherol'd, b. 1922
6. Gunner - SVUNSKIJ Gendrik, b. 1922
7. Navigator - ATKINS Turner, b. 1923

8th Crew of an American "LIBERATOR" aircraft.

1. Copilot - KAREL Robert, b. 1925 - Lieutenant.
2. Navigator - EJDLOT Roj, b. 1921 - Jr. Lieutenant.
3. Engineer-Mechanic - FID Ruvas, b. 1918 - Corporal.
4. Radio Operator - TAJSON Kense, b. 1916 - Corporal.
5. Gunner - STEJSIJ Vulin, b. 1925 -
6. Gunner - KHAZMAN Narman, b. 1925 -
7. Gunner - FRAJ Chejimd, b. 1925 -
8. Gunner - LEVIN Mel'vin, b. 1925 -

[handwritten "17"]

Senior Assistant Commander of the 1st Section
NKVD TROOPS, REAR GUARD OF THE 3RD UKRAINIAN FRONT
MAJOR (ROSTILOV)

[handwritten "True Copy: Junior Assistant
Commander of the 1st Intelligence Section Captain
Najdenov (Najdenov)"]

[TFR 39-15]

[handwritten "27"]

LIST

76 men from crews of American "Liberator - B 24" aircraft who were sent to the city of Bucharest by Lieutenant General VINOGRADOV for transfer to the AMERICAN MILITARY MISSION on 23 Dec 1944.

1. Crew Commander - KLADFERDER Donald, b. 1924 - Lieutenant.
2. Copilot - KRISTIAN Verzhil, b. 1919 Lieutenant.

SENIOR ASSISTANT TO THE HEAD
OF THE 1ST INTELLIGENCE SECTION
NKVD REAR GUARD OF THE 3RD UKRAINIAN FRONT
MAJOR [signature] (ROSTILOV)

"23" December 1944

[Stamp "TsGASA"
fund32900
opis' 1
delo 75
list 27"]

[TFR 39-16]

[handwritten "31"]

[stamp "TSGASA"
fund32900
opis' 1
delo 75
list 31"]

LIST

of crew members of American aircraft and technical personnel of an English airfield detained by the 57th Army of the Third Ukrainian Front and sent to Bucharest on " " Dec 1944.-

Technical Personnel of British
Airfield.-

- | | |
|------------------------------|---|
| 1. Airfield Commander | - TSEL'S LORENS, born 1914
Major |
| 2. Radio Operator/Technician | - KEJZHI KLEV, b. 1921, Corporal. |
| 3. Radio Operator | - NOVELS DZHON, b. 1921, Corporal. |
| 4. Radio Operator | - FORESTER Ehdvard, b. 1921,
Corporal. |
| 5. Air Traffic Controller | - GILI Dzhezef, b. 1919 - Sergeant |
| 6. Medic | - MAKALAK Dzhon, b. 1916,
Corporal. |

1st Crew of an American "LIBERATOR"
B-24 Aircraft.

- | | |
|-------------------|---|
| 1. Crew Commander | - GIUS Aritur, born 1924,
Lieutenant |
| 2. Copilot | - VEJGER Leonard, born 1923,
Lieutenant |
| 3. Bombardier | - BOULS Bejts, born 1922,
Lieutenant |
| 4. Navigator | - GARD Vil'yam, born 1921,
Lieutenant |
| 5. Engineer | - SKINMAN Robert, born 1925,
Corporal |
| 6. Radio Operator | - PETONZHU Ard, b. 1922, Corporal |
| 7. Radio Operator | - SHEJFER Dorens, b. 1918,
Junior Sergeant |
| 8. Gunner | - LARDCH Divij, born 1922,
Corporal |
| 9. Gunner | - BRAND Dzheu, born 1925, Corporal |
| 10. Gunner | - BOJS Vitn, born 1921,
Corporal |
| 11. Gunner | - MAJFRED Duglas, born 1923,
Corporal. |

[TFR 39-17]

2.-

[stamp "TSGASA"
fund32900
opis' 1
delo 75
list 3105]

2nd Crew of an American
"LIBERATOR" B-24 Aircraft.-

- | | |
|-------------------|--|
| 1. Radio Operator | - BEGS Al'fred, b. 1920, Sergeant |
| 2. Gunner | - TOUMAN Donal'd, born 1920,
Junior Sergeant |
| 3. Gunner | - LAHERDIJ Zhorzh, born 1919,
Junior Sergeant |

3rd Crew of the American "LIBERATOR"
B-24 Aircraft "IRISH LASSIE"

- | | |
|---------------|---|
| 1. Bombardier | - GIPSEN Lojd, born 1924,
Lieutenant |
| 2. Engineer | - KAKS Lizar, born 1920,
Sergeant |
| 3. Gunner | - KAKS Braen, born 1925,
Junior Sergeant |
| 4. Gunner | - EHLVUD Robert, born
1925, Sergeant |
| 5. Gunner | - VOGO Dzhek, born 1919, Sergeant |
| 6. Gunner | - GENERO Frank, born 1921, Sergeant |

4th Crew of an American "LIBERATOR"
B-24 Aircraft.

- | | |
|-----------|---|
| 1. Gunner | - SKAD Dan, born 1925, Sergeant |
| 2. Gunner | - MAKDANEUL Vil'yam,
born 1924, Sergeant |
| 3. Gunner | - KARDES Gvido, born 1923, Sergeant |
| 4. | |

5th Crew of an American "Liberator"
B-24 Aircraft.-

- | | |
|---------------|--|
| 1. Bombardier | - PRAJS Vil'yam, born 1924,
Lieutenant |
| 2. Gunner | - SHPRAS Zhorzh, born 1925,
Junior Sergeant |

[TFR 39-18]

[handwritten "32"]

3.-

6th Crew of an American "LIBERATOR"
B-24 Aircraft.-

1. Gunner - METOS Ernst, born 1925,
Junior Sergeant

7th Crew of an American
"B-24" Aircraft.

1. Gunner - DAER Yuzef, born 1911,
Junior Sergeant.-

DEPUTY COMMANDER OF NKVD TROOPS
REAR GUARD OF THE 3RD UKRAINIAN FRONT
LIEUTENANT COLONEL (SOKOLOV).

[Stamp "TsGASA
fund32900
opis' 1
delo 75
list 32"]

"27" December 1944

r.ch.-

[handwritten "True copy: Junior Assistant
Commander of the 1st section Captain Najdenov
(Najdenov)"]

[TFR 39-19]

[handwritten "34"]

LIST

of the crew of an American "B-17" aircraft detained at 1700 hrs
on 11 Dec 1944, and sent to the city of Bucharest 17 Dec 1944.

[stamp "TsGASA
fund32900
opis' 1
delo 75
list 34"]

- | | |
|-------------------|--|
| 1. Crew Commander | - DEHON DZHER, born 1920,
Sr. Lieutenant. |
| 2. Copilot | - BOVERN GOFERT, born 1923
Jr. Lieutenant. |
| 3. Navigator | - MEHGI DEHENS, born 1924
Sr. Lieutenant. |
| 4. Navigator | - VAL'TER TEHVAP, born 1923
Sr. Lieutenant. |
| 5. Engineer | - EHGOL PAUL, born 1920
Sergeant. |
| 6. Radio Operator | - MEHKTOP PERSI, born 1917
Sergeant. |
| 7. Bombardier | - DONNOL UAJT, born 1923
Lieutenant. |
| 8. Gunner | - KAL'SON, born 1919
Sergeant. |
| 9. Gunner | - MARTIN, born 1925
Sergeant. |
| 10. Gunner | - UOLK KONNEHLIOS, born 1920
Sergeant.- |

DEPUTY COMMANDER OF NKVD TROOPS
REAR GUARD OF THE 3RD UKRAINIAN FRONT -
LIEUTENANT COLONEL (A. SOKOLOV)
Original signed

[handwritten "True copy: Junior Assistant Commander
of the 1st section Captain Najdenov (Najdenov)"]

r.ch.-

[TFR 39-20]

[handwritten "40"]

LIST

of the crew of the American "Liberator" B-24 aircraft No. 377, detained by the 57th Army of the 3rd Ukrainian Front and sent to the city of Bucharest " " January 1945.

1. Crew Commander - KELI Genrikh, born 1917, Captain
2. Copilot - FAZERINGEN Donal'd, born 1918, Lieutenant
3. Bombardier - KOON Charliz, born 1920, Lieutenant
4. Navigator - KRUGR Robert, born 1916, Lieutenant
5. Engineer - KELLI Gel'man, born 1920, Sergeant
6. Radio Operator - RELEN Villiam, born 1920, Sergeant
7. Gunner - POOR Steven, born 1915, Sergeant
8. Gunner - CHABLANSKIJ Garij, born 1921, Sergeant
9. Gunner - MEJSON Robert, born 1921, Sergeant
10. Gunner - STERNIOLA Tomas, born 1913, Sergeant
11. Linguist - KOTS Dzhon, born 1918, Captain.

[stamp "TAGASA"
fund32900
opis' 1
delo 75
list 40"]

DEPUTY COMMANDER OF NKVD TROOPS
REAR GUARD OF THE 3RD UKRAINIAN FRONT
LIEUTENANT COLONEL- (A. SOKOLOV)
original signed

"4" January 1945.

[handwritten "True copy: Clerk for the Rear Guard NKVD
Senior Sergeant]

[2 illeg.]

r.ch.-

[TFR 39-21]

[handwritten "72"]

[stamp "TAGASA"
fund32900
opis' 1
delo 75
list 72"]

LIST

of the crews of American aircraft detained by the 57th Army of the 3rd Ukrainian Front, and sent to the city of Bucharest on "29" January 1945.

1st Crew of American "LIBERATOR"
B-24 Aircraft No. 20.-

1. Copilot KHAUER Kol, born 1923, Lieutenant
2. Engineer GLEN Leus, born 1923, Sergeant

2nd Crew of American "Flying Fortress"
B-17 Aircraft No. 420862

2. Radio Operator BARNEM Gerand, born 1921, Sergeant

3rd Crew of American "Liberator"
Aircraft No. 42 - 51790.

1. Crew Commander FLOR Mal'shon, born 1916, Lieutenant
2. Copilot GERT Lej, born 1920, Lieutenant
3. Bombardier LENDRI Lomar, born 1916, Lieutenant
4. Navigator AUNAN Robert, born 1924, Lieutenant
5. Engineer GARIS Robert, born 1921, Sergeant
6. Radio Operator EHREMSON Oskar, born 1924, Sergeant
7. Gunner SPEJS Dzhajson, born 1909, Sergeant
8. Gunner BERLISON Dzhim, born 1919, Sergeant
9. Gunner KANINIGEM Charli, born 1924, Sergeant
10. Gunner DAMARO Sil'vio, born 1920, Sergeant

DEPUTY COMMANDER OF NKVD TROOPS
REAR GUARD OF THE 3RD UKRAINIAN FRONT
LIEUTENANT COLONEL - (A. SOKOLOV)

"28" January 1945.
originator: Najdenov

[handwritten "True copy: Captain A. Najdenov"]
r.ch.-

[TFR 39-22]

[handwritten "116"]

stamp "USSR-NKO
EVAC. HOSPITAL
No. 280
"6" February 1945
No. 3/383-1"]

CERTIFICATE

given to American airman LEO ROBERT of the 15th Air Regiment to attest that he was wounded in the city of Adonio and sent to Medical Evacuation Hospital No. 280 due to a closed fracture of the lower right fibula. Upon recovery, he will be transferred on orders of the the Front Rear Guard Commander, Comrade Major General PAVLOV. (1-2 echelon) [?].

[stamp [hospital stamp]

"TAGASA
fund32900
inv. 1
file 75 Commander of Med. Evac. Hosp. No. 280
page 116"] Colonel (Medical) [signature] (KOLODKO)

[stamp "USSR-NKO
EVAC. HOSPITAL
No. 280
"6" February 1945
No. 3/383-2"]

CERTIFICATE

given to American airman ROKET EHDVIN of the 15th Air Regiment to attest that he was wounded in the city of Adonio and sent to Medical Evacuation Hospital No. 280 due to a closed supramalleolar fracture of the right shin. Upon recovery, he will be transferred on orders of the the Front Rear Guard Commander, Comrade Major General PAVLOV. (1-2 echelon) [?].

[hospital stamp]

Commander of Med. Evac. Hosp. No. 280
Colonel (Medical) [signature]
(KOLODKO)

[TFR 39-22a]

[stamp "USSR-NKO
EVAC. HOSPITAL
No. 280
"6" February 1945
No. 3/383-3"]

CERTIFICATE

given to American airman MAK GUDAR of the 15th Air Regiment to attest that he was wounded in the city of Adonio, and sent to Medical Evacuation Hospital No. 280 due to a tangential shrapnel wound of the soft tissue of the right frontal cranial lobe and of the soft tissue of the right shin and both forearms. Upon recovery, he will be transferred on orders of the the Front Rear Guard Commander, Comrade Major General PAVLOV. (1-2 echelon) [?].

Subject to 10 days rest in unit.

[hospital stamp]

Commander of Med. Evac. Hosp. No. 280
Colonel (Medical) [signature] (KOLODKO)

[TFR 39-23]

[handwritten "118"]

DIRECTORATE OF NKVD TROOPS
REAR GUARD OF THE 3RD UKRAINIAN FRONT
 (INTELLIGENCE DEPARTMENT)

TOP SECRET
 Copy No. 2

"11" March 1945
 No. 7/-00 182
 Field Army

TO THE CHIEF OF STAFF OF THE THIRD UKRAINIAN FRONT
 GUARD LIEUTENANT GENERAL

[stamp "TsGASA"
 fund32900
 opis' 1
 delo 75
 list 118"]

Comrade IVANOV

I am presenting a list of 9 servicemen of the American Army sent by us on "11" March 1945 to the city of Debrecen (Hungary) to the Chief of Staff of the Allied Control Commission in Hungary, Comrade Major General LEVUSHKIN, for transfer as directed.

ATTACHMENTS: - List consisting of " " pages.

COMMANDER OF NKVD TROOPS, REAR
 GUARD OF THE 3RD UKRAINIAN FRONT
 MAJOR GENERAL (I. PAVLOV)

DEPUTY COMMANDER OF NKVD TROOPS,
 REAR GUARD OF THE 3RD UKRAINIAN FRONT
 LIEUTENANT COLONEL (A. SOKOLOV)
 original signed

Typed 2 copies
 1.g.-

[handwritten "True copy: Captain Najdenov"]

[TFR 39-24]

[handwritten "119"]

[stamp "TsGASA"
 fund32900
 opis' 1
 delo 75
 list 119"]

LIST

of the crews of American aircraft detained in the sector of the 57th Army of the 3rd Ukrainian Front, and sent to the city of Debrecen (Hungary) "11" March 1945.

**1st Crew of an American
 "LIBERATOR" Aircraft**

- | | |
|--------------|--|
| 1. Navigator | - ROKAJ Ehdvin, born 1925, Lieutenant. |
| 2. Gunner | - GOBETS Lio, born 1924, Senior Sergeant. |
| 3. Gunner | - MAGOER Reef, born 1921, Senior Sergeant. |

**2nd Crew of American "Liberator"
 Aircraft No. 689**

- | | |
|-------------------|--|
| 1. Crew Commander | - BOL Yulzhink, born 1920, Sr. Lieutenant. |
| 2. Copilot | - FREJZER Gerol'ts, born 1921, Lieutenant. |
| 3. Bombardier | - ROBERT Krejger, born 1919, Lieutenant. |
| 4. Navigator | - OREPEKER Lzhon, born 1925, Jr. Lieutenant. |

**3rd Crew of an American
 "LIBERATOR" Aircraft**

- | | |
|-------------------|--|
| 1. Crew Commander | - FERENCH Robert, born 1923, Sr. Lieutenant. |
| 2. Copilot | - PARKERET Kened, born 1924, Lieutenant. |

DEPUTY COMMANDER OF NKVD TROOPS
 REAR GUARD OF THE 3RD UKRAINIAN FRONT
 LIEUTENANT COLONEL (A. SOKOLOV)
 original signed

"9" March 1945.

1.g.-

[handwritten "True copy: Captain A. Najdenov"]

[TFR 39-25]

[handwritten "137"]

DIRECTORATE OF NKVD TROOPS
REAR GUARD OF THE 3RD UKRAINIAN FRONT
 (INTELLIGENCE DEPARTMENT)

20 March 1945
 No. 7/-00 195
 Field Army

TOP SECRET
 Copy No. _____

TO THE CHIEF OF STAFF OF THE ALLIED CONTROL COMMISSION
 IN HUNGARY

[stamp "TeGASA"
 fund32900
 opis' 1
 delo 75
 list 137"]

COMRADE MAJOR GENERAL LEVUSHKIN

By order of the Commander of the 3rd Ukrainian Front,
 Marshal of the Soviet Union Comrade TOLVUKHIN, I am sending you
 21 American airmen who crash landed in the rear of the 3rd
 Ukrainian Front for transfer to the American MILITARY MISSION.

ATTACHMENTS: - List of 21 men.

COMMANDER OF NKVD TROOPS
REAR GUARD OF THE 3RD UKRAINIAN FRONT
 MAJOR GENERAL

(I. PAVLOV)

DEPUTY COMMANDER OF NKVD TROOPS
REAR GUARD OF THE 3RD UKRAINIAN FRONT
 LIEUTENANT COLONEL

(A. SOKOLOV)

[handwritten "True copy: Captain A. Najdenov"]

Typed 2 copies
 checked by Captain Najdenov
 r.ch.-

[TFR 39-26]

[handwritten "138"]

LIST

of the crews of American aircraft detained in the sector of the
 57th Army of the 3rd Ukrainian Front, and sent to the city of
 Debrecen (Hungary) " " March 1945.

1st Crew of an American
"FLYING FORTRESS" Aircraft

1. Bombardier - DABS Klejton, born 1924, Lieutenant

2nd Crew of an American
"FLYING FORTRESS" Aircraft

1. Crew Commander - ANDERSON Gomer, born 1923, Sr. Lieutenant
 2. Copilot - KHECHER Luehs, born 1923, Lieutenant
 3. Navigator - EHKSLT Mar, born 1916, Lieutenant
 4. Radio Operator - LEO Devn, born 1924, Senior Sergeant
 5. Gunner - SHREDER Kenod, born 1924, Senior Sergeant

3rd Crew of an American
"FLYING FORTRESS" Aircraft

1. Bombardier - EREL Aleksander, born 1924, Lieutenant
 2. Engineer - KREMP Dzhordzh, born 1920, Senior Sergeant
 3. Gunner - SMIT Robert, born 1925, Senior Sergeant
 4. Gunner - ONIS Lodz, born 1921, Senior Sergeant
 5. Gunner - ZEKETS On, born 1925, Senior Sergeant

[stamp "TeGASA"
 fund32900
 opis' 1
 delo 75
 list 138"]

[TFR 39-27]

4th Crew of an American
"Liberator B-24" Aircraft

1. Crew Commander - RUZMER Arnol'd, born 1922, Sr. Lieutenant
2. Bombardier - DZHARVES Gerol'd, born 1915, Sr. Lieutenant
3. Navigator - VERBER Dzhon, born 1924, Lieutenant
4. Engineer - VARTI Mauehds, born 1922, Sergeant
5. Photographer - RAK Gershul, born 1923, Sergeant
6. Radio Operator - LINDLI Grevil', born 1917, Sergeant
7. Gunner - STERN Ol, born 1920, Sergeant
8. Gunner - MEKI Pol, born 1925, Sergeant
9. Gunner - VITM Charlz, born 1925, Sergeant
10. Gunner - GARDING Fred, born 1924, Sergeant

[stamp "TsGASA
fund32900
opis' 1
delo 75
list13805"]

DEPUTY COMMANDER OF NKVD TROOPS
REAR GUARD OF THE 3RD UKRAINIAN FRONT
LIEUTENANT COLONEL- (A. SOKOLOV)

- [handwritten "True copy: Captain A. Najdenov"]

" March 1945.
r.ch.-

[TFR 39-28]

[handwritten "142"]

DIRECTORATE OF NKVD TROOPS
REAR GUARD OF THE 3RD UKRAINIAN FRONT
(INTELLIGENCE DEPARTMENT)

"24" March 1945
No. 7/-00 216
Field Army

TOP SECRET
Copy No. 2

TO THE CHIEF OF STAFF OF THE ALLIED CONTROL COMMISSION
IN HUNGARY

[stamp "TsGASA
fund32900
opis' 1
delo 75
list 142"]

COMRADE MAJOR GENERAL LEVUSHKIN

By the order of the Commander of the 3rd Ukrainian Front,
Marshal of the Soviet Union Comrade TOLVUKHIN, I am sending you
22 American airmen, who crash landed in the rear of the 3rd
Ukrainian Front, for transfer to the American Military Mission.

ATTACHMENTS:- List of 22 men.

COMMANDER OF NKVD TROOPS
REAR GUARD OF THE 3RD UKRAINIAN FRONT -
MAJOR GENERAL (I. PAVLOV)

DEPUTY COMMANDER OF NKVD TROOPS
REAR GUARD OF THE 3RD UKRAINIAN FRONT
LIEUTENANT COLONEL (A. SOKOLOV)
original signed

[handwritten "True copy: Captain A. Najdenov (Najdenov)"]

Typed 2 copies
r.ch.-

[TFR 39-29]

[handwritten "143"]

LIST

of the crew of an American aircraft detained in the sector of the 57th Army of the 3rd Ukrainian Front, and sent to the city of Debrecen (Hungary) " " March 1945.

FIRST CREW OF AMERICAN AIRCRAFT
"FLYING FORTRESS" No. -17

[stamp "TAGASA
fund 32900
opis' 1
delo 75
list 143 "]

1. Crew Commander - KESLER Arnol'd, b. 1923, Lieutenant
2. Copilot - PEKI Ehdvard, b. 1923, Lieutenant
3. Navigator - BREKVIL Gaj, born 1924, Lieutenant
4. Bombardier - DZHUBENSKI Chester, b. 1921, Lieutenant
5. Engineer - KHARISON Ehlver, b. 1924, Sergeant
6. Radio Operator - DABKEN Gerol'd, b. 1924, Sergeant
7. Photographer - Pradol' Arnod, b. 1917, Sergeant
8. Gunner - VON Li, b. 1916, Sergeant
9. Gunner - VILKI Martel', b. 1920, Sergeant
10. Gunner - GRIN Rupert, b. 1925, Sergeant
11. Gunner - SAMA Gerol'd, b. 1923, Sergeant

SECOND CREW OF AMERICAN
"LIBERATOR AIRCRAFT-44"

1. Crew Commander - VAIK Tsary, b. 1923, Sr. Lieutenant
2. Copilot - LEN Dzhon, b. 1923, Sr. Lieutenant
3. Navigator - DULI Ehlots, born 1924, Sr. Lieutenant
4. Bombardier - BKARSKI Archi, b. 1920, Sr. Lieutenant
5. Engineer - NAGL Vil'yam, b. 1921, Sergeant
6. Radio Operator - AGLI Dzhems, b. 1920, Sergeant
7. Photographer - RIV Gerbert, b. 1918, Sergeant
8. Gunner - DZHONS Dzhon, b. 1926, Gunner
9. Gunner - VIL'ZON Robert, b. 1922, Gunner
10. Gunner - OLN Nels, b. 1921, Gunner
11. Gunner - RENDOL'F Robert, b. 1925, Gunner

DEPUTY COMMANDER OF NKVD TROOPS
REAR GUARD OF THE 3RD UKRAINIAN FRONT
LIEUTENANT COLONEL
original signed

(A. SOKOLOV)

[handwritten "True copy: Captain A. Najdenov"]

" " Mar 45
r.ch.

[TFR 39-30]

DISCHARGES
From the list of sick and wounded allied forces recuperating in hospitals and base infirmaries of the Northern Fleet

No.	Name FML	Rank	Unit	Date admitted	Date of discharge	Duration of stay	Diagnosis	Outcome
1.	ANKA ADOL'F	Sailor	American transport vessel	17 May 42	30 Jun 42	44	Thoracic contusions, bronchitis	Discharged for ambul. recovery at British camp at Vasgna
2.	AL'BERT KATSGUST	"	British military vessel	17 Jun 42 VMG-71	Now at hosp.	--	Postoperative stump, lower right leg, toes of left foot amputated after frostbite.	---
3.	MGARS BEJ	"	"	21 Jun 42 VMG-71	"	--	Contusions in the pelvic area. Comp- ression fracture of the 9th thoracic vertebrae.	---
4.	HARRISON VIL'YAM	"	"	21 Jun 42 VMG-71	"	--	Broken right shin bone and pelvis. lacerations to the forehead.	---

[TFR 39-31]

798

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
5. URINGVAL CHARL'Z	"	"	"	21 Jun 42 VMG-71	Now at hosp.	---	Contusions to the left temporal region, broken calcanal bone of the left foot.	---
6. VAJT ROBERT	"	"	"	21 Jun 42 VMG-71	"	---	Contusions to the superciliary arch, contusions to the pelvic region.	---
7. PELLEGRIN OSKAR	"	Commercial ship	3 Jun 42	communicable disease, VMG	17 Jun 42	15	Acute gonorrheal uritis.	Released to unit.
8. MEHNDZHER MIKHAIL	"	"	"	"	9 Jun 42	7	Contusions to knee joint.	---
9. RO IOSEF Stoker	"	"	"	"	7 Jun 42	5	Flu.	---
10. KRICH L'YUIS TOMAS	Sailor	Commercial vessel "Kapiro"	7 May 42	Commun. disease TSMG	11 May 42	5	Subacute articular rheumatism.	---
11. PALLER KHEHNSON	"	Commercial vessel "Bego-Chico"	15 May 42	Commun. disease, VMG	31 May 42	15	Acute cerebral spinal meningitis	---

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799

[TFR 39-32]

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
12. BREWBERG VIL'YAM	"	American commercial ship	3 Jun 42	Commun. disease, VMG	4 Jun 42	1	2nd stage of Syphilis	Released, refused hosp treatment
13. GAMBLIN DZHEMS	Officer	Merchant Marine ship "Biffingham"	3 Apr 42	3 May 42	25 Apr 42	22 44	3rd degree frostbite toes of both feet	Evacuated to England 26th Apr 1942 on cruiser "Edinberg". After its torpedoing he returned to the naval hosp on 16 Jun. Released at the request of the British Mission.
14. GARLENEH LION	Sailor	"	3 Apr 42	3 May 42	25 Apr 42	22 2	2nd degree frostbite of both hands	Released to unit.
15. BEREH FREHNSIS	"	"	1 Apr 42	11 Apr 42	5 Apr 42	4 12	Frostbite in both feet. Acute artic- ular rheumat- ism.	Released to unit. 23 Apr evacuated to England.
16. KHANIFILOD CHARL'S	"	"	1 Apr 42	Murmansk VMG	5 Apr 42	4	General frostbite, catarrhal angina.	5 Apr 42 released to mission.

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[TFR 39-33]

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
17. ISTERLING ANTI	Sailor	Merchant	1 Apr 42	5 Apr 42	4	General frostbite, acute bronchitis	Released to mission.	
18. LOKK FRANK	"	"	1 Apr 42	4 Apr 42	4	Frostbite, both feet	"	
19. BATILA GODERN	"	"	"	"	"	"	"	
20. KHEHEUBEJ MONS	"	"	"	"	"	Frostbite both feet and hands	"	
21. KH'YULIP	Captain	"	"	"	"	General frostbite.	"	
22. KLOK DZHEJMS	Sailor	"	"	"	"	"	"	
23. ASHA TOMOS	"	"	"	"	"	"	"	
24. IRGAJS VIL'YAM	"	"	"	"	"	1st degree frostbite, both feet.	"	

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[TFR 39-34]

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
25. KHOTON MEKS	Senior Officer	Merchant	31 May 42	3 Jun 42	3	Contusions to right knee	Released to unit	
26. NEHFTLER KEHRI	Sailor	Mer.Mar. ship "Hijeer"	15 Jun 42	18 Jun 42	3	Carbuncle of neck	"	
27. DAL'MER NEHNSON	Sailor (Mil)	Mer.Mar. ship "Beo Chico"	15 May 42	16 May 42	1	Meningitis	Transf. to infectious disease hosp.	
28. VITENBOK	Sailor	Mer.Mar. ship "Effingham"	1 Apr 42	5 Apr 42	4	1st degree frostbite on hands and feet.	Released to mission	
29. GUGRI	"	"	"	"	"	1st and 2nd degree frostbite on hands and feet	"	
30. VHK EHDMOND	"	"	11 Apr 42	26 Apr 42	15	General frostbite Sciatica, left side.	26 Apr evac to England. Released to mission	
31. DOUL CHARL'Z	"	"	3 May 42	5 May 42	2	General frostbite	"	

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	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
32. MUST RICHARD			Sailor	Mer.Mar. ship "Effingham"	1 Apr 42	5 Apr 42	4	General frostbite Lacerations to ankle	5 Apr released to mission 26 Apr evac to England 5 May released to mission
					3 May 42	5 May 42	2	Lacerations to R. super- ciliary arch	
33. KISS GIL'YAM					1 Apr 42	5 Apr 42	4	Frostbite to legs	5 Apr released to mission
					11 Apr 42	26 Apr 42	15	Residual frostbite	26 Apr evac to England
					3 May 42	5 May 42	2	General frostbite	5 May released to mission
34. PLATONER CHARL'E					1 Apr 42	26 Apr 42	25	1st and 2nd degree frost- bite, toes of both feet.	26 Apr evac to England
					3 May 42	5 May 42	2	General frostbite	5 May released to mission.
35. SALMON RUDOL'Y					3 Apr 42	23 Apr 42	20	"	Released.

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802

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
36. KOVINGTON SHARL'			Sailor	Mer.Mar. ship "Effingham"	3 Apr 42	10 Apr 42	7	1st degree frost- bite, both legs	Released
37. KLOS KHALBERIK				Mer.Mar. ship "Belot"	3 Apr 42	26 Apr 42	23	2nd, 3rd degree frostbite in both feet, hands and lower legs.	26 Apr evac to England
					3 May 42	16 Jun 42	44		16 Jun rel- eased to Polyarnoe
38. CHEHLER DZHORZH					3 Apr 42	26 Apr 42	23	2nd degree frost- bite, both feet	Evac'd to England.
39. HAJN GIL' BERT				Mer.Mar. ship "Effingham"	3 Apr 42	26 Apr 42	23	3rd deg. frostbite fingers and toes	26 Apr evac to England
					3 May 42	27 May 42	24		27 May released to Polyarnoe
40. HERLIK IOSIF					3 Apr 42	26 Apr 42	23	2nd deg. frostbite 1st toe R. foot and 1st deg. both feet	26 Apr evac to England
					3 May 42	27 May 42	24	3rd deg. frostbite both feet	27 May released to mission.

130

803

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
41. LARSEN SAILOR UIL'YAM	Mar. Mar. ship "Hillingham"	3 Apr 42	26 Apr 42	23	2nd deg. frostbite both feet	2	26 Apr Evac to England Released to mission.	
42. ADKINSON DAVID	"	3 Apr 42 3 May 42	26 Apr 42 16 Jun 42	23	4th deg. frostbite right foot		16 Jun rel- eased to mission.	
43. NAJD PETER	Mar. Mar. ship "Belokt"	3 Apr 42	16 Jun 42	74	3rd deg. frostbite both feet and hands		16 Jun rel- eased to Polyarnoe.	
44. EHL'NON ENOSEF	Mar. Mar. ship "Hillingham"	3 May 42	12 May 42	9	General frostbite		Released to Polyarnoe.	
45. STARKI EDUARD	Ship "Westminster City"	3 May 42	5 May 42	2	"		Released to mission.	
46. MILS MORIS	Ship "New "Westminster City"	3 May 42	9 Jun 42	37	Frostbite, right foot		Released to Polyarnoe.	

(This page is entirely handwritten)

Questionnaire.

For injured/sick servicemen and citizens of the US, England, Canada and other foreigners.

1. Last [Name], First, Patronymic - Bryunu Vilyas 32
2. Born - 1918 [illeg.]
3. Military rank - Lieutenant [initials]
4. Nationality - American
5. Address - America, Mar'es, Ohio
6. When wounded or became ill - sick since 13 Dec 1944
7. Repatriated or not - yes
8. The circumstances of injury or illness: Became a prisoner on 13 Sep 1944.
9. Diagnosis: - Myocarditis (after diphtheria)
10. Is he transportable - Evac. sitting
11. Proposed time of recovery - up to 2 months
12. In which medical institution is he (Number and Location) at Evac-hospital 4652, Landsberg.

Signature of individual completing questionnaire:
Medical statistician [signature]

Chief of KhG4652
Major (Medical)

[signature]

(Zagorskiy)

[TFR 39-39]

[All entries are handwritten on a typed form.]

QUESTIONNAIRE

[handwritten "34"]

For injured/sick servicemen and citizens of the USA, England, Canada and other foreigners.

1. Last [Name], First, Patronymic - Ponder Ardivin
[handwritten "N. 2"]
2. Born - 1922
3. Military rank - private
4. Nationality - American
5. Address - America, Louisiana, Meni, PO Box 85, Apt. 2
6. When wounded or became sick - wounded 1 May 1945
7. Repatriated or not -
8. The circumstances of injury or illness: From an escape from a POW camp in Brandenburg, wounded by German artillery.
9. Diagnosis: - Closed shrapnel wound in the soft tissues of the left shoulder
10. Is he transportable - sitting
11. Proposed time of recovery - 25-30 days
12. In which medical institution is he (his stationing) in Army Field Hospital No. 2162 - Bernau

[handwritten "4 May 1945"]

Chief of APG 1/r No. 2162
Guard Colonel (Medical) [signature] (Gorden)

[handwritten "Bernau"] [handwritten "N. 2"]
[signature]

[TFR 39-40]

[handwritten "97"]

QUESTIONNAIRE

For injured/sick servicemen and citizens of the USA, England, Canada and other foreigners.

1. Last [Name], First, Patronymic - IOEN AKOSTA
2. Born - 15 March 1919
3. Military rank - Corporal
4. Nationality - American
5. Address - California
6. When wounded or became sick - 15 April 1945
7. Repatriated or not - no
8. The circumstances of injury or illness:
9. Diagnosis: - Tangential shrapnel wound in the frontal wall of the thorax.
10. Is he transportable (sitting, lying) - sitting
11. Proposed time of recovery - 45 days
12. In which medical institution is he (Number and Location) -
KhPPG 2401 - ALTENGRABOW

Assistant Chief 1st Directorate SO
Major (Medical) [signature] (DERKACH)

May 1945

[This page is entirely handwritten.]

Questionnaire for sending Americans to PPG-2267

Last First	Born	Nation-ality	Rank	Ad-dress	Date wound	Repa-ria-ted	How wound	Diag-nosis	Recov-ery time	Which camp
Parker Arthur	1924	American	Private	5 May 1945 Trauma	no	car ran over leg	closed more than 60 middle days 3rd of left shin	PPG2267 Altes-Lager		

Chief of PPG - 2267
Major (Medical)

(Fedorenko)

[This page is entirely handwritten.]

No. 014350
Questionnaire

for sick US servicemen.

104

Last [Name], First, Patronymic: Siborn Sharl Sharl
Birth date: 17 July 1911
Military rank: Captain - flier
Nationality: American
Address: Philadelphia USA Pennsylvania
When wounded: 6 February 1945
Repatriated or not: Yes
The circumstances of the injury: 6 Feb 1945, his plane was shot down, he parachuted and landed in the trees.
Diagnosis: residual effects of vertebrae fracture
Is he transportable: Yes, lying
Proposed time of recovery: 45 days
Medical institution where he is located: TEhG-3756
Beesdorf, Germany.

Signature of individual completing the questionnaire
[signature]

13 May 1945

[TFR 39-43]

[cut-off by stamp]
of USA, England, Canada and other foreign [cut-off]

[stamp "SECRET"

Received _____ 194_

Entry No. _____

Case No. _____"]

[initials dated 17 May 42] 178

1. Last - Ponder First - Pierre Patronymic -----
2. Born - 1923
3. Military Rank - POW Sergeant
4. Nationality - American
5. Address - Box 85, Mannu Road, Louisiana
6. When wounded: 1 May 1945
7. Repatriated or not - no
8. The circumstances of the illness or injury: From an explosion of an artillery round nearby - 11 meters.
9. Diagnosis: Closed shrapnel wound from a fragmentary artillery round, soft tissue lower 3rd of left shoulder.
10. Is he transportable (sitting, lying) - transportable - (Evacuated sitting)
11. Proposed time of recovery - until the 1st [cut off]
12. At which medical institution is he - Eh/G 4652 Landsberg Geerishtrasse No.40

Signature of the person who completed the questionnaire.

Medical Statistician [signature]

Signature of the Hospital Chief

Major (Medical) [signature]
12 May 1945

(Zagorski)

[TFR 39-44]

[This page is entirely handwritten.]

Questionnaire

For injured/sick servicemen and citizens of the USA, England, Canada and other foreigners.

1. Last [Name] - Keje First - Bobi Patronymic --- [handwritten "179"]
2. Born - 1925
3. Military rank - Private
4. Nationality - American
5. Address - Greenwood-village, state of Orkney
6. When wounded or became sick - 10 May 1945
7. Is he transportable - Yes
8. The circumstances of injury or illness: Became sick when wiping his foreskin with a sponge.
9. Diagnosis: - Paraphimosis
10. Repatriated or not - no
11. Proposed time of recovery - up to 7 days
12. In which medical institution is he (Number and Location) Eh/G 4652 Landsberg.

Signature of individual completing the questionnaire.

(Medical) [signature]

Chief of EhG4652
Major (Medical)

[signature]

(Zagorski)

15 May 1945

[TFR 39-45]

[This page is entirely handwritten.]

Questionnaire.For injured/sick servicemen and citizens of the USA,
England, Canada and other foreigners.

1. Last [Name] - Siborn First - Sheril' Patronymic --
[handwritten "184"]
2. Born - 1911
3. Military rank - Captain
4. Nationality - American
5. Address - Pennsylvania, Philadelphia 56th St. No.
102
6. When wounded or became sick - 6-7 February 1945
7. Repatriated or not - no
8. The circumstances of injury or illness: When
parachuting from his plane which was shot down
9. Diagnosis: - Closed fracture of the lumbar vertebrae
10. Is he transportable - yes
11. Proposed time of recovery - up to 1 year
12. In which medical institution is he (Number and
Location) Kh/G 4652 Landsberg.

Signature of individual completing the
questionnaire.

(Medical) [signature]

Signature of the Chief of Hospital KhG4652.

Major (Medical) [signature] (Zagorski)
18 May 1945

[TFR 39-46]

Questionnaire [handwritten "186"]For injured/sick servicemen and citizens of the USA,
England, Canada and other foreigners.

1. Last [Name], First, Patronymic - Dzhen Tomas King
2. Born - 1919
3. Military rank - Corporal
4. Nationality - American
5. Address - America Box 162, Bradenton, Florida
6. When wounded or became sick - wounded 15 April 1945
7. Repatriated or not -
8. The circumstances of injury or illness: During a
skirmish in the city of Magdeburg
9. Diagnosis: - Shrapnel that passed through the right
hand damaging bones. A tangential shrapnel wound on
the upper third of the left shoulder. A shrapnel
wound that passed through the middle third of the
soft tissue on the left shin.
10. Is he transportable (sitting, lying) - transportable -
(lying).
11. Proposed time of recovery - 2 and a half months
12. In which medical institution is he - Magdeburg POW
hospital.

Assistant Chief 1st Department
Major (Medical) [signature] (Derkach)

[cut-off] May 1945

[TFR 39-47]

[This page is entirely handwritten.]

Comrade [Penkit?]
Questionnaire.

243

For injured/sick servicemen and citizens of the USA,
England, Canada and other foreigners.

24 May 1945 [initials]

1. Last [Name] - Parker First - Arthur Patronymic ----
2. Born - 1924
3. Military rank - Private
4. Nationality - American
5. Address - Maryland, Baltimore, Silver Hill Ave. 29-10
6. When wounded or became sick - 6 May 1945
7. Repatriated or not - no
8. The circumstances of injury or illness: During an automobile accident
9. Diagnosis: - Closed fracture of the right shin bone.
10. Is he transportable - transportable
11. Proposed time of recovery - up to 2 months
12. In which medical institution is he and its station no. - Evac. Hospital 4652 Landsberg.

Signature of individual completing the
questionnaire.

(Medical) [signature]

Signature of the Chief of Evacuation Hospital 4652
Major (Medical) [signature] (Zagorski)

16 May 1945

[TFR 39-48]

NKO-DSSR [handwritten "Stat"]
DIRECTORATE [initials] [handwritten "612"]
PEP-15 To the HEAD OF THE 1st DEPARTMENT S.U. GROUP
18 July 1945 OF SOVIET FORCES IN GERMANY
No. 315 [handwritten "D121"]
[handwritten entry "315"]

I am reporting to you that there is one American and
three English hospitalized in KhG 4652.

No.	Last [Name], First, Middle	Born	Nationality	Diagnosis
1.	Parker Atur	1924	American	Closed fracture right shin
2.	Gejman Carol'd	1919	English	Amputation stump lower 3rd of the thigh.
3.	Kespler Paul'	1920	"	Osteomyelitis of the lower 3rd of the left shin.
4.	Majsan Vil'yan	1901	"	Amputation stump at the fundamental phalanx of one finger, contracted bending of the left talocrural joint.

Of these, three require full treatment for 7-10 days, and one suffers from chronic osteomyelitis and does not need immediate surgical intervention. At the present time, they can be transported by train, bus, or plane.

CHIEF PEP-15
Colonel (Medical):

(Drozhshin)

[handwritten "2"]

INFORMATION

Military servicemen of Allied countries treated at hospital PEHP-15.

No.	Last, First, P	Nation-ality	Rank	Brought from	Diagnosis	Recovery time	Subject to evac.
1.	LEON Norman	American	Tech. SGT	18 March at EHP121 the site of the air battle	Facial burn with 1-2 minor abrasions Upper right shoulder dislocated	3 weeks	Sitting
2.	RASSEL' Nillech	"	2LT	"	Strained ligament of the left shin Suspected fracture of the inner ankle	10 days	"
3.	ALBERT Lanberg	"	Copilot	"	"	30 days	Lying
4.	FRIDRIK Kid	American	SGT	21 March at KhPPG 4397- KhPPG 2413	Closed compound fracture of the middle 3rd of the right thigh	4 months	Lying
5.	GRAVER Parker	"	1LT	"	Closed fracture outer ankle of the left shin.	45 days	Sitting

Typed: 2 copies For the CHIEF OF PEHP-15 [signature] (DROZHKIN)
Colonel (Medical)

[This page is entirely handwritten.]
No. 08521

[TFR 39-50]

No. 29
5

QUESTIONNAIRE
on a sick American POW

No. 29

1. Last, First, Patronymic - Varren Mark Frankovich
2. Year of birth - 1917
3. Military Rank - Sergeant
4. Nationality - American
5. Address:- 129 West 70th Street, Cincinnati Ohio, America.
6. Fell sick on - 3rd March 1945
7. Repatriated or not - yes
8. Circumstances of illness - sore throat and appearance of rash.
9. Diagnosis: Scarlet Fever
10. Is he transportable - not advisable.
11. Suggested recovery period - [until] 15 April 45
12. In what treatment facility is he located - IG-4288, city of LODZ', Khojniki, Tuberculosis Sanatorium.

26 Mar 45

Chief IG-4288
Major (Medical) [signature] (KUCHERENKO)

[TFR 39-51]

[This page is entirely handwritten.]

No. 08521

No. 30

QUESTIONNAIRE

on a sick American POW

1. Last, First, Patronymic - KOL
Daniel Dzhenevich
2. Year of birth - 1915
3. Military Rank - officer - Engineer-Technician
4. Nationality - American
5. Address:- P.O. Box 99, North Street, Claytonville,
Massachusetts, U.S.
6. Fell sick on - 16th Feb 1945
7. Repatriated or not- yes
8. Circumstances of illness - sore throat and chest
(circumstances are unclear)
9. Diagnosis: Scarlet Fever
10. Is he transportable - not advisable.
11. Suggested recovery period - [until] 3 April 45
12. In which treatment facility is he located - IG-4288
city of LODZ', Khojniki, Tuberculosis Sanatorium.

26 Mar 45

Chief IG-4288
Major (Medical) [signature] (KUCHERENKO)

[TFR 39-52]

[handwritten entries on a typed form.]

[handwritten "No. 08522"]

[handwritten "No. 3"]

[handwritten "No. 37"]

QUESTIONNAIRE

on injured and sick military and civilian personnel
of the US, England, Canada, and other foreigners.

1. Last, First, Patronymic - Niuman Bzef
2. Year of birth - 1924
3. Military Rank - private (airman)
4. Nationality - American
5. Address:- Philadelphia.
6. Date wounded or became ill - 3 Feb 45
7. Repatriated or not- no
8. Circumstances of wound, injury - during a combat flight
9. Diagnosis: perforated fragmentation wound of the right
shoulder with extensive damage to the soft tissue and a large
bone defect. Perforated fragment wound of the left forearm
with damage to the radius.
10. Is he transportable (sitting, lying): yes, lying.
11. Suggested recovery period - more than 3 months
12. Located in which treatment facility (number and
location) Evac-Hospital 2704 city of Lodz'

Chief EhG 2704

Major (Medical) [signature] (GERSHEVICH)

"25" March 1945

[TFR 39-53]

[handwritten entries on a typed form.]
[handwritten "No. 5"]

[handwritten "8"]

QUESTIONNAIRE

on injured and sick military and civilian personnel
of the US, England, Canada, and other foreigners.

1. Last, First, Patronymic - Ehrnst Iokhan
2. Year of birth - 1916
3. Military Rank - Captain
4. Nationality - American
5. Address:- Washington D.C.
6. Date wounded or became ill - 3 Feb 45
7. Repatriated or not- no
8. Circumstances of wound, illness - during a combat flight
9. Diagnosis: amputation stump at the upper third of the right shin.
10. Is he transportable (sitting, lying): yes, sitting
11. Suggested recovery period - up to 2 months
12. Located in which treatment facility (number and location) Evac-Hospital 2704 city of Lodz'

Chief EhG 2704
Major (Medical) [signature] (GERSHEVICH)

"25" March 1945

[TFR 39-54]

[handwritten entries on a typed form.]
[handwritten "No. 4"]

[handwritten "p. 9"]

QUESTIONNAIRE

on injured and sick military and civilian personnel
of the US, England, Canada, and other foreigners.

1. Last, First, Patronymic - Fifyuld Moris
2. Year of Birth - 1919
3. Military Rank - Lieutenant
4. Nationality - American
5. Address:- New York City
6. Date wounded or became ill - 3 Feb 45
7. Repatriated or not- no
8. Circumstances of wound, illness- during a combat flight
9. Diagnosis: perforated shrapnel wound on the upper third of the right thigh with damage to the femoral bone. After the operation - treat the bone according to [illeg.].
10. Is he transportable (sitting, lying): yes, lying
11. Suggested recovery period - more than 3 months
12. Located in which treatment facility (number and location) Evac-Hospital 2704 city of Lodz'

Chief EhG 2704
Major (Medical) [signature] (GERSHEVICH)

"25" March 1945

[This page is entirely handwritten.]

[TFR 39-55]

List of Americans evacuated on 25 Mar 45 to Lublin

E.G. 3685
L 173

Blankinsim Kim	Sr. Sergeant	Bullet wound Upper jaw	American English	France 27 Sep 44	infantry sitting
Viss Robert	Sergeant	wound of the right thigh	American Irish	Germany 30 Sep 44	infantry lying
Bilger Arpolvu	Sergeant	wound of soft tissue right thigh	American German	Germany 21 Oct 44	infantry lying
Dzhogensan Lavdiv	Corporal	wound left knee	American English	Holland 1 Oct 44	parachute sitting
Yaiblaz Frejk	Corporal	wound in soft tissue of the	American English	Germany 17 Sep 44	tanker sitting
Marglis Kenuami	Senior Sergeant	wound soft tissue left	American Jewish	Germany 27 Sep 44	infantry sitting
Martvi Dzhosef	Sr. Sergeant	closed shrap wound of right knee	American Italian	France 8 Aug 44	infantry sitting
Suit Didek	Lieutenant	closed shrap wound of right knee	American Jewish	Germany 17 Dec 44	artillery sitting
Ash Robert	Corporal	wound right buttock clammy soft tissue	American English	Germany 4 Oct 44	infantry lying
Danounye	Sergeant	wound left foot and left	American Irish	Germany 6 Oct 44	lying

[TFR 39-56 is a duplicate of TFR 39-55]

[TFR 39-56]

[TFR 39-57]

[handwritten entries on a typed form.]

[handwritten "accounted for"]

[handwritten "No. 21"]

[handwritten "29 Apr"] [illeg. signature]

QUESTIONNAIRE

[handwritten "186"]

on injured-sick military and civilian personnel
of the US, England, Canada, and other foreigners.

1. Last, First, Patronymic - Polen Robert
2. Year of birth - 1925
3. Military Rank - Lieutenant - aircrew
4. Nationality - American
5. Address:- 23 Ovilla, Pennsylvania
6. Date wounded or became ill - 18 Mar 45
7. Repatriated or not - yes
8. Circumstances of wound, illness- came under German anti-aircraft fire during flight.
9. Diagnosis: closed shrapnel wound of the soft tissue on the upper third of the right shin with damage to the popliteal artery.
10. Transportable or not (sitting, lying) - transportable, lying
11. Suggested recovery period - 2 months
12. Located in which treatment facility - Lodz' SEhG 1103 (number and location)

[handwritten to end of page.]

Chief SEhG 1103

Medical Statistician [signature]

Major (Medical) [signature] (Yastrebenetski)

[TFR 39-58]

[handwritten entries on a typed form.]

[handwritten "No. 33"]

QUESTIONNAIRE

on injured-sick military and civilian personnel
of the US, England, Canada, and other foreigners.
[handwritten "No. 188"]

1. Last, First, Patronymic - Kol Verne
2. Year of birth - 1925
3. Military Rank - Sergeant - aircrew
4. Nationality - American
5. Address:- Skepch
6. Date wounded or became ill - 21 Mar 45
7. Repatriated or not - no
8. Circumstances of wound, illness - was wounded in [cut off]
9. Diagnosis: [cut off] right hand, soft tissue of the right shoulder, upper arm, and left forearm.
10. Transportable or not (sitting, lying) - transportable, lying
Can be evacuated on 28 March 45 after a surgical operation.
11. Suggested recovery period - 2 1/2 months
12. Located in which treatment facility - Lodz' SEhG 1103 (number and location)

[handwritten "Chief SEhG 1103 Major (Medical)"]

[signature]

(Yastrebenetski)

[signature] (Ivanovo)

1945

[handwritten "N 09071"]

INFORMATION

[handwritten "1. 216"]
 on the reception of foreign military arrivals of allied countries
 stationed for recovery at the Treatment Facility PHp - 15.

No.	Last, First Patronymic	Rank	Nationality	Diagnosis	Recovery Time	Transport Where
1.	Ehdmunt, Darkl- Klard	Pvt	American	Acute Appendicitis	at KPEG 60 28 March this year	Transport from the Comm-

andant

826

Staff

in
Berlin
Khen. P.P.
96033

for the Chief PHp-15 [handwritten [illeg. word] "No 34"]
 [handwritten "31 Mar 45"] [illeg. signature]
 Colonel (Medical) [signature] (DROZHIN)

Distribution: 3 copies
 No. 1-2 to addressees
 No. 3 to case file

153

827

[handwritten entries on a typed form.]

[handwritten "219"]

QUESTIONNAIRE

on wounded-sick military and civilian personnel
 of the US, England, Canada, and other foreigners.
 [handwritten [illeg. word] N 32/1 Apr"] [signature]

1. Last, First, Patronymic - Khristofer Pikan
2. Year of birth - 27 yrs old.
3. Military Rank - Private
4. Nationality - American
5. Address - 62 Haupt St, Hampton
6. Date wounded or became ill - 25 Mar 45
7. Repatriated or not -
8. Circumstances of wound, illness - at the transfer point.
9. Diagnosis: Scarlet Fever.
10. Transportable or not (sitting, lying) - under no
circumstances!
11. Suggested recovery period - 35 days
12. Located in which treatment facility (number and location)
city of Rembertuv, EhG 2014

signature of person
 completing the form [signature]

March 1945 [handwritten "Hospital Chief Major (Medical)"]
 [signature]

[handwritten "31 Mar transferred
 to Lodz'."] [signature]

154

[TFR 39-61]

[stamp "Military-Medical Directorate YuZF

SECRET

31 March 1945

Issue No. 09215

Case File No. 2125"]

Secret
copy No. 1
[handwritten "285"]TO THE HEAD, MILITARY-MEDICAL DIRECTORATE OF THE 1ST BF,
MAJOR GENERAL (Medical) BARABANOV.

Regarding your No. T-3/02157 dated 28 Mar 45, I am reporting that the American Khristofor Pikan and Englishman Ross Viktor, who are suffering from scarlet fever, were evacuated by aircraft to Lodz' on 30 March of this year at 0900.

With regard to the Hindu Kanau Gluda, suffering from tuberculosis of the lungs, he was again examined today and is not transportable (two-sided cavernous process, high temperature, acute exhaustion). He will remain in the hospital for further treatment and, upon improvement of health, will be transferred to one of our hospitals.

As for the American Val'ter Obolen, a telegraphed report was sent on 30 March in accordance with the established forms. The aforementioned Valter Obolen does not have a stomach wound, but is in the hospital for deep general contusions and pressure on the thorax. For health reasons at this time he is also not transportable, and will remain in the hospital in Otvotsk for treatment.

A nurse was sent to escort the scarlet fever patients. Information was given to the pilot about the necessity to carry out disinfection of the aircraft.

Attachments: two questionnaires.

Head, Directorate MEhP-6
Lieutenant Colonel (Medical)

[signature]

(Chernets)

Copy
to addressee
to [illeg.]

[TFR 39-62]

[This page is entirely handwritten.]
D 121

Evac-Hospital
Neuman, Yezef

YuZF

Born 1924

Airman - flier

American

City of Philadelphia

424

[stamp "Military Medical Directorate

SECRET

Rcvd No. 194

Entry No.

Case File No. 1

[handwritten "25 Mar 45"]

He was wounded 3 Feb 45 during a combat mission and made a forced landing on territory occupied by our forces.

Perforated shrapnel wound of the right shoulder with an extensive wound in the soft tissues and significant bone damage. A perforated fragment wound of the left forearm with damage to the ulna.

Transportable lying.

Recovery time is more than 3 months.

25 Mar 45

Guard Major (Medical) [signature]

[TFR 39-63]

[This page is entirely handwritten.]

426

Hospital No. 3, [illeg.] (Captain)

Stendly Friche(de) Tomasovich

[initials]

Year of birth 1923

American

Private 1st Class (Private First Class) [Russian equivalent]

Diagnosis - Post-influenzal condition

Admitted to the hospital on 18 Mar 45 from the Staff Headquarters (assembly-transfer point) in the city of Osjdche. Given the diagnosis - [in English "pulmonary"] tuberculosis

Became ill on 26 Feb 45 (3 weeks before admittance to the hospital).

Was captured in Italy 30 km from Rome, at a bridge-head at Anzio,

in 1944, was not wounded.

Was liberated from a German camp by our forces on 25 Feb 45 not far from Kolabert.

Taken from the German camp to the Staff Headquarters on 22 Mar 45 for recovery.

Guard Major (Medical)

[signature]

24 Mar 45

/Spirin/

[TFR 39-64]

[This page is entirely handwritten.]

[handwritten "427"]

Evacuation hospital No. 2704, City of Lodz'

Pifold Moris Martinovich

Born in 1919

Lieutenant/flier

American

New York City

He was wounded 3 Feb 45 during a combat flight and made a forced landing on territory occupied by our forces.

Perforated shrapnel wound, middle third of the right thigh with damage to the thigh bone. Carried out an operation and returned to [health].

Subject to transportation - lying.

Recovery period is more than 3 months.

Guard Major (Medical) [signature]

25 Mar 45

[TFR 39-65]

[This page is entirely handwritten.]

Hospital No. 2704 Major (Medical) Garshevich [handwritten "428"]

Ernst Iogan Dzhalo

born 1916

Captain/flier

American

From Washington D.C.

Wounded 3 Feb 45 during a combat flight
(bombing Berlin) and conducted a forced
landing on territory occupied by our forces.
Amputation stump at the upper third of the
right shin.

Transportable sitting.

Recovery period up to 2 months.

Located at the Evac Hospital 2704 in the city of Lodz'.

Guard Major (Medical) [SPIRIN]

25 Mar 45

[TFR 39-66]

[This page is entirely handwritten.]

429

Hospital KHPPT 3533 in Neudam (Mayor is Ehshtein)

429

No. 21

1. Polen Robert Sharls
2. Lieutenant - pilot
3. American
4. Born in 1925
5. Was not a prisoner of the Germans.
Landed out of necessity on our
territory, due to being wounded.
6. Was wounded on 19 Mar 45 and
also admitted to the hospital on 19 March.
7. Diagnosis: a closed shrapnel wound in the soft
tissue of the right upper third of the shin with
damage to the [in English "popliteal artery"].
(dimensions of the fragment 2x5cm, 21 Mar)
Not transportable for 4-5 days.

24 Mar 45 Major (Medical) [signature "L.M. BARSHAVCHIK"]

[TFR 39-67]

QUESTIONNAIRE
[handwritten "accounted for", No. 33, 28 Mar"]

on an injured flier of the United States of America.

1. Last, First, Patronymic - Kol' Krest'yan Verne
2. Year of birth - 19 December 1925
3. Military Rank - Private
4. Nationality - American
5. Address:- City of Michigan
6. Date wounded or became ill - 22 Mar 45 (wounded)
7. Repatriated or not- no, he is a flyer of the American Air Army.
8. Circumstances of wound - during a combat flight
9. Diagnosis: closed shrapnel wound in the left shoulder joint, with damage to the joint. Multiple shrapnel wounds in the soft tissue of the left shoulder. Perforated shrapnel wounds of the soft tissue of the shoulder. Multiple shrapnel wounds of the right hand.
10. Transportable or not (sitting, lying) - transportable, lying
11. Recovery period - up to three months.
12. Located in treatment facility - KhPPG 611, 61st Army, City of Eberswalde.

Signature of person [signature] (KONDRATOV)
completing the form

March 1945

[handwritten] Evacuated by aircraft to Lodz'.

[TFR 39-68]

[handwritten entries on a typed form]

[handwritten "No. 35 and "431"]

QUESTIONNAIRE

for wounded-sick military members of the
US, England, Canada, and other Dominions.

1. Last, First, Patronymic - Miller Karl
2. Year of birth - 1922
3. Military Rank - [blank]
4. Nationality - American
5. Address - USA state [illeg.]
6. Date wounded or became ill - 20 Apr 45
7. Repatriated or not- no
8. Circumstances of illness, wound -
9. Diagnosis: Closed shrapnel wound in the soft tissue of the right shoulder and forearm, perforated shrapnel wound of the left forearm with damage to the bone.
10. Transportable or not (sitting, lying) -
11. Suggested recovery period -
12. Located in which treatment facility (number and location)
RNG 3996

Signature.

Junior Lieutenant

[signature "Telegina"]

[TFR 39-69]

[handwritten "D121"]

[handwritten "552"]

[illeg.]
of
Military-Medical
Directorate
1st Belarussian Front
20 March 1945
T-3 - 1896

Secret
Copy No. 2

to the Chief MEHP 14

Colonel (Medical)
Comrade KNYAZEV

Deputy Head, Military-Medical Directorate of the 1st BF
Major General (Medical) - ordered:

1. Evacuate, using your transport from GLR 1155,
[illeg.] the wounded American Captain - PARKER GROVEK -
[illeg.] via airfield evacuation. The time that is necessary
to be in Poznan, will be determined by our representative,
[illeg.] provided in this instruction.
2. Dispatch one doctor to escort the "Douglas",
[illeg.] Americans will be sent to MOSCOW. Send a doctor, hand-
carrying medicines and instruments needed to provide aid en
route, to the airfield at the time of arrival.

Original Signed HEAD, 1ST DEPARTMENT OF THE VSU, 1ST BF
LIEUTENANT COLONEL (Medical)

[signature]
(ANDREEV)

[TFR 39-70]

NKO USSR
[- re -?]
Military-Medical
Directorate of the
1st Belarussian Front
22 March 1945
N-T-3/01921

SECRET
Copy No. 2
[handwritten "553"]

TO THE HEAD, DEPARTMENT OF REPATRIATION
ATTACHED TO THE MILITARY COUNCIL OF THE 1ST BF
Colonel Comrade KUROVOKOV

With this document, I am reporting amplified data on
the Americans and Englishmen located at Front hospitals for
treatment.

1. Evac-Hospital 2771 - [illeg.]

1. [illeg.] - Senior Sergeant, 1913, American; closed shrapnel
wound in the soft tissue of the upper third of
the lower left leg, transportable sitting.
2. ...AD FRANK - Corporal, 1922, American; closed shrapnel wound
in the soft tissue of the middle third of the
left thigh and left groin region;
transportable lying.
3. R.. Robert - Corporal, 1923, American; multiple shrapnel
wounds to the right buttock with damage to the
pelvic bone and soft tissue of the right thigh;
not transportable.

2. Evac-Hospital 1694 - PULAVA

4. Kol Edvard - Master Sergeant, 1918, American;
tangential shrapnel wound of the lower third of
the left shin with damage to the large thigh
bone, and a closed shrapnel wound of the right
foot with damage to the bone; not transportable.
5. Kar...st. - Senior Sergeant, 1919, American; closed shrapnel
wound of the right ankle, penetrating, with
damage to the bone, transportable sitting.
6. ROBERT D. SEMIDT - Sergeant, 1920, American; closed shrapnel
wound on the right heel with damage to the
bone; transportable sitting.
7. ...K.ER Arnold - Sergeant, 1918, American; penetrating shrapnel
wound in the soft tissue, middle third of
the right shin, closed shrapnel wound in
the soft tissue of the right thigh, and the
shoulder with damage to the ulnar nerve;
transportable lying.
8. ...GENSA. Lazev - Corporal, 1923, American, closed shrapnel
wound of the left knee, transportable
sitting.

[TFR 39-71]

The above mentioned wounded have already been registered with your office. In addition, the following wounded were recently admitted:

2.

AMERICANS:

(handwritten "554")

1. KPPG 3 - DO.CE KROKE - 1st Polish Army:
STENDYU FRICHE, flier, pulmonary tuberculosis, transportable sitting.
2. KPPG 3335 - MEUDAM - 5th Shock Army:
name unknown, flier, wound in the soft tissue of the right lower leg, at present not transportable.
3. EhG 1305 - SHVEBUS - 33rd Army:
PICHUJ Dzhim, flier, 2nd Lieutenant, closed fragment wound in the upper third of the right thigh with destruction of the trochanter, transportable lying.
4. EhG 1305 - SHVEBUS - 33rd Army:
FAGANEN Zhdanov, flier, Lieutenant, compound fracture of the medial malleolus of the right leg; transportable lying.
5. EhG 1305 - SHVEBUS - 33rd Army:
PROTZ Richard, flier, Sergeant, closed fragment wound penetrating the right half of the thorax; transportable lying.
6. EhG 4175 - Lodz' - MEhP 14:
PAL'NER Vestal, Senior Sergeant, closed fragment wound of the right ankle; transportable sitting.
7. EhG 4175 - Lodz' - MEhP 14:
URAB Kenedi, Senior Sergeant, closed fragment wound of the thorax with damage to the shoulder [blade]; transportable sitting.
8. EhG 1103 - Lodz' - MEhP 14:
DANIEL Garrit, Captain, flier, lymphadenitis; transportable sitting.
9. EhG 1103 - Lodz' - MEhP 14:
STYUART Gilzen, Captain, flier, panaritium of the left toes; transportable sitting.
10. EhG 3849 - Lodz' - MEhP 14:
DIGARANIKO Iosef, corporal, closed fragment wound in the soft tissue of the right shoulder; transportable sitting.

BRITISH

1. EhG 266 - REMBERTOV - MEhP 6:
KHE.LTON Leonard, Corporal; stomach ulcer, transportable sitting.
2. EhG 4928 - MARIENWALDE - 3rd Shock Army:
MARL.RG Galms Gordon, Private, croup on the right side, pneumonia; not transportable.

2 copies

1-addressee

1-file

FOR THE HEAD, 3RD DEPARTMENT OF THE VSU, 1ST BF
LIEUTENANT COLONEL (Medical) [signature]

[TFR 39-72]

[handwritten "Secret"]

[stamp "Military-Medical Directorate YuzF"]

SECRET

16 Apr 45

ENTRY NO. 011137

CASE FILE NO. ""]

[handwritten "556" and "D121"]

LIST

of the wounded-sick of Allied Armies arriving at SHG 3813

Last, First, Patronymic	Rank	Nationality	Hosp. name	Date Arrive	Diagnosis	From Where	Recovery period	Remarks
Goll Donal	Cpl	American	SHG3813	9 Apr 45	Paralysis of facial nerve after diphtheria	VCh 71714	30 Days	
Varren Mark	Pvt	"	"	"	Scarlet Fever, Residue of Bronchial-pneumonia	"	"	
Ross Viktor	"	British	"	"	Scarlet Fever	"	15 Days	
Daraj Klark Edmund	"	American	"	"	Acute Appendicitis	SHG 1103	30 Days	
Bor Georgij	"	British	"	"	Amputation stump 4th finger both bones due to frost-bite.	"	45 Days	
Uol'ch Georgij	Sgt	American	"	"	Bruised thorax Lodz'	"		
Abavid Val'ter	"	"	"	"	Contusion of the cerebral conjunctiva	"		
Davn Sidnej	Pvt	British	"	8 Apr	Frostbite on	SHG		

Tomash 4473 fingers of the left hand

Dzvajtilyan Hindu 8 Apr Pulmonary Tuberculosis 4495

Matamain

Kaninsin 9 Apr Pulmonary Tuberculosis

Podzhatin

Chief SHHG 3813
Lieutenant Colonel (Medical) [signature] (Yatlov).

[circular stamp with seal "Evacuation Hospital 3813"]
[handwritten "Khristofer Pikan?"] [illeg. handwriting]

167

MILITARY-MEDICAL
DIRECTORATE OF THE
SHLYAKHTENKO
1ST BYELORUSSIAN FRONT
AUTHORIZED
(Medical)
26 March 1945
off]
No. T-5/0 [handwritten "2078"]

[TFR 39-73]
[handwritten "556"]

TO: THE CHIEF OF STAFF OF THE UT, G.M.
HEAD OF THE MEDICAL DEPARTMENT OF THE
PLENIPOTENTIARY FOR REPATRIATION, COLONEL
[cut]
HEAD OF DEPARTMENT FOR REPATRIATION OF THE 1ST
BELARUSSIAN FRONT, COLONEL KURO [cut off]

REPORT

[handwritten over illegible print] about the progress of the evacuation by status of
American and English sick and wounded on 26 March 1945.

No.	Last name, first name	Rank	Diagnosis	Trans. of wounded	Hospital or location trans. from	Remarks
1	2	3	4	5	6	7
a) Americans:						
1. Evacuation from MILOSTOVO airfield 23 Mar at 1515 hrs						
1.	Kidd Fridrikh	CPT/flier	wounded thigh	lying	UPPG1397	Schverin
2.	Parker Grovek	"	broken shin bone	"	"	"
3.	Pichij Jim	2LT/flier	wounded thigh	"	ZG1305	Shvibus

[names occur twice - once handwritten and once typed.]

168

[TFR 39-74]

[handwritten "557"]

842

1	2	3	4	5	6
4. Fagotsen Zhdanov	LT		broken shin bone	lying	ZG1305 Shvibus
5. Protch Richard	SGT/flier		Thorax wound	"	YPGR134 Tsilentsig
6. Miller Russel'	LT		dislocated shoulder	sitting	"
7. Lundberg Akbert	"		bruised shin (?) joint	"	"
8. Norman Deon	SGT		facial burn	"	"
9. Vaskes Antonio	PVT		wounded shoulder	"	ZG2731 Vreshe
2. Also evacuated by plane from Lodz' airfield 23 Mar at 1700 hrs.					
10. Pal'mar Vestal	Sr. SGT		wounded ankle	sitting	ZG4175 Lodz'
11. Khrauf Kenedi	"		thorax wound	"	"
12. Daniel' Garri	CPT/flier		lymphadenitis	"	ZG1703
13. Styuart Gil'zen	"		hangnail	"	"
14. Digaraniko Iosif	CPL		wounded shoulder	"	ZG3649

169

[TFR 39-74a]

843

3. Evacuated by plane from Lublin airfield 25 Mar

15. Margolis Ben'yamen	Sr. SGT	wounded shins	sitting	ZG3685 Lublin
16. Yankblad Frank	CPL	wounded thigh and groin	lying	"
17. Dzhan Eduard	MSG	wounded thigh	"	"
18. Martin Iosif	Sr. SGT	wounded foot	sitting	"

[Names occur twice - once handwritten and once typed.]

170

[Cut off] 2	3	4	5	6	7
Shmidt Robert	SGT	wounded heel	sitting	203695	Lublin
Bikler Arnol'd	"	wounded thigh and shin	lying	"	"
Chogenesan Laven	CPL	wounded knee	"	"	"
Resh Robert	"	wounded pelvis	lying	"	"
Svit	LT	"	"	"	"
Panakinskij	Sr. LT	"	"	"	"

[illeg.]
[handwritten "24 March 1945"]

4. Extracts of recoveries in commandant's staff.

Stendsh Friche	PVT	influenzal pulmonary tuberculosis	TPPG3	Dejch-Krone
Vanantgen Kened			SGTZG4719	Rembertuv
Nagle David David	LT	healthy	ZG1103	Lodz'
		171		

5. Temporary left in front hospitals

Pollen Robert	LT/flier	wounded popliteal artery	Not transportable	RPPG3533	Neudam 23.3
Vazena Mark	SGT/flier	scarlet fever	"	IG4286	Lodz'
Gall Donald	PVT	"	"	"	"
Neuman Chausov Dzhaan	"	wounded shoulder	lying	ZG2704	"
Fidel'd Moris Martin	1st-LT ["ober-left"]	wounded thigh	lying	"	"

[Names occur twice - once handwritten and once typed.]

[TFR 39-76]

[handwritten "559"]

[Cut off] : 3 : 4 : 5 : 6 : 7

Ernst Iogan Dshacko CPT amputation lying illeg. 12704 Lodz' subject to
of lower evacuation
leg

[The remainder of this page has been whited-out]

173

NKO USSR
SECRET
Military Medical
Directorate of the
1st Belarussian Front
[illeg.] March 1945
No. 02154

[handwritten "D121"] SECRET

[handwritten "560"]

TO CHIEF OF STAFF, UT OF THE 1st BF
MAJOR GENERAL
Comrade SCHLYAKHENKO

[TFR 39-77]

copy No. 3

[handwritten "Copy - To Head, Department of Repatriation,
Comrade Colonel Kurovskii"]

REPORT

About the American, British, and Hindu sick and wounded evacuated by status on 28 March 1945.

No.	Last and First [Names]	Rank	Diagnosis	Trans. Of wounded	Hospital or location trans. from	Remarks
1	2	3	4	5	6	7

a) Americans

1. Evacuated from MILOSTOVO airfield to ODESSA 23.3 9 people
2. Evacuated from LODZ' airfield to ODESSA 23.3 5 "
3. " " Lyublin airfield to ODESSA 25.3 10 "
4. " " LODZ' airfield to POLTAVA 26.3 3 "
5. Discharged upon recovery to Headquarters 3

174

[handwritten "561"]

2.

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
<u>5. Temporarily left in front hospitals:</u>						
1. Pollen Robert	LT/flier	popliteal artery wound	lying	EHG275-LODZ'	Subject to evacuation	
2. Kol' Krest'yan Verne	PVT/flier	shoulder wound	lying	EHG275-LODZ'	Came in from 61 A down plane	Contagious
3. Vazena Mark	SGT/flier	scarlet fever	non transportable	IG4288-LODZ'		
4. Gall Donal'd	PVT		"	"		
5. Khristophor Pican	PVT		"	IG2014-Rembertuv		
[No. 6 & 7 are handwritten entries]						
6. Miller Karl	[LT?]/flier	shoulder wound	sitting	EHG1103-LODZ'	Subject to evacuation	
7. Shdmunt Dorin Klark	PVT	appendicitis	lying	KhPPG-SCHMERIN		

175

848

b) British

1. Evacuated by plane from Prague airport 24 Mar 1 person
2. Discharged to Headquarters upon recovery 4 "
3. Temporarily left in front hospitals:

Bar Georgy	PVT	amputated fingers	sitting	EHG275-LODZ'	Subject to evacuation
Clark Cornel'	PVT	pulmonary tuberculosis	non transportable	TPPG-DEJCh-KRONE	Critical condition
Ross Viktor	PVT	scarlet fever	"	IG2014-Rembertuv	Contagious period

176

849

[TFR 39-79]

REPORT

Secret.
Copy

NKO USSR

[- re-?]

No. 2

Military-Medical

Directorate of the

1st Belarussian Front.

[illeg.] March 1945

T-3/02157

[handwritten "563"]

To the Head of MEHP6

Lt. Colonel (Medical) Comrade CHERNETS

According to information we received from you on

28 March you have:

1. American KRISTOPOR PIKAN, private, scarlet fever.
2. British ROSS VIKTOR, private, scarlet fever.
3. Hindu KANADU GLUDA, private, pulmonary tuberculosis.

In addition,

4. American VALMER OBOLEN is located in OTVOTSK, with an abdominal wound, and you have not reported to us in the established manner.

Moscow demands that everyone be evacuated. Therefore, it is your personal responsibility to organize consultations of all the injured and ill patients to evacuate them by air to LODZ'.

It is possible to send those with scarlet fever, if they are not in such critical condition that it threatens life - a plane will be modified accordingly.

In view of the serious difficulty in supplying fuel for the aircraft, 2 aircraft will arrive: one - for carrying scarlet fever patients; the other - for carrying tuberculosis and injured patients, which is fully permissible, in view of the presence of separate cabins for them.

Bring the wounded from OTVOTSK to REMBERTOV for simultaneous evacuation with the tuberculosis patients. If OTVOTSK has a runway, then the plane will pick-up the tuberculosis patients first, and then the wounded patients.

Ensure all necessities are provided for during loading. If there is a critical need for an escort, talk it over with the pilot and then decide for yourself.

Send all the information on the dispatched Americans, English, and Hindu with the pilots, in accordance with our questionnaire, indicating the aircraft take-off time from REMBERTOV and security on the flight route.

Make the pilot transporting the scarlet fever patients aware of the necessity of disinfecting the aircraft.

DEPUTY DIRECTOR, MILITARY MEDICAL DIRECTORATE OF THE

1ST BF

MAJOR GENERAL (Medical)

(PLIOCENE)

Distro 2 copies:

copy 1- addressee

HEAD, 3rd DEPARTMENT OF THE VSU, 1ST BF

copy 2- case file

LT. COLONEL (Medical)

(POZNYAKOV)

Originator: Poznyakov.

No. 106.

True copy:

[TFR 39-80]

SECRET
copy No. 2

[faintly handwritten "D121"] [handwritten "564"]

NKO-USSR

MILITARY-MEDICAL
DIRECTORATE OF THE
1ST BYELORUSSIAN FRONT

SHELYAKHVENKO

[illeg.] March 1945

No. T-5/0 2211

TO THE CHIEF OF STAFF OF THE UT 1ST BELARUSSIAN FRONT
MAJOR GENERAL ComradeCOPY TO: HEAD, DEPARTMENT OF REPATRIATION
Comrade COLONEL KUROBSKOM

REPORT.

On the presence of American, British, and Hindu injured and ill patients in front hospitals on 30 March 1945.

Last, First Rank [Names]	Diagnosis	Trans. of wounded	In which Hospital	Remarks
2	3	4	5	6
al Americans - 8 people				
Pollen Robert LT/flier	popliteal artery wound	lying		subject to evacuation
Kol' Krest'yan PVT/flier Verne	shoulder wound	"		"
Miller Karl LT/flier	shoulder wound	sitting		"
Edmund Darti PVT Klark	appendicitis	lying		"
Vazena Mark SGT/flier	scarlet fever	sitting		"
Gall Donal'd PVT	"	"		"

MG4288

[handwritten "565"]

2.

7

[handwritten on the left side "Khristofor"]
 Khristofor Pican PVT scarlet fever

Untrans. IG2014 Rembertuv contagious

[handwritten on the left side "Abovets"]
 Abovets Valter SGT thorax wound

generally serious condition

b) British - 3 people

[?]ar Georg PVT amputated fingers

sitting EhG1103 Lodz' subject to evacuation

Ross Victor " scarlet fever

Untrans. IG2014 Rembertuv contagious

[illeg.]Torned' " pulmonary tuberculosis

EhG4478 Dojch-Krone [illeg.]

c) Hindu - 1 person

[illeg.] Gluda PVT pulmonary tuberculosis

Untrans. EhG266 Rembertuv [illeg.]

[handwritten initials] MAJOR GENERAL (Medical)
 Original Signed Deputy Head, Military Medical Directorate, 1st BF (PLYAKIN)

True copy: [signature]

[illeg.] copy
 [illeg.] addressee
 [illeg.] case file
 [Poznyakov?]

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NKO-USSE

MILITARY-MEDICAL
 DIRECTORATE OF THE
 1ST BYELORUSSIAN FRONT

SHLYAKHTENKO
 1 April 1945
 No. T-3/0 2229

[faintly handwritten "D121"]

[handwritten "566"]

[TFR 39-82]

SECRET
copy No. 3

TO THE CHIEF OF STAFF OF THE UT, 1ST BELARUSSIAN FRONT
 MAJOR GENERAL Comrade

COPY TO: HEAD, DEPARTMENT OF REPATRIATION
 Comrade COLONEL KUROBSKON

REPORT

On the evacuation of American, British, and Hindu injured and ill patients according to status on 1 April 1945.

Last, First [Names]	Rank	Diagnosis	Trans. of wounded	In which hospital	Remarks
2	3	4	5	6	7

a) Americans - 8 people

1. Evacuations from LODZ' airport to POLYAVA 31.3 at 1145 - 3 people
 Pollen Robert LT/flier popliteal artery wound lying

Kol' Krest'yan PVT/flier shoulder wound
 Varne

Miller Karl LT/flier shoulder wound sitting

[handwritten "567"]

2.

[Cut off] 2 : 3 : 4 : 5 : 6 : 7

2. Temporarily left in front hospitals - 5 people:

Ehdmund Darti	PVT	appendicitis	lying	EhG1103 Lodz'	subject to evacuation
Koark					
Vazena Mark	SGT/flier	recovering from scarlet fever	sitting	IG4288	"
Gall Donal'd	PVT	"	"	"	"
Khristophor Pikan	"	"	"	"	"
Abovets Val'ter	SGT	thorax wound	Untrans.	EhG1763 Otvotak	generally serious condition

[next entry is handwritten]
 Dzhorden Patrik SGT/flier
 Vol'sh

b) British - 3 people

Bar Georgy	PVT	amputated fingers	sitting	EhG1103 Lodz'	subject to evacuation
Rosa Viktor	"	recovering after scarlet fever	"	IG4288	"
Klark Kornel'	"	pulmonary tuberculosis	"	EhG4478 Dojch-Krone	critical condition

181

c) Hindu - 1 person

Kanadi Gluda	PVT	pulmonary tuberculosis	Nontrans-portable	EhG266 Rembertuv	In very serious condition
[Next two entries are handwritten] [illeg.] Pandtati 1923 PVT pulmonary tuberculosis [illeg.]					
[illeg.] [Maragist'in?]	"	pulmonary tuberculosis [illeg.]	lying	EhG1335 [Tieza?]	subject to evacuation
[illeg.] [Maragist'in?]	"	pulmonary tuberculosis [illeg.]	lying	EhG1335 [Tieza?]	subject to evacuation

Original Signed DEPUTY DIRECTOR, MILITARY MEDICAL DIRECTORATE, 1st BF
 [handwritten initials] MAJOR GENERAL (Medical) (PLYAKIN)

True copy: [signature]

[illeg.] copy
 [illeg.] addressee
 [illeg.] case file
 [Poznyakov?]

182

[handwritten "1 leg"] [handwritten "Transported"] [handwritten "Entry No. 03418"]
 [handwritten "Directorate FHP-73"] [handwritten "15 Mar 45"]
 [handwritten "Need to inform [illeg.]?"] [handwritten "No. 011414"] (Secret)
 [handwritten "581"]

QUESTIONNAIRE

On wounded, sick military members or citizens of the USA, England, Canada and other foreigners.

No. Name FNL	Year of Birth	Mil Rank	Nationality	Address	Date Injured or Sick	Repat-riated or not?	How Wound Occurred	Diagnosis	Trans- portable or not?	Term
--------------	---------------	----------	-------------	---------	----------------------	----------------------	--------------------	-----------	-------------------------	------

[The remainder of the page is handwritten.]

1. Uolsh Dzhorsh Petchik	1917	SGT	American	Linn, Mass South St House #7	15Mar45	No	During bombing of Berlin 4,5,6th ribs broken right side?	Contusions to chest	Sitting	3 wks
--------------------------	------	-----	----------	------------------------------	---------	----	--	---------------------	---------	-------

ISKH No. 0218 / Chief EHC [39967] [signature]
 7 April 1945 Major (Medical) (Marejnie)

[entire document is handwritten]

No. 011402 List

Of Discharged and Evacuated Foreigners, located [cut-off]
 in hospitals for recovery
 [handwritten "650"]

Last name First	Year Of	Rank	Nation- ality	Date admitted	Date of discharge	To where discharged	Date of evacua-	When died	Which hospital
Christopher Pikan	1920	Pvt	American	30 March	8 April	to Lodz' repatriation point	--	--	4288
Varri Mark Frajnukev	1917	Sgt	"	26 March	--	--	9 April	--	--
Khol Danil Dzhenovich	1915	Tech.	"	26 March	--	--	9 April	--	--
Ross Mark	1917	Pvt	British	30 March	--	--	9 April	--	--
[Pless?] Albert	1907	"	French	31 March	17 April	to Lodz' repatriation pt. No. 129	--	--	3544
Shironan P'er	1910	"	"	31 March	17 April	same as above	--	--	--
Larzhes Zhak	1914	"	"	6 April	17 April	"	--	--	--
Levilli Zhan	1916	"	"	12 April	16 April	"	--	--	--

Mukhamed	1915	"	French	6	13
1565					
Belikbir			Moroccan	April	April
Ian'o	1913	"	French	6	13
1565					
[illeg.] Inand				April	April
Marparov	1915	"	"	6	14
Jen Martin					
282				April	April

Head of Administrations, MBHP-198
Colonel (Medical) (signature)

(Penerdzhi)

contents 1 copy
1 - addressee

Chief of Medicine (signature)
Major (Medical)

(Gol'dshtejn)

[Entire page handwritten]

List
of discharged foreigners from IG4182
for time of work in Vreshen from 19 Feb to 15 Apr 1945

Last Name, First, Patronymic	Year of Birth	Rank	Nationality	Diagnosis	Date admitted dis- charged	Date to which Hdqtrs.
Chek Giv	1923	Pvt	American	Enteritis	19 Feb 1945	23 Feb 1945

[Entire page handwritten]
[Right-hand side of page cut off]

No. 012019

692

List

of discharges, evacuations, deaths of foreign [cut-off]

Last Name, First and Patronymic	Born	Rank	Nationality	Diagnosis	Date admitted	Date discharged
Parker Grovek	1920	Captain	American	closed fracture, external ankle bone of the left leg	10 Jan 1945	--

Chief of G.L.R. 1155
[circular stamp
"Sorting (illeg.)
Hospital No. 1107"]
Major (Medical) [signature] (P[cut-off])

187

OFFICE OF THE COMMISSIONER
THE USSR COUNCIL OF PEOPLE'S COMMISSARS
FOR REPATRIATION MATTERS

Moscow, Kropotkinskiy Lane No. 7 Tele No. G-6-11-00
1945

13 Dec

[handwritten "7544"]
"532"]

[handwritten

Entry No. 06988, 010332, 010440

[illeg. handwriting]

[handwritten "D-59"]

TO THE HEAD, MEDICAL-EVACUATION ADMINISTRATION OF THE
RED ARMY CHIEF MILITARY MEDICAL DIRECTORATE

To Comrade Major General (Medical) KHODORKOV

The American Embassy has informed us of the following
information.

There were American soldiers that were located in the city
of Kyustrin [Germany] held prisoner by the Germans in Stalag 3.
Among them, there were 7 people who were in the camp hospital --
including SGT Robert R. BRYUEHR and PVT Aloize DZH. MAKLIN.

After the Red Army troops took Kyustrin, an American, CPT
(Medical) NASH, transferred BRYUEHR and MAKLIN on 4 Feb 45 along
with other American soldiers to the care of a major in the Red
Army Medical Service and the Chief of the Field Hospital at
Stalag 3 in Kyustrin.

I ask your cooperation in a complete investigation of this
information and I am interested in its results and the fates of
the Americans in question. Please keep me informed.

ACTING DEPUTY FOR THE COMMISSIONER OF THE USSR
COUNCIL OF PEOPLE'S COMMISSARS FOR REPATRIATION AFFAIRS
MAJOR GENERAL

[signature]
(BASILOV)

[Stamp "SECRET - 37945, 14 Dec 45, Main [words missing] of the
Red Army"]

[illeg. handwriting] [handwritten "10432"] [illeg. handwriting]

188

[TFR 39-89]

OFFICE OF THE COMMISSIONER
THE USSR COUNCIL OF PEOPLE'S COMMISSARS
FOR REPATRIATION MATTERS

Moscow, Kropotkinskiy Lane No. 7 Tele No. G-6-11-00
Dec 45
No. 07814
[handwritten "558"]
[illeg. handwriting]
handwriting]

25

[handwritten "364"]
[illeg.]

Issue No. 010679/41

TO THE HEAD, MEDICAL-EVACUATION ADMINISTRATION OF THE
RED ARMY CHIEF MILITARY MEDICAL DIRECTORATE

To Comrade Major General (Medical) KHODORKOV

According to the American embassy, a PFC VEHN Art Lourens,
service no. 1305331, died in a Russian hospital in the city of
Landsberg [Poland] some time between 02 and 05 Mar 45.

It is also known that the doctor in charge of his case was a
Russian doctor, Major Georgij Davydovich AROIS.

Please report the exact date and cause of death of VEHN Art
Lourens.

Please send a death certificate with directions to the exact
location of his grave to our address.

ACTING DEPUTY FOR THE COMMISSIONER OF THE USSR
COUNCIL OF PEOPLE'S COMMISSARS FOR REPATRIATION AFFAIRS
MAJOR GENERAL

[signature]
(BASIOV)

[stamp 4309
39034, 26 Dec 45]
[handwritten "10622"]

[this page was cut off, poss. white-out]

[TFR 39-90]

[handwritten "page 363"]

SECRET
copy No. 2

TO THE DEPUTY COMMISSIONER OF THE USSR
COUNCIL OF PEOPLE'S COMMISSARS ON REPATRIATION AFFAIRS

To COMRADE MAJOR GENERAL BASIOV

Reference No. 07814, 25 Dec 45

[cut-off typing]
[handwritten "3 No. 1052510s"]

According to the Head of the Medical Directorate, Northern
Group of Forces, US Army PFC Art Lajrens Vehn [Lawrence Van Art]
does not appear on the lists of hospital deaths.

HEAD, MEDICAL EVACUATION ADMINISTRATION OF THE
CHIEF MILITARY MEDICAL DIRECTORATE

MAJOR GENERAL (Medical)

(KHODORKOV)

True copy: Major [illeg. signature]

[TFR 39-91]

[illeg. handwriting]
[handwritten "23 March 1945"]

[handwritten "1. 4"]

Secret
copy No. ___

THE RED ARMY CHIEF MEDICAL DIRECTORATE

To Comrade GENERAL L.A. KHODORKOV

[handwritten "178"]

[handwritten reference to Comrade Vajner on 26 Mar 45]

The following is a list of Americans and British who are located in hospitals and collection points in the territory of Poland and other places. The following are subject to evacuation to ODESSA by plane and railroad.

The evacuation was set for 23 Mar 45.

[mostly illeg. stamp "SECRET
23 Mar 45
11232,3203"]

No.	Rank	Last Name	Hospital location	Nationality
1.	Ober LT	FIDEL'D Myuris Martyn	Neudamm	American
2.	CPT	ERHNS Togan Dzako	"	"
3.	LT	NAGLS David Davidovich	"	"
4.	PVT	GNEWMAN Geus Dzhan	"	"
5.	CPT	POKER	Friedenau	"
6.		KIDD Fridrikh	Landsberg	"
7.	PVT	VASKES Aimoni	Malenchuv	"
8.	SGT	VANANDGAN Kenad	Rembertuv	"
9.	Sr.SGT	MARGOLIS Ben'yamin	Malenchuv	"
10.	CPL	ENBLUD Frank	"	"
11.	CPL	RESH Robert	"	"
12.		DZHON Eduard	Pulavy	"
13.		MARTYN Esei	"	"

[TFR 39-91a]

14.		ROBERT Mase	"	"
15.		BIGLER Arnol'd	"	"
16.	CPL	CHEGENESAN	"	"
17.	PVT	Last name not yet established	Lyublin	"
18.	SGT	VAKES Antoni	Vreshen	"
19.	CPL	HEJLEJTEL Leist	Rembertuv	English

[handwritten "Central Military Medical Archives P. 39, Op. 69512, D.13"]

[TFR 39-92]

[illeg. stamp "12841", "20 Mar 45"]

SECRET
copy No. 2[stamp "Secret
20 Mar 45
10880, 3128"]

[illeg. handwriting]

[handwritten reference to Comrade Vajner, dated 26 Mar 45]

TO COMRADE POSKREBYSHCHEV
[handwritten "183"]

For the report to Comrade STALIN, I am sending you information on sick and wounded Americans, who are in army and front hospitals and cannot be evacuated to the rear for health reasons.

1st BELARUSSIAN Front

No.	Rank	Last Name	Hosp. Loc.	Note
1.	OberLT +	Fidel'd Myuris Martyn	Neudamm	4167
2.	CPT +	Ehrnst Logan Dzhako	"	"
3.	LT +	Nagls David Davidovich	"	"
4.	CPT +	Poker	Friedenau	496
5.	+	Kidd	Landsberg	5177
6.	PVT +	Vaskes Aimoni	Nalenchuv	2771
7.	SGT +	Vanandgan Kenad	Rembertuv	4719 [x]
8.	Sr SGT ++	Margolis Ben'yamin	Nalenchuv	2771
9.	CPL ++	Enblud Frank	"	2771
10.	CPL ++	Resh Rebet	"	1694
11.	++	Dzhon Khduard	Pulavy	1694
12.	++	Martyn Esef	"	1694
13.	++	Robert Mase	"	1694
14.	++	Bigler Arnol'd	"	1694
15.	CPL ++	Chegenesan Lavan	"	5238
16.	PVT +	Neuman Cheusov Dzhaan	Neudamm	Ukrainian Front
17.	PVT	Last name not yet established	Katowice	"

[The "+" signs are representations of check marks on the original.]

20 Mar 45

COLONEL GENERAL [signature] (SHEMENKO)

[TFR 39-93]

[handwritten "page 6"]

3.

No.	Rank	Last Name	Hosp. Loc.	Nationality
23.		PETI Robert	Chenstohoff	American
24.	PVT	Name being checked on	Katowice	American

2nd UKRAINIAN FRONT

1.	SGT	DZHANSTON Vil'yam	Seget	American
----	-----	-------------------	-------	----------

4th UKRAINIAN FRONT

1.	LT	GANSLER Rikhard	Novo-Sonch [Nowa Sol?]	American
----	----	-----------------	---------------------------	----------

In addition to that there are also 38 British in the hospital at Chenstokhof. Their names are being clarified.

Reports have been received that there are 65 British and 9 Americans who were freed from captivity during the course of battle on the 20th and 21st of March 45 in the city of Katowice.

Thus, in all of our hospitals we have:

65 British 21 Americans

Recently liberated in combat:

65 British 9 Americans

In total, the following personnel must be sent to the Odessa transient camp by rail or air on 23 Mar.

130 British 30 Americans

On 25 Mar a group of the Directorate's officers is being sent to Poland in order to once more thoroughly search all hospitals, collection points and populated areas. They will work through the Polish administration to reveal all British and Americans, who for various reasons were able to remain in Poland, and send them all to Odessa.

[TFR 39-94]

[illeg. handwriting]

[handwritten "page 8"]

Secret
copy No. 10CHIEF MEDICAL DIRECTORATE OF THE RED ARMY
TO Comrade GENERAL L.A. KHODORKOB

[handwritten "119"]

[handwritten "Comrade Vajner/
in case No. 263"]
[initials]

[stamp mostly illeg. "SECRET"]

I am reporting preliminary figures on the evacuation of British and Americans from Poland to Odessa by air and by rail on 23 Mar.

1. Total number delivered	78 People
Of these: Americans	33 "
British	45 "

[illeg. stamp]

Temporarily remaining in hospitals as nontransportable:

Americans	10 People
British	7 "

2. This information, by front, breaks down as follows:
a. 1st Belafussian Front
22 Americans were sent:

1. CPT	POKER
2.	KIDD Fridrikh
3. SGT	VANANDGAN Kenad
4.Sr SGT	MARGOLIS Ben'yamin
5. CPL	ENVLUD Frank
6.Sr SGT	MARTYN Esaf
7. SGT	ROBERT Mase
8. SGT	BIGLER Arnol'd
9. CPL	CHEGHESEAN Loven
10. SGT	VAKES Antoni
11. CPT/flier	PARKER Grovek
12. LT/flier	PICHI Dzhim
13. LT	FAGATSEN Ehdanov
14. SGT/flier	PROTCH Richard
15. LT	MILLER Russel'

[TFR 39-95]

[handwritten "page 9"]

2.

16. LT	LUNDERG Ogbert
17. SGT	NORMAL Leon
18.Sr SGT	PAL'MER Gestel'
19.Sr SGT	URAUZ Kenada
20. CPT/flier	DANIEL' Garpi
21.	STYUART Gil'zen
22. CPL	DIGARANIKO Iosif

From this number there are twelve people that are accounted for, including the crews from downed "Flying Fortress" aircraft.

Temporarily remaining in hospitals as nontransportable:

10 Americans:

1. 1LT	FIDEL'D Moris Martyn
2. CPT	ERNST Iogan Dzhako
3. LT	NAGLS David Davidovich
4. PVT	GNEVMAN Geus Dzhon
5. CPL	RESH Robert
6.	DEHON Ehdvard
7. SGT/flier	VAZENA Mark
8. PVT	GALL Donal'd
9. LT/flier	POLEN Robert
10. PVT	STENZH Friche and

7 British:

1. CPL	HEJLEJTEN Leist
2. PVT	LYAGSHVUR Yan
3. CPL	GALAKAN E.M.
4. CPL	REJTER A.E.
5. PVT	MARLING Gallen Gordin
6. PVT	BAR Georg and
7. PVT	KVARK Kornel'g

[TFR 39-96]

[illeg. handwriting] [handwritten "23 Mar 45 1st Belar. Fr."]
 [illeg. handwriting] [handwritten "25.3"]
 [Entire page is teletype.]
 [illeg.] [handwritten "Comrade Vajner/
 ...material on this question,"
 [initials], "26 Mar"]
 [handwritten "23"]

[stamp "SECRET
 28 Mar 45
 12030, 3454"]

[illeg. handwriting] [handwritten "1 amer[ican]...Odessa clarify
 arrival of Resh Robert"]

FIND OUT WHO REQUESTED GENERAL PLYAKHIN FROM THE MEDICAL DIRECTORATE.
 IS G PLYAKHIN AT THE SET?

I REQUEST THAT YOU IMMEDIATELY CALL SMIRNOV
 STOP AIRCRAFT WITH MUKHIN ARRIVED AT 2000 HRS
 22 MAR 1945 TOOK 9 AMERICANS ON BOARD
 AT MILOSLOVO AIRFIELD TOOK OFF AT 1516 HRS
 ASSUMED COURSE TO LODZ, WHERE AFTER AN HOUR FLIGHT
 TOOK ON 5 AMERICANS AND TODAY HAVING
 14 PERSONS ON BOARD DEPARTED ON A COURSE
 TO ODESSA STOP

I AM TRANSMITTING INFORMATION, THAT WE STILL HAVE MORE
 TO REPORT ON LYUBLIN ACCORDING TO OUR INFORMATION
 THE DOUGLAS AIRCRAFT DID NOT ARRIVE AT LYUBLIN A TOTAL OF
 8 PERSONNEL ARE SUBJECT TO EVACUATION FROM LYUBLIN STOP

2 AMERICANS AND 7 BRITISH ARE HOSPITALIZED, AT LYUBLIN-
 STATION NALEMCHUK MILITARY HOSPITAL 2771

RESH ROBOT - MULTIPLE SHRAPNEL WOUNDS ARE ON THE RIGHT
 BUTTOCK WITH DAMAGE TO THE BUTTOCK, PELVIC BONE, AND
 THE SOFT TISSUE OF THE RIGHT THIGH

[TFR 39-97]

[Entire page is teletype, with illeg. handwriting in the left margin]
 [handwritten "2"] [handwritten "24"]

:NONTRANSPORTABLE STOP

AMERICAN DZHON ADUANT SGT EhG 1694 PULAVY
 TANGENTIAL SHRAPNEL WOUND ON LOWER THIRD OF LEFT SHIN WITH DAMAGE
 TO THE TIBIA AND CLOSED SHRAPNEL WOUND ON LEFT FOOT WITH BONE DAMAGE
 NONTRANSPORTABLE STOP

BRITISH
 REMBERTOV EVAC HOSP 266
 KHOZEMTON - LEONART [underlined by hand]
 CPL GASTRIC ULCER STOP
 [REMBERTOV KHOZEMTON LENAT CPL GASTRIC ULCER STOP] [This is lined out
 by hand.]

IG 2014 REMBERTOV
 LYAGTVOR YAN - DYSENTERY, / [FDAASH] [This is lined out by hand.]

PRAGUE
 GALAKEN E M SICK DIAGNOSIS YET TO BE DETERMINED.

EhG 1116 PRAGUE REISPER (underlined by hand) A 2 [handwritten word -
 may say "departed"]
 SICK DIAGNOSIS YET TO BE DETERMINED STOP

AT FILIMONENKO MARIENWALDE EhG 4928
 MARLIG GALLER GORDIN EVT [underlined by hand]

AT FILIMONENKO MARIENWALDE EhG 4928
 BAR GEORG [illeg. handwriting] PVT AMPUTATION OF
 TWO FINGERS FOLLOWING FROSTBITE STOP

AT SELEMANOVICH / 1 PA [TIENT] / KHPPGZ 3
 KRONE CLARK KORNEL'K PVT TBts [cirrhotic tuberculosis] STOP

TODAY 23 MAR 45 UNDER THE ESCORT OF MUKHIN THE AMERICANS
 WERE EVACUATED BY DOUGLAS TO ODESSA STOP

[TFR 39-98]

[handwritten "3"]
[handwritten "25"]

[Entire page is teletype.]

FIRST: - KIDD FRIDRIKH CPT flier FROM
KHPPGZ 4397 SCHWERIN STOP

PARKER GRAVER FLIER CPT KHPPGZ 4397 SCHWERIN STOP
WITH BROKEN SHIN BONE

PICHY DZHM LT/FLIER EVAC HOSP 1305 SHVIGUS
SHRAPNEL WOUND TO UPPER THIRD OF
THE HIP.

FAGATSEN ZHDANOV LT EVAC HOSP 1305 SHVIDUS
CLOSED FRACTURE OF THE ANKLE OF RIGHT LEG.

PROTCH RICHARD SGT FLIER KHPPGZ 434 TSILENTSIG
SHRAPNEL WOUNDS TO RIGHT SIDE OF THROAT STOP

MILLER RUSSEL' LT KHPPGZ 434 TSILENTSIG
DISLOCATION OF RIGHT SHOULDER.

LUNDERG OKBERT LT KHPPGZ 434 TSILENTSIG
STRAIN OF THE LEFT TALOCRURAL LIGAMENT.

NORMAN LEON SGT KHPPGZ 434 TSILENTSIG
2ND DEGREE BURNS AND CONTUSIONS TO THE FACE

THE LAST FOUR ARE PILOTS FROM A DOWNED FLYING
FORTRESS AIRCRAFT AND LANDED BY PARACHUTE ON
OUR TERRITORY.

VASSKES ANTON LT
WOUNDED DIAGNOSIS NOT YET ESTABLISHED

IN ADDITION WE ARE REPORTING THAT RECOVERING IN
RESHEN EVAC HOSP 2871 STOP FROM LODZ' EVAC HOSP 4175ST

[TFR 39-99]

[handwritten "26"]

[handwritten "4"]
[Entire page is teletype.]

SGT PAL'MER VESTAL
CLOSED SHRAPNEL WOUNDS TO THE TALOCRURAL LIGAMENT OF THE RIGHT FOOT
STOP.

EVAC HOSPITAL 4175 LODZ'
SR. SGT URAUF KENEHDI
CLOSED SHRAPNEL WOUNDS TO THE RIBCAGE WITH DAMAGE TO BRACHIAL FLEXUS
STOP

EVAC HOSP 1703 LODZ'
CPT/FLIER DANIEHL' GARRI
LYMPHADENITIS STOP

LODZ' EVAC HOSP 1703
STYUART GIL'ZEN
PARONYCHIA 1ST TOE LEFT FOOT STOP

LODZ' 3649 CPL DIGARANIKO IOSIF
SOFT TISSUE SHRAPNEL WOUND OF THE RIGHT SHOULDER STOP

THEY MUST BE EVACUATED BY A SPECIAL DOUGLAS AIRCRAFT FROM LYUBLIN STOP

EVAC HOSPITAL 3685
SR. SGT MARGOLIS BIN'MEN
CLOSED SHRAPNEL WOUNDS IN THE SOFT TISSUE OF THE UPPER THIRD OF LOWER
LEFT LEG STOP

EVAC HOSPITAL 3685
CPL YANKELAD FRANK
CLOSED SHRAPNEL WOUND IN THE SOFT TISSUE OF THE MIDDLE THIRD OF THE
LEFT THIGH AND LEFT INGUINAL AREA STOP

EVAC HOSPITAL 3685
SR. SGT MARTIN IOSIF
CLOSED SHRAPNEL WOUNDS TO THE RIGHT TALOCRURAL LIGAMENT WITH BONE
PENETRATING SKIN STOP

EVAC HOSPITAL 3685
SGT ROBERT L. SEMIT
CLOSED SHRAPNEL WOUND TO RIGHT HEEL WITH BONE DAMAGE.

EVAC HOSPITAL 3685
SGT BIKLER ARNOLD/ RECOVERED IN EVAC HOSP 1694/
PIERCING SHRAPNEL WOUND TO THE

[TFR 39-100]

[Entire page is teletype.]
[handwritten "5"]

[handwritten "27"]

SOFT TISSUE OF THE MIDDLE THIRD OF LOWER RIGHT LEG,
CLOSED SHRAPNEL WOUND TO THE LOWER THIRD OF RIGHT THIGH
AND TO THE SOFT TISSUE OF LOWER THIRD OF THE RIGHT SHOULDER

CHOCHENSAN LAVEN CPL EVAC HOSP 3685
SHRAPNEL WOUND LEFT LEG / ALSO RECUPERATED
PULAVY EVAC HOSP 1694

STENDZH FRIGI PVT EVAC HOSP 3685
SICK TBT [Pelvic Tuberculosis?] TRANSPORTABLE STOP

LEVMANZH [NEUMAN crossed out by hand]

GAUSOV DZHEAN PRIVATE EVAC HOSP 3685
SHRAPNEL WOUND TO THE RIGHT SHOULDER WITH BONE DAMAGE STOP

NEUMAN NOT NECESSARY - EIGHTH LAST NAME NOT YET ESTABLISHED
RANK LT LEG WOUND.

PLEASE REPORT TO KHODORKOV THAT THE EVACUATION ON THE DOUGLAS WITH
ESCORT OF MUKHIN WAS ONLY JUST MADE KNOWN TO US ON 22 MAR 45 AND IN
THE MORNING THE CIPHER WAS RECEIVED ABOUT THE FOUR AMERICANS UNDER THE
MANAGEMENT OF MOROZOV AND THEIR REMOVAL FROM THE ARMY AND HOW IT HELD
UP THE TAKEOFF OF THE DOUGLASS AIRCRAFT AT MILOSLOVO AIRFIELD FOR A
SHORT WHILE STOP

[TFR 39-101]

[handwritten "page 28"]

[Official telegram form]

[handwritten "30"]

No. 800/255/59/95/25 3 82 44
To: Chief Medical Directorate - Smirnov

[stamp "SECRET
22 Mar 45
/203/ 3455"]

[illeg. handwriting]

I AM REPORTING ON THE NONTRANSPORTABLE [Page cut off]
: FOUR AMERICANS -

RESH ROBERT CPL THIGH INJURY GENERAL CONDITION NOT SERIOUS,

POLLEN ROBERT LT/FLIER SHIN INJURY SERIOUS CONDITION TEMPERATURE,

TWO SICK WITH INFECTIONS -

VAZENA MAK SGT/FLIER SCARLET FEVER

HALL DONAL'D PVT

876

[TFR 39-102]

TELEGRAPH [stamp "14/2"]
Commo center of the NKO USSR

TELEGRAM

:MERCURY TO LT COLONEL ROMANOV - GENERAL PLYAKHIN IS
COMING TO THE NEGOTIATIONS - DS TYPEFACE(SHIFT)

[handwritten "29"]

16 00 IGON'KIN :

203

877

[TFR 39-103]

Copy

LIST No. 3

CORPSES OF BRITISH AND AMERICANS
BROUGHT TO EVAC HOSP 1398 11 Mar 45

No.	Last, First Names	Rank
1.	BIZLEJ GENRI	NCO
2.	FREZORFURST Kokkej	Sr. SGT
3.	GEZEL' SHTEJN Frederick	SGT
4.	GOLYAN Leoli	CPL
5.	MIL'TON Dzhon	PVT
6.	TOMAS Dzhozef	GUARDSMAN
7.	FINISHAL'	
8.	ROBETSON Dzhak	PVT

Original Signed Chief of Medical Unit KhG 1398
Major (Medical)

(Trogun)

True copy: Chief, KhG 4548
Major (Medical)

(Parfatski)
[signature]

204

[TFR 39-104]

TELEGRAPH
Commo center of the NKU USSR

TELEGRAM

[Official telegram form]

No. 8000/255/59/95/25 3 82 44
To: Chief Military Medical Directorate - to Smirnov

[stamp "SECRET
22 Mar 45 /203/ 3455"]
[handwritten "30"]

[illeg. handwriting]

I AM REPORTING ON THE NONTRANSPORTABLE [Page cut off].
: FOUR AMERICANS

RESH ROBERT CPL HIP INJURY GENERAL CONDITION NOT SERIOUS,

POLLEN ROBERT LT/FLIER SHIN INJURY SERIOUS CONDITION TEMPERATURE,

TWO SICK WITH INFECTIONS -

VAZENA MAK SGT/FLIER SCARLET FEVER

HALL DONALD' PVT [Ends in progress]

NKU. 1083-45

[TFR 39-105]

[Entire page is handwritten.]

LIST

of servicemen of the Allied Forces delivered by aircraft
from the region of Shvibus-Lodz', to Odessa on 25 Mar 45
[handwritten "Case 1 2738"] [handwritten "Comrade Vajner"]

Last, First Names	DOB	Rank	Nat	Diagnosis
Kidd Fridrikh	1919	SGT	American	Closed fracture middle third right thigh.
Parker Griver	1924	Sr.LT	"	Closed fracture of the external malleolus of the lower left leg.
Norman Leon	1922	SGT	"	Head wounds, facial burns.
Landberg Al'bert	1922	LT	"	Sprained ligaments of the lower left leg.
Pal'mer Veston	1922	Sr.SGT	"	Closed shrapnel wound of the lower right leg.
Digoronimo Iosif	1922	CPL	"	Perforated shrapnel wound on upper third of right shoulder.
Daniehl' Garri	1916	CPT	"	Hydradenitis of the left axillary region.
Styuart Gil'sen	1922	CPT	"	Panaritium of toes on left foot.
Kenidi Urauf	1915	Sr.SGT	"	Closed shrapnel wound to the ribcage with damage to the brachial plexus.
Vaskes Antoni	1922	SGT	"	Perforated bullet wound to shoulder with paralysis of the right [illeg.]
Killer Ravali	1922	2LT	"	Subglenoid dislocation of the right shoulder.
Grog Richard	1923	SGT	"	Contusions of head. Closed wound right half of the ribcage - penetrating.
Fogosen Danal	1917	Sr. SGT	"	Closed fracture of the malleolus of the lower right leg ([illeg.]).
Diga Dzhim	1925	2LT	"	Closed shrapnel wound to right with bone damage.

[1 word illeg.] LTC Zh. Mukhin

[TFR 39-106]

THE CHIEF MEDICAL DIRECTORATE OF THE RED ARMY
to Comrade L. A. KHODORKOV
[handwritten "D No. 50"]

[stamp "SECRET
11867/1399"]

I am reporting that as of 27 Mar the following Americans and British, who were liberated from captivity, were located on the territory of Poland:

	British		Americans	
	Sick	Healthy	Sick	Healthy
1. Nontransportable sick:				
a. Krakow KhG 4548 CPL Klejn	1	-	-	-
b. Rembertuv KhG 2014 PVT Recke	1	-	-	-
" " PVT Kanak Bluda	1 (Hindu)	-	-	-
" " Pilot Bal'mer	-	-	1 (From Otvodsk)	-
c. Lodz' KhG 4288 Bezhen Mark	-	-	1 (Pilot)	-
2. Sick received from Front Hospitals of the 1st BF: Lodz' Medical Evac Hosp 1103 - will be evacuated to Odessa	-	-	5	-
3. Information by Front				
a. 1st BF - Neudamm Mobile Field Hosp 3533 flier Palen Robert	-	-	1 (nontrans)	-
Waldenburg KhG 2753 PVT Bar Georg	1	-	-	-
Deutch-Krone KhG 3 PVT Dlang Kornel	-	-	1 (nontrans)	-
Marienvalde KhG 4928 PVT Marling Gordon	1	-	-	-
Those liberated in Pomerania and concentrated in the 1st BF for dispatch to Odessa from Vzhesen Station	-	96	-	37
b. Also from Rembertuv Station - 2nd BF	-	12	-	9
c. Also from Rastenburg Station - 3rd BF	-	28	-	-

[illeg.] [handwritten "283"]

[TFR 39-106a]

Individual groups of men from the mentioned contingents continue to be sent from the fronts to Poland for loading on transport, as well as to separate front hospitals (Lodz') without regard to their assigned military unit.

Measures have been taken to dispatch all healthy transportable troops to Odessa on 27 Mar.

DEPUTY TO THE COMMISSIONER OF THE SNK USSR
FOR REPATRIATION MATTERS
LIEUTENANT GENERAL

[illeg. handwriting]

[signature]

(GOLUBEV)

"24" Mar 45
No. 001544

[TFR 39-107]

[handwritten "page 108"]

LIST No. 3

Sick American servicemen sent by plane from Lyublin to Odessa on 23 Mar 45.

No.	Rank/Branch of Service	Last Name, First Name
1.	---	DEHONES Edward
2.	Senior SGT	MARGOLIS Binimehn
3.	CPL	YANGBLAD Preuk
4.	Senior SGT	MARTYN Iosif
5.	SGT	ROBERT Shmed
6.	SGT	BIGLER Arnel'd
7.	CPL	CHEGENESAN Loven
8.	CPL	RESE Robert
9.	Sr.LT	BLANKINSKI
10.	---	SVUL'T

[TFR 39-108]

[handwritten "page 109"]

LIST No. 4

Sick American servicemen sent by plane from Poznan to Odessa on 23 Mar 45.

No.	Rank/Branch of Service	Last Name, First Name
1.	LT	VASKES Antoni
2.	CPT/flier	KIDD Fridrikh
3.	CPT/flier	PARKER Gravel
4.	LT/flier	PICHIJ Dzhim
5.	LT	FAGATSEN Zhdanov
6.	SGT/flier	PROTCH Richard
7.	LT	MILLER Russel'
8.	LT	LUNDERG Ogbert
9.	SGT	NORMAN Lench

[TFR 39-109]

[handwritten "page 110"]

LIST No. 5

Sick American servicemen sent by plane from Lodz' to Odessa on
23 Mar 45.

No.	Rank/Branch of Service	Last Name, First Name
1.	Senior SGT	PALMER Vestal
2.	Senior SGT	URAUZ Kensdi
3.	CPT/Flier	DANIEHL' Gari
4.		STUART Gil'zen
5.	CPL	DIGARANIKO Iosif

[TFR 39-110]

[handwritten "111"]

LIST No. 6

Sick servicemen of the Allied armies who remained in Lodz' based on
seriousness of ailments.

No.	Rank/Branch of service	Last Name, First Name
1.	OberLT	FIDEL'D Moris Martin
2.	CPT	KERNST Logan Dzako
3.	LT	HAGLS David Davidovich
4.	PVT	NEUMAN Geusov Dzohn
5.	SGT/flier	VAZENI Mark
6.	PVT	GALL Donal'd
7.	LT/flier	POLEN Robert

[TFR 39-111]

[Two illeg. handwritten references to Comrade Vajner]
[handwritten "270"]

OFFICE OF THE COMMISSIONER
THE USSR COUNCIL OF PEOPLE'S COMMISSARS
FOR REPATRIATION AFFAIRS

Moscow
Kropotkinskiy Lane No. 7
Tele No. G-6-11-00

21 Apr 1945 **Secret**
No. 02146 File No. 1

[handwritten "D-50"]

DEPUTY HEAD OF THE RED ARMY
CHIEF MEDICAL DIRECTORATE

To Comrade Major General (Medical) KHODORKOV

The following individuals are recuperating in hospitals on the territory of Poland for an extended period of time:

1. KANALU Gluda - Indian, PVT, city of Rembertuv, EhG No. 266
2. CLEJTON Radzhinal'd - British, Senior SGT, city of Krakow, EhG No. 4548, 1st Ukrainian Front
3. CORNET Genry - British, PVT, EhG No. 3284, city of Chenstokhov, 1st Ukr. Fr.
4. FELTNER Vil'yams - British, PVT, EhG No. 3284, city of Chenstokhov, 1st Ukr. Fr.

In addition, the following are at Front Hospitals:

1. MEJ Stenarij Penton - American, CPT, city of Khatvan, 2nd Ukr. Fr.

2. BRADLEY Ehrnest - British, EhG No. 2655, city of Shlokhau

ACTING DEPUTY TO THE COMMISSIONER OF THE SNK USSR
FOR REPATRIATION AFFAIRS

MAJOR GENERAL

[signature]
(BASIOV)

[stamp "SECRET
21 Apr 45
15148/4416"]

[TFR 39-112]

[Entire page handwritten]

D 50

pg. 139

Enciphered Telegram
from 2nd Ukr. Fr.
sent 17 Apr, received 17 Apr
[illeg. note to Comrade Vajner.]

[stamp "SECRET
17 Apr 45
75V/4332"]

Dovaroren, PFC, British, is in EhG 3390, amputation of both feet, transportable. American Kituman Richard, PVT, closed fracture lower third right femur, transportable. Erran Suzbachish Grodman is in EhG 39 (Iskaf), NCO, pulmonary tuberculosis (Iskaf).
Conclusion follows

[illeg. writing across entire page]

No. 1600

19:00

618

[TFR 39-113]

[Official telegraph form]

[handwritten "page 5"]

TELEGRAPH
Comms Center NKO USSR-FLASH DELIVER IMMEDIATELY
TO CHIEF MILITARY MED DIR - TO SMIRNOV

[handwritten "2nd Belar. Fr. 24"]

FROM 1577/354 B/S 2 4 14 52

Received 14:25 04 Apr No. 127 24

[Page is cut off.]

EhG 2222 KONITTS HAS AMERICAN PILOTS WHO WERE IN A
DOWNED B-17 OF BOMBER GROUP 103 :
KARL [Broken off] EDRICKSON [underlined by hand] LT MULTIPLE BULLET
WOUNDS OF SOFT TISSUE OF LEFT

[TFR 39-114]

[official telegraph form]

[handwritten "page 6"]

[stamp "24"]
TELEGRAPH
Comms Center NKO USSR

[handwritten "128"]

THIGH, LOWER RIGHT LEG, LEFT ANKLE

TRANSPORTABLE,

GEROLD D GETER [All names hand underlined] LT - HEALTHY,

ARTUR GERMAN 2LT INJURY TO SOFT TISSUE OF HEAD,
PENETRATING WOUNDS TO SKULL NONTRANSPORTABLE.

DEHAN STAVARD SGT CONTUSIONS TRANSPORTABLE,

GEROLD' MIL'NAN SGT INJURIES TO SOFT TISSUE OF FACE
[broken off] TRANSPORTABLE,

GEORG BEULI SGT CONTUSIONS TRANSPORTABLE,

CHARL'Z FARREL' SGT 8 BROKEN RIBS OF RIGHT

[TFR 39-115]

[official telegraph form]

[stamp "24"]
TELEGRAPH
Commo Center NKO USSR

No. 129

[page is broken off]

() TRANSPORTABLE.
SGT GERRI STUBI DIED DURING THE ACCIDENT
NUMBER 1/2711- COMRADE ZHUKOV

SOBOLEV 14 25

[handwritten "page 7"]

[TFR 39-116]

[official telegraph form]

[handwritten "page 24"]

TELEGRAPH
Commo Center NKO USSR

[page is cut off]
[illeg. handwritten note to Comrade Vajner.]
ODVO 1074 5/8 2673 21 45 - MOSCOW
CHIEF MEDICAL
DIRECTORATE OF THE RED ARMY
FROM SMIRNOV

A LIST OF INJURED ALLIED POWS
TAKEN BY PLANE TO COESSA ON 25
Mar 1945

FROM KRAKOV PILOTS [broken off] VAVA AND MALOV/ 2 DOUGLASES
1/ KARAN STANLEY - PVT - BRITISH
2/ MIKDEJ DEBORDEH - NCO - BRITISH
3/ MIKGREKO RONAL'D - NCO [cut off]

[handwritten "D 50"]

[official telegraph form]

[handwritten "page 25"]

- 4/ ZHIRAR ZHAN - SGT [cut off]
- 5/ [5/EH?DUARD - PVT - BRITISH
- 6/ [completely cut off]
- 7/ [cut off] PVT - BRITISH
- 8/ VOL' [cut off] - BRITISH
- 9/ PIASON IOGANN - [cut off]
- 10/ ZAJMAN KHUARD - SGT [cut off]
- 11/ [cut off] OCHNGAUZ - SEN. SGT - [cut off]
- 12/ [cut off] ARTUR - PVT - BRITISH
- 13/ [cut off] BRITISH
- 14/ LIDEHONDEH [cut off] BRITISH
- 15/ KOLMAN STENDLI [cut off]
- 16/ KLEVTON DEBONDEH - PVT - [cut off]
- 17/ [cut off] UD LEONARD - NCO
- 18/ [cut off] D GARRI - NCO

TELEGRAPH
Commo Center NKO USSR

TELEGRAM

- BRITISH
- 19/ VUD DEMON - SR SGT - BRITISH
 - 20/ KAKAREL VERTRON - PVT - BRITISH
 - 21/ BOLDING GARRI - SR SGT - BRITISH
 - 22/ BEKKER CERTUR - OBER FELTWEREL - BRITISH
- FROM LYUBLIN/2 DOUGLASES/PILOTS GUARDS LT NOVIKOV AND GUARDS CAPT OKALINA.
- 1/ GEUGEL SHENRI - SGT - AMERICAN
 - 2/ OSH'OR KARL - CPL - AMERICAN
 - 3/ KHISMAN VIL'YAM - SR SGT - AMERICAN
 - 4/ TAST DONAL'DO - SR SGT - AMERICAN
 - 5/ SVIT TEUG - LT - AMERICAN
 - 6/ YANBLAT FRANK - SGT - AMERICAN
 - 7/ BLYANKLENKLI NIL - SR SGT - AMERICAN

[Entire page is teletype]

[handwritten "page 25 back side"]

- 8/ MARTEN IOSIF - SR SGT - AMERICAN
- 9/ BIGER ARNOL'D - SGT/FLIER - AMERICAN
- 10/ DZHONS KHUARD - SEN SGT - AMERICAN
- 11/ RAJSH ROBERT - CPL - AMERICAN
- 12/ DOGLAS DEVID - PVT - AMERICAN
- 13/ DZHOUNS DEVID - CPL - AMERICAN
- 14/ AKKARELI VILEZH VIL'YAM - SGT - AMERICAN
- 15/ KUINLI IORAN - LT - AMERICAN
- 16/ DZHOGENNICON KHVEN - CPL - AMERICAN
- 17/ SMITO ROBERT - SGT - AMERICAN
- 18/ MIKSEN DZHM - LT - AMERICAN
- 19/ FERGATION DONAL'D - SR SGT - AMERICAN
- 20/ MARGOLIS VERNALIN - SR SGT - AMERICAN

[TFR 39-119]

[official telegraph form]

[handwritten "page 26"]

TELEGRAM

TELEGRAPH
Commo Center NKO USSR

21/ STEPONOV MARTI IOSEF - PVT - AMERICAN

FROM LODZ' PILOT LT NOVIKOV
 1/ PARKER GRAVER - SR LT - AMERICAN
 2/ DONALD GARRI - SR SGT - AMERICAN
 3/ PALMER VESTERST - SR SGT - AMERICAN
 4/ NORMAN LEON - SGT - AMERICAN
 5/ VASKES ANTHONY - LT - AMERICAN
 6/ PROK RICHARD - SGT - AMERICAN
 7/ LAMBERG ALBERT - LT - AMERICAN
 8/ KIDS FRIDRIKH - PVT - AMERICAN
 9/ KINADI RALET - SR SGT - AMERICAN
 10/ DZHOUPUL TOSLAD - CPT - AMERICAN

[TFR 39-120]

[Entire page is teletype]

[handwritten "page 26 back side"]

11/ STYUART GIL'ZON - PVT - AMERICAN
 12/ NOLLER ROVALI - LT - AMERICAN
 13/ ROGESHEN JOHN - LT - AMERICAN
 14/ PICHU - LT - AMERICAN

FROM CHENSTOKHOV. PILOT ZVEZDIN.

1/ LAJBAGADU GRUN - PVT - INDIAN
 2/ VALLA KRAM - PVT - INDIAN
 3/ RAKUBIR ZNIK - JR SGT - BRITISH
 4/ BERDVARO OMORD - PVT - BRITISH
 5/ VIL'SON DUGLAS - PVT - BRITISH
 6/ DADZHY KALET - PVT - INDIAN
 7/ TILASNI DZHEMS - PVT - BRITISH
 8/ SHARBUZEL' KRANOKHA - PVT - INDIAN
 9/ DADI KADEN - JR SGT - INDIAN

[TFR 39-121]

[official telegraph form]

[illeg. handwriting] [illeg. handwritten note to "Comrade Vajner"]
[handwritten "page 40"]TELEGRAPH
Commo Center NKO USSR

TELEGRAM

From 1291/858/606 61 6/5 2033

Received 02:13 [Month/Day unreadable]
TO THE CHIEF MIL MED DIR TO SMIRNOVI AM REPORTING THAT IN LANDSBERG RECOVERY
HOSPITAL THERE ARE THREE PEOPLE:
ONE AMERICAN: BRUZH, VIL'YAN; 2LT;
TWENTY SEVEN YEARS OLD; ENDOCARDITISTWO BRITISH : FIRST
MANZI, VIL'YAN; SGT; 44 YEARS OLD; FROSTBITE,
LEFT FOOT
: SECOND
NEJCHE, GOROL'; PVT; TWENTY FIVE YEARS OLD; WOUNDED,

[TFR 39-122]

[Entire page is teletype.]

[handwritten "page 40 back side"]

AMPUTATION UP TO RIGHT THIGH.
ALL TRANSPORTABLE. REQUEST
ORDERS ON FURTHER EVACUATION.
NO 3/1854 ANDREEV

0210 CHIGRINEV

[illeg. handwriting]

[TFR 39-123]

[entire page handwritten]

List

List No. 3

page No. 52

Sick American servicemembers sent by plane from Lyublin to Odessa - 23
Mar 45.

Rank	Name
---	DZHONES Ehdvard
Sr SGT	MARGOLIS Binimehn
CPL	YANGELAD Preuk
Sr SGT	MARTYN Iosef
SGT	ROBERT Shmed
SGT	BIGLER Arnol'd
CPL	CHEGENESAN Loven
CPL	RESH Robert
Sr LT	BLANKINSKI
---	SVUL'T

[TFR 39-124]

[entire page handwritten]

List No. [cut off]

A list of sick American servicemembers sent by plane from Poznan to
Odessa - 23 Mar 45.

	Rank	Name
1.	LT	VASKES Anthoni
2.	CPT/flier	KIDD Fridrik
3.	CPT/flier	PARKER Gravek
4.	LT/flier	Pichij Dahim
5.	LT	FAGATSE Ehdanov
6.	SGT/flier	PROTCH Richard
7.	LT	MILLER Rusel'
8.	LT	LUNDERG Ogbert
9.	SGT	WARMAN Leng

[TFR 39-125]

[entire page handwritten]

Page 53

List List No. 8

Sick American servicemembers sent by plane from Lodz' to Odessa - 23 Mar 45.

Rank	Name
SGT	PAL'MER Vestal
Sr SGT	URAUW Kensdi
CPT/flier	DANIEHL Tari
---	STYUART Gil'sen
CPL	DIGARANIKO Iosef

[TFR 39-126]

[handwritten "page 60"]

LIST No. 3

Sick American servicemembers sent by plane from Lublin to Odessa - 23 Mar 45.

[handwritten "60"]

No.	Rank	Name
1.	---	DZHONES Ehdvard
2.	Sr SGT	MARGOLIS Binimehn
3.	CPL	YANGBLAD Preuk
4.	Sr SGT	MARTIN Iosef
5.	SGT	ROBERT Shmed
6.	SGT	BIGLER Arnol'd
7.	CPL	CHEGENESAN Loven
8.	CPL	RESE Robert
9.	Sr LT	BLANKINSKIJ
10.	---	SVUL'T

[TFR 39-127]

LIST No. 4

[handwritten "page 61"]

Sick American servicemen sent by plane from Poznan to Odessa - 23
Mar 45.

[handwritten "6"]

Rank	Name
1. LT	VASKES Anthony
2. CPT/flier	KIDD Fririkh
3. CPT/flier	PARKER Gruek
4. LT/flier	PICHLJ Dahm
5. LT	FAGATSE Ehdanov
6. SGT/flier	PROTCH Richard
7. LT	MILLER Russel
8. LT	LUNDERG Ogbert
9. SGT	NORMAN Lench

[TFR 39-128]

LIST No. 5

[handwritten "page 62"]

Sick American servicemen sent by plane from Lodz' to Odessa - 23
Mar 45.

[handwritten "62"]

No.	Rank	Name
1.	SGT	PAL'MER Vestal
2.	Sr SGT	URAUPE Kenzdi
3.	CPT/flier	DANIEHL' Gari
4.	---	STYUART Gil'sen
5.	CPL	DIGARANIKO Josef

[TFR 39-129]

LIST No. 6 [handwritten "page 63"]

Sick servicemen of Allied armies remaining in Lodz' due to severity of ailments. (Americans)

[handwritten "63"]

No.	Rank/Branch	Name
1.	OberLT	FIDEL'D, Moris Martin
2.	CPT	KERNST, Iogan Dzako
3.	LT	NAGLS, David Davidovich
4.	PVT	NEUMAN, Geucov Dzhan
5.	SGT/flier	VAZENI, Mark
6.	PVT	GALL, Donald
7.	LT/flier	POLEN, Robert

[TFR 39-130]

[official telegraph form]

[stamp "VVS"]

[illeg. handwriting]
[page is cut off]TELEGRAPH
Commo Center NKO USSR

TELEGRAM

3259/2968/42 76 19 5 2 38
TO CHIEF MIL MED DIR. TO KHODERKOVI AM REPORTING NEW AMERICANS AND INDIANS RECUPERATING
IN MY HOSPITAL :

AMERICANS : FIRST - PARKER, OTRON; PVT; BROKEN SHIN CONFINED
TO BED
SECOND - SIBORIN, SHARL; PILOT CPT; AFTER BREAK
OF SPINE CONFINED TO BED, BOTH ARE AT
LANDSBERG.

INDIANS, FIVE : TEK, BAGADUT; PPC [listed as ober afrejter]
DVE KESKE [broken off] JUNIOR OFFICER
CHANSERAJ PVT
ROMBATA KARLE PVT
NASIF SIN PVT.

ALL OF THEM HAVE PULMONARY TUBERCULOSIS.

[TFR 39-131]

Copy. 2

Embassy of USSR in the USA
Washington

(stamp "MID-USSR
USA DEPT.
File 44
22 Apr 1946")

9 April 1946.

DIRECTOR OF THE USA DEPARTMENT, MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS

To Comrade S.K. TSARAPKIN

I am sending you the State Department's demarche of 9 April 1946 inquiring as to the burial location of 6 American airmen shot down by the Japanese near Cape Lopatka on the Kamchatka peninsula on 9 June 1945.

Please reply to the embassy with the necessary information for forwarding to the State Department.

[signature]

ATTACHMENTS: see text

Chargé d'affaires
of the USSR in the USA
[illeg. handwriting]

[signature] (N. Novikov)

[TFR 39-132]

Copy. 2
Translation from English.

The Secretary of State pays his respects to the temporary Chargé d'Affaires of the USSR and requests that he inform the State Department as to the burial location of the following United States Army Air Corps personnel:

Captain Dzh. Natam Ehlzer	0-724028
Captain E. Dzh. Irving	0-396938
Lt. Eutnant Orvil Kh. Lord	0-784739
Senior Sergeant Frederik A. Lang	34275916
Senior Sergeant Roland R. Ehrner	16046137
Corporal Link K. Denton, Jr.	34505983

These individuals were crew members of a United States Army B-25 bomber aircraft No. 44-29148, which was shot down 9 June 1945 by enemy aircraft near Cape Lopatka, Kamchatka, USSR.

State Department
Washington, 9 April 1946.

Translated - Alekseeva.

True copy: [illeg. signature]

[TFR 39-133]

[handwritten several illeg. words "Filed"]

[handwritten "537"]

Armed Forces Ministry
of the USSR
GENERAL STAFF
Directorate for
Foreign Relations
"22" Sep 1948
No. 145832c
Moscow

[stamp "MID-USSR
USA Dept. ~~SECRET~~
entry No. 1380
"23" September 1948"]

[stamp "Declassified
3 June 19" cut off]
~~Secret~~
Copy No. 1

To the Director of the USA Dept.
of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs
USSR

To Comrade P.T. OREKHOV
Reference No. 617/USA

I am reporting that the remains of six American fliers who
perished during the Great Patriotic War and were buried on Cape
Lopatka, Kamchatka, have been exhumed and sent to Japan, in six
galvanized coffins, onboard the steamship "Dojku Maru" on 16 September
of this year.

It has been suggested that General DEREVIANKO organize their
transfer to American authorities in Japan.

original signed
COMMANDER OF THE DIRECTORATE FOR FOREIGN RELATIONS
GENERAL STAFF OF USSR ARMED FORCES
LIEUTENANT GENERAL
[signature] (SLAVIN)

[TFR 39-134]

[handwritten "36 18"]

Moscow, 12 April 1945

Dear Mr. Kennan,

I am writing to confirm the receipt of your letter of 8
April 1945 concerning the issuance of a Soviet exit visa to Mr.
Charl's Gordon Barrouz and have the honor to inform you that, as
reported by official Soviet organs, an exit visa to leave the USSR has
been approved for Charl's Gordon Barrouz as of 10 April of this year.

With sincere respect,

Original signed Tsarepkin

to Mr. D.C. Kennan
Counsel to the Embassy
of the United States of America

Moscow

Distrn:
Molotov
Vyshinski
Bekasov
Consular Dept.
file 2.
12 April 45
[handwritten [1 illeg.] "22/" [1 illeg.]]

True copy: [signature]

[TFR 39-135]

USSR
PEOPLE'S COMMISSARIAT
OF INTERNAL AFFAIRS

[stamp "DECLASSIFIED
3 Jul 92"] [handwritten "19" "48" "20"]
COPY
copy No. 1
SECRET

TO THE HEAD OF THE CONSULATE DEPARTMENT
OF THE NKVD OF THE USSR - Comrade BELYAEV.

Chief Directorate of Militia
OVIR
" " Apr 45

In reference to No. KO-1430 dated 2 Mar 45

No. 29/v/3456
city of Moscow

It is reported that, on 10 Apr 45, citizen BARROUZ Charl's
Gardoni was issued a visa for exit from the USSR through the KPP Baku
No. 100047, valid until 24 Apr 45.

HEAD OF THE OVIR, CHIEF DIRECTORATE
OF THE MILITIA NKVD USSR

(EMEL'YANOV)

DEPUTY HEAD, 2ND DIVISION OVIR
MAJOR, MILITIA

(LANDAR')

[illeg.] Moscow OVIR comrade Ryazantsev
reports that Barrouz received the passport
on 10 Apr.

(Nikishin)

[handwritten "True copy:"] [illeg. signature]

[TFR 39-136]

USSR
MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS
Department 2nd Far East

Attachment No. 1
[handwritten "46"]
copy No. 1
No. 73/2FE

Moscow, Kuznetskiy issue No. and date record No. and date
Most. 2145
[Telephone number illeg.]
[stamp "[mostly illeg.] 401" [stamp "[mostly illeg.] 1557s."
1 Mar 47 142" 1 Mar 47"]

23 Feb 47

TO THE ASSISTANT CHIEF OF GENERAL STAFF, ARMED FORCES OF THE USSR
To the General of the Army A.I. ANTONOV

I submit for your approval a draft of the reply to MacArthur's
staff regarding his request to send an American mortuary team to the
Petropavlovsk region in Kamchatka [to obtain] the remains of Tomas
Ring.

If you concur, please stamp the draft. I will then present it to
Comrade Molotov for authorization.

DEPUTY MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS
USSR -

[signature]
[Ya. MALIK]

Sent in 2 copies fx.
1- addressee
2- file

[handwritten "[illeg.] 438960s"]

[TFR 39-137]

[stamp "Central Archives

MO RF

Fond 40
 Opis' 178425ss
 Delo 1
 Korobka pg 46"]

[TFR 39-138]

[handwritten "to 1557s]

[handwritten "Attachment No. 1"]
 [handwritten "47"]

" " Jan 1947
 No. _____

to Comrade V.M. MOLOTOV.

In a telegram from Tokyo on 27 October 1946, Comrade Derevyanko reported that he received a memorandum from MacArthur's staff with a request to permit the Americans to send a special team from the Mortuary Bureau to the Petropavlovsk region in Kamchatka [to obtain] the remains of Tomas E. Ring, an American Air Corps Technical Sergeant who was buried there in 1943.

In reply to our inquiry to the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the USSR on this matter, General of the Army Antonov reported in a letter dated 6 December 1946, that according to information from the border guard, nine American military service members were buried in five different places in Kamchatka from 1943 to 1945. The grave of Tomas E. Ring is currently being put in order and will be ready in a month. At the same time, the letter noted that Marshall Vasilevskij considers it necessary to decline the American request for access to Kamchatka.

As we know from the practice of our military authorities in the Balkans, where the Americans made similar requests to our military authorities, such American commissions were given access to the burial places of the US Army servicemen.

In connection with the above, I would consider it advisable to propose the following solution:

[TFR 39-139]

[handwritten "to 1557s"]

[handwritten "48"]

2.

1. Issue instructions to the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the USSR to conduct exhumations of all nine graves of the American military servicemen and to cremate the remains. Send the inscribed urns of those cremated to Vladivostok for subsequent delivery to Comrade Derevyanko in Tokyo.

2. Issue instructions to Derevyanko to send a reply to MacArthur's Staff, pointing out that with regard to the request to send a special mortuary team to Kamchatka to obtain the remains of Sergeant T. Ring, the Soviet authorities have established that during the period of 1943-45, in addition to Sergeant Ring, eight American servicemen (list the names) were buried on Kamchatka. These graves were exhumed and the bodies sent for cremation with all observance of military honors. Express our readiness to transfer the urns of all listed personnel to MacArthur's staff. They can be sent immediately from Vladivostok to Tokyo with the consent of MacArthur's staff.

Request your instructions.

(Ya. Malik)

[TFR 39-140]

[stamp "Central Archives
MO RF"]

Fond 40
Opis' 178425ss
Delo 1
Korobka pg 47-48*)

[TFR 39-141]

[handwritten "Attachment No. 2, 3 pgs"] [handwritten "43"]

[handwritten "Entry 1557a, 2075a"]

copy No. 2

TO THE DEPUTY MINISTER FOREIGN AFFAIRS
OF THE USSR

25 Mar 47

[handwritten "No. 438960a"]

Comrade MALIK

Reference No. 73/2ndFB

It is necessary to decline the request from MacArthur's staff to send a special mortuary team to Kamchatka and the Kurile Islands to exhume the remains of American Servicemen buried in these regions.

Conducting cremations in place is not possible. It is possible to exhume the graves of Sergeant TOMAS RING, Sergeant UDOCHEK, and Corporal NET'YU-M GLADEK and send their remains to Vladivostok.

The Americans are aware of the deaths of the three servicemen listed above. The Americans do not know about the deaths of six fliers who were shot down near Cape Lopatka and therefore we should not inform them of it.

I consider it advisable to report the following to MacArthur through comrade DEREVYANKO:

[handwritten "42-81"]

[TFR 39-142]

[handwritten "11"]

- 2 -

"In accordance with your wishes, the Soviet command issued orders regarding the exhumation and delivery of remains of Sergeant TOMAS RING, Sergeant UDOCHEK, and Corporal NET'YU-M GLADEK to Vladivostok. These last two were also buried in this area.

The transfer of remains can be conducted in the ports of Vladivostok or Tokyo, at your convenience.

With regard to the remains of DZHEKK GRINSHTAJN, the Soviet command has issued orders to conduct a search in the area you indicated.

The results of the search will be reported."

DEPUTY CHIEF TO THE GENERAL STAFF
USSR ARMED FORCES
GENERAL OF THE ARMY

(ANTONOV)

[TFR 39-143]

[stamp "Central Archives

MO RF

Fond 40
 Opis' 178425ss
 Delo 1
 Korobka pg 43-44"]

[TFR 39-144]
 [handwritten "72"]
 Copy No. 2

Foreign Affairs
 Directorate
 22 April 47
 [handwritten "43954ss"]

TO THE DEPUTY MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS
 USSR
 Comrade MALIK

Attachment to our No. 438960s of 25 Mar 47

In response to our inquiry concerning missing-in-action US
 Army Private DEHEK GRINSHEIN, the Chief of Staff of the Far East
 Military District reported that there were no remains of deceased
 American fliers found during the Red Army occupation of the Kurile
 Island area.

original signed
 HEAD OF THE DIRECTORATE OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS
 CHIEF OF STAFF OF THE USSR ARMED FORCES
 LIEUTENANT GENERAL

____ (M. SLAVIN)

True Copy: [illegible signature]

[TFR 39-145]

[archival stamp at bottom of page "Central Archives, MO RF, Fond 40, Opis' 178425ss, Delo 1, Korobka 1. 72"]

[TFR 39-146]

[handwritten "Attachment No. 1"]

Directorate of
Internal Relations

TO THE DEPUTY MINISTER OF FOREIGN
AFFAIRS, USSR

[cut off] Feb 47

[cut off] [handwritten "8184s"]

To Comrade MALIK

In Reference to our No. 293787a dated 7 Dec 46

I am sending an attached list of American aircrew members who perished or are missing in the Far East, and about whom the American military mission has inquired to the General Staff of the USSR Armed Forces several times.

I also wish to report:

- a) Sergeant TOMAS RING (REYNS) from the crew of the interned B-24 aircraft No. 240309. Both bones of the left shin were broken and the right hip joint was dislocated. Crew members delivered him in a state of shock to the infirmary of the Kamchatka Border Detachment, where he died. He is buried in the Petropavlovsk Cemetery.
- b) Sergeant Pavel UDOCHER (UDCHER) from the crew of the interned B-25 aircraft No. 336158 was delivered dead on 11 May 45. He is buried 5 miles south of Petropavlovsk-Kamchatskii.
- c) Corporal MET'YU M. GLADEK from the crew of the interned B-25 aircraft No. 43-36160 was delivered dead on 10 Jun 45. He is buried on Kamchatka.

[TFR 39-147]

[handwritten "15"]

- 2 -

All three crews of these aircraft, with the exception of the dead, were transferred to the Americans through the Tashkent Internment Camp.

The following US Air Force servicemen are also buried on Kamchatka:

1. Captain EHDUARD EHRVING (EHDUARD DZH. IRVING)
2. Captain NAJTEN ANZER (DZH. NATAN EJZAR)
3. Lieutenant NERD' (ORVIL KH. LORD)
4. Sergeant FRED BENE (FREDERIK A. LEHNG)
5. Corporal ROLAND (ROLAND R. ERNGER)
6. Corporal LES MAKE-DENTON (LEZLI K. DENTON DZHCH.)

All were crew members of the B-25 aircraft No. 44-29148 which was shot down on 10 Jun 45 south of Cape Lopatka.

According to the Far Eastern Military District Command, no other graves of American servicemen were found.

ATTACHEMENTS: A four page list.

THE HEAD OF THE INTERNAL RELATIONS DIRECTORATE
GENERAL STAFF OF THE ARMED FORCES OF THE SOVIET UNION
LIEUTENANT GENERAL

_____(N. SLAVIN)

[handwritten "True copy:"] [illeg. signature]

[stamp "Central Archives
MO RF
Fond 40
Opis' 178425ss
Delo 5
Korobka pg 14-15]

[TFR 39-149]

Record No. 01507

[handwritten "9099s" "59" [stamp "[mostly illeg.] 2322
28 Oct 47"]]

Chief of Staff
Far East Military
District
2 October 1947
No. 0659

TO THE HEAD, INTERNAL RELATIONS DEPARTMENT
MINISTRY OF THE USSR ARMED FORCES

[handwritten "30.10."]

A copy of the protocols on the exhumation of the American fliers
and a copy of the statement of their transfer to the captain of the
steamship 'Byryanin' is attached.

Attachment: Copy of the Protocols and statement on 4
pages, addressee only

ACTING CHIEF OF STAFF, MVV [SKROTA?]
LIEUTENANT GENERAL

[signature]
(DROMOV)

typed 2 copies
Copy 1 - addressee
" 2 - file
Checked by Romashev
Sent. BA.27 Sep 47
No. [illeg.]

[illeg. handwriting]

[TFR 39-151]

[handwritten "to 9099s" "60"]

DUPLICATE

PROTOCOL

6 Jul 47

city of Petropavlovsk

On this day and year, the commission consisting of the chairman - Lieutenant Colonel F.P. Kukarin and members - Chief of Anatomic Pathology Laboratory Major (Medical) A.A. Terekhov and medical-forensic expert Captain (Medical) V.S. Remarchuk conducted an exhumation of the corpse of US Air Force Corporal Maht'yu M. Gladek, who died on 10 Jun 1945 in air combat against Japanese fighters near Simisyu Island.

The exhumation of the above-mentioned corpse was conducted in order to return him to his homeland.

The body, dressed for burial and wrapped in a white linen sheet, was removed from the grave and placed in a wooden coffin which was then placed in a metal coffin made of galvanized iron. The lid was fastened with screws and hermetically soldered shut.

A brass plate engraved with the last name of the deceased is affixed to the lid of the metal coffin.

This statement attests to the aforementioned.

Lieutenant Colonel (KUKARIN)

SIGNATURES: Major (Medical) (TEREKHOV)

Captain (Medical) (REMARCHUK)

CAPTAIN (Admin) [signature]
(ROMASHOV)

[seal "Military Unit Field Post 83529"]

[stamp "Central Archives
MO RF"]Fond 40
Opis' 178425ss
Delo 5
Korobka pg 60]

[TFR 39-152]

[TFR 39-153]

[handwritten "to 9099s" "61"]

DUPLICATE

PROTOCOL

6 Jul 47

city of Petropavlovsk

On this day and year, the commission consisting of the chairman - Lieutenant Colonel P.P. Kukarin and members - Chief of Anatomic Pathology Laboratory Major (Medical) A.A. Terekhov and medical-forensic expert Captain (Medical) V.S. Remarchuk conducted an exhumation of the corpse of US Air Force Sergeant PAVEL UTCHER, who died on 11 Jun 1945 while bombing Japanese targets near Simisyu Island.

The exhumation of the above-mentioned corpse was conducted in order to return him to his homeland.

The body, dressed for burial and wrapped in a white linen sheet, was removed from the grave and placed in a wooden coffin which was then placed in a metal coffin made of galvanized iron. The lid was fastened with screws and hermetically soldered shut.

A brass plate engraved with the last name of the deceased is affixed to the lid of the metal coffin.

This protocol attests to the aforementioned.

Lieutenant Colonel (KUKARIN)

SIGNATURES: Major (Medical) (TEREKHOV)

Captain (Medical) (REMARCHUK)

CAPTAIN (Admin) [signature]
(ROMASHOV)

[seal "Military Unit Field Post 83529"]

[stamp "Central Archives
MQ RF"]Fond 40
Opis' 178425ss
Delo 5
Korobka pg 61"]

[TFR 39-155]

[handwritten "to 9099s" "62"]

COPY

PROTOCOL

6 Jul 47

city of Petropavlovsk

On this day and year, the commission consisting of the chairman - Lieutenant Colonel F.P. Kukarin and members - Chief of Anatomic Pathology Laboratory Major (Medical) A.A. Terakhov and medical-forensic expert Captain (Medical) V.S. Remezchuk conducted an exhumation of the corpse of US Air Force Sergeant TOMAS E. KING who died in a hospital on 1 Sep 1943 as a result of wounds received during an aircraft crash on 12 August 1943 in the region of Petropavlovsk.

The exhumation of the above-mentioned corpse was conducted in order to return him to his homeland.

The body, dressed for burial and wrapped in a white linen sheet, was removed from the grave and placed in a wooden coffin which was then placed in a metal coffin made of galvanized iron. The lid was fastened with screws and hermetically soldered shut.

A brass plate engraved with the last name of the deceased is affixed to the lid of the metal coffin.

This protocol attests to the aforementioned.

Lieutenant Colonel (KUKARIN)

SIGNATURES: Major (Medical) (TEREKHOV) —

Captain (Medical) (REMEZCHUK)

CAPTAIN (Admin) [signature]
(ROMASHOV)

[seal "Military Unit Field Post 83529"]

[TFR 39-156]

[stamp "Central Archives
MO RF

Fond 40
Opis' 178425ss
Delo 5
Korobka pg 62"]

[TFR 39-157]

[handwritten "to 9099s" "63"]

COPY

STATEMENT

12 Jul 47

Petropavlovsk

On this day and year, Lieutenant Colonel F.M. Kukarin, the representative of the Garrison Chief of the city of Petropavlovsk, in the presence of Captain 3rd Class Yu. D. DARKIN conducted a transfer of the exhumed corpses of American fliers: Sergeant TOMAS E. RING, Sergeant PAVEL UTCHIK, and Corporal MERT'YU M. GLADEK to the captain of the steamship 'SYRYANIN' N.V. KOPYLOV, for delivery to Vladivostok, where they will be surrendered to representatives of the 5th Navy. The above named bodies are being transferred in galvanized iron coffins; the lids fastened with screws and hermetically soldered. Brass memorial plates engraved with the last name of the deceased are affixed to the lids of the metal coffins.

Three protocols, written in English, one for each coffin, are being transferred along with the coffins.

The captain of the steamship "SYRYANIN" has received three coffins and three protocols written in English.

Completed: Lieutenant Colonel - Kukarin

Present during the transfer
Captain 3rd Rank

- DARKIN

CAPTAIN (Admin) [signature]
(ROMASHOV)

[seal "Military Unit Field Post 83529"]

[TFR 39-158]

[stamp "Central Archives
MO RF

Fond 40
Opis' 178425ss
Delo 5
Korobka pg 63"]

[TFR-39-159]

[illeg. handwritten note to Slavin dated
10 Nov 46]

Secret Copy No. 1
[handwritten "181"]

USSR
Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Department 2nd Far East

Moscow, Kuznetakij Most. 2115 Record and date Index No. and date

Tel. 5-30-20

[stamp "[mostly illeg.] 7022a
10 Nov 46"]

No. 366/2FE
4 Oct, 46

TO THE CHIEF, GENERAL STAFF OF THE USSR ARMED FORCES
Marshal A.M. VASILJEVSKIY

Comrade Derevyanko reports in telegram No. 54267 dated 27 October about a memorandum he received from MacArthur's staff which requested permission to send a special mortuary team to the Petropavlovsk region on Kamchatka to obtain the remains of Air Corps Technical Sergeant Thomas E. Ring, who was buried there in 1943.

If you have no objection to allowing the Americans access to Kamchatka, it would be possible to give Comrade Derevyanko instructions to reply to MacArthur's staff that the American government should apply directly through their Embassy in Moscow on this matter.

Until you make a decision, we must keep in mind that the Americans may make similar requests in the future. Therefore, it is desirable to establish how many Americans were buried on Kamchatka during the war years 1941-1945 and their places of burial.

I request that you report your observations on the entire situation.

DEPUTY MINISTER OF FOREIGN
AFFAIRS USSR -

[signature]
(Ya. Malik)

[stamp "Entry No. 3575
5 Nov 1946"]

Secretariat of the Chief of the General Staff

Typed 2 copies.rsh
1 - to addressee,

[Bottom of page is cut off]

[TFR-39-160]

[stamp "Central Archives MO RF
TOP SECRET, copy No. 1
Fond 40
Opis' 178419ss
Delo 3
Pages 180,181
Order No. 61/84
Done by [signature]
19 May 92"]

[TFR 39-161]

[stamp "Top Secret"] [handwritten "180"]
[handwritten "Entry No. 7022s"] SECRET
Copy No. 2

[handwritten "D6"]

TO THE DEPUTY MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS
USSR

Comrade MALIK

7 Dec 46

[handwritten "No. 293787s"]

Reference No. 366/2fe, No. 401/2fe

According to reports from the border troops, the following
American military servicemen were buried in five different places
on Kamchatka from 1943-45:

1. Sergeant TOMAS RING, [handwritten "interned aircrew"] buried in the Petropavlovsk cemetery in 1943.
2. Sergeant UDOCHER, [handwritten "interned aircrew"] buried five kilometers north of Petropavlovsk in 1945.
3. Lieutenant MERD, Corporal LES HAKE-DENTON, Captain NEJTEN ANZER, Sergeant FRED VENE, and Corporal ROLAND; all perished 9 Jun 45, buried on the southern end of Cape Lopatka. [handwritten "perished aircrew" after each name]
4. Captain EDUARD KHRVING [handwritten "perished aircrew"] and Corporal RET'YU M. GLADEK [handwritten "interned aircrew"], are buried in various places on Kamchatka in 1945.

IN TOTAL, 9 Americans are buried on Kamchatka.

The grave of TOMAS RING is currently being put in order and will be ready in a month.

Marshal of the Soviet Union VASILEVSKIJ believes it necessary to refuse the Americans access to Kamchatka.

original signed

DEPUTY CHIEF OF THE GENERAL STAFF
USSR ARMED FORCES
GENERAL OF THE ARMY

(ANTONOV)

[handwritten "True copy:] [illeg. signature]

[TFR 39-162]

[illeg. stamp]

OFFICE OF THE COMMISSIONER
THE USSR COUNCIL OF PEOPLES COMMISSARS
FOR REPATRIATION AFFAIRS
Moscow, 7 Kropotkinskiy Prospect, tel G-6-11-00

[handwritten "D-17"]
No. 07801

27 Dec 45

Entry no. 09061, 12031/sh.

TO THE ASSISTANT CHIEF OF THE GENERAL STAFF
OF THE RED ARMY

To Comrade Lieutenant General N.V. SLAVIN

In sending you a copy of the letter from General Roberts, the US Embassy Military Attache, I am reporting that a corresponding request has been made to Comrade Lieutenant General KAZAKOVTSSEV, the Chief of Staff of the Far East District, in regards to the aircrew that perished.

However, since the last response (see telegram No. 204257 dated 19 Dec 45) the following has become known:

An American B-25 was damaged during a flight to Syumusyu Island. The aircraft violated the state border and flew into our territory at an altitude of 200 meters at 1130 hrs. A TOF battery on Cape Lopatka shot down the aircraft at 1132 hrs. The aircraft crashed at coordinates 5054 north longitude and 15643 east latitude. The six crew members perished. The aircrew composition, as recovered from burned documents, is as follows:

1. IRVING Eduard, aircraft commander, also Squadron Commander
2. LORDER Kherri, pilot, Lieutenant
3. AJZER Natan, navigator, Captain
4. PENE Fred, flight mechanic, Senior Sergeant
5. DENTON Lesli, radio operator, Corporal
6. KHRNSER Roland, gunner, Private.

I do not believe that it is advisable for us to report the incident to the US Mission, especially considering the fact that it does not concern repatriation.

I request that the Mission be given an answer in accordance with your decision on this matter.

We have made General ROBERTS aware that any response to the question they raised in letter No. 22 dated 23 Nov 45 will be made by you.

ACTING DEPUTY COMMISSIONER OF THE SNK USSR
ON REPATRIATION AFFAIRS
MAJOR GENERAL

[signature] (BASIOV)

[illeg. handwriting]

[TFR 39-163]

[handwritten "6751s"]
[handwritten "19 Aug 47"]

[handwritten "49"]

USSR
Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Department 2nd Far East

Moscow, Kuznetskiy Most. No. 15 Record and date No. and date

Tel. 5-30-20

[stamp "3352
18 Aug 47"]copy No. 1 No. 250/2DV
18 Aug 47TO THE ASSISTANT CHIEF OF THE GENERAL STAFF
USSR ARMED FORCES

[illeg. handwriting]

To Comrade General of the Army A. I. ANTONOV

Comrade Major General Kislenko, our representative in the Allied Council for Japan, has reported that MacArthur's staff has made a request for information on the burial of crew members of an American aircraft. According to information held by the staff, they died on 9 Jun 45 near Cape Lopatka on Kamchatka and were buried, as suggested by the Americans, by Soviet authorities in that same area. The Americans reported the following information on the deceased:

Last, First	Rank	Service number
1. Irving Edward Dzh.	Captain	0396038
2. Ehsar Dzh. Matan	Captain	0724028
3. Lord Orvil Kh.	2nd Lieutenant	0784739
4. Ehnmer Roland R.	Sr. Sergeant	16046137
5. Lang Frederik A.	Sr. Sergeant	34275906
6. Denton Leslie S.	Corporal	34607983

At the same time, MacArthur's staff requests permission to send an American mortuary services investigation group to the territory of the USSR in order to search for and return the remains of the above mentioned crew members.

[illeg. handwriting along left side]

[illeg. handwriting]

[TFR 39-164]

[handwritten "50"]
2.

[handwritten "to 67315?"]

The information reported on the deceased American fliers corresponds with the information detailed in your letter No. 438184s dated 13 Feb of this year.

Request you inform the MID USSR as to the opinion of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the USSR concerning the above mentioned request from MacArthur's staff.

DEPUTY MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS
OF THE USSR[signature]
(A. Vyshinskij)typed 2 copies, f2
1- to addressee
2- to file

[handwritten "letter sent from Comrade Slavin"]

[TFR 39-165]

Copy
(handwritten 328)

MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS USA
EMBASSY OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Secretariat of the Military Attache
Moscow, USSR

23 Nov 45

No. 22
to Lieutenant General K.D. GOLUBEV
Deputy Representative SMK for repatriation
Moscow, USSR

Dear General GOLUBEV,

On 19 Sep 45, we made a request for the exact location of the
graves of the B-25 aircrew which perished in combat near Kamchatka on
9 Jun 45.

The crew composition:

Captain Kh. Natan AJZER, serial number O-724028

Lieutenant Orvil Kh. Lord, s/n O-784739

Captain Edward Kh. IRVING, s/n O-396038

Staff Sergeant Frederik A. Lang, s/n 342759916

Staff Sergeant Roland R. Ehrnsner, s/n 16046137

Corporal Leslie K. DENTON, s/n 34607983.

We have not yet received a reply. We would be very grateful for
a reply to our letter so that we might report to the Defense
Department.

Yours truly,
US Military Attache
Brigadier General US Army
F.W. ROBERTS

True copy:
Guards Captain

(signature)
(PCHKLINTSEV)

"24" Dec 45

[TFR 39-166]

[stamp "Central Archives MO RF
TOP SECRET, copy No. 1
Fund 40
Opis' 11549
Delo 269
Pages 47,48,327,328
Order No. 61/83
Completed [signature]
19 May 92"]

[TFR 39-167]

[handwritten "191"]

Report

10 June 1945, 1800 hours Kamchatka time. Naval map 2988, published 1943. Petropavlovsk, Kamchatka

As a result of the interrogation of the crew [of one of the aircraft] and the results of the observations of the Border Guards detail, I, Major REVA, the representative of the USSR Border Troops, have established that:

On 10 June 1945 at 0620 hours, a U.S. B-25J "Mitchell" aircraft, number 43-36160, departed a U.S. military base in the Aleutian Islands on a course of 260 degrees on a mission to bomb the fishing industry and ships on the Japanese Island of Araid. It was in a formation of eight aircraft of the same type under the overall command of Captain Irving, the Squadron Commander.

During the approach to the target the detachment was divided into two groups of four planes each in order to attack from two directions. At approximately 1120 hrs bombs were dropped on the target from an altitude of 500 meters. While returning to their base the aircraft were attacked by five Japanese Zero Oscar fighters who had followed to the approximate coordinates of 50 degrees, 55 minutes latitude, 156 degrees, 40 minutes longitude. The right engine failed, the hydraulic system was damaged and the turret gunner was killed by Japanese fighter gunfire. The crew observed Captain Irving's aircraft, which supposedly was being shot down by Japanese fighters, begin to smoke in the air approximately two miles from Cape Lopatka, glide down and crash on Kamchatka near Lopatka. The two undamaged aircraft departed for base. Flying on one engine, the decision was made to land on Kamchatka. During the approach to Petropavlovsk, a malfunction of the hydraulic system was discovered and the landing gear would not go down.

At 1228 hrs at coordinates 52 degrees, 58 minutes latitude and 158 degrees, 56 minutes, 15 seconds longitude it violated the state border of the USSR, at 1230 hrs at coordinates 53 degrees, 02 minutes latitude and 158 degrees, 56 minutes longitude it flew over the territory of the Kamchatka peninsula and at 1243 hrs it landed at the Elizovo airfield - 128 AD, on its fuselage with retracted landing gear. As a result of landing on the fuselage, the entire lower part of the fuselage along the entire length of the aircraft was crushed and deformed and the propeller blades of the engines were bent. Except for the one killed in the air, the crew of five were healthy and unharmed:

1. Aircraft Commander	Lieutenant	Robert B. Varing	22 yrs
2. Copilot	Lieutenant	Zherri N. Krut	22 yrs
3. Navigator	Lieutenant	Bajron F. Pil't	21 yrs
4. Radio operator	Corporal	Roj A. Devejn	20 yrs

[TFR 39-167a]

5. Gunner Corporal Roj S. Keris 22 yrs

A corpse was discovered in the plane with a bullet wound through the head - the flight engineer, who was also a gunner, Corporal Matthew M. Gladek - 20 years.

The crew was disarmed and interned. The corpse, until further notice, remains at the airfield under guard.

[stamp "Basis: TsAPV Fund No. 231, op. No. 1, d. KhR 871, l. 191"]

This document was prepared in triplicate.

ENCLOSURE: Report of the technical inspection of the aircraft and [1 word illeg.] removable equipment.

REPRESENTATIVE OF THE BORDER TROOPS
USSR - MAJOR:- [signature] (REVA)

COMMANDER OF THE U.S. AIRCRAFT [signature]
LIEUTENANT:- (ROBERT B. WABRING)

TRANSLATOR-LIEUTENANT [signature] (TRUKHACHEV)

[stamp "Basis: TsAPV Fund No. 231, op. No. 1, d. KhR 871, l. 191ob"]

[handwritten "194"]

Report

The external examination of the crew member of the U.S. [Army] Air Forces B-25J aircraft No. 43-36160 Corporal Matthew M. Gladek Matth(ew M. Gladek [handwritten in English] No. 42020135 T 43.44A).

On 12 June 1945, I, the senior physician of military unit PP 64310 of subunit PP 64306, Far East Front, Captain (Medical) PLETNER, L. B. in the presence of the senior physician of military unit PP 64308 BEREZIN, I. A., and the representative of counter-espionage "SMERSH" Senior Lieutenant CHEBATKOV, P.A., at the request of the senior physician of military unit PP 64306, carried out an external examination of the corpse of Corporal Gladek.

PRELIMINARY INFORMATION

Upon the landing of the damaged B-25J aircraft No. 43-36160 on 10 June 45 at 1330 hrs, among the crew members was the seriously wounded Corporal M. GLADEK. He exhibited weak life signs. While extracting M. GLADEK from the aircraft he expired.

EXTERNAL EXAMINATION

Clothing. The body was dressed in a fur-lined jacket, summer overalls, wool pants and uniform blouse, knitted t-shirt, cotton shorts, leather Chukka boots, socks and a canvas belt. On the body were two identical medallions [dog tags]. One medallion was taken to be sent to the relatives of the deceased, the second was left on the corpse. The pockets were empty. Parts of the clothing were torn and stained by blood.

The corpse is that of a male of average height, average build, 22-25 years old, in satisfactory health. Rigor mortis was highly pronounced in all parts of the body. On the lower parts of the corpse in the area of the sacrum and the shoulder blades are bluish-purple bruises. In the chest area is a sign of a past injection. Above the left ear is a 2 x 1 centimeter half-moon shaped laceration penetrating the skull cavity with a smashed left pars squamosa ossis temporalis [left temporal bone]. There is brain matter in the cavity. The exit wound is in the oral cavity. There is a circular shaped lacerated wound 4 centimeters in diameter and many small wounds up to 0.3 centimeters in size in the skin of the left thigh. On the inner surface of the left thigh is a round shaped, 0.8 centimeter diameter exit wound. On the posterior surface of the left thigh is a second exit wound with a diameter of 0.5 centimeters. There were no other injuries found on the body during the examination.

[TFR 39-169a]

Senior physician of military unit PP 64310
[original signed] Captain (Medical) _____ (Pletner)

Senior physician of military unit PP 64308
Captain (Medical) [signature] (Berezin)

Representative of Counter-intelligence
[original signed] Senior Lieutenant _____ (Chebatkov)

[TFR 39-170]

CONCLUSION: The death of Mat'ev M. Gladek, crewmember U.S. [Army] Air
Forces B-25J aircraft No. 43-36160, (according to his dog tag
[Name handwritten in English] Matthew M. Gladek,
No. 42020135 T 43.44A)
resulted from the destruction of brain matter due to a gunshot wound.

original signed SENIOR PHYSICIAN OF MILITARY UNIT PP 64310
Captain (Medical) _____ (PLETNER)

[handwritten "True copy: Senior Sergeant [illeg.]"]

Done in triplicate
Copy No. 1 File
Copies 2-3 to the addressees

15 June 45

[stamp "Basis: TsAPV Fund No. 231, op.No. 1, ed. Khr 871, 1. 194ob"]

[TFR 39-171]

[handwritten "195"]

Report

On 12 June 1945, a burial commission consisting of MESHERYAKOV, SHEROUKHOV and TASKIN, on the verbal orders of the unit commander, buried Mat'yu M. Gladek, the deceased aerial gunner of U.S. aircraft No. 43-36-160.

The burial took place on 12 June 1945 at 1900 hrs in the cemetery of military unit 64308. The coordinates are:

Latitude - 53 degrees - 09 minutes
Longitude - 158 degrees - 28 minutes

The grave was marked by a cross with an inscription.

COMMISSION: 1. [signature] (MESHERYAKOV)
2. [signature] (SHEROUKHOV)
3. [signature] (TASKIN)

[stamp "Basis: TsAPV Fund No. 231, op.No. 1, ed. KhR 871, 1. 195"]

[TFR 39-172]

[handwritten "222"]

Report

10 June 1945

Petropavlovsk, Kamchatka

Naval chart 2988, published 1943. I, the Chief of the 1st Section of the Headquarters Detachment, Major P. I. Reva, from the results of the observation [by border patrol troops] and interrogation of the crew of a U.S. aircraft that made a forced landing at Elizovo airfield on 10 June of this year, have established that:

A two engine U.S. B-25J "Mitchell" Bomber aircraft was damaged while on a combat raid on Japanese military targets on Shumshu Island. At 1130 hrs the aircraft violated the border at an altitude of 200 meters and at 1132 hrs it flew over our territory and was shot down by a battery of the Pacific Ocean Fleet. The aircraft caught on fire in the air and crashed into the ground at coordinates 50 degrees, 54 minutes north latitude, 156 degrees, 43 minutes east longitude.

The crew of 6 was killed during the explosion and crash of the aircraft. They included:

1. Aircraft Commander, who was also the Squadron Commander, Captain Eduard Ehrving
2. Copilot, Lieutenant Herri Lord
3. Navigator, Captain Zh. Mejten Ajzer
4. Flight Engineer, Senior Sergeant Fred Pene
5. Radio Operator, Corporal Leslie Denton
6. Gunner, Private Roland Ehrmer

The partially burned documents for 4 of the people were found among the mutilated and partially burned corpses. The fliers' bodies were buried in a common grave at coordinates 50 degrees, 54 minutes north latitude, 156 degrees, 43 minutes east longitude.

A copy of the incident area map is attached to this document and to the first copy of the personal documents of the 4 flyers.

Chief of the 1st Department
Major:- [signature] (REVA)

[stamp "Basis: TsAPV Fund No. 231, op.No. 1, ed. KhR 871, 1. 222"]

[TFR 39-173]

[handwritten "54"]
 TOP SECRET
 Copy No. 2

To the Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, USSR

Comrade VYSHINSKIY

28/29 Aug 47

[handwritten "44256/ss"]

[handwritten "I332"]

[handwritten "D4"]

Four American aircraft appeared over the Kuril Ridge flying from the direction of the Japanese Islands and violated the state border near Cape Lapatka on 10 Jun 1945.

During the flight over our territory, the aircraft were fired on by shore batteries of the Pacific Fleet. One aircraft was shot down.

At the crash site the parts of six burned bodies and the broken-up, burned remains of a B-25 aircraft were found. The bodies were buried on the west coast of the Kamchatka Peninsula.

Major General Dean, the former head of the American Military Mission, said in a letter from 13 Jun 45 that based on information from Washington on 10 Jun 45 an American B-25 aircraft No. 44-29148 was shot down near Cape Lapatka. General Dean requested information on the fate of the downed aircraft's crew in this letter, in a letter from 18 Sep 45 and in a meeting with Lieutenant General SLAVIN on 21 Sep 45.

The Americans were informed that the General Headquarters of the Red Army has no information on the lost plane.

It is possible to conclude from the requests from General Dean and from the MacArthur headquarters that the Americans want to receive confirmation that their aircraft was shot down by our artillery [sic] and use this against us. On the other hand they are trying everything to obtain permission to visit our Far East border zone in the Kamchatka region.

[TFR 39-174]

- 2 -

[handwritten "55"]

It is considered necessary to decline the Americans request to send a mortuary search team onto the territory of the USSR and to affirm that the General Staff of the Soviet Army has no information about the aircraft.

DEPUTY CHIEF OF THE GENERAL STAFF
 USSR ARMED FORCES
 GENERAL OF THE ARMY

(ANTONOV)

[handwritten "True copy:"] [illeg. signature]

[TFR 39-175]

[stamp "Central Archives of the Ministry of Defense of the USSR
 SECRET, copy No. 1
 Fund No. 40
 Opis' No. 17842588
 Delo No. 5
 Pages No. 20 pages
 Order No. 61/85
 Completed by [illeg. signature]
 [handwritten "19 May 92"]]

[TFR 39-176]

[stamp "TOP SECRET"]

SECRET
 Copy No. 2

[handwritten "D-4"]
 Directorate of
 Internal Relations
 [cut off] Feb 48
 [handwritten "1438184s"]

TO THE DEPUTY MINISTER OF FOREIGN
 AFFAIRS, USSR

to Comrade MALIK

Reference our No. 293787s dated 7 Dec 46

Attached please find a list of American aircrew members who
 perished or are missing in the Far East, and about whom the American
 military mission has inquired to the General Staff of the Armed Forces
 of the USSR several times.

I also wish to report:

- a) Sergeant TOMAS RING (REJUNG) from the crew of the interned B-24 aircraft No. 240309. Both bones of the left shin were broken and the right hip joint was dislocated. Crew members delivered him in a state of shock to the infirmary of the Kamchatka Border Detachment, where he died. He is buried in the Petropavlovsk Cemetery.
- b) Sergeant Pavel UDOCHEK (UTCHEK) from the crew of the interned B-25 aircraft No. 336158 was delivered dead on 11 May 45. He is buried 5 miles south of the Petropavlovsk-Kamchatskiy.
- c) Corporal MET'YU M. GLADEK from the crew of the interned B-25 aircraft No. 43-36160 was delivered dead on 10 Jun 45. He is buried on Kamchatka.

[TFR 39-177]

[handwritten "15"]

- 2 -

All three crews of these aircraft, with the exception of the dead, were transferred to the Americans through the Tashkent Internment Camp.

The remaining American Air Force servicemen are buried on Kamchatka:

1. Captain EDUARD KERVING (EDUARD DEH. IRVING)
2. Captain NEUTEN ANKER (DEH. NATAN EYZAR)
3. Lieutenant "NEED" (ORVIL KH. LORD)
4. Sergeant FRED BENE (FREDERIK A. LEHNG)
5. Corporal ROLAND (ROLAND R. KRINGER)
6. Corporal LES WAKE-DENTON (LEZLI K. DENTON DEHCH.)

All were crew members of the B-25 aircraft No. 44-29148 which was shot down on 10 Jun 45 south of Cape Lopatka.

According to the Far Eastern Military District Command, no other graves of American servicemen were found.

ATTACHMENTS: A four page list.

THE HEAD OF THE INTERNAL RELATIONS DIRECTORATE OF THE GENERAL STAFF OF
THE ARMED FORCES OF THE SOVIET UNION
LIEUTENANT GENERAL

(N. SLAVIN)

[handwritten "True copy:"] [illeg. signature]

[TFR 39-178]

[This page is handwritten.]
[English]

This document states that Radioman was killed almost instantly, which is contrary to the actual truth. He died shortly after landing at Petropavlovsk.

[signature] Hubert B. Winter

[End English]

In this document it states that the radio operator was killed instantly, which is a discrepancy with the facts. He died within several minutes of landing at Petropavlovsk.

Khaber Vinter

Translated from English
LT:- [signature] (A. Trukhachev)

[stamp "Basis: TsAPV Fund No. 231, op. No. 1, ed. KhR 871, l. 141ob"]

[TFR 39-179]

[handwritten "146"]

REPORT

12 May 1945

Petropavlovsk, Kamchatka

I, The Forensic Medical Expert Korotkov, in the presence of the Judge Advocate, Major (Legal) Sozin, Lt. Colonel (Medical) Kichaev, Senior Lieutenant (Medical) Golosovskij, at the suggestion of the Military Judge Advocate, carried out an external examination of the corpse of UTCHER, PAVEL, delivered to the city hospital from the military airfield.

During the examination it was established that it was the corpse of a large framed, taller than average, well nourished male. There were minor injuries on the back of the body. The head was seriously injured - the face was unrecognizable and displayed an overall lacerated, fragmentary wound. The eyes, nose and lips were absent. The skull was crushed and in the area of the left eye socket, and brain matter was visible from the wound. On the left forearm there was a large laceration and fragmented bone breaks.

Both hands were crushed and several fingers were absent. On [1 word illeg.] surface of the body there are individual superficial wounds of various size and irregular shapes.

Small metal fragments were found in the crushed tissue.

Signatures - Forensic Medical Expert Korotkov [signature]
Lt. Colonel (Medical) Kichaev [signature]
Sr. Lt. (Medical) Golosovskij [signature]
Major (Legal) Sozin [signature]

Conclusion: Based on the information from the external examination of the corpse, I conclude that the death of UTCHER, PAVEL is a result of severe wounds to the head from shell fragments with massive destruction of the skull and brain.

Forensic Medical Expert:- [signature] (Korotkov)
[Circular seal over the signature above that says Forensic Medical Expert in the middle and Kamchatka Oblast around the outside.]

[stamp "Basis: TsAPV Fund No. 231, op.No. 1, ed. KhR 871, 1. 146"]

[TFR 39-180]

[handwritten "147"]

Report

15 May 1945

Petropavlovsk, Kamchatka

We the undersigned - representatives of the Border Troops of the NKVD, USSR - Major Reva, Captain Petrov and Lieutenant Trukhachev and the Commanders of U.S. aircraft which made forced landings on the territory of the USSR on 11 May 1945 - Lieutenant Hubert Winter and Lieutenant Richard Bruno Klinki, on this date buried the body of the deceased American flyer Sergeant UTCHER, PAVEL, who was killed on board the U.S. aircraft B-25J No. 43-36158 during the bombing of targets on the Japanese Island of Shumushu.

The corpse was laid to rest in a grave two meters deep at coordinates 53 degrees, 05 minutes north latitude and 153 degrees, 38 minutes east longitude, map 100.00 [published] 1934, sheet N-57-102 Petropavlovsk, Kamchatka.

Over the grave a burial mound was made and a wooden grave marker (cross) was erected, inscribed in English and in Russian with his last name, surname and date of death.

The crews of the two aircraft that made forced landings in the area of Petropavlovsk on 11 May 1945, participated at the burial.

This document is to certify the foregoing.

Representatives of the Border Troops - Major [signature] Reva
Captain [signature] Petrov
Lt. [signature] Trukhachev

Commanders of the U.S. aircraft: Lt [signature] (Hubert Winter)
Lt (Richard Bruno Klinki)
[signature]

[stamp "Basis: TsAPV Fund No. 231, op.No. 1, ed. KhR 871, 1. 14"]

[TFR 39-181]

[handwritten "22"]
Top Secret
 [handwritten "465"]

[handwritten "1/4-51"]
 [handwritten "29 Jan 47"]

To HEAD OF GUPVI MVD, USSR
 LIEUTENANT GENERAL Comrade KRIVENKO

MOSCOW

Reference No. 3/. /38 dated 6/..-47

A thorough cross-check of the data of the registration and operations department of Special Camp No. 188 and the Special Hospital No. 5951 has established the following:

1. BAILER Iogan Gustav, born 1911, a junior private, claimed American nationality, exposed as a German in October 1945, sent from Camp No. 188 on special train No. 98333 to Camp No. 69 in Frankfurt am der Oder for repatriation to his homeland among 496 prisoners of war, listed on the guards list as number 31, but no notes regarding his departure were found in the card file.

2. With regards to the prisoner of war BONER Karl Zheri, born 1919, according to operational documents of OCHO Camp No. 188 he was also revealed to be a German and had Mexican nationality. In connection with this, he was taken for exploitation as an trained element for d-f under the nickname "merchant". The d-f on him was given to the Special department UNVD TO archives, in which there is information regarding the departure of BONER 20 July 46 from URO Camp No. 189 to Camp No. 69 in Frankfurt am der Oder for repatriation. Also, in a statistical report for July 1946, BONER was listed as a departee for Frankfurt am der Oder for repatriation to his homeland (see our stat report from the month of June 1946 for the list of learned element departees as number 5, but in guard lists of 20 July 46 for Camp No. 188, a prisoner of war BONER is not listed at being sent.)

Simultaneously, the Deputy Chief of Administration of Camp No. 188 requested clarification by his own will for the operational work of a Major AKSYUTIN (previously the assistant chief OCHO Camp No. 64) and the authorized representative LOBANOV of these camps; the conduct of which is located within the exploitation of the prisoner of war BONER.

3. As regards the prisoner of war KHARVIS Arenberg, he is not listed on the registration cardfile at the former Camp No. 188, but he was sent from Camp No. 210 to camp No. 188 as number 227 on the guards list of 158 prisoners of war. He was listed as an American (the only American) and subsequently crossed off the list, along with 9 other names. Then on a dual-signature statement dated 6 June 1945 acknowledging the receipt of the train and its contents it is stated that Camp No. 188

[TFR 39-182]

received only 149 prisoners, and not one was listed as an American. Therefore, prisoner of war KHARVIS Arenberg did not reach Camp No. 188 and his location can be determined by asking Camp No. 210.
 4. Regarding the deceased prisoner of war KONRADI Dzhordzh - no notes were made on the guards list regarding his death, but the explanation was attached by nurse Sr. Sergeant TIMOFEEVA who was escorting the train on which KONRADI died. According to hospital No. 5951 no information confirming the death of KONRADI has been found and there is nothing about him in the registration [files].

HEAD GUPVI MVD DIRECTORATE TO
 COLONEL

(LESHCHUK)

HEAD OPVI UMVD TO
 MAJOR

(KVALENSKIJ)

"...." January 1947

[TFR-39-183]

[handwritten "20"]

Top Secret

[handwritten "465"]

To Comrade Senior Lieutenant IVANOV
Deputy Chief, Camp No. 64 Directorate of Operational Work

City of Morshank

The GUPVI of the MVD of the USSR urgently demands that you establish the whereabouts of American POWs who were earlier detained in MVD Camp No. 188: BONNER Karl Karl, born in 1919; and VAJLER Iogan Gustav, born in 1922.

A check of all the documents by us has established that BONNER and VAJLER were in fact held in Camp No. 188. They went through the appropriate screening, after which they were not listed as Americans, but as Germans, and were included by the Senior Operational Representative, Junior Lieutenant LOBANOV, on the list of POWs who were not subject to be sent for repatriation.

The prisoner BONNER, however, while passing through the d/f "trader" is listed in the rolls and index file of the Camp No. 188 registration account as having departed to Frankfurt am Oder for repatriation on 20 Jul 46, but there are no traces [of him] in the URO's transport list and card index of the departing [repatriates]. VAJLER is also not listed amongst those repatriated or sent or to other camps. Thus, the POW's VAJLER and BONNER have not departed Camp No. 188 and must be held in the camps of the Tobovsk Oblast, but during the search no traces [of them] were found.

With the receipt of this letter, I ask you to immediately begin a search and determine the whereabouts of the above mentioned POW's of Camp No. 188.

You are to simultaneously make an inquiry with the Operational Worker Junior Lieutenant LOBANOV, who earlier dealt with the Americans, as to how he knows about BONNER and VAJLER and establish in what documentation it was shown that the POW BONNER was repatriated on 20 Jul 46.

Considering the seriousness and importance of the decision on this matter, be forthcoming with the reply.

HEAD OF THE OPVI UMVD TO
MAJOR

(KHVALENSKI)

"28" Jan 47

No. [illeg. 146]

[handwritten "Received [illeg. signature] 28 Jan 47"]

[TFR 39-184]

THE DIRECTORATE OF THE MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS
Tobovsk Oblast

"2" Sep 47

No. -p-1573

City of Tombov

[illeg. signature]

TO THE DEPUTY HEAD OF THE 1ST DIRECTORATE OF THE
GUPVI MVD USSR
COLONEL

Comrade EFREMO [cut off]
-city of Mo [cut off]

Reference No. 8/2/6134 dated 16 Sep 47

With regard to the situation surrounding the prisoner KHARVIS-ARENBERG Vil'yam (Fridrikh Vil'gel'm), born 1913 - American. [cut-off] has been reported to you three times - namely: 26 Nov 46 for No. 1/II 205 [cut-off] 1947 for No. 1/V-51 and 7 Feb 47 for No. 1/V-69.

With receipt of your inquiry dated 9 Apr 47 for No. 8/2/ [cut-off] we again conducted a thorough search of the registration document archives [cut-off] of MVD Camp No. 188, an inquiry was made at [cut-off] Department No. 1 of Camp No. 188, which is located in the city of Kirsanov [cut-off] to the Seratov Oblast to determine if the POW we are looking for, KHARVIS-ARENBERG, would turn up there. The 1 [cut-off] Camp Section No. 2 of Camp No. 64 was again inquired (the [cut-off] and answers are attached), but no positive response was received.

As a result, the situation surrounding the search remains [cut-off] - in specific, KHARVIS-ARENBERG's presence is not listed nor is he listed on the lists of [cut-off] those who died.

The registration section of b/Camp No. 188 was dismissed as a result of the dissolution [cut-off] and is outside of the Oblast's boundaries. Not having any kind of possibility at the present of determining the residence [sic] of the prisoner KHARVIS-ARENBERG, we assume that the prisoner ARENBERG Fridrikh Vil'gel'm, having entered Camp No.

[ends in progress, cut-off]

[TFR 39-185]

[illeg. handwriting]
MVD of the USSR
Camp No. 64
Operations Section
"18" February 46

Top Secret

TO THE HEAD OF OPVI UMVD - TAMBOV OBLAST
To COMRADE MAJOR KHVALENSKIY

No. 00124
City of Mormanak

[illeg. handwriting]
City of Tombovsk

Reference No. 1/U 46 dated 27 Jan 47

As a result of the questioning of the POWs, Khajm Fred and Sklej Dzhordzh, regarding the POWs you are searching for - Bonner Karl Karl born 1919, and Vajler Iogan Gustav, born in 1922, it was explained that at the end of 1945 or at the beginning of 1946, the prisoner Bonner Karl departed Camp No. 188 on a special transport train for one of the work camps (according to prisoner Khajm). Prisoner Vajler Iogan departed for his own country from Camp No. 188 in October 1945 (according to prisoner Sklej).

In addition, these POWs explained that the following POWs also know of Bonner Karl and Vajler Iogan: Brayling Genri (at the Kaganovich factory), Myuller Al'fred (at the st-va? Sanitorie) and Dykh Prefan (in the territory of former Camp No. 188) who are located in Camp section No. 2 [cut off] of Camp No. 64. These people, who were also considered Americans, were held in MVD Camp No. 188.

At the same time, we are reporting that the Operational Worker Junior Lieutenant Lobanov found that POW Bonner Karl's departure was indicated in the card index of the operations/registration [section] of Camp No. 188. The basis of this is a memo from the registration section.

Deputy Chief of the Directorate of MVD Camp No. 64
Operations Junior Lieutenant [signature] (Ivanov)

Chief of the 1st Department, Camp Operations Section
Lieutenant [signature] (Petrov)

Sent in 2 copies
Copy No. 1 Addressee
Copy No. 2 file
Checked by Lobanov
1 ya

[TFR 39-186]

[handwritten "456"]

RECEIPT

Given to Comrade Merkylenko. I received 2 (two) prisoners of war from him in Camp No. 188 t/o.

Duty officer (signature [handwritten "not legible"])
(Three cornered authorization stamp)

True copy: Secretary of the Camp Directorate
[illeg.] KPSSR Captain [signature "Maksimov"]

[seal "Ministry of Internal Affairs
POW Camp No. 126"]

[handwritten "141"]

Top Secret

[handwritten "457"]

TO THE [illeg.] HEAD OF CAMP SECTION No. 2, CAMP No. 64
SENIOR LIEUTENANT Comrade DILVEAPNESHKIN

- here -

OPVI

22 Apr 47

[handwritten "4/p 602"]

I am asking you to immediately report to where and when the prisoner of war ARENBERG Fridrikh Vil'gel'm departed. [He was] born in 192 [cut off], American, who arrived from camp [illeg.] and [illeg.] to Camp No. 188 on 20 Sep 45 for which there is a receipt issued by Camp No. 188 and a certificate.

I am also reporting that REJGER R(u)dol'f Genrikh, born in 1905, arrived at Camp No. 188 along with Prisoner ARENBERG.

THE HEAD OF THE OPVI MVD TO
MAJOR
(KHVALENSKIY)

[illeg. handwriting]

[TFR 39-187]

[handwritten "Entry No. 53040/ 26 Dec 46"]
 [illeg. handwriting]
 [handwritten "462"]
 [handwritten "19"]

Top Secret
 USSR
 MINISTRY OF
 INTERNAL AFFAIRS
 GUPVI

"20" December 1946 TO THE HEAD OF THE OPVI UMVD, TAMBOV OBLAST
 No. 8/2/5367
 city of Moscow to Comrade KHVALENSKIJ

For No. 1/II/2059 dated 28 NOV 46

Thoroughly recheck all of the documents you have on Camp No. 188, and also [check] the documents from the Operations Section. The American POW VAJNER Iogan Gustav, born in 1922, arrived from Camp No. 125. Establish exactly to where and under what last name he was sent. Also [check on] Kharvis-Arenberg Frank Vil'yam [arrived] from Camp No. 120. Report the results to the GUPVI MVD USSR by 1 Jan 47. Henceforth, you are to immediately report all changes in the registration documents for prisoners of war to the Registration Section of the GUPVI, MID of the USSR so the changes can be made in the central index file.

DEPUTY HEAD OF THE GUPVI, MID USSR
 LIEUTENANT GENERAL
 [signature] (PETROV)

[stamp "[mostly illeg.] SECRETARIAT
 Entry No. 7875
 25 Dec 46"]

Completed by Davydova

[printed along the left side of the page "When answering refer to our No. and the date."]

[TFR 39-188]

Entry No. 13352

[stamp "[mostly illeg.] SECRETARIAT [handwritten "93(?)"]
 201 [handwritten "465"]
 9 Jan 47"]

PERSONAL

USSR
 MINISTRY OF
 INTERNAL AFFAIRS
 GUPVI

"6" January 1946 TO THE HEAD OF THE UMVD - TAMBOVSK OBLAST
 No. 8/2/28 COLONEL
 city of Moscow

To Comrade LESCHUK
 city of Tambov

[handwritten "to Comrade Khvalenskiy"]
 [illeg. handwriting]

I am reporting that the GUPVI, MVD USSR is receiving requests from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, USSR and from other official organizations about the search for prisoners of war who are listed in the card index as being held in Camp No. 188. There are no records on [their] release from Camp No. 188 and the OPVI UMVD confirms that they could not have departed, although they are also not present in any of the camps in the Tambov Oblast.

For instance:

1. No. 8/2/4462 dated 28 Oct 46 (passed via "VCH") We inquired as to the whereabouts of the American prisoners KONRADI Dzhordzh, born in 1925 and BONAR Karl Karl, born in 1919, after their departure from Camp No. 188. It is highly intolerable that almost two months have been wasted since [we sent] our memorandum No. 8/2/5013 dated 30 Nov 46. Comrade Major KHVALENSKIJ, the Head of the GUPVI, reported in No. 1/II/2191 dated 24 Dec 46 that KONRADI Dzhordzh died on 6 Jul 45 and BONAR, Karl Karl is listed as having arrived at Camp No. 188, but where he went has not been established.

2. We inquired with No. 8/2/4791 dated 20 Nov 46 (passed via "VCH") as to the whereabouts of the American prisoners KHARVIS Arenberg, born in 1920, arrived at Camp No. 188 from Camp No. 120, and VAJNER Iogan Gustav, born in 1922, he arrived at Camp No. 188 from Camp No. 125. Major KHVALENSKIJ, with No. 1/II/2059 dated 28 Nov 46, reported that the prisoners KHARVIS and VAJNER are listed as having arrived, but it does not seem possible to determine to where they departed. To date, there has been no response to our repeat inquiry No. 8/2/5367 dated 20 Dec 46.

Having reported the above to you, I ask you to immediately reverify where the American prisoners of war KHARVIS Arenberg, VAJNER Iogan and BONAR Karl have departed, and report this to the GUPVI of the MVD, USSR. Send the registration file with the certificates of death and of burial for the prisoner KONRADI Dzhordzh who died on 6 Jul 45, while being transported from Camp No. 188 to Special Hospital No. 5951 (City of Kirzhanov)

I am also asking that any remaining registration [files] of POWs from Camp No. 188 and Special Hospital No. 5951 be

[TFR 39-188a]

immediately put in proper order and point out to Comrade Major KHVALENSKIY, the Head of the OPVI, the unacceptable sluggishness in completing our request.

THE HEAD OF THE GUPVI, MVD USSR
LIEUTENANT GENERAL

[signature]
(KRIVENKO)

[printed along the left side of the page "When answering refer to our No. and the date."]

[TFR 39-189]

[handwritten "Entry 5245
15 Apr 47"]

[handwritten "415 10"]

[handwritten "comrades [illeg.] 16 Apr"]

USSR
MINISTRY OF
INTERNAL AFFAIRS
GUPVI

Top Secret

"9" Apr 47
No. 8/2/2453
city of Moscow

TO THE HEAD OF OPVI UMVD OF THE
TAMBOV OBLAST
MAJOR COMRADE KHVALENSKIY
city of Tambov

In reference to No. 1/u-51 from 28 Jan 47

I am requesting for the third time that you recheck and report to the GUPVI MVD USSR on where the American prisoner of war KHORVIS-ARENBERG Fridrikh Vil'gelm is being held, or to where he was sent.

The ARENBERG mentioned above was turned over to the MVD Camp No. 188 on 30 Sep 45.

I am attaching a copy of the statement of the transfer of the prisoner of war ARENBERG, the receipt and a list from the MVD Camp No. 120.

ATTACHMENT: see above.

HEAD OF THE 2ND DEPARTMENT OF THE GUPVI, MVD USSR
MAJOR
[signature] (NAKOV)

[stamp "[mostly illeg.] 2666
14 Apr 47"]

[printed along left-hand margin "When answering, refer to our [entry] number and date."]

[TFR 39-190]

[handwritten "454 11"]

LIST.

of the prisoners of war from Camp No. 120 who departed for Camp No. 188 on 25 Sep 45

No.	Name Last	First	Middle	Date of Birth	Nationality	Rank
1.	Arenberg	Fridrikh	Vil'gelm	1923	American	PFC
2.	Rejger	Rudol'f	Genrikh	1905	American	Private

Head of the Directorate of Camp 120
MVD KPSSR Lieutenant Colonel [signature] (Makarov)

Head of URO Camp Directorate
Lieutenant [signature] (Gubin)

[handwritten "425 12"]
Copy

STATEMENT

On 30 Sep 45, we, the signatories: Duty Officer Nitshiperov, Zone Commandant Dubovitskiy and Convoy Chief Merkulenko, have prepared this statement for the arrival of the two prisoners from Petrozavodsk.

Garrison caps 2, overcoats 2, cloth service jacket 2, cloth pants 2, shirts 4, drawers 2, leather boots 2, socks 2, sweaters 2.

To this end, this statement was prepared.

Duty Officer (signature illeg.)

Zone Commandant of the Camp (no signature)

Convoy Chief (Merkulenko)

True copy: secretary of Camp 120 Directorate
MVD KP SSR Captain [signature] (Maksimov)

[stamp "Ministry of Internal Affairs POW Camp No. 120"]

27 Mar 47

[TFR 39-191]

[This page is entirely handwritten.]

according to transfer lists from the registration department as those who departed [for?] Camp 188.

Deputy Head of [Camp Department No. 2?] (Lepeshkin)
Senior Lieutenant [signature] (Bodrova)
Inspector ug.

[This page is a continuation of TFR 39-202]

[TFR 39-192]

[This page is entirely handwritten.]

[handwritten "Entry No. 5323 15 May 47"]
 [illeg. handwriting]

Directorate
 of Prisoner of War Camp No. 388 MVD USSR

Camp Division No. 11

Operative Group

7 May 47

No. 8/5-47

city of Kirsanov

to the Chief of OPVI Directorate
 MVD of Tambov Oblast
 Major Comrade Khryvalenkov(sic)
 city of Tambov

In reference to your No. 1/u-239 from 4 May 47

I am reporting that the following 4 prisoners of war:

- 1) Kharvis-Arenberg Fridrikh Vil'gelm
- 2) Gaim Fred Valentin, born 1912, Ober Efrejter
- 3) Simbrat Ion Georg, born 1917, Private
- 4) Dzhurógiev Zharko, born 1920, Yugoslav

were not held in Camp Division No. 11 in the city of Kirsanov nor are they presently held here. Therefore, I must report to you that it is not possible [for me to know] the location of the above-mentioned prisoners of war.

Operational Representative
 of Camp Division No. 11, Directorate
 of the Prisoner of War Camp No. 338 of the MVD

Sergeant [signature] (Shlakov?)

[TFR 39-193]

Top Secret

to the Head of the OPVI UMVD TO
 Comrade Major KHVALENSKIY

I am reporting that the prisoner of war BONAR Karl Karl -- born 1919, American -- appears in the archives of Camp No. 188 as having arrived 1 Jul 45, but is not present and does not appear on the lists of killed or dead.

20 Dec 46 Inspector [signature] (BODROVA)

Top Secret
 [handwritten "30"]

to the Head of the OPVI UMVD TO
 Major Comrade KHVALENSKIY

I am reporting that prisoner of war VAJLER Iogan Gustav -- born 1922, American -- appears in the archives of Camp No. 188 as having arrived 30 May 45, but is not present and does not appear on the lists of killed or dead.

20 Nov 46 Inspector [signature] (BODROVA)

Top Secret
 [handwritten "28"]

to the Chief of the OPVI UMVD TO
 Major Comrade KHVALENSKIY

I am reporting that after a thorough investigation, it has been established that the American prisoner of war Arenberg Kharvis Vil'gelm (born 1923), not Kharvis Arenberg Vil'yan Rudolf (born 1923), appears under No. 227 in the transfer list of prisoners of war sent from Camp No. 212 on 24 Jun 45 to Camp No. 188, but is crossed off the list; Americans accepted at the camp do not appear in the transfer statement of 5 Jul 45.

16 Jan 47 Inspector [signature] (BODROVA)

[TFR 39-194]

Copy
[handwritten "462 26"]to the Deputy Head of the GUPVI MVD USSR
Major General Comrade BATUSHENYI

city of Moscow

In reference to No. 8/2/4462 from 28 Oct 46

I am reporting that the prisoner of war KONRAD Dzholdzh, born 1925, American, died during transport from Camp No. 188, station Rada to Special Hospital No. 5951, city of Kirsanov, 6 Jul 45, from dystrophy.

As concerns the prisoner of war BONAR Karl Karlovich, born 1919, he is mentioned in the card index from Camp No. 188 as having arrived from Camp No. 120 on 1 Aug 45, but no one under that name is listed as having departed [the camp] and he is not present [in the camp]. In all probability, the prisoner of war BONAR was discovered as having taken on a different nationality and last name and has already been sent somewhere under a different last name.

Presently, clarification is impossible since Camp No. 188 has been closed.

Head of the OPVI UMVD TO
MAJOR

(KHEVALENSKIY)

25 Dec 46
No. 1/p-2191

[handwritten "True copy from the original
Head of OPV UMIR
16 Jan Major [illeg. signature]"]

[TFR 39-195]

25-52

Note [sent] by "VCH"
[handwritten "462 24"]to the Head of GUPVI MVD USSR
LIEUTENANT GENERAL COMRADE KRIVENKO

city of Moscow

In reference to No. 8/2/791 from 5 Feb 47

I am reporting that your No. 8/2/28 was completed by us and sent to your address 28 Jan 47 as No. 1/u-51.

THE HEAD OF THE DIRECTORATE OF THE MVD TO
LIEUTENANT COLONEL (LESHCHUK)"7" Feb 47
No. [handwritten "1/u-69"]

Transmitted:

Received:

[the following text is handwritten]
[four illeg. words and "7 Feb 47" written over text]
207
[1-2 missing] 47

from Moscow

Note [sent] by "VCH" 25

to Head of the UMVD TO, Comrade Lt. Colonel Leshchuk 460

I request that you quickly reply to our No. 8/2/28 from 6 Jan 47 on the status of American prisoners of war Kharvis Arenberg, Vajner Iogan and Bonar Karl.

original signed Krivenko

[stamp "Secretariat entry No. 867 7 Feb 1947"]
No. 8/2/791 6 Feb 47 Transmitted: Gavrilov
5 Feb 47
V-57 from 22 [illeg.] 2330 [hours] Received: Davydov

[TFR 39-196]

Top Secret
Copy No. 1

[handwritten "entry No. 5028/27 Jul 47"]
 kn-2. USSR [stamp "SECRETARIAT UNK TO
 Ministry of Entry No. 5331
 Internal Affairs 2 Aug 47"]
 GUPVI
 "26" Jul 47
 No. 8/2/4898
 city of Moscow

TO HEAD OF THE OPVI, TAMBOV OBLAST
 MAJOR COMRADE KHVALENSKIY
 city of Tambov

Expedite completing our No. 8/2/2453 from 9 Apr 47 on the
 recheck of the prisoner of war ARENBERG Fridrikh Villi, born 1923, by
 nationality American, Private First Class, sent 26 Sep 45 to Camp No.
 188 station Rada from MVD Camp No. 212.

HEAD OF THE REGISTRATION DEPARTMENT, GUPVI MVD USSR
 MAJOR [signature]

(MAKOV)

[printed along left-hand margin "Upon answering, refer to our
 [entry] number and date."]

Top Secret
Copy No. 1

[handwritten "OPVI [illeg.] 10 Oct 47"]

[handwritten "45+ 8"]

2-od. USSR
 Ministry of
 Internal Affairs
 GUPVI
 "26" Sep 47
 No. 8/2/61340
 city of Moscow

TO HEAD OF THE UMVD, TAMBOV OBLAST
 MAJOR GENERAL

COMRADE MAKHAN' KOV
 city of Tambov

I am reporting that over the course of nine months, the GUPVI MVD
 USSR has been corresponding with the Tambov Oblast UMVD (8/2/15367?
 from 20 Dec 46, 8/2/28 from 6 Jan 47, 8/2/791 from 5 Feb 47, 8/2/2453
 from 9 Apr 47, and 8/2/4898 from 26 Jul 47) with the goal of
 establishing the destination of the American prisoner of war KHARVIS-
 ARENBERG Frank Vil'yam, who was transferred from Camp No. 120 to Camp
 No. 188. To this date, a satisfactory answer has not been received at
 the GUPVI MVD USSR. The Chief of the OPVI Major Comrade KHVALENSKIY
 did not answer our last request No. 8/2/2453 of 9 Apr 47.

I request that you order the Chief of the OPVI to immediately
 fulfill our requests concerning the POW KHARVIS and that you impose
 disciplinary punishment on those persons responsible for the delay in
 the fulfillment of these requests.

I request that you report the results to GUPVI.

DEPUTY HEAD OF THE 1ST DIRECTORATE, GUPVI MVD USSR
 COLONEL [signature] (EFREMOV)

[printed along left-hand margin "Upon answering, refer to our
 [entry] number and date."]

[TFR 39-196a]

[stamp "SECRETARIAT UNK TO
 ENTRY No. 6697
 30 Sep 47"]

[TFR 39-197]

to the Chief of the OPVI UMVD of Tambov Oblast
Major Khvalenskiy.

Concerning your telephone request, I am reporting that after repeated checks by myself and the Senior Assistant to the Chief, Lieutenant Vyazov, it has been established that the American POW Arenberg Fridrikh Vil'gelm (born 1923) and with him the POW Fejger Rudol'f German arrived at Camp 188 from Camp 120 on 1 Oct 45. However, they are not [listed] in the registration materials of departures from Camp No. 188, in lists of the dead, in lists of those transferred to their native countries, or in lists of those transferred to other camps.

Deputy Chief of the Camp division [signature] (Vorvuzov)

Major
Inspector

[signature] (Bodrova)

[Above text is handwritten. Text below is typed.]

[stamp "OPVI
4 May 47
1/u-239"]

Top Secret
[handwritten "458 15"]
Operational Representative of the
POW Camp Section No. 1
Junior Lieutenant Pankov
city of Kirsanov

I request that you check and report on whether you have detained in your camp section the following American POWs:

1. KHORVIS-ARENBERG Fridrikh Vil'gelm
2. GAIM Fred Valentin, born 1912, ober efrejter
3. SIMBRAT Ion Georg, born 1917, soldier
4. DEHURDNEV Zharko, born 1920, Yugoslav.

The above-mentioned POWs were transferred from Camp No. 188 to Camp No. 388, city of Arkar.

If they have departed, report to where and when they departed.

Head of the OPVI UMVD TO
MAJOR

(KHVALENSKIY)

[TFR 39-198]

[handwritten "Entry 5245
15 Apr 47"]

[handwritten "445 10"]

[handwritten "To Comrade [illeg.] 16 Apr"]

USSR
MINISTRY OF
INTERNAL AFFAIRS
GUPVI

Top Secret

TO HEAD OF THE OPVI, UMVD
TAMBOV OBLAST
MAJOR COMRADE KHVALENSKIY
city of Tambov

"9" Apr 47
No. 8/2/2453
city of Moscow

In reference to No. 1/u-51 from 28 Jan 47

I am requesting for the third time that you recheck and report to the GUPVI MVD USSR as to the place where the American prisoner of war KHORVIS-ARENBERG Fridrikh Vil'gelm is being held, or to where he was sent.

The ARENBERG mentioned above was turned over to the MVD Camp No. 188 on 30 Sep 45.

I am attaching a copy of the statement of the transfer of the prisoner of war ARENBERG, the receipt and a list from the MVD Camp No. 120.

ATTACHMENTS: see above.

HEAD OF THE 2ND DEPARTMENT, GUPVI MVD USSR
MAJOR

[signature] (MAKOV)

[stamp "[mostly illeg.] 2666
14 Apr 47"]

[printed along left-hand margin "Upon answering, refer to our
[entry] number and date."]

[TFR-39-199]

[handwritten "454 11"]

LIST.

of the prisoners of war from Camp No. 120 who departed for Camp No. 188 on 25-Sep-45

No.	Name Last	First	Middle	Date of Birth	Nationality	Rank
1.	Arenberg	Fridrikh	Vil'gelm	1923	American	PFC
2.	Rejger	Rudol'f	Genrikh	1905	American	Private

Head of the Directorate for Camp 120
MVD KPSSR Lieutenant Colonel [signature] (Makarov)

Head of URO Camp Directorate
Lieutenant [signature] (Gubin)

[handwritten "445 12"]
Copy

STATEMENT

On 30 Sep 45, we, the signatories: Duty Officer Nitshiperov, Zone Commandant Dubovitskiy and Convoy Chief Merkulenko, have prepared this statement for the arrival of the two prisoners from Petrozavodsk.

Garrison cape 2, overcoats 2, cloth service jacket 2, cloth pants 2, shirts 4, drawers 2, leather boots 2, socks 2, sweaters 2.

To this end, this statement was prepared.

Duty Officer (signature illeg.)

Zone Commandant of the Camp (no signature)

Convoy Chief (Merkulenko)

True copy: Secretary of Camp 120 Directorate
MVD KP SSR Captain [signature] (Maksimov)

[stamp "Ministry of Internal Affairs of the USSR
POW Camp No. 120"]

27 Mar 47

[TFR 39-200]

[handwritten "452"]
Top Secret
Copy No. 1

[handwritten "Entry No. 5028/27 Jul 47"]

kn-2, USSR [stamp "SECRETARIAT UNK TO
Ministry of Internal Affairs Entry No. 5331
2 Aug 47"]

GUPVI TO HEAD OF THE OPVI, TAMBOV OBLAST
"26" Jul 47 MAJOR COMRADE KHVALENSKIY
No. 8/2/4898 city of Moscow

Expedite completing our No. 8/2/2453 from 9 Apr 47 on the recheck of prisoner of war ARENBERG Fridrikh Villi, born 1923, by nationality American, Private First Class, sent 26 Sep 45 to Camp No. 188 station Rada from MVD Camp No. 212.

HEAD OF THE REGISTRATION DEPARTMENT, GUPVI MVD USSR
MAJOR [signature]

(MAKOV)
[printed along left-hand margin "Upon answering, refer to our
[entry] number and date."]

Top Secret
Copy No. 1

2-od. USSR
Ministry of Internal Affairs
GUPVI
"26" Sep 47
No. 8/2/61340
city of Moscow

[handwritten "452 8"]

TO HEAD OF THE UMVD, TAMBOV OBLAST
MAJOR GENERAL

COMRADE MAKHAN'KOV
city of Tambov

I am reporting that over the course of nine months, the GUPVI MVD USSR has been corresponding with UMVD of Tambov Oblast (8/2/153677 from 20 Dec 46, 8/2/28 from 6 Jan 47, 8/2/791 from 5 Feb 47, 8/2/2453 from 9 Apr 47, and 8/2/4898 from 26 Jul 47) with the goal of establishing the destination of the American prisoner of war KHARVIS-ARENBERG Frank Vil'yam, who was transferred from Camp No. 120 to Camp No. 188. To this date, a satisfactory answer has not been received at the GUPVI MVD USSR. The Head of the OPVI, Comrade Major KHVALENSKIY did not answer our last request No. 8/2/2453 of 9 Apr 47.

I request that you order the Head of the OPVI to immediately fulfill our requests concerning the prisoner KHARVIS and that you impose disciplinary punishment on those persons responsible for the delay in the fulfillment of these requests.

I request that you report the results to GUPVI.
DEPUTY HEAD OF THE 1ST DIRECTORATE, GUPVI MVD USSR
COLONEL [signature] (EFREMOV)

[printed along left-hand margin "When answering, refer to our
[entry] number and date."]

[TFR 39-200a]

[stamp "SECRETARIAT UNK TO
ENTRY No. 6697
30 Sep 47"]

[TFR 39-201]

to the Head of the OPVI UNVD, Tambov Oblast
Major Khvalenskiy

Concerning your telephone request, I am reporting that after repeated checks by myself and the Senior Assistant to the Head, Lieutenant Vyazov, it has been established that the American POW Arenberg Fridrikh Vil'gelm (born 1923) and POW Fejger Rudol'f German arrived at Camp 188 from Camp 120 on 1 Oct 45. However, they are not [listed] in the registration materials of departures from Camp 188, in lists of the dead, in lists of those transferred to their native countries, or in lists of those transferred to other camps.

Deputy Head of the Camp Division [signature] (Vorvuzov)
Major
Inspector [signature] (Bodrova)

[handwritten "458 15"]
Top Secret

[stamp "OPVI
4 May 47
1/u-239"]

Operational Representative of the
POW Camp Section
Junior Lieutenant Blynov?
city of Kirsanov

I request that you check and report on whether you have detained the following American POWs in your camp section:

1. KHORVIS-ARENBERG Fridrikh Vil'gelm
2. GAIN Fred Valentin, born 1912, ober efrejter
3. SIMBRAT Ion Georg, born 1917, soldier
4. DZHURDNEV Zharko, born 1920, Yugoslav.

The above-mentioned POWs were transferred from Camp No. 188 to Camp No. 388, city of Atkar.

If they have departed, report to where and when they departed.

Head of the OPVI UNVD TO
MAJOR

(KHALENSKIY)

[TFR 39-202]

[This page is entirely handwritten.]

Entry 5245
29 Apr 47 [illeg. signature]
Comrade [remainder illeg.]

17

460 [crossed out]

to Head of OPVI UMVD, Tambov Oblast

Major Khvalenskiy

Regarding your request dated 21 Jan 47 No. 1/p-[?]02

I am reporting that there is no POW Arenberg Fridrik Vil'gel'm, born 1923, American, listed in the registration information in the archives of MVD Camp No. 48. The arrival of POW Fejgehr Rudol'f Genrikh is also not listed. As a former co-worker in the registration section of the UV MVD Camp, I suggest that these POWs were sent to Camp No. 188 of the [illeg.] camp. One should inquire [illeg.] Saratov-Moscow, since Camp 188 sent people there, like their own camp division, according to a labor-usage list and therefore they are not here [possibly cut-off].

[TFR 39-203]

[This page is entirely handwritten]

Top Secret 462 18

Directorate
of Prisoner of War Camp No. 388 MVD USSR
Camp Division No. 11
Operative Group
7 May 47
No. 8/5-47
city of Kirsanov

to Head of OPVI Directorate
MVD of Tambov Oblast
Major Comrade Khvalenkov (sic)
city of Tambov

In reference to your No. 1/u-219 from 4 May 47

I am reporting that the following prisoners of war:

- 1) Kharvis-Arenberg Fridrikh Vil'gel'm
- 2) Gaim-Fred-Valentin, born 1912, Ober-Efretjer
- 3) Simbrat Ion Georgy, born 1917, Private
- 4) Dzhurdgiev Zharko, born 1920, Yugoslav

were not held in camp division No. 11 in the city of Kirsanov nor are they presently held. Therefore, I must report to you that it is not possible [for me to know] the location of the above mentioned prisoners of war.

Operational Representative
of Camp Division No. 11, Directorate
of the Prisoner of War Camp No. 338 of the MVD

Sergeant [signature] (Shlakov?)

[TFR 39-204]

[handwritten "20"]
Top Secret
 [handwritten "465"]

To Comrade Senior Lieutenant IVANOV
 Deputy Head, Camp No. 64 Directorate of Operational Work

City of Morshanok

The GUPV of the MVD, USSR urgently demands that you establish the whereabouts of American POWs who were earlier detained in MVD Camp No. 188: BONNER Karl Karl, born in 1919; and VAJLER Iogan Gustav, born in 1922.

A check of all the documents by us has established that BONNER and VAJLER were in fact held in Camp No. 188. They went through the appropriate screening, after which they were not listed as Americans, but as Germans, and were included by the Senior Operational Representative, Junior Lieutenant LOBANOV, on the list of POWs who were not subject to be sent for repatriation.

The prisoner BONNER, however, while passing through the d/f "trader" is listed in the rolls and index file of the Camp No. 188 registration account as having departed to Frankfurt am Oder for repatriation on 20 Jul 46, but there are no traces [of him] in the URO's transport list and card index of the departing [repatriates]. VAJLER is also not listed amongst those repatriated or sent on to other camps. Thus, the POWs VAJLER and BONNER have not departed Camp No. 188 and must be held in the camps of the Tobovsk Oblast, but during the search no traces [of them] were found.

With the receipt of this letter, I ask you to immediately begin a search and determine the whereabouts of the above mentioned POWs from Camp No. 188.

You are to simultaneously make an inquiry with the Operational Worker Junior Lieutenant LOBANOV, who earlier dealt with the Americans, as to how he knows about BONNER and VAJLER and establish in what documentation it was shown that the POW BONNER was repatriated on 20 Jul 46.

Considering the seriousness and importance of the decision on this matter, be forthcoming with the reply.

HEAD OF THE OPVI, UMVD TO
 MAJOR

(KHVALENSKIJ)

"28" Jan 47

No. [illeg. 146]

[handwritten "Received [illeg. signature] 28 Jan 47"]

[TFR 39-205]

[handwritten "22"]
Top Secret
 [handwritten "465"]

[handwritten "1/4-51"]
 [handwritten "29 Jan 47"]

To HEAD OF THE GUPVI, MVD USSR

LIEUTENANT GENERAL Comrade KRIVENKO
 MOSCOW

Reference No. 3/./38 dated 6/./47

A thorough cross-check of the data of the registrations and the operations departments of Special Camp No. 188 and the special hospital No. 5951 has established:

1. BAILER Iogan Gustav, born 1911, Junior Private, claimed American nationality, exposed as a German in October 1945, sent from Camp No. 188 on train No. 98333 to Camp No. 69 in Frankfurt am der Oder for repatriation to his homeland among 496 prisoners of war, listed on the guards list as number 31, but no notes regarding his departure were found in the card file.

2. With regards to the prisoner of war BONER Karl Zheri, born 1919, according to operational documents of OCHO Camp No. 188 he was also revealed to be a German, and had Mexican nationality. In connection with this, he was taken for exploitation as an trained element for d-f under the nickname "merchant". The d-f on him was given to the Special department UMVD TO archives, in which there is information regarding the departure of BONER 20 July 46 from URO Camp No. 188 to Camp No. 69 in Frankfurt am der Oder for repatriation. Also, in a statistical report for July 1946 BONER was listed as a departee for Frankfurt am der Oder for repatriation to his homeland (see our status report from the month of June 1946 for the list of learned element departees as number 5, but in guard lists of 20 July 46 for Camp No. 188, a prisoner of war BONER is not listed at being sent.)

Simultaneously, the Deputy Head of Administration Camp No. 188, requested clarification by his own will for the operational work of a Major AKSYUTIN (previously the assistant chief OCHO Camp No. 64) and the authorized representative LOBANOV of these camps; the conduct of which is located within the exploitation of the prisoner of war BONER.

3. As regards the prisoner of war KHARVIS Arenberg, he is not listed on the registration cardfile at the former Camp No. 188, but he was sent from Camp No. 210 to Camp No. 188 as number 227 on the guards list of 158 prisoners of war. He was listed as an American (the only American) and subsequently crossed off the list along with 9 other names. Then on a dual-signature statement dated 6 June 1945 acknowledging the receipt of the train and its contents, it is stated that Camp No. 188

[ends in progress].

[TFR 39-206]

Entry No. 13352

(stamp mostly illeg. "SECRETARIAT
201
9 Jan 47")

465
Top Secret

PERSONAL

USSR
MINISTRY OF
INTERNAL AFFAIRS
GUPVI

"6" January 1946 TO HEAD OF THE UMVD, TAMBOVSK OBLAST
No. 8/2/5367 COLONEL
city of Moscow

To Comrade LESHCHUK
city of Tambov

[handwritten "to Comrade Khvalenskiy"]

[illeg. handwriting]

I am reporting that the GUPVI, MVD USSR is receiving requests from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, USSR and from other official organizations about the search for prisoners of war who are listed in the card index of those held in Camp No. 188. There are no records on [their] release from Camp No. 188 and the OPVI UMVD confirms that they could not have departed, although they are also not present in any of the camps in the Tambov Oblast.

For example:

1. No. 8/2/4462 dated 28 Oct 46 (passed via "VCH") We inquired as to the whereabouts of American POWs KONRADI Dzhordzh, born in 1925, and BONAR Karl Karl, born in 1919 after their departure from Camp No. 188. It is highly intolerable that almost two months have been wasted since [we sent] our memorandum No. 8/2/5013 dated 30 Nov 46. Comrade Major KHALENSKIY, Head of the GUPVI, reported in No. 1/II/2191 dated 24 Dec 46 that KONRADI Dzhordzh died on 6 Jul 45 and BONAR, Karl is listed as having arrived at Camp No. 188, but where he went to has not been established.

2. We inquired with No. 8/2/4791 dated 20 Nov 46 (passed via "VCH") as to the whereabouts of American POWs KHARVIS Arenberg, born in 1920, arrived in camp No. 188 from camp No. 120, and VAJNER Iogan Gustav, born in 1922, arrived in Camp No. 188 from Camp No. 125. Major KHALENSKIY, with No. 1/II/2059 dated 28 Nov 46, reported that The POWs KHARVIS and VAJNER are listed as having arrived, but it does not seem possible to determine to where they departed. To date, there has been no response to our repeat inquiry No. 8/2/5367 dated 20 Dec 46.

Having reported the above to you, I ask you to immediately recheck to where the American POWs KHARVIS Arenberg, VAJNER Iogan and BONAR Karl have departed and report this to the GUPVI of the MVD, USSR. Send the registration file with the certificates of death and of burial for prisoner KONRADI Dzhordzh who died on 6 Jul 45, while being transported from Camp No. 188 to Special Hospital No. 5951 (city of Kirsanov)

I am also asking that any remaining registration [files] of POWs from Camp No. 188 and Special Hospital No. 5951 be

[TFR 39-206a]

immediately put in proper order and point out to Comrade Major KHALENSKIY, the Head of the OPVI, the intolerable slowness in carrying out these requests.

HEAD OF THE GUPVI, MVD USSR
LIEUTENANT GENERAL

[signature]
(KRIVENKO)

[printed along the left side of the page "When answering refer to our No. and the date."]

[TFR 39-207]

25-52

Note [sent] by "VCh"
[handwritten "462 24"]

to Head of GUPVI, MVD USSR
LIEUTENANT GENERAL COMRADE KRIVENKO

city of Moscow

In reference to No. 8/2/791 dated 5 Feb 47

I am reporting that your No. 8/2/28 was completed by us and sent
to your address on 28 Jan 47 as No. 1/u-51.

HEAD OF THE DIRECTORATE OF THE MVD TO
LIEUTENANT COLONEL (LE UK)

"7" Feb 47
No. [handwritten "1/u-69"]

Transmitted:

Recieved:

[the following text is handwritten]
[four illeg. words and "7 Feb 47" written over text]
207

[illeg.] 47
from Moscow

Note [sent] by "VCh" 25

to the Head of the UMVD TO, Comrade Lt. Colonel Leshchuk 468

I request that you expedite completion of our No. 8/2/28 dated 6
Jan 47 concerning the check on American prisoners of war Kharvis
Arenberg, Vajner Iogan and Bonar Karl.

original signed Krivenko

[stamp "867
1947"]

No. 8/2/791 6 Feb 47 Transmitted: Gavrilov
5 Feb 47

V-57 from 22 [illeg.] 2330 [hours] Received: Davydov

[TFR 39-208]

Copy
469 26

to the Deputy Head of the GUPVI, MVD USSR
Comrade Major General RATUSHNYI

city of Moscow

In reference to No. 8/2/4462 dated 28 Oct 46

I am reporting that the prisoner of war KONRAD Dzhordzh, born
1925, American, died from dystrophy during transport from Camp No.
188, station Rada to the Specialized Hospital No. 5951 in the city of
Kirsanov, on 6 Jul 45.

As concerns the prisoner of war BONAR Karl-Karlovich, born 1919,
he is mentioned in the card index from Camp No. 188 as having arrived
from Camp No. 120 on 1 Aug 45, but no one under that name is listed as
having departed [the camp] and he is not present [in the camp]. In
all probability, the prisoner of war BONAR was uncovered as having
taken on a different nationality and last name and has already been
sent somewhere under a different last name.

Presently, it is not possible to clarify [this] as Camp No. 188
has been closed.

Head of the GUPVI UMVD TO
MAJOR

(KHEVALENSKIY)

25 Dec 46
No. 1/p-2191

[handwritten "True copy from the original
Head of [GUPV USSR?]
16/I Major [illeg. signature]"]

[TFR 39-209]

Top Secret

to the Head of the OPVI UMVD TO
Comrade Major KHVALENSKIY

I am reporting that the prisoner of war BONAR Karl Karl -- born 1919, American -- appears in the archives of Camp No. 188 as having arrived 1 Jul 45, but is not present and does not appear on the lists of killed or dead.

20 Dec 46 Inspector [signature] (BODROVA)

Top Secret

to the Head of the OPVI UMVD TO
Major Comrade KHVALENSKIY

I am reporting that prisoner of war VAJLER [2-illeg.] -- born 1922, American -- appears in the archives of Camp No. 188 as having arrived 30 May 45, but is not present and does not appear on the lists of killed or dead.

20 Nov 46 Inspector [signature] (BODROVA)

Top Secret

to the Head of the OPVI UMVD TO
Major Comrade KHVALENSKIY

I am reporting that after a thorough investigation, it has been established that the American prisoner of war Arenberg Kharvis Vil'gelm (born 1923), not Kharvis Arenberg Vil'yan Rudolf (born 1923) appears under No. 227 in the transfer list of prisoners of war sent from Camp No. 212 on 24 Jun 45 to Camp No. 188, but is crossed off the list; Americans received at the camp do not appear in the transfer statement of 5 Jul 45.

16 Jan 47 Inspector [signature] (BODROVA)

[TFR 39-210]

Top Secret

[illeg. handwriting]
MVD of the USSR
Camp No. 64
Operations Section
"18" February 46
No. 00124
City of Mornansk

TO THE HEAD OF OPVI UMVD, TAMBOV OBLAST
TO COMRADE MAJOR KHVALENSKIY

[illeg. handwriting]
City of Tombovsk

Reference No. 1/V 46 dated 27 Jan 47

As a result of the questioning of the POWs Fred Khajm and Dzordzh Sklej, regarding the POWs you are searching for - Karl Karl Bonner born 1919, and Iogan Gustav Vajler, born in 1922, it was explained that at the end of 1945 or at the beginning of 1946 the POW, Karl Bonner, departed Camp No. 188 on a special transport train for one of the work camps (according to POW Khajm). The POW, Vajler Iogan, departed for his own country from Camp No. 188 in October 1945 (according to POW Sklej).

In addition, these POWs explained that the following POWs also know of Karl Bonner and Iogan Vajler: Genri Brayling (at the Kaganovich Factory), Al'fred Myuller (at the St-ve Sanitorie) and Ptefan Dykh (in the territory of former Camp No. 188) who are located in camp section No. 2 [cut-off] of Camp No. 64. These people, who were also considered Americans, were held in MVD Camp No. 188.

At the same time we are reporting that the Operational Worker Junior Lieutenant Lobanov found that POW Karl Bonner's departure was indicated in the card index of the operations/registration [section] of Camp No. 188. This is based on a memo from the registration section.

Deputy Head of the Directorate of MVD Camp No. 64
Operations Junior Lieutenant [signature "Ivanov"]

Head of the 1st Department of the Camp Operations Section
Lieutenant [signature "Petrov"]

Sent in 2 copies
Copy No. 1 Addressee
Copy No. 2 file
Checked by Lobanov
1 ya

[TFR 39-211]

[handwritten "Entry No. 53040/26 Dec 46"]
[illeg. handwriting]

462
19

TOP SECRET

USSR
MINISTRY OF
INTERNAL AFFAIRS
GUPVI

"20" December 1946

TO THE HEAD OF THE OPVI UMVD
TANBOV OBLAST

To Comrade KHALENSKIY

No. 8/2/5367
city of Moscow

Reference No. 1/II/2059 dated 28 Nov 46

Thoroughly recheck all of the documents you have on Camp No. 188, and also [check] the documents from the Operations Section. The American POW Iogan Gustav VAJLER, born in 1922, arrived from Camp No. 125. Establish exactly to where and under what last name he was sent. Also [check on] Frank Vil'yan Kharvis-Arenberg who [arrived] from Camp No. 120. Report the results to the GUPVI MVD USSR by 1 Jan 47. Henceforth, you are to immediately report all changes in the registration documents for prisoners of war to the Registration Section of the GUPVI, MID USSR so the changes can be made in the central index file.

DEPUTY HEAD OF THE GUPVI, MID USSR
LIEUTENANT GENERAL
[signature "PETROV"]

[Stamp "[mostly illeg.] SECRETARIAT
Entry No. 7875
25 Dec 46"]

Completed by Davydova

[printed along the left side of the page "When answering refer to our No. and the date."]

[TFR 39-212]

[handwritten "456"]

RECEIPT

Given to Comrade Merkylenko. I received 2 (two) prisoners of war from him in Camp No. 188 t/o.

Duty officer (signature [handwritten "not legible"])
(Three corner seal for authorization)

True copy: Secretary of the Camp Directorate
[illeg.] KPSSR Captain [signature "Maksimov"]

[seal "Ministry of Internal Affairs
POW Camp No. 126"]

[handwritten "144"]

Top Secret

[handwritten "457"]

TO THE [illeg.] HEAD OF CAMP SECTION No. 2, CAMP No. 64
SENIOR LIEUTENANT Comrade DILVEAPNESHKIN

- here -
OPVI

22 Apr 47

[handwritten "4p602"]

I am asking you to immediately report to where and when the prisoner of war Fridrikh Vil'gel'm ARENBERG departed. Born in 192[cut-off], American, who arrived from camp [illeg.] and [illeg.] to Camp No. 188 on 20 Sep 45 for which there is a receipt issued by Camp No. 188 and a certificate. I am also reporting that R[u]dol'f Genrikh REJGER, born in 1905, arrived at Camp No. 188 along with the POW ARENBERG.

THE HEAD OF THE OPVI MVD TO
MAJOR
(KHALENSKIY)

[illeg. handwriting]

GLOSSARY

AD Air Division
 AEH Aviation Squadron
 AK Possibly Alphanumeric Catalog or Administrative Committee
 AP Aviation Regiment
 APG Army Mobile Hospital
 A/S Administration Service
 AYMB Not defined
 BF Byelorussian Front
 BSSR Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic
 CC Central Committee
 CINC Commander-in-Chief
 CIS Commonwealth of Independent States
 CP Command Post
 CPSU Communist Party of the Soviet Union
 CM Council of Ministers
 DKA Not defined
 DPNK Not defined
 DRV Democratic Republic of Vietnam
 DVO Far East Military District
 EH Evacuation Hospital
 ENG Evacuation Hospital
 EHPK Expert Verification Committee
 ER Clearing Station
 FL Not defined
 FNOYUV National Front for Liberation of South Vietnam
 FPL Not defined
 FPFL Not defined
 FRG Federal Republic of Germany
 GAU City/State Vehicle Inspection
 GCI Ground Controlled Intercept
 GIAP Guards Fighter Aviation Regiment
 GIAPb Undefined subunit at a Guards Fighter Aviation Regiment
 GIAPV Probably Guards Fighter Aviation Regiment
 GIT Not defined
 GLR Hospital for the Walking Wounded
 GOM City Militia Station
 GRU Main Intelligence Directorate
 GSh General Staff
 GSOV Group of Soviet Occupation Forces
 GUGB Main Administration of State Security
 GUIN Main Directorate of Foreign Affairs
 GUM Main Directorate of Militia
 GUPM Not defined
 GUPV Main Directorate of Border Troops
 GUPVI Main Directorate of the Military Inspectorate
 GUUIS Not defined
 GUV Probably Main Directorate of Troops
 Hrs Hours
 IAD Fighter Aviation Division
 IAP Fighter Aviation Regiment

GLOSSARY (cont'd)

IB Not Defined
 IG Hospital for Contagious Diseases
 illeg. Illegible
 IPK Iranian Border Commissioner
 isl. Island
 ITX Corrective Labor Colony
 ITL Corrective Labor Camp
 KA Red Army
 KARLAG Karaganda Corrective Labor Camp
 KGB Committee for State Security
 KHPPG Mobile Field Surgical Hospital
 KHR People's Democratic Republic of Korea
 KIR People's Republic of China
 KKh Not defined
 KEG Not defined
 KP Communist Party
 KPFG Not Defined
 KPFT Not Defined
 KPES Communist Party Soviet Union
 KPI Preliminary Detention Cell
 KU Probably Sector Commander
 LVM Not defined
 MASH Mobile Army Surgical Hospital
 MNSF Ministry of Security of the Russian Federation
 MD Military District
 MHP Local Evacuation Station
 MFA Ministry of Foreign Affairs
 MGB Ministry of State Security
 MSU Moscow State University
 MSH Naval General Staff
 MUK International Red Cross
 MID Ministry of Foreign Affairs
 MINUSOLO- Ministry of Geological Survey/Research
 MORASVEDEI Ministry of Defense
 MO Place for Seal
 M.P. Medical Service
 M/S Ministry of Internal Affairs
 MVD National Liberation Front
 MFO People's Commissariat of Defense
 MHO People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs
 MVD Oblast Statistics
 OBLASTAT Regional Department of Highways
 OBLDOROTDEL Duty Officer
 OD Odessa Military District
 ODVO Counter-Intelligence Section
 OIR Operational Maneuver Group
 OIS Inventory
 OJ Separate Service Company
 ORC Not Defined
 OROP Separate Supply Company or Separate Signals Company
 ORS Not defined (Probably Department of American
 OSA

GLOSSARY (cont'd)

TsKI	Central Design and Research
TsKP	Central Command Post
TsOG	Not defined
TsVG	Central Military Hospital
TsVKVP(b)	Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks)
TsZ	Not defined
U/I	unidentified
UID	Not defined
UK	Criminal Code
UM	Directorate of the Militia
UMGB	Directorate of the Ministry of State Security
UMVD	Directorate of the Ministry of Internal Affairs
UMKGB	Directorate of People's Commissariat of State Security
UPPG	Not defined
UPT	Directorate of Public Transportation
UPVI	Not defined
USKh	Not defined
USSR	Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
UT	Directorate of Rear Services
UVD	Directorate of Internal Affairs
UVV	War-time Record
VCh	High Frequency
VCh	Military Unit
VG	Military Hospital
VIA	Vietnamese Fighter Aviation
VK	Military Medical Commission
VKh	entry, input
VKP	All-Union Communist Party
VKP(b)	All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks)
VMP	Navy
VNG	Naval Hospital
VNM	Military Medical Museum
VNS	Naval Forces
VNOS	Aircraft-warning Service
VORKUTLAG	Vorkuta Corrective Labor Camp
VS	Armed Forces
VBU	Military Medical Directorate
VT	Military Tribunal
VVK	Military Medical Commission
VVS	Air Force(s)
ZAGOTZERNO	Grain Procurement Point
ZAGS	Civil Registry Office
ZAKVO	Zakavkas Military District

PREPARED STATEMENT OF BRUCE WARREN SANDERSON

BRUCE WARREN SANDERSON

1424 6 AVE S
FARGO, ND

Date of Birth: July 28, 1953

Place of Birth: Forbes Air Force Base, Topeka, Kansas

Graduated from Fargo North High School: 1971

Employed as a welder and fabricator until 1960

Attended Moorhead Technical Vocational Institute: 1960-1962

Employed as a refrigeration/air conditioning technician 1962-present.

November 1, 1992

TO: SENATOR JOHN F. KERRY, CHAIRMAN, AND SENATOR BOB SMITH, VICE CHAIRMAN, UNITED STATES SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON POW/MIA AFFAIRS

FROM: BRUCE V. SANDERSON
JOHN R. SANDERSON

The enclosed written statement and supporting documents detail our efforts to collect information concerning the incident in which our father, Captain Warren John Sanderson, U. S. Air Force, was shot down, and is unaccounted for.

During the past several months, we have had extensive contact with many of the government agencies concerned with the POW/MIA effort, as well as our state Senators and Representative in Congress. In some cases, the contact has been fruitful, in others, frustrating.

This account of the incident involving U. S. aircraft RB-50, tail number 47-145A, and her crew, is as complete and accurate as we can present with the information supplied.

It is hoped that this information will be helpful in your efforts.

Bruce V. Sanderson
Bruce V. Sanderson

John R. Sanderson
John R. Sanderson

On July 29, 1953, at 6:15 A. M., a U. S. Air Force RB-50, tail number 47-145A, was attacked by two Soviet MIG-15 fighters over the Sea of Japan. After the first firing pass by the MIG-15's, the aircrew was ordered to bail out. The MIG-15's made a second pass, causing the right wing to separate. The RB-50 crashed into the Sea of Japan approximately 40 miles southeast of Vladivostok. The co-pilot, Capt John E. Roche, was rescued by the U. S. Navy destroyer USS Pickens at approximately 4:30 A. M., July 30, 1953. One crewmember was determined to have died in the aircraft, and two bodies were recovered several months after the incident. Thirteen crewmembers are unaccounted for.

From the date of the incident until June of 1992, very little information was released to families of the crew. Requests for information received replies that informed us that the incident was still classified, and further information was not available.

On March 28, 1992, we submitted a letter to the office of Senator Kent Conrad of North Dakota, requesting his assistance in obtaining information concerning the loss of our father, Capt. Warren John Sanderson, who was an Electronic Countermeasures Officer on the RB-50.

In early June, 1992, a packet of information arrived from Senator Conrad's office that contained the documents on the Continuation of Missing Status past 12 months, the Presumptive Finding of Death (PFD), and documents concerning the efforts of the State Department to obtain an accounting of the incident from the Soviet government through the United Nations Security Council.

From these documents, we learned for the first time that live survivors were sighted in the water by search and rescue aircraft. These sightings were documented in the Continuation of Missing Status beyond 12 months, and in the State Department documents.

On June 13, 1992, Russian President Boris Yeltsin announced that as of August 1, 1993, the Soviet Union held 12 U. S. servicemen, eight in prison camps, and four in psychiatric hospitals. The release of this information, with the date so close to the date of the shoot down of the RB-50, brought hope that our father may have survived the attack and crash.

On June 19, 1992, we sent a second letter to Senator Kent Conrad requesting specific information on several points. A copy of that letter is attached. Briefly, we requested information on the following points:

Reports from the Naval surface vessels that were involved in the search.

A copy of the de-briefing report from Capt. John E. Roche.

A copy of the de-briefing report from the pilots and aircrew of the aircraft involved in the search for the RB-50 and her crew.

An explanation of the report made in 1955 that summarizes a possible sighting of Warren J. Sanderson by a Japanese National at Ints Camp #1.

In 1979, a Soviet dissident made a statement through Reverend Paul Lindstrom that he had contact with 6 members of the crew of the RB-50 shot down July 29, 1953, and had knowledge of three other crew members. These contacts were as late as 1975. We are requesting any information that may be in any intelligence interview reports of that person.

In the weeks that followed, we received invaluable assistance from Senators Kent Conrad, Quentin Burdick, and Congressman Byron Dorgan. Through their offices, we were put in contact with the various government agencies that we would be dealing with.

We began the process of compiling as much information as possible about the incident, as well as trying to locate personal information about our father. We contacted the U. S. Air Force Casualty Office and the National Personnel Records Center in St. Louis, Missouri, for any records that may include personal, dental, medical, or fingerprint records. We were informed that those records were destroyed in the fire that occurred at the National Personnel Records Center in 1973.

We learned that the League of Families was having a meeting in Washington, D. C. on July 23-27, 1992, and that representatives from the Air Force Casualty Office would be on hand to discuss individual cases with the family members. Although we were not eligible for government transportation, we decided to attend.

Meetings had been arranged with representatives of the U. S. Air Force Casualty Office, the office of Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (DSAD) Al Ptak, and Mr. William LeGros from the Senate Select Committee for POW/MIA Affairs.

In the joint meeting with the U. S. Air Force Casualty Office and DASD, we were given information from the USS Maddox, which was one of the destroyers involved in the search for survivors. In reviewing these documents, we learned that the U. S. Navy was notified to proceed to the coordinates of the crash at approximately 5:20 P. M. July 28, and look for six men in a raft or boat.

During our meeting with the Air Force Casualty Office and DASD, it was apparent that we had more detailed information about the RB-50 incident than was being presented at the meeting. We showed that the RB-50 incident has several factors that would make it a good priority case. It was an admitted shoot down by the Soviets. Survivors were observed in the water by search and rescue aircraft. Soviet patrol boats were observed in the area, both moving to and from the crash site. And we rescued the co-pilot 22 hours after the shoot down 17 miles from the coast.

Major Marty Wista and Mr. B. J. Andrews from Department of Defense agreed that the RB-50 case did have these merits, and would press to have it handled as a priority.

We met with Mr. William LeGros, an investigator assigned to the Senate Select Committee for POW/MIA Affairs. In our meeting with him, we stressed the need for the Select Committee to extend its' existence beyond the December 31, 1992 expiration. The issue before this Committee is extremely complex, and will require years of oversight to ensure a full accounting is provided on the fate of the POW/MIA's.

We visited the National Archives, and requested to view 10 boxes of documents from Group 59, State Department Documents. We located approximately 50 pages of related material, including withdrawal notices and access denied notices. Much of this material augmented the information we had received earlier that survivors were sighted in the water, and that the United States government believed that the Soviet government had custody of some of the crew.

Following our return from Washington, D. C., we spent much of the month of August, 1992, requesting additional documents on the RB-50 incident, and tracking the progress of our requests for information. We have not received any of the aircrew de-briefings that we requested, or information that the records had been located. We supplied DASD with additional information, such as pilots names, units, base stationed at, who de-briefed the pilots, as we uncovered it.

In mid-August, Bruce decided that a trip to Russia to meet with the members of Task Force Russia and others involved in the search of POW/MIA's was necessary. The required passport and visa were expedited with the assistance of Senator Kent Conrad. Bruce left for Russia on September 2, 1992.

Upon arrival in Moscow, Bruce met with Ed Pussey, Bill Saxe, and Al Graham (Task Force Russia). At this point, he turned over copies of the most pertinent documents that demonstrated the facts to show why the RB-50 incident is an excellent model for the Task Force to use as it's lead case. The

information was discussed, and the Task Force members took possession of the documents. After the discussion, Ed Pussey stated that because of Bruce's detailed understanding of the facts, that he should present the RB-50 case to the Russian members of the Joint Task Force. This was agreed to. A meeting was arranged with Russian General Dimitri Volkogonov and his staff.

Bruce's host in Russia, Valery Smirnov, was invited by the Task Force members to view a French video tape taken in 1989 at Pers 35, where Mr. Smirnov was a prisoner, to identify people in the tape. Mr. Smirnov agreed, and was able to assist in identifying many of the persons depicted.

On September 16, 1992, Bruce met privately with Russian Colonel [redacted] of the [redacted]. The meeting took place at the apartment of Valery Smirnov, who acted as interpreter. They discussed Colonel [redacted] personal involvement with interrogating U. S. servicemen from 1950-1954 in the [redacted] region. One of the main focuses of this discussion concerned the flow of documents pertaining to the interrogation of the U. S. servicemen from the initial processing to their current location at the Podolsk Military Archives. [redacted] also provided very specific fond (file) numbers for these documents. [redacted] seemed very willing and sincere in wanting to assist Bruce in further efforts in obtaining an accounting of his father.

On September 17, 1992, Bruce went to the U. S. Embassy to meet with Ed Pussey. At that meeting, all pertinent information obtained in the meeting with Colonel [redacted] including the fond (file) numbers, and the geographic locations of the interrogations of U. S. servicemen was turned over.

On September 18, 1992, a meeting took place with General Volkogonov and his staff. This meeting was attended by General Bernard Loeffke, Ed Pussey, Al Graham, a staff translator from DASD, a female Russian translator, and Bruce. At this meeting, Bruce was able to directly address the RB-50 incident, and also to request specific information from the Russian archives confirming the incident. He requested the names of the MIG-15 pilots involved in the shoot-down, and the pilots de-briefing reports. He also requested information detailing the activities of the NKVD border patrol boats observed going to and from the crash site.

Throughout the course of the visit to Moscow, Bruce was in contact with the U. S. Embassy several times per week. He also contacted our sources in Washington, D. C., and other locations in the United States requesting updates on the status of our requests for information. Telephone contacts with his brother, John, resulted in further written correspondence with information sources.

On September 22, 1992, Bruce contacted the co-pilot of the RB-50 who was rescued by the Navy. Captain John E. Roche recounted that while he was in the water, Soviet vessels passed close enough to him that the wake would wash over his head. This took place 90 minutes after the RB-50 crashed. Captain Roche stated that after his return to military control, he was de-briefed in great detail by the State Department in Washington, D. C.

On October 5, 1992, Bruce met with Ambassador Robert Straus at the U. S. Embassy. Bruce briefed Ambassador Straus on the progress of his visit to date. The Ambassador conveyed his best wishes.

On October 7, 1992, Bruce met Russian Lt. Col Osipov of the Joint Task Force. He was accompanied by Ed Pussey, Al Graham, and Valery Smirnov, who acted as Bruce's personal translator. At this meeting, Bruce inquired as to the status of the request for the information that was referred to in the meeting with General Volkogonov. They had no new information to deliver to Bruce at this time. Lt. Col Osipov then gave his personal word of honor that these documents would be supplied within a month's time.

On October 12, 1992, Bruce met with Colonel [redacted] at Valery Smirnov's apartment. Valery Smirnov acted as the translator. At this meeting, they went over the various methods in which the documents were routed from local and regional archives, to the central archives. Col. [redacted] described how various government agencies, such as the KGB, Army, Navy, or Politburo, had local, regional, and central archives for information.

Col. [redacted] also reaffirmed the information from the first meeting that all U. S. personnel under Soviet control were photographed, fingerprinted, and given Russian names. That these men were then moved frequently from camp to camp. It was a common practice to create a false death certificate or record when a prisoner was moved from camp to camp. Most of these men were sentenced to long prison terms under the worst conditions. Examples are uranium mines, coal mines, salt mines, and logging camps. Some of the men with technical skills and knowledge were forced to work in prison factories.

Col. [redacted] stated that he received special written permission from General Volkogonov to access restricted archives to obtain an initial accounting for the crew of the RB-50. It is his belief from his preliminary investigation that crew members from the RB-50 were captured July 29, 1953. He again stated his willingness to assist Bruce in his search for the fate of his father and the crew members of the RB-50.

Bruce returned to the United States on October 13, 1992.

March 26, 1992

Senator Kent Conrad
157 2 Ave N
Fargo, ND 58102

Dear Senator Conrad,

I am writing to request your assistance in obtaining information concerning the death of my father.

My father was a navigator/radar operator aboard a U. S. Air Force RB-50 aircraft that was shot down in the North Sea of Japan on July 29, 1953. This was the day after the armistice that ended hostilities in Korea.

What information I have is that the RB-50 was flying approximately 40 miles off the coast of Siberia when it was attacked by two MIG-15 fighters. The aircraft crashed into the sea. The co-pilot survived and was rescued. It is presumed that the other sixteen men aboard perished.

My father's name was Warren John Sanderson. His date of birth is December 27, 1923. His service number was AO 2 066 184. At the time of his death he was a 1st Lieutenant. He was assigned to the 343rd Strategic Reconnaissance Squadron, 55th Strategic Reconnaissance Wing M. Their home base was Forbes Air Force Base, Kansas. At the time of his death, he was on temporary duty at Yokota Air Force Base, Japan.

The co-pilot who survived is 1st Lieutenant John E. Roche, service number AO2029268.

I am including a copy of the orders for the temporary duty. I believe the names listed are those of the crew of the RB-50.

Specifically, I am interested in any information that was obtained by the Air Force, Department of Defense, or Department of State concerning the incident. Was there contact with the Soviet Government, and what was their response? At the time of the incident, political and military tensions were quite high. What actually happened may be different from what was stated publicly.

Were there any reports of survivors picked up later by other ships in the area? Were any bodies recovered after the crash by either government? If so, were they identified and returned?

After the incident, very little information was released. I hope that in the 39 years that have passed, the need to classify this event will have been satisfied.

My mailing address is 2018 N. 8 St, Fargo, ND 58102.
My home phone is 701-235-6791.

Thank you in advance for any assistance you can provide.

Sincerely,

John R. Sanderson

June 19, 1992

Senator Kent Conrad
657 2 Ave N
Fargo, ND 58102

Dear Senator Conrad,

First, I must take this opportunity to express my deep and sincere appreciation for your efforts on behalf of the Sanderson family. The interest your office, both in Washington, D. C., and in Fargo, N. D. has taken in our quest for information into the circumstances surrounding the death or disappearance of my father has been very encouraging.

The recent letter and statement from Russian President Yeltsin, confirming that American servicemen were detained in the Soviet Union, has brought hope to the families of MIA's throughout the United States that answers may finally be forthcoming.

The search for information continues. The purpose of this letter is to request your assistance in obtaining information on several issues.

First: The survivor of the incident is Captain John E. Roche. He was reportedly picked up by the USS Picking, a U. S. Navy destroyer, at approximately 0450 Hrs, 7/30/53. By this time, Captain Roche had been in the water for more than 20 hours. The point of rescue was reported to be only 17 miles from the Russian port of Vladivostok. Did the USS Picking continue the search for survivors or bodies past that point?

Did the Commanding Officer of the USS Picking, Cdr Michael P. Smith, file a report detailing the actions and observations during the rescue? Were there any other surface vessels sighted or noted on radar? If an after action report was filed, can I obtain a copy?

Second: Did Captain Roche indicate during his de-briefing whether the crew members were wearing their Mae West floatation devices when ordered to bail out? If they were, the members should remain afloat, even if unconscious or deceased. Also, Captain Roche was prevented from giving the families of the other crew members any details of the mission, or the events of or following the attack. Is a copy of Captain Roche's debriefing report available?

Third: A B-29 dropped a life raft to Captain Roche at 1750 Hrs, 7/29/53. This was the second B-29 through the area, or the second pass by the same aircraft. There were other life rafts dropped, and crew members seen swimming or moving

toward those rafts. Were there any reports filed by the aircrews of the aircraft involved? Can I obtain copies of those reports?

Fourth: I am enclosing a copy of a report summarizing an interview of a Japanese National who was repatriated from Communist China in 1955. This former POW was shown the photographs of 11 downed U. S. airmen believed to be held as POW's. This individual selected the photograph of Warren J. Sanderson as the U. S. serviceman he had observed at INTA. There are some discrepancies in the report and the date and circumstances of my father's incident, such as date and location. The report also refers to another American, age approximately 40, who was interned at PW Camp #1 at INTA. Captain John C. Ward, a member of the RB-50 crew, was approximately 40 years of age at the time of the shoot-down.

What I am enclosing is an extract from the complete report. An examination of the complete report may reveal if the Japanese National's identification of the photograph was considered reliable. Also, in 1955, those 11 U. S. airmen were believed to be held by the Soviet Union. What was the basis for that belief? Who were the other 10 airmen whose photographs were shown?

Finally: For your information. During the week of June 22, 1992, I expect to be in possession of a news article from the May 21, 1979 edition of the El Paso, TX Times. In this article, a Soviet dissident is reported as stating that he spent time in a Soviet prison camp with the crew of the RB-50 aircraft shot down on 29 July 53. We have located the clergy who sponsored him. As soon as I have the news clipping and have contacted the clergyman, I will send this to you. I may need assistance in locating the Soviet national, and determining if U. S. intelligence services were aware of his claims and investigated them.

I thank you again for your valuable assistance, and look forward to contacting you.

If you or your staff have any questions or need clarification on any of the information I have forwarded, please contact me.

Sincerely,

John R. Sanderson

22 June 1992

Congressman Byron Dorgan
112 Robert St
Fargo, N. D. 58102

Congressman Dorgan,

This letter is my authorization for you to request on my behalf, all personnel, medical, and dental records that pertain to my father.

My father was a navigator/radar operator aboard a U. S. Air Force RB-50 aircraft that was shot down in the North Sea of Japan on July 29, 1953. This was the day after the armistice that ended hostilities in Korea.

My father's name was Warren John Sanderson. His date of birth is December 27, 1923. His service number was AO-2 066 184. At the time of his death he was a 1st Lieutenant. He was assigned to the 343rd Strategic Reconnaissance Squadron, 55th Strategic Reconnaissance Wing M. Their home base was Forbes Air Force Base, Kansas. At the time of his death, he was on temporary duty at Yokota Air Force Base, Japan.

He was promoted to Captain after the incident.

Thank you for your assistance.

Sincerely,

John R. Sanderson

July 10, 1992

Mr. Foust,

These are the basic topics that Bruce and I would like to discuss with Mr. Ptak and the Senate Select Committee.

In reference to the shoot down of the RB-50 aircraft at 0615 Hrs, July 29, 1953, have any Soviet records been located on the incident? The MIG-15 pilots report of the incident, as well as any other Soviet aircraft involved in the search for crew members, may indicate sightings of aircrew parachutes or survivors in the water.

Have records been located detailing Soviet Naval activity involving the search for crew members of the RB-50? Was there any record of remains recovered along the coast in the days following the shoot down? If these records have not been located, has the group conducting the investigation in Russia requested access to these records?

In April, 1979, two convicted Soviet spies were traded for five Soviet dissidents. They are Alexander Ginzburg, Valentin Moroz, Georgi P. Vins, Eduard Kuznetsov, and Mark Dymshyts. Following the release of the five dissidents, information was reported by the Associated Press that crew members of the RB-50 shot down July 29, 1953 were imprisoned in labor camps in eastern Russia. The report further states that survivors of the incident were being held in five camps, identified as Bogushi, Kelka (or Kuska), Komsomolsk, Gandala, and Wanger. Were the five dissidents interviewed by U. S. intelligence services?

What has the search group currently in Russia discovered in regards to the crew of the RB-50? Have they obtained records from the camps listed above?

Has the Department of State, the Department of Defense, or any of the intelligence services received information in the years since the shoot down that any of the crew survived, or that remains were recovered?

When the RB-50 departed Yokota AFB, Japan, was the flight tracked by radar through-out its flight?

We look forward to meeting with Senator Conrad, Mr. Ptak, and the Senate Select Committee. We also extend our appreciation to you for taking the time and effort to make these meetings possible.

Sincerely,

John R. Sanderson

July 28, 1992

Mr. Bob Foust

Per our conversation on July 24, 1992, I am requesting assistance in obtaining the following information concerning the incident in which my father, Capt. Warren J. Sanderson, was lost, and events after that incident concerning his possible recovery by Soviet forces.

1. The de-briefing report of the survivor, Capt. John E. Roche A02029268. Capt. Roche's report may provide details of the events of and following the attack and crash of the RB-50. In the report filed by the Officers of the Navy ships involved in the search and rescue, Capt. Roche mentioned that six or seven members of the crew were together just after the crash.
2. In April of 1979, the U. S. agreed to release two convicted Soviet spies in exchange for the release of 5 Soviet dissidents. They are Alexander Ginzburg, Valentin Moroz, Georgi P. Vins, Eduard Kuznetsov, and Mark Dymshits. Following the release of the five dissidents, information was reported by the Associated Press that crew members of the RB-50 shot down July 29, 1953 were imprisoned in labor camps in eastern Russia. The report further states that survivors of the incident were being held in five camps, identified as Bogoshi, Kelka (or Kuska), Komsomolsk, Gandala, and Wangar. Were the five dissidents interviewed by U. S. intelligence services? Can I obtain copies of the interviews?
3. The mission orders for the flight of the RB-50, tail number 47-147A that departed Yokota AFB, Japan on or about 0307 Hrs, July 29, 1953.
4. Any Russian documents provided to the Office of Deputy Assistance Secretary of Defense Al Ptak from February-July 1992 that pertain to missing or unaccounted for American servicemen.
5. I am enclosing a copy of a report summarizing an interview of a Japanese National who was repatriated from Communist China in 1955. This former POW was shown the photographs of 11 downed U. S. airmen believed to be held as POW's. This individual selected the photograph of Warren J. Sanderson as the U. S. serviceman he had observed at INTA. There are some discrepancies in the report and the date and circumstances of my father's incident, such as date and location. The report also refers to another American, age approximately 40, who was interned at PW Camp #1 at INTA. Captain John C. Ward, a member of the RB-50 crew, was approximately 40 years of

age at the time of the shoot-down.

What I am enclosing is an extract from the complete report. An examination of the complete report may reveal if the Japanese National's identification of the photograph was considered reliable. Also, in 1955, those 11 U. S. airmen were believed to be held by the Soviet Union. What was the basis for that belief? Who were the other 10 airmen whose photographs were shown?

Thank you for your assistance.

John R. Sanderson

1 Aug 1992

Senator Kent Conrad
724 Senate Hart Bldg
Washington, D. C. 20510

Senator Burdick,

This letter is my authorization for you to request on my behalf, all personnel, medical, dental, and fingerprint records that pertain to my father.

My father was a navigator/radar operator aboard a U. S. Air Force RB-50 aircraft that was shot down in the North Sea of Japan on July 29, 1950. This was the day after the armistice that ended hostilities in Korea.

My father's name was Warren John Sanderson. His date of birth is December 27, 1923. His service number was AO 2 066 184. At the time of his death he was a 1st Lieutenant. He was assigned to the 343rd Strategic Reconnaissance Squadron, 55th Strategic Reconnaissance Wing M. Their home base was Forbes Air Force Base, Kansas. At the time of his death, he was on temporary duty at Yokota Air Force Base, Japan.

He was promoted to Captain after the incident.

Thank you for your assistance.

Sincerely,

John R. Sanderson

Bruce W. Sanderson

1 Aug 1992

Senator Kent Conrad
724 Senate Hart Bldg
Washington, D. C. 20510

Senator Conrad,

This letter is my authorization for you to request on my behalf, all personnel, medical, dental, and fingerprint records that pertain to my father.

My father was a navigator/radar operator aboard a U. S. Air Force RB-50 aircraft that was shot down in the North Sea of Japan on July 29, 1950. This was the day after the armistice that ended hostilities in Korea.

My father's name was Warren John Sanderson. His date of birth is December 27, 1923. His service number was AO 2 066 184. At the time of his death he was a 1st Lieutenant. He was assigned to the 343rd Strategic Reconnaissance Squadron, 55th Strategic Reconnaissance Wing M. Their home base was Forbes Air Force Base, Kansas. At the time of his death, he was on temporary duty at Yokota Air Force Base, Japan.

He was promoted to Captain after the incident.

Thank you for your assistance.

Sincerely,

John R. Sanderson

Bruce W. Sanderson

September 21, 1992

Mr. Richard Loeffe
511 Senate Hall Building
Washington, D. C. 20510

Dear Richard,

Per our conversation, I am requesting the assistance of the FBI in determining how my father, Warren J. Sanderson, would appear in the years since the shoot down of the RB-50 aircraft on July 29, 1953.

I am requesting that the "aging" process be done in ten year increments. It is important to show the aging process in increments, as people may have observed him, or photographs may have been taken, at different times.

My father was 29 years of age when the RB-50 was shot down in 1953. I request that the process show how he may age in 1963 (39 years of age), 1973 (49 years of age), 1983 (59 years of age), and 1993 (69 years of age).

I am enclosing two photographs. The first is of Warren and my mother, Stella, taken late 1948 or early 1949, when Warren would have been 26 years of age.

The second photograph is of Warren's parents, Fred and Stella Sanderson. This photograph was taken in approximately 1944. Fred would have been 57 years of age, Stella 47 years of age.

If other photos are needed, please contact me.

Thank you for your assistance.

Sincerely,

John R. Sanderson

September 27, 1992

Mr. Bernard Loeffke, USA (Ret)
Director-Task Force Russia
HQ, DA-ODCSPER
DATE: 28-TFR
Pentagon, Room 2D 677
Washington, D. C. 20310-0300

Dear General Loeffke,

I was contacted by my brother, Bruce Sanderson, from Moscow, Russia earlier this month following his meeting with General Dimitri Volkogonov. In that conversation, Bruce said that you instructed him to request, through your office, information that we have requested and not received.

These are the items that we have requested, but not received.

1. The de-briefing report of the survivor, Capt. John E. Roche AO2029268. Capt. Roche's report may provide details of the events of and following the attack and crash of the RB-50. In the report filed by the Officers of the Navy ships involved in the search and rescue, Capt. Roche mentioned that six or seven members of the crew were together just after the crash. He has informed Bruce in a telephone conversation recently that surface vessels (Soviet) were in the area of the crash 45-60 minutes following the crash.

Captain Roche has stated that following his return to the United States after the incident, he went to Washington, D. C., where he was debriefed by the Department of State. He was accompanied by two Air Force intelligence officers. To this date, all I have received is a one page summary that details the death of Lt. James Keith.

2. A B-29 dropped an A-3 boat to Captain Roche at 1750 Hrs, 7/29/53. This was the second B-29 through the area, or the second pass by the same aircraft. There were other life rafts dropped, and crew members seen swimming or moving toward those rafts. These observations were detailed in the documents for the continuation of missing status, and presumptive finding of death for 13 members of the crew. Also, the original information received by the U. S. Navy was to search for 6 men in a life boat or raft. These observation could only have been made by the aircrew of the search and rescue aircraft. Were there any reports filed or photographs taken by the aircrews of the aircraft involved? Can I obtain copies of those reports and/or photographs?

2. In April of 1975, the U. S. agreed to release two convicted Soviet spies in exchange for the release of 5 Soviet dissidents. They are Alexander Ginzburg, Valentin Moroz, George P. Vins, Eduard Kuznetsov, and Mark Dymshys. Following the release of the five dissidents, information was reported by the Associated Press that crew members of the RB-50 shot down July 29, 1953 were imprisoned in labor camps in eastern Russia. The report further states that survivors of the incident were being held in five camps, identified as Bogoshi, Kelka (or Kuska), Komsomolsk, Gandala, and Wangar. Were the five dissidents interviewed by U. S. intelligence services?

The source for the Associated Press was Rev. Paul Lindstrom, Christian Liberty Academy Satellite Schools, Arlington Heights, IL. Rev. Lindstrom initially informed me that one of the five dissidents was in a camp with six of the members of the RB-50 crew, and had knowledge that three other members of the crew were alive in another camp as late as 1975.

In recent conversations, Rev. Lindstrom has indicated that the source was not one of the five dissidents, but a Soviet citizen from the Ukraine who was arrested for anti-Soviet writing and imprisoned. He was released in 1974 and left the Soviet Union for Germany. He went from Germany to Canada (Ottawa), and then to New York. While in New York, he was transported to Washington, D. C., at government expense, where he was interviewed by the intelligence services. It is believed that this interview took place in 1979. This individual went back to Canada, then to Israel. Rev. Lindstrom will not reveal his name.

Intelligence interviews with this subject would provide a first-hand account of the locations where the crew was last observed.

4. I am enclosing a copy of a report summarizing an interview of a Japanese National who was repatriated from Communist China in 1955. This former POW was shown the photographs of 11 downed U. S. airmen believed to be held as POW's. This individual selected the photograph of Warren J. Sanderson as the U. S. serviceman he had observed at INTA. There are some discrepancies in the report and the date and circumstances of my father's incident, such as date and location. The report also refers to another American, age approximately 40, who was interned at PW Camp #1 at INTA. Captain John C. Ward, a member of the RB-50 crew, was approximately 40 years of age at the time of the shoot-down.

What I am enclosing is an extract from the complete report. An examination of the complete report may reveal if the Japanese National's identification of the photograph was considered reliable. Also, in 1955, those 11 U. S. airmen were believed to be held by the Soviet Union. What was the basis for that belief? Who were the other 10 airmen whose photographs were shown?

5. Any Russian documents provided to the Office of Deputy Assistance Secretary of Defense Al Ptak from February-July 1992 that pertain to missing or unaccounted for American servicemen.

Your assistance is appreciated.

Sincerely,

John R. Sanderson

The Department of State

ADMINISTRATIVE SERVICES

SERVICES

JAN 10 1955

RECEIVED

Bulletin

Vol. XXXI, No. 806

December 6, 1954

PROGRESS TOWARD EUROPEAN SECURITY

Assistant Secretary Merchant

PROTOCOLS ON GERMAN OCCUPATION AND AC- CESSION TO NATO TRANSMITTED TO SENATE

ECONOMIC COOPERATION IN THE AMERICAS

Statement by Secretary of the Treasury Humphrey

PRESENTATION OF CLAIM AGAINST U.S.S.R. IN 1953 PLANE ATTACK

For index see inside back cover

tives at Geneva last June from the list of American civilians held in Chinese Communist jails, is equally reprehensible.

The United States Government calls upon the Chinese Communist authorities to release these unjustly detained American nationals forthwith, in accordance with the provisions of the Korean Armistice Agreement and in conformity with the elementary precepts of justice and humanity.

The Chinese Communist authorities are under an obligation to redress in so far as possible the wrong they have inflicted on these American na-

tionals and their families. The United States Government reserves the right to claim compensation as may be determined appropriate, and to demand the punishment of the Chinese Communist officials responsible for the denial of the rights of these persons.

The Chinese Communist authorities should bear in mind that the long list of Chinese Communist outrages against American nationals, which the American people have borne with restraint thus far, is significantly extended by the Chinese Communist announcement of November 23rd.

Presentation of Claim Against U.S.S.R. in 1953 Plane Attack

The Department of State announced on October 9 (press release 566) that Ambassador Charles E. Bohlen on that date delivered to the Soviet Foreign Office at Moscow a note from the United States Government to the Soviet Government preferring a formal diplomatic claim against the Soviet Government on account of the destruction of a B-50 aircraft by Soviet aircraft off Cape Povorotny in the international airspace over the Sea of Japan on July 29, 1953. The note demands that the Soviet Government pay damages in the sum of \$2,785,492.94 and invites the Soviet Government, in the event that the Soviet Government denies liability, to join in submitting this dispute to the International Court of Justice. It likewise demands the release of any survivors of the B-50.

Henry Cabot Lodge, Jr., U.S. Representative to the United Nations, on October 11 transmitted the note to the president of the Security Council with the request that it be circulated to members of the Council.

On January 26, 1954, following an intensive investigation of the attack on the B-50 aircraft, the United States Government delivered to the Soviet Government a note¹ requesting certain detailed information with respect to the attack and the var-

ious allegations made by the Soviet Government in prior notes. Among other things, the Soviet Government had alleged that it had evidence to refute the United States Government's contention that the B-50 did not fly over Soviet territory and was attacked by Soviet fighters in international airspace over the Sea of Japan. The Soviet Government was requested to produce this evidence. The Soviet Government having failed to reply to the United States Government's note of January 26, 1954, the United States Government delivered to the Soviet Government another note on May 25, 1954,² inquiring when a reply might be expected to the note of January 26, 1954. The Soviet Government has made no reply or acknowledgment whatever to either note.

The October 9 note charges that the B-50 was shot down without warning in international airspace over the Sea of Japan. It takes note of the possibility that the Soviet Government may have information of the fate of the missing crew members and again demands that the Soviet Government provide such information as it has and make provision for the prompt return of any survivors whom it may still be holding or of whose whereabouts it may be informed.

¹ U.N. doc. E/3304 dated Oct. 12.

² BULLETIN of Mar. 15, 1954, p. 409.

³ Not printed here.

December 6, 1954

221289-54-3

TEXT OF OCTOBER 9 NOTE

The Government of the United States of America refers again to the destruction on July 29, 1953, by Soviet military aircraft of a United States Air Force B-50 type aircraft off Cape Pororotny in the international air space over the Sea of Japan. On January 26, 1954, following an intensive investigation and study of the incident, the United States Government delivered to the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics a note requesting certain detailed information with respect to the incident and with respect to the various allegations made by the Soviet Government in prior notes of July 30, 1953, August 4, 1953, and August 20, 1953. The Soviet Government having failed to reply to the United States Government's note of January 26, 1954, the United States Government, through its Embassy at Moscow, transmitted another note on May 25, 1954 to the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs inquiring when a reply might be expected to the note of January 26, 1954. The Soviet Government has made no reply or acknowledgement whatever to either note, although far more than sufficient time has elapsed to enable the Soviet Government to make a reply or to state its intentions with respect to such reply. The United States Government must conclude, therefore, that the Soviet Government is fully aware that it is not in a position to make a responsive or adequate reply to the United States Government's note of January 26, 1954.

This circumstance, the United States Government concludes, reinforces and confirms the essential accuracy of the findings of fact resulting from the United States Government's own investigation and study, as well as of the statements made in the various communications of the United States Government to the Soviet Government on this subject, particularly the United States Government's note of August 4, 1953.

The United States Government therefore takes this opportunity to place solemnly upon the record the facts relevant to the Soviet Government's liability and to prefer against the Soviet Government a formal international diplomatic claim for damages as set forth below.

I

The United States Government is prepared to prove by evidence in an appropriate forum, and it charges, the following:

1. Early in the morning of July 29, 1953 a four-engine aircraft of the United States Air Force, of the B-50 type, was duly dispatched from its base in Japan by United States Air Force authorities to perform a routine navigational mission in the air space over the international waters of the Sea of Japan, returning to base in Japan upon completion of the mission. The officers and crew were instructed prior to departure that under no circumstances was the aircraft to fly closer to the Soviet-held land mass than twelve nautical miles.

Upon its departure the B-50 type aircraft had on board a crew of seventeen persons, all members of the United

* BULLETIN of Aug. 17, 1953, p. 206.

* Not printed here.

* BULLETIN of Aug. 17, 1953, p. 206.

States Air Force and all nationals of the United States. They were, as the Soviet Government was informed in the United States Government's note of August 4, 1953, the following:

Stanley Keith O'Kelley - Captain - Serial No. AO 776002
John Ernst Roche - Captain - Serial No. AO 2029368
Edmund Joseph Cays - 1st Lieutenant - Serial No. AO 2072656
Lloyd Clayton Wiggins - 1st Lieutenant - Serial No. AO 865660
James Gordon Keith - 1st Lieutenant - Serial No. AO 2022928
Warren John Sanderson - 1st Lieutenant - Serial No. AO 2025184
Robert Elton Stalnaker - 1st Lieutenant - Serial No. AO 761237
John Cyrus Ward - Captain - Serial No. AO 865370
Francisco Joseph Tejeda - Major - Serial No. AO 726704
Frank Ernest Beyer - 1st Lieutenant - Serial No. AO 2026236
Francis Luther Brown - Master Sergeant - Serial No. AF 19 053497
Donald Wayne Gabree - S. Sergeant - Serial No. AF 19 233787
Roland Edgar Goulet - A/1G - Serial No. AF 12 223323
James Edwin Woods - A/2C - Serial No. AF 24418123
Charles Joseph Russell - A/2C - Serial No. AF 14 851458
Donald George Hill - S. Sergeant - Serial No. AF 19 253976
Earl Wilbur Madalin, Jr. - A/2C - Serial No. AF 14 270722

The B-50 aircraft proceeded on a course of approximately 215 degrees from the Japanese Island of Honshu. When it arrived in the air space over the international waters of the Sea of Japan at a point approximately 80 miles from the coastline, the aircraft turned to the right and proceeded on an easterly heading, flying at an altitude of approximately 20,000 feet, the crew carrying out the instructions given them as above stated.

The aircraft had reached a point in the air space over the international waters of the Sea of Japan approximately 40 miles south of Cape Pororotny, flying on a heading of approximately 95 degrees at an altitude of 20,000 feet when suddenly, at approximately 6:15 in the morning local time and without any prior warning whatever, Soviet MIG-15 type aircraft intercepted and fired upon the United States aircraft. One MIG-15 type aircraft commenced the interception and firing by coming up from below and to the left of the B-50 and shooting the No. 1 engine, rendering it inoperative. One or more additional MIG-15 type aircraft thereupon appeared behind the B-50, directed fire on the No. 4 engine and upon the right wing and other portions of the aircraft, and set the No. 4 engine on fire. When the Soviet MIG-15 aircraft appeared from behind, shooting at the B-50, one or more of the personnel on board the B-50 aircraft opened fire in self-defense against the oncoming attacking MIG-15 aircraft, but to no avail.

Immediately upon being hit, the B-50 aircraft dived sharply, losing altitude rapidly. The shots from the rear attack tore off the right wing and the tail section and caused the aircraft to disintegrate. The component parts of the B-50 then hit the water, at approximately the same position at which the interception and attack took place.

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The total time which elapsed between the commencement of the attack until the component parts of the aircraft hit the water was approximately two minutes.

Upon the B-50's first becoming disabled, in consequence of the actions of the MIG-15 aircraft against it, the members of the crew of the B-50 were directed by the aircraft commander, Captain Stanley K. O'Kelley, to abandon the aircraft and to seek safety by bailing out of the aircraft. The United States Government is informed and believes that, apart from First Lieutenant James Gordon Keith, all members of the crew above named bailed out of the aircraft, or parachuted, into the Sea of Japan, all coming down at points within the area of the Sea of Japan approximately 40 miles south of Cape Pororotny.

The United States Government finds, and charges, that all the actions of the MIG-15 type aircraft above described were taken upon the deliberate and willful orders of competent Soviet authorities.

When the B-50 failed to return to its base at the time required for its return, and could not be otherwise accounted for, the competent United States authorities commenced and conducted a meticulous and thorough search of the area by aircraft and by surface vessels of the United States Government and with the assistance of a naval vessel of the Australian Government in the area. The search of the Sea of Japan off Cape Pororotny succeeded in the sighting in the international waters of several survivors and disclosed the active presence in the same area of Soviet PT-type boats, trawlers and aircraft. One of the search aircraft dropped a lifeboat to a group of survivors but only Captain John E. Roche, the co-pilot, was able to reach the lifeboat and get into it. Intermittent fog hampered the rescue efforts and no other personnel could be rescued by the United States and Australian surface vessels. When the weather in the area cleared up, by dawn of July 30, 1953, no evidence of survivors, other than Captain Roche, could be seen in the international waters of the Sea of Japan by the air or surface rescue craft.

2. The United States Government finds, and charges, that in direct consequence of the Soviet Government's actions above described, the following took place:

- The B-50 aircraft was totally destroyed.
- First Lieutenant James Gordon Keith, navigator situated in the nose of the aircraft, was thrown from his position and mortally wounded, so that he was unable to bail out from the aircraft, and died.
- Captain Stanley K. O'Kelley, the aircraft commander, although he succeeded in bailing out from the aircraft to the waters of the Sea of Japan, was badly injured and shocked as a direct result of the shooting by the MIG-15 aircraft, and died as a result of these physical injuries and shock and of his exposure for approximately twenty hours in the Sea of Japan.
- Master Sergeant Francis Luther Brown, flight engineer, although he succeeded in bailing out from the aircraft to the waters of the Sea of Japan, was badly injured and shocked as a direct result of the shooting by the MIG-15 aircraft, and died as a result of these physical injuries and of shock and of long exposure in the Sea of Japan.
- Captain John Ernst Roche, the co-pilot, was thrown headlong into the body of the aircraft, suffering numerous bodily injuries and shock as a direct result of the shooting by the MIG-15 aircraft but he succeeded in bailing out from the aircraft. He suffered further shock and expo-

sure in the Sea of Japan from approximately 6:17 in the morning local time, July 29, 1953, to approximately 4:20 in the morning local time July 30, 1953. He was rescued from the waters of the Sea of Japan by a search vessel of the United States Navy.

2. The remaining thirteen members of the crew have not so far been accounted for. The United States Government finds, however, that all of them suffered bodily injury and shock as a direct result of the shooting by the MIG-15 aircraft. It finds further that a number, if not all, of them successfully parachuted to the surface of the Sea of Japan in the area above described in which the attack and destruction of the B-50 took place. It must conclude that these persons were either picked up alive by surface vessels of the Soviet Government in the area in which they hit the water, or that in due course, dead or alive, they were carried by the prevailing currents to Soviet-held territory and into the Soviet Government's custody. These dead, the United States Government finds and charges, were brought to their death by the injuries caused in the course of the attack on the B-50 aircraft, by shock and by exposure in the waters of the Sea of Japan. Those that were alive when they came into the custody of the Soviet Government, the United States Government finds and charges, suffered in addition injuries and anguish caused by their long detention by the Soviet Government, by the failure of the Soviet Government to inform the United States Government with respect to their whereabouts and their condition or to permit them to communicate with United States Government authorities.

These conclusions are based on the following considerations:

(I) As the United States Government has previously indicated, personnel on board search craft of the United States Government observed at least twelve Soviet PT-type boats, at least one armed trawler-type Soviet naval vessel, and Soviet aircraft, proceeding at high speed to and from the area of the scene of the incident. Other surface vessels of Soviet nationality were in the vicinity. These observations were made as late as 3 o'clock in the afternoon local time July 29, 1953. In view of the failure of the Soviet Government to make responsive reply to questions of the United States Government in its note of January 26, 1954 on this subject, the United States Government is confirmed in its conclusion, and it charges, that these Soviet craft picked up survivors and portions of the disabled B-50 aircraft.

(II) The prevailing currents of the Sea of Japan at the positions above mentioned and at the date of the incident, which are well known to the Soviet Government, move toward the coast in a northerly and northwesterly direction at a rate of approximately 0.7 to 1.1 knots. Even if the Soviet Government did not have these crew members in custody, dead or alive, earlier, it must have become aware of their arrival in Soviet territorial waters or on Soviet soil by August 1, 1953.

3. The B-50 aircraft at the time of the attack upon it and its destruction, and the navigational and flying equipment thereon, were in efficient and good working order. Each member of the crew was efficient and experienced in the performance of his task. In particular, Captain O'Kelley, the aircraft commander, was an efficient and experienced pilot; Captain Roche was an efficient and experienced co-pilot; First Lieutenant Cays, First Lieutenant Wiggins and First Lieutenant Keith were efficient and experienced navigators.

II

The United States Government finds as a result of its investigation that in its notes above mentioned the Soviet Government willfully and knowingly made material mis-

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statements of fact for the purpose of creating an untrue record and of misleading the United States Government. These misstatements of fact are most explicitly made in the Soviet Government's note of August 26, 1953 on this subject, which substantially reiterates the misstatements contained in the Soviet Government's earlier notes on the same subject:

1. The Soviet Government states that the B-50 aircraft at about 6 a. m. local time "violated the state boundary of the USSR, at first in the region of Cape Gamov, and continued the flight over the territory of the USSR at Ashold Island not far from Vladivostok". But the Soviet Government has refused, although duly requested, to state where the boundary, which it claims, runs in this region. The United States Government must therefore conclude, as it has found, that the B-50 aircraft at no time crossed into territory of the Soviet Union in this area but, on the contrary, flew entirely in the air space over the international waters of the Sea of Japan.

2. The Soviet Government states that two Soviet fighter aircraft approached the B-50 with the intention of showing the B-50 that it was within the boundaries of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and with the intention of suggesting that the B-50 leave the air space of the Soviet Union. This statement must be characterized as false, as well as misleading, since the first intimation which the crew of the B-50 had of the approach of any aircraft was the destruction of the No. 1 engine on the B-50 by fire directed from one of the Soviet MIG-15 type aircraft, which had appeared without any warning whatever to the left and from below the B-50 aircraft. This fact and the shooting which immediately followed directed by MIG-15 type aircraft coming up without warning from behind the B-50 aircraft conclusively demonstrates that it was the intention of the MIG-15 interceptors, and of the competent Soviet authorities who dispatched them and controlled their actions, to give the crew of the B-50 aircraft no warning whatever but, on the contrary, to effect the B-50's destruction without any warning or opportunity to the crew to disengage or to defend themselves.

3. The Soviet Government's statement permits the implication that the interception of the B-50 by Soviet aircraft took place within the air space over Soviet territory. This statement is false also. As has been stated above, the interception as well as the attack took place approximately forty miles south of Cape Poronoy and in the air space over the international waters of the Sea of Japan.

4. The Soviet Government states that fire was first opened by the B-50, being directed against the intercepting Soviet aircraft. This statement is false. As the United States Government has stated above, the B-50 aircraft did not open fire until after two firing passes had been made by the Soviet intercepting aircraft. The first MIG-15 type aircraft, which as stated above without warning destroyed the No. 1 engine, flew away unscathed. When immediately thereafter one or more MIG-15 type aircraft appeared from behind, the MIG aircraft were firing and the gunners on board the B-50 were compelled in self-defense to open fire against the MIG aircraft so firing upon the B-50.

5. The Soviet Government states that the attack took place at 6:12 in the morning local time. The United States Government charges that this statement is untrue and is known by the Soviet Government to be untrue. The United States Government has found that the interception and attack took place not earlier than 6:15 in the morning local time, if not later. By this time the B-50 aircraft, as the Soviet authorities well knew, had reached a point approximately forty miles off the Soviet land mass at its closest proximity.

6. The Soviet Government states that one of the Soviet aircraft was seriously damaged by fire from the B-50 in consequence of which the Soviet aircraft was compelled to fire upon the B-50. This statement is misleading as well as false. Even if, contrary to fact, the B-50 gunners had opened fire on the MIG aircraft appearing from the rear, the destruction of the No. 1 engine by the MIG aircraft which appeared first and the hostile attitude of the MIG aircraft appearing in the rear would have justified the B-50 gunners in opening fire on the MIG aircraft.

7. The Soviet Government states that after the Soviet aircraft fired on the B-50 the B-50 "departed in the direction of the sea" and that the Soviet authorities have no further information regarding the American military aircraft. This statement must be characterized as false as well as misleading. As stated above, within seconds after the Soviet aircraft hit the right wing and fuselage the B-50 disintegrated and fell into the sea. The pilots of the Soviet aircraft could not but have seen the consequences of their actions and reported it to the competent Soviet authorities. The United States Government notes that the Soviet Government admits that the pilots upon returning to base, if not earlier, reported what they had done and what had happened.

8. The Soviet Government indicates that it has "verified data", presumably including reports of ground observers as well as the testimony of the pilots of the Soviet aircraft involved, and that these data "refute the statement that the American airplane B-50 did not violate the boundary of the USSR and was attacked by Soviet fighters over the Sea of Japan". The Soviet Government, although duly requested in the United States Government's note of January 26, 1954, has failed and refused to produce these supporting data. The United States Government is compelled to conclude that such data as exist do not support the Soviet Government's conclusion and that these statements are therefore false.

9. The Soviet Government states that, contrary to the allegations contained in the United States Government's notes, there were no Soviet surface ships on July 29, 1953 in the area of the Sea of Japan in which the shooting incident took place, and it further implies that the weather conditions of fog and darkness were such that the observations of the crews of search craft reported in the United States Government's notes were not in fact made. These statements, as above indicated, are false and misleading. The weather, during the hours of daylight, was in fact foggy but at the low altitudes at which the search aircraft flew, and on the surface of the sea at which the naval craft proceeded, there was as the Soviet Government well knows intermittent visibility permitting the ob-

servations which were made and which were reported by the United States Government.

10. The Soviet Government states that "as a result of investigation, it has been confirmed that the Soviet authorities have no information concerning the crew of the American bomber B-50". For the reasons above stated this statement must be characterized as false and misleading.

III

The United States Government finds and it charges that the foregoing actions of the pilots of the Soviet aircraft and of the competent Soviet authorities made the Soviet Government guilty of deliberate and willful violations of international law, on account of which it has become liable to the United States Government for damages and other demands:

1. Since the Soviet Government has evaded the questions in the United States Government's note of January 26, 1954 on this subject, the United States Government declares that the limit of the territory of the Soviet Government in the area of the incident extends no further than three nautical miles from the mean low water mark of the shore line of the Soviet-held land mass in this area, following the sinuosities of the coast and the sinuosities of each of the Soviet-held islands. While the United States Government in instructions to its personnel has prohibited any overflying aircraft or seagoing craft from coming closer than twelve miles to Soviet-held territory in traversing the international waters of the Sea of Japan or the air space above, the United States Government takes this opportunity again to inform the Soviet Government that it does not recognize the claim of the Soviet Government to territorial waters in excess of three miles from its coast. In the opinion of the United States Government there is no obligation under international law to recognize claims to territorial waters in excess of three miles from the coast.

2. In the circumstances of the case it was the duty of the Soviet Government to make every effort, following the wrongful destruction of the B-50 aircraft, to search for and pick up members of the crew, dead or alive, to cooperate with all other searching aircraft and surface craft in such search and rescue operations and promptly to turn over to authorities of the United States Government rescued personnel, the bodies of any dead personnel picked up and any portions of the aircraft salvaged, or to make arrangements for their prompt delivery to the United States Government. The failure of the Soviet Government to do so constitutes violation of international obligations.

3. It was the duty of the Soviet Government to make truthful statements to the United States Government in the notes above mentioned which the Soviet Government delivered to the United States Government in connection with this incident. The willful making of false or misleading statements in these circumstances constitutes a violation of international obligation.

4. The continued detention of survivors by the Soviet Government, and the failure of the Soviet Government immediately upon receipt of information at any time from its own sources of the observation of bodies of any of the

crew members, constitute violations on the part of the Soviet Government of international obligation.

5. Any shooting by the crew of the B-50 at the MIG aircraft, in the circumstances of the case, was lawful as an exercise of the right of self-defense. The B-50 having been fired upon and hit without prior warning, the crew of the B-50 were justified in the exercise of self-defense in shooting at the approaching MIG aircraft.

IV

The United States has suffered the following items of damage in direct consequence of the foregoing illegal acts and violations of duty and international legal obligations, for which the Soviet Government is liable, and the United States Government demands that the Soviet Government pay the following sums on account thereof:

1. United States Air Force airplane B-50 type No. 47-1454 and equipment thereon, amounting in total to \$1,989,908.50.
2. Damages to the United States by the willful and unlawful conduct of the Soviet Government \$491,584.88.
3. Damages to Captain John Ernst Roche, a national of the United States, for injuries to him, \$25,000.00.
4. Damages to the next-of-kin, nationals of the United States, for the deaths of Captain Stanley Keith O'Kelley, Master Sergeant Francis Luther Brown, First Lieutenant James Gordon Keith, \$150,000.00.
5. Damages to the next-of-kin, nationals of the United States, of the remaining thirteen crew members for all injuries resulting from the willful and unlawful conduct of the Soviet Government, including the wrongful deaths of such crew members or the wrongful and unlawful detention by the Soviet Government of such members of the crew as survived, \$850,000.00.

The United States Government declares that its demand for compensation on account of the members of the crew who survived does not imply the acquiescence of the United States Government in the withholding of those crew members from return to the United States, or the suppression by the Soviet Government of information regarding their whereabouts or welfare, or the making of false statements by the Soviet Government with respect thereto. The United States takes this opportunity again to demand that the Soviet Government forthwith provide the information in this regard which the United States Government has already requested, and make provision for the prompt return of any crew members whom it may still be holding or of whose whereabouts it is informed, and in the interim to provide such crew members with the maximum degree of care and comfort and facilitate access to them by appropriate representatives of the United States Government. The United States Government further declares that such demand for compensation with respect to members of the crew whose bodies came into the custody of Soviet authorities but who were no longer alive does not imply the acquiescence of the United States Government in the failure of the Soviet Government to inform the United States Government of such facts or to turn over such bodies to the United States Government. The United States Government further reserves the right to make additional demand upon the Soviet Government for amends or other actions on account of its conduct on

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or since July 29, 1953 with respect to such survivors or such dead crew members.

Furthermore, the United States Government has not included in its demand for damages, specified above, any sum on account of items of intangible injury deliberately and intentionally caused to the United States Government and to the American people by the wrongful actions of the Soviet Government. In this regard the United States Government had determined to defer to a future date the formulation of the kind and measure of redress or other action which the Soviet Government should take which would be appropriate in international law and practice to confirm the illegality of the actions directed by the Soviet Government against the United States Government and against the American people.

The Government of the United States calls upon the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics promptly to make its detailed answer to the allegations and demands made in this communication.

Should the Soviet Government in its answer acknowledge its indebtedness to the United States on account of the foregoing and agree to pay the damages suffered and to comply with the demands as above set forth, the United States Government is prepared, if requested, to present detailed evidence in support of its calculations of damages suffered and alleged. If, however, the Soviet Government contests liability, it is requested so to state in its answer. In the latter event, the Soviet Government is hereby notified that the United States Government deems an international dispute to exist falling within the competence of the International Court of Justice and that the United States Government proposes that that dispute be presented for hearing and decision in the International Court of Justice. Since it appears that the Soviet Government has thus far not filed with that Court any declaration of acceptance of the compulsory jurisdiction of the Court, the United States Government invites the Soviet Government to file an appropriate declaration with the Court, or to enter into a Special Agreement, by which the Court may be empowered in accordance with its Statute and Rules to determine the issues of fact and law which have been set forth herein.

The Soviet Government is requested to inform the United States Government in its reply to the present note of its intentions with respect to such a declaration or Special Agreement.

Albanian Independence Day

Statement by Secretary Dulles

Press release 671 dated November 27

November 28 marks the anniversary of the two historic events most cherished by the Albanian people: the first proclamation of Albanian independence in 1443 and the reemergence of Albania as an independent nation in 1912.

The traditional friendship of the United States for the people of Albania has sprung from a natural American sympathy with Albanian aspirations for liberty. Since World War I, this sympathy has expressed itself in important actions of support by the United States for the sovereign independence of the Albanian nation and for the welfare of its people. Whenever contacts between Americans and Albanians occur, we are reminded that the Albanian people retain a keen appreciation of past evidences of U.S. interest and that, in consequence, a special bond of understanding between the peoples of the two countries has been firmly established.

The present sufferings of the Albanian people under Communist oppression and their strong desire to be rid of this alien yoke are matters of deep concern to the United States. The American Government and people recognize the right of the Albanian people to a sovereign national status, to genuinely democratic institutions, and to a government of their free choice. During the past few years, the United States has noted with satisfaction declarations by official spokesmen of the neighboring countries in support of a free and independent Albania. Americans look forward to the ultimate resumption by Albania of its rightful place in the community of nations, and the U.S. Government will not cease its advocacy of this goal.

bulletin



Soviet Airplane Incidents of July 27 and 29, 1953

STATEMENT BY THE DEPARTMENT

Press release 90 dated February 24

The United States Government, following exhaustive investigations of two air incidents which occurred in the Far East in July, 1953, instructed the American Embassy at Moscow to deliver two notes to the Soviet Government concerning these incidents. The notes were delivered to the Soviet Foreign Office on January 26, 1954, by Chargé d'Affaires Elim O'Shaughnessy.

One note concerns the shooting down by Soviet aircraft of a United States Air Force RB-50 aircraft and its crew of 17 over the Sea of Japan. The note states in part:

The United States Government desires, before considering further action, to receive from the Soviet Government first, explicit and unambiguous details of the Soviet Government's claims as to the facts and the applicable propositions of law and, secondly, the latest evidence which the Soviet Government may possess or have available bearing on the question of survivors from the RB-50 crew.

The second note involves a claim by the Soviet Government for \$1,861,450, based on an alleged destruction by United States military aircraft on July 27, 1953, of an IL-12 airplane. United States military authorities in Korea announced on July 27, 1953, the destruction by Capt. Ralph S. Parr, USAF, of an IL-12 aircraft in North Korea. When Ambassador Bohlen, on July 31, 1953, protested the destruction by Soviet aircraft of the RB-50 over international waters, he was informed of an alleged destruction on July 27, 1953, of a Soviet IL-12 airplane in Manchuria. The Soviet Government asserted that this was the Soviet airplane reported by United States Air Force authorities as having been shot down by Captain Parr. In this regard the second note states:

The United States Government points out that it does not concede and has not conceded that the IL-12 whose destruction the United States Government was the first to announce on July 27, 1953, five days before the Soviet Government made any announcement or claim on the subject, was the same airplane to which the Soviet Gov-

ernment's notes of July 31, 1953, and August 11, 1953, refer, nor does it have any independent information in respect to the destruction, whether by firing or otherwise, of any IL-12 aircraft within Manchuria or elsewhere than in North Korea, on or about July 27, 1953. In this regard the United States Government reiterates its request that the Soviet Government state specifically whether any aircraft, belonging to it or to any other government or organization to its knowledge, of an IL-12 type, whether carrying passengers or cargo, or neither, was destroyed or damaged in the area of North Korea on July 27, 1953, or at any date in the proximity of July 27, 1953.

The note points out that while the United States Government's investigation of evidence available to it demonstrates that the only IL-12 aircraft destroyed by an American aircraft on July 27, 1953, (the last day of the Korean hostilities), of which the United States Government is aware, occurred entirely within North Korea and that no such action took place in Manchuria as the Soviet Government claims; nevertheless the United States Government prefers to make a definitive answer to the Soviet Government's claim to its note of July 31 based on a consideration of the evidence which the Soviet Government allegedly examined in Manchuria. The note states further:

The policy of the United States Government, as is well known, is to further the settlement of international disputes by the procedures of international law and order and in accordance with the established practices of diplomacy, and to encourage other governments to pursue the same policy and practices in their relations with the United States Government and among themselves. If the applicable law and the established facts, upon the issues raised by the exchange of notes in this matter, demonstrate that the United States Government is under any obligation to the Soviet Government, the United States Government is prepared to recognize and meet that obligation in accordance with the established rules of international law and the international practices common among peace-loving and law-abiding governments.

In consequence of the foregoing, the United States Government, reserving its final decision as to its liability, if any, and the extent thereof, requests the Soviet Government to supply the United States Government with the following information which the Soviet Government has indicated is in its possession or is available to it and which is necessary in order that the United States Government may reach a determination of its own liability, if any, to the Soviet Government in the premises.

¹ Bulletin of Aug. 10, 1953, p. 179.

² Post, p. 412. For a statement by the Department regarding the Soviet note of Aug. 11, see Bulletin of Aug. 24, 1953, p. 237.

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The information requested, itemized in detail in the note, is essential for any determination of the right of the Soviet Government to advance any diplomatic claim for damages under international law and to enable the United States Government to prepare a proper reply to the Soviet claim.

U.S. NOTE OF JANUARY 26 REGARDING RB-50 INCIDENT

Continued: The Embassy of the United States of America presents its compliments to the Ministry for Foreign Affairs of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and, upon instructions from its Government, has the honor to state the following:

The Government of the United States of America refers to the notes of the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics of July 30 and August 4, 1953, and to the note of the United States Government to the Soviet Government dated August 4, 1953, and in particular to the Soviet Government's note of August 26, 1953, all of which concern the destruction by the Soviet Government of an American military RB-50 aircraft over the Sea of Japan on July 29, 1953.

This matter has continued to receive the careful and serious attention of the United States Government, both because of the United States Government's concern with the fate of the crew members of the destroyed aircraft and because of the implications which the Soviet Government's conduct in this and similar prior incidents suggests concerning the respect for international law and order which may be expected from the Soviet Government now and in the future. In the light of further investigation and study of the incident of July 29, 1953, which the United States Government has been making, the Soviet Government's notes in this matter, particularly the relatively detailed note of August 26, 1953, must be characterized as inadequate.

The United States Government desires, before considering further action, to receive from the Soviet Government first, explicit and unambiguous details of the Soviet Government's claims as to the facts and the applicable propositions of law and, secondly, the latest evidence which the Soviet Government may possess or have available bearing on the question of survivors from the RB-50 crew.

The Soviet Government is requested to communicate to the United States Government at the Soviet Government's earliest convenience the following detailed information:

1. As to the incident of July 29, 1953, the Soviet Government should give, without ambiguous or indefinite qualification, the precise and exact positions, by coordinates of latitude and longitude, at which the RB-50 is claimed by the Soviet Government to have been when the Soviet Government took each of the actions involved in the destruction of the aircraft.

The statements in the above-cited notes of the Soviet Government as to these positions are vague and ambiguous. The United States Government cannot respond properly to these assertions unless the Soviet Government makes its points more definite and more certain.

For example, the Soviet Government states in its note of August 26, 1953 that "ground observation" showed that the RB-50 which was shot down "violated the state boundary of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics first in the region of Cape Gamov and continued to fly over territory of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics in the vicinity of Askold Island not far from Vladivostok." The Soviet Government fails to state, it will be noticed, (a) precisely where it claims the state boundary of the Soviet Union runs in this area; (b) precisely where it claims the alleged violation of that boundary took place,

¹ Ibid., Aug. 17, 1953, p. 207.

² Ibid., p. 206.

³ Not printed here.

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and (c) the precise positions it claims the RB-50 was when it was first intercepted and then when it was shot. Specifically, the Soviet Government is requested to inform the United States Government:

1. The position by latitude and longitude coordinates where the Soviet Government claims the RB-50 aircraft crossed into Soviet territory "in the region of Cape Gamov."

2. The precise course by latitude and longitude coordinates which the Soviet Government claims the RB-50 flew "in the vicinity of Askold Island."

3. Whether ground observation, on the basis of which the position of the RB-50 was fixed by Soviet authorities, was made by radar or by direct visual observation of the aircraft. In case the claim of the Soviet Government is based on radar observation, the Soviet Government should provide, duly authenticated, copies of the logs and reports of the radar observers. In case it is based on reports of direct visual contact, the Soviet Government should provide in the original version, duly authenticated, the full statements made by the observers.

4. If the Soviet Government claims that the flight of the RB-50 was continuously observed before and after, as well as during the time it was alleged to have crossed the boundary of the Soviet Union, the Soviet Government should provide the supporting logs and reports of the observers, duly authenticated, including both radar and visual observation.

5. With respect to the intercepting Soviet aircraft, the Soviet Government is requested to state whether these aircraft were during and following the time of interception under the supervision of Soviet authorities or the direction of ground controllers and whether instructions were given to the pilots of the intercepting aircraft concerning the action to be taken by them affecting the RB-50; and to provide the United States with duly authenticated copies of (a) all communications between the aircraft and supervisory Soviet authorities respecting the interception; (b) all radar and radio logs bearing on, or reflecting, the interception and on the actions of the Soviet pilots and the controllers; and (c) all reports submitted by the pilots, whether in writing or orally.

6. With respect to the alleged warning of Soviet aircraft to the RB-50, the Soviet note is not clear as to whether the Soviet Government claims any attempt was made to warn the RB-50 to leave Soviet territory prior to its destruction by Soviet fighters. In this regard the Soviet Government is requested to describe, with specificity and detail, the precise actions which were taken by the Soviet personnel involved (whether in the air or on the ground) to communicate, prior to the firing at it, any warning at all to the RB-50, or any suggestion to it that it was firing over Soviet territory and that it should leave the air space. Among the precise actions above mentioned which the Soviet Government is requested to describe are (a) the altitudes at which the Soviet aircraft flew with reference to the RB-50 aircraft, before, during and after interception; (b) the attitudes and directions of approach which the Soviet aircraft made in effecting each communication with and interception of the RB-50.

7. With respect to the actual shooting, which it is noted the Soviet Government apparently claims was first begun by the RB-50, the Soviet Government is requested to specify the precise position by coordinates of latitude and longitude, and the precise time sequence at which each of the various bursts of fire were made, distinguishing chronologically bursts of fire claimed to have been made by the RB-50 aircraft from those by the Soviet fighters.

8. With respect to the RB-50 aircraft, it is noted that the Soviet Government has indicated that it claims that the RB-50, after being shot by Soviet fighters, went off "in the direction of the sea." The Soviet Government is requested to inform the United States Government first, whether the Soviet authorities have made any attempt (a) to find the destroyed aircraft or (b) to salvage any part of the aircraft; and secondly, what the results of such attempts, if made, were. If salvage was attempted,

the Soviet Government is requested to state precisely what articles were picked up, and what has been done with those articles, and to arrange with the United States Government for the prompt return of the property wherever it may now be situated.

B. The United States Government is aware that the Soviet Government stated in its note of August 26, 1953, that it had no knowledge with respect to the existence of survivors. The United States Government must state that its own study of the known facts leads it to believe that it is highly likely that Soviet authorities—certainly since August 26, 1953—may have become informed with respect to the fate of the RB-50 crew members, either because one or more such crew members were picked up on the sea by Soviet nationals, or picked up on the land by Soviet nationals after being swept to the adjacent Soviet shores by sea currents; or because, if dead, the bodies of such crew members may have drifted to or near the Soviet shore where they could be detected or picked up.

The United States Government requests the Soviet Government (a) to inform it of all the relevant facts in this regard if these facts are already in the Soviet Government's possession or (b) to investigate, if it has not already done so, the question of identification of persons dead or alive who may have been members of the RB-50 crew and have come into the custody of Soviet authorities or of persons subject to Soviet jurisdiction, and to inform the United States Government of the results of the investigation.

The foregoing request concerns facts of which the Soviet Government must have the most direct, and therefore in a judicial sense the best, available evidence. Should the Soviet Government fail to favor the United States Government with the evidence requested, the United States Government takes this opportunity to declare to the Soviet Government that the United States Government will in any future proceeding in which the evidence may be relevant consider itself entitled to rely upon and submit other evidence in the United States Government's possession, and reserves the right to consider and contend wherever that may be relevant that the Soviet Government should be estopped from relying upon or offering any of such evidence so requested by the United States Government and not produced by the Soviet Government.

Accept, Excellency, the renewed assurances of my highest consideration.

U.S. NOTE OF JANUARY 26 REGARDING IL-12 INCIDENT

EXCELLENCY: The Embassy of the United States of America presents its compliments to the Ministry for Foreign Affairs of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and, upon instructions from its Government, has the honor to state the following:

The Government of the United States of America refers to note No. 27/OSA of August 11, 1953, from the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics in which the Soviet Government requests the United States Government to make payment of 7,445,800 rubles, or \$1,861,450, on account of damages alleged by the Soviet Government to have been suffered by it in consequence of the destruction of an IL-12 airplane on July 27, 1953. As the United States Government has indicated in related previous correspondence with the Soviet Government, in a note of August 1, 1953, replying to the Soviet Government note dated July 31, 1953, the only incident in which any American aircraft destroyed an IL-12 on July 27, 1953, occurred entirely within North Korea, during a period of hostilities

in which North Korea was a belligerent zone and aircraft destroyed was hostile.

In view, however, of the Soviet Government's specific allegations of fact in its note of August 11, 1953, and of its request for compensation, the United States Government has conducted a comprehensive and exhaustive investigation, not only to check the accuracy of the statements made by the United States Government in the note of August 1, replying to the Soviet Government's note of July 31, to which reference has been made, but to check so far as possible the accuracy of the various specific statements made in the Soviet Government's note of August 11, 1953, with respect to the Soviet Government's own facts of fact.

The evidence derived from witnesses to whom the United States Government has access completely confirms the conclusions set out in the United States Government's note of August 1, 1953.

As the Soviet Government is well aware, investigation of the character described as having been conducted by Soviet authorities in Manchuria, or in North Korea, is not as feasible for the United States Government as for the Soviet Government. It is clear that a final resolution of the issues of fact raised by the Soviet note of August 11, 1953, cannot be reached, and the claim made by the Soviet Government cannot be answered as fully as the character of the claim would appear to merit, unless the United States Government can obtain all evidence relevant to the claim, and consider it as carefully and exhaustively as it has the evidence which the United States Government has obtained in its investigation.

The policy of the United States Government, as is well known, is to further the settlement of international disputes by the procedures of international law and order and, in accordance with the established practice of diplomacy, and to encourage other governments to pursue the same policy and practice in their relations with the United States Government and among themselves. If the applicable law and the established facts, upon the issues raised by the exchanges of notes in this matter, demonstrate that the United States Government is under any obligation to the Soviet Government, the United States Government is prepared to recognize and meet that obligation in accordance with the established rules of international law and the international practice common among peace-loving and law-abiding governments.

In consequence of the foregoing, the United States Government, reserving its final decision as to its liability, if any, and the extent thereof, requests the Soviet Government to supply the United States Government with the following information which the Soviet Government has indicated is in its possession or is available to it and which is necessary in order that the United States Government may reach a determination of its own liability, if any, to the Soviet Government in the premises:

A. With respect to the statements in the first paragraph of recitals of fact in each of the Soviet Government's notes, that of July 31, 1953, and that of August 11, 1953, the following particulars are requested:

1. The source of the statement in the note of July 31, 1953, that the number of American aircraft which attacked the Soviet IL-12 was four, and the circumstances under which the information was obtained. It is requested particularly that it be stated on what date and by what means this report was first received by the Soviet Government, and whether the witnesses making the alleged identification were ground witnesses or in the air, and whether their observations were visual or made by means of mechanical equipment.

2. The number of IL-12 type of aircraft of all kinds belonging to the Soviet Government flying in the area of North Korea, and the number flying in the area of Manchuria during July 27, 1953, and for seven days prior to that date, and the circumstances of each such flight. The times included should comprise particularly the time of the first receipt by the Soviet Government of the news of

the attack described in its notes of July 31, 1953, and of August 11, 1953, and all flying conducted from approximately 12:25 to approximately 12:35 local time July 27, 1953; and the circumstances should include the directions being flown and the positions in the air over the ground at which the aircraft involved were reported by observers and at which they reported themselves to be.

3. Whether prior to or on July 27, 1953, it had made IL-12 type aircraft available to non-Soviet authorities or persons in North Korea or in Manchuria, or China, or for flight in or over these areas; the full details bearing upon each of these transactions should be set forth.

4. All available supporting evidence in Soviet possession regarding the statement that the aircraft attacked was a Soviet passenger airplane which was making its regular flight from Port Arthur to Vladivostok on an established course, and en route of a regular Port Arthur-Vladivostok airline. In particular the United States Government requests:

a. Only authenticated copies, for the period prior to July 27, 1953, and covering the number of years referred to in the Soviet Government's note, of (i) all literature advertising this airline, (ii) its time tables, (iii) its published schedules of rates, (iv) its airports of call, and (v) the names of the countries and places where such information was publicly distributed.

b. A statement whether at any time, and if so what time, the passenger line in question or any other airline flying between Port Arthur and Vladivostok, or neighboring points, used a course which would carry it over or into the territory of North Korea.

c. The radio call signs and the radio frequencies of the airline in question, with publications in which they were given, and the international organization, if any, in which they were registered or made public.

d. A statement whether the aircraft in question was at the time of this incident acting under the aegis of any operational organization other than this airline or other than on its regular schedule.

5. With respect to the aircraft for which the Soviet Government seeks compensation, the United States Government requests that the following information, duly authenticated, be submitted to it by the Soviet Government:

a. A statement whether the aircraft was registered with any official government agency, and if so, the name of the agency and a copy of the certificate or other document of registration.

b. A complete description of all the colorings and markings on the aircraft, particularly including:

(1) Those indicating the country of nationality and the country of registration of (a) the airline or other operating organization, and (b) the aircraft.

(2) The external color or colors of the airplane.

(3) All other identification symbols, whether in letters, words, figures, numbers or marks, giving (a) the colors and the location, by exact positions on the external parts of the airplane, occupied by each such letter, word, figure, number and mark, together with (b) the dimensions, in length and width, of each of them and of the spaces separating them.

(4) The international organizations to which each of the foregoing items was notified, and a copy of such notification with the date thereof.

c. The radio call signs and the radio frequency or frequencies used by the aircraft, and the radio stations to which it was required to report, and the times at which such reports were required, en route from origination of the flight to destination.

d. The places and times of origination and of intermediate landings and departures immediately preceding the place and time of alleged destruction.

e. All radio and communications logs for July 27, 1953, including voice and all other forms of transmission,

March 15, 1954

covering communications to and by the aircraft which the Soviet Government claims American fliers destroyed over Manchuria as specified in the Soviet Government's notes above mentioned.

f. All radar logs for July 27 respecting this same aircraft in flight, from origination to the last point of observation.

g. All radio and radar logs, with the same specificity as requested in the foregoing paragraphs f. a. and f. 2, relating to other IL-12 aircraft known by the Soviet Government to have been in Manchuria or North Korea on July 27, 1953.

7. With respect to the last sentence of the first paragraph of the Soviet Government's note of August 11, 1953, giving coordinates by latitude and longitude of the place of alleged attack, the Soviet Government is requested to state the source or sources of its information and the full content of the message or messages originally transmitting this information.

B. With respect to the second paragraph of recital of facts in the Soviet note of August 11, 1953, the Soviet Government is requested:

1. To state on what date and from what geographical place the special commission referred to departed for the investigation.

2. To state at what place or places, by name and by coordinates of latitude and longitude, the commission examined the corpses and remains of the airplane and its contents.

3. To state whether the corpses and other contents of the airplane had been removed from the precise spot or spots in which they had first been found to the precise spot of examination by the commission. If so, the United States Government requests (a) the places and circumstances involved in such removal, (b) the names, official occupations and nationalities of all persons participating, and (c) the methods of transportation of the objects examined.

4. With respect to the bullet holes, to give the dimensions of the holes.

5. To supply, in duly authenticated form, the interrogations of all local inhabitants alleged to have been witnesses of the attack, together with the specific places at which the witnesses were interviewed and the places at which they claimed they were situated when they made the observation referred to. These should be given in the original language in which the statements were made, and preferably by photography of the original documents.

6. If the commission took or considered any photographs, to supply duly authenticated copies of all such photographs, together with places and circumstances of the taking of these photographs.

C. With reference to the third paragraph of the Soviet note of August 11, 1953, the United States Government points out that it does not concede and has not conceded that the IL-12 whose destruction the United States Government was the first to announce on July 27, 1953, five days before the Soviet Government made any announcement or claim on the subject, was the same airplane to which the Soviet Government's notes of July 31, 1953, and August 11, 1953, refer, nor does it have any independent information in respect to the destruction, whether by firing or otherwise, of any IL-12 aircraft within Manchuria or elsewhere than in North Korea, on or about July 27, 1953. In this regard the United States Government reiterates its request that the Soviet Government state specifically whether any aircraft, belonging to it or to any other government or organization to its knowledge, of an IL-12 type, whether carrying passengers or cargo, or neither, was destroyed or damaged in the area of North Korea on July 27, 1953, or at any date in the proximity of July 27, 1953.

D. With respect to the annex to the Soviet Government's note of August 11, 1953, requesting payment of

* BULLETIN of Aug. 10, 1953, p. 179.

damages, the United States Government is unable to determine either its liability on the merits of the Soviet Government's claim or the extent thereof without the following additional information, which the United States Government requests, together with the source of the Soviet Government's information:

1. As to each passenger and each member of the crew for whom damages are claimed as single payment grants, and as to each member of his family for whom compensation is asked, as of July 27, 1953:

- His name and nationality.
- His home address.
- His post of duty.
- His occupation.
- His age.

(f) Other facts entitling the Soviet Government under international law and practice to make any claim against the United States Government on his account.

2. As to each of the minor children and aged parents of each deceased, for whom a claim of pension is made, similar factual data as in the paragraph immediately preceding, including nationality as of July 27, 1953, and prior thereto, together with an explanation for the basis of claiming both single payment grants and pensions.

3. As to each of the deceased passengers and crew members:

- The place where he embarked on the aircraft.
- The place of his destination.
- The business he was to perform after arrival at destination.
- If he had business during flight, the nature thereof.
- Whether he was concerned in flight, or was to be concerned after arrival at destination, with any matter bearing upon the hostilities between the United Nations and the forces of North Korea and Communist China or the settlement or continuation of such hostilities.

4. The places where the funerals referred to were held and the places where the transfers of remains were to be made for each of the persons on whose account this claim is made.

5. In respect to the compensation for property, a complete and detailed inventory of the property involved, and the evidence on which the evaluation was made.

6. In respect to the value of the IL-12 airplane, a statement whether this is market value or cost; if market value, the Soviet Government is requested to state the evidence upon which market value was obtained.

7. With respect to all computations of ruble values, in the annex to the note of August 11, 1953, an explanation of the basis upon which these figures were arrived at.

Accept, Excellency, the renewed assurances of my highest consideration.

SOVIET NOTE OF AUGUST 11, 1953

(Translation)

The Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, confirming the receipt of the note of the Government of the United States of America of August 1, 1953, considers it necessary to state the following:

As has already been communicated in the note of the Soviet Government of July 31, four American fighter planes, having invaded the borders of the Chinese People's Republic on July 27 of this year, at 12:28 local time (6:28 Moscow time), attacked and brought down over Chinese territory a Soviet IL-12 passenger airplane, which was making its regular flight from Port Arthur to Vladivostok on an established course. The attack of the American fighters on an unarmed Soviet passenger airplane took place 110 kilometers from the Chinese-Korean border

in the region of the Chinese city of Hsu-tien (Khabarovsk) which is on the route of the regular airline from Port Arthur to Vladivostok, along which Soviet passenger airplanes have now been making flights for several years. The coordinates of the Soviet airplane at the moment of the attack on it by the American fighter planes were 43 degrees 5 minutes north latitude and 127 degrees 45 minutes east longitude.

Upon receipt of the news of the attack by American fighters on the Soviet airplane and of the loss of the airplane as the result of this attack in the region of Hsu-tien, a special commission of the Chief Administration for the Civil Air Fleet of the U. S. S. R. was immediately dispatched to investigate the circumstances relating to the loss of the Soviet airplane. The commission discovered 15 corpses of passengers and 9 corpses of crew members as well as remains of smashed airplane. The investigation conducted by the commission showed that 9 corpses had bullet and fragment wounds and the wreckage of the airplane which was found had 15 bullet holes. Parachutes and other objects located in the airplane also had bullet holes. In addition, the commission interrogated local Chinese inhabitants, who were witnesses of the attack by the American fighter planes on the Soviet passenger airplane, who completely confirmed the facts set forth in the note of the Soviet Government of July 31.

In its note of August 1 of this year, the Government of the United States of America admits that American fighter planes attacked an airplane of the IL-12 type on July 27 at 12:25 local time, which, in regard to the moment of the attack, approximately coincides with data cited in the Soviet note. As the result of the attack referred to, the IL-12 airplane was brought down. In addition, however, the Government of the United States of America alleges that the IL-12 airplane was attacked by the American fighter planes, not over Chinese territory, but over the territory of Korea, approximately 8 miles from the Yalu River at a point with coordinates 41 degrees 35 minutes north latitude and 126 degrees 55 minutes east longitude. Such a statement is made despite the precisely determined fact that the attack by the American fighter planes on the Soviet passenger plane actually took place, not at the point indicated in the note of the Government of the United States of America, but at a point with the coordinates cited above of 43 degrees 5 minutes north latitude and 127 degrees 45 minutes east longitude, which is located, not on Korean territory 8 miles from the Yalu River, but on Chinese territory 170 kilometers northeast of the point cited in the note.

Thus, the time of the attack by the American fighter planes on the Soviet passenger airplane is correctly given in the note of the Government of the United States of America, but the place of the attack is incorrectly indicated. Obviously the Government of the United States of America has been misled regarding the place of the attack by the American fighter planes on the Soviet passenger airplane.

In view of everything set forth above, the Soviet Government confirms the decisive protest expressed in the note of July 31 in connection with the piratical attack by American military aircraft on the unarmed Soviet IL-12 passenger airplane and insists on severe punishment of the persons guilty of this crime and also on the prevention in future of such criminal actions by the American military command.

At the same time the Soviet Government insists on compensation by the Government of the United States of America for the damage inflicted upon the Soviet Government in connection with the loss of the above-mentioned IL-12 Soviet citizens and the IL-12 airplane. The amount of damages is set forth in enclosure to the present note. Moscow, August 11, 1953.

ENCLOSURES:

The value of the damage which was inflicted upon the Soviet Union in connection with the loss of the Soviet IL-12 airplane, its crew, and passengers, which occurred

Department of State Bulletin

as the result of the attack by American fighter planes on July 27, 1953, amounts to 7,445,800 rubles or \$1,861,450 and consists of the following:

- Single-payment grant to families of lost passengers and members of the crew of the airplane: 420,000 rubles;
- Pensions for minor children and aged parents of deceased: 5,670,000 rubles;
- Expenses connected with funerals and transfer of remains of deceased: 315,000 rubles;
- Compensation for value of personal property of the deceased (clothing, watches and other personal objects): 84,000 rubles;
- Value of IL-12 airplane: 930,800 rubles.

U. S. Delegations to International Conferences

Executive Board of UNESCO

The Department of State announced on March 5 (press release 110) that Mrs. Elisabeth Hoffeldinger has been designated as alternate to Dr. John Perkins, President of the University of Delaware, for the meeting of the Executive Board of Unesco which will convene in Paris, March 10, 1954.

Mrs. Hoffeldinger is a member of the Executive Committee of the U.S. National Commission for Unesco and was a delegate to the second extraordinary session of the Unesco General Conference held in Paris last July. The meeting on March 10 is to review plans and make program recommendations to the eighth session of the General Conference of Unesco, which will be held in Montevideo next fall.

THE DEPARTMENT

Organizational Changes

Press release 102 dated March 1, 1954

Pursuant to instructions of the Secretary of State, the following changes in organization and assignment of responsibility are announced, effective at once:

(a) Assistant Secretary Morton is designated Acting Deputy Under Secretary (Administration), and in addition to his present duties he will, until further instructions, perform those heretofore assigned to Under Secretary Lourie.

(b) Assistant Secretary Wallis is designated Assistant Secretary for Personnel Administration. Under the general direction of the Acting Deputy Under Secretary (Administration), Mr.

March 15, 1954

Wallis will assume responsibility for all functions of personnel administration excepting those relating to security.

(c) The "Bureau of Security, Consular Affairs and Personnel" is designated the "Bureau of Inspection, Security and Consular Affairs," under the administration of Mr. McLeod. The functions of personnel administration previously performed by this Bureau are transferred to the office of Assistant Secretary for Personnel Administration. Inspection functions in the Department are made a responsibility of the Administrator, Bureau of Inspection, Security and Consular Affairs, under the general supervision of the Deputy Under Secretary (Administration).

(d) The Acting Deputy Under Secretary (Administration) will make such supplementary changes in personnel and responsibility as are necessary in his judgment to complete the above directed changes.

Confirmation

The Senate on March 1 confirmed Henry F. Holland as Assistant Secretary for Inter-American Affairs.

THE FOREIGN SERVICE

Public Committee on Personnel

ESTABLISHMENT OF COMMITTEE

Press release 105 dated March 3

The Department of State on March 3 announced the formation of a Public Committee on Personnel.

The committee was established by Secretary Dulles, to study and advise him on measures necessary to increase the effectiveness of the career service to meet the vastly increasing responsibilities in the field of foreign policy which have devolved upon the President and the Secretary.

Members of the committee are Norman Armour, Foreign Service officer, retired, former Assistant Secretary of State and former Ambassador; John A. McCone, President, the Joshua Hendy Corporation, Los Angeles; Robert Murphy, Ex-Officio Member, Deputy Under Secretary of State; Morehead Patterson, Chairman and President, American Machine and Foundry Company, New York;

#23/osa [expansion unknown]

The government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics considers it necessary to state the following to the United States of America government:

According to verified data, on 29 July 1953 about 0700 hrs Vladivostok time, a four engine bomber (B50 type) with US insignia violated the official USSR border initially in the area of Cape Gamov and continued to fly over USSR territory around Ascold island near Vladivostok. When the US plane was approached by two Soviet fighters who intended only to point out that the US plane was violating Soviet borders and suggest it leave the Soviet airspace, it opened fire on the Soviet planes and caused serious damage to one of them. The Soviet fighter sustained damage consisting of holes in the fuselage and left wing and damage to the integrity of the hermetic seal of the pilots cabin. The Soviet planes were forced to return fire, after which the American plane headed toward the sea.

To the United States of America Embassy
Moscow

OSIA/DXL

TFR-2-94

Handed to Comrade A.A. Gromyko by Ambassador Bolen during discussion on 31 July 53.

[in Russian text: Translated from English]

MEMORANDUM

My government has instructed me to strongly protest the action taken by a Soviet plane to shoot down an American Air Force type RB-50 which was on a routine navigation training flight over the Sea of Japan.

The second pilot of the American plane, who was rescued by a US ship approximately 40 miles from the Soviet shoreline south of cape Povorotnie, confirmed that his plane with 17 crew members on board was attacked by one or more Soviet MIG-15. The firing by MIGs on the engine caused a fire which led to the crash of the American plane.

We also received information that other crew members who survived were picked up by Soviet vessels in the area of the crash. My government has instructed me to request that Soviet authorities immediately inform us about the condition of these individuals and let us know what measures are being taken for their repatriation in the near future.

American Embassy
31 July 1953, Moscow

Translated by: [signature] Alekseyeva

OSIA/DXL

TFR-2-95

#25 osa [expansion unknown]

Power 1/3

In connection with the American Embassy Memorandum dated 31 July 1953, the government of USSR considers it necessary to state the following to the United States government:

The Soviet government note to the US government dated 30 July 1953 presents verified facts confirming that a US four engine type B-50 bomber violated Soviet border on July 29 1953 initially in the Cape Gamov area and then continued it's flight near the Ascold island near Vladivostok. When two Soviet fighters approached to show the US aircraft that it is in Soviet airspace and show it a way out, the American plane opened fire on the fighters, seriously damaging one of them. Because of the action taken by the US plane the Soviet plane was forced to return fire, after which the US plane headed out to sea.

The above facts show that American statements contained in the US government Memorandum alleging that the American plane was attacked by Soviet fighters during routine flight over the Sea of Japan, contradict the established facts.

The Soviet government has no information regarding the above mentioned American plane which headed out toward the sea, or its crew.

OSIA/DXL

TFR-2-96..

Power 1/3

The Soviet government confirms its note dated 30 July and insists on a strict reprimand of those individuals responsible for violating the Soviet borders and expects that the US government will take measures to prevent any future violations of Soviet borders by American aircraft.

The Soviet government rejects the protest contained in the US Embassy Memorandum as having no substance.

Moscow, 03 Aug. 1953

to the American Embassy
Moscow

Verified: [signature]

Routing list:
comrades

Molotov
Vishinsky
Gromyko
Zorin
Pushkin
Podcherov
Il'ichev

USSR Embassy in Washington. Case 2

TFR-2-97.

Conveyed by U.S. Ambassador [Bolen?]
to V.I. Molotov on 4 [Aug?] 1953

[stamp] Declassified
Secret

Translated from English

MEMORANDUM

[stamp] MFA-USSR
USA Department
Secret
Input No. 757 osa [unknown]
4 August 1953

Information available to the U.S. government regarding survivors of the incident involving the B-50 aircraft:

1. The co-pilot was rescued by an American vessel 40 miles from the Soviet coast south of Cape Povorotny.
 2. The pilot parachuted from the airplane at the same time as the co-pilot, and it is assumed that the other crewmembers also parachuted.
 3. Search and rescue aircraft dropped a life raft to the other survivors and the crews of those airplanes are more or less certain that at least four, and possible more, of the survivors climbed into the raft.
 4. Those same American aircraft discovered approximately nine Soviet "PT" type vessels in the general area, and at least six of these "PT" type vessels were headed for the site where wreckage of the plane had been found earlier. Soviet trawlers were also detected in the same general area.
- On the basis of the above observations and testimony of the rescued co-pilot, it appears highly likely that the other crewmembers survived and that they were possibly rescued by the Soviet vessels. In light of this, the U.S. government urges the Soviet government to conduct a further investigation into the location of any surviving members of the crew.

Translated by: [signature]

(O. Troyanovsky)

Distribution:

Comrades Molotov
Gromyko
Zorin
Godtserob [?]
Department of Countries of America
[handwritten] 596/m

OSIA/DXL

TFR 2 98-99

[stamps, left to right:]

Ministry of Defense
Union of SSR
Chief Naval Headquarters
8 August 1953
No. 5/15272s

MFA-USSR
Department of USA
Secret
Input No. 7651
10 August 1953

MFA-USSR
[illegible] Gromyko
Secret
Input No. 3461
8 August 1953

[?illegible]
Secret
Copy #1

[handwritten] Filed 10 August

To: USSR Deputy Minister of Foreign
Affairs
Comrade A.A. Gromyko

The assertion contained in the U.S. note dated 5 August 1953 that on 29 July of this year 12 Soviet "PT" type vessels were observed in an area where the co-pilot of a U.S. B-50 airplane had been found by an American surface vessel, and that these Soviet vessels were allegedly engaged in picking up the other members of the airplane's crew who survived the crash, has no basis in reality.

On 30 July at about 04:00 hours, Vladivostok time, Soviet fishing trawler No. 423 was passing through the area in which the Americans were searching for their airplane. The Soviet trawler was engaged in a fishing operation.

As already indicated in a report by naval Commander-in-Chief Fleet Admiral Kuznetsov, dated 30 July 1953, two U.S. destroyers approached the Soviet fishing trawler in question at about 04:00.

An American and a Japanese officer aboard a cutter deployed from one of the destroyers attempted to obtain information about the "B-50" and its crew. However, they were unable to do so, since the trawler had not seen any wreckage of the airplane and had not picked up the crew.

OSIA/DXL

TFR 2 100a

1038

The Americans' efforts to converse with the trawler were in vain, as the Americans did not have a Russian interpreter with them.

Aside from this trawler, there were no other Soviet vessels in the area where the Americans were searching for their airplane.

Chief, Main Headquarters
Admiral [signature, illegible]

OSIA/DXL

TFR 2-100 b

1039

[upper left, handwritten] Return

[stamp, upper center] Declassified
[date not indicated]
Secret. Copy No. 16
24 November 1954
Initial No. 1174/osa [expansion unknown]

Comrade A.A. Gromyko

Enclosed please find drafts of Memoranda in the CPSU Central Committee, Decrees and a note to the U.S. government in response to its note of 9 October 1954 regarding an incident involving an American aircraft that violated the national borders of the USSR in the vicinity of Vladivostok.

Please review them.

[signature]
(G. Tunkin)

[signature]
(V. Bazykin)

Typed in three copies, ms/VB
Copy 1 to Comrade Gromyko
Copy 2 to Tunkin
Copy 3 to file
No. 1691
24 November 1954

[stamp] MFA-USSR
[one word illegible] Gromyko
Secret
Input No. 6490
24 November 1954

[handwritten] 9629

OSIA/DXL

TFR 2-101

[stamp] Declassified
[No date]

Secret. Copy No. 5

CPSU Central Committee

The United States government, in its note of 9 November 1954, again is raising the issue of the incident involving an American military B-50 airplane that violated the national border of the USSR in the vicinity of Vladivostok on 29 July 1953. This note essentially contains nothing new about this incident as compared to previous U.S. notes; it presents a lengthy U.S. version of the incident, as well as unfounded suppositions that the crewmembers of the intruder-aircraft may have been picked up by Soviet vessels and are under the control of Soviet authorities.

The U.S. government indicates a number of claims associated with the loss of an operational military airplane and its crew members, and in the event the Soviet Union refuses to satisfy these claims, proposes to refer the issue to the World Court.

At the same time the U.S. government in its note raises the issue of the extent of Soviet territorial waters, asserting that territorial waters [illegible, 13?] nautical miles in extent as established in the Soviet Union are inconsistent with conventions of international law. The United States states that it "does not recognize the Soviet government's claim to territorial waters beyond three miles from its shore."

The text of the U.S. note was published by the State Department, and by request of U.S. representatives in the United Nations was distributed to members of the Security Council.

The USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs considers it advisable to send a return note to the U.S. Embassy and attach to it an excerpt from the "Report on Circumstances of a U.S. B-50's Violation of National Borders of the USSR in the Vicinity of Vladivostok on 29 July 1953".

In the opinion of the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the U.S. government's claim of possible loss, and its proposal to submit this case to the World Court for its consideration, should be dismissed as unfounded.

As regards the U.S. government's statement about the extent of Soviet territorial waters, the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs deems it advisable to respond to the substance of the statement.

TFR 2 102/103

OSIA/DXL

Because a considerable amount of time has passed since the incident and there is no need to draw public attention to it, the opinion of the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs is that it would be inadvisable to publish this note.

A draft Decree is attached.

Please review.

[no day] November 1954
No. _____

OSIA/DXL

TFR 2 p. 102-103

TFR 2-103

(stamp) Declassified
[no date given]

Draft

Secret

Resolution of the CPSU Central Committee

On a response to the U.S. government note of 9 October 1954

The draft note to the U.S. government in response to its note of 9 October 1954 (attached) is approved as proposed by the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

TFR 2 104

OSIA/DXL

[handwritten, illegible numbers]

OSIA/DXL

Draft

In reference to a note of the United States government, dated 9 October 1954, the government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics considers it necessary to report the following:

In its notes of [illegible, 29?] July, 3 and [illegible, 26?] August 1953 the Soviet government already [one word illegible, one-two words apparently erased from the original] the circumstances of the violation of the USSR border by an American B-50 bomber in the vicinity of Vladivostok on 29 July 1953.

It is obvious from these Soviet government notes, and from the "Report on Circumstances of the Violation of USSR borders by an American B-50 Airplane in the Vicinity of Vladivostok on 29 July 1953," an excerpt from which is attached, that an American B-50 bomber located on [day illegible] July 1953 over the territory of the Soviet Union in the vicinity of Vladivostok, upon being approached by Soviet airplanes [one word illegible] opened fire on them. The Soviet fighters, defending the national border of the USSR, were forced to return fire. At the time it began firing on the Soviet fighters, the intruder aircraft was located at a point with the coordinates: 4[5?][remainder illegible] latitude, 1[illegible] 20' 9" longitude, that is, near the Soviet [two words illegible], not far from Vladivostok, and not 40 [3-4 words illegible] as asserted in the U.S. Government note. After the intruder aircraft moved away to the southeast toward [1-2 words illegible] the Soviet fighters returned to their airfield.

The government of the USSR has already reported that Soviet authorities have no information regarding the fate of the [one word illegible] of the American airplane and its crew. Since then no further information has been received on this matter.

The facts of the violation of the USSR national border by this American airplane and its firing on Soviet aircraft that were carrying out the functions of protecting the national borders of the Soviet Union have been accurately established. Bearing this in mind, and considering that the entire responsibility for the incident lies with the United States government, the Soviet government cannot accept for consideration the claims contained in the U.S. government note of 9 October and sees no grounds for submitting the matter to the consideration of the World Court.

The U.S. government in its note of 9 October asserts that according to international law the extent of a country's territorial waters is limited to three nautical miles. In this connection the Soviet Government considers it necessary to draw the attention of the U.S. government to the well known fact that there do not exist any commonly accepted standards of international law establishing a maximum extent of territorial waters. The establishment of the extent of territorial waters is within the competence of a coastal nation, which determines the extent according to its supreme interests and the interests of

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international [one word illegible]. It is a known fact that at the present time over 30 nations have territorial waters greater than three nautical miles in extent. Thus the U.S. government's statement that territorial waters of [illegible, 11?] nautical miles supposedly do not conform to standards of international law is completely groundless.

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